

**Māori and Military Service for the Crown
1946-2017**



Military Veterans Kaupapa Inquiry, Wai 2500

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Introduction

Covering the period from 1946 to 2017, this is the final of three research reports that examine Maori military service for the Crown, all of which have been commissioned for the Military Veterans Kaupapa Inquiry (Wai 2500). Terence Green has written a report that examines developments during the period between 1840 and 1899, while Ross Webb, in another report, has covered the years from 1899 to 1945.¹

The themes examined in this report are linked to and extend from those that Webb has discussed. In the years before 1946, military service involved – for Maori – key issues concerning equality and autonomy. Webb explains that, during World Wars I and II, Maori who volunteered to serve were motivated substantially by a desire to affirm the Treaty partnership and secure greater equality of status with Pakeha. Evidence concerning the position that Maori occupied in the armed services during the interwar years shows that, by the beginning of World War II, Maori had yet to secure such recognition and equality. Alongside the issue of equality, Webb also explains that, while some Maori were willing to undertake military service for the Crown, they possessed preferences as to how this should be carried out. Where possible, and linked with broader aspirations, Maori generally sought to retain some autonomy while serving for the Crown. In acknowledgement of this wish, separate units were established for the Maori volunteers who served in the Army during World Wars I and II. Most Maori who fought during these conflicts did so within these units. Not only did they enable Maori to serve together and retain a measure of control over their service, they ensured that the Maori war contribution would be clearly recognised – something that would increase the likelihood of Maori achieving the advances that they sought.

At the beginning of the period covered in this report, issues concerning equality and autonomy continued to be of central relevance to Maori military service. The extent to which Maori would receive equality of treatment in respect of service opportunities was an important issue, as was the ability of Maori to exercise some autonomy within the post-war services, including – potentially – through the formation of a separate unit in the peacetime Army. In respect of both of these issues, it will be explained that the policy of integration was to be a defining influence. A key component of government Maori policy after World War II, integration promised equality of treatment, but provided little scope for Maori autonomy within the services.

¹ Terence Green, 'Māori Military Service for the Crown, 1840-1899', Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 2500, #A246, March 2018. Ross Webb, 'Equality and Autonomy: An Overview of Māori Military Service for the Crown, c.1899-1945', Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 2500, #A247, May 2018.

Alongside the influence of integrationist ideology, it will be explained that Maori military service has been shaped by organisational change within the armed services. After World War II, service opportunities were much greater than in the pre-war years. Notably, within all three services – the Army, Navy, and Air Force – the number of regular personnel (those who served on a paid, full-time basis) was significantly higher. This situation has continued, with some fluctuation of numbers. It will be explained that, for Maori who entered the services after World War II, economic and employment considerations began to feature among the motivations that underlay their enlistment. The extent to which Maori were able to enter the services and take advantage of the opportunities that existed is one of the key issues examined in this report.

Barriers that sought to restrict Maori involvement in the post-war armed services would eventually be removed, though not necessarily at the same time for each service. It will be explained that this shift was linked to the recruitment challenges that each of the services faced. Both the Army and Navy began to actively encourage Maori recruitment and, partly as a result, Maori, from about 1960, would become over-represented in both forces in comparison to the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. In respect of the roles that Maori have occupied in the armed forces, this report looks particularly at the ability of Maori to gain promotions and serve in leadership positions, especially at commissioned rank. It will be explained that Maori, facing certain disadvantages, especially lower levels of educational achievement, have been underrepresented among officers throughout the whole period covered. Though this has been the case, the evidence presented in this report shows that Maori, overall, came to experience substantially greater equality of treatment within the armed services. For many years, however, integrationist ideology ensured that the services were reluctant to differentiate between Maori and Pakeha and were unwilling to recognise and support Maori cultural difference. Reflecting the influence of broader developments within government and society, this would begin to change only in the 1990s.

Project background

On 25 September 2014, Chief Judge Isaac, Presiding Officer for the Military Veterans Kaupapa Inquiry, issued directions setting out the scope of the inquiry. These stated that the inquiry would hear all claims relating to past military service undertaken by Maori for or on behalf of the Crown. This would involve all types of military service, whether operational or routine, whether in time of war or peace, and whether at home or abroad. As well as the military service itself, it would include the

rehabilitation and remediation of service-related impacts on ex-servicemen and their whanau.²

On 25 August 2016, Chief Judge Isaac issued directions setting out the casebook research programme for the inquiry.³ This provided for three casebook projects: Maori military service for the Crown, 1845-present; Crown repatriation support for Maori military veterans, 1860s-present; and health and social impacts for Maori veterans and their whanau, 1845-present. As noted above, this report is one of three commissioned reports that examine Maori military service for the Crown.

Claimant issues

In the early stages of preparing this report, the author reviewed the Wai claims that are included in the Wai 2500 inquiry. The statements of claim that raise issues concerning Maori military service since World War II were identified and noted. During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, which took place in 2015 and 2016, claimant witnesses presented evidence that related to and in some cases expanded upon the issues set out in the Wai claims. Though he did not attend these hearings, the author has read through the hearing transcripts and has also examined claimant briefs of evidence that were presented at the hearings. In September 2017, after commencing research work, the author discussed the report and proposed research issues at a research hui held in Wellington, which was attended by some claimants as well as claimant counsel.

In the Wai claims and during the oral hearings, claimants have raised a range of issues regarding Maori military service undertaken between 1946 and 2017. These can be divided into four categories:

1. general, unspecified issues relating to all historical matters involving Maori military service for the Crown;
2. issues relating to recruitment and service experiences,
3. issues concerning the place of Maori culture and tikanga within the services;
4. and issues regarding official recognition of Maori military service.

² Wai 2500, #2.5.1.

³ Wai 2500, #2.5.43.

Commission questions

The issues raised by claimants are broadly reflected in the questions that are set out in the research commission. (A copy of this document is provided in Appendix 1.) The commission requires the report to consider the following research themes:

- a) What were Crown and Maori understandings and expectations of the terms on which Maori provided military service to the Crown after the Second World War?
- b) What were the major Crown policy developments, and the principal internal and external influences on these developments, regarding recruitment, terms, conditions and organisation of Maori military service within the post-1945 integrated armed services, and with what outcomes for Maori and their communities in so far as these do not relate to repatriation or health and social impacts?
- c) What were Maori responses and strategies to Crown policies and practices regarding their service for the Crown?
- d) What legislative, policy or practical barriers or restrictions, if any, did Maori face with regard to providing military service for the Crown?
- e) What were Maori service experiences in terms of pay, conditions, training, discipline, promotions and honours, and exposure to risk, and how did these change over time?
- f) How important have the armed services become for Maori since the Second World War in terms of employment, economic and cultural opportunities?

Sources and methodology

This report is based mostly on written sources of evidence. This includes both written secondary sources (research that is based upon information originally presented elsewhere) and written primary sources (original documents that were created during the period under study).

Published books and articles comprise most of the written secondary sources drawn upon in this report. These have, for example, provided useful contextual information on New Zealand's armed forces since World War II as well as some specific information on the role that Maori have played within the forces. The focus of much of this research has been on New Zealand's involvement in the various wars and deployments that the country's armed services have participated in over the last 70 years. Much less attention has been given to how the services have functioned outside of the operational environment, including the role of Maori within this context.

Among the written primary sources that have been utilised, the report presents evidence drawn from a range of files held at Archives New Zealand, especially records of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Department of Maori Affairs. The report also cites official published material, principally the *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives*, *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, and census results. Other written primary sources include regional and national newspapers. A number of magazines published by the armed services are also cited, along with the Department of Maori Affairs' magazine *Te Ao Hou*, which was published from 1952 to 1976.

The report also draws upon oral sources of information. These primarily record the experiences and observations of Maori servicemen and women, though interviews with some Pakeha are also cited. The oral evidence includes the Wai 2500 oral hearing transcripts; interview extracts recorded in existing secondary material; transcripts of interviews with several naval personnel held at the Royal New Zealand Navy National Museum; interviews with two Maori veterans of the Korean War who were the subject of a television documentary; and an oral history interview with a Maori veteran of the Vietnam War that is held at the Alexander Turnbull Library. In respect of the last oral source noted here, it should be noted that the Turnbull Library holds a number of other oral history interviews with Maori Vietnam veterans. However, it was not possible to readily use these owing to access restrictions. The oral evidence that is presented in the report complements the written sources, providing a perspective on some issues and developments for which the written sources yield relatively limited information. In relation to this, it is notable that between about 1960 and 1990 – and reflecting the policy of integration that prevailed within the forces during this period – the archival records of the three services contain relatively little information that specifically concerns Maori or distinguishes them from other personnel.

In the second chapter, the report presents data on the level of Maori involvement in particular overseas deployments as well as broader Maori participation within each of the three armed services. These statistics are drawn from a range of sources. They include figures that the services provided to the Statistics Department from the late 1940s through to the late 1950s. They also include data drawn from census results and more recent statistics collected by the New Zealand Defence Force. As discussed in chapter two, there are various issues relating to the reliability of some of this data. Though the statistics may not always provide a completely accurate representation of Maori participation, they nevertheless indicate some clear trends regarding how the level of Maori involvement in the armed services has changed.

Limitations of coverage

Relatively little coverage of Maori involvement in the non-regular Territorial or Reserve Forces is provided in this report. It will be explained that, during the period covered, the regular branches of the three armed services have offered the main opportunities for military service. This especially became the case from the late 1950s, when compulsory military training (CMT) was abolished and, in the case of the Army, overseas deployments invariably involved personnel who were enlisted in the Regular Force. Prior to this shift, the Army forces deployed to Japan (1946-1949) and Korea (1950-1957) – both specially raised expeditionary forces – were composed mainly of non-regular citizen volunteers. Maori involvement in both of these conflicts will be discussed.

While the report presents much evidence concerning Maori enlistment and recruitment practices, it has not been possible to closely examine one particular issue that at least two claimants have raised. As detailed on page 124, these individuals allege that in the 1960s Army recruiters forced them to enlist in the Regular Force. Both were later involved in deployments to South-East Asia. In order to investigate the allegations made, it would be necessary to examine the individuals' Army personnel files, which are held by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). However, where service personnel remain alive, NZDF confidentiality restrictions prevent these files from being accessed by anyone but the individuals to whom they relate. Therefore, if the enlistment experiences of these individuals are to be examined and any information disclosed, access permission will need to be granted.

In addressing commission question (e), the report does not provide a comprehensive description of the experiences of Maori in relation to pay, conditions, training, discipline, promotions and honours, and exposure to risk. While these various aspects of military service are examined (in chapter four), it has been necessary to narrow the scope of the research. Rather than attempting to provide a broad narrative of Maori experiences, research has instead focused on establishing the extent to which Maori have experienced different treatment from non-Maori. It has also looked to determine whether any special consideration has been given to Maori interests where these differed from those of non-Maori, including, notably, differences arising from Maori overrepresentation in the Army and Navy.

Owing to a lack of relevant source material, it should also be noted that the report presents little evidence regarding the average length of time that Maori personnel have served in the armed services and how this has changed. Similarly, little evidence has been located concerning the extent to which Maori, during their time in the services, have undertaken vocational training directly applicable to employment opportunities outside of the military sector. While evidence relating to individual

personnel is available, the overall picture is unclear. Because of the limited evidence concerning length of service and vocational training, it has not been possible to comprehensively respond to the part of commission question (f) that concerns the extent to which military service has been of economic importance to Maori since World War II.

Report structure and contents

The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter one examines the policy of integration and looks particularly at the debate and decision making that surrounded proposals to establish a separate Maori unit in the Army. In chapter two, issues concerning Maori recruitment and levels of involvement in each of the three armed services are examined. Chapter three then discusses the ability of Maori to serve in leadership positions and gain promotions within the integrated forces. The final chapter looks at other aspects of Maori military service. Divided into two parts, it first examines issues concerning the following matters: pay and conditions, training and equipment, honours and recognition of service, exposure to risk, and welfare measures and discipline. The second part of chapter four discusses the place that Maori culture and te reo has occupied within the services and how this has changed.

Terminology – ‘post-war’

The term ‘post-war’ is used throughout the report, but does not always refer to the same period of time. Where it stands alone, ‘post-war’ means the period between the end of World War II and 1960. The ‘immediate post-war’ period relates to the shorter interval between the end of the war and 1950. The government’s ‘post-war policy of integration’ refers to a longer period and spans the years from the end of World War II to about 1975.

Macrons

Owing to the difficulty of using macrons when working with historical sources, macrons have not been used in this report except on the title page and where they feature in original sources that have been directly quoted.

Chapter One: A Separate Maori Unit? – Integration and the Organisation of the Post-war Army



Troopers (from left) N.P. Kaa (Gisborne) and G.E. Goldsworthy (New Plymouth) – members of New Zealand Army Special Air Service. Photograph taken c. 1955, during the Malayan Emergency. Reference: SAS-115/SAS-116-F, ATL Wellington.

Introduction

This chapter examines key policy developments concerning the ability of Maori to serve in the post-war Army and how Maori service in the force would be organised – a contested issue that centred upon the question of whether Maori should serve alongside Pakeha or be able to serve separately. The discussion presented here concerns both the Army's regular and non-regular elements, the roles of which changed during the post-war period. After World War II, it will be explained, defence planning continued for some years to be based upon deployment of non-regular soldiers – a general policy that was evident in the reintroduction of CMT in 1950 and also in the composition of the Army forces that were deployed to Japan and Korea, both of which were made up largely of citizen soldiers. In the late 1950s, however, defence preparedness began to shift away from a reliance on non-regular personnel, and from this time overseas deployments invariably involved soldiers enlisted in the Regular Force.

The policy decisions concerning Maori and the post-war Army that are discussed in this chapter need to be viewed against earlier developments. In respect of the issue of whether Maori were to serve on an integrated basis or separately, it is relevant that during World Wars I and II most of the Maori volunteers who served within New Zealand's citizen-soldier Army forces did so within separate Maori units – the Maori Contingent and Pioneer Battalion during World War I; and 28 (Maori) Battalion during World War II. At the beginning of each conflict, these units were set up at the request of Maori leaders. However, there was not a strict policy of separation and, with some Maori serving in 'Pakeha' units, an element of integration existed within both the First and Second New Zealand Expeditionary Forces (1NZE and 2NZE). In his report on the period between 1899 and 1946, Webb explains that, outside of the war years, there was less willingness to accommodate Maori preferences and create separate Maori units. Notably, Maori who served in the Territorial Force that was established under the Defence Act 1909 were required to serve alongside Pakeha. (In the mid- to late 1930s Maori requested separate Territorial units, but these requests were generally declined and it is doubtful that any such a unit was formed before the outbreak of World War II.⁴) In respect of the interwar regular Army, the small Permanent Force did not include any organisational separation between Maori and Pakeha. But the extent to which Maori were able to enter and serve in the pre-war regular Army is unclear. Webb notes that very little information is available

⁴ Webb notes that prior to the war officials appear to have agreed to the establishment of a separate Maori unit in the Territorial Force. But it is unclear if any steps were taken to form this unit before the war started. Webb, 'Equality and Autonomy: An Overview of Māori Military Service for the Crown', pp183-192.

concerning Maori involvement in the Army – regular and non-regular – during the interwar years.⁵

It will be explained in this chapter that, after World War II, when steps were being taken to reorganise the regular Army for peacetime service, Maori were initially excluded from entering the force except where they possessed ‘special qualifications’. Though it is difficult to be certain, this probably represented a return to pre-war enlistment policy. In the face of protests from Maori and the Returned Services Association (RSA), the exclusion against Maori was, however, short-lived. In September 1946, Maori became formally eligible to enter the Regular Force on the same basis as Pakeha. When this decision was made, it was understood that Maori would serve alongside Pakeha within an integrated force, reflecting the absence of any formal separation in the pre-war regular Army. In chapter two, it will be explained that, while the formal entry restriction was removed, some Maori who sought to enter the regular Army faced discriminatory recruitment practices over the following years. Nevertheless, the reform of the eligibility criteria was a crucial step that enabled greater Maori participation in the integrated post-war Regular Force.

In the late 1940s, outside of the regular Army, the issue of whether Maori were to serve alongside Pakeha or be given the option of serving in a separate unit was considered in respect of the non-regular Territorial Force. It will be explained that this question received attention during planning for the reintroduction of CMT, with some Maori – particularly former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion – calling for the formation of a separate Maori Territorial unit. In December 1949, the outgoing Labour Government’s Minister of Defence decided in favour of a separate Maori unit. However, in March 1950, the National Government overturned this decision, determining instead that Maori and Pakeha should train together within the CMT scheme.

The decision not to form a separate Maori Territorial unit was based on a number of specific, practical considerations as well as broader ideas about Maori and the future of race relations in New Zealand. With regard to the latter, it will be explained that the post-war policy of integration was of primary importance. Integrationist policy, which included an emphasis on equality of treatment, underpinned much of government Maori policy during this period. Seeking to address Maori social and economic problems (real and perceived), the aim of integration was to transition Maori towards Pakeha ways of living, ending a separate Maori identity. The belief that Maori and Pakeha should serve together in the Territorial Force was consistent with this policy.

⁵ Ibid., p168.

The decision against establishing a separate Maori unit would have a number of implications. Without their own unit, Maori would be less able to exercise a measure of control and independence over how they operated, including, for example, control over matters that concerned tikanga. Also, without a dedicated Maori unit, there would be no clear need to train and appoint Maori officers to lead such a unit. Further, the requirement to serve alongside Pakeha meant that the Territorial Force's Maori component would be less visible and distinct, limiting the extent to which the Maori contribution would be easily recognisable.

Significantly, the policy that Maori should serve in the Territorial Force on an integrated basis was evidently seen as being applicable to all non-regular Army service. In mid-1950, the citizen-soldier force that was established to serve in the Korean War – Kayforce – was formed without a separate Maori unit, thereby breaking a tradition that had begun with the inclusion of the Maori Contingent in 1NZEF in 1914. However, the policy was not strictly enforced. It will be explained that during the deployment of Kayforce some informal Maori groupings emerged, along with one formally designated Maori unit – the last such unit to feature within a New Zealand Army force deployed overseas.

Kayforce was the final overseas Army force that was predominantly made up of non-regular citizen soldiers. In the late 1950s, as noted above, defence planning shifted to a reliance on deployment of personnel within the Regular Force, which had never had a tradition of organisational separation between Maori and Pakeha. From this point onwards, overseas deployments did not feature separate Maori units, even though – as discussed later in the report – a significant proportion of the personnel involved in these deployments was Maori. It was perhaps in light of this situation that, from the late-1950s to mid-1960s, former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion – focussing, it seems, on the Regular Force – called for the formation of a separate Maori unit in the New Zealand Army. However, it will be explained that officials and Army leaders rejected the idea, with the policy of integration prevailing.

Following World War II, the issue of whether Maori should serve separately or alongside Pakeha did not arise in respect of the Navy or Air Force. Within these services, there was no established tradition of separate Maori service as there had been in the Army through World Wars I and II. Webb details that some Maori served in the Navy and Air Force during World War II, but it is evident that they did so on an integrated basis.⁶ Earlier, during the interwar period, Maori had been barred from Navy service – an exclusion that ended only at the beginning of 1939.⁷ And, while Webb presents some evidence of Maori involvement in the interwar Territorial Air

⁶ Ibid., pp323-327, 337-347.

⁷ Ibid., pp307-320.

Force, it is unclear whether any Maori served in the Air Force as regular personnel.⁸ After World War II, as with the regular Army, the main issue concerning Maori involvement in the Navy and Air Force was to be, not whether Maori would serve separately, but whether they would be able to freely enter these services on equal terms with Pakeha.

While this chapter explains that integrationist ideology influenced decision making concerning the issue of whether Maori would serve separately or alongside Pakeha in the non-regular Army, the report will later explain that the policy of integration was also applied at a broader level, across all three of the armed services. Specifically, for most of the second half of the twentieth century, the Army, Navy, and Air Force all showed a reluctance to recognise and disclose information on the ethnicity of personnel, and there was also an unwillingness to acknowledge and support Maori cultural difference. As discussed in subsequent chapters, changes concerning this general policy began to be introduced from around 1990.

The first section of this chapter discusses several key aspects of the post-war context that informed decision making concerning the place of Maori in New Zealand's armed services. As well as providing an overview of the government policy of integration, it looks at issues relating to equality of treatment. While integrationist policy emphasised the need for equality of treatment between Maori and Pakeha, it will be explained that this was also something that Maori sought. The discussion focuses on how the Maori war effort helped to secure greater equality of treatment and encouraged some Pakeha to oppose discrimination against Maori. As part of the wider post-war context, international influences are also discussed in the first section of the chapter. As well as developments in the United States military, these influences included the setting of United Nations-backed standards concerning race relations, with which the New Zealand government wished to be seen as being compliant.

Next, the chapter examines developments concerning the Army during the immediate post-war period. This section firstly discusses the involvement of Maori in the New Zealand citizen-soldier force that assisted in the occupation of Japan. It is noted that Jayforce – an extension of 2NZEF – included a small, separate Maori unit. The second part of the section explains that in August 1946, during the deployment of Jayforce, some former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion began promoting the idea that the peacetime Army should include a separate Maori unit. The final part of the section discusses developments that confirmed the eligibility of Maori to serve in the post-war regular Army. In relation to this, it is explained that enlistment criteria

⁸ Ibid., pp334-335.

introduced in June 1946 excluded Maori, though within a few months this was overturned.

The chapter then examines the decision that was made in March 1950 against the establishment of a separate Maori unit in the CMT scheme. It traces first the reintroduction of CMT and explains that the Labour Government, with support from Maori, decided that Maori should serve – not on a voluntary basis, but compulsorily, like Pakeha. The decision concerning whether Maori would serve separately or alongside Pakeha was made after the scheme was introduced. The various reasons and considerations that underlay this decision are discussed. As noted above, Labour’s Minister of Defence initially decided in favour of a separate Maori unit, but the incoming National Government subsequently reversed this decision.

After briefly setting out evidence concerning the level of Maori involvement in the CMT scheme and later National Service training scheme, the chapter discusses the wider implementation of the policy of integrated service within the non-regular Army. It is explained that the decision against establishing a separate Maori unit within the CMT scheme bore an influence on the initial organisation of the citizen volunteers who served within the Army force that was deployed to Korea. However as the number of Maori within Kayforce increased, some all-Maori groupings began to operate and one unit – B Platoon of 10 Transport Company – was formally designated as an all-Maori unit. No such unit would feature within subsequent regular Army deployments.

The final section of the chapter explains that debate concerning the establishment of a separate Maori unit continued for some years after the decision that was made in March 1950 in respect of the Territorial Force. In particular, from the late 1950s, former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion called for a Maori unit to be reformed. These calls, it seems, were focussed on the establishment of an all-Maori unit within the Regular Force. This reflected the fact that, as noted above, overseas deployments from around this time invariably involved only Regular Force personnel. It will be explained that Army and political leaders were resolute on the matter and that in the mid-1960s efforts to pursue the establishment of a separate Maori unit ended.

Maori, integration, and the post-war context

This section briefly discusses the ideological, political, and social context within which decisions concerning Maori involvement in the armed services were made in the post-war period. The role of Maori in the armed services was not defined exclusively on the basis of military factors that concerned practical and organisational matters. Reflecting the broader context that the armed services operated within, decisions regarding the place of Maori in the forces were influenced

by prevailing ideas concerning Maori and the future of race relations in New Zealand. Developments overseas, including changes relating to the position of African Americans within the United States' military, were also influential.

Integrationist ideology and policy, 1945-1975

During the post-war period, the ideology of integration underpinned much of government policy concerning Maori. Unsurprisingly, integrationist ideology partly informed decision making about the role of Maori in the armed services, including the policy that Maori should serve alongside Pakeha.

Hill has observed that post-war efforts to integrate Maori into Pakeha society shared much with earlier, assimilationist objectives. These had aimed to transition Maori to a Pakeha way of life and, in the process, bring to an end separate Maori cultural identity and more communal Maori forms of social organisation.⁹ However, there were some differences that – on the surface, at least – subtly distinguished post-war integration from the earlier policies of assimilation. Integration placed greater weight on the need for equality of treatment and emphasised that the outcome of integrationist policies would be a fusion of Maori and Pakeha. This would create a new, blended people, though in reality Pakeha dominance meant that any such blending would always be overwhelmingly one-sided.¹⁰ Integration also seemed to offer greater scope for retention of aspects of Maori culture. However, strategies concerning this were not clearly articulated, and cultural difference did not sit comfortably with governmental insistence that, in the end, there could only be one people in New Zealand.¹¹

The ideology of integration that prevailed after World War II was closely linked to a major societal change – the rapid and large-scale migration of Maori from rural areas to urban centres.¹² It was believed that urbanisation would result in the breaking down of traditional, tribal forms of association, a process that would enable and encourage Maori integration. At the same time, integrationist policies were seen to offer a solution to social problems – perceived and real – that emerged as Maori took up life in urban centres. With substantial numbers of Pakeha and Maori living close together for the first time, these problems gave rise to elevated racial intolerance and tension – a shift that undermined long-held Pakeha perceptions about the harmonious nature of race relations in New Zealand.¹³ The government, however, did

⁹ Richard S. Hill, *Maori and the State: Crown-Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1950-2000*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2009, p1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p95.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p94. Aroha Harris, 'Concurrent Narratives of Māori and Integration in the 1950s and 60s', *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, No. 6/7, 2008, p145.

¹² Hill, *Maori and the State*, p11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp34-36.

not attempt to slow the process of Maori urbanisation, believing that urban employment opportunities offered the best opportunity for improvement of the economic position of Maori, which would itself encourage Maori to abandon old forms of life. A Maori workforce was also required to undertake the unskilled and semi-skilled work that needed to be carried out in New Zealand's urban centres.¹⁴

Eventually, between 1972 and 1975, during the Third Labour Government's term in office, integrationist objectives were abandoned. From the end of World War II until this time, both Labour and National Governments had pursued integrationist policies, though Labour – especially the First Labour Government that held power until 1949 – was perhaps less concerned with forcing the pace of change and more willing to acknowledge Maori aspirations for a greater level of self-government over their affairs. Following the 1935 election, Labour had entered into a formal political alliance with the Ratana movement, and from 1943 all four Maori seats were held by Ratana-affiliated Labour MPs. Hill states that Peter Fraser – Prime Minister from 1940 to 1949, and Minister of Maori Affairs from 1946 to 1949 – possessed 'a higher degree of empathy with Maori autonomist aspirations than many others'.¹⁵ Labour's greater willingness to listen and respond to Maori concerns seems to have been evident in the Minister of Defence's decision, in December 1949, to establish a separate Maori unit within the Compulsory Military Training Scheme. It will be explained that this decision, made just before Labour left office, was within a short time overturned by the new National Government.

Though more sympathetic to Maori concerns, Labour was, overall, unwilling to significantly advance Maori aspirations for greater autonomy. Notably, following the end of World War II, the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 showed the limited extent to which Labour was prepared to allow Maori to independently manage community development.¹⁶ Modifying and replacing the Maori War Effort Organisation, the 1945 Act set down the framework for what became known as the Maori Welfare Division of the Department of Maori Affairs. In December 1949, the Under Secretary of Maori Affairs, Tipi Ropiha, informed the incoming National Government's Minister of Maori Affairs that the 1945 Act was entirely concerned with the 'full integration of the Maori race into the social and economic structure of the country'.¹⁷

¹⁴ Ibid., p38.

¹⁵ Ibid., p16.

¹⁶ Ibid., p13.

¹⁷ Under Secretary to Minister of Maori Affairs, 14 December 1949, ACIH 16036 W2459 MAW2459 box 2 1/1/41 part 1, Statistical Information Supplied to Minister, 1949-1954, ANZ Wellington, cited in Harris, 'Current Narratives', p142.

Throughout the post-war period, the Department of Maori Affairs, under both Labour and National Governments, would play a central role in the implementation of integrationist policies and legislation, which continued to be introduced in the 1950s.¹⁸ Like the 1945 Act, the Maori Affairs Act 1953 also had a strong focus on Maori integration.¹⁹ During the same decade, notable integrationist policies included the ‘pepper potting’ of Maori families among Pakeha in urban areas, while the first steps to wind up the separate Maori schooling system were also taken.²⁰ Labour’s return to power between 1957 and 1960 did not see a shift in the general policy. In 1959, Prime Minister and Minister of Maori Affairs Walter Nash stated unequivocally that the Government’s policy was ‘to integrate Maoris with the European community’.²¹

Prepared at the end of the Second Labour Government’s term in office, Acting Secretary of Maori Affairs J.K. Hunn’s influential 1960 report perhaps most clearly articulated the policy of integration and, at the same time, urged the speeding up of measures to support what Hunn and others believed was an inevitable, evolutionary process.²² The incoming National Government’s Minister of Maori Affairs, Ralph Hanan, welcomed Hunn’s report and resolved to implement its recommendations. In the foreword to a 1962 Maori Affairs’ publication on the subject of integration, Hanan stressed that race relations and Maori policy were widely perceived as matters of significant importance:

At the present time and throughout New Zealand there is a growing interest in things Maori and a growing awareness of the importance of Maori-Pakeha relationships. It has indeed been said that the question of race integration is the most important problem facing the present generation of New Zealanders.²³

In 1961, Hunn had been confirmed as the permanent head of Maori Affairs.²⁴ In accordance with the recommendations of the Hunn’s report, government efforts to facilitate the integration of Maori intensified. Among the most significant legislative developments, the Maori Welfare Act 1962 repealed the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945. In part, the new legislation was introduced to provide a framework that better suited the rapid urbanisation that had taken place since the introduction of the 1945 Act. And a central aim was to hasten progress towards full

¹⁸ Harris, ‘Concurrent Narratives’, p142.

¹⁹ Hill, *Maori and the State*, p34.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p35. Harris, ‘Concurrent Narratives’, p144.

²¹ Walter Nash, quoted in Hill, *Maori and the State*, p95.

²² J.K. Hunn, *Report on Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement, 24 August 1960*, Government Printer, Wellington, 1961.

²³ J.R. Hanan, Minister of Maori Affairs, ‘Foreword’, in J.M. Booth and J.K. Hunn, *Integration of Maori and Pakeha*, Department of Maori Affairs’ Special Studies Series, no. 1, Department of Maori Affairs, Wellington, 1962.

²⁴ Hill, *Maori and the State*, p92.

integration.²⁵ Alongside the 1962 Act, other measures were introduced towards this end. For example, Harris notes that following the Hunn report there was firmer resolve to bring the separate Maori schooling system to an end. It was decided that all remaining Maori schools would be transferred to the control of regional education boards by the beginning of 1969.²⁶

The policy of integration was maintained for more than a quarter of a century after World War II. The brief outline provided here has so far focused on the government's policy objectives and the mechanisms through which government sought to achieve its aims. Throughout the period, Maori contested and resisted the policy. Ranginui Walker states that among those who urbanised – who were the focus of the government's efforts to integrate Maori – 'some Maori chose assimilation, [but] the vast majority rejected it.'²⁷ The Maori Renaissance, underway by the early 1970s, was linked to an eventual shift in policy. As noted above, between 1972 and 1975 integrationist objectives were abandoned during the Third Labour Government's term in office. Instead, the concepts of biculturalism and partnership began to gain ground.²⁸ In 1975, Hugh Kawharu wrote of the disjunct that had existed between Maori and Pakeha in respect of the policy of integration, commenting that 'while opinions have shifted on both sides from time to time, they have failed to coalesce'.²⁹

Equality of treatment and the legacy of 28 (Maori) Battalion

It has been explained that, during the post-war period, integrationist ideology underlay much of government decision making concerning Maori. It has also been noted that the broad policy of integration included an emphasis on equality of treatment and the need for race-based discrimination to end. The successful integration of Maori, it was argued, depended upon this happening. The emphasis on equality of treatment seems to have been the single aspect of integrationist thinking where some common ground existed between Maori and promoters of the ideology. Notably, an ambition to secure greater formal equality for Maori was one of the motivations that underlay Maori leaders' offer of a Maori battalion at the outbreak of World War II. Ngata and others viewed the contribution of the Battalion as a means of elevating the status of Maori and gaining equality of treatment. Ngata articulated

²⁵ Hill states that the new terminology of 'Maori welfare' reflected a prevailing government and official view that 'the future welfare of all components of Maoridom lay in moving quickly towards institutions and policies which were solidly integrationist.' Hill, *Maori and the State*, p114.

²⁶ Harris, 'Concurrent Narratives', p144.

²⁷ Ranginui Walker, *Ko Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End*, Penguin, Auckland, 1990, pp198-199.

²⁸ Hill, *Maori and the State*, pp165-166.

²⁹ I. Hugh Kawharu, 'Introduction', in I. Hugh Kawharu (ed.), *Conflict and Compromise: Essays on the Maori since Colonisation*, Reed, Wellington, 1975 (2003 ed), p16.

this clearly in the title of his 1943 booklet *The Price of Citizenship*, which set out the story of the Battalion up to this time.³⁰

Government efforts to introduce greater formal equality between Maori and Pakeha had, it should be noted, commenced before World War II. Both prior to and after the 1935 election, Labour leader Michael Joseph Savage had promised equality of treatment for Maori, especially in policies concerning economic opportunity.³¹ After entering office, Labour began, slowly and incrementally, to amend some statutory provisions and administrative practices that distinguished between Maori and Pakeha. These efforts included measures relating to the payment of state welfare assistance as well as reform of electoral law.³² The contribution of 28 (Maori) Battalion and the wider Maori war effort helped to hasten the rate of change. Within the Social Security system, for example, the practice of paying Maori lower benefit rates was brought to an end in 1943. In respect of this development, Margaret McClure has argued that the voluntary participation of Maori soldiers in the war and their commitment in battle made it impossible for the Government to continue to deny Maori equal benefit entitlements.³³

This section further explores how the wartime contribution of 28 (Maori) Battalion strengthened Maori efforts to secure greater equality of status. It looks particularly at how, outside of government, the Battalion's role during the war motivated some Pakeha to oppose discrimination against Maori in the post-war years. Former Pakeha servicemen who had fought alongside 28 (Maori) Battalion were prominent among these individuals. The discussion focuses particularly on evidence relating to the public debate that arose in connection with the New Zealand Rugby Football Union's decision to exclude Maori players from the All Blacks team that was to tour South Africa in 1949. Those who opposed the exclusion were unsuccessful in bringing about any change, and in 1960, it will be noted, another All Blacks would team travel to South Africa without Maori players, highlighting the discrimination that Maori faced during this period.

Later in the chapter it will also be explained that the Returned Services Association (RSA) – a predominantly Pakeha organisation – raised concerns about an initial policy to exclude Maori from the post-war regular Army. However, there were limits

³⁰ A.T. Ngata, *The Price of Citizenship: Ngārimu, V.C.*, Printed by Whitcombe & Tombs, Wellington, 1943.

³¹ Claudia J. Orange, 'A Kind of Equality: Labour and the Maori People, 1935-1949', MA Thesis (History), University of Auckland, 1977, p59.

³² See, for example, M.P.K. Sorrenson, 'A history of Maori representation in parliament', Appendix B of *Towards a Better Democracy – Report of The Royal Commission on the Electoral System*, V.R. Ward, Government Printer, Wellington, 1986, p43-44.

³³ Margaret McClure, 'A Badge of Poverty or a Symbol of Citizenship? Needs, Rights, and Social Security, 1935-2000', in Bronwyn Dalley and Margaret Tennant (eds), *Past Judgement: Social Policy in New Zealand History*, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2004, p145.

as to how far the RSA was prepared to back Maori. In particular, during the 1950s and 1960s, the RSA did not endorse or support calls that former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion made for the establishment of a separate Maori Army unit. The RSA's position appears to have been consistent with the stance of the Army and government, which – on the basis of practical considerations and integrationist reasoning – refused the requests that were made.

Public debate surrounding the 1949 tour was sparked by comments made by Howard Kippenberger, who expressed strong opposition to the Rugby Union's decision to exclude Maori players. During World War II, Kippenberger had been one of the senior-most citizen-soldier officers within 2nd New Zealand Division, serving at times as the temporary commanding officer. After the war, he was appointed editor in chief of the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs, and in 1948 he was elected president of the RSA, a position he held for seven years.³⁴ In justifying his opposition to the exclusion of Maori players, Kippenberger pointed to the Maori Battalion's contribution during the recent war, which in his view removed any doubt as to the equality of status that Maori deserved alongside Pakeha.

According to Kippenberger's biographer, Glyn Harper, Kippenberger spoke out after three former commanding officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion asked him to comment on the issue.³⁵ Early in September 1948, the Christchurch *Press* reported his views. The paper stated that Kippenberger, though he could not speak for the RSA, intended to make a personal protest to the Rugby Union. Maori, Kippenberger asserted, had fought for and earned their citizenship. No New Zealand battalion could say it had been let down by the Maori Battalion. Referring to the high price Maori had paid for their service, Kippenberger stated in strong terms that: 'I had Maoris under my command for two years and in that time they had 1500 casualties, and I am not going to acquiesce in any damned Afrikanders [sic] saying they cannot go... To hell with them.'³⁶ While later stating he regretted using the words he did, Kippenberger stood by the sentiment they expressed.³⁷

The debate that followed publication of Kippenberger's views was of a sometimes acrimonious nature, which reflected the fact that his stance on the exclusion of Maori players was not universally supported. Unsurprisingly, Maori were among those who welcomed his remarks. Several Maori individuals and organisations wrote to

³⁴ Glyn Harper, 'Kippenberger, Howard Karl', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 8 May 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5k11/kippenberger-howard-karl>

³⁵ Glyn Harper, *Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander*, Harper Collins, Auckland, 1997, p274.

³⁶ 'South African Rugby Tour – Exclusion of Maoris – Protest by Sir Howard Kippenberger', *The Press*, 1 September 1948, p4.

³⁷ Harper, *Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander*, pp274-275.

Kippenberger, expressing their unequivocal support for his comments. For example, in a letter dated 8 September 1948, the Kahungunu Tribal Executive Committee expressed gratitude for Kippenberger's stance on 'this very unpleasant yet vital matter'. The Committee, it was explained, was 'the voice of Ngati Kahungunu, within whose ranks stand a large percentage of ex-servicemen both of World War 1 and World War 2.'³⁸ Alongside Kippenberger, the Ratana-Labour MP for Southern Maori, Eruera Tirikatene, also spoke out against the tour, describing the decision of the Rugby Union as 'lamentable and thoroughly obnoxious'. Comradeship achieved on the battlefield, Tirikatene stated, could not be put aside as lightly as some believed.³⁹

Kippenberger's comments also drew support from trade unions, including the New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union.⁴⁰ Some branches of organisations that represented ex-servicemen also backed his stance. In an article published in the *Evening Post*, the Secretary of the Wellington branch of the 2nd NZEF Association, R. Childs, stated that the South African Rugby Board should be informed that 'Maori and pakeha are indivisible'. Childs suggested that the issue went 'far beyond the field of sport. It offends a fundamental principle of our way of life, and it is particularly offensive to returned men.'⁴¹ In letters to Kippenberger, a number of Pakeha ex-servicemen individually expressed their support. For example, in a letter written on 7 September 1948, F. Cooke of Wellington, who had served with 22 Battalion, assured Kippenberger that 'the stand you made for the Maoris is appreciated by all who were in the 5th Brigade and met them daily.'⁴²

However, among both the organisations that represented former servicemen and individual ex-servicemen, opinion on the issue was divided. The President of the South Canterbury RSA, D.J. McBeath, informed Kippenberger that the branch executive opposed his views and believed it improper that he had commented on the matter while serving as RSA President. Though McBeath acknowledged 'the good

³⁸ Raureti, Maori Welfare Officer, to Kippenberger, 8 September 1948, ACGO 8399 IA77 box 3 18, Maoris excluded from South African Rugby Tour, 1948, ANZ Wellington. For other relevant correspondence from Maori to Kippenberger, also see: King, Arawa Returned Services League, to Kippenberger, 3 September 1948; Henare to Kippenberger, 3 September 1948 (telegram); Whanau Apanui Maori RSA to Kippenberger, 7 September 1948 (telegram); Kawiti, Secretary, Kawakawa Tribal Executive Committee, to Kippenberger, 7 September 1949, ACGO 8399 IA77 box 3 18, ANZ Wellington.

³⁹ 'Maori Issue – All Black Tour – The Watersiders' Protest', *Evening Post*, 3 September 1948, p8. See also: 'Statement by Mr Tirikatene', *The Press*, 2 September 1948, p4.

⁴⁰ 'Maori Issue – All Black Tour – The Watersiders' Protest', *Evening Post*, 3 September 1948, p8. Robert Consedine, 'Anti-racism and Treaty of Waitangi activism – First sporting contacts with South Africa', Te Ara website, accessed 9 May 2017. URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/anti-racism-and-treaty-of-waitangi-activism/page-2>

⁴¹ 'Maori Issue – All Black Tour – The Watersiders' Protest', *Evening Post*, 3 September 1948, p8.

⁴² Cooke to 'Sir', 7 September 1948, ACGO 8399 IA77 box 3 18, ANZ Wellington. In another letter, also dated 7 September 1948, C.A. Borman wrote: 'I must express my support and loyalty to your attitude concerning the cynical discrimination against the Maoris a very large number of whom are returned men of the 2 Division.' Borman to 'General', 7 September 1948, ACGO 8399 IA77 box 3 18, ANZ Wellington.

job' Maori had done during the war, he considered that the issue at stake was New Zealand's ongoing international relationship with South Africa, not the question of race relations between the people of New Zealand.⁴³ Other organisations representing ex-servicemen also chose not to back Kippenberger. The *Evening Post* reported that the Air Force Association, though it opposed discrimination towards Maori, did not wish to comment on the controversy. The Dominion President of the 2nd NZEF Association, K.H. Malvin, also expressed opposition to discrimination against Maori, but believed the tour should go ahead. The Rugby Union, Malvin believed, was obliged to undertake the tour to enable the South African Rugby Board to recoup expenses from its 1937 tour to New Zealand.⁴⁴

Along with other members of the community, Pakeha ex-servicemen also independently expressed opposition to Kippenberger's stance on the exclusion of Maori players from the 1949 tour. A number of individuals wrote letters to Kippenberger, firmly setting out their opposition to his comments. In one letter of protest, a former serviceman of World War I, E.W. Clarkson, seemed to question whether the Maori Battalion's contribution needed to be taken into account during peacetime and, further, suggested that Battalion's achievements may have been exaggerated: 'Maori Battalion, Yes. But the fighting part of the war is long since over and there are many of us who were not altogether influenced by the highly coloured reports upon the activities of the battalion which reached this country during active hostilities.'⁴⁵

In spite of the opposition that Kippenberger and others expressed, which emphasised the contribution that Maori had made during the war, the All Blacks tour to South Africa went ahead without Maori players. In a letter to his friend J.L. Scoullar, Kippenberger reflected: 'I say it with some bitterness, Rugby is King and the dead are only bones'. New Zealand, he stated, had lost 'our great opportunity' to show its racial equality.⁴⁶

A little over a decade later, Maori players were again excluded from the All Blacks' 1960 tour to South Africa. Once more, the decision not to include Maori was the subject of heated debate, and a vocal, organised opposition emerged. Maori were among the tour's opponents, who included the Kingitanga, Maori Women's Welfare League (MWWL), trade unions, church organisations, student associations, as well

⁴³ McBeath to Kippenberger, 21 September 1948, ACGO 8399 IA77 box 3 18, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁴ 'Maori Issue – All Black Tour – The Watersiders' Protest', *Evening Post*, 3 September 1948, p8.

⁴⁵ Clarkson to General Secretary, New Zealand Returned Services Association, 3 September 1948, ACGO 8399 IA77 box 3 18, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁶ Kippenberger to Scoullar, cited in Harper, *Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander*, p276.

as civic and professional bodies.⁴⁷ Some prominent figures formed the Citizen's All Black Tour Association (CABTA), which used the slogan 'No Maoris, no tour'.⁴⁸ The President of CABTA was Rolland O'Regan, a surgeon, who was married to Ngai Tahu woman Rena Bradshaw.⁴⁹ CABTA's Secretary was Mira Szaszy, who was also Secretary of the MWWL.⁵⁰ Research for this report has not established whether the opponents of the 1960 tour referred to the contribution Maori had made during World War II. However, many evidently believed that the equality the Battalion's founders sought had yet to be achieved. In particular, discrimination continued especially outside of the government sphere and was experienced most by those in urban areas. On 2 June 1960, during CABTA's final meeting before the All Blacks departed for South Africa, O'Regan asserted that:

there is a great deal of discrimination against the Maori in employment, in housing, lodging houses, cinemas, and social relationships. In this private, social, or non-governmental sphere, the grossest act of racial discrimination to date is that of the New Zealand Rugby Union in banning Maoris from the New Zealand representative team. In this sector, discrimination will only be eliminated in time by removing its causes and much patient study, public education, and personal service will be needed... As the Maori urban population rapidly increases this is becoming a matter of some urgency, and unless something constructive is done clashes in the Notting Hill pattern will undoubtedly occur, and the remaining shreds of our reputation in the field of race relations will be gone... Real and absolute equality in every sphere of our social and national life must be our goal.⁵¹

In 1970 and 1976, All Blacks teams toured South Africa with Maori players, though these individuals were declared to be 'honorary whites'.⁵²

International influences

Post-war government policy relating to Maori and race relations in New Zealand partly reflected and was shaped by international trends and developments.

⁴⁷ Hill, *Maori and the State*, pp60-61. See also: Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash*, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1976, pp334-335.

⁴⁸ Consedine, 'Anti-racism and Treaty of Waitangi activism – First sporting contacts with South Africa', Te Ara website. URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/speech/26668/no-maoris-no-tour-1960>

⁴⁹ 'O'Regan, John Arthur Rolland (1904-1992)', Royal College of Surgeons' website, accessed 10 May 2017. URL: <http://livesonline.rcseng.ac.uk/biogs/E008239b.htm>

⁵⁰ Hill, *Maori and the State*, p61.

⁵¹ Author transcript of sound recording, 1960 All Blacks/Reference number 27674, Radio New Zealand Sound Archives Ngā Taonga Kōrero. See Consedine, 'Anti-racism and Treaty of Waitangi activism – First sporting contacts with South Africa', Te Ara website.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/speech/26668/no-maoris-no-tour-1960>

⁵² Consedine, 'Anti-racism and Treaty of Waitangi activism – Opposing domestic and international racism, 1960s and 1970s', Te Ara website, accessed 9 May 2017.

URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/anti-racism-and-treaty-of-waitangi-activism/page-3>

Politicians and officials were mindful of these developments, and were generally concerned that New Zealand should be viewed as a country with a progressive and harmonious society. As an arm of the state that was active overseas, the military forces of New Zealand presented a picture of the country's race relations to the wider world. An awareness of this appears to have influenced decision making concerning the role of Maori within the armed services.

Post-war integrationist policy in the United States was among the international influences that helped to reinforce policy decisions made in New Zealand, especially – in respect of New Zealand's military forces – the policy that Maori and Pakeha should serve together. Until the mid-twentieth century, African Americans served in the United States military on a strictly segregated basis. This contrasted with the position that Maori occupied within the New Zealand forces, where formal policies of separation had never been introduced. Following World War II, steps were taken to integrate African Americans in the US military, ending the long-standing policy of segregation. The major development that led to this was President Truman's Executive Order 9981, signed in July 1948, which formally introduced the policy of integration and required equality of treatment and opportunity for those who served in the United States armed forces. The process of desegregation, however, was to take several years. All-black units continued well into the Korean War, the last being disbanded in 1954. In July 1963, Truman's 1948 Executive Order was reinforced when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara issued Department of Defense Directive 5120.36, which required military commanders to oppose racial and gender discrimination and to foster equality of treatment – not only in areas immediately under their command, but also in nearby communities where service personnel might gather.⁵³

After World War II, New Zealand became more closely aligned to and strategically dependent upon the United States. In the immediate post-war period, New Zealand forces were among those deployed alongside much larger United States forces, first during the occupation of Japan and then on the Korean Peninsula. New Zealand's military leaders were aware of racial policy developments in the United States military and, while the position of African Americans had differed from that of Maori, these developments reinforced their views on the place that Maori should occupy within the New Zealand armed forces. It is notable that the terminology of 'segregation' and 'integration' used in the United States military were employed also by New Zealand's military leaders. In 1952, as detailed later, the Army's Chief of the General Staff, William Gentry, pointed to the United States policy of integration

⁵³ See Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965*, Defense Studies Series, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1981.

when arguing against the reversal of the decision not to establish a separate Maori unit in the Territorial Force.⁵⁴

The application of integrationist policy in the New Zealand armed forces was an expression of a broader government policy of integration, which, as discussed above, dominated government policy concerning Maori in the post-war period. Hill explains that the promoters of integrationist policy in New Zealand had counterparts elsewhere, their ideas reflecting ‘progressive’ thinking in other post-colonial settler countries and being shared by many individuals and organisations throughout the world.⁵⁵ In 1957, the widespread currency of these ideas was demonstrated when the International Labour Organisation sought to provide a written definition of indigenous people’s rights – the first United Nations body to attempt to do so. Today, the 1957 Convention on International Indigenous and Tribal Populations is widely seen as having promoted policies of assimilation. However, some of the convention’s content, particularly a call for the introduction of governmental anti-discrimination measures, made some New Zealand politicians and their advisers uneasy. In late 1959, the Secretary of External Affairs suggested there could be difficulty for New Zealand because ‘there is racial discrimination in New Zealand and the Government is not actively taking steps to improve matters’.⁵⁶

The concern expressed here reflected a desire that New Zealand should be viewed as a country with positive race relations. This desire was partly about gaining the satisfaction of meeting international expectations and winning the approval of other nations, but it was also linked to domestic perceptions – particularly, it seems, a concern that prevailing views about the harmonious nature of race relations in New Zealand could be maintained. Both politicians and officials were active in reinforcing and promoting this view. For example, in a 1962 booklet entitled *Integration of Maori and Pakeha*, published by the Department of Maori Affairs, J.M Booth and J.K. Hunn argued that:

For many years New Zealand has been recognised as one of the nations in the vanguard of those that are building multi-racial societies. While no one would claim that there have been no instances of injustice and discrimination against sections of the Maori people, relations between the two main groups in our population, Maori and European or “pakeha”, have not recently been marked by any great degree of friction.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 30 October 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, Organisation – Maori battalion (suggested), 1949-1964, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵ Hill, *Maori and the State*, p105.

⁵⁶ Secretary of External Affairs to the Prime Minister, 24 December 1959, and attached draft, cited in Hill, *Maori and the State*, pp105-106.

⁵⁷ Booth and Hunn, *Integration of Maori and Pakeha*, p1.

In 1963, and in a similar vein, Minister of Maori Affairs Ralph Hanan stated that New Zealand was giving 'the world a lead in showing how two ways of life can become one, each enriching the other. Maori and pakeha, though having two different pasts, have one common future'.⁵⁸

New Zealand's military forces provided a representation of the country's race relations to the outside world. The desire to project a positive picture to the international community was among the factors that influenced decision making about the organisation of the country's military forces in the post-war period. It was believed that integrated forces that demonstrated equality of treatment provided the most positive representation of race relations in New Zealand. Also, on another level, the integration of personnel was seen by some to have advantages in certain deployment situations, enabling the Army to build and maintain better relationships with the local people. In particular, integration was viewed as beneficial to the Army's operations in post-colonial South-East Asia, where it was thought that the integration of Maori and Pakeha was important for the Army's credibility in the eyes of the local people. In March 1964, J.K. Hunn spoke of this in a speech he made to a reunion of the Maori Battalion. At this time, Hunn was Secretary of Defence. As detailed later, in his speech to the reunion, Hunn argued against calls for the re-establishment of a separate Maori unit. Among the points he put forward, Hunn stated that:

Nowadays we are working hard to project an image of two races but one people amongst the multi-racial peoples of South East Asia. It would seriously damage our reputation to send overseas at some future time a racial unit, particularly when it might have to be officered substantially by pakehas because Maori officers have not stayed on with the forces.⁵⁹

Around this time, another United Nations convention further defined international standards of race relations. The 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) focused on combating racial discrimination and also sought to promote greater understanding between peoples. It addressed some indigenous concerns about the assimilationist assumptions of the earlier 1957 Convention on International Indigenous and Tribal Populations.⁶⁰ As with the 1957 Convention, officials in New Zealand expressed concern about the extent to which New Zealand would be able to comply with ICERD. Eventually, concerns relating to international perceptions were removed with the enactment of

⁵⁸ J.R. Hanan, 'Foreword', in Department of Maori Affairs, *The Maori Today*, Department of Maori Affairs, Wellington, 1964, cited in Hill, *Maori and the State*, Wellington, 2009, p98.

⁵⁹ J.K. Hunn, 'Maori Battalion: Vanguard or Rearguard? – an address by Secretary of Defence (J.K. Hunn) at the Annual Reunion of the Maori Battalion Association, Gisborne, 28 March 1964', ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, Army – Maori Battalion, 1964-1985, ANZ Wellington, p8.

⁶⁰ Hill, *Maori and the State*, p106.

the Race Relations Act 1971, which introduced legal sanctions against racial discrimination. In 1972, the following year, New Zealand ratified the convention.⁶¹ These developments, Hill states, encouraged Maori in their efforts to gain greater control over matters of importance to them and in their rejection of assimilationist policies. At the same time, with processes of decolonisation underway in many places, Maori began to see this resistance as part of a broader, indigenous phenomenon.⁶²

Maori and the Army after war's end, 1946-1949

This section of the chapter discusses several developments concerning the role of Maori in the Army during the immediate post-war period. This was a transitional time, during which the eligibility of Maori to serve within the peacetime, integrated Regular Force was confirmed. It will first be explained that, in the aftermath of hostilities, Maori served in an all-Maori unit within Jayforce – New Zealand's contribution to the United States-led group of Allied forces that occupied post-war Japan. Next, it will be detailed that in August 1946, during the deployment of Jayforce, some former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion called for the inclusion of a separate Maori unit in the New Zealand Army. Though not specified, it appears this call was made in respect of the Army's peacetime, non-regular Territorial Force. As detailed later in the chapter, a final decision on this matter was not made until March 1950, following the reintroduction of CMT. The section concludes by discussing the initial exclusion of Maori from the post-war Regular Force and the subsequent overturning of this policy in September 1946 – a reversal that confirmed that Maori were formally eligible to serve in the integrated regular Army.

Jayforce, 1946-1949

Soon after Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, the New Zealand government agreed to participate in the occupation of the country as part of a Commonwealth force.⁶³ Although hesitant about the need for a Commonwealth contribution, the United States accepted the proposal in principle in late November 1945.⁶⁴ Preparations for New Zealand's involvement were well advanced when the establishment of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force was officially announced on 1 February 1946.⁶⁵ New Zealand agreed to provide an army brigade group and an air force tactical unit.⁶⁶ Commonly known as Jayforce, the army

⁶¹ Ibid., p106.

⁶² Ibid., pp106-107.

⁶³ Laurie Brocklebank, *Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan 1945-48*, Oxford University Press and Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Auckland, 1997, p6.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p21.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p23.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp6, 33.

brigade group was formally part of 2NZEF and known officially as 2NZEF, Japan.⁶⁷ Jayforce reached Japan in late March 1946. About two years later, in April 1948, Cabinet decided to withdraw New Zealand's forces in Japan. Most of the troops and airmen were back in New Zealand by late 1948, with some remaining officers leaving in early 1949.⁶⁸

Reflecting the limited time available to organise the force, efforts to secure troops for Jayforce initially focused on those serving with 2NZEF in Italy, where hostilities had ceased at the beginning of May 1945. In late September 1945, after it became apparent that there would be insufficient volunteers, Prime Minister Fraser approved the drafting of men from the 13th to 15th reinforcements.⁶⁹ Brocklebank explains that soldiers who served in the Pacific, 28 (Maori) Battalion soldiers, and nurses were exempt.⁷⁰ Research for this report has failed to locate evidence regarding the decision not to draft soldiers serving in 28 (Maori) Battalion. New Zealand's involvement in the occupation of Japan, it should be noted, was a continuation of the country's wartime commitment. While Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, New Zealand technically remained at war with Japan until 1951, when a peace treaty was signed between Japan and the Allied Powers. Under these circumstances, the government, in September 1945, would have been entitled to detail Maori volunteers within 28 (Maori) Battalion to serve in Japan in accordance with their commitment to serve for the war's duration. However, the government left it to Maori to decide for themselves whether they would serve in Japan or return to New Zealand.

Though not compelled to serve in Japan, Maori citizen soldiers were able to volunteer to serve in the occupation force. (Also, as discussed in the next chapter, a small number of Maori were among a limited regular Army component of Jayforce.) Policy discussions concerning the decision to include Maori in Jayforce have not been located.⁷¹ Cody notes that the question of Maori representation within Jayforce was settled 'after some correspondence' between 2NZEF and New Zealand.⁷² The inclusion of Maori in the occupation force contrasted with the British policy that had been applied to Maori members of the Pioneer Battalion at the end of World War I.

⁶⁷ Oliver A. Gillespie, *The Pacific*, Department of Internal Affairs, Historical Publications Branch, Wellington, 1952, p310.

⁶⁸ Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, pp201, 208. 'Jayforce', entry in Ian McGibbon (ed.), with assistance of Paul Goldstone, *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2000, p256.

⁶⁹ Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, p21, 25. Some officers were also detailed from the 10th to 12th reinforcements. Regular Force officers who had no choice as to where they served were also included in the initial deployment of troops to Japan. Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, pp26-27.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p25.

⁷¹ Several files were searched for relevant policy evidence, including ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, New Zealand Forces – 2nd NZEF Japan Section – Recruitment of forces, 1945-1946, ANZ Wellington.

⁷² J.F. Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1956, p483.

At this time, the Maori Pioneers – to their resentment – had not been allowed to enter Germany, evidently owing to sensitivities about the appropriateness of native troops participating in the occupation of a white people's lands.⁷³ Such concerns may not have existed in respect of the Japanese. Moreover, the decision to provide Maori with the opportunity to serve within Jayforce was consistent with policy and legislative developments in New Zealand that sought to create greater formal equality between Maori and Pakeha. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the aim of securing greater equality had been a key motivation underlying the Maori war effort.

Following the pattern established through the creation of the Maori Contingent and Pioneer Battalion in World War I and 28 (Maori) Battalion in World War II, Jayforce included a separate Maori unit – D Squadron of the Divisional Calvary Battalion, which was led initially by 28 (Maori) Battalion officer Major J.S. Baker.⁷⁴ Limited to 270 troops of all ranks, D Squadron was formed in October 1945, before 28 (Maori) Battalion began departing from Italy for New Zealand (this happened in early December 1945).⁷⁵ Cody states that there was no lack of volunteers and that recruitment was restricted to single men of the most recent reinforcements.⁷⁶ Drawing upon the organisational structure of 28 (Maori) Battalion, D Squadron included four tribally based sub-units – A, B, C, and D platoons.⁷⁷

The decision to establish a separate Maori unit within Jayforce continued the tradition of including such units within New Zealand's citizen-soldier forces deployed overseas. And, if volunteers from 28 (Maori) Battalion were to be allowed to serve in Japan, it was logical that Jayforce would include a Maori unit given that these individuals had originally volunteered to serve in 2NZEF within a separate unit. As noted above, Jayforce was, formally, a 2NZEF operation.

It is notable that the United States, which had the largest occupation force in Japan, continued at this time to have segregated army units for African Americans. As detailed earlier, a formal policy of integration was introduced in the United States Army in 1948, though the process of desegregation was to take several years. At least one African-American unit, the 24th Infantry Regiment, was stationed in Japan as part of the United States occupation force.⁷⁸

⁷³ Webb, 'Equality and Autonomy: An Overview of Māori Military Service for the Crown', pp132-133.

⁷⁴ Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, p483.

⁷⁵ Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, p28. Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, p484.

⁷⁶ Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, p483.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p483. In written correspondence with Laurie Brocklebank, Brian Poananga, who served in D Squadron, noted the tribal basis of the sub-units. Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, p28, 229 (footnote 15).

⁷⁸ See Yasuhiro Okada, 'Masculinity, and Military Occupation: African American Soldiers' Encounters with the Japanese at Camp Gifu, 1947-1951', *Journal of African American History*, Spring 2011, vol. 96, no. 2.

In 1950, following the withdrawal of Jayforce, a policy of integration was introduced with regard to New Zealand's non-regular Army forces. As discussed later, this policy decision was made in relation to the Territorial Force and was subsequently applied during the formation of Kayforce – the Army's final deployment of citizen-soldier volunteers. However, it will be explained that Maori groupings emerged within Kayforce, along with one formally designated, separate Maori unit.

The next chapter briefly examines Jayforce in respect of recruitment issues and the level of Maori involvement in the occupation force – not only in the initial force that landed in Japan in March 1946, but also in the two replacement drafts that were subsequently raised from volunteers in New Zealand.

Early calls for the formation of a separate Maori unit, August 1946

The existence of a Maori unit within Jayforce may have encouraged some Maori to consider that a separate Maori unit might be formed within the non-regular, peacetime Territorial Force. As noted earlier, Maori had requested separate Territorial units in the mid- to late-1930s, but these requests were generally declined and it is doubtful that any steps were taken to form such a unit before the outbreak of war. It will be explained here that in August 1946 some former senior officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion repeated the call for a separate Maori unit. Though not specified in the evidence that concerns this request, it appears these individuals sought the establishment of a separate Maori Territorial unit. With the return to peace, it was envisaged that the Army would be organised along the same lines as the interwar force. It would therefore consist of a relatively small regular component, which would focus primarily on overseeing the organisation, training, and equipment of a larger citizen-soldier element in the Territorial Force. By early 1946, army staff were beginning to plan the formation the peacetime Regular Force, with the Minister of Defence announcing plans for a regular 'Interim Army' on 9 May 1946.⁷⁹

In late August 1946, while enlistments for the Interim Army were being taken, former senior officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion called for the formation of a separate Maori unit.⁸⁰ The matter was raised during a meeting held on 29 August 1946. This meeting, evidently attended by a number of former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion, was called to discuss the publication of the Battalion's unit history, which was being prepared within the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs.

⁷⁹ 'Interim Army', *Evening Post*, 9 May 1946, extract (typed copy) in AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, Organisation – Interim Army – organisation and enlistment conditions, 1946-1946, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁰ 'Separate Unit – Defence Forces – Proposal by Maoris', *Evening Post*, 30 August 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 EA1 box 600 87/5/8 part 1, NZ Forces – special units – Maori forces, 1942-1946, ANZ Wellington.

Lieutenant-Colonel George Bertrand informed the *Evening Post* that he raised the issue of a separate Maori unit because he had been anxious to obtain the opinion of other senior officers, believing that many, like himself, were ‘military minded’ and anxious to preserve the identity of Maori within a separate unit.⁸¹ Bertrand explained that he had consulted Ngata, ‘the Father of the Battalion’, and had received the following letter of support:

I approve your plans for a peacetime Maori unit, and all that is implied in giving body to the maintenance of a splendid tradition of service in the two world wars. It would focus the interest of the officers and the men now serving in it, and provide an objective to the youth of the tribes in the years to come. Nothing would be so effective in breaking down the prejudices which militated so greatly against the war service of some tribes, so that if ever New Zealand is called upon again to maintain the ideologies of the Empire, our people everywhere would be found ready.⁸²

Bertrand stated that other senior officers had responded enthusiastically to the proposal for a separate unit. He believed that without such a unit young Maori would hesitate to go into training alongside Pakeha, whereas they would not object to training with their fellow Maori. Bertrand acknowledged that some of the officers had a personal interest in the matter and were concerned that, without a separate Maori unit, they would face a ‘lack of continuity in their military life’. Like Ngata, Bertrand considered that the creation of such a unit would prevent the tradition of the 28 (Maori) Battalion from dying. The Battalion, he argued, should be able to retain the position it had secured during the war. ‘We feel that the Maoris have proved their capacity in two world wars. We want our own unit.’ Bertrand pointed to the existence of a Scottish unit in the New Zealand Army and suggested that the Maori had ‘a greater claim than the Scots’.⁸³

⁸¹ Bertrand served in both World Wars I and II. At the outbreak of World War II he was appointed second in command of the Maori Battalion and served in Greece (including Crete) and North Africa. He was recalled to New Zealand and from 1942 to 1944 was in charge of a Maori training unit. ‘Haere ki o koutou Tipuna – George F. Bertrand’, *Te Ao Hou*, No. 22, April 1958, p3. ‘Separate Unit – Defence Forces – Proposal by Maoris’, *Evening Post*, 30 August 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 EA1 box 600 87/5/8 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸² ‘Separate Unit – Defence Forces – Proposal by Maoris’, *Evening Post*, 30 August 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 EA1 box 600 87/5/8 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸³ Ibid. The New Zealand Scottish Regiment was established in January 1939 after the Army had been lobbied for a number of years to follow other Commonwealth countries and include a kilted Scottish regiment. Units were set up in Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland as part of the Territorial Force. From late 1942 to mid 1943, 1 Battalion of the Scottish Regiment served briefly in the Pacific before being disbanded. Oliver Gillespie, *Base Wallahs: Story of the Units of the Base Organisation, NZEF IP*, Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, Dunedin, 1946, pp70-78. ‘Laying up of the New Zealand Scottish Regiment colours’, 8 April 2016, Toitū Otago Settlers Museum website, accessed 6 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.toituosm.com/whats-on/news/laying-up-of-the-new-zealand-scottish-regiment-colours>

Other former senior officers of the Battalion also offered comments in support of the proposed separate Maori unit. The *Post* reported that Major Rangī Royal had strongly urged the adoption of the idea at a recent meeting in New Plymouth and that he intended to place the matter before iwi during an upcoming tour of the North Island.⁸⁴ In 1944, Royal had been appointed Chief Welfare Officer within the Native Department. In September 1946, soon after the meeting of senior officers, he was appointed Controller of the Department's newly-created Maori Welfare Organisation (later the Maori Welfare Division), which was set up under the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945.⁸⁵

Former Battalion commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Bennett was also reported to be in favour of a separate Maori unit. At this time, Bennett was working on a draft of the Battalion's history within the War History Branch under Kippenberger.⁸⁶ The *Post* reported that Bennett considered the Battalion to have been 'the greatest inspiration of Maori youth in modern times' and that it would be a loss to New Zealand if that sentiment was not capitalised upon. Bennett believed the response of Maori youth would assure the unit's success.⁸⁷

While those who attended the meeting unanimously supported the establishment of a separate unit, Lieutenant-Colonel Bertrand believed the issue had to be put before the Maori people. He stated that those who had been consulted were in favour of the proposal, but he noted that some tribes had yet to consider the matter.⁸⁸ Within the files examined for this report, no evidence has been located regarding any steps that Bertrand and the other former officers took to further promote the proposal and gauge wider Maori opinion. Neither the Army nor government appear to have responded to the issue at this time. But given that the matter had been reported upon

⁸⁴ Royal, like Bertrand, had also served in World War I. During World War II he served as commander of B Company in Greece (including Crete) and Libya. Wounded in late 1941, he returned to New Zealand early in 1942 and became involved in training of Maori soldiers before resuming work with his pre-war employer, the Native Department. Te Ahukaramu Charles Royal and Tom Jamison, 'Royal, Te Rangiatāhūa Kīniwe', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 6 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4r29/royal-te-rangiatāhūa-kīniwe>
'Separate Unit – Defence Forces – Proposal by Maoris', *Evening Post*, 30 August 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 box 600 EA1 87/5/8 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁵ Royal and Jamison, 'Royal, Te Rangiatāhūa Kīniwe', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

⁸⁶ Having enlisted as a private at the outbreak of World War II, Bennett undertook officer training before embarking overseas in May 1940. He fought in Greece (including Crete) and North Africa. By October 1942, he had assumed command of B Company, and the following month took over command of the Battalion. He occupied this position until April 1943, when he was wounded. Angela Ballara, 'Bennett, Charles Moihī Te Arawaka', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 6 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5b23/bennett-charles-moihī-te-arawaka>

⁸⁷ 'Separate Unit – Defence Forces – Proposal by Maoris', *Evening Post*, 30 August 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 box 600 EA1 87/5/8 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

in the press, it is likely that, within both, there was an awareness of the proposal that had been put forward. As discussed later, the issue of a separate Maori unit would, however, continue to surface and be debated, even after it was officially decided in March 1950 that non-regular Maori and Pakeha soldiers would serve together in integrated units.

Maori and the Interim Army – the right to serve questioned and confirmed, 1946-1947

While senior officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion were proposing the formation of a separate Maori unit within the non-regular Territorial Force, Army and political leaders had yet to confirm that Maori would be able to serve in the post-war Regular Force. The question of Maori participation surfaced during planning for the Interim Army – the temporary force that would serve as a transition between the wartime force and peacetime regular Army. It will be explained here that, during the development of recruitment policy, army staff decided that Maori should be excluded from entering the Interim Army except where they possessed ‘special qualifications’. However, this decision, which probably represented a return to the entry criteria of the interwar Permanent Force, was reversed after the Minister of Defence became aware of the policy – a move that opened the way for Maori involvement in the post-war regular Army.

As noted above, planning for the Interim Army was underway in early 1946. On 9 May 1946, the Minister of Defence made a public announcement about the transitional service scheme. He called for enlistments, expressing the hope that numbers would be sufficient to enable serving personnel who sought release to be discharged by September 1946. Enlistments for the Interim Army would be taken from existing personnel and civilians. The Minister noted that those who proved suitable would be favourably considered for permanent positions in the Regular Force.⁸⁹ Though army leaders looked to establish an interim force of about 6,200 personnel, this was to be substantially cut at the request of political leaders.⁹⁰

Following the Minister of Defence’s announcement, staff at Army Headquarters began further developing recruitment criteria for the Interim Army. In a document dated 10 June 1946, Army Headquarters set out enlistment criteria and the terms and conditions of service. The document noted that opportunities existed for employment in administrative and clerical positions as well as in mechanical, semi-skilled and unskilled trades. Applications would be considered from:

⁸⁹ ‘Interim Army’, *Evening Post*, 9 May 1946, extract (typed copy) in AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁰ Minutes of conference held at Army Headquarters on 19 July 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, 1946-1946, ANZ Wellington.

- (1) present serving members of the New Zealand Temporary Staff (NZTS);
- (2) ex members of New Zealand military forces;
- (3) discharged navy or air force personnel; and
- (4) civilians of British nationality without previous service experience.⁹¹

On 27 June 1946, further instructions were issued as to the enlistment eligibility of civilians and current members of the NZTS. In a widely circulated memorandum, the Adjutant General, Brigadier A.E. Conway, clarified that enlistments should not be accepted from:

- (1) Maori, except where they possessed some special qualifications;
- (2) Indians, Chinese, and other Asiatics; and
- (3) Aliens.⁹²

The available documentary evidence does not set out Army Headquarters' reasoning for the eligibility criteria that was to be applied to enlistments in the Interim Army. The Minister of Defence and other members of the Labour Government do not appear to have been consulted about the criteria ahead of their introduction. It seems likely that the exclusionary enlistment criteria were based on policies that had applied during the pre-war years, though specific evidence concerning the Permanent Force's interwar entry criteria has not been located. It should be noted that, while the provision that applied to Maori would certainly serve to restrict Maori involvement, it did not amount to an outright proscription against Maori, who could – if specially qualified – enter the force and serve alongside Pakeha.

The Minister of Defence, Fred Jones, evidently became aware of the enlistment policy early in September 1946, when the general secretary of the Returned Services Association (RSA) forwarded him a letter from three Maori members whose enlistment applications had been refused.⁹³ Named in later correspondence, it appears these individuals were Sam Clark, K. Tamihana, and W. Poroa, all of whom were members of the RSA's Western Bay of Plenty Branch.⁹⁴ Their letter stated that:

We and a lot of other Maori returned ex-servicemen, wish to know exactly why we soldiers with overseas service are prohibited from entering the ranks of the N.Z. staff and the Interim Army.

⁹¹ Army Headquarters, memorandum, 'New Zealand military forces – enlistment in the Interim Army', 10 June 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹² Adjutant General, memorandum, 'Interim Army', 27 June 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹³ General Secretary, RSA, to Minister of Defence, 2 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁴ See Minister of Rehabilitation to Minister of Defence, 16 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

We voice a protest against such action, because we all definitely understood, that the returned soldier, brown or white he may be, had the first option on enlisting.

Instead, application forms are being rejected for no apparent reason other than we being Maoris.

Some of us, like the Pakeha ex-serviceman, wish to make the Army our career because of unsuitable employment, but we find us thus handicapped.

The world of today is so different from the world of yesterday, when we Maoris had nothing to fear whatever, of having our application forms rejected.

In those days they didn't say – "Not accepting Maori enlistments for overseas service."⁹⁵

As well as forwarding the Minister this letter, the RSA general secretary also enclosed one of the refused application forms, pointing out that it had been 'marked bluntly in blue pencil' and 'returned without even the courtesy of a covering letter'. The general secretary's letter did not question the exclusion policy and stated only that the RSA believed a call for greater courtesy be issued to the recruitment officer concerned. He advised, however, that a copy of his letter to the Minister of Defence was being sent to the Minister of Native Affairs.⁹⁶ Research has not located this letter or any response from the Native Minister.

In response to the RSA general secretary's letter, the Minister of Defence sought to establish who had been responsible for the decision not to include Maori in the Interim Army.⁹⁷ Following up on the matter, the Adjutant General, now Brigadier Keith Stewart, wrote to Headquarters of the Northern Military District, within which the refused applications had been handled. The new Adjutant General did not signal there would be any shift in policy and acknowledged that the refusal of the applications had been in accordance with the memorandum issued on 27 June 1946. However, he stated that Army Headquarters considered 'the crudely-casual' way that the Maori applicants had been dealt with was unjustifiable.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ A copy of this letter has not been located. However, its contents were quoted in subsequent correspondence. See Adjutant General to Headquarters, Northern Military District, 5 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁶ General Secretary, RSA, to Minister of Defence, 2 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁷ Minister of Defence, minute, 3 September 1946, on General Secretary, RSA, to Minister of Defence, 2 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁸ Adjutant General to Headquarters, Northern Military District, 5 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

On 7 September 1946, the refusal of Maori applications for the Interim Army was also brought to the attention of the Minister of Rehabilitation, Clarence Skinner, when he attended an RSA conference in Te Kuiti. On 16 September 1946, Skinner wrote to the Minister of Defence, advising that the following remit had been discussed:

That Maoris should be eligible for enlistment in interim and permanent forces as they were eligible for overseas service in the 2nd N.Z.E.F.⁹⁹

Stating that he had told the conference that Maori eligibility for enlistment was identical to that of Pakeha, Skinner asked the Minister of Defence to enquire into the cases where Maori applications had been refused.¹⁰⁰

A change of policy was soon introduced, probably following instructions from the Minister of Defence, though no evidence to confirm this has been located. On 24 September 1946, the Adjutant General, Stewart, issued a circular memorandum that cancelled the existing policy and ordered that: 'Enlistment of Maoris in the Interim Army will in future be on the same basis as that for Europeans'.¹⁰¹ A few days later, on 27 September 1946, the Minister wrote letters to both the General Secretary of the RSA and the Minister of Rehabilitation, advising of the change of policy.¹⁰² He suggested that the latter inform the RSA at Te Kuiti that Maori were now being considered and that those who wished to enlist should resubmit their applications.¹⁰³ Army Headquarters also made enquiries to identify the individual who had handled the refused application that had been enclosed with the RSA General Secretary's letter to the Minister of Defence. It was established that the person involved had since been released to civilian life.¹⁰⁴

Though a clear policy of allowing Maori enlistment was introduced in September 1946, the next chapter will explain that recruitment officers in some areas introduced separate vetting procedures for Maori applicants. Lasting for several years, this administrative practice was of a less conspicuous nature, but nevertheless meant that some Maori continued to face barriers for recruitment into the Interim Army and subsequent permanent body. The transition from Interim Army to permanent

⁹⁹ Minister of Rehabilitation to Minister of Defence, 16 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Adjutant General, memorandum, 'Interim Army', 24 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰² Minister of Defence to General Secretary, RSA, 27 September 1946; Minister of Defence to Minister of Rehabilitation, 27 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰³ Minister of Defence to Minister of Rehabilitation, 27 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰⁴ Commandant, Northern District, to Army H.Q., 18 February 1947, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

Regular Force was confirmed in February 1948, with Cabinet approving a new peacetime establishment that numbered 3747 personnel of all ranks.¹⁰⁵

The decision against the establishment of a separate Maori unit in the Territorial Force, 1950

It has been explained that, at an official policy level at least, the ability of Maori to serve in the peacetime regular Army was confirmed by late September 1946, but the question of whether Maori would serve alongside Pakeha or separately in the larger non-regular Army yet to be settled. In August 1946, as detailed above, some former senior officers of the Maori Battalion had called for the establishment of a separate Maori unit in the Territorial Force, but no evidence has been located to indicate that this prompted army staff or political leaders to consider the issue at this time. However, the question would resurface during planning for the post-war CMT scheme, which was introduced in 1949 and required both Pakeha and Maori to serve. Early the following year, Cabinet decided – in accordance with advice received from senior army staff – that Maori would serve within the scheme alongside Pakeha, rather than separately. This decision was to have implications beyond the CMT scheme and saw a policy of integration applied to non-regular Army elements generally. The next section of the chapter will explain that Kayforce, composed of citizen-soldier volunteers, was formed on an integrated basis and – unlike the earlier citizen-soldier forces of 1NZEF and 2NZEF – initially did not include a separate Maori unit.

Maori and the Compulsory Military Training scheme

As noted above, the issue of integration was addressed during the planning that surrounded the reintroduction of CMT, which became the focus of New Zealand's post-war military preparations.¹⁰⁶ Under the Military Service Act 1949, all 18-year olds were required to register for training, with those deemed fit for service to be posted to one of the three armed services.¹⁰⁷ Most, however, would serve in the Army's Territorial Force.¹⁰⁸ In reintroducing CMT, the government sought to ensure that New Zealand was able to meet its post-war defence commitments, which – in the context of the developing Cold War – were centred upon providing a contribution

¹⁰⁵ Adjutant General to Minister of Defence, 24 October 1947; Adjutant General to Minister of Defence, 24 May 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1187 228/2/2 part 1, Establishments – establishments, peace, Regular Force – instructions, 1947-1950, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰⁶ Christopher Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation: the New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo, 1949-1966*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003, p6.

¹⁰⁷ Under the Military Training Amendment Act 1949, this was extended to 20-year olds, 18- and 19-year olds having already been called up.

¹⁰⁸ 'Compulsory military training', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p110.

to a Commonwealth war effort against the Soviet Union. In late 1948, the role that New Zealand would play in such a conflict was confirmed when Peter Fraser met with British Chiefs of Staff in London. The plan, which was withheld from the New Zealand public, involved the deployment of New Zealand forces to the Middle East. An important feature of this commitment – and one that the CMT scheme aimed to meet – was that it required the New Zealand forces to reach the theatre quickly, within 90 days of the outbreak of war – a timeframe much shorter than the period over which 2nd New Zealand Division had been dispatched at the beginning of World War II.¹⁰⁹

The Middle East commitment and its requirements were an important part of the context within which the issue of whether the Territorial Force would include a separate Maori unit was considered. The available documentary evidence that relates to the decision making that surrounded this issue does not specifically refer to the commitment, but it clearly would have helped to frame the discussions. For example, it will later be explained that a separate Maori unit that covered the whole country was seen to present certain organisational difficulties, which may have been viewed as an impediment to the fast deployment that the plan required. On the other hand, the scenario that the commitment entailed, which closely matched 2nd New Zealand Division's role in World War II, may have made some politicians and Army leaders more amenable to the idea of a Maori Territorial unit – given that there were signs of Maori support for such a unit and that a separate Maori unit had very recently served within 2nd New Zealand Division.

New Zealand's commitment to provide forces for service in the Middle East ended in 1955, when the country's defence focus shifted instead to South-East Asia.¹¹⁰ CMT remained in place until 1958.¹¹¹ The Second Labour Government discontinued the scheme, arguing that its cost and the number of Army personnel involved in running it could not be justified.¹¹² This marked an important transition in defence planning – the shift away from deployment of citizen-volunteers towards a reliance on personnel enlisted in the Regular Force, who could be deployed quickly, though in smaller numbers. However, after regaining office, National reintroduced a more limited training scheme. Under the National Military Service Act 1961, a significantly smaller number of recruits were balloted annually from a pool of 20-year-old men.

¹⁰⁹ 'Middle East commitment', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p318.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ The legislation that abolished CMT was passed in 1958. However, the Act did not come into effect until 1 April 1959. See the National Service Registration Act 1958.

¹¹² 'Compulsory military training', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p112.

This scheme lasted until 1972, when it was abolished by the newly-elected Labour Government.¹¹³

Early in 1946, the potential role of Maori within any future national training scheme was discussed during a meeting between the RSA and the Acting Prime Minister and some other senior members of the Labour Government, including the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Rehabilitation. (Sometime beforehand, the Dominion Council of the RSA had passed a resolution that called for the introduction of a compulsory training scheme.¹¹⁴) At the meeting, which appears to have been held at the end of February 1946, discussion concerning the potential Maori involvement did not deal with the issue of integration, but focused instead upon whether Maori would be included in any scheme and, if so, whether this would be on a voluntary or compulsory basis.

Prior to the meeting, the Adjutant General, Conway, had commented on these matters in a memorandum prepared for the Minister of Defence. The question of whether Maori should be subject to a future compulsory military service scheme was, the Adjutant General stated, 'a matter of Government policy'. He noted that when CMT had been introduced under the Defence Act 1909, Maori had been liable for training, but except at first this had not been applied. Their participation 'virtually became voluntary' and only a small number served in the Territorial Force. (The fact that Maori largely lived in rural areas and had limited English language skills has been put forward as a reason why Maori were not expected to comply with the Defence Act.¹¹⁵) Conway further noted that, apart from when voluntary recruiting had 'failed' towards the end of World War I, Maori service during both World Wars I and II had also been on a voluntary basis.¹¹⁶

When the meeting was held, there was evidently consensus that Maori participation in any future military training scheme should be on a voluntary basis. An RSA representative, Taylor, emphasised that the RSA 'would not enforce their views on the Maori race'. He stated that Maori should be consulted on any future training scheme and be trained only if this was 'feasible'. Jones, the Minister of Defence, indicated that he thought Maori would choose to participate, stating in reference to the recent involvement on Maori in World War II that 'they had made a great response on a voluntary basis'.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Ibid., pp111-113.

¹¹⁴ Jones to Army Secretary, 15 February 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1125 210/1/103, Training – training Maoris – policy, 1946, ANZ Wellington.

¹¹⁵ Webb, 'Equality and Autonomy: An Overview of Māori Military Service for the Crown', p69.

¹¹⁶ Adjutant General to Minister of Defence, 29 February 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1125 210/1/103, ANZ Wellington.

¹¹⁷ Minutes of meeting, 'Defence, rehabilitation, war pensions, and land settlement', undated, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1125 210/1/103, ANZ Wellington.

Army planning for the possible introduction of a national training scheme began during 1946, when an initial scheme was outlined.¹¹⁸ In 1947, Army staff began to give some attention to the role that Maori would play and whether they should train separately from Pakeha. In a planning document dated 3 September 1947, potential Maori involvement was discussed on the basis that Maori would be part of the scheme and would serve compulsorily. It was suggested that, where possible, Maori should serve together:

Assuming that the Maori people will come within any future plan for a Territorial Force, it is desirable for reasons of tradition, racial prestige, and administrative convenience that Maori recruits be grouped in complete units or sub-units, wherever this may be possible. Owing to the admixturation of European and Maori populations, this will not be possible in many areas, and individual Maoris will appear in predominantly non-Maori units. On the other hand concentrations of Maori people exist in certain areas, and units formed therein should be exclusively Maori.¹¹⁹

Around the middle of 1948, when Army Headquarters appears to have next considered the matter, planning was instead carried out on the assumption that Maori involvement would be voluntary. Partly because of this, a proposal for a separate Maori Battalion was rejected, perhaps because it was thought there would be insufficient Maori trainees to form a battalion. Other reasons for rejecting the establishment of a Maori battalion at this time included anticipated administrative difficulties associated with the distribution of the Maori population. Also, if the total number of infantry battalions was to be limited to the nine required for a standard division, it would not be possible to form a Maori Battalion without disbanding a 'pakeha battalion', all of which 'had a longer existence and more regimental traditions than the Maori Battalion'. Further, it was understood that Maori did not universally wish to serve in an all-Maori unit.¹²⁰

In the end, however, Labour's leadership decided that Maori would be included in the compulsory training scheme – as they legally had been under the 1909 Act, even though the provisions were not enforced. Peter Fraser, Prime Minister and Minister of Maori Affairs, appears to have played a key role in this decision. On 30 June 1949,

¹¹⁸ This outline plan has not been located. It is mentioned in Chief of the General Staff, memorandum, 'Alteration of Inter District Boundaries', 26 September 1947, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1483 209/1/1 part 2, Organisation – district and areas, 1920-1948, ANZ Wellington.

¹¹⁹ Planning document, 'Readjustment of existing central-northern district boundary', 3 September 1947, p3, attached to Chief of the General Staff, memorandum, 'Alteration of Inter District Boundaries', 26 September 1947, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1483 209/1/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

¹²⁰ See Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 7 July 1949; and Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 16 December 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington. These documents set out the policy recommendations that were made in mid-1948 and the reasoning that underpinned the view that a Maori Battalion should not be established.

during debates on the Military Training Poll Bill, which provided for a national referendum on CMT, Fraser informed the House of Representatives that:

There are no exemptions here for anybody at all... I want to make that also beyond any question, because I am sure some of the Maori members of the House will say that the Maori race has arrived at the stage when they are claiming equality, and the claiming of equality of privileges and rights means equality of responsibility.¹²¹

The Maori people, Fraser asserted, would want to be included and ‘would resent anything else’.¹²²

While it was consistent with the position that had existed under the 1909 Act, the inclusion of Maori in the post-war CMT scheme – though it did not commit Maori to active, overseas service – marked a departure from the voluntary basis that had underlain Maori service during World Wars I and II. Justifying the decision to include Maori, Fraser described compulsory Maori participation as a responsibility that was linked to recent advances that had seen Maori secure greater formal equality and equality of treatment with Pakeha. These advances, it has been explained, had been the focus of the Labour’s Maori policy, with the Maori contribution to the war effort adding weight to the push for change. The changes that were introduced included, for example, significant reforms to the Maori electoral system, which aligned voting in the Maori seats more closely to the system that applied in the European electorates. During debates on the Military Training Poll Bill, Fraser seemingly acknowledged these reforms, emphasising that Maori ‘will have the vote and they will serve’.¹²³ A few months earlier, in March 1949, Maori had been able to participate for the first time in a national referendum.¹²⁴

During debates concerning the Military Training Poll Bill, Fraser did not discuss the issue of whether Maori would train separately or alongside Pakeha. However, this issue was raised around the time the Bill was enacted on 1 July 1949. On the same day, Tawai Kawiti, Secretary of the Kawakawa Tribal Executive Committee, wrote to Fraser, advising that the committee wished to see, upon CMT becoming law, a Maori battalion raised and organised along the same tribal lines as 28 (Maori) Battalion.¹²⁵ Fraser forwarded the letter to Defence Minister Jones, who then referred it to the

¹²¹ *NZPD*, vol. 285, 30 June 1949, p85.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ On 9 March 1949, eligible Maori voters were able to vote in two referenda that concerned the introduction of totaliser betting and the hours of sale for liquor. *New Zealand Gazette*, 1949, no. 22, p861.

¹²⁵ Kawiti, Secretary, Kawakawa Tribal Executive, to Prime Minister, 1 July 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

Army Secretary.¹²⁶ As detailed below, Fraser soon after stated at a public meeting that he had instructed the Army to explore the possibility of setting up a Maori battalion within the CMT scheme.¹²⁷

In a memo prepared for the Minister of Defence, dated 7 July 1949, the Chief of the General Staff (and former commander of Jayforce), Keith Stewart, discussed the proposal for a separate Maori unit.¹²⁸ Stewart recommended that, as it had been decided that Maori would be required to undertake training, a Maori battalion should be added to the proposed Territorial Force. Noting that this was a reversal of Army Headquarters' previous thinking on the matter, he explained that the compulsory inclusion of Maori meant there would be more men available than the Armed Forces required. (It seems that the Maori battalion that Stewart proposed would be an addition to the standard number included in an infantry division.) Stewart further stated that, if the recommendation was accepted, he would consult Maori representatives in respect of matters such as the location of companies and the appointment of officers. He pointed out that some Maori, depending on where they lived, would not be able to serve with the proposed battalion, while others would have to serve with Pakeha if they wished to be in a non-infantry unit.¹²⁹ On 12 July 1949, at the Minister of Defence's direction, Stewart forwarded his memo of 7 July 1949 to the Prime Minister.¹³⁰

Army Headquarters' file evidence shows that in the lead up to the referendum, which was held on 3 August 1949, no clear decision was made regarding whether a Maori battalion would be created in connection with the introduction of CMT. However, Rangi Royal later claimed that, prior to the poll, Maori had been led to believe that a Maori battalion would be set up. In a memo to the Minister of Defence, dated 10 March 1950, the Chief of the General Staff stated that Royal alleged that Fraser had instructed him to go out among the Maori people and encourage them to vote in favour of CMT on the understanding that, if the scheme was introduced, a Maori battalion would be established. Royal, who in the lead up to the poll had been Chief Welfare Officer within the Native Department, stated that other welfare officers in the Department had been instructed to take similar action. He also claimed that Fraser and Eruera Tirikatene, the Ratana-Labour MP for Southern Maori and Member of the Executive Council Representing the Maori Race, several times

¹²⁶ Fraser to Jones, 4 July 1949, minute on Fraser to Kawiti, 4 July 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington. Jones to Army Secretary, 5 July 1949, minute on Fraser to Kawiti, 4 July 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹²⁷ See 'Maori Battalion may be revived after poll taken', *Dominion*, 11 July 1949, p6.

¹²⁸ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 7 July 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Chief of the General Staff to Prime Minister, 12 July 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

announced publicly that there would be a Maori battalion.¹³¹ No evidence has been located to confirm Royal's statements regarding the instructions given to him ahead of the poll or the public pronouncements that he claimed Fraser and Tirikatene had made.

Research has, however, found evidence of one occasion when, in the lead up to the CMT referendum, Fraser spoke publicly on the possibility of establishing a Maori battalion. On 9 July 1949, he commented on the issue during a speech made at the opening of a Maori community centre at Freeman's Bay. From a report published in the *Dominion*, it appears that Fraser spoke in favour of the establishment of a Maori battalion, but made no clear assurances. He indicated that, if a Maori battalion was set up, it would probably assemble only occasionally as a full unit. It was likely that Maori would have to train in groups that were far apart, in different districts, but Fraser believed it was 'not beyond military organisation to see that sometimes they get together'. He told the gathering he had put this idea to the military authorities in the hope it would be carried out. (Presumably, Stewart's memo of 7 July 1949 was prepared, at least partly, as a response.) The *Dominion* reported that Fraser's proposal was warmly received by the gathering, which included Maori from most parts of the North Island. It was noted that Fraser's words had been preceded by speeches from Reverend Mutu Kapa (representing Waikato Maori) and Major Ray Vercoe (representing Te Arawa), both of whom supported the compulsory inclusion of Maori in the proposed training scheme.¹³²

Tirikatene also appears to have fallen short of announcing that a Maori battalion would be set up if the proposed training scheme was introduced. As with Fraser, Tirikatene, during the lead up to the CMT poll on 3 August 1949, spoke publicly about the possibility of a Maori battalion being established on at least one occasion. On 13 July 1949, he referred to the matter in a speech to the House during the Address in Reply debate. Noting that he himself had undertaken compulsory military training (presumably under the 1909 Act) and had served overseas, Tirikatene spoke strongly in support of CMT and expressed confidence that Maori would vote in favour of the scheme.¹³³ He emphasised that: 'It is not a matter of conscription for war; it is a matter of compulsory military training'. Tirikatene suggested that those who passed through the scheme – Maori and Pakeha – would benefit in five ways:

¹³¹ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 10 March 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹³² 'Maori Battalion may be revived after poll taken', *Dominion*, 11 July 1949, p6.

¹³³ *NZPD*, vol. 285, 13 July 1949, p407. During World War I, Tirikatene served with the New Zealand (Maori) Pioneer Battalion in Egypt and France. Angela Ballara, 'Tirikatene, Eruera Tihema Te Aika', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 21 March 2017. URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4t18/tirikatene-eruera-tihema-te-aika>

- (1) They would be medically examined and as a result any ailments would be detected, providing an opportunity for these to be addressed.
- (2) They would have the right to nominate the service they wished to carry out their training in.
- (3) They would meet hundreds of other young men and would make many friends.
- (4) They would benefit from military discipline and pass some of this on to later generations.
- (5) They would be better prepared – ‘given a sporting chance at least’ – if later called up for active serve.¹³⁴

In response to the suggestion that a Maori battalion might be established, Tirikatene thought it would be preferable for Maori to train alongside Pakeha: ‘I think it would be better for them to train in their districts with their pakeha friends’. However, in the event of war, he considered that Maori should again be able to form and serve within a separate battalion. He noted the existence of two Scottish regiments in New Zealand and was confident that – as long as Labour remained in power, at least – Maori would again be allowed to have their own unit and have officers trained as commanders. ‘Let them train together, then, later on, it would be their privilege and honour to form their own battalion.’¹³⁵

Tirikatene shared Fraser’s view that the shift towards formal equality with Pakeha was coupled with obligations and responsibilities. Though he did not directly say so, this view is likely to have informed Tirikatene’s position on Maori involvement in the proposed training scheme. In his speech during the Address in Reply debate, Tirikatene spoke generally about the changing place of Maori in society:

In recent years there has been an endeavour to give the Maori a place in the community. Over the past fifteen years there has been a growing recognition of the fact that the Maori is entitled to his rights and privileges, and to equality, while on the other hand the Maori people realize that those rights and privileges carry with them real responsibilities, I have no hesitation in saying that the Maori people will not back down from those responsibilities.¹³⁶

Tirikatene possibly thought that Maori should train alongside Pakeha because this would improve their knowledge and understanding of each other. During the Address in Reply debate, the MP for Southern Maori noted the cultural difference that separated Maori and Pakeha:

¹³⁴ *NZPD*, vol. 285, 13 July 1949, p407.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p409.

On the advent of the pakeha a hundred years ago there was a great change, and from that time onwards the Maori has had to fight an uphill battle, not only for an economic existence but in an endeavour to understand the pakeha outlook and attitude. No doubt the pakeha also had this problem in understanding the Maori. At any rate, I can make this claim, that the Maori has come through with flying colours.¹³⁷

On about 20 July 1949, Tirikatene also spoke publicly on Maori involvement in CMT during a large public meeting held in the Wellington Town Hall. However, from the newspaper report of this RSA-sponsored meeting, it is not clear that he made any reference to the possible establishment of a Maori battalion. The *Evening Post* stated that Tirikatene, one of seven speakers, spoke initially in Maori and then in English. The paper did not report upon what Tirikatene said in te reo and stated only that, speaking in English, he pledged the support of Maori for the proposed training scheme.¹³⁸

Tiaki Omana (Jack Ormond) and Tapihana Paikea, the Ratana-Labour MPs for Eastern and Northern Maori, also commented on the proposed training scheme and spoke in favour of Maori involvement. On 14 July 1949, during the Address and Reply debate, Omana expressed support for the comments Tirikatene had made and told the House that ‘the vast majority of the Maori people’ would vote in favour of CMT.¹³⁹ Like Tirikatene, Omana suggested that in the event of war Maori should again be able to serve in their own battalion on a voluntary basis.¹⁴⁰

Speaking in the House on 15 July 1946, Paikea expressed similar views, reiterating many of the points that Tirikatene had made two days earlier. The MP for Northern Maori believed that Maori youths would benefit from the training, discipline, and leadership they would receive, and that this would bring wider benefits to their people. He pointed to the post-war achievements of two former 28 (Maori) Battalion commanding officers, Fred Baker and James Henare, both from Taitokerau, ‘who were good soldiers and are now doing splendid work in our maraes as leaders of our people in their economic life’.¹⁴¹ Paikea also seems to have shared the view that, in

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ ‘Compulsory military training – city endorses proposals’, *Evening Post*, 22 July 1949, p7.

¹³⁹ Like Tirikatene, Omana had also served with the Pioneer Battalion during World War I, though he was evidently conscripted as a Pakeha. Cushla Parekowhai, ‘Omana, Tiaki’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 22 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/406/omana-tiaki>

¹⁴⁰ *NZPD*, vol. 285, 14 July 1949, p445.

¹⁴¹ *NZPD*, vol. 285, 15 July 1949, p512. Graham Butterworth, ‘Baker, Frederick’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 22 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5b3/baker-frederick>

Puna McConnell and Robin C. McConnell, ‘Henare, James Clendon Tau’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 22 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5h15/henare-james-clendon-tau>

the event of war, Maori should be able re-establish the Maori Battalion and serve voluntarily within this unit – ‘to perpetuate the memory of our boys who made the supreme sacrifice overseas’.¹⁴²

The Ratana-Labour MP for Western Maori, Matiu Ratana, did not comment on the proposed training scheme during debates in the House. In May 1949, Ratana had been hospitalised following a serious car accident.¹⁴³ Remaining in hospital, he died on 7 October 1949.¹⁴⁴

When the CMT referendum was held on 3 August 1949, Maori voted in support of the proposed training scheme. In the four Maori seats, 63.9 percent of valid votes were cast in favour of CMT.¹⁴⁵ While this represented a clear majority, the result fell short of the ‘vast majority’ that Omana had predicted and was significantly lower than the level of support that existed in European electorates, where 78.3 percent of votes were in favour of the proposed training scheme. The poll showed some voting differences between the four seats. Voters in Western Maori showed the least support for CMT, with only 58.0 percent voting in favour of the proposed training scheme. Of all the valid votes cast in Maori and European electorates, 77.9 percent supported CMT. Voting in the Maori seats accounted for only 2.6 percent of total votes. The number of valid Maori votes in the CMT poll, while a little less than the number cast in the two referenda held in March 1949, amounted to only just over half the number of valid Maori votes that would be counted in the general election held on 29 and 30 November 1949.¹⁴⁶

Rejection of the plan to establish a separate Maori unit

Early in September 1949, about one month after the CMT referendum, Army Headquarters pressed the Minister of Defence for an answer to the question of whether or not a Maori battalion would be established within the Territorial Force. As detailed above, the Chief of the General Staff, Stewart, had recommended, in a memo dated 7 July 1949, that a separate Maori unit be created if Maori were to be included in the training scheme. On 7 September 1949, Stewart telephoned the

¹⁴² The record of Paikea’s speech does not explicitly state that he believed the Maori Battalion should be re-established only in the event of war. However, it appears this was his view because, earlier in his speech, he had spoken positively of the mixing of Pakeha and Maori that would occur as a result of CMT: ‘The meeting together of youths of the same age will no doubt engender a spirit of comradeship and understanding, which is so essential to the wellbeing of the young people of both races.’ *NZPD*, vol. 285, 15 July 1949, p512.

¹⁴³ *NZPD*, vol. 288, 14 October 1949, p2837.

¹⁴⁴ *NZPD*, vol. 288, 7 October 1949, p2679.

¹⁴⁵ *New Zealand Gazette*, 1949, no. 49, p1784. The CMT poll figures presented in this paragraph have been rounded to one decimal point.

¹⁴⁶ As noted above, the referenda held on 9 March 1949 concerned the introduction of totaliser betting and the hours of sale for liquor. *New Zealand Gazette*, 1949, no. 22, p861. For details of Maori voting in the 1949 general election, see AJHR, 1950, H-33, p8.

Minister about the issue and was advised that the question would be addressed after the legislation required to set up CMT had passed through the House.¹⁴⁷

On 18 October 1949, two days before the Military Training Bill was enacted, the Chief of the General Staff wrote again to the Minister of Defence, once more asking for direction on the proposal to form a Maori battalion. Stewart suggested that – if it was decided that Maori should train separately – he be authorised to establish an advisory body comprised of Maori leaders, who could provide advice on ‘the best locations and organisations’. In the event of the advisory body being authorised, Stewart stated that he would appreciate the Minister’s guidance on the selection of members.¹⁴⁸

However, a decision regarding whether or not a separate Maori unit would be established was not immediately reached, and the issue had yet to be finalised when the general election was held on 29 and 30 November 1949. Following defeat in this election, Labour remained in office until 13 December 1949. On 7 December 1949, before the formal handover of power, the Minister of Defence, Jones, finally advised Stewart that he approved both the formation of a Maori battalion within the Territorial Force and the establishment of the suggested advisory committee. The Minister stated that the advisory committee should be comprised of Eruera Tirikatene (who had retained the Southern Maori seat), former commanders of 28 (Maori) Battalion, and Rangī Royal. He requested that arrangements be made to give effect to these decisions.¹⁴⁹

By the time Jones communicated his direction, there appears to have been growing debate and concern amongst Army staff regarding the desirability of forming a separate Maori unit within the CMT scheme. On 24 October 1949, soon after the Military Training Act was passed, the *Auckland Star* reported that some senior officers of the regular Army ‘strongly opposed’ the proposal. These officers believed there should be no special units raised on a national basis, such as a Maori battalion or the existing Scottish regiment. The *Star* noted that some officers were not opposed to the establishment of Maori sub-units, such as companies or squadrons. However, many of the Regular Force officers who served in Japan were stated to be against even this, believing that Maori officers and soldiers should be split among sub-units. The training of Maori sub-units or a national unit, the *Star* reported, would present organisational challenges, especially in districts with small Maori populations. It was

¹⁴⁷ Stewart, Chief of the General Staff, minute, 7 September 1949, on Chief of the General Staff to Prime Minister, 12 July 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁴⁸ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 18 October 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁴⁹ Minister of Defence to Chief of the General Staff, 7 December 1949, minute on Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 18 October 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

noted that the views of former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion had been sought and while many favoured the establishment of a separate Maori unit, others opposed the idea, believing that Maori 'should be absorbed into units according to aptitude'.¹⁵⁰

On 25 October 1949, the day after the *Star* article was published, the Commander of the Northern Military District, Brigadier Ronald Park, wrote to Army Headquarters, strongly recommending that a Maori battalion not be formed. Believing that Northern District Headquarters would assume most responsibility for the organisation, administration, and training of any Maori Battalion, he asserted that the interests of the 'NZ Army and the races forming it' would be best served if there was no racial distinction between units. The Northern Commander offered several reasons for his position on the issue, arguing first that any segregation of Maori would inhibit progress towards equality between Maori and Pakeha. He explained that, in an effort to conform with government policy, Northern Headquarters had:

in all instruction to cadet units, stressed equality of status of Maori and White, and in camps and courses of inst[ructio]n for off[ice]rs and NCOs, emphasised the equal responsibility of service with the associated local unit.

He considered that, as with local sports clubs, 'the policy of equal status is best under-written by allowing Maori and Pakeha to serve, work and play together'. In contrast, forming a Maori battalion would introduce 'an element of racial segregation in the Army, and to this extent can only be considered a very retrograde step.'

Countering the argument that a separate Maori unit would be positive for the development of Maori leaders, the Northern Commander suggested instead that 'service in the local unit with fellow pakeha citizens would have an individual stimulus for the Maori which it would not experience in a purely Maori unit'. Moreover, the establishment of a Maori unit would limit opportunities for Maori to serve in all branches of the Army and would preclude Maori from rising to higher command.

The Northern Commander also believed that tribal difficulties would inevitably surface with the establishment of a separate Maori unit:

The raising of a purely Maori B[attalio]n must recreate or revive the inter-tribal feeling. In the past, and during two wars this has lead [sic] to jealousy within the unit and the exercise of great care in fostering the corporate loyalty so necessary to its efficiency and welfare.

¹⁵⁰ 'Maori Battalion Territorial Proposal Opposed', *Auckland Star*, 24 October 1949, extract in AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

Recognising tribal divisions within the battalion would also create serious organisational and command difficulties:

The tribal system makes both organisation and command difficult and unlike a white unit, it is not possible when raising a Maori one to organise it on the availability, capacity and qualifications of the numbers of off[ice]rs NCOs and men forming it. Organisation must be on a tribal basis. For instance although 40 Maoris may be available at one training centre if different tribes are represented provision must be made for them to serve in separate sub-units.

Furthermore, the tribal system would mean that officers would be selected in accordance with tribal seniority – an approach that did ‘not always result in efficiency or the selection of the most suitable military commander.’

The Northern Commander also pointed to other organisational problems. He stated that the geographic spread of Maori would make ‘unit parades extremely difficult, if not impossible’. And because the large proportion of Maori lived in country districts that would be some distance from the training centre there would be problems with transportation and travelling expenses would be high. He also claimed there would be many administrative problems, noting that the location of sub-units ‘cuts completely across the present Army organisation’. Overcoming some of these problems – for example, those connected with postings, promotions, and transfers – would be difficult. Other problems – such as those associated with the accounting of equipment – would be ‘almost impossible of solution’.

A further issue, the Northern Commander stated, was that the estimated number of Maori trainees was significantly greater than the number of personnel that would be required to fill a battalion. While it had been estimated that about 2,000 Maori trainees would come forward over the next three years, the battalion would accommodate only 938 personnel. Therefore, considerable numbers of Maori would be denied service in their battalion, creating a ‘possible source of friction’. The Northern Commander also noted that, as the battalion would be an infantry unit, ‘the proposal definitely limits the arms of the service open to the Maori race.’

The Northern Commander claimed that among serving Maori officers there was little support for the proposal to establish a Maori battalion. He stated that Maori officers had been sounded as to their views on the matter. None were enthusiastic about the proposal, with some being strongly opposed to it.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ Commander, Northern Military District, to Army Headquarters, 25 October 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

Though there was growing disquiet among senior staff, Army Headquarters did not provide Labour's Minister of Defence, Jones, with new advice that recommended against the formation of a Maori battalion. When Jones approved the proposal on 7 December 1949, his direction was consistent with the most recent advice he had received on the matter, set out in the Chief of the General Staff's memo of 7 July 1949. As noted above, Jones, in his direction, requested that steps be taken to form the battalion and set up the advisory committee. However, Army Headquarters' staff did not follow this instruction and instead sought a fresh direction from the new Minister of Defence, Tom Macdonald.

On 15 December 1949, Stewart, the Chief of the General Staff, discussed the Maori Battalion proposal with Macdonald.¹⁵² The following day, on 16 December 1949, he sent a memorandum to the Minister, setting down a number of points for him to consider and requesting a final decision as to whether a Maori battalion was to be included within the CMT scheme. Noting that Jones had approved the formation of the unit on 7 December 1949, Stewart explained that: 'As there are considerable political ramifications, I have not taken any executive action to implement the minute, pending further directions from you.'¹⁵³

In his memo of 16 December 1949, Stewart first outlined the policy background and developments that underlay Jones' decision to approve the setting up of a Maori battalion. He explained that in mid-1948 Army planners had decided that a Maori battalion should not be established. (As detailed above, this decision had been based partly on the assumption that Maori involvement in CMT would be on a voluntary basis.) Subsequently, Prime Minister Fraser indicated that Maori would be compulsorily included in the scheme and that it would be desirable to form a Maori battalion. As this meant it would be possible to form an additional battalion, and knowing the government's wishes, Stewart had recommended the formation of a Maori battalion, which Jones approved on 7 December 1949.

Stewart then set out additional points that he thought might assist the new Minister to make his decision. He suggested that perhaps the most important and decisive factor was whether there would be a Maori battalion in the event of war. If there was to be such a battalion, Stewart believed it should be formed and trained in peace. He commented that, though it was desirable that the New Zealand Army should mirror the organisation of the British Army, it would be possible to set up an additional, tenth infantry battalion for Maori. The Divisional Commander would in many respects find it an advantage to have an additional battalion, but on the other hand there would be 'disadvantages from a supply and administrative angle'. However, if a

¹⁵² Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 16 December 1949, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

Maori battalion was to be formed, Stewart was firmly of the opinion that it should be as an addition to the existing battalions. He was, he stated, 'very definitely opposed to disbanding one the existing pakeha battalions to make way for a Maori battalion'. Stewart noted that he understood there was 'a considerable body of Maori opinion' against the formation of a Maori battalion, with James Henare – 28 (Maori) Battalion's last commanding officer – being among those opposed.¹⁵⁴

On 10 January 1950, the Minister of Defence's private secretary distributed the memo of 16 December 1949 to members of Cabinet. In an accompanying letter, he advised that the issue of whether a Maori battalion was to be formed within the Territorial Army had been 'noted for consideration at an early meeting of Cabinet'.¹⁵⁵ No evidence has been located to confirm that the issue was brought before Cabinet. On 19 January 1950, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff discussed the matter once more. Following this meeting, the Minister wrote to Stewart, requesting that he could obtain 'additional Maori opinions' regarding the proposal to set up a Maori battalion.¹⁵⁶

In response to this request, a staff member at Army Headquarters set out an 'Anti Maori bn' list, comprising the following five names: Rangi Logan, Moana Raureti, James Henare, Fred Baker, and 'Wikirima' (referring, most likely, to Monty Wikiriwhi).¹⁵⁷ All of these individuals had served as officers within 28 (Maori) Battalion.¹⁵⁸ The absence of any effort to develop a list of those who were in favour of a Maori battalion reflects the fact that Army Headquarters did not wish to see a separate Maori unit created. As detailed above, other former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion – George Bertrand, Charles Bennett, and Rangi Royal – had in August 1946 spoken publicly in support of a Maori battalion. Both Bennett and Royal, it will be seen, continued to raise the issue after Cabinet reversed Jones' decision, sometime around the middle of March 1950.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Shanahan, Cabinet Paper, 10 January 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁵⁶ Macdonald to Chief of the General Staff, 19 January 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁵⁷ Unknown author, annotation, 'Anti Maori bn' list, on Macdonald to Chief of the General Staff, 19 January 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁵⁸ Fred Baker and James Henare's involvement in 28 (Maori) Battalion has been noted above. Rangi Logan served for a period as commander of D Company. See 'Libyan Campaign, Part 6 – Captain Rangi Logan', 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 28 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.28maoribattalion.org.nz/audio/libyan-campaign-part-6-captain-rangi-logan>
Moana Raureti (whose surname was incorrectly written on the list as Raetihi or Rareti) served for a period as an intelligence officer. See 'Maori Battalion Officers at Cassino', 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 28 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.28maoribattalion.org.nz/photo/m%C4%81ori-battalion-officers-cassino>
Matarehui (Monty) Wikiriwhi also served as an intelligence officer, though for a period in Italy, before being wounded, he also commanded B Company. See 'Matarehui (Monty) Wikiriwhi', 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 28 March 2017.

URL: <https://28maoribattalion.org.nz/soldier/matarehua-wikiriwhi>

In his advice to the Minister, however, the Chief of the General Staff acknowledged there was some Maori support for the establishment of a separate battalion. In a memo dated 10 March 1950, Stewart informed Macdonald of the consultation he had undertaken with Maori. He stated that he had sought the views of several former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion. At least five 'responsible ex-Officers' opposed the formation of the unit. However, Rangi Royal, who claimed to voice the opinion of 'the great majority of Maori', was 'very strongly in favour'. Moreover, Stewart noted, Royal alleged that prior to the CMT poll Maori had been led to believe that a separate battalion would be set up. (As discussed above, research for this report has located no evidence to confirm Royal's statements concerning this allegation.) Royal had also advised Stewart that a large meeting of Maori representatives was to be held at Otaki on 18 March 1950. Royal believed that if the matter was referred to these people they would overwhelmingly vote in favour of a Maori battalion. Concluding the memo, Stewart requested the Minister's direction on the matter.¹⁵⁹

Soon after Macdonald received this memo, the matter was placed before Cabinet, which decided to overturn the decision of Macdonald's predecessor, directing that a Maori battalion not be established.¹⁶⁰ It is unclear exactly when this decision was made. However, it is referred to in a later memo from the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defence, dated 30 October 1952. In this memo, which is discussed later, Stewart's successor, William Gentry, noted that, not long after receiving the memo of 10 March 1950, Macdonald had verbally communicated the decision to Stewart. While there was no record on file, Gentry noted that several officers recalled this.¹⁶¹

No effort appears to have been made to either investigate Royal's claim regarding the assurances made to Maori prior to the CMT referendum or to more accurately determine where the weight of Maori opinion lay on the issue. Given that Cabinet's decision was made soon after Macdonald received Stewart's memo of 10 March 1950, it is doubtful that the matter was put before the Otaki gathering in accordance with Royal's suggestion. Overall, it seems that the views of Maori were not a key consideration underpinning Cabinet's decision. From the available evidence, it is not possible to identify exactly what this decision was based upon. Cabinet is likely to have been influenced by the various points that Stewart made (in memoranda and during meetings with Macdonald). The Minister of Defence might also have put

¹⁵⁹ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 10 March 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁶⁰ For evidence of Cabinet's involvement in the decision, see Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 5 November 1952, AAFD 811 W2347 box 73 h CAB 225/2/2 part 1, New Zealand Forces Special Units – Maori Battalion, 1949-1952, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁶¹ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 30 October 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

forward views that he independently held on the matter, based on his own military experience during World War II.¹⁶²

Evidence concerning Maori participation in the CMT and National Service schemes

This section briefly discusses the rate of Maori involvement in the CMT scheme and later National Service scheme. As detailed earlier, Labour ended CMT in 1958, but in 1961 the National Government reintroduced the more limited National Service scheme, which involved a smaller number of annually-balloted recruits. In 1972, the newly-elected Labour Government discontinued National Service. Archival evidence shows that the level of Maori compliance with the registration requirements of both schemes was – at certain times, at least – significantly lower than that of Pakeha. While this seems to have partly reflected that Maori were less aware of their obligations, it is also likely that some deliberately chose not to comply. That some Maori were unwilling to participate in the training schemes possibly represented opposition to the schemes' compulsory nature, which ran contrary to the tradition of voluntary Maori military service. The absence of a separate Maori unit may have been a contributing factor. As detailed above, in August 1946, George Bertrand had predicted that, without such a unit, young Maori would hesitate to go into training alongside Pakeha.¹⁶³ More broadly, it is likely that for some Maori the existence of unresolved historical grievances against the Crown partly underpinned their unwillingness to undertake compulsory training.

The evidence presented here is drawn primarily from correspondence of the Department of Maori Affairs, which played a role in encouraging Maori to comply with the requirements of the CMT and National Service schemes. The earliest of this evidence is a memo that Rangi Royal, Controller of the Maori Welfare Division, wrote in December 1949, about two months after the passage of the Military Training Act. In this memo, which was addressed to district welfare officers, tribal executives, and tribal committees, Royal provided details of the service obligations of the CMT scheme:

¹⁶² Malcolm Templeton, 'Macdonald, Thomas Lachlan', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 29 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5m11/macdonald-thomas-lachlan>

¹⁶³ 'Separate Unit – Defence Forces – Proposal by Maoris', *Evening Post*, 30 August 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 EA1 87/5/8 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

The position is that Maoris who attain the age of 18 years on or after 1st November 1949 are liable for service. Under the Act it is absolutely compulsory for those in this category to apply for registration.¹⁶⁴

Royal advised that pamphlets that set out the provisions of the 1949 Act were available at any post office, and that those who were liable for service could register at either post offices or district offices of the Department of Labour and Employment.¹⁶⁵

However, a substantial proportion of Maori who were liable to serve failed to register as required. On 5 February 1951, Royal discussed this in another memo addressed to district welfare officers, tribal executives, and tribal committees. Royal stated that the Minister of Maori Affairs had advised him that only 60 percent of eligible Maori youths had registered under the 1949 Act – a level significantly less than the Pakeha registration rate, which was almost 100 percent. He suggested that the disparity in the figures indicated that Maori youths were either unaware of their obligations or were deliberately evading their duty.¹⁶⁶ Royal asked the memo's recipients to take active steps to remedy the shortfall in Maori registrations, emphasising that:

The laxity on the part of Maori youths to register under the Act is a very serious matter and unless some improvement is shown drastic action may have to be taken against the defaulters.¹⁶⁷

Under the Military Training Act 1949, individuals who did not comply with the Act's requirements were liable, upon summary conviction, to a fine of up to £50.¹⁶⁸ Such fines could be imposed repeatedly for ongoing failure to comply.¹⁶⁹ The Act also imposed obligations on employers, who could be fined if they retained an individual who failed to register.¹⁷⁰

The file evidence examined for this report includes few details of the steps that welfare officers, tribal executives, and tribal committees took in response to Royal's memo of 5 February 1951. In the Wanganui District, in mid-1952, the District Welfare Officer wrote a circular letter to local welfare officers, tribal executives, and tribal committees, setting out the registration obligations of the 1949 Act and

¹⁶⁴ Controller, Maori Social and Economic Advancement, to welfare officers, tribal executives, and tribal committees, 20 December 1950, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, Maori welfare – armed services – Army policy, 1951-1974, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Controller, Maori Social and Economic Advancement, to welfare officers, tribal executives, and tribal committees, 5 February 1951, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Subsection 56(2), Military Training Act 1949.

¹⁶⁹ Subsection 56(4), Military Training Act 1949.

¹⁷⁰ Section 53, Military Training Act 1949.

requesting that the letter's recipients do their best to persuade Maori youths to register immediately. The District Welfare Officer suggested that it should be explained to offenders that a failure to register was an offence punishable by law. He noted the possibility that offenders were unaware of their obligations.¹⁷¹

Other evidence, dating from 1958, but also concerning the Wanganui District, shows that the Department of Labour and Employment, which was responsible for handling CMT registrations, sometimes sought Maori Affairs' assistance to complete individual registrations.¹⁷² However, the extent to which legal action was taken against Maori who failed to register under the CMT scheme is unclear. And it is uncertain whether, prior to the scheme's abolition, there was any significant change in the rate of Maori registration from that which Royal had noted in his memo of 5 February 1951.

In January 1964, in notes prepared for Defence Secretary Hunn prior to 28 (Maori) Battalion's 1964 reunion, Captain Alan Armstrong commented generally on the level of Maori involvement in the CMT scheme. Armstrong recalled there had been a high proportion of Maori within CMT intakes, attributing this to the fact that the percentage of Maori among young people was greater than the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole.¹⁷³ Armstrong did not mention the rate of Maori registration compliance, and it is not clear from his comments whether this changed significantly during the course of the CMT scheme.

At the time Armstrong recorded his observations about Maori involvement in the CMT scheme, the National Service scheme had been operating for about three years. Maori Affairs' file evidence again shows that – in the first years of this scheme, at least – significant numbers of Maori failed to register in accordance with the provisions of the 1961 Act. In light of this situation, the Department of Labour sought assistance from the Department of Maori Affairs. The earliest communication between the Departments appears to have been between district officers. In January 1962, in the Wanganui district, the Department of Labour's District Officer wrote to his counterpart in the Department of Maori Affairs, advising that head office of the Labour Department had informed him that 'a considerable number of Maori youths' had failed to register. He suggested that some youths might be confused if they had previously registered under earlier legislation. Noting that fresh registrations were

¹⁷¹ District Welfare Officer, Wanganui, to Welfare Officers, Tribal Executive Committees, and Tribal Committees, 25 July 1952, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁷² District Officer, Wanganui, to Resident Officer, Hawera, 6 November 1958, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁷³ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

required under the 1961 Act, he pointed out that it was an offence not to register, even in cases when an individual's date of birth was not drawn from the ballot.¹⁷⁴

Following this, Maori Affairs' head office also communicated with district officers on the failure of Maori to register for National Service. Writing on 19 March 1962, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Maori Affairs, R.A. Law, informed district officers that the Department of Labour had advised that there were 600 defaulters and that a large proportion of these were Maori. Law stated that many Maori who were required to register lived in remote localities or were engaged in seasonal occupations away from their homes. He believed that many of the defaulters may not have been fully aware of their obligations. Law asked the district officers to arrange for the matter to be brought to the attention of tribal authorities.¹⁷⁵

However, any such action appears to have brought about no immediate change in the situation. In a further memo, written towards the end of the following year, on 13 December 1963, the Assistant Secretary for Maori Affairs, former 28 (Maori) Battalion commanding officer Charles Bennett, advised district officers that the Labour Department had recently provided information that indicated that a large proportion of Maori within the eligible age group had not registered under the 1961 Act. Once more, it was suggested that many of those involved may have been unaware of their obligations, and Bennett asked that tribal authorities be alerted to situation.¹⁷⁶

File evidence examined for this report contains little further information on the issue. It is unclear whether, before the National Service scheme ended in 1972, there was any significant change in Maori registration rates or whether legal action was taken against any Maori defaulters.

Integration in the field – Korea, Malaya, and Vietnam

Cabinet's decision not to set up a Maori battalion within the CMT scheme set a policy benchmark on the issue of whether, in the non-regular Army, Maori would serve on a segregated basis or alongside Pakeha. Army Headquarters evidently viewed the policy of integration to be relevant to all non-regular service. Outside of the Territorial Force, this included the citizen-soldier force that between 1950 and 1957 served in Korea, which was to be the final deployment composed primarily of non-

¹⁷⁴ District Officer, Department of Labour, to District Officer, Department of Maori Affairs, 18 January 1962, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁷⁵ Acting Assistant Secretary, Maori Affairs, to District Officers, 19 March 1962, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁷⁶ Assistant Secretary, Maori Affairs, to District Officers, 13 December 1963, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

regular personnel. From the mid-1950s, overseas deployments invariably involved soldiers who were enlisted in the Regular Force, where there was no tradition of separate Maori service. The shift away from the use of citizen soldiers was linked to the demise of New Zealand's Middle East commitment. As explained earlier, this ended in 1955, when the country's strategic focus switched instead to South-East Asia.¹⁷⁷ With this change, and with the prospect of a major war declining in the mid-to late 1950s, it became apparent that 'ready-to-go' forces were needed. Territorial Force units were unable to meet this requirement and, as a result, defence preparedness began to be based on the use of regular soldiers who were trained and equipped for immediate deployment.¹⁷⁸

This section looks at the extent to which, after 1950, the policy of integration was consistently enforced among New Zealand forces deployed overseas. It looks particularly at evidence concerning the citizen-soldier force that served in Korea, and it also briefly discusses the regular units that, between the mid-1950s and 1972, served first in Malaya and then in Vietnam. It will be explained that, in spite of the policy of integration, the tradition of separate Maori service units (within citizen-soldier forces deployed overseas) re-emerged within the force that served in Korea. In contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that there were separate Maori units among the regular units that were later deployed to Malaya and Vietnam. Within the Regular Force, the policy of integration was maintained even though Maori, during the 1950s, began to make up an increasingly significant proportion of regular personnel, including among those who served overseas. Also, as explained in the next section, some Maori – especially former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion – continued up until the mid-1960s to call for the establishment of a separate Maori unit in the Army. Reflecting the shift towards deployment of regular personnel, it seems likely that these calls became focussed on the creation of a unit within the Regular Force – though this was not explicitly stated. Regardless, as discussed later, those who sought the establishment of a separate Maori unit gained little traction and there was no change in policy.

In mid-1950, only a few months after Cabinet decided that Maori would serve within the Territorial Force on an integrated basis, New Zealand committed support to the United Nations' force that was to fight in Korea. At the end of June 1950, the government offered two frigates and about one month later agreed to provide a 1000-man ground force, which was to become known as Kayforce.¹⁷⁹ After New

¹⁷⁷ 'Middle East commitment', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p318.

¹⁷⁸ 'New Zealand Army', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p359.

¹⁷⁹ 'Korean War', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p267.

Zealand made its commitment of troops, Army leaders decided that Maori personnel would serve within Kayforce on an integrated basis.¹⁸⁰ Documentary evidence concerning this decision has not been located. It is possible that it was not the subject of a document, given that the issue had effectively been settled by the decision that Cabinet had made in March 1950. The decision not to include a separate Maori unit within Kayforce may also have been influenced by the fact that the force was to be relatively small and to have an artillery orientation, which was not an area in which Maori had traditionally served.

Though it was decided that Kayforce would not include a separate Maori component, Army leaders, at an early stage, expressed a willingness to accommodate the preferences of Maori volunteers who wished to serve alongside their siblings and friends. Consideration of this matter initially stemmed from an enquiry made by the mother of a Maori soldier who asked the Leader of the Opposition, Peter Fraser, whether Maori members of Kayforce were to serve together.¹⁸¹ On 28 September 1950, in a letter to the Minister of Defence, the Army Secretary advised that it was not intended 'to segregate' Maori from their Pakeha comrades. Individual Maori, he stated, were to be posted to units that best fitted their capacity. However, where 'service exigencies' allowed, an endeavour would be made to meet the wishes of brothers or close friends who wanted to serve together.¹⁸²

Maori groupings did emerge within Kayforce, though it is unclear exactly when this began. In a memo to the Minister of Defence, dated 30 October 1952, the Chief of the General Staff indicated that Maori, at this time, were serving within Kayforce on a wholly integrated basis. Commenting on the implementation of the policy of integration within CMT, he noted that the policy was also being applied to the force that was serving in Korea:

Maoris at present do their whole-time training mixed with the pakehas. They are serving in Territorial units on the same basis. This organisation is working well and I have had no complaints whatever against this basis of organisation. The same principle has been applied with success in K-Force and also with the other two Services.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Vol II: Combat Operations*, Oxford University Press and Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Auckland, 1996, p366.

¹⁸¹ See Macdonald to Army Secretary, 18 September 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1345 319/23/1 Staff – Personnel K-force, undated, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁸² Army Secretary to Minister of Defence, 28 September 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1345 319/23/1, Staff – Personnel K-force, undated, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁸³ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 30 October 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, Organisation – Maori battalion (suggested), 1949-1964, ANZ Wellington.

The first groupings of Maori personnel possibly emerged around this time, when the proportion of Maori within Kayforce began to increase. As discussed in the next chapter, Maori comprised about 7.5 percent of the main body that left New Zealand at the end of 1950.¹⁸⁴ Later, within the drafts that left New Zealand between April 1952 and March 1953, about 25 percent of the men were Maori.¹⁸⁵ Overall, Maori would comprise about 15 percent of the personnel who served in Kayforce between 1950 and 1957.¹⁸⁶



Maori gun crew from 162 Battery, 16 Field Regiment, serving in Korea – (from left) Gunners P. Te Kani (Tauranga), W. Martin (Whakatane), J.J. Hudson (Whakatane), B. Manga (Gisborne), and Lance-Bombardier J.T. Popata (Kaitaia). Photograph taken c. 30 April 1953. Reference: K-2007-F, ATL Wellington.

Within Kayforce, Maori may have first served together in gun crews of 16 Field Regiment, each of which would have consisted of a maximum of eight men. Drawing on the recollections of an ex-serviceman, McGibbon states that several guns in 163 Battery were manned mainly by Maori, who were grouped together on a tribal basis.¹⁸⁷ Photographic evidence presented above also indicates the existence of Maori artillery crews in Korea. McGibbon explains that the Maori gun crews were ‘informal

¹⁸⁴ Monty Soutar, ‘Ngā pakanga ki tāwāhi – Māori and overseas wars – Overseas service after 1945’, Te Ara website, accessed 3 April 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/nga-pakanga-ki-tawahi-maori-and-overseas-wars/page-6>

¹⁸⁵ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Vol II*, p295.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p436 (endnote 29).

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 436 (endnote 29).

arrangements' and, with changes of personnel and the arrival of reinforcements, 'such arrangements tended to re-emerge'.¹⁸⁸ The extent to which the gun crews were put together at the request of Maori is uncertain. Gun sergeants probably had some flexibility in determining their teams and, with the emphasis being on effective teamwork, some may have thought this would be better facilitated if Maori served together. Officers in the field presumably sanctioned the arrangements.

In addition to the Maori gun crews, Maori were more formally grouped together within an all-Maori platoon that was established within 10 Transport Company. In the Company's war diary, it was recorded that, on 1 February 1954, B Platoon began to operate 'as a Maori Pl[atoon]'. The diary noted that the unit was staffed completely by Maori and under the command of Second Lieutenant E.N. Munro.¹⁸⁹ The formation of the all-Maori unit was possibly initiated by the regular officer that commanded 10 Transport Company, Major K.G. Miles. At the very least, Miles would have sanctioned the unit's establishment. Indeed, the Maori unit appears to have been sanctioned at the highest level of Kayforce. Brigadier J.T. Burrows, Kayforce's commander, had visited 10 Transport Company on 28 January and – after B Platoon began operating as an all-Maori unit – did so again on 13 February.¹⁹⁰ The fact that the creation of the Maori Platoon was recorded in the company's war diary suggests that Miles was confident that higher authorities would not disapprove of his action. Nothing has been located to indicate when B Platoon's designation as a Maori unit ended. Presumably, it continued to operate as a Maori unit until 10 Transport Company's withdrawal in 1956.

The Korean War was the final conflict in which a formally-designated Maori unit was to feature within a New Zealand Army force deployed overseas. No evidence has been located to suggest that such units emerged within the forces that were deployed in the Malayan Emergency and later Borneo Confrontation. Continuing a trend that had emerged within Kayforce, Maori again made up a large proportion of those who served in Malaya. In January 1958, for example, Maori comprised almost 23 percent of the personnel within 1 Battalion New Zealand Regiment.¹⁹¹ However, unlike Kayforce, those who served in these conflicts – and in subsequent conflicts – were members of the Regular Force in which there was no tradition of separate Maori service.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p295.

¹⁸⁹ See diary for February 1954, ADRB 17581 WA-K1 box 19 DAK 1. 4/1/1-6, Transport Platoon, 10 Company, Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps, War Diary, 1951-1956, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁹⁰ See diary for January 1954 and February 1954, ADRB 17581 WA-K1 box 19 DAK 1. 4/1/1-6, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁹¹ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Vol II*, p366.

In his history of New Zealand's involvement in the Malayan Emergency and Borneo Confrontation, Christopher Pugsley makes no mention of separate Maori units. Indeed, he emphasises that Maori and Pakeha served alongside each other.¹⁹² Articles that were published in the Department of Maori Affairs' magazine *Te Ao Hou* provide a similar picture. In the early 1960s, the magazine published several pieces that discussed the experiences of Maori servicemen who were either stationed in Malaya or training to serve there. These articles stressed that Maori and Pakeha served together. Moreover, they described relations between Maori and Pakeha soldiers as being harmonious – an emphasis that perhaps arose from the Department's efforts both to promote the ideology of integration and to encourage Maori enlistment into the Army, a role that is discussed further in the next chapter.¹⁹³

Research for this report has similarly located no evidence of any formal separation of Maori and Pakeha soldiers who served in Vietnam, where New Zealand Army personnel – all Regular Force enlistees – were committed between 1964 and 1972. Secondary literature that examines New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam conflict, including works that draw upon oral interviews with veterans, includes no mention of separate Maori units. Instead, it is again emphasised that Maori and Pakeha served alongside each other.¹⁹⁴ As discussed in the next chapter, about 35 percent of those who served in Vietnam were Maori, somewhat higher than the proportion in earlier Asian deployments. Photographic evidence suggests that some informal groupings of Maori may have emerged among gun crews of 161 Battery, similar to those that formed in Korea.¹⁹⁵ Also, given especially high rates of Maori participation within the Special Air Service (SAS) units that served in Vietnam, it is possible that all-Maori SAS patrols routinely came together in the theatre.¹⁹⁶ However, any such groupings were not formally designated Maori units, and they would not have undermined or have been seen as inconsistent with the prevailing policy of integration.

¹⁹² Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp356-357.

¹⁹³ See: E.G.S, 'Why Maoris Choose The Army', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 36, September 1961, p7; Arena Kahi, 'Maori Soldiers in Malaya', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 40, September 1962, pp21-22; Alan Armstrong, 'The Blooding of the Warriors', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 42, March 1963, p9.

¹⁹⁴ See, for example, Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy*, Exisle Publishing, Auckland, 2010; Claire Hall, *No Front Line: Inside Stories of New Zealand's Vietnam War*, Penguin, Auckland, 2014.

¹⁹⁵ 'Maori artillerymen in Vietnam', image in Monty Soutar, 'Ngā pakanga ki tāwāhi – Māori and overseas wars', Te Ara website, accessed 3 April 2017.

URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/photograph/36701/maori-artillerymen-in-vietnam>

¹⁹⁶ Chapter two includes evidence that suggests that the proportion of Maori within the SAS units that served in Vietnam may have been as high as 70 percent.

Ongoing calls for a separate Maori unit

Cabinet's decision against forming a separate Maori unit within the CMT scheme did not end debate on the issue of whether the New Zealand Army should include a separate Maori unit. Calls for the creation of a separate Maori unit continued to be made into the mid-1960s, with former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion advocating most strongly for the establishment of such a unit. As suggested above, given the shift towards deployment of regular personnel, it is likely that calls for a separate unit became focussed on the formation of a Maori unit in the Regular Force – though this was not explicitly stated. Either way, in response, army staff, defence officials, and political leaders remained resolute on the issue. The debate, it will be seen, was linked to a broader discussion about the place of Maori in post-war society. Those who sought the creation of a Maori unit believed that such a unit would, in part, serve to strengthen and promote greater recognition of a separate Maori identity. Countering this position, army staff, defence officials, and political leaders argued that – within the Army and wider society – integration of Maori was the most progressive approach. To the great disappointment of Maori who sought the establishment of a separate unit, this ideology was to prevail and there would be no change in army policy.

File evidence shows that, following Cabinet's decision of March 1950, the issue of a separate Maori unit was next raised in 1952. At this time, the debate focussed on the events that had preceded the decision, specifically the question of whether, prior to the CMT poll, Maori had been led to believe that a separate unit would be established. As detailed above, not long before Cabinet made the decision, Rangi Royal claimed that this had been the case. The issue resurfaced when it was raised at a meeting of the RSA Dominion Executive Council on 14 October 1952. Soon after, the General Secretary of the RSA wrote to the Minister of Defence, enquiring about the matter. He explained that at the Executive Council meeting it had been claimed that:

during the Referendum Campaign on Compulsory Military Training, a definite promise had been made to the Maori people by the previous Government – that the Maori Battalion would be retained as an individual unit within the Territorial Force establishment. That this promise had had considerable effect on the attitude of the Maori population to the Referendum...¹⁹⁷

The General Secretary advised that, owing to 'the outstanding record of the Maori troops in World Wars I and II', the Executive Council considered that the matter should be investigated.

¹⁹⁷ Harrison, General Secretary, to Macdonald, Minister of Defence, 20 October 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

In a memo dated 30 October 1952, the Chief of the General Staff, Gentry, informed the Minister that he could find no evidence to support claims that Maori had been assured a separate unit within the CMT scheme, though he acknowledged that this did not necessarily mean they were untrue. Gentry then went on to discuss the question of a separate Maori unit, arguing that the existing policy should be maintained. He stated that the arguments against forming the unit 'lie partly in the practical and ethical spheres and partly in the military'. Unlike his predecessor, Keith Stewart, Gentry ventured beyond organisational and administrative matters, linking the question of a separate unit to a broader debate about the future of Maori in society and also noting parallels with developments in the United States:

There is a strong and growing body of opinion (represented strongly by the late Sir Peter Buck) that the best future for race relations in New Zealand lies in the closest possible association of the two races. This idea is not promoted by the formation of military units on racial lines...

It is of interest in this connection that in the evolution of race relationships in the United States, racial units have been done away with fairly recently in all three Services and all races are now integrated within units. This is generally regarded as a progressive move.¹⁹⁸

Gentry also stated that the desire of the Maori to serve in a separate unit was not universal, claiming that many Maori leaders opposed the idea. He further set out a number of military and organisational arguments, reiterating many of the points that Stewart had made in earlier memoranda. He noted, for example, that efforts to organise along 'racial lines' would 'cut across the Territorial basis of organisation to a large extent'. While possible, it would entail 'certain administrative and training disadvantages'. Gentry also believed that tribal affiliations might be difficult to accommodate within a peacetime unit that would be geographically widespread, though he thought this issue would not be difficult to resolve in a wartime unit.

Two new arguments were introduced on 'the military side'. Gentry claimed that during World War II the existence of a racial unit 'on occasions had military repercussions, eg during the evacuation of Crete'.¹⁹⁹ Additionally, he suggested that it would not be easy to find Maori officers who were 'sufficiently skilled to ensure that the unit is well administered'. As detailed in the previous section, Gentry also emphasised that the existing, integrated Territorial units were operating successfully

¹⁹⁸ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 30 October 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁹⁹ Gentry may have been referring to the objection that was expressed against the splitting of 28 (Maori) Battalion during the evacuation. See Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, p129.

and that the same system of organisation had been applied with success to Kayforce and the other two services.

Gentry advised the Minister that he had discussed the issue of a separate Maori unit at length with the Dominion President of the RSA. (At this time, Howard Kippenberger held this position.²⁰⁰) The Dominion President had asked for a comprehensive written statement on 'the whole problem', stating that he would be able to refer to this if questioned on the matter.²⁰¹ In satisfaction of this request, a letter summarising the various arguments that Gentry put forward in his memo of 30 October 1952 was sent to the RSA's General Secretary.²⁰²

From this point, the RSA appears to have played no further role in questioning the decision not to establish a separate Maori unit. Kippenberger, who was evidently satisfied with the arguments that Gentry had put forward, remained President of the RSA until the mid-1950s, no doubt bearing some influence on the Association's position on the issue. Later evidence indicates that RSA support for the proposal to set up a separate Maori unit continued to be limited. During the Maori Battalion's 1964 reunion, the President of the 28th Maori Battalion (NZ) Association, Kuru Waaka, noted that in 1962, at the RSA's Dominion Conference, the Rotorua branch of the RSA had unsuccessfully presented a well-supported remit that called for a separate unit. The remit, Waaka explained, had not progressed beyond committee stages.²⁰³

The RSA's position on the issue of a separate Maori unit may have been among the factors that prompted some former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion to take steps to more formally organise themselves through the establishment of a separate association. This would create a firmer platform from which the ex-servicemen could lobby for the creation of a separate unit. The 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association was established in 1958, following a meeting attended by 40 former Battalion members in Auckland. The meeting had been called by ex-intelligence officer Monty Wikiriwhi, who at the time was working as a welfare officer in Pukehohe. Those who attended the meeting appear to have mostly been from Auckland and surrounding areas. Initially, there was some discussion as to whether the Association should be an Auckland or a national body. It was resolved that all former members of the Battalion

²⁰⁰ Harper, 'Kippenberger, Howard Karl', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

²⁰¹ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 30 October 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

²⁰² McDonald to General Secretary, N.Z. Returned Services' Assn (Inc.), 6 November 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

²⁰³ Report of K. Waaka, President, 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association, 28 March 1964, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

should be invited to join, including Pakeha. Monty Wikiriwhi was chosen to be the Association's first president.²⁰⁴

From an account of the 1958 meeting that was published in *Te Ao Hou*, two objectives underlay the Association's establishment. First, building upon the traditions and achievements of 28 (Maori) Battalion, the Association would endeavour to assist young Maori to meet the new challenges of the post-war world. *Te Ao Hou* explained that the organisation was:

dedicated to holding the ground in the New World which the battalion won for the people on the battlefields of the Old World. Not a man was not conscious of what he could do to build for the future by guiding and assisting the young generation which is launching forth into an even newer world.²⁰⁵

Secondly, and related to some extent to the first objective, those who established the Association aimed to ensure that the Maori Battalion was reformed as a military unit:

If there was one thing which they wanted to achieve it was to retrieve the identity of the battalion as a military unit. They would like to obliterate those sorrowful words which provide the ending to the official history—"Trains throughout the afternoon carried the Maori soldiers to a hundred welcoming maraes. The 28th (Maori) Battalion had ceased to exist."²⁰⁶

After the Association was established, regular and well-attended reunions of 28 (Maori) Battalion began to be held. As discussed below, during the earliest of these events – reunions held in 1961 and 1964 – strong calls were made for the establishment of a separate Maori unit. These calls were evidently supported by the great majority of the ex-servicemen in attendance. Though no dissenting voices are recorded in the available evidence, it is possible, however, that not all former Battalion members believed that a Maori unit should be established. As detailed above, Army Headquarters' staff had in 1950 identified several former Battalion officers who opposed the proposal to form a separate unit, including former commanding officer James Henare. It is likely that at least some former Battalion members continued to hold this view.

The 1961 reunion of 28 (Maori) Battalion was held in Rotorua, some time during the first half of the year. In December 1961, *Te Ao Hou* published an account of the reunion, which was written by former Battalion soldier and serving member of the

²⁰⁴ Elsdon Craig, 'Maori Battalion Reunion', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 25, December 1958, p9.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p9.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p10. For the text that is in quotation marks, see: Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, p485. For details concerning the setting up of 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association, also see Merehora Taurua, Wai 2500, #A106, p7.

Association's executive body, Ted Nepia.²⁰⁷ According to this report, an estimated 2000 people attended the reunion.²⁰⁸ Nepia recorded he had been 'very impressed with the strong feeling of Maori nationalism' that he identified among those who spoke during the formal sessions of the reunion: 'Speaker after speaker for instance, hammered the theme of the welfare of the Maori people. Parochialism was forgotten in the endeavour to view the problems at the national level.'²⁰⁹

Nepia believed such unity was evident in the response given to a proposal to urge the government to form a separate Maori unit within the defence system. He reported that 'wild scenes of enthusiasm broke out', negating any need to debate the question. Nevertheless, some discussion followed. Nepia stated that one ex-commander rejected the notion that the formation of a separate unit would amount to segregation, pointing out that this had never been an issue when such units had been raised during World Wars I and II. It was argued that Maori would perform best if they served together.²¹⁰ Another speaker argued that Maori had earned the right to have their wishes on the matter fulfilled, noting that the proportion of Maori serving in the defence forces was higher than that of Pakeha. 'At least we are fully conscious of our obligation to the defence of the world's ideals? Surely... we have proved our right to have our own way in this matter.'²¹¹

Nepia reported that following the reunion, at a meeting held in Hastings on 28 July 1961, three members of the 28th Maori Battalion Association's executive committee were delegated to place the request for a separate Maori unit before 'the Minister'.²¹² (It is not clear here whether Nepia was referring to the Minister of Maori Affairs or Minister of Defence.) Research for this report has located no evidence concerning any direct lobbying that may have followed. However, soon after the Hastings meeting, the *Auckland Star's* parliamentary press gallery representative, M. Steemson, sought the Minister of Defence's views on the Association's recent decision to ask for the formation of a separate Maori unit.²¹³ Army Headquarters prepared a letter of reply, which the Minister, Dean Eyre, signed on 18 August 1961. Noting that the question had already received much attention, the letter reiterated earlier arguments concerning the organisational difficulties of forming a Maori unit in the Territorial Force. It also asserted that integration would ensure that Maori had

²⁰⁷ Ted Nepia, 'A People of Warriors', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 37, December 1961, p52. See also: E.H. Nepia, '28 Bn Veterans Want Maori Unit Re-formed', *RSA Review*, June 1961, p9. Ted Nepia was a member of the 12th Reinforcements and served with D Company. See 'Ted Nepia', 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 11 April 2017. URL: <http://www.28maoribattalion.org.nz/photo/ted-nepia>

²⁰⁸ Ted Nepia, 'A People of Warriors', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 37, December 1961, p50.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p51.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p51.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp51-52.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p52.

²¹³ Private Secretary of Minister of Defence to Army Secretary, 2 August 1961, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

access to the same opportunities as Pakeha – a policy that was believed, more broadly, to offer the best outcomes for race relations in New Zealand. The Minister stated that:

During the past 15 years a great deal of thought has been given to the advisability of forming a separate Maori Battalion in peacetime and if it had been feasible to do so a unit would have been formed by now. However, there are many difficulties including the problems resulting from tribal affinities and the wide distribution throughout New Zealand of the Maori people which make it difficult to establish a unit and sub-units in localities where there is a sufficient concentration of the Maori race. The alternative of locating these sub-units in widely separated and remote areas throughout the country would result in many administrative and training problems.

Under the present arrangement the Maori soldier has the opportunity to serve in any Corps of the Army. The formation of a separate Maori battalion within the Territorial Force would place most, if not all, Maoris in an Infantry Battalion and service would be limited to that particular Corps. The present opportunity for all New Zealanders to serve together in the unit of their preference, regardless of race, is in line with a strong body of opinion that the best future for race relations in New Zealand lies in the closest possible association of the two races with the avoidance of anything in the nature of discrimination.

I am of the opinion that it is preferable to continue the present system under which New Zealanders have the right to serve in all branches and in the higher commands and staff of the Army.²¹⁴

The arguments that were set out in the letter were not immediately published. Some time before or around the middle of September 1961, for reasons that are unclear, the Minister requested that Steemson hand the letter back, unactioned. The journalist agreed to do so, though ‘with some little reluctance’.²¹⁵

The extent to which Maori serving in the Regular Force around this time supported the establishment of a separate unit is unclear. In 1962, *Te Ao Hou* published an article that was written purportedly by a Maori soldier stationed in Malaya named Arena Kahi, who expressed strong opposition to the proposal:

²¹⁴ Minister of Defence to Steemson, 18 August 1961, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

²¹⁵ Private Secretary to Army Secretary, 18 September 1961, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1485 209/3/170, ANZ Wellington.

When we came home we read that the Maori Battalion old boys are agitating for an all-Maori unit in the army. This makes me sad. Of course the tradition of my race tells me I must listen with respect to our elders. Yet age does not always bring wisdom and the elders are not always right. They often think with their hearts and not their heads.

Before I went into the army I do not mind admitting that I had never learned to mix with Pakeha. I thought they were different in more ways than skin colour. Well, now I have lived with them we all know one another. For the first time in my life I have really close Pakeha friends. The other chaps and I have learned a lot off the pakeha and I like to think that they have learned a lot off us. They respect us. Many of the pakeha in the battalion sing our songs and some can do a pretty good haka. Where else in New Zealand do we find a group of Maori and Pakeha in roughly equal proportions living cheek by jowl and yet some people would put a stop to it. Anyway to be logical the army could decide to start all-white units as well as all-brown and who would start talking first about racial discrimination? These old boys should use their energies to encourage Maoris with more education than I to become officers instead of wanting racial segregation in the army.²¹⁶

It seems likely that this article was written to advance and promote the Department of Maori Affairs' position on the issue. However, no conflicting evidence has been located that indicates that Maori who were serving in the Army did strongly support the formation of a separate unit. It will later be explained that the Battalion Association eventually abandoned the proposal because it was established that the younger generation was ambivalent about the proposal. It is unclear whether those referred to here were younger Maori in the forces or younger Maori generally.

The 1964 reunion of 28 (Maori) Battalion, held in Gisborne, was the focus of further, lengthy discussion about the establishment of a Maori unit in the New Zealand Army. Again, former members of the Battalion expressed strong support for the proposal. However, unlike the 1961 reunion, local political leaders were present as well as the government's senior-most defence official – J.K. Hunn, Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, who contested the view that the Army should include a separate Maori unit. As detailed above, a few years earlier, while serving as Acting Secretary of the Department of Maori Affairs, Hunn had written the influential 'Hunn report'. When invited to address the reunion conference, it was explained to Hunn that the Battalion Association wished him to speak for the following reasons: 'Because of your knowledge of the Maori and of his local and National interests and of your position in

²¹⁶ Arena Kahi, 'Maori Soldiers in Malaya', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 40, September 1962, pp21-22.

the National Defence of New Zealand, both of which the members of the Maori Battalion Association are vitally interested in'.²¹⁷

The issue of a separate Maori unit was raised at the outset of the reunion, during the powhiri held at Poho-o-Rawiri marae on 27 March 1964.²¹⁸ It was reported that, at the powhiri, Ngati Porou elder H.A. Reedy called for the revival of the Maori Battalion, claiming he represented the views of ordinary Maori.²¹⁹ Those who wanted to see the Battalion re-established, he stated, 'are actually interpreting the feeling of the Maori'. He emphasised he was not opposed to the policy of integration generally, but believed a separate unit was necessary to ensure that the contribution of Maori personnel, during war, reached its full potential. 'After all the one aim in war is to win', he stated, and – with the leadership it had had – the Maori Battalion had shown it 'could do its job as a group, and... get the best out of the Maori soldiers'.²²⁰

In his report to the reunion conference, held on 28 March 1964, the President of the 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association, Waaka, also discussed the proposal to establish a Maori unit, though he evidently was not optimistic that there would be a change of policy. Like Reedy, Waaka understood that the majority of Maori favoured the formation of a separate unit. However, he noted that the reaction from Wellington had not been favourable and suggested the matter to be 'so strongly political that it would not be possible to foresee the formation of such a unit'. He noted, for example, a lack of support within the RSA and the New Zealand Territorial Association. Waaka believed that political opposition to a separate unit was understandable given that the existing level of Maori involvement in the military was – in comparison to the proportion of Maori in the general population – significantly greater than that of Pakeha.²²¹

Secretary of Defence Hunn, in his address to the conference, dealt at length with the proposal that the Army should again include a separate Maori unit. However, he also commented on other matters, reflecting that he had been requested to comment on

²¹⁷ Searancke, Secretary, 28th Maori Battalion (Gis.) Association, to Hunn, Secretary of Defence, 24 November 1963, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²¹⁸ 'Plea for revival of Maori Battalion', unidentified newspaper extract, in ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²¹⁹ This would appear to be Hanara Tangiawha Te Ohaki Reedy, commonly known as Arnold Reedy, who had served with 28 (Maori) Battalion, rising to the rank of Captain, before being captured on Crete in May 1941. Maraki Tautuhi Orongo Reedy and Miria Hine Tapu Te Ariki Walker, 'Reedy, Hanara Tangiawha Te Ohaki', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 19 April 2017. URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5r10/reedy-hanara-tangiawha-te-ohaki>

²²⁰ 'Plea for revival of Maori Battalion', unidentified newspaper extract, in ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²²¹ Report of K. Waaka, President, 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association, 28 March 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

the role that the former Maori serviceman should play in the ‘modern community’ as well as ‘something about his responsibility in the Defence of this country’.²²²

Hunn’s address set down three challenges for the Maori Battalion Association, all of which were consistent with the integrationist ideals he had earlier advanced in the Hunn report. In his first challenge, *wero tuatahi*, Hunn spoke of the need for Maori to enter new, higher career pathways and leadership positions. Success in the education system would be crucial if this was to happen. He therefore encouraged former Battalion members to closely support and encourage the schooling of young Maori.²²³ *Wero tuarua*, the second challenge, concerned Maori involvement in community affairs and public life. While some progress was being made, Hunn believed Maori should play a greater role in ‘the social field’, arguing that adult Maori had ‘a valuable contribution to make... and he should be ready and willing to make it.’²²⁴

In his third challenge, *wero tuatoru*, Hunn argued that Maori should avoid living in the past. In discussing this challenge, he focused almost entirely upon the ‘delicate subject’ of whether a separate Maori unit should again be established in the Army. Hunn informed the conference he had been expressly asked to comment on this issue, and his initial comments left no doubt as to his view on the matter: ‘The idea would no longer be workable even if it were a good one, which is very doubtful.’²²⁵ Elaborating, Hunn asserted that the creation of a separate Maori unit would be a retrograde step, one that was at odds with 28 (Maori) Battalion’s battlefield achievements and the advances it had helped secure for Maori. When the Battalion had been formed, he stated, the Maori people had been very different:

When World War II began, many Maoris had poor command of the English language. The race as a whole was unsophisticated. Most of the Maori people were rural dwellers and had limited contact with the pakeha world.²²⁶

The absence of a Maori unit in the post-war Army, Hunn suggested, owed much to the Battalion’s success, and it represented progress that should not be undone:

It was the success of the Maori Battalion in open company that gave the new generation confidence to mix in with their pakeha brethren. That is a further victory for the Battalion and the Maori people. Why throw it away? The old

²²² Searancke, Secretary, 28th Maori Battalion (Gis.) Association, to Hunn, Secretary of Defence, 24 November 1963, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²²³ Hunn, ‘Maori Battalion: Vanguard or Rearguard?’, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington, pp2-3.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p4.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p5.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p6.

soldiers would not wish to gratify their own nostalgia by pressuring the young soldiers of today back into an entirely Maori unit.²²⁷

Hunn claimed that among Maori soldiers who were currently serving there was no demand for segregated, all-Maori units. However, he admitted that some young ones said ‘they wouldn’t mind’, but dismissed this as ‘a negative attitude that shows they have not given the matter any real thought.’ Overall, Hunn emphasised, the formation of racial units would amount to ‘a reversal of the process of “he iwi kotahi tatou” to which New Zealand is moving inexorably.’²²⁸

Hunn then turned to identify and discuss the following ‘military objections’, which he believed ‘would be hard to overcome’:

- There were insufficient Maori officers to fully staff even a small Maori unit.
- Unless a completely new unit were established (which would be costly), it would be necessary to ‘convert’ an existing unit and in the process ‘weed out’ Pakeha. This would be repugnant to all concerned – Maori and Pakeha.
- Given the high proportion of Maori who were presently serving, not all would be able to be included in such a unit. This would cause a split among Maori and ‘be the makings of trouble’.
- As New Zealand did not expect to fight again with an entire Division, the Army currently had one Brigade Group within the Regular Force and another in reserve with the Territorial Force. In this context, a Maori battalion would be disproportionately large, while – on the other hand – an all-Maori company ‘would be too small to have a military identity and satisfy the aspirations of the people’.
- Reinforcement of a Maori unit ‘would be extremely difficult and complicated, if not outright impossible’.
- The Army needed Maori soldiers spread throughout all trades of the Brigade, not concentrated in one unit.
- The establishment of racial units might project the idea Pakeha officers and NCOs were not qualified to command Maori troops and, conversely, that Maori officers and NCOs were not well placed to command Pakeha. This would provide ‘a false picture... and give our overseas friends in Malaysia and elsewhere an unfavourable impression of race relations in this country.’
- In units comprised substantially of Maori, promising young Maori were reluctant to accept responsibility as this entailed separation from their friends. The creation of an all-Maori unit would exacerbate this tendency.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

- Segregation might lead to competition between units that were based on racial grounds rather than military efficiency.
- With different strengths, Maori and Pakeha complemented each other. Therefore, units that included members of both races would militarily be better balanced than either all-Pakeha or all-Maori groups. For example, in the jungle setting of South East Asia, the qualities of Maori soldiers were ‘so marked that it would be a serious step to send a New Zealand unit to the theatre which did not include a substantial Maori segment.’²²⁹

Not only would a separate unit be contrary to the general policy of integration, any move to abandon the current system, where both races served alongside each other, would remove a positive influence upon New Zealand race relations. Hunn argued that the Army’s integrated units were contributing positively to greater harmony and understanding between Maori and Pakeha:

In the Army many Maoris for the first time live and work with pakehas, and vice versa. At an impressionable age these men live and train together in close contact and make enduring friendships which do much to assist the course of racial harmony. To break up this happy state of affairs by segregating soldiers in two racial groups, viewing one another from a distance and consciously or unconsciously competing with one another on the basis of their skin colour would be as much a social tragedy as it would be militarily inefficient and undesirable.

In camp a warm community of interest builds up between Maori and pakeha soldiers which often expresses itself in a desire of the pakehas to know more of Maori matters and join more in Maori cultural activities, which are always fostered by the Army. The Maori soldier of today welcomes this pakeha interest.²³⁰

Further, Hunn stated, New Zealand wanted to project – specifically amongst the people of South-East Asia, where New Zealand forces were at this time deployed – a picture ‘of two races but one people’. The country’s reputation, he argued, would be seriously damaged if an all-Maori unit was sent overseas, especially if it needed to be officered largely by Pakeha because Maori officers had chosen not to stay with the forces.²³¹

²²⁹ Ibid., pp6-7. In advancing these arguments, Hunn drew upon some notes concerning Maori involvement in the Army, which were prepared for Hunn ahead of the reunion and written by Captain Alan Armstrong. See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington. Some biographical notes concerning Armstrong are provided in the next chapter. See page 122.

²³⁰ Hunn, ‘Maori Battalion: Vanguard or Rearguard?’, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington, pp7-8.

²³¹ Ibid., p8.

The former Battalion members received Hunn's speech with much frustration. Writing again in *Te Ao Hou*, Ted Nepia reported that many considered the speech 'a very provocative address'. While the Secretary of Defence was setting out his arguments against the formation of a Maori unit, 'an apparent restlessness pervaded his ex-servicemen listeners, many of whom lost sympathy with Mr Hunn.' As soon as Hunn finished speaking, 'the fight was on'. Every speaker, Nepia reported, attacked the various points that Hunn had made. The meeting ended with a firm resolve to continue to push for the formation of a separate unit.²³² It was decided that a panel of inquiry would be formed to examine how a Maori unit might be set up and maintained within the Army. The panel would report to a meeting of the Association that was due to take place in Palmerston North three months later.²³³

Speaking in the House on 23 June 1964, the Ratana-Labour MP for Eastern Maori, Puti Watene, discussed Hunn's recent Gisborne speech and asked that the setting up a separate Maori unit again receive consideration. During the Address in Reply debate, Watene told the House that the Government's refusal to form a separate Maori unit in the defence system had 'caused much heartburning among the Maori people and particularly Maori ex-servicemen'. Noting the achievements of 28 (Maori) Battalion during World War II, he stated it was unsurprising that Maori wanted to preserve and maintain the unit's traditions. Watene noted that the issue had been raised by 'many important persons other than Maoris', including Prime Minister Peter Fraser in 1949 and, more recently, the Duke of Edinburgh.²³⁴

Turning to the speech that Hunn had recently made at Gisborne, Watene stated that Hunn – a 'very keen advocate of integration' – had argued that a separate unit would be a backward step, one that would see Maori and Pakeha separated, thereby delaying the 'fusion of ideals'. Watene noted, also, that Hunn had suggested it would be unfair to compel Maori to serve in a unit composed only of other members of their race. He explained that the opposing arguments of the ex-servicemen who had responded to Hunn were based on 'racial, cultural, and traditional motives'. The question of battle honours was also important.²³⁵ Watene stated that all four Maori MPs supported the call for a separate Maori unit:

It required the united consent of the Maori members to set up the 28th Maori Battalion during wartime, and I can assure this House that the four Maori

²³² Ted Nepia, 'Reunion of 28th Maori Battalion Association', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 47, June 1964, p45.

²³³ 'Panel to probe forming all-Maori force', *Gisborne Herald*, 28 March 1964, p8, extract in ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²³⁴ *NZPD*, vol. 338, 23 June 1964, p263.

²³⁵ A battle honour is an award made to a military unit, which bestows the right to show the name of a battle or operation on its flags ('colours'), uniforms, and other unit accessories. Watene was evidently referring to the battle honours of the disbanded 28 (Maori) Battalion. The re-establishment of a Maori unit may have provided opportunity for greater display of the Battalion's battle honours, helping to ensure the contribution of Maori during World War II would continue to be recognised.

members are in agreement that a separate Maori unit should be formed in peacetime.²³⁶

Further, he indicated broad, strong support among Maori as a whole, describing the call for a separate unit to be a ‘most important request of the Maori people’. Hoping that the issue would ‘not be determined on the contentious basis of integration’, Watene asked the Minister and Government to give serious consideration to this request.²³⁷

This does not appear to have happened. In spite of Watene’s claims regarding the level of Maori support for a separate unit, his remarks in the House drew no response from the National Government’s Minister of Defence, Eyre, or other members of the Government. Within the Ministry of Defence, the issue of a separate Maori unit evidently received no further consideration.

However, the 28th Maori Battalion Association continued to pursue the issue. As noted above, the 1964 reunion conference resolved that a panel should further examine the proposal. Initially expected to furnish a report three months after the reunion, the panel’s final findings were released in February 1966. The panel was comprised of three former Battalion members: George Dittmer, Peta Awatere, and Bill Herewini. Dittmer, a Pakeha, had served as the Battalion’s first commanding officer and was patron of the Battalion Association.²³⁸ Awatere, another former commanding officer, appears at this time to have been working as a Maori Affairs welfare officer in Auckland, where he was also serving on the Auckland City Council.²³⁹ Herewini was employed at a senior level within the Department of Maori Affairs.²⁴⁰

Research for this report has not located a copy of the panel’s report, which was presented ahead of a Battalion reunion held at Hastings in late March 1966. However, the report is discussed in Wira Gardiner’s 1992 history of 28 (Maori) Battalion. Quoting from the report, Gardiner explains that the panel made a ‘number of discreet enquiries’ that revealed a generational divide on the issue of a separate unit. While the older generation that remembered the war favoured the formation of a Maori unit, the younger people canvassed did not entirely support the proposal.

²³⁶ *NZPD*, vol. 338, 23 June 1964, p263.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ Elsdon Craig, ‘Maori Battalion Reunion’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 25, December 1958, pp9-10.

²³⁹ Hinemoa Ruataupere Awatere, ‘Awatere, Arapeta Marukitepua Pitapitanuiarangi’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 19 April 2017.
URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5a27/awatere-arapeta-marukitepua-pitapitanuiarangi>

²⁴⁰ Wira Gardiner, *Te Mura o Te Ahi – The Story of the Maori Battalion*, Reed, Auckland, 1992, p185. See also ‘William Herewini’, 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 19 April 2017.
URL: <http://www.28maoribattalion.org.nz/soldier/william-herewini>

The impact of the Vietnam War was stated to be a significant influence on people's attitudes, though Gardiner does not explain why this was the case. On the basis of the investigations it had made, the panel recommended that the issue be pursued no further. However, in the event of another world war, it noted that Maori would again be able to ask the government to form a separate unit.²⁴¹

Following the panel's report, and in accordance with its recommendations, the Battalion Association did not lobby further for the creation of a separate Maori unit. Public discussion of the issue, it seems, came to an end. *Te Ao Hou's* report of the Battalion's 1966 reunion in Hastings, for example, does not mention that the issue was raised.²⁴²

Conclusion

The policy that all Maori should serve alongside Pakeha in the post-war non-regular Army helped to an end a tradition that had been established during World Wars I and II. In these conflicts, the New Zealand citizen-soldier forces that served overseas had included a separate Maori unit, within which most Maori volunteers had served. The policy of integration, it has been explained, was determined in March 1950, when the National Government decided against establishing a separate Maori unit within the CMT scheme. While this decision concerned the Territorial Force, it marked a shift in policy for non-regular service generally. Reflecting this, Kayforce – the final New Zealand Army deployment composed mainly of non-regular personnel – was established without a separate Maori unit. However, during the Korean deployment, some informal groupings of Maori emerged among gun crew and, more significantly, a transport platoon gained formal status as an all-Maori unit. This would be the last such unit to feature within a New Zealand Army force deployed overseas.

Among Maori, views varied as to whether, in the post-war non-regular Army, Maori should serve together or alongside Pakeha. In August 1946, a group of former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion, with support from Ngata, proposed the establishment of a separate Maori unit in the peacetime Army. Possessing a different perspective, Southern Maori MP Eruera Tirikatene, prior to the introduction of CMT, expressed the view that it would be best for Maori and Pakeha to serve within the Territorial Force alongside each other, though he believed that in the event of war Maori should again be able to form their own battalion. For Maori, the policy of integration had a number of potentially negative implications. For example, without their own unit, Maori would be less able to exercise some control over certain aspects of their

²⁴¹ Gardiner, *Te Mura o Te Ahi*, p186.

²⁴² Author unknown, '28th Battalion Reunion', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 55, June 1966, pp24-25.

service, including their ability to ensure observance of tikanga. Also, within an integrated force, Maori would be less visible, limiting the extent to which their service would receive any special recognition. It seems likely that a Maori preference for serving separately from Pakeha partly explained the emergence of the all-Maori groupings and separate transport platoon in Korea. It is also possible that the absence of a separate Maori unit in the Territorial Force partly explained lower rates of Maori registration within both the CMT and later National Service schemes.

In spite of the potentially negative implications of the policy, little consultation was undertaken with Maori before the decision not to set up a separate Maori unit within the Territorial Force was made. The Army and government made no real effort to establish where the weight of Maori opinion lay on the matter. From late October 1949, following the CMT referendum, Army leaders evidently became resolved against the idea of establishing a separate Maori unit. In the advice that the Army provided from this time, the views of Maori who opposed the formation of a separate unit were emphasised over those who favoured the establishment of such a unit. On 10 March 1950, after being asked to provide information on Maori opinion regarding the proposal to set up a Maori unit in the CMT scheme, Stewart, the Chief of the General Staff, informed National's Minister of Defence that at least five former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion opposed the creation of a separate Maori unit. However, he admitted that another former battalion officer, Rangi Royal, was strongly in favour and claimed to voice the opinion of the 'great majority' of Maori. Nevertheless, Cabinet's decision against forming a Maori unit within the CMT scheme was made without any further investigation of Maori opinion or consultation with Maori.

The decision that Cabinet made was in line with the position that Army leaders held on the matter, though Stewart, it should be noted, did not make an explicit recommendation against the establishment of a separate unit. In articulating their stance on the issue, Army leaders pointed to a number of practical difficulties. Stewart, for example, noted that, if an additional Maori battalion needed to be formed in the event of war, there would be administrative and supply disadvantages. Earlier, the commanding officer of Northern Military District, Brigadier Ron Park, had advanced arguments that drew more heavily on integrationist ideology. The most progressive option, he argued, was to have Maori and Pakeha serving alongside each other, as this would best promote equality of status between Maori and Pakeha. In contrast, the formation of a Maori battalion would introduce 'an element of racial segregation in the Army, and to this extent can only be considered a very retrograde step.' Later, in 1952, Stewart's successor, Gentry, reiterated these sentiments. He advised the Minister of Defence that 'the best future for race relations in New Zealand lies in the closest possible association of the two races. This idea is not promoted by the formation of military units on racial lines'.

While the March 1950 decision was an important development in respect of the non-regular Army, it has been explained that within the Regular Force there had never been a tradition of separate Maori service. Two key developments concerning the post-war Regular Force have been noted, both of which influenced a trend towards integrated Maori service. First, in September 1946, exclusionary enlistment criteria introduced in respect of the Interim Army (which represented, it seems, a return to pre-war enlistment policy) were removed. The Maori war effort, it has been explained, helped to secure greater equality of treatment for Maori. Outside of government, some Pakeha – influenced by the role that 28 (Maori) Battalion had played – were vocal in opposing discrimination. The exclusion against Maori enlistment in the Interim Army was reversed soon after it was brought to the Minister of Defence’s attention. This change opened the way for Maori to serve in the integrated, post-war Regular Force, though it will be explained in the next chapter that Maori for some time continued to face discriminatory recruitment practices. The second key development concerning the Regular Force was the shift that occurred from the mid-1950s, whereby overseas deployments invariably began to be made up of regular Army personnel. Given the absence of any tradition of separate Maori service within the Regular Force, this development further limited the future possibility of Maori serving together during overseas deployments.

It has been explained that, following the 1950 decision against establishing an all-Maori Territorial unit, calls for the formation of a separate unit continued to be made by Maori until the mid-1960s. Given the shift towards deployment of regular personnel, it seems likely – though it was not explicitly stated – that these calls were focussed on the creation of a Maori unit within the Regular Force. While the ongoing calls for the establishment of a Maori unit were made most strongly by former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion, their stance on the issue evidently represented the views of a wider support base. Speaking in the House after the Battalion’s 1964 reunion, Eastern Maori MP Puti Watene described the call for a Maori battalion to be a ‘most important request of the Maori people’ and he stated that the other Maori MPs shared his views on the matter. On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that, by the mid-1960s, at least, there may have been a generational divide on the issue, with younger Maori – including, possibly, some who were serving in the Army – being less supportive of the proposal.

When countering the calls that continued to be made for the establishment of a separate Maori unit, Army leaders and Defence officials again noted organisational obstacles, but they also increasingly referenced integrationist ideology. Unsurprisingly, it was J.K. Hunn, occupying the position of Defence Secretary, who most clearly articulated integrationist objectives when justifying the need for Maori to continue serving alongside Pakeha. When addressing 28 (Maori) Battalion’s 1964 reunion, Hunn spoke of practical difficulties, but especially emphasised that the

formation of racial units would amount to ‘a reversal of the process of “he iwi kotahi tatou” to which New Zealand is moving inexorably.’ This response did not satisfy those who were present. When he later raised the matter in the House, Watene rejected that the request for a separate Maori unit should be decided upon on ‘the contentious basis of integration’ and he appealed to the government to give serious consideration to the issue. However, nothing came of this, and in 1966 the Battalion Association panel that had been appointed to further investigate the matter recommended that the issue be put to rest.

Chapter Two: Recruitment and Participation



New Zealand Army troopers in Malaya – (from left) N. Pepene (Northland), G. Otene (Mangamuka), A.J. Allen (Taumarunui?), P.N. Hurst (Taumarunui), S.C. Watene (Northland), and T.A. Stevens (Northland). Photograph taken in April 1957, during the Malayan Emergency. Reference: M-2080-F, ATL Wellington.

Introduction

This chapter discusses issues concerning recruitment of Maori and it also presents related evidence regarding the level of Maori involvement in each of the three services and how this has changed. It examines, in particular, the extent to which Maori have been able to enter and serve in New Zealand's armed services during the period examined in this report. The issues that are discussed here link partly to the developments and themes that were examined in the previous chapter. This explained that equality of treatment between Maori and Pakeha was a feature of post-war government integrationist policy and, separately, was also something that Maori themselves sought. The extent to which Maori were treated equally in respect of their ability to enter the armed forces is a key issue examined in this chapter. Evidence concerning all three services indicates this did not happen immediately.

In examining Maori recruitment, evidence concerning a range of matters is discussed. For contextual purposes, the chapter provides information on the challenges that the armed forces have sometimes faced in securing sufficient recruits and maintaining establishment strengths. It will be explained that this formed part of the background to growth in Maori participation in the Army and Navy that began during the 1950s. For each of the three services, the formal eligibility criteria for entry are discussed, along with available evidence concerning enlistment practices. Maori, it will be explained, faced some disadvantages and barriers to entry. These included, during the post-war period, at least, some discriminatory enlistment practices that aimed to limit Maori involvement. In the case of the Air Force, higher educational requirements also disproportionately disadvantaged Maori, partly explaining why the proportion of Maori personnel in this service has been lower than in the Army and Navy. In the case of these two services, it will be explained that growth in Maori involvement stemmed partly from deliberate efforts to encourage Maori enlistment, which began with the Navy in the early 1950s. Based largely on oral sources of information, the chapter also discusses the circumstances and motivations that underlay Maori enlistment during the period examined in this report.

While the available evidence shows some important differences between Maori and non-Maori recruitment experiences, little specific evidence – for any one time – has been located regarding the extent to which Maori who sought to enter the services were successful in doing so and how this compared to the success rates of non-Maori. However, evidence relating to the overall levels of Maori involvement in the services sheds some light on the ability of Maori to enter the three services. The chapter presents a significant amount of statistical evidence regarding the proportion of Maori personnel within the forces and how this changed over time. It will be explained that, for most of the period covered in this report, the three services did

not routinely collect data on the ethnicity of service personnel. The statistical evidence presented here is derived from a range of sources, including census and intercensal data. Some of the data concerns Maori participation in forces deployed overseas and has been drawn from existing research. It will be explained that a number of issues exist with regard to the reliability of much of the data that is presented in this chapter. There are, for example, uncertainties relating to how some of the data was collected and also regarding the definitions of 'a Maori' that were used when individuals were categorised as such. Nevertheless, the data remains valuable because it provides an overall indication of Maori involvement and shows some clear trends, which are consistent with more impressionistic written and oral observations and recollections.

In relation to the rate of Maori involvement within each force, it is explained that all three services became reluctant to publicly disclose information on the level of Maori participation. This reluctance was expressed during the 1960s, by which time both the Army and the Navy included a significant proportion of Maori. It will be explained that the refusal to disclose details of Maori involvement was justified with reference to integrationist concepts. Specifically, it was emphasised that, within the forces, no distinction was or should be made between personnel on the grounds of race. It is possible, however, that the Army, especially, may have been concerned about how disclosure of a very high rate of Maori involvement would affect its reputation among the public. As discussed later in the report, in chapter four, an unwillingness to recognise ethnic difference had important implications for Maori personnel. This policy, it will be explained, eventually began to break down from 1990.

The first section of the chapter sets out background information that provides context to later discussion of issues concerning Maori recruitment and rates of participation in the armed forces. For the period that this report covers, it presents details of Regular Force personnel numbers and how these have changed. It then briefly discusses the recruitment challenges that the services have faced, noting that the difficulty of attracting recruits and retaining personnel appears to have been greatest in the post-years, though it has presented an ongoing challenge. The last part of the section describes the major reforms and restructuring of New Zealand's armed forces that began in about the mid-1980s and continued until the early 2000s. During this period, it will be explained, significant cuts were made to Regular Force personnel numbers.

The next section of the chapter provides an overview of the position that women have occupied within the armed forces since World War II. While Maori women have taken advantage of opportunities to serve in the armed forces, it will be explained that, for much of the period covered in this report, service opportunities for women

have until recent years been very restricted. Up until 1977, each service included a separate women's branch, within which personnel served in a limited range of roles. By 2000, various restrictions surrounding women's service – including the ability to serve in combat roles – had been removed, opening the way for greater female participation.

The chapter then turns to look at the issues – outlined above – concerning Maori recruitment and levels of participation in the three armed services between 1946 and 2000. Each of the services is dealt with separately, with developments discussed chronologically. In each case, a brief overview is provided of the role that the service has played, including key overseas deployments. As noted in the report introduction, research has focused on regular service, which from the mid-1950s became the main element in defence preparations. In respect of the Army, the previous chapter has explained that planning shifted away from the large-scale deployment of citizen-soldier volunteers and instead became focused on the use of regular personnel who could be deployed at short notice. In light of the relatively minor role they came to occupy, little information is presented in this chapter on service opportunities within the Territorial and Reserve branches of the services. However, outside of the regular Army, the involvement of Maori within Jayforce (1946-1949) and Kayforce (1950-1957) is examined. As noted in chapter one, these deployments predominantly involved citizen-soldier volunteers, with Kayforce being New Zealand's final such deployment.

The next section of the chapter, which looks at all three services together, examines developments since 2000. By this time, following the establishment in 1990 of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), the three services were operating within a more unified organisational structure. Since 2000, one notable development has seen the NZDF begin to routinely gather ethnicity data, which sheds light on current Maori involvement in New Zealand's armed services. In the Army, details of soldiers' ethnicity had been recorded on attestation forms since the mid-1950s, but for many years such information appears to have been rarely utilised for statistical purposes.


Drawing partly on the statistics that the NZDF has recently begun to collect, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the extent to which military service has been of economic significance to Maori and how this has changed.

Regular Force personnel numbers, 1950-2017

This section provides contextual evidence concerning regular personnel numbers and how these have changed. It also briefly discusses the difficulties that the armed services have faced in attracting new recruits. This discussion focuses particularly on the 1950s, when the challenge of maintaining establishment numbers appears to

have been most pronounced. It was during this decade that Maori began to comprise a significant proportion of the regular personnel in the Army and, to a lesser extent, Navy. The section concludes by describing an important recent development – the significant decline in regular personnel numbers that took place between the late 1980s and the early 2000s as the result of a major restructuring of New Zealand’s defence sector.

Graph 1: Army, Navy, and Air Force – regular personnel numbers, 1950-2017²⁴³



Based primarily upon data published annually in the *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, Graph 1 sets out regular personnel figures for each of the three armed services over the period from 1950 to 2017. It also shows the total number of regular personnel as well as the number of personnel per 100,000 of the New Zealand

²⁴³ Figures for the years 1950 to 2012 have been sourced from ‘Defence’, *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1950-2012. The 2013 to 2016 figures are those set out in the NZDF annual reports for these years. See ‘NZDF Annual Report’, NZDF website, accessed 16 August 2017.

URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/corporate-documents/annual-report/default.htm>

For the 2017 figures, see ‘Personnel Summary’, New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 16 August 2017. URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/what-we-do/personnel-composition.htm>

population. Regular personnel numbers have not been established for the years between 1946 and 1950 – a transitional period, during which wartime personnel were released and the services reorganised. In the case of the Army, it should be noted that the 1950s figures presented in Graph 1 do not include the majority of those who served in Kayforce, which was composed primarily of non-regular personnel. As noted earlier, subsequent overseas deployments invariably involved soldiers who were enlisted in the Regular Force.

Graph 1 shows that from 1950 the total number of regular personnel increased for several years, though with some fluctuation, especially for numbers serving in the Army. Except for the years between 1950 and 1959, when the Air Force had the greatest number of personnel, the Army has been the largest of the three services. The Air Force has had the next highest number of personnel, with the Navy being consistently the smallest of the three services, though since around 2000 the difference in personnel numbers between these services has been smaller. From the late 1950s through to the late 1980s, the total number of regular personnel numbers remained reasonably stable. Between 1958 and 1989, the number ranged between 11,784 and 13,287.²⁴⁴ As described in greater detail below, cuts from the late 1980s saw a significant fall in personnel numbers. All three services were affected, but especially the Air Force. Between 2002 and 2017, total personnel numbers have recovered somewhat, though have fluctuated during this period. Alongside the decline in real numbers that took place between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, Graph 1 shows another and much longer downward trend in the proportion of regular personnel within the wider population. This decline, which began in the early 1950s, remains evident today as New Zealand's population continues to grow.

Recruitment challenges

Like other agencies of the state as well as private enterprises, New Zealand's armed services have needed to maintain and at times increase personnel numbers to match desired levels of strength. Some of these efforts have been directed towards retaining existing personnel, but attracting and training new recruits has also been a major focus – especially during times of expansion. Graph 1 shows that, across the three services, the early 1950s was the period of strongest growth, and in the case of the Army, Regular Force personnel numbers continued to climb modestly through to the late 1960s. While recruitment has presented an ongoing challenge, securing sufficient numbers during this period appears to have posed the greatest difficulty. As explained later, Maori involvement in the armed services, especially the Army and Navy, increased during these years. The recruitment problems that the services faced during this period were part of the context within which this development took place.

²⁴⁴ These figures were recorded in 1959 and 1970 respectively.

In the post-war environment, these difficulties are likely to have encouraged the services to become more open to Maori participation.

Evidence from a range of sources indicates that all three services struggled to attract recruits after the war and that this continued into the 1950s. In April 1952, for example, the *Evening Post* reported that the armed services were some 3000 men short of their authorised strength – the number required for ‘desired peacetime efficiency’. Breaking this figure down, the report stated that the Army required about 85 officers and 1150 other ranks; the Navy an additional 800 to 1000 men; and the Air Force between 1000 and 1500 men, mostly skilled or potential tradesmen. In the case of the Navy and Air Force, it was claimed that the personnel shortages meant that full use was not being made of the ships and aircraft that these services possessed. Endeavouring to address the situation, the Government had increased pay rates and in the main camps and bases work had been carried out to improve amenities and build new living quarters. As a result, some new recruits had joined up, ‘but still not enough’.²⁴⁵

During the previous year, a joint-services memorandum had discussed the reasons that underlay the recruitment difficulties. Dated 9 February 1951, the memo set down, in order of importance, five key factors that were influencing the situation:

(1) There were 30,000 unfilled jobs in New Zealand.

(2) New Zealanders were reluctant to undertake Regular service as distinct from war-time service. In the case of the Army, ‘the greater part of tradition lies in the tradition of the Expeditionary Forces in which there were a small proportion of regular personnel, but no regular units.’ Further, civilian employment conditions more closely aligned with the preferences of most workers. ‘The New Zealand employee is relatively independent and sheltered. He likes to have a clear contract for a forty-hour week with penal overtime rates and a protective union. He does not like his dress to be subject to rules. He can follow his feelings with the present labour shortages.’

(3) Pay rates in the Services, though nominally higher than award rates, were ‘certainly below’ the rates commonly advertised for civilians. The pay rates were therefore insufficient to overcome the general reluctance to participate in Regular Force service and other factors perceived to be disadvantageous.

(4) The inability of the Services to guarantee housing to married recruits.

²⁴⁵ ‘Armed Services Need 3000 Extra Men’, *Evening Post*, 23 April 1952, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, New Zealand Forces – Regular Forces – Recruitment and Settlement, 1950-1954, ANZ Wellington.

(5) New Zealand's state welfare assistance and healthcare meant that many of the advertised advantages of service life were not as significant as they might be in other countries. Age benefits and subsidised medical care ensured that superannuation and healthcare offered in the Services did not significantly benefit recruitment. However, free optical and dental services offered in the Armed Forces were not available to civilians.²⁴⁶

As identified in this memo, recruitment difficulties in the post-war years partly reflected the significant and competing employment opportunities that existed outside the armed services. These opportunities were more widely open to Pakeha, than to Maori. Faced with educational and other barriers, work opportunities for Maori were generally more limited and for many were restricted to unskilled and semi-skilled work. With entry requirements for some positions involving few formal barriers, including minimal educational standards, Maori were more likely than Pakeha to look towards the opportunities that existed for employment in the armed services. Discussing the circumstances that underlay the enlistment of Maori who served in Malaya, Pugsley notes that for young Maori in the 1950s, when relatively few other such options were available to them, the Army's Regular Force provided a career path that could include trade training and other educational opportunities.²⁴⁷ Similarly, commenting on the reasons that underlay the enlistment of some Maori who would serve in Vietnam, Hall suggests that the Army presented 'another avenue' from the usual opportunities open to Maori – factory work, commercial cleaning, and labouring in urban centres and the rural alternatives of farming and forestry work.²⁴⁸ Alongside the opportunity that the armed services presented as a form of employment, there were of course other motivations and factors that underlay Maori enlistment, which will be discussed in more detail later.

Reflecting persistent difficulties and the need to cover shortfalls, all three services, but especially the Navy and Air Force, recruited personnel from the United Kingdom on an ongoing basis. Owing to the expenditure involved, this recruitment required the approval of Cabinet. In March 1957, for example, Cabinet approved – in accordance with 'the existing policy approved for each Service during recent years' – the following recruitment from the United Kingdom:

- (1) Army: 100 personnel for the following four years;
- (2) Navy: 150 ex-Royal Navy ratings during the 1957/58 year; and

²⁴⁶ Secretary, PAO (Personnel) Committee, to Secretary, External Relations, 9 February 1951, ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²⁴⁷ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p5.

²⁴⁸ Hall, *No Front Line*, p210.

(3) Air Force: 250 airmen and 50 airwomen during the 1957/58 year.²⁴⁹

File evidence shows that Cabinet continued to approve funding for such purposes until at least the late 1970s.²⁵⁰ But overall the number of individuals recruited from the United Kingdom appears to have declined and become increasingly limited to the filling of specialist positions. However, into the 1970s, United Kingdom recruitment sometimes still involved quite significant numbers. For example, in January 1973, Cabinet approved the recruitment of 74 specialist servicemen and civilians from the United Kingdom for the three armed services and HMNZ Dockyard at Devonport.²⁵¹

In the late twentieth century, the armed services' continued to maintain a steady focus on recruitment. This is evident, for example, in a 1988 Defence Psychology Unit report that sought to determine the long term implications of demographic and social change on Defence manning. Commissioned by the Chief of Defence Staff, this report identified several key long-term trends, including a likely change to the New Zealand population's ethnic composition as a result of growth in Maori and Pacific numbers. The report also noted regional population shifts and the likelihood that female participation in careers traditionally occupied by males would continue to increase. These trends, it was anticipated, would see a change in the make up of New Zealand's armed services and would require an adjustment to the way that recruiting resources were being utilised.²⁵²

Restructuring and reorganisation, 1985-2002

Around the time this report was prepared, politically-driven reforms were beginning to be introduced to the armed services. These would have a major impact on both the organisation of New Zealand's defence sector and the number of regular personnel. Commencing in the mid 1980s, the changes were part of a wider programme of state-sector restructuring, which the Fourth Labour Government initiated after it entered office in 1984 and which National continued after it gained power in 1990. The

²⁴⁹ Minister of Defence, memorandum for Cabinet, 21 February 1957, AAFD 811 W2347 box 104 k CAB 225/19/1, New Zealand Forces – Recruitment? – General, 1950-1951 [actual 1954-1957], ANZ Wellington. Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 4 March 1957, AAFD 811 W2347 box 104 k CAB 225/19/1, ANZ Wellington.

²⁵⁰ See, for example: Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 22 November 1961; Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 25 June 1962; Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 25 November 1963; Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 17 August 1965); Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 22 September 1970); Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 6 February 1973); Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 10 September 1974); Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 4 April 1978) AAFD 811 W4198 box 88 CAB 223/3/1, NZ Forces – Recruitment – General, 1961-1978, ANZ Wellington.

²⁵¹ Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 6 February 1973), AAFD 811 W4198 box 88 CAB 223/3/1, ANZ Wellington.

²⁵² A copy of this report has not been located. The RNZAF News provides a brief summary of its findings. See 'DPU Study Highlights Changes to Future Recruit Pools', *RNZAF News*, April 1989, p5

defence sector reforms can be viewed alongside the changes that, for example, reshaped New Zealand Railways and the New Zealand Forest Service. The restructuring of the armed services contributed to the significant decline in state-sector employment opportunities that occurred during this time.

Significant changes that affected the armed services began in about the mid-1980s, when declining budgets and rationalisation policies resulted in the closure and sale of a number of bases.²⁵³ Personnel numbers began to decline somewhat later, beginning first in the Army from 1989 and then in the Air Force from 1990 and the Navy from 1991. With reductions in personnel numbers underway, the Defence Act 1990 provided for a major reorganisation of the armed services. The 1990 Act, which created the NZDF, brought the three services closer together, within a more unified leadership structure.²⁵⁴ Cuts to personnel numbers continued after the Act's introduction. As detailed in Table 1, the period of time over which the reductions unfolded and their extent varied between the services. The Army and Navy were similarly affected, both losing about a quarter of their strength. The Air Force was hit hardest, with the number of regular personnel in the service declining by almost 50 percent between about 1990 and 2002. Maori, it will be explained, have predominantly served in the Army and Navy.

Table 1: Decline in regular personnel numbers, 1989-2002²⁵⁵

Service	Period of decline	Shift in personnel numbers	Decrease (%)
Army	1989-1996	5718 ↘ 4349	23.9
Navy	1991-2001	2605 ↘ 1893	27.3
Air Force	1990-2002	4155 ↘ 2194	47.2

Overall, between 1989 and 2002, the total number of regular personnel dropped from 12,448 to 8597, representing a 31 percent decline. Since 2002, numbers in all three services have recovered somewhat, though have fluctuated. Some positions, it should be noted, were reclassified as civilian positions.²⁵⁶ In 2017, the NZDF

²⁵³ See, for example, 'New Zealand Army', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p360.

²⁵⁴ For an explanation of the objectives that underlay the 1990 Act, see Derek Quigley, *The War Against Defence Restructuring: A Case Study on Changes Leading to the Current Structure of New Zealand Defence*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 166, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2006.

²⁵⁵ The figures shown here are the same as those presented in Figure 1. They have been sourced from 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1950-2012*.

²⁵⁶ See, for example, details for 1992, 'RNZAF timeline', *New Zealand History* website, accessed 19 August 2017. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/rnzaf/timeline>

As at 30 April 2017, the NZDF had 2865 civilian employees, about 30 percent of the number of Regular Force personnel. Research for this report has not established how the number of civilian

recorded a total of 9249 regular personnel – a figure that was about 26 percent lower than the number in 1989. Table 2 sets out the numbers for each service as at 30 April 2017.

Table 2: NZDF regular personnel numbers, 30 April 2017²⁵⁷

Service	Number of regular personnel	Proportion of regular personnel
Army	4647	50.2
Navy	2149	23.2
Air Force	2453	26.5
Total	9249	100.0

Women in the armed services, 1946-2017

Later sections of this chapter include a limited amount of evidence relating to the recruitment of Maori women into the armed services. For contextual purposes, this section briefly describes developments concerning the involvement of women in New Zealand’s forces. It explains that opportunities for women and the roles they served in were initially very limited. However, from the late 1970s, formal barriers that prevented women from serving on equal terms with men began to be removed, opening the way for a greater level of female involvement in the services and for participation across all roles.

During the first three decades covered in this report, the Army, Navy, and Air Force all included separate women’s branches. These had been established during World War II, when – between 1941 and 1942 – the following services were set up: the New Zealand Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC), the Women’s Royal New Zealand Naval Service (WRNZNS), and the New Zealand Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF). At their wartime peak, a total of almost 9,000 women served in these services, many being employed in clerical, domestic, or medical support activities.²⁵⁸

Though they were demobilised rapidly after the war, the women’s services were retained (except for the brief disbandment of the WRNZNS). The war experience had shown that women served a valuable role and, at the same time, post-war conditions

employees in the years since the restructuring of the armed services compares with previous years. See ‘Personnel Summary’, New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 16 August 2017.

URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/what-we-do/personnel-composition.htm>

²⁵⁷ ‘Personnel Summary’, New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 16 August 2017.

URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/what-we-do/personnel-composition.htm>

²⁵⁸ Elizabeth Cox, ‘Women in the armed forces’, entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, pp620-621.

made recruitment of men difficult. In 1948, the women's services were formally established as regular corps. At this time, the WAAC became the New Zealand Women's Army Corps (NZWAC), which in 1952 was renamed the New Zealand Women's Royal Army Corps (NZWRAC).²⁵⁹ Around the same time, the WAAF was renamed the Women's Royal New Zealand Air Force (WRNZAF).²⁶⁰



WRNZAF technician, Woodbourne Air Force Base, Blenheim. Photograph taken on 10 January 1958. Reference: EP/1958/0319-F, Evening Post Collection, ATL Wellington.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the women's branches maintained a total strength of about 500, which equated to between four or five percent of regular personnel. The roles that women filled remained relatively unchanged from the war period.²⁶¹ In 1953, for example, the work of WRNZNS personnel was stated to include duties as cooks, stewards, writers, shorthand-typists, chart correctors, motor-transport drivers, and teleprinter operators, though these might be 'supplemented or amended as necessary to meet the requirements of the Navy'.²⁶² Female personnel received significantly lower rates of pay than male counterparts of equivalent rank, and their

²⁵⁹ Ibid., pp621-622.

²⁶⁰ 'RNZAF timeline', *NZ History* website, accessed 30 October 2017.

²⁶¹ Cox, 'Women in the armed forces', p622.

²⁶² 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1953.

conditions of service were also poor in comparison. Until the mid-1960s, they were expected to be single and were discharged upon marriage. Unsurprisingly, there was significant turnover of female personnel. In the 1970s, some broadening of roles began to take place. For example, women began to be trained in the handling of small arms.²⁶³

The three women's services were disbanded in mid-1977, a process that reflected anticipated legislative developments, specifically the passage of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 – New Zealand's response to the United Nations International Covenants on Human Rights. However, neither the 1977 Act nor later Human Rights Act 1993 provided for complete equality of status for women in the armed services. Both Acts included provisions that enabled preferential treatment on the basis of gender to continue in relation to combat roles. These provisions were eventually repealed by the Human Rights (Women in Armed Forces) Amendment Act 2007, though by about 2000 the NZDF had, in practice, already lifted all restrictions on women's service.²⁶⁴

While there was significant reform in the removal of formal restrictions that related to women's service, there was not a corresponding change in the culture of the armed forces. Writing in 2000, Elizabeth Cox stated that problems associated with sexual harassment and discrimination – in spite of the recent changes – served as major barriers to the recruitment, advancement, and retention of women across all three services.²⁶⁵ Research for this report has not closely examined these issues, but it is assumed that Maori women were among those affected. During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, Catherine Walker, who served in the Army between 1978 and 2007, described her experience of the force, noting that during her time few Maori women had obtained senior rank:

The New Zealand Defence Force is dominated by white male[s]. I managed to reach my third rank... as a Senior Non Commissioned Officer [in] 2004. To my knowledge, there were few Maori women in high ranking positions beyond Sergeant.²⁶⁶

The NZDF and Ministry of Defence have undertaken initiatives in an effort to address the issues that women in the services have faced.²⁶⁷ In 2014, for example, the Ministry of Defence published a review of the treatment of women in the NZDF, which sought to establish the extent to which women were treated equitably, were

²⁶³ Cox, 'Women in the armed forces', pp622-623.

²⁶⁴ Jim Rolfe, 'Armed forces – Historical overview', Te Ara website, accessed 22 April 2018. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/armed-forces/page-1>

²⁶⁵ Cox, 'Women in the armed forces', pp623-624.

²⁶⁶ Catherine Walker, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p389.

²⁶⁷ Cox, 'Women in the armed forces', pp623-624.

able to achieve their full potential, and were safe from harassment, bullying and assault. It identified several areas where there was scope for the NZDF to further improve in respect of recruitment, retention, leadership pathways, and safety.²⁶⁸ More recently, in 2015, an independent review of the Air Force identified a ‘culture of sexism’ within the service, highlighting the need for further improvement.²⁶⁹

Since the disbanding of the women’s corps in the late 1970s, the number of women in the forces has grown significantly, though it remains considerably lower than the rate of male participation, reflecting at least some of the problems discussed above. There is some variation between the forces, with the Navy having the largest component of female personnel. In 2012, 16.2 percent of regular personnel were women, with the individual services recording the following rates of female participation: Army - 13.2 percent; Navy - 22.4 percent; Air Force - 16.8 percent.²⁷⁰ In 2017, very similar figures were recorded.²⁷¹

Army recruitment, 1946-2000

Regular Force, 1946-1957

This section examines evidence concerning the recruitment of Maori as regular Army personnel in the immediate post-war period through to 1957. As detailed in the previous chapter, a transitional force, the Interim Army, was set up at the conclusion of World War II, with Maori initially being ineligible for enlistment. In 1948, the regular Army’s post-war transition was completed and, late in the following year, CMT was introduced. Organisation of this scheme and the training of CMT recruits became a major focus of the Regular Force during the period examined in this section.²⁷² As discussed below, it appears that Maori came to comprise a significant proportion of the Army’s CMT instructors.

²⁶⁸ Ministry of Defence, Evaluation Division, *Maximising opportunities for Military Women in the New Zealand Defence Force*, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 2014. See also, Beck Eleven, ‘Women in the Navy’, in Royal New Zealand Navy, *Courage, Commitment, Comradeship: Celebrating 75 Years of the Royal New Zealand Navy, 1941-2016*, Royal New Zealand Navy, 2016, p99.

²⁶⁹ Tiaki Consultants, *Air Force Culture Review 2015*, New Zealand Defence Force, 2015.

URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2016/air-force-culture-review.pdf>

See also: ‘Review finds ‘culture of sexism’ in Air Force’, published 16 March 2016, *NZ Herald* website, accessed 22 April 2018.

URL: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11606108

²⁷⁰ ‘Defence Force personnel by gender and ethnicity, 2012’ (NZDF source statistics), Te Ara website, accessed 16 August 2017. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/graph/35716/defence-force-personnel-by-gender-and-ethnicity-2012>

²⁷¹ ‘Personnel Summary’, NZDF website, accessed 22 April 2017.

URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/what-we-do/personnel-composition.htm>

²⁷² See, for example: Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 26 March 1953, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1187 228/1/1 part 2, Establishments – Peace establishments – general proposals – recommend, no date-1952 [1953-1956], ANZ Wellington, pp2-5.

During the period examined in this section, the New Zealand Army was involved in two major overseas deployments – the occupation of Japan and the Korean War. The forces deployed – Jayforce and Kayforce – were composed mainly of volunteers who served outside of the regular Army. Maori participation in these forces is examined later in the chapter. Within the period covered here, the Army was also, during the early and middle stages of the Malayan Emergency, involved in some much smaller deployments to Malaya. Limited to Regular Force personnel, the involvement of Maori soldiers in these deployments is briefly discussed in this section. The end of the period examined here is marked by the decision, in 1957, to raise a Regular Force battalion for service in Malaya. Examined later in the chapter, this development – marking a shift away from a defence capability that relied on citizen volunteers – saw opportunities for Maori within the Regular Force increase.

In addition to the overseas deployments mentioned here, Army personnel, perhaps more controversially, were also deployed during a civil, industrial dispute – the 1951 waterfront strike. The two other services were also involved. Indeed, of the military personnel who served in strike-related roles – all of whom were regular personnel – members of the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) formed the largest component. For each service, peak manning figures were: RNZAF 1425, Army 1170, and Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) 930. Following the declaration of a state of emergency on 22 February 1951, the armed services were required to provide labour to ensure the continuing supply of goods and services deemed essential to the community. For members of the Army, this included the road trucking of goods. Revoked on 26 July 1951, the state of emergency lasted for about five months.²⁷³

As explained in the previous chapter, an initial policy to exclude Maori from the Interim Army was overturned in September 1946. On 24 September 1946, the Adjutant General, Keith Stewart, issued a circular memorandum ordering that: ‘Enlistment of Maoris in the Interim Army will in future be on the same basis as that for Europeans’.²⁷⁴ No evidence has been located to suggest that at any stage afterwards an exclusionary policy was reintroduced in respect of the regular Army. Rather, it is evident that the policy to allow Maori enlistment continued. For example, in October 1947, during the development of a Regular Force cadet scheme, which Cabinet approved early in 1948, no suggestion was made that Maori youths would be ineligible.²⁷⁵ Similarly, in July 1953, an Army Headquarters’ memo regarding the strength of the Regular Force and recruitment criteria makes no

²⁷³ ‘Industrial disputes’, entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, pp238-239.

²⁷⁴ Adjutant General, memorandum, ‘Interim Army’, 24 September 1946, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

²⁷⁵ Adjutant General to Minister of Defence, 2 October 1947; Memo to Minister of Defence (recording Cabinet approval), 4 February 1948, ACIE 8798 EA1 box 597 87/3/19 part 1, NZ Forces – Army – Enlistment of Youths for NZ Forces (Regular Army), 1947-1949, ANZ Wellington.

mention of an exclusionary policy toward Maori.²⁷⁶ Other evidence more explicitly shows that Maori were eligible for Regular Force service. For example, a 1948 draft recruitment pamphlet for the three women's branches of the armed services emphasised: 'You must be a British subject, of European or Maori descent.'²⁷⁷

Though there was no reversal of the official policy that allowed Maori to enlist on the same basis as Pakeha, it seems that in practice Maori continued to face barriers. These barriers arose from the attitudes of recruitment officers who were able to exercise discretionary power during the recruitment process. Evidence concerning this relates specifically to the Northern Military District, where it seems some Maori applicants were rejected largely on the basis of race, rather than a reasonable assessment of their potential ability to serve. Documentary evidence recording this was generated in connection with concerns that were raised about the suitability of some of the Maori recruits who were entering Papakura Military Camp.²⁷⁸

In late January 1947, about four months after it had been confirmed that Maori and Pakeha enlistments should be treated the same, the commanding officer of Papakura Camp, G.P. Sanders, wrote to Northern Military District Headquarters, alleging problems with recent Maori recruits. In this letter, Sanders stated that 27 Maori had entered the camp since September 1946 and, among these recruits, criminal and disciplinary problems were prevalent. He commented:

It is felt that a thoroughly bad type of Maori is being recruited into the Interim Army, and that this has the effect of not only causing considerable trouble in the Camp itself (where theft and insubordination is on the increase) but also gives the Army a bad name amongst the outside public.²⁷⁹

Sanders strongly recommended that all areas within the Northern Military District be requested to take great care when selecting Maori recruits, especially with regard to the checking of police records. He requested that three particular Maori recruits, who had criminal records in the civil courts, be dispensed with as unsuitable for the Interim Army.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁶ Adjutant General, circular memo, 14 July 1953, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1187 228/1/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington, p5 and graph attached after p7.

²⁷⁷ Combined pamphlets – Women's Services (draft), ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/3 part 2, Recruiting, WAAF, Policy, 1943-1948, ANZ Wellington, p2.

²⁷⁸ All recruits in the Northern Military District appear to have undertaken initial training in the camp, some then being posted to units in other locations.

²⁷⁹ Camp Commandant, Papakura, to Headquarters, Northern Military District, 27 January 1947, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. Details of the three recruits' criminal convictions are not provided. In an appendix to his letter, Sanders set out details of the disciplinary transgressions of 12 Maori recruits.

Sander's letter was forwarded to the headquarters of each of the four Northern sub-districts. Accompanying the letter was a memo prepared by senior staff members at Northern Military District Headquarters. Dated 3 February 1947, this memo reiterated the recent instructions that required that Maori be enlisted on the same basis as Europeans. However, it emphasised that only suitable personnel of either race should be recruited. In cases where a Maori was to be turned down, this was to be done in a way that would ensure that the individual concerned would not be able to plead they had been refused because of their race. The memo promoted a method of vetting Maori applicants that was being practised in Areas 1 and 2 of the Northern Military District. In these Areas, Maori applicants were given a brief 'general knowledge' test and those who failed were turned away. No Maori, it was suggested, could complain if his application was declined on these grounds.²⁸¹

It is unclear how such a test would have served to screen applicants of unsuitable character. Though not explicitly stated, it seems to have been used simply to limit the number of Maori recruits. Indeed, the Northern Headquarters' memo of 3 February 1947 indicated that few Maori recruits had come from Areas 1 and 2, where the general knowledge test was being used. While encouraging this vetting of Maori, the memo noted that the Interim Army faced recruitment shortfalls and could not lightly turn down enlistments. Though it was not desired that the Interim Army be loaded with unsuitable applicants, all areas in the Northern District were encouraged to do their best to recruit personnel as the situation for all units had become 'most critical'.²⁸²

The approach to vetting Maori applicants set down in the Northern Headquarters' memo of 3 February 1947 suggests that, at this time, there were no clearly defined guidelines and criteria for determining the suitability of individual applicants. Procedures evidently varied from place to place, with recruitment officers being able to exercise significant discretion. As a result, Maori applicants were vulnerable to rejection from unsympathetic officers who wished to limit Maori recruitment. Army Headquarters received a copy of the memo, which meant that some staff in Wellington would have been aware of the vetting being carried in the Northern District. The memo did not generate a response from Army Headquarters and was filed without any questions being raised. No evidence of separate vetting of Maori has been located in respect of the Central and Southern Military Districts.

However, in the Northern District, the difficulty of securing Regular Force recruits may have constrained the extent to which the practice was used. In 1952, the Commander of the District, Brigadier G.H. Clifton, wrote to Army Headquarters,

²⁸¹ AA and QMG, Northern District, and Commandant, Northern Military District, to HQ, Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 3 February 1947, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1113 209/1/69, ANZ Wellington.

²⁸² Ibid.

expressing concerns about the number of Maori in the regular Army and proposing that restrictions on Maori enlistment be imposed. Writing on 3 July 1952, Clifton commented first on the number of Maori instructors engaged in training CMT recruits and then discussed Maori involvement in the regular Army more generally. Clifton stated that at Papakura Camp some 40 percent of the CMT instructors – all Regular Force personnel – were Maori. He explained that when the scheme had been introduced, the Northern District had made ‘strenuous efforts’ to enlist recruits capable of becoming instructors, and the majority who had applied were Maori. Clifton claimed that the large number of Maori instructors was discouraging CMT recruits from opting to join the regular Army. Referring, presumably, to some Pakeha recruits, he claimed that:

a feeling exists amongst Territorial Recruits, that to join the RF means becoming a member of the “Pa”. Some have expressed regret that the low strength of the Army necessitates their being instructed by Maoris.²⁸³

Brigadier Clifton stated that the ‘problem’ of Maori over-representation concerned five Corps in particular. For each of these, he provided details of the level of Maori involvement, which are set out in Table 3.

Table 3: Maori involvement in selected Corps at Papakura Camp – Brigadier Clifton letter, July 1952

Corps	Details of Maori involvement
New Zealand Regiment	At Papakura Camp, 15 instructors were Maori. No details provided of the total number.
Royal New Zealand Artillery	At Papakura Camp, 6 instructors were Maori. No details provided of the total number.
Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps	Of a total strength of 126, 12 (9.5 percent) were Maori.
Royal New Zealand Engineers	Of a total strength of 80, 23 (28.8 percent) were Maori.
New Zealand Women’s Army Corps	Of a total strength of 62, 10 (16.1 percent) were Maori.

Commenting on the characteristics and suitability of Maori who were in the Regular Force, Clifton stated that:

Some of the Maoris employed are of good type and will attain high rank. The majority unfortunately, are of the lower category, requiring constant

²⁸³ Brigadier, Commanding, Northern Military District, to Military Secretary, Army, 3 July 1952, AALJ 7291 W3449 box 15 243/8/26, Regular force – Employment and Establishment of Maoris, no date-1952, ANZ Wellington.

supervision, and are in frequent trouble through contravention of regulations, and in the main make very mediocre tradesmen.²⁸⁴

Clifton believed that a ‘satisfactory career’ could only be guaranteed to ‘the very good type’. However, not many of these could be employed as experience had shown it was ‘preferable not to post Maoris to Areas.’ (Here, Clifton was evidently referring to the sub-districts within the Northern District.) He did not specify what problems arose when Maori were posted to these areas, but may have been referring to discipline problems or possibly difficulties arising from intolerance towards Maori personnel, especially instructors. In light of this, Clifton believed it was probable that very few Maori would be recommended for extension of service beyond their initial engagement. He advised that, in ‘fairness to the Maori Race’, it was proposed that ‘as soon as practicable’ restrictions be imposed on the enlistment of Maori in the regular Army to ‘a more reasonable proportion’.²⁸⁵

A staff member at Army Headquarters, whose identity is unclear, passed Clifton’s letter on to the Adjutant General, noting that he believed the Northern Military District already had an effective means of dealing with the matter: ‘Largely NMD have the solution in their own hands, by adjusting their Pass Selection standards.’²⁸⁶ (This would seem to be a reference to the vetting practice discussed above, which involved a general knowledge test.) The Adjutant General – the senior-most staff member responsible for personnel matters – appears to have read Clifton’s letter.²⁸⁷

No record of any further responses or discussions concerning Brigadier Clifton’s letter has been located. It is unclear whether any steps were taken in the Northern Military District to limit Maori recruitment in accordance with Clifton’s plans. Overall, facing the ongoing challenge of attracting recruits, it seems that the Army continued to recruit Maori without any significant shift in policy. Pugsley observes that during the 1950s Maori were able to take advantage of opportunities to serve in the Regular Force, stating these provided ‘a conduit for Maori advancement that was not available anywhere else in New Zealand society.’²⁸⁸ At first, these opportunities related primarily to the raising of training instructors. Towards the end of the decade, from 1957, as discussed later in the chapter, the raising of regular Army battalions for service in Malaya provided a new opportunity for Maori.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Unidentified to AG, 8 June 1952, minute on Brigadier, Commanding, Northern Military District, to Military Secretary, Army, 3 July 1952, AALJ 7291 W3449 box 15 243/8/26, ANZ Wellington.

²⁸⁷ JRP, 8 July 2016, minute on Brigadier, Commanding, Northern Military District, to Military Secretary, Army, 3 July 1952, AALJ 7291 W3449 box 15 243/8/26, ANZ Wellington.

²⁸⁸ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p356.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

During the early and mid-1950s, Maori involvement in the regular Army was not confined to serving as CMT training instructors. Maori were also involved in other roles. For example, as recorded in Table 3, Maori women served in the NZWAC. In the Wanganui district, at least, the Army actively sought to recruit young Maori women into the Corps, with the intention that the recruits would serve at Waiouru Camp. In its efforts to do so, the Army sought assistance from the Department of Maori Affairs' Wanganui district office.²⁹⁰ Departmental officers accordingly provided help, including advice on the suitability of applicants.²⁹¹ It is unclear how many, if any, Maori women from the Wanganui district joined the Corps at this time. As discussed below, the Department of Maori Affairs' role in assisting Army recruitment efforts became more pronounced from around 1960.

Maori participation in the regular Army during the early and mid 1950s is also evident in the relatively small, initial deployments of New Zealand ground-force troops to Malaya. The first of these deployments was in the opening stages of the Malayan Emergency, when, from 1949, several New Zealand regular Army officers were seconded to British units. Later, between 1952 and 1956, about 40 regular personnel served with 1 Battalion, Fiji Infantry Regiment (1FIR).²⁹² And in 1955, an SAS squadron was set up for service in Malaya – New Zealand's initial contribution to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. Deployed between April 1956 and the end of 1957, the squadron was raised as a Regular Force unit and comprised about 120 personnel – one-third existing regular Army personnel and two-thirds selected volunteers.²⁹³ Upon its return to New Zealand, the SAS squadron was disbanded.²⁹⁴

While research has not identified whether any Maori were among the officers seconded to British units from 1949, Maori were certainly among the New Zealand troops who served with 1FIR and in the SAS squadron, though the exact extent of Maori involvement has not been established.²⁹⁵ Army Headquarters' recruitment directions for the SAS squadron made no suggestion that Maori applicants were in

²⁹⁰ See, for example: Public Relations Officer, Central Military District, to Registrar, Maori Affairs Department, 9 April 1951; 'New Zealand Army: NZWAC', information sheet, 12 April 1951, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²⁹¹ See, for example: Public Relations Officer, Central Military District, to Jorgensen, Maori Welfare Office, Tokaanu, 24 April 1951; Welfare Officer to District Officer Wanganui, 25 March 1954, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

²⁹² Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp22-35.

²⁹³ Adjutant-General, circular memo, 22 March 1955, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/210, Organisation – SAS [Special Air Service] squadron Malaya, 1955-1958, ANZ Wellington. Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp88-89.

²⁹⁴ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p122.

²⁹⁵ Pugsley refers to Maori involvement in both 1FIR and in the SAS squadron. See, for example, Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp35, 122.

any way to be treated differently from non-Maori.²⁹⁶ The squadron, Pugsley notes, had a 'Maori-Pakeha mix' – a description that is consistent with photographs that show a number of Maori among the SAS personnel who served in Malaya during the deployment.²⁹⁷

In the mid-1950s, it should be noted, the attestation form that all soldiers were required to fill out when enlisting in the regular Army was altered to include a question that asked whether or not the individual was Maori and, if so, the degree of their Maori ancestry.²⁹⁸ The reasoning behind this change is unclear, though – as discussed below – it was possibly introduced to enable the Army to more easily provide data to the Department of Statistics. While the new attestation form enabled the Army to track the number of Maori who were entering the force or re-enlisting, little effort appears to have been made to use the information recorded to produce statistics on the overall level of Maori involvement in the Army. During the 1960s, as discussed below, the Army became reluctant to recognise and acknowledge the number of Maori within its ranks.

From the early 1950s, however, the Army was required to provide some data to the Statistics Department that distinguished between Maori and non-Maori personnel. The Statistics Department requested this information in connection with its intercensal population estimates. The Army was first asked to supply figures for these estimates in March 1952, when the Government Statistician wrote to the Army Secretary, requesting that details of the number of personnel residing in each of the Army's camps be furnished.²⁹⁹ He asked that separate figures be provided for Maori and non-Maori and noted that the information supplied would be treated as confidential. As suggested above, the change made to the Army's attestation form during the 1950s was possibly introduced in connection with the Statistics Department's requests, with the new form making it easier for the Army to gather statistics on the number of Maori personnel.

The Army provided data for the intercensal population returns from 1952 through to at least 1970.³⁰⁰ However, in respect of Maori personnel numbers, there are a number of uncertainties and limitations regarding the statistics that were produced. First, the method that the Army used to collect the data and the level of care that it

²⁹⁶ Adjutant-General, circular memo, 22 March 1955, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/210, ANZ Wellington.

²⁹⁷ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p122 and photographs between pp104-105 (specifically 'Trooper Bill Edwards...', 'Corporal Huia Woods...', and 'Two troopers in the Malayan jungle...').

²⁹⁸ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p297.

²⁹⁹ Government Statistician to Army Secretary, 21 March 1952, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 293 277/1/5 part 2, Census and Statistics – Population Returns, 1952-1970, ANZ Wellington.

³⁰⁰ See correspondence and returns in AALJ 7291 W3508 box 293 277/1/5 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

exercised is unclear. In connection with this, it should be noted that, though the Government Statistician asked that Maori and non-Maori be differentiated, he did not provide a definition of 'Maori'. At this time, the Statistics Department categorised an individual as being Maori if they were of half or more Maori descent.³⁰¹ It is unclear whether it was this definition that the Army adhered to when it gathered figures for the intercensal estimates. It is also notable that the statistics do not provide a comprehensive survey of the Army as a whole. They are limited only to personnel residing in camps and do not, for example, include personnel who were involved in overseas deployments. The figures possibly include some civilian employees and in one year, at least, 1952, the Army's figures include CMT personnel.

From 1957, the data that the Army produced for the intercensal population estimates becomes less useful because, though the figures continue to distinguish Maori from non-Maori, they do not consistently differentiate between service personnel and civilian dependents who also resided in the camps. It is evident that the combined figures – those that include both service personnel and civilian dependents – do not always provide an accurate indication of the proportion of Maori among service personnel alone.³⁰² It should be noted this is also an issue with the locality data that between 1936 and 1971 was included in official census results and which was based upon census returns that individuals completed. Some Army camps were among the localities for which population data was provided and again there are separate figures for the number Maori. However, the locality data captures all camp residents – military personnel and civilians.³⁰³

Of the figures that the Army produced for the intercensal population estimates, the data collected for the years 1953, 1954, and 1955 provides the clearest indication of the number of Maori personnel residing in the Army's camps. It is possible that these figures, which are set out in Table 4, include some civilian employees alongside Regular Force personnel. For each of the three years, the total number of camp residents recorded represents between 55 and 65 percent of the Regular Force. Notwithstanding the data's limitations, the figures suggest a modest level of Maori involvement in the Army during the mid-1950s – a level roughly in line with the proportion of Maori within the total population as recorded in the 1956 census, which was 6.3 percent.³⁰⁴ The figures show a considerable variation between camps

³⁰¹ See, for example, Department of Statistics, *Population Census, 1961: Volume 1, Increase and Location of Population*, Department of Statistics, Wellington, undated, p18.

³⁰² See, for example, Army Secretary to Government Statistician, 25 May 1954, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 293 277/1/5 part 2, ANZ Wellington. This return provides separate figures for Army personnel and civilian dependents. As detailed in Table 4, about 6.3 percent of the camp's Army personnel were recorded to be Maori. However, Maori made up only 4.8 percent of all the individuals recorded – Army personnel and civilian dependents.

³⁰³ See, for example, New Zealand Census Results 1956 (Volume I, Table 19).

³⁰⁴ See 'Population', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1957.

that might partly reflect uneven levels of Maori involvement across the Army's different corps. Some broader geographical patterns are also evident. Specifically, the number of Maori in the Army's North Island camps greatly exceeded the number in the south. However, the number of Maori at the Army's main South Island camp, Burnham, would increase by the early 1960s, when the camp was used as a support base for the regular Army infantry units being deployed to South-East Asia.³⁰⁵

Table 4: Army intercensal personnel returns, 1953-1955³⁰⁶

Army camp	1953		1954		1955	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
Narrow Neck, Devonport	90	6	91	5	86	11
Papakura	367	20	275	45	218	35
Ngaruawahia	74	5	66	7	82	8
Waiouru	732	97	693	32	647	45
Linton	175	22	151	17	142	16
Trentham	168	14	208	10	189	7
Petone	18	2	16	1	2	0
Fort Dorset, Wellington	136	14	122	11	119	8
Burnham	654	22	462	14	334	3
Addington	47	1	37	0	34	1
Other, smaller camps	79	7	96	6	154	7
Non-Maori and Maori – totals	2540	210	2217	148	2007	141
Combined total	2750		2365		2148	
Maori percentage of combined total	7.6		6.3		6.6	

Jayforce, 1946-1949

Outside of the regular Army, during the decade that followed World War II, there were also opportunities for fixed-term Army service for individuals who volunteered for deployment as members of Jayforce and Kayforce. From the mid 1950s, when the emphasis shifted to deployment of professional soldiers enlisted in the regular Army, such opportunities ended. While Jayforce and Kayforce primarily involved volunteers, there was a small regular Army component in both deployments. However, especially in the case of Jayforce, this involvement was very limited. In March 1953, the Chief of the General Staff, William Gentry, recalled that, though

³⁰⁵ EGS, 'Why Maoris Choose the Army', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 36, September 1961 p8. Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp189-190.

³⁰⁶ Army Secretary to Government Statistician, 19 June 1953; 25 May 1954; 10 June 1955; AALJ 7291 W3508 box 293 277/1/5 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

Jayforce was overseas when the Regular Force was formally reconstituted in March 1948, 'it made few demands on the Regular Force as it was a continuation of 2 NZEF and thus reasonably self-contained.'³⁰⁷

The previous chapter has explained that sometime between August and October 1945 a decision was made to include Maori volunteers within Jayforce and that these soldiers would serve in a separate unit. Initially established with 270 men, D Squadron was a small component of Jayforce. In March 1946, when Jayforce arrived in Japan from Italy, some 4200 New Zealand personnel landed.³⁰⁸ Within the original draft, the members of D Squadron comprised about six-and-a-half percent of the force that departed Italy. This was close to the proportion of Maori in the New Zealand population, which in the 1946 census was recorded to be 6.2 percent.³⁰⁹ However, it is not clear that the Maori component of the Italy draft was deliberately set to reflect this. It may instead have been established to roughly reflect the relative size of 28 (Maori) Battalion within the organisational structure of 2nd New Zealand Division.

Jayforce's initial body was relieved by a replacement draft recruited from volunteers in New Zealand. This draft was itself relieved by a second replacement draft.³¹⁰ Alongside Pakeha volunteers, a limited number of Maori were included in these drafts. Recruitment for the first replacement draft began in February 1946.³¹¹ This draft, which arrived in Japan in June and August 1946, numbered 4203 personnel.³¹² A quota was set for the number of Maori personnel who were to serve within the draft – 176 volunteers, who were to be divided into four troops, each with 44 soldiers.³¹³ (The four troops were organised along the same tribal lines as D Squadron, which as noted earlier reflected the organisational structure of 28 (Maori) Battalion.) The proportion of Maori volunteers within the first replacement draft was less than the proportion within the initial Italy draft. Maori comprised a little more than four percent of the draft. The quota almost certainly saw a reduction in the

³⁰⁷ Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 26 March 1953, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1187 228/1/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington, p5 and graph attached after p7.

³⁰⁸ Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, pp49, 53.

³⁰⁹ See data table accompanying graph 'New Zealand population by ethnicity, 1840-2006', media item within Ian Pool, 'Population Change', Te Ara website, accessed 2 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/graph/28720/new-zealand-population-by-ethnicity-1840-2006>

³¹⁰ The volunteers in each of these drafts received the same rates of pay as members of 2NZEF, including 'deferred pay and gratuity'. 'New Zealand Military Forces – British Commonwealth Occupation Force for Japan', publicity advertisement, undated, ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

³¹¹ Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, p79. See also 'Occupation of Japan – Minister's appeal for volunteers', *Dominion*, 6 February 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

³¹² Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, p218.

³¹³ 'Maoris for J Force', *Evening Post*, 28 March 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

number of Maori in Japan as it seems unlikely that many Maori in the original draft would have remained in Japan following the arrival of the replacement draft.³¹⁴

No evidence has been located regarding how the Maori quota for the first replacement draft was set and the reasons why the proportion of Maori within the draft was less than that of the original draft. The reduction may have represented a deliberate effort to limit Maori involvement, underpinned perhaps by the same views that lay behind the belief that Maori should be excluded from the Interim Army. Research for this report has not identified any evidence of disciplinary or other issues concerning Maori who served in the initial draft that might help to explain why the number of Maori in the replacement draft was reduced.

The limits placed on recruitment of Maori volunteers for the first replacement draft was a matter of frustration for some Maori. On 28 March 1946, the *Evening Post* reported that Hawke's Bay Maori had expressed concern about the number of places available for local Maori. In response, the Maori War Effort Organisation's chief liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J.P. Ferris, explained that allocations had been made as to the number of volunteers that would be accepted from different districts. While the Heretaunga people called for the inclusion of 24 men from Hawke's Bay and Wairarapa, Ferris stated that only 10 volunteers from these districts would be accepted. These individuals would service in Troop No. 4, which would include men from the tribes of Wairoa, Hawke's Bay, Wairarapa, Taupo, Taranaki, Wanganui, West Coast, Wellington, and the South Island.³¹⁵

Many Pakeha were also excluded from the first replacement draft, but the proportion of Maori enlistees who were turned away was much higher. By mid March 1946, some 8828 individuals had enlisted for the draft – 7655 Pakeha and 1173 Maori.³¹⁶ Recruiting continued into early April.³¹⁷ Less than half of those who enlisted were selected for the draft. Based on the recruitment figures produced in mid March 1946, about 13 percent of those who enlisted were Maori, yet as noted above the quota for Maori volunteers equated to only four percent of the total number within the draft. The high rate of Maori enlistment (compared to the proportion of Maori in the total population) indicates that Maori at this time viewed military service more favourably than the general population. However, with a quota in place, this was not expressed in the number of Maori who served.

³¹⁴ Brocklebank explains that few members of the Italy draft elected to remain in Japan. Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, pp201-203.

³¹⁵ 'Maoris for J Force', *Evening Post*, 28 March 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

³¹⁶ J Force enlistments, press statement, undated, (received by Prime Minister's office on 14 March 1946), ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

³¹⁷ 'End in Sight – J Force Recruiting', *Evening Post*, 8 April 1946, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 27 87/11/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

A quota for Maori personnel does not seem to have been set for the second Jayforce replacement draft. With 1820 personnel, this draft was about half the size of the two earlier drafts. If a Maori quota did exist, it was set considerably higher than that of the first replacement draft. As detailed below, about 20 percent of personnel in the second replacement draft appear to have been Maori. Evidence concerning the number of individuals who applied to serve in the draft has not been located, but details concerning the draft's final composition are available. The draft sailed for Japan in two groups, the first of which departed on 15 July 1947, the second on 28 August 1947.³¹⁸ Accompanying the draft were 146 personnel who were returning to Japan after leave in New Zealand. Most of the replacement draft (more than 95 percent of personnel) left New Zealand on 15 July 1947. The 1948 annual report of the Military Forces of New Zealand identified the number of European and Maori personnel who embarked on this date. These details are set out in Table 5.

Table 5: Jayforce second replacement draft and returning personnel, embarkation of 15 July 1947³¹⁹

	Officers	Other Ranks
Replacement personnel		
European	54	1346
Maori	3	365
Sub-total	57	1711
Returning personnel		
European	8	6
Maori	2	-
Sub-total	10	6
Total	67	1717

It is uncertain how many Maori were among the 52 replacement draft recruits and 130 returning personnel who sailed on 28 August 1947. But it is clear that Maori comprised a significant proportion of the second replacement draft. Out of the 1768 replacement personnel who sailed on 15 July 1947, 368 or almost 21 percent were Maori. The figures presented in Table 5 show that very few Maori served as officers – an issue that will be examined in the next chapter.

As noted above, no information has been located regarding the number of individuals who enlisted to serve with the second replacement draft. It is doubtful that the response to recruitment efforts matched the enthusiasm that existed when enlistments were sought for the first replacement draft. Interest in serving in Japan may have waned among members of the general population. The high level of Maori representation in the second replacement draft possibly reflected this, with recruiters potentially selecting from a more limited pool of enlistees. It is notable that the

³¹⁸ 'Military Forces of New Zealand', AJHR, 1948, H-19, p3.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

second replacement draft was recruited after September 1946, when the policy of excluding Maori from the Interim Army was overturned. This decision might also have helped to open the way for greater Maori participation in Jayforce.

In total, about 12,000 New Zealanders served in Japan between 1946 and 1949. While the great majority of these individuals were men, several hundred women were also involved – serving as nurses and within the WAAC.³²⁰ The exact number of Maori who served in Japan is unclear. From the figures available for the initial draft and the two replacement drafts, Jayforce appears to have included more than 800 Maori personnel. Based on this, at least seven percent of the New Zealanders who served in Japan were Maori.

Alongside Maori volunteer recruits, a small number of Maori personnel within the Regular Forces also served in Japan. These included two officers – brothers Bruce and Brian Poananga. As discussed in the report that covers the years up to 1946, Maori had been admitted into officer cadet training during World War II. Bruce and Brian Poananga entered the Royal Military College of Australia at Duntroon in 1943 and 1944 respectively. Graduating before his brother, Bruce was sent first to Japan, where he was posted with D Squadron. In 1946, Brian joined his brother, initially serving beneath him in D Squadron before holding staff appointments.³²¹ Both brothers would go on to have long careers as professional soldiers in the New Zealand Army.³²² Between 1978 and 1981, Brian Poananga would serve as Chief of the General Staff – the first person of Maori descent to hold the Army’s senior-most position.

Kayforce, 1950-1957

Spanning the years from 1950 to 1957, New Zealand’s military involvement in the Korean War and its aftermath was to be the country’s final deployment of citizen volunteers. As with the force that participated in the occupation of Japan, the majority of New Zealanders who served in Korea did so as part of an Army ground force. Also like Jayforce, relatively few Regular Force soldiers participated in the deployment, though some were posted to the theatre, while others were involved in

³²⁰ ‘Jayforce’, entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p258. Brocklebank, *Jayforce*, p152. Alison Parr, *The Occupiers: New Zealand Veterans Remember Post-War Japan*, Penguin Books, Auckland, 2012, p13.

³²¹ Henare Matauru Poananga, ‘Poananga, Brian Matauru’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 6 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5p32/poananga-brian-matauru>

³²² ‘Retired major remembered at tangi’, *Manawatu Standard*, article last updated 22 September 2010, Stuff website, accessed 6 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.stuff.co.nz/manawatu-standard/news/4154101/Retired-major-remembered-at-tangi>

the training of Kayforce volunteers.³²³ During the deployment, Kayforce's regular Army component did increase somewhat, foreshadowing the 'force-in-being' concept that was to become the focus of Army preparations.³²⁴ About 4700 individuals served in Kayforce, which comprised an initial main body and later reinforcement and replacement drafts. Following the armistice of July 1953, the number of New Zealand personnel in Korea was reduced. In addition to Kayforce, 1300 New Zealanders served in Navy frigates during the war and for a period after the armistice.³²⁵

While accurate figures concerning Maori involvement in Kayforce are unavailable, it is evident that the proportion of Maori recruits within the drafts that left New Zealand grew significantly and became substantially higher than the proportion of Maori in the general population. It will be explained that this increase in Maori recruitment occurred as enthusiasm for enlistment amongst the wider population declined – as had been the case with the second Jayforce replacement draft. Again, the high rate of Maori involvement shows a greater willingness among Maori to serve, reflecting – partly, at least – that employment opportunities for Maori in the post-war period were generally more restricted. As detailed in the previous chapter, Kayforce was the first post-war force that was established without a separate Maori unit, though during the deployment some informal groupings emerged and, early in 1954, one all-Maori unit was designated. No evidence has been located to suggest that the initial absence of a separate unit deterred Maori from enlisting for service in Kayforce.

In comparison to the later drafts, enlistment for the main body of Kayforce generated significant interest. Between 27 July and 5 August 1950, five men came forward for every one required.³²⁶ No evidence has been located regarding the total number of Maori who enlisted for the main body of Kayforce. The proportion of Maori enlistees who were turned away, and how this compared with the rate for non-Maori, is therefore unclear. In September 1950, the Military Secretary stated that 'Blood... in no way enters into consideration in selection'.³²⁷ But without figures relating to enlistment and acceptance, it is unclear whether this was in fact the case.

The main body and advance parties that embarked towards the end of 1950 comprised a total of 1056 personnel. McGibbon states that the attestation forms of

³²³ General Staff to Minister of Defence, 26 March 1953, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1187 228/1/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington, p5 and graph attached after p7.

³²⁴ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p366.

³²⁵ 'Korean War', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p270.

³²⁶ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p41. 'Korean War', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p267.

³²⁷ Military Secretary, minute, 21 September 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1345 319/23/1, ANZ Wellington, cited in McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p46.

these individuals shows that 78 recorded some degree of Maori descent, with 49 of these individuals specifying that half or more of their ancestry was Maori.³²⁸ Those who fell into these categories respectively comprised about 7.4 and 4.6 percent of the main body, while the proportion of Maori recorded in the 1951 census was 6.0 percent.³²⁹ (As noted above, the Statistics Department categorised an individual as being Maori if they were of half or more Maori descent.) However, McGibbon suggests that not all men were forthcoming about their ethnic status and that the number of Maori in the main body may have been higher. He notes anecdotal evidence of at least two men who did not declare they were Maori.³³⁰

Exact figures are not available concerning the number of Maori in the 97-strong reinforcement draft that followed the main body, embarking in June 1951. Army records indicate that the number of Maori in this draft ranged from seven to at least 13.³³¹ The figures available for the next and larger Expansion Draft, which was composed of 579 men and embarked in August 1951, must also be treated with caution.³³² Army quarterly embarkation returns suggest that Maori made up about 13.4 percent of this draft.³³³ While unlikely to be exact, this figure signals the growth of Maori participation in Kayforce.

This shift occurred as enthusiasm for enlistment generally declined. While some 6000 men had come forward for the main body, recruitment of the Expansion Draft, which began in May 1951, drew only about 1600 enlistments.³³⁴ More generally, interest in Korea waned when, from around the end of 1951, it became clear that the conflict had become stalemated and would remain confined to the Korean Peninsula. From this time, New Zealanders began to pay little attention to the events occurring in Korea and there were sometimes complaints that Kayforce was a 'Forgotten Force'.³³⁵ Writing to Kayforce Headquarters in April 1952, the Chief of the General Staff, noting that New Zealand's existing contribution was high as a proportion of the country's population, expressed 'little doubt' that it would be difficult to maintain this commitment. In light of this, a ceiling figure of 1537 (80 officers and 1457 other ranks) had been determined for the New Zealand force in Korea.³³⁶

³²⁸ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p46, 383.

³²⁹ See data table accompanying graph 'New Zealand population by ethnicity, 1840-2006', media item within Ian Pool, 'Population Change', Te Ara website, accessed 2 March 2017.

URL: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/graph/28720/new-zealand-population-by-ethnicity-1840-2006>

³³⁰ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p46, 383.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, pp380-381, 451, endnote 42.

³³² *Ibid.*, pp380-381, 451, endnote 42.

³³³ *Ibid.*, p197.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, p197.

³³⁵ 'Korean War', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p270.

³³⁶ Chief of the General Staff to HQ NZ Kayforce, 4 April 1952, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1356 325/6/3 part 1, War establishments – Establishment BC [British Commonwealth] Force Korea, undated, ANZ Wellington.

Within this context of declining public interest and recruitment challenges, there continued to be growth in the proportion of Maori recruits amongst Kayforce reinforcement drafts. Archival material examined for this report includes no evidence that indicates this was the result of deliberate efforts to encourage Maori enlistment. Evidence of growing Maori involvement includes casual written observations. For example, Captain A.C. Lyall of 16 Field Regiment noted a 'Large proportion' of Maori amongst the 136-strong 3rd Reinforcements that followed the Expansion Draft, embarking from New Zealand in January 1952.³³⁷ Drawing upon Army quarterly embarkation returns, McGibbon states that Maori comprised almost 25 percent of personnel in subsequent reinforcement groups that embarked between April 1952 and March 1953.³³⁸ Over this period, five groups left New Zealand, with a total of about 1329 personnel.³³⁹

Among the Maori who embarked during this period was Kihī Ngatai of Ngāti Ranginui, who had been working for New Zealand Railways in Auckland before he enlisted for Kayforce.³⁴⁰ (His brother, Dickson, had embarked during the previous year. On 28 January 1953, Dickson Ngatai was killed in Korea as the result of an accident.³⁴¹) Kihī Ngatai left New Zealand in December 1952, evidently as a member of the 109-strong 4th Reinforcement Draft, which travelled to Korea by air between August and December 1952.³⁴² Recalling those who he departed with – and referring, it seems, only to the Maori members of the draft – Ngatai observed: 'There were a lot of us from all over – Tauranga, Ngāti Awa, Mataatua, Ngapuhi, Te Arawa and Hauraki.'³⁴³ While it is not possible to say whether this group was representative of the Maori who served in Korea, it is notable that it included iwi that had strong traditions of Crown military service.

Though the exact number is difficult to establish, some further 1537 Kayforce personnel departed from New Zealand between March 1953 and March 1957, when

³³⁷ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p295, 380-381, 467 endnote 28. 'Alfred Clinton Lyall', Cenotaph website, accessed 26 June 2017.

URL: <http://www.aucklandmuseum.com/war-memorial/online-cenotaph/record/C121393>

³³⁸ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p295, 467 endnote 29.

³³⁹ McGibbon notes that the exact strength of embarkations from September 1952 is difficult to determine. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, pp380-381.

³⁴⁰ Kihī Ngatai interview, 'Waka Huia Anzac Special – Korean war – K Force – Tahī Takao and Kihī Ngatai', English subtitles (translated from Te Reo) from 3m05s.

URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNmkZEK6U6co>

³⁴¹ Kihī Ngatai interview, 'Waka Huia Anzac Special – Korean war – K Force – Tahī Takao and Kihī Ngatai', English subtitles (translated from Te Reo) from 7m25s and 36m35s. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p371.

³⁴² Kihī Ngatai interview, 'Waka Huia Anzac Special – Korean war – K Force – Tahī Takao and Kihī Ngatai', English subtitles (translated from Te Reo) from 10m10s. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, pp380-381.

³⁴³ Kihī Ngatai interview, 'Waka Huia Anzac Special – Korean war – K Force – Tahī Takao and Kihī Ngatai', English subtitles (translated from Te Reo) from 9m45s.

the final embarkation took place.³⁴⁴ Research for this report has not established how many Maori were among those who left New Zealand during this period.

In respect of the total Maori contribution to Kayforce, Army quarterly embarkation returns suggest that at least 700 Maori were among the 4700 personnel who served in Korea. Proportionally, this equates to almost 15 percent of personnel. McGibbon, however, notes inconsistencies in the Army's statistics and suggests that the rate of Maori participation was somewhat higher than this.³⁴⁵

Oral interviews with Kayforce veterans provide some insight into the circumstances and motivations of Maori who volunteered to serve in Korea. They record examples of volunteers who left low-skilled employment to serve in Korea as well as individuals motivated by a sense of adventure and, in some cases, a desire to follow in the footsteps of whanau members who had served in earlier conflicts. In one of two interviews with Maori veterans included in Pip Desmond's *The War That Never Ended*, Isaac Kemp, of Ngati Porou and Te Aupouri, explained that he enlisted at the beginning of the war, while working at an asbestos cladding factory in Auckland.³⁴⁶ He joined up with two friends who he was boarding with at the United Maori Mission Hostel. Kemp, who went on to serve two tours in Korea, recalled that: 'I didn't know a thing about Korea. It wasn't political, just pure adventure.'³⁴⁷

The other Maori veteran whose experiences are recorded in Desmond's book is Wiremu (Bill) Keiha, of Rongowhakaata and Te Aitangi-a-Mahaki, who embarked with the 7th Reinforcements in 1953. When he enlisted, Keiha was working as a farm labourer. For Keiha, a key motivation was the desire to follow the example set by his father – Kingi Areta Keiha, who had been an officer in 28 (Maori) Battalion and, for several months, the Battalion's commander.³⁴⁸

Other interviews with Maori Kayforce veterans reveal that the motivations that volunteers possessed at the time of enlistment did not always align with the perspective they gained while serving on the ground in Korea. For example, Kihi Ngatai recalled:

³⁴⁴ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, pp380-381.

³⁴⁵ McGibbon notes that quarterly returns show 770 Maori embarking but only 700 disembarking. He also notes a newspaper article published in November 1954 in which the Army was reported as estimating that 1600 (or 40 percent) of the 4000 Kayforce personnel who had served up until this time were Maori. (See *Auckland Star*, 24 November 1954.) McGibbon suggests this figure seems too high and was most likely derived from guesswork rather than any systematic review of attestation forms. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p467 endnote 29.

³⁴⁶ Pip Desmond, *The War That Never Ended: New Zealand Veterans Remember Korea*, Penguin, Auckland, 2013, p123.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p124.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp232-233.

Originally I signed up to just go and tour another country, but as time went on, with the war and the firing of artillery, I asked myself what was I doing in this place. This came about all because we [were] fighting against the enemy, and the enemy was responding to our fire power. It was just them on their own. As for us, we had a lot of soldiers. There was us, the Australians, and people from all over the world. That's why I asked what was I doing there. I remember I only wanted to travel. As time went by, I forgot about that. I started to feel for those who were suffering as a result of the war.³⁴⁹

Alongside Maori volunteers, it is unclear how many Maori served in the small regular Army element of Kayforce. Between June 1952 and March 1953, Duntroon graduate Brian Poananga, who had by this time risen to the rank of captain, undertook a posting at Commonwealth Divisional Headquarters.³⁵⁰ Rangi Tataura (Sam) Christie, born in Opotiki, possibly also served as a Regular Force soldier in Korea, where he was posted to 10 Transport Company. Christie joined the Army in 1954, leaving a Bluff freezing works to do so.³⁵¹ He later also served in Malaya and Vietnam, remaining in the Army until 1976.³⁵² No further evidence relating to Maori involvement in the regular Army component of Kayforce has been located.

It is uncertain how many of the Maori volunteers who served in Korea went on to join the Regular Force. It is possible that some transferred directly into the regular Army after serving in Korea. However, oral history evidence indicates that, while joining the Regular Force may have been an option, the Army did not actively promote this – not in the early 1950s, at least. Discharged in about 1953, Isaac Kemp explained that he left Kayforce without giving any thought to joining the Army and becoming a professional soldier. Kemp had enjoyed his time in Kayforce and had volunteered to stay in Korea for a second term. He recalled: 'I would have liked to have stayed in the army when I got home but it never entered my mind. I thought, Well, I'm discharged and that's it. None of my friends went into the regular force.'³⁵³

Though direct transfers into the Regular Force may have been relatively uncommon, it is very likely that the establishment of the regular battalions for service in Malaya, which is discussed in the next section, saw some Maori Kayforce volunteers rejoin the Army to serve as Regular Force soldiers. Kayforce veterans were certainly among

³⁴⁹ Kihī Ngatai interview, 'Waka Huia Anzac Special – Korean war – K Force – Tahī Takao and Kihī Ngatai', English subtitles (translated from Te Reo) from 28m57s.

³⁵⁰ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, pp273, 409.

³⁵¹ Christie had believed he would not be accepted and attributed his successful entry to the fact he knew the recruiting officer through rugby. 'Obituary – 208991 Rangi Tataura (Sam) Christie, BEM – 1928-2009', *Selamat*, December 2009, p10.

³⁵² 'Obituary – 208991 Rangi Tataura (Sam) Christie, BEM – 1928-2009', *Selamat*, December 2009, p10. 'Rangi Tataura Christie', Cenotaph website, accessed 28 June 2017.

URL: <http://www.aucklandmuseum.com/war-memorial/online-cenotaph/record/C130425>

³⁵³ Desmond, *The War That Never Ended*, p134.

those who served in these battalions. This is apparent from statistical evidence that concerns the initial battalion that was raised in mid-1957 – 1 Battalion, New Zealand Regiment (1 NZ Regiment). This evidence shows that about fifteen percent of the soldiers within the 739-strong battalion had served in Korea.³⁵⁴ As detailed later, these statistics also recorded a high rate of Maori involvement, with about 22 percent of the battalion's members identifying themselves as Maori. It is probable that a number of those Maori who joined the Regular Force at this time had earlier served as volunteers in Korea.

Reshaping of the Regular Force and the Malaya and Borneo deployments, 1957-1966

During the period examined in this section, the proportion of Maori within the Regular Force increased significantly, with growth in Maori involvement stemming especially from the raising of the infantry battalions for service in Malaya. Increased Maori participation reflected, however, not only the broadening of service opportunities, but also that the Army began to more actively encourage Maori enlistment.

From mid-1957, opportunities for Maori to serve in the regular Army were to grow when the Holland-led National Government announced that a regular infantry battalion was to be established for deployment in Malaya with the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.³⁵⁵ Under South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) arrangements, the Strategic Reserve was to defend against large-scale communist aggression in South-East Asia, though as events transpired it was never used in active SEATO operations.³⁵⁶ As a secondary task, the deployment of the New Zealand battalion to Malaya saw an immediate increase in New Zealand's ground-force involvement in the Malayan Emergency, a conflict that had begun in 1948 and lasted until 1960. The commitment of the battalion emphasised that South-East Asia had become the focus of New Zealand's defence planning.

The initial Regular Force battalion, 1 NZ Regiment, was formed soon after plans to establish the unit were announced in mid-1957. The 739-strong battalion was deployed to Malaya late in 1957, arriving not long after the withdrawal of the SAS squadron that, as detailed above, had been deployed in 1955.³⁵⁷ Following the November 1957 election, Nash's Labour Government took steps that more

³⁵⁴ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p400, 443 endnote 19. Pugsley provides two different figures for the number of Kayforce veterans within the battalion. The statement that about 15 percent of battalion personnel had served in Korea has been calculated from the average of these figures.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p123.

³⁵⁶ David Dickens, 'SEATO', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p482.

³⁵⁷ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp129-130.

deliberately aimed to reorganise the Regular Force in order to create a 'ready-to-go' force of professional soldiers. In 1958, as noted earlier, Labour moved to abolish CMT – a decision that saw the strength of the Territorial Force drop from 28,000 to some 7,000 volunteers.³⁵⁸ Next, the 1958 Defence Review proposed the formation of a regular Army brigade group that would consist of three infantry battalions and additional units, including an SAS squadron.³⁵⁹ In late 1958, in accordance with this plan, a second battalion – 2 Battalion, New Zealand Regiment (2 NZ Regiment) – was formed with the intention that it would relieve 1 NZ Regiment the following year.³⁶⁰ Efforts to form the proposed third battalion, however, were unsuccessful. Though a strong recruitment campaign was undertaken, the Army failed to attract sufficient recruits, facing competition from a labour market that remained buoyant despite the economic difficulties that New Zealand faced at the end of the 1950s.³⁶¹

Before scheme was fully implemented, Holyoake's National Government overturned the plan to establish the regular Army brigade group, and in the 1960s New Zealand's ground-force commitments would be met by a more limited regular Army force and 'an embryo Territorial Force'.³⁶² As noted in the previous chapter, National reintroduced a limited compulsory training scheme in 1961, which was abolished in 1972. Pugsley observes that, though the plan to establish a regular brigade group was not realised, the initiatives of Nash's Labour Government marked a clear shift from the expeditionary force concept that had dominated defence planning since 1909. They laid the foundation for the small, professional regular Army that, by the end of the twentieth century, was a key component of New Zealand's defence capability.³⁶³

Through to the end of the Malayan Emergency in mid-1960 and during the Borneo Confrontation, which spanned a three-year period from 1963 to 1966, New Zealand's contribution to ground-force operations in these conflicts was based almost entirely around the deployment of the infantry battalions.³⁶⁴ In 1964, the two battalions, 1 and 2 NZ Regiment, were reorganised into a single unit – 1 Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1RNZIR). The new battalion was supported by a 402-strong depot at Burnham Camp, which would provide reinforcements and enable a system of 'continuous relief'.³⁶⁵ From 1961, New Zealand's troops in Malaya were based at Terendak Camp (near Malacca), which also served as a base for British and

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p164.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p164.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p162.

³⁶¹ Ibid., pp125, 165.

³⁶² Ibid., pp7, 124-125.

³⁶³ Ibid., p125.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., pp123-161, 195-221, 293-340. The Borneo Confrontation included, late in September 1964, two Indonesian incursions onto the Malay Peninsula. New Zealand troops were involved in suppressing both of these actions.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., pp189-190.

Australian soldiers.³⁶⁶ Until late 1969, when the New Zealand base was shifted to Singapore, Terendak Camp also served as a staging base for New Zealand infantry serving in South Vietnam.³⁶⁷ As detailed in the next section, New Zealand Army personnel were first deployed to South Vietnam in mid-1964 – overlapping New Zealand’s involvement in the Borneo Confrontation.

Towards the end of the Confrontation, it should be noted, a small number of New Zealand SAS troops were also committed to the Borneo theatre, where 1RNZIR had served. In 1959, an SAS squadron – 1 New Zealand Ranger Squadron, New Zealand Special Air Service – had been reformed as a component of the planned brigade group.³⁶⁸ In 1962, a 30-strong detachment of 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron served in Thailand.³⁶⁹ In 1965 and 1966, four detachments served successively in Borneo, each involving about 40 troops.³⁷⁰ In January 1965, before these operations began, the Squadron’s total strength was about 60 personnel, who included some individuals who Pugsley describes as ‘the elite of the New Zealand Army’.³⁷¹

As detailed later, Maori were among those who served in 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron. However, the earlier raising of the much larger battalions was of greater significance in terms of the opportunities it created for Maori service in the regular Army. Towards the end of the decade, the formation of the battalions for Malaya provided the key avenue for Maori involvement and advancement in the regular Army. As detailed below, a significant percentage of battalion members were Maori – similar to the proportion in the drafts that had left New Zealand during the mid-stages of the Kayforce deployment. Once more indicating a greater Maori willingness to serve in the Army, Maori involvement in the battalions contributed an overall increase in the proportion of Maori personnel in the regular Army. Evidence presented below suggests that in the mid-1960s at least one-third of regular Army personnel were Maori. It will be explained that, by this time, the Army viewed the Maori population as an important potential source of recruits and was making deliberate efforts to encourage Maori enlistment.

As noted above, steps to form the first battalion, 1 NZ Regiment, commenced in mid-1957. Recruitment began on 19 June 1957 and – after each Military District had filled its quota – closed about six weeks later in late July 1957.³⁷² The 739-strong battalion

³⁶⁶ Ibid., pp178-180.

³⁶⁷ ‘New Zealand military headquarters in Singapore’, New Zealand History website, accessed 15 August 2017. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/new-zealand-defence-force-headquarters-singapore>

³⁶⁸ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p259.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., pp185-189.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., pp252-292.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p259.

³⁷² Ibid., p127.

was raised from serving regular Army personnel and through enlistment of new recruits referred to as 'Special Regular enlistments'.³⁷³ (With only 79 'Long Service Regulars', the new battalion was comprised primarily of the latter group.³⁷⁴) The 'Special Regular' applicants were required to be 'a New Zealand citizen of European or Maori ancestry'. They also needed to be medically and dentally fit and be aged between 21 and 35, though 20 year olds were also eligible providing the consent of a parent or guardian was obtained.³⁷⁵ In respect of minimum formal education requirements, applicants needed to have passed standard six – the final year of primary school.³⁷⁶ Additionally, they were required to undertake 'PSO Testing', which sought to provide an overall assessment of intelligence. Applicants who failed to achieve an appropriate level – Selection Grade (SG) 4 or higher – were not to be accepted. (There were five SG levels. The four highest – SG 1 to 4 – were expected to capture about 90 percent of individuals.³⁷⁷) CMT personnel who had already undertaken the test were not required to repeat it, but their results were to be filed.³⁷⁸ Standardised intelligence testing, it seems, had become a routine part of the Army's recruitment process by the mid-1950s.³⁷⁹

Though Maori would comprise a significant proportion of the battalion, the acceptance rate of Maori applicants – and how this compared to that of Pakeha – is unclear. No specific evidence has been located in respect of the extent to which Maori applicants successfully passed through the recruitment process. However, evidence has been located that indicates that Maori were disadvantaged with regard to the Army's intelligence testing, which presumably would have resulted in a higher rate of failure for Maori applicants. Observations concerning the intelligence test results of Maori were recorded in a later Army memo entitled 'The Maori Soldier', which the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General W.S. McKinnon, circularised in May 1966.³⁸⁰ While this was almost a decade after recruitment was undertaken for 1 NZ

³⁷³ Army HQ circular memo, 14 June 1957, Annex A, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1119 209/3/218 part 1, Organisation – New Zealand Army Force – FARELF [Far East Land Forces] – Organisation and formation – [Malaya], 1957-1959, ANZ Wellington, p1.

³⁷⁴ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p400.

³⁷⁵ Army HQ circular memo, 14 June 1957, Annex A, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1119 209/3/218 part 1, Organisation – New Zealand Army Force – FARELF [Far East Land Forces] – Organisation and formation – [Malaya], 1957-1959, ANZ Wellington, p1, 5-6.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p2.

³⁷⁷ See undated file note (released 5 May 1955), AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/210, ANZ Wellington.

³⁷⁸ Army HQ circular memo, 14 June 1957, Annex A, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1119 209/3/218 part 1, Organisation – New Zealand Army Force – FARELF [Far East Land Forces] – Organisation and formation – [Malaya], 1957-1959, ANZ Wellington, p5.

³⁷⁹ See undated file note (released 5 May 1955), AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/210, ANZ Wellington.

³⁸⁰ 'The Maori Soldier', attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, Education and Welfare – Maoris in the Armed Forces, 1964-1967, ANZ Wellington.

Regiment, it is very likely that the shortcomings that the memo identified had existed from the time that the intelligence testing was introduced.

The 1966 memo, which is discussed in further detail later in the report, identified various ways that Maori soldiers differed from their Pakeha counterparts, and it provided suggestions as to how officers and NCOs might manage and accommodate these differences. Maori underperformance in the Army's testing of intelligence was noted in a section of the memo that discussed issues relating to Maori use of language. It was stated that many Maori spoke te reo as their first language and often struggled to understand long and complex English sentences.³⁸¹ As a result, they were believed to be disadvantaged when they took the Army's intelligence testing, which was conducted in English, mostly verbally. The memo noted that 'one authority' had unofficially estimated that 80 percent of Maori in the Army were underrated on their SG rating.³⁸² Maori underperformance in the Army's intelligence testing would have seen a higher proportion of Maori applicants fail to gain entry into the Army because they did not achieve the minimum intelligence rating. (As discussed in the next chapter, it is likely that this underperformance also influenced Maori opportunities for promotion.) But Army leadership may not have viewed this to be a problem because, though the testing did not provide an accurate representation of Maori intellectual capability, it did show whether an individual would be able to operate within an institution where Pakeha values and modes of operation were dominant. Noting that SG ratings provided a limited measure of the 'pure intelligence' of Maori who spoke te reo as their first language, the 1966 memo suggested the ratings were nevertheless valuable because 'the Maori must measure up to the Army's pakeha environment and requirements, and the SG rating will indicate his capability in this regard.'³⁸³

Recruitment for 1 NZ Regiment's four infantry companies was carried out on a geographical basis, which meant that men from the same districts – and, in the case of Maori, tribal groups – would serve together. A Company was drawn from Auckland and North Auckland; B Company from the Bay of Plenty, Rotorua, and the King Country; C Company from Wellington, Manawatu, and Wairarapa; and D Company from the South Island.³⁸⁴ With each company being 117-men strong, about 63 percent of the battalion's personnel served in these units. As detailed later, most of the battalion's Maori members served in the infantry companies. According to Pugsley, the geographic organisation of the rifle companies was 'a deliberate reflection of the tribal distribution used in 28 (Maori) Battalion during the Second

³⁸¹ Ibid., p3.

³⁸² Ibid., p5.

³⁸³ Ibid., p5.

³⁸⁴ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p127.

World War.³⁸⁵ Research for this report has not located evidence to confirm this.³⁸⁶ If the Army did intentionally organise the four infantry companies along the lines of 28 (Maori) Battalion, it is likely that it did so at least partly with the aim of attracting Maori recruits, who would be able serve alongside other members of their iwi. Pugsley suggests that the geographical basis for recruitment was among the factors that encouraged Maori to enlist in 1 NZ Regiment.³⁸⁷

Following the battalion's formation, the Army produced some statistics that were based on analysis of the attestation forms of personnel in 1 NZ Regiment. The data included figures on the number of individuals who identified themselves to be Maori. (As noted in the previous section, the data also recorded the number of Kayforce veterans. Further, it captured information on other previous military service as well as soldiers' height and weight.) Within the recently formed battalion, the statistics recorded that 163 or about 22 percent of the battalion's members had declared themselves to be Maori on their attestation forms. It is unclear whether this figure includes all who indicated some Maori ancestry or only those who, for example, stated they were of half or more Maori descent. Either way, it is clear that the battalion's Maori component significantly exceeded the proportion of Maori in the total population, which at the time of the 1956 census was 6.3 percent (half or more Maori descent).³⁸⁸ In the four rifle companies, the proportion of Maori was higher than that of the battalion as a whole. Of the 468 who served in these companies, 135 or almost 29 percent were noted to be Maori. But there were significant differences between the companies, reflecting in part where the major areas of Maori population lay: A Company (42 Maori – 36 percent); B Company (55 Maori – 47 percent); C Company (26 Maori – 22 percent); D Company (12 Maori – 10 percent). Outside of the rifle companies, about 10 percent of the battalion's other members were Maori, with 28 Maori among the 271 personnel who served in Battalion Headquarters or Headquarters Company.³⁸⁹

The data that the Army compiled in respect of 1 NZ Regiment following its formation appears to be the only such statistics generated for New Zealand Army units that served in Malaya. Statistics were not produced on the second battalion raised for Malaya – 2 NZ Regiment, which was formed at the end of 1958.³⁹⁰ However, impressionistic evidence suggests there was again a high rate of Maori involvement in this battalion. In June 1961, *Te Ao Hou* published an article, written by a soldier

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Several Army files concerning the organisation of the battalion have been examined. See, for example, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1119 209/3/218 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

³⁸⁷ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p127.

³⁸⁸ See 'Population', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1957.

³⁸⁹ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp394-400. Pugsley provides the following reference: 1 NZ Regiment Statistics Breakdown, 1 NZ Regiment War Diary, WA-M 1/1, ANZ Wellington.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., p162.

serving in Malaya, which claimed that: 'Almost half of the 750-odd officers, NCOs and men of the Second Battalion are of Maori blood in some degree'.³⁹¹ Similarly, though it has not been possible to establish exact figures, there was also a significant Maori component within 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron. Describing the 30-strong detachment that deployed to Thailand from Papakura Camp in 1962, one newspaper report noted 'about half... are Maoris'.³⁹² The detachments deployed to Borneo in 1965 and 1966 also included a number of Maori.³⁹³

Other evidence describes a high level of Maori involvement, not only in units deployed overseas, but in the regular Army as a whole. In March 1964, in another article published in *Te Ao Hou*, it was reported that: 'Although an official account has never been taken, it is estimated unofficially that between thirty and forty per cent of the regular Army is composed of Maoris and part Maoris.'³⁹⁴ The article within which this statement was made was one of several Army promotion pieces published in *Te Ao Hou* in the early and mid-1960s. As the article sought to encourage Maori enlistment, the reliability of this estimate is questionable.

However, another source, generated from within the Army and unrelated to recruitment objectives, offered a similar assessment. Notes prepared for Defence Secretary Hunn before the March 1964 reunion of 28 (Maori) Battalion included some observations about the number of Maori personnel and the positions in which they served. These notes were written by a Pakeha officer, Captain Alan Armstrong. Commenting on the level of Maori involvement in the regular Army, Armstrong stated: 'A very high percentage of the New Zealand Regular Force (compared with the total percentage of the population) are Maoris.' Describing the branches of the Army that Maori served in, he observed:

The majority are in infantry – most in fact enlist with a tour of Malaya as their primary aim. Next to infantry, Army Service Corps driving is the most popular trade. A number are in Engineers where their skill at handling machinery has been put to good use. A proportion of those who are apprenticed yearly through the Regular Force Cadet scheme have been Maoris. They have proved capable and reliable.³⁹⁵

When forwarding these notes to Hunn, the Army's Director of Public Relations claimed that Armstrong had 'a good knowledge of the Maori in the NZ Army and is

³⁹¹ 'New Zealand Concert Party in Malaya', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 35, June 1961, p24.

³⁹² 'Tough troopers at Papakura eager to be off', 24 May 1962, clipping in AEFZ 22618 W5727 box 30 91/0110-0213, News Release – Thailand and Laos, 1962-1962, ANZ Wellington.

³⁹³ See, for example, Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp259-260.

³⁹⁴ 'Maoris in Uniform', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 46, March 1964, p41.

³⁹⁵ Untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

extremely interested in them.’³⁹⁶ Earlier, in June 1961, *Te Ao Hou* had reported that Armstrong, from Auckland, was in charge of the Maori Concert Party in Malaya and sometimes led the group.³⁹⁷ Following his service in Malaya, Armstrong evidently undertook a period of training at the United States Army Command and General Staff College.³⁹⁸ When he briefed Hunn ahead of the March 1964 reunion, Armstrong appears to have been stationed at Army Headquarters in Wellington. He continued to serve in Wellington in late 1965, around which time he married, near Gisborne, Waiehu Te Purei, who was reported to be a grand niece of Apirana Ngata.³⁹⁹ As well as preparing the notes for Hunn prior to 28 (Maori) Battalion’s 1964 reunion, it is likely that Armstrong was also the author of the ‘Maori Soldier’ memo. Circulated in May 1966, this memo was mentioned earlier with regard to the Army’s intelligence testing and it is referred to again later in the report.

The high level of Maori involvement in the regular Army that is evident by the early 1960s once more shows greater Maori willingness to serve in the Army. Again, it is suggested here that this partly reflected the narrower employment options that were open to Maori. As Pugsley has noted in respect of Maori enlistment for service in 1 NZ Regiment, limited entry barriers – especially relating to formal education – made the Army a viable employment option for many Maori.⁴⁰⁰ During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, some witnesses who entered the Army during the period examined here believed that, for many, the economic security that the Army offered was a strong motivation for joining the force. For example, Edward Pikiāo Moana, who enlisted in 1962, stated that:

I came to learn that soldiers enlisted for different reasons but many of the Māori soldiers enlisted because it was a job. It put a roof over their head and you got fed. At least you weren’t a burden on the whānau at home.⁴⁰¹

Similarly, William Edward Broughton, who joined the Army in 1963 at the age of 21, recalled:

A lot of Māori at that particular time signed up. We didn’t have too many other opportunities to pursue with regards to a career. So the Army sort of became to us, a lot of us in reality [it] was a job.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁶ Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

³⁹⁷ ‘New Zealand Concert Party in Malaya’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 35, June 1961, p24.

³⁹⁸ ‘Notable Wedding’, *Gisborne Photo News*, no. 138, 1 December 1965, p30.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p127.

⁴⁰¹ Edward Pikiāo Moana, Hearing Week 4, Wairaka Marae, Whakatane, Wai 2500, #4.1.5, p442.

⁴⁰² William Edward Broughton, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p140.

Along with their Pakeha counterparts, Maori who joined up to serve in Malaya were also drawn to the Army by a sense of adventure and a desire to follow in the footsteps of relatives who had served overseas in earlier conflicts. Maori, Pugsley states, 'were especially conscious of the tradition of their elders, many of whom had served in the world wars.'⁴⁰³ As noted above, Pugsley also suggests that the provincial basis for recruitment, which allowed Maori of the same tribal affiliation to serve together, was among the factors that encouraged Maori to enlist for the battalion.

Oral interviews with Maori veterans provide details of the background and circumstances of some who enlisted in the regular Army and served in Malaya. Pugsley quotes from a 1992 interview with J.T. (Johnno) Johnston, who was from the Ruawai district of North Auckland:

I joined in May 1959 and the reason, well the main reason, I actually joined was I was working up north and I was having a few problems in the area upsetting the locals. And we had a constable up there, a Constable Wells, and he bailed me up one day, and he said, 'Well, you know you're causing a lot of problems in this town?' And I said, 'Oh yeah?' and he said, 'There's a battalion that will be going to Malaya within the next six months or so.' He said, 'Why don't you join it?' and I said, being a young fellow and cheeky, 'Yeah, well, I might.' And his reply was, 'Well, if you don't, you're going to finish up in prison.' So this is what made me join the Army.⁴⁰⁴

Hawea (Guv) Grey, who grew up in Taupo, signed up in 1960. In a 2007 interview, Grey recalled that he joined the Army after a Maori Affairs' welfare officer encouraged him to do so. Grey left an environment where he witnessed discrimination against Maori and felt his prospects were limited. Like Johnston, there also seems to have been a risk that, sooner or later, Grey would get into trouble and potentially face the police and courts. Describing the background to his enlistment, Grey stated:

I was the worst student in the world, I got whacked daily. But I had no other option but to stay at school until I was 17. In the 1950s Māori were treated a little differently. Pākehā people could go to the liquor store and take liquor home. Māori weren't allowed to. They weren't allowed to take liquor from the pub, not that I ever would, but there was that difference. At the age of 17 I was too young to even look for a job, even if there were any.

My friends and I were starting to get into a gang. In those days gangs weren't gangs like how they are now. There were no drugs and we were drinking more

⁴⁰³ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p127.

⁴⁰⁴ J.T. Johnston, oral interview by Christopher Pugsley, 14 October 1992, quoted in Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p3.

for bravado than boozing. It was really just showing off. But this woman from the Māori welfare office could see that eventually I could get into some serious trouble. When we broke the coloured lights in the street... She knew it was us, and if it was coloured lights today, then it would be shop windows tomorrow. And you're not going to break a shop window for nothing.⁴⁰⁵

Johnston and Grey stayed on in the Army after serving in Malaya, and both were to later serve in Vietnam. Their long-term commitment to the Army does not seem to have been uncommon. According to Pugsley, many Maori who joined the battalions raised for Malaya stayed on after their tour and became career soldiers.⁴⁰⁶

During the oral hearings, two witnesses – Edward Pikiāo Moana and Waehapara Tapara – separately raised issues about the Army's enlistment practices during the 1960s.⁴⁰⁷ Both stated that correct enlistment procedures were not followed and that Army recruitment personnel forced them to enter the service. Moana went on to serve in Malaya, while Tapara served in Vietnam. Further research is required to investigate these allegations.⁴⁰⁸ A related matter concerns underage enlistment, an issue that both Moana and Tapara spoke of. The Wai 762 claim alleges that Moana, at the age of 16, was underage when he entered the Army.⁴⁰⁹ However, in 2016, during the oral hearings, Moana stated that he was 74 years of age and that he joined the Army in 1962, suggesting he would have been about 20 years old when he entered the service.⁴¹⁰ Other evidence cited for this report indicates that the Army sought to comply with minimum age rules, at least in respect of deployments outside of New Zealand. For example, in 1959, Lance Corporal Albert Kiwi – 'Being underage' – was required to remain in New Zealand when his battalion (2 NZ Regiment) went to Malaya. Kiwi joined the battalion the following year, by which time he had turned 20.⁴¹¹

While further research is required to investigate the allegations of forced enlistment, it is very clear that by the early 1960s the Army was deliberately, though not exclusively, seeking to attract Maori recruits. Around this time, as noted above, the Department of Maori Affairs' magazine, *Te Ao Hou*, published several articles that

⁴⁰⁵ Hawea (Guv) Grey, oral interview by Claire Hall, 14 December 2007, quoted in Hall, *No Front Line*, p25.

⁴⁰⁶ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p127.

⁴⁰⁷ Edward Pikiāo Moana, Hearing Week 4, Wairaka Marae, Whakatane, Wai 2500, #4.1.5, p441-442; Waehapara Tapara, Hearing Week 4, Wairaka Marae, Whakatane, Wai 2500, #4.1.5, pp308-309.

⁴⁰⁸ As discussed in the introduction, it would be necessary to examine Moana and Tapara's Army personnel files. However, where a serviceman or woman remains alive, NZDF policy is that their personnel files can only be accessed with their permission. Any subsequent disclosure of information would also require permission.

⁴⁰⁹ Wai 762, #1.1(c), p14.

⁴¹⁰ Edward Pikiāo Moana, Hearing Week 4, Wairaka Marae, Whakatane, Wai 2500, #4.1.5, p439, 442.

⁴¹¹ Aitken, 2 NZ Regiment, to HQ NZ Army Force, 5 April 1961, Personnel file 2479033, Kiwi, Albert Reti, NZDF Archives Trentham.

promoted the Army and provided recruitment information. The Army's recruitment needs linked closely to the role that Maori Affairs played in assisting Maori to gain employment. In order to attract recruits, the *Te Ao Hou* articles conveyed several key messages: the high proportion of Maori in the Army; the absence of discrimination; the positive relationships that existed between Maori and Pakeha personnel; the challenges and excitement of training and active deployment; the opportunities that existed for involvement at different levels, including as NCOs and officers; and the opportunities for playing sport and participating in Maori cultural groups.

For example, an article entitled 'Why Maoris Choose the Army', which was published in September 1961, included the following comments:

Clearly, the Malaya force holds special attractions to the Maori. It contains four times as many Maoris as one would expect from the size of the Maori population. Many come for adventure, but many also because of the regularity, the security and the close fellowship of army life. They are pleased to serve a patriotic cause. They are happy with the excellent race relations in the battalion.⁴¹²

Another article, entitled 'Maoris in Uniform', which was published in *Te Ao Hou* in March 1964, included further observations about the motivations of Maori who enlisted, and it emphasised there were opportunities for short and long term service, with pathways for career development:

Many enter for the adventure which the short three year engagement (which often includes two years in Malaya) offers. Others are attracted by the security and opportunities for advancement offered by a long term career, and sign on for the longer engagements.⁴¹³

Other evidence also shows that from around 1960 the Army was deliberately targeting Maori and, in doing so, received assistance from the Department of Maori Affairs. Early in 1960, as a result of a meeting between an Army Headquarters' recruiting officer and Maori Affairs' officials, it was arranged that the Maori Welfare Division would provide support during an upcoming Army recruitment tour.⁴¹⁴ In a circular memo dated 12 February 1960, an official at Maori Affairs' head office advised the Department's District Officers of this meeting and its outcome. The memo explained that the Welfare Division was to help raise awareness of Army vans that were to tour various parts of the country:

⁴¹² EGS, 'Why Maoris Choose the Army', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 36, September 1961 p8.

⁴¹³ 'Maoris in Uniform', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 46, March 1964, p41.

⁴¹⁴ Herewini (for Acting Secretary), circular memo to District Officers, 12 February 1960, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

The vans are complete with film projectors, displays of weapons, photographs and other publicity material and it is hoped that as a result of the tours young men of the Maori race will be encouraged to seek a career in the Regular Force or volunteer for service in the Territorial Force.⁴¹⁵

Tour itineraries were attached with the memo. Within the Northern and Central Military Districts, itineraries covered centres within the Tokerau, Ikaroa, and Tairāwhiti districts. In Northland, the tour was already underway. It was noted that itineraries were therefore to be sent directly to the Kaitiā and Kaikohe sub-offices.⁴¹⁶

The official who signed the circular memo appears to have been Bill Herewini. As detailed in the previous chapter, Herewini had been a member of 28 (Maori) Battalion. After the war he became a senior official in the Maori Affairs Department, serving for a period as Controller of the Maori Welfare Division.⁴¹⁷ He was not the only former Battalion officer who worked for the Department after completing his war service. Notably, Charles Bennett and Rangi Royal also held senior positions in the Department.⁴¹⁸ Like Herewini, both led the Maori Welfare Division. As noted in the previous chapter, Royal was appointed the Division's first Controller. It seems quite possible that the military experience of these officials and the connections they established during the war would have helped to strengthen links between the Department and the Army. As a result of these connections, Maori Affairs may have been more disposed to assisting the Army's efforts to recruit Maori, which to a large extent dovetailed with the Department's own objectives of supporting Maori into employment.

In September 1946, soon after the meeting of senior officers, he was appointed Controller of the Department's newly-created Maori Welfare Organisation (later the Maori Welfare Division), which was set up under the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945.⁴¹⁹

Some evidence concerning the Army's 1960 recruitment tour has been located. A newspaper report from mid-1960 provides details of a speech that recruitment officer Colonel H.J.G. Low gave to a meeting of the Tuwharetoa No. 4 Tribal Executive in Tokaanu. Low informed the gathering that the Army was undertaking its first full-scale recruitment campaign in the area, which he noted was populated

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Wira Gardiner, *Te Mura o Te Ahi*, p185. See also 'William Herewini', 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 19 April 2017. URL: <http://www.28maoribattalion.org.nz/soldier/william-herewini>

⁴¹⁸ Ballara, 'Bennett, Charles Moihī Te Arawaka', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website. Royal and Jamison, 'Royal, Te Rangiataahua Kiniwe', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

⁴¹⁹ Royal and Jamison, 'Royal, Te Rangiataahua Kiniwe', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

predominantly by Maori. He noted both the contribution that Maori had made during earlier conflicts and the large number who at the time were serving in Malaya. As well as stressing that New Zealand needed to be able to meet its alliance commitments, Low spoke of the communist threat that existed in Asian countries to the north. He told the meeting that another battalion was to be sent to Malaya, noting that any men who joined would have the opportunity to serve for two years in that country. However, he emphasised there were a range of opportunities for long-term service, including at officer level. Referring, it seems, to the yet-to-be-abandoned plan to establish a regular Army brigade group, Low stated there was an aim to get 8000 New Zealanders into the regular Army, which compared to an existing strength of only 5000.⁴²⁰

It seems likely that Maori Affairs' officers assisted in arranging for Low to attend the Tribal Executive meeting. And, within the Wanganui district office, Low's message regarding the opportunities that existed for Maori in the Army did not go unnoticed. Writing to the Resident Officer in Taumarunui on 30 September 1960, the Wanganui District Officer commented that the Army might provide an option for people in the Taumarunui area who were likely to face employment difficulties due to the expected closure of three timber mills. Noting Low's recent presentation in Tokaanu, the District Officer suggested: 'The labour force could be used by ensuring that those of our people who have the necessary qualifications take up a permanent life with the Army.'⁴²¹

In 1961, the following year, the Army undertook another recruitment tour, again with some assistance from the Department of Maori Affairs. On 18 April 1961, Maori Affairs' head office wrote to the Wanganui district office, requesting that welfare officers support the Army in its upcoming tour, making use wherever possible of local organisations.⁴²² It seems likely that similar letters were written to other district offices. Itineraries were attached to the head office letter, setting out the various places that the Army information vans planned to stop in the Northern and Central Military Districts:⁴²³

⁴²⁰ 'Maori told of need for Army', undated newspaper extract in ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴²¹ District Officer, Wanganui, to Resident Officer, Taumarunui, 30 September 1960, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴²² Herewini (for Secretary) to Wanganui, 18 April 1961, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴²³ Itineraries for Army Information Vans: April-May 1961, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

Northern Military District:

Pukekohe	Whakatane
Ngaruawahia	Tauranga
Rotorua	Te Aroha
Opotiki	

Central Military District:

Otaki	Tokomaru Bay
Levin	Ruatoria
Feilding	Tikitiki
Marton	Te Araroa
Foxton	Te Puia Springs
Hastings	Wairoa
Napier	Stratford
Gisborne	Hawera
Tolaga Bay	

These itineraries suggest that the focus of the Army's mobile recruitment efforts was on smaller, provincial centres. This is understandable given that a number of larger towns and cities appear to have had recruitment offices that were open throughout the year. It is notable that the itineraries included a number of towns and settlements where there was a strong traditional of Crown military service among the local Maori population – including, for example, Gisborne and various East Coast settlements.

During the period examined in this section, Maori woman continued to serve in the small women's branch of the Army. In April 1962, there were 30 Maori personnel in the NZWRAC.⁴²⁴ The total strength of the Corps at this time has not been established.

By 1960, it has been explained, the Army was deliberately seeking to attract Maori recruits. While these efforts were driven by the Army's personnel requirements, it seems unlikely that enlistment of Maori was viewed simply as a means of making up numbers. The Army, no doubt, also sought to recruit Maori because the performance of Maori soldiers generally seems to have been respected and Maori were seen to possess qualities that made the Army a more effective force. For example, Armstrong's 1964 briefing notes for Hunn included the following observations:

They are very adaptable, settle down quickly in the military environment and are often capable of absorbing the harsher discipline of units like SAS with greater enthusiasm than Europeans. Maoris often say they like to know where

⁴²⁴ Puriri (for Secretary) to All District Offices, 9 April 1962, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

they stand and hence prefer a rigid (but fair) system of discipline more than a lax, inconsistently applied one.⁴²⁵

And commenting on the performance of Maori recruits in the CMT scheme, Armstrong stated:

a large number of CMT recruits were of Maori descent. For many lads in the back country this was their first experience of city life and living and working with large numbers of Pakeha. By and large their approach to training was often more enthusiastic and wholehearted than their Pakeha counterparts. They were generally more adaptable to community living and to making do for themselves. They particularly enjoyed field exercises. The largest proportion of them were employed in infantry units.⁴²⁶

While there is an element of stereotyping in such comments, Armstrong's observations show that, among the Army's Pakeha majority, Maori soldiers were viewed with a measure of respect. Armstrong's views are consistent with comments that Pugsley makes about the performance of New Zealand ground-forces in Malaya and Borneo. He notes, for example, the advanced tracking skills of some Maori and also the linguistic abilities that some possessed.⁴²⁷ Further, Pugsley states that the Army's Maori component helped to create 'a racial mix... that enabled the New Zealanders to relate to the peoples of South-East Asia to a degree not matched by the largely Anglo-Saxon units of Australia and Great Britain.'⁴²⁸

Though the abilities of Maori soldiers were respected, within the Army there also existed a reluctance to recognise ethnicity and distinguish between Maori and Pakeha personnel. Integrationist policy informed and underpinned this position. In January 1964, when forwarding Armstrong's notes to Hunn, the Army's Director of Public Relations advised the Secretary of Defence that:

A thorough search among our PR files has turned up very little about Maoris as a separate race in the Army, because they are treated as soldiers first and Maoris – when at all – a long way behind. Mostly when we write about soldiers, although there will be one or more Maoris in the group, their race is not specifically mentioned. I should say that under the Army set-up, there is probably less notice taken of this question than in most organisations or jobs.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁵ Untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p1.

⁴²⁷ See, for example, Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p103, 141.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p356.

⁴²⁹ Director of Public Relations, N.Z. Army, to Secretary for Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

The next section, which covers the years 1966 to 1972, sets out further evidence of the Army's reluctance to distinguish between Maori and Pakeha personnel. This reluctance, it will be explained, was especially pronounced when the Army was asked to provide information to the public on the level of Maori involvement in the force. Yet the Army – in internal communications, at least – did sometimes continue to recognise and discuss Maori as a distinct group. In 1966, as detailed above, a memo entitled 'The Maori Soldier', written probably by Captain Alan Armstrong, was circulated for the benefit of officers and NCOs. However, while this memo acknowledged Maori as a separate group and sought to foster greater understanding of the differences between Maori and Pakeha soldiers, it suggested these differences would eventually disappear as Maori became more like Pakeha. Articulating an integrationist ideology, the memo contended that, overall, 'the trend in New Zealand is towards ever increasing Europeanisation of the Maori'.⁴³⁰

Developments during Vietnam War, 1966-1972

This section examines Maori involvement in the regular Army between 1966 and 1972, during which time New Zealand Army units were deployed to South Vietnam, a military commitment that had begun in 1964. Over this period, many of the developments that occurred from the late 1950s remained evident. For example, the Army, facing ongoing recruitment challenges, continued to actively encourage Maori enlistment. And, reflecting this and that Maori generally were more open to serving in the Army than Pakeha, the rate of Maori involvement in the Army remained high – in both the units deployed overseas and in the regular Army as a whole. Further, Army leadership continued to be reluctant to recognise ethnic differences and to disclose information about the size of the Maori component within the force.

Maori participation in the Army's war effort in Vietnam is examined first here. The regular Army's role in this conflict remains its single largest combat effort.⁴³¹ Alongside Australia, New Zealand was one of only a small number of countries that provided military support to the United States during the conflict – others being South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and, covertly, Taiwan. The decision to provide this support represented the increasing importance of New Zealand's strategic relationship with the United States. The Vietnam War was the first conflict in which New Zealand did not fight alongside Great Britain.

New Zealand Army personnel were first deployed to South Vietnam in June 1964. This initial military commitment, which followed the earlier posting of a civilian

⁴³⁰ 'The Maori Soldier', memo attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington, p1.

⁴³¹ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p541.

surgical team, involved a small non-combatant engineer detachment.⁴³² In July 1965, this detachment was withdrawn and the country's first combat unit was deployed – 161 Battery of the Royal New Zealand Artillery. In 1967, New Zealand further increased its commitment. In April, an armed services' medical team was deployed and, later, in May and November, two infantry companies of 1RNZIR were sent to the theatre.⁴³³ (These companies would be replaced at regular intervals by companies sent from Malaysia and, later, Singapore.) Towards the end of 1968, New Zealand's combat contribution broadened with the deployment of 4 Troop 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron.⁴³⁴ Two years later, in August 1970, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake announced that New Zealand's commitment to the war would be scaled back, and by the end of the following year the artillery, infantry, SAS, and armed services' medical team had all been withdrawn.⁴³⁵ Army training teams deployed between January 1971 and December 1972 marked the final stages of the New Zealand Army's involvement in South Vietnam.⁴³⁶

In total, about 3200 New Zealanders served in Vietnam, the large majority – some 3033 – being military personnel.⁴³⁷ The Army made up the great bulk of the country's military contribution, with about 97 percent of those deployed being in this service.⁴³⁸ In terms of numbers deployed, New Zealand's involvement peaked in late 1968, when 548 military personnel were in Vietnam, of whom 543 were in the Army.⁴³⁹ The Army personnel serving in Vietnam at this time amounted to only a little less than ten percent of the regular Army's total strength, which was 5706 as at 31 August 1968.⁴⁴⁰

Continuing the practice established during the Malayan Emergency and Confrontation, those who served in the Army in Vietnam did so as Regular Force personnel. Many were professional soldiers who had seen service in Malaya and had made the Army their career.⁴⁴¹ Others signed up for a short term of service with the specific aim of fighting in the war. Maori soldiers fell into both categories. New Zealand's initial infantry contributions included a high proportion of those who had

⁴³² The civilian surgical team, which arrived in April 1963, remained in Vietnam until March 1975 – the month before New Zealand's Ambassador departed from Saigon. Hall, *No Front Line*, pp8-9.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, pp8-9.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp44, 100.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp8-9, 269. McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, pp454-469.

⁴³⁶ Hall, *No Front Line*, pp8-9.

⁴³⁷ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p589.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp540, 589.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p588.

⁴⁴⁰ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1969.

⁴⁴¹ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p538. Long-term Regular Force soldiers served as volunteers. However, some evidently felt they had little choice in the matter, believing any decision not to go would have impacted on their opportunities for career advancement. See Deborah Challinor, *Grey Ghosts: New Zealand Vietnam Vets Talk About Their War*, Hodder Moa Beckett, Auckland, 1998, p50.

been involved in operations in Malaya and Borneo, with short-service recruits becoming a more significant element in later deployments.⁴⁴² Those who fell into the latter category were required to sign up for three years. After joining they underwent training ahead of a period of deployment in Vietnam, which from late 1966 (before the first infantry company was sent to the theatre) was limited to one year.⁴⁴³

As New Zealand's military commitment in Vietnam increased, Army recruitment efforts became focused on sustaining New Zealand's war effort. Hall explains that the Army embarked on a publicity campaign that aimed to boost Territorial Force and civilian recruitment for the war and, more generally, increase public awareness of New Zealand's involvement in the conflict. However, this campaign ultimately failed, with fewer joining up than anticipated.⁴⁴⁴

At the same time, the Army continued to encourage Maori enlistment, evidently perceiving young Maori to be a valuable pool of potential recruits. As explained in the previous section, the Army – working alongside the Maori Affairs' Department – began targeting Maori communities from around 1960. Maori Affairs' file evidence concerning the Wanganui district indicates these efforts continued in the late 1960s. In August 1967, for example, Army representatives and a Maori Affairs' official were among those who attended a meeting in Taumarunui to plan for the opening of Taumarunui airport and 'Army Week'. The meeting agreed there should be a Maori representative at the airport opening, where the Army would have a display. Proceedings would also include a 'Special tribute and salute to [the] Maori people', to be given at Ngapuwaiwaha Marae. Later in the day, the marae would host a hangi dinner, ahead of a civic ball at the Taumarunui Memorial Hall.⁴⁴⁵

Evidence from the Wanganui district also shows that young Maori sometimes approached Maori Affairs' welfare officers for recruitment information – reflecting the visible and active role that the Department played in the Army's recruitment efforts. In September 1968, Maori Affairs' Wanganui District Officer wrote to the local Army office, advising that Maori girls had been seeking information about the Army and requesting application forms.⁴⁴⁶ In response, the Area Warrant Officer sent a number of application forms and noted that further information could be

⁴⁴² Hall, *No Front Line*, pp16-17.

⁴⁴³ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, pp179-182.

⁴⁴⁴ Hall, *No Front Line*, pp22-23.

⁴⁴⁵ Resident Officer, Taumarunui, to Wanganui District Officer, 6 September 1967, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁴⁶ Puohotaua (for District Officer) to Officer in Charge, 19 September 1968, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

obtained from the local Army office. However, he pointed out that opportunities for females were generally more limited.⁴⁴⁷

As argued in the previous section, the Army's efforts to recruit Maori reflect in part that Maori were generally seen to be capable soldiers. Their skills continued to be recognised in Vietnam. For example, New Zealand's Ambassador to Thailand, Stephen Weir, commented positively on the role of Maori personnel within the small engineer detachment that was deployed between June 1964 and June 1965. Around the time the detachment was withdrawn, Weir reported that its members had shown a strong ability to get along and connect with the local Vietnamese population. He suggested that the New Zealand soldier was 'in his natural element in this field and probably better than most; the Maori in this context is often just ahead of the Pakeha'.⁴⁴⁸ Formerly a career soldier, Weir had served as Chief of the General Staff between 1955 and 1960.⁴⁴⁹

Maori who joined the Army in order to serve in Vietnam were again driven by a range of motivations, similar to those that had underlain earlier Maori enlistment. Oral sources once more are a useful source of information. For many, the excitement and adventure of participating in an overseas deployment seems to have been an important factor. Rangi Rata, of Te Atiawa and Ngati Porou descent, who joined up with his two brothers, stated in a 2010 interview that 'a lot of Maori joined the army back then to go to Vietnam. They weren't just drifting in – they were coming in droves.'⁴⁵⁰

Once more, Maori enlistment continued to be driven partly by economic and career motivations. During the oral hearings, William (Willie) Wilson, who joined the Army in May 1968, stated that:

The economic downturn in New Zealand influenced my choice to join the Army because I was only about a year out of high school, and I noticed most of the boys from the Easy [sic] Coast felt the same way, and joined the army for the same reasons.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁷ Area Warrant Officer to Department of Maori Affairs, Wanganui, 23 September 1968, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁴⁸ New Zealand Ambassador, Bangkok, to Secretary External Affairs, 30 June 1965, cited in McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p61.

⁴⁴⁹ J.A.B. Crawford, 'Weir, Stephen Cyril Ettick', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 1 August 2017. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5w17/weir-stephen-cyril-ettrick>

⁴⁵⁰ Rangi Rata, oral interview by Paul Diamond for the Māori Vietnam War Veterans Oral History Project, 15 December 2010, quoted in Hall, *No Front Line*, p211.

⁴⁵¹ William (Willie) Wilson, Hearing Week 6, Rongomaraeroa-o-nga-hau-e-wha Marae, Waiouru Army Base, Wai 2500, #4.1.7, p191.

Wilson had been advised that serving for a period in the Army would assist him in his aim to join the Police Force.⁴⁵² However, after completing his time in Vietnam, he began working at the local freezing works and appears to have secured a paid role within the Territorial Force, which he retained through to the early 1990s.⁴⁵³ Willie stated that his brother, Hiwi Thompson Wilson, followed him into the Army and was to remain in the force for over 20 years.⁴⁵⁴

Other Maori who joined up at this time recalled that they were motivated primarily by a strong family tradition of overseas military service, which they wished to continue. Hall notes the example of George Babbington of Ngati Porou, whose father, grandfather, and at least one uncle had served in earlier conflicts. In a 2008 interview, Babbington, who appears to have been working on his family's East Coast farm when he joined the Army, recalled that early television coverage of the Vietnam War and family conversation about the conflict prompted him to enlist:

I had no idea of why it was happening or where Vietnam was. I saw it on television and heard my uncles talking about it. I thought of George Taihuka, my father and grandfather's service. It was just an accepted thing that one of us had to go to war too – and it had to be me.⁴⁵⁵

At the same time, there was also enlistment from some Maori communities that, historically, had largely declined to undertake military service for the Crown. Within these communities, attitudes had begun to shift by the time New Zealand became involved in Vietnam. In an interview conducted in 2010, Maori veteran Paul Carr explained that, during the 1960s, enlistment of Maori from South Taranaki represented a break with tradition. Carr, who served as a gunner in 161 Battery, affiliated principally to Ngati Ruanui and Nga Ruahine, with links also to Nga Rauru, Te Atiawa, and Ngati Maru.⁴⁵⁶ Among his father's generation, the teachings of the Parihaka prophets Te Whiti and Tohu remained a strong influence. These teachings included a pacifist dimension and, more broadly, discouraged close engagement with Pakeha – in Carr's words, 'getting too involved with Pakeha issues'.⁴⁵⁷ Because of this tradition, Paul Carr's father and many other Taranaki Maori did not serve in World War II: 'That's why they didn't go to school. That's why he never went to the Second World War.'⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵² Ibid., p191.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., p192.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., p191.

⁴⁵⁵ George Babbington, oral interview by Claire Hall, 31 January 2008, quoted in Hall, *No Front Line*, p211. Hori (George) Taihuka was Babbington's uncle and a veteran of World War I.

⁴⁵⁶ Paul Carr, oral interview by Paul Diamond for the Māori Vietnam War Veterans Oral History Project, 27 November and 5 December 2010, digital sound recording, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 1, from 6.45 min.

⁴⁵⁷ Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 1 from 9.40 min.

⁴⁵⁸ Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 1 from 13.58 min.

Carr, who enlisted in 1968, was not the first of his generation to join the Army.⁴⁵⁹ About five years earlier, his older brother, Brian, had joined up along with four relatives from around the local iwi.⁴⁶⁰ (An infantry soldier, Brian Carr went on to serve in Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam.⁴⁶¹) Paul Carr stated that, by the time his brother and relatives joined up, the influence of Te Whiti and Tohu was lessening:

it wasn't so strong... the issues weren't so active, you know, because my koro was old... and he didn't have the mana... Te Whiti and Tohu... had passed on... We were coming into a, sort of, new realm.⁴⁶²

Paul Carr left the Army in 1970, near the end of his three-year enlistment term. He had wished to serve another tour in Vietnam, but was prevented from doing so because a medical test established he had a hearing problem. Unable to serve again overseas as a gunner, he applied for a discharge.⁴⁶³

Carr was not alone in deciding to leave the Army at the end of his active service in Vietnam. Referring to the Maori soldiers who had joined with the specific aim of fighting in Vietnam, Rangi Rata recalled: 'Once the war ended the novelty wore off, and the army started losing them again to Civvy Street.'⁴⁶⁴ According to McGibbon, about 40 percent of the men who served in Vietnam – Maori and Pakeha – left the Army shortly after returning to New Zealand.⁴⁶⁵ He notes that those on short term engagements did have the option of re-engaging.⁴⁶⁶ Many of those who continued on in the Army appear to have been career soldiers. In 1980, about one-third of those who served in Vietnam remained in the Army.⁴⁶⁷

The available evidence shows that a large number of Maori were among the New Zealand Army personnel deployed to Vietnam. The rate of Maori involvement significantly exceeded the proportion of Maori in the general population. The 1966 and 1971 censuses respectively recorded that 7.5 and 7.9 percent of the total population was Maori, based on a definition that identified a Maori as being a person of half or greater Maori descent.⁴⁶⁸ In his history of New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War, McGibbon notes contemporary observations that claimed that about half of Army's personnel in Vietnam were Maori. However, he suggests these

⁴⁵⁹ Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 2 from 17.50 min.

⁴⁶⁰ Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 1 from 30.50 min.

⁴⁶¹ Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 1 from 25.00 min and file 2 from 10.10 min.

⁴⁶² Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 1 from 30.50 min.

⁴⁶³ Carr, OHDL-001961, ATL, file 3 from 22.30 min.

⁴⁶⁴ Rangi Rata, oral interview by Paul Diamond for the Māori Vietnam War Veterans Oral History Project, 15 December 2010, quoted in Hall, *No Front Line*, p211.

⁴⁶⁵ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p526.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p525.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p526.

⁴⁶⁸ 'Population', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1967; 1972.

estimates are too high and instead contends that Maori comprised about 35 percent of the combat force, with a slightly lower rate in the non-combat elements.⁴⁶⁹ The proportion of Maori within the units that served in Vietnam appears to have been greater than that of the forces that earlier served in Malaya and Borneo.

McGibbon’s assessment of the extent of Maori participation among the New Zealand Army units deployed to Vietnam is based upon an examination of the attestation forms of individuals who served in three different groups. Table 6 sets out the results of this research, which focussed on the main body of V Force, Victor 4 Company 1RNZIR, and 4 Troop 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron. McGibbon examined the attestation forms of 339 individuals – about 12 percent of the total number of Army personnel who served in the theatre. Across the three units, 32.4 percent of those surveyed recorded on their attestation form that they were of half or greater Maori descent, while 36.6 percent noted some degree of Maori ancestry. It is notable that there was considerable variation between units, with the Maori component ranging from about 20 percent in the main body (composed primarily of personnel serving with 161 Battery) through to about 60 percent in 4 Troop 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron. This reflects that Maori service in the Army was not spread evenly across all branches. The available evidence does not provide a clear explanation as to why this was the case. Suggesting that the uneven spread of Maori largely reflected their service preferences, McGibbon states that ‘many Maori were not so keen on the technical trades, many preferred to serve in the infantry’.⁴⁷⁰

Table 6: Proportion of Maori within selected Army units deployed to Vietnam – figures derived from attestation forms⁴⁷¹

Unit	Main Body [HQ, 161 Battery, logistics]	Victor 4 Company 1RNZIR	4 Troop 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron	Combined totals
Total personnel	124	187	28	339
Number of Maori, less than half descent	6	7	3	16
Number of Maori, half to full descent	22	72	16	110
Total number of personnel with any Maori ancestry	28	77	19	124

⁴⁶⁹ McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, p297.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p297.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp590-594.

Unit	Main Body [HQ, 161 Battery, logistics]	Victor 4 Company 1RNZIR	4 Troop 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron	Combined totals
Proportion of personnel with Maori ancestry, half to full descent (%)	17.7	38.5	57.1	32.4
Proportion of personnel with Maori ancestry, all levels of descent (%)	23.1	41.2	67.9	36.6

Table notes:

Main Body: Deployed in June-July 1965. Figures include three HQ personnel who were already in Saigon.⁴⁷²

Victor 4 Company 1RNZIR: Deployed in May 1969, withdrawn in May 1970.⁴⁷³ Figures include all who served in the company during the deployment. The figures include four Cook Islands' Maori, one of whom indicated that one quarter of his ancestry was New Zealand Maori.⁴⁷⁴

4 Troop 1 Ranger (SAS) Squadron: Deployed in December 1968.⁴⁷⁵ Figures include original detachment and two replacement soldiers.⁴⁷⁶

Alongside McGibbon's work, research for this report has located some relevant data produced in connection with the 1971 census, which also sheds light on Maori involvement in the Army units deployed to Vietnam. In compliance with a request from the Government Statistician, all military units serving overseas completed returns showing personnel numbers and dependents at 12am on 24 March 1971. The returns enumerated non-Maori and Maori separately, with a Maori being defined as 'a person with half or more Maori blood'.⁴⁷⁷ It is unclear how each unit went about collecting the information that was supplied or the extent to which care was taken to ensure its accuracy. Given these uncertainties, the census data may not be as reliable as McGibbon's research of attestation forms, which collates information that soldiers had provided themselves.

⁴⁷² Ibid., pp590-591.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., p549.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., p592.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p549.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p593.

⁴⁷⁷ Squadron Leader for Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel), airmail letter for distribution, 3 February 1971, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 21 31/1/26 part 1, PERSONNEL: Policy & General Census of Population & Dwellings, 1970-1976, ANZ Wellington.

Table 7: Census returns of Army units serving in Vietnam, 23/24 March 1971⁴⁷⁸

Unit	Non-Maori	Maori	Total	Maori (%)
No. 1 NZ Services Medical Team, Vietnam	14	0	14	0.0
NZ Army Training Team, Vietnam	20	5	25	20.0
NZ Component V Company, Vietnam	123	66	189	34.9
161 Battery RNZA, Vietnam	106	28	134	20.9
HQ NZ V Force, Vietnam	63	6	69	8.7
Total	326	105	431	24.4

Table 7 sets out the figures that the Army units in Vietnam supplied for the 1971 census. The data provides a slightly larger sample than McGibbon's attestation form research, with the 431 personnel captured in the unit returns comprising close to 15 percent of the Army personnel who served in Vietnam. The census data shows a somewhat lower rate of Maori involvement than McGibbon's research. Overall, 24.2 percent of the individuals recorded in the 1971 data were stated to be Maori, which compares to McGibbon's figure of 32.4 percent (half or more Maori descent). The two sets of data cover mostly the same branches of the Army. Notable differences are that McGibbon's figures include an SAS unit, while the 1971 census results include a New Zealand Services medical team. In respect of the two infantry units for which they provide information, McGibbon's figures and the census data show similarly high rates of Maori involvement – between about 35 and 40 percent.⁴⁷⁹ As with McGibbon's research, the 1971 figures also indicate that Maori personnel were not spread evenly across the different units deployed to Vietnam. At the time of the census, no Maori were in the medical team and, in contrast to the high overall rate of Maori involvement, only a relatively small number were serving at V Force Headquarters. Only two women were among the 431 personnel in Vietnam when the 1971 census was held. Both served at Headquarters, and neither were Maori.

Other Army units serving outside of New Zealand also filed returns in connection with the 1971 census. There were four such units – two based in Singapore, one in Malaysia, and one in Thailand. (In Malaysia, the New Zealand personnel served within 28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.) As detailed in Table 8, a total of 706 personnel were recorded as serving in these units at the time of the census. By far the single largest was 1RNZIR – the infantry battalion that had been based in Singapore since the closure of Terendak Camp in late 1969. The census return filed for 1RNZIR again

⁴⁷⁸ Unit census returns (23/24 March 1971), ABFK 7494 W4948 box 21 31/1/26 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁷⁹ In the 1971 data, the infantry unit is Victor 5 Company, deployed between May 1970 and May 1971. 'Vietnam War', NZ History website, accessed 23 November 2017. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/vietnam-war>

shows a high rate of Maori involvement in the infantry, and it is consistent with the figures presented above for the personnel who served in Vietnam within Victor 4 and 5 infantry companies. Across the four units based in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, 28.5 percent of personnel were recorded to be Maori. However, once more, considerable variation between units is apparent. Notably, as at V Force Headquarters in Saigon, Maori comprised a comparatively small proportion of the personnel who served at Army Headquarters in Singapore.

Table 8: Census returns of Army units serving in Singapore, Malaya, and Thailand, 24 March 1971⁴⁸⁰

Unit	Non-Maori	Maori	Total	Maori (%)
HQ, NZ Army Force, Singapore	102	11	126	8.7
1RNZIR, Singapore	324	180	504	35.7
28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, Malaysia	45	5	50	10.0
No 5 Specialist Team, RNZE, Thailand	21	5	26	19.2
Total	492	201	706	28.5

The evidence presented so far has focused on Maori involvement in Army units deployed to Vietnam, with the 1971 census figures also providing details concerning units serving in other locations outside of New Zealand. Across the various units, the overall rate of Maori involvement appears to have lain between about 25 to 35 percent (half or more Maori descent). The extent to which this reflects the level of Maori involvement in the regular Army as a whole is not entirely clear. At any one time, units deployed outside of New Zealand comprised only a small proportion of the Regular Force. For example, the 1971 unit returns provide details of 1137 Army personnel serving overseas – about 20 percent of the Regular Force, which was recorded to be 5638 in the same year.⁴⁸¹

Given that Maori appear to have been concentrated mostly in the Army's combat elements – units predominant among those deployed overseas at the time of the Vietnam War – the rate of Maori involvement in the regular Army as a whole is likely to have been somewhat lower than the 25 to 35 percent evident in the overseas units. However, impressionist evidence suggests the rate was far from insignificant and may not have been much less than that among personnel serving overseas. Indeed, at the beginning of the period examined here, the 1966 'Maori Soldier' memo, which

⁴⁸⁰ Unit census returns (23/24 March 1971), ABFK 7494 W4948 box 21 31/1/26 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁸¹ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1969.

was discussed in the previous section, noted unofficial estimates that placed the proportion of Maori personnel within the Army 'as high as 40%'.⁴⁸²

Other evidence similarly points to a significant Maori component within the regular Army. For example, in June 1967, when writing to the Minister of Defence to request information on Maori participation in the armed services, Victoria University psychology student Don Murray recalled that during his National Service training he had observed that 'on a population basis, many Maori men seem to belong to the army.' In contrast to the fields of higher education or business, where he believed 'subtle selection factors' worked against Maori, Murray suggested that: 'In the armed forces Maoris seem to be accepted more readily than in civilian life.'⁴⁸³

No evidence has been located to suggest that, during the period examined in this section, the Army began to compile statistics on the force's overall ethnic make up. However, in internal communications, such as in the 1966 memo, Army staff continued to occasionally offer estimates as to the proportion of personnel who were Maori. Army leaders, however, generally seem to have been reluctant to provide any such information to the public. In February 1967, in response to some questions about Maori participation in Vietnam, which were raised after a friendly fire incident concerning 161 Battery, Minister of Defence David Thomson informed the press – presumably, on the basis of advice provided by the Army – that it was not possible to determine how many Maori were serving in the theatre. As McGibbon notes, this was not true, because, as explained above, Maori were required to record their ethnicity on their attestation forms.⁴⁸⁴

A few months later, a reluctance to provide information was again evident when the Army was asked to provide details of the proportion of personnel who were Maori. This request stemmed from psychology student Don Murray's above-mentioned letter to the Minister of Defence, which was dated 15 June 1967. After explaining that he was undertaking research into the 'social and economic aspirations of the Maori people' and was particularly interested in the areas of society that catered most for the needs of Maori people, Murray asked the Minister for information on: (1) the percentage of Maori personnel within the armed forces, (2) the number of Maori who helped the allied war effort in World War II, and (3) the percentage of Maori men amongst the New Zealand personnel deployed to Vietnam.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸² 'The Maori Soldier', memo attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington, p1.

⁴⁸³ Murray to Thomson, 15 June 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁸⁴ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, pp297, 643 endnote 4. For details of the friendly fire incident, which resulted in four Australians being killed and 13 wounded, see pp167-169.

⁴⁸⁵ Murray to Thomson, 15 June 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

The Defence Secretary, William Hutching, forwarded Murray's letter to each of the three armed services, requesting comments on the questions that Murray had set out.⁴⁸⁶ The Army decided against offering any figures on the level of Maori involvement within the force. Considering Murray's request, a senior staff officer, whose name and position is unclear, stated that: 'As a matter of principle I believe it is wrong to officially release this type of info[mation]'.⁴⁸⁷ On 13 July 1967, in accordance with this view, the Deputy Secretary of Defence (Army) advised the Secretary of Defence that the requested information was not readily available because Army records did not differentiate between Maori and European. He suggested that Murray could contact and discuss his request further with the Director of Army Education and Welfare Services.⁴⁸⁸

The statement that the Army's records did not differentiate between Maori and Pakeha was, of course, misleading. About a month later, early in August 1967, an Army staff member pointed out that the figures that Murray sought could be generated through 'a machine run'.⁴⁸⁹ But no statistics were produced in accordance with this suggestion. Instead, another, more senior staff member, decided that the matter should be left to rest: 'If and when Mr Murray makes the next move, DHG and I will see him together and discuss his problem.'⁴⁹⁰ As detailed later in the chapter, the Air Force was similarly reluctant to disclose any information in response to Murray's letter. And, though the Navy's response has not been located, it appears to have adopted a similar stance.⁴⁹¹

Research for this report has located no evidence that offers an explicit explanation as to why, at this time, the Army was reluctant to publicly acknowledge and provide statistics on the proportion of Maori within its ranks. However, the stance was clearly consistent with the policy of integration, which demanded that Maori and Pakeha serve together, with no distinction to be made between soldiers of each race. The practice of requiring enlistees to note whether or not they were Maori was somewhat at odds with this policy, and the Army understandably would have been reluctant to acknowledge that details of race were recorded in this way. Through refusing to generate and release figures on Maori participation, the Army demonstrated that it

⁴⁸⁶ Secretary of Defence to Deputy Secretary of Defence (Navy, Army, and Air), 5 July 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁸⁷ Unknown to DAG, 6 July 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁸⁸ Deputy Secretary of Defence (Army) to Secretary of Defence, 13 July 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁸⁹ Unknown to DAEWS [Director Army Education and Welfare Services], 3 August 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁹⁰ Unknown, minute, 4 August 1967, on unknown to DAEWS [Director Army Education and Welfare Services], 3 August 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁹¹ A/AMP to Deputy Secretary Defence, 25 July 1967, minute on Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) to Secretary of Defence, 25 July 1967, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, Maoris in RNZAF, general instructions, 1917-1969, ANZ Wellington.

adhered to the policy of integration and held military professionalism, not race, to be of primary importance.

While the Army's reluctance to provide information on the number of Maori within its ranks was consistent with the policy of integration, it is possible – though confirming evidence has not been located – that the stance may also have reflected concerns about the impact that the information might have had upon the Army's reputation. At a time when discrimination against Maori remained common, Army leadership possibly held concerns that New Zealand's Pakeha majority would look unfavourably upon the high level of Maori involvement in the Army, potentially to the detriment of its ability to recruit Pakeha. As detailed above, less than two decades earlier, such concerns had been expressed in the Northern Military District, with Brigadier Clifton claiming that among some Pakeha CMT recruits it was thought that joining the regular Army meant becoming 'a member of the "Pa"'.⁴⁹² The extent to which such attitudes persisted and continued to concern Army leaders is unclear. If there were remaining concerns, the policy of integration provided a useful justification for refusing to acknowledge the rate of Maori involvement in the Army, and at the same time it enabled the Army to emphasise that race was not important. Maori did serve in the Army, but they were – first and foremost – soldiers.

Regular Force, 1972-2000

This section briefly discusses Maori participation in the Regular Force from the end of New Zealand's military involvement in the Vietnam War through to 2000. Developments concerning the organisation of the Army and its activities during these years are also described. During the period, there continued to be a high level of Maori participation in the service, with the rate of Maori involvement significantly exceeding the proportion of Maori in the general population. Again, however, comprehensive statistics on the ethnicity of Army personnel are generally not available. In 1978, an internal Defence Psychology Unit study established that about 34 percent of the Regular Force identified as Maori, while in the Territorial Force the figure was about 16 percent.⁴⁹³ Such efforts to establish the rate of Maori participation appear to have been uncommon. In 1999, James Rolfe noted that the NZDF, at this time, did not compile data on the 'racial background' of its members.⁴⁹⁴ A reluctance to identify the ethnic make up of New Zealand armed services evidently continued. As explained later in the chapter, this would eventually

⁴⁹² Brigadier, Commanding, Northern Military District, to Military Secretary, Army, 3 July 1952, AALJ 7291 W3449 box 15 243/8/26, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁹³ See Peter Cooke and John Crawford, *The Territorials: The History of the Territorial and Volunteer Forces of New Zealand*, Random House, Auckland, 2011, p371. In respect of these statistics, Cooke and Crawford reference the following file: ABFK 22686 W4312 box 2, Defence Psychology Unit Research Report 4/78 The Territorial Force – A Cross Sectional Study, 1978-1978, ANZ Wellington.

⁴⁹⁴ James Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*, Allen and Unwin, New South Wales, 1999, p160.

change in the early 2000s, when the NZDF began to regularly gather data on the ethnicity of its personnel. Before this time, figures concerning the rate of Maori involvement are mostly estimates. In 2000, for example, the *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History* suggested that Maori comprised about 30 percent of personnel in the three armed services, most serving in the Army.⁴⁹⁵

While it is clear there continued to be high Maori involvement in the Army (and the Navy), the NZDF, in the early 1990s, expressed strong reluctance to assume any broader responsibility for providing employment and training opportunities for Maori. In September 1991, following remarks that the Prime Minister had made in respect of the Ka Awatea policy, the Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, wrote to the Minister of Maori Affairs, Winston Peters, advising him in no uncertain terms that:

The New Zealand Defence Force is not a development agency. The recommendations of Ka Awatea do not impinge on the Defence Force, and there is in fact no reason why there should be a particularly close relationship between it and the new Ministry of Maori Development. The Defence Force exists to provide services to the Government, rather than assistance or support to individual New Zealanders (whether Maori or of any other descent).

The Maori people have played a distinguished role, alongside other New Zealanders, in the delivery of defence services to the Government, as members of the Armed Forces. They have done so without any need for special assistance or preferment, and I have no doubt that they will continue to do so.⁴⁹⁶

Research for this report has not established whether deliberate efforts to encourage Maori recruitment into the Army were undertaken between the early 1970s and 2000. As detailed above, efforts to attract Maori recruits began in about 1960 and continued throughout the decade. While it is not clear that the Army continued to target Maori, ongoing high rates of Maori participation in the force suggest this may have been the case. For Maori who joined the Army at this time, at least some of the motivations that underlay earlier Maori enlistments continued. For example, oral interviews conducted in the mid-1990s indicate that a family history of military service and an affinity with ‘the warrior instinct’ remained important.⁴⁹⁷ It is likely that the achievements of Maori in the Army were also a motivation for some. During

⁴⁹⁵ ‘Maori in the armed forces’, entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p303.

⁴⁹⁶ Minister of Defence to Minister of Maori Affairs, 3 September 1991, 65457 215B-5-E3 NZDF 3302/7 part 2, Plans, Operations and Readiness – Assistance – Other Government Departments – Department of Maori Affairs, 1989-2000, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁴⁹⁷ Michelle Frances Erai, ‘Maori Soldiers: Maori Experiences of the New Zealand Army’, MA Thesis (Social Science), Victoria University of Wellington, 1995, pp36-37. These interviews were conducted both with Maori serving in the Army and Maori who had left the Army.

the period discussed here, Brian Poananga's role as a leader is especially notable. As noted earlier, Poananga, holding the rank of major-general, served as Chief of the General Staff between 1978 and 1981 – the first person of Maori descent to hold the Army's senior-most position.⁴⁹⁸

Over the period discussed here, ongoing Maori involvement in the Army continued against a background of defence policy shifts that resulted in changes to the Army and the role it served. During the 1970s, the Army's role was reassessed as concerns about the communist threat lessened, in part because of an ongoing division between the powers of Russia and China.⁴⁹⁹ In respect of New Zealand's defence commitments, the disbanding of SEATO in 1975 was also important.⁵⁰⁰ Within this context, priority was given to the development of new capabilities, including the capacity to respond to emergencies in the South Pacific, to provide defence aid and cooperation, and to participate in United Nations' peace-keeping operations.⁵⁰¹ In 1974, following a reorganisation of the Army, a second infantry battalion was reformed – 2/1 Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment.⁵⁰² Though New Zealand's security focus shifted from South-East Asia, the Regiment's original battalion, 1RNZIR, remained stationed in Singapore until 1989 – an ongoing presence that has been described as 'diplomatic rather than strategic'.⁵⁰³ The cost of restationing the battalion in New Zealand may also have been a factor. From about 1980, the Army became more involved in peace-keeping deployments, some of which also included Air Force and Navy contributions.⁵⁰⁴

After the Fourth Labour Government came to power in 1984, defence policy became more focussed on the South Pacific – a shift linked to the decision to ban visits from nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels, which brought to an end New Zealand's active participation in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS).⁵⁰⁵ Peace-keeping continued to be the main focus of the Army's overseas deployments. During the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, New

⁴⁹⁸ Poananga, 'Poananga, Brian Matauru', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

⁴⁹⁹ Ian McGibbon, 'Asian conflicts – Later Asian wars', Te Ara website, accessed 15 August 2017.

URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/asian-conflicts/page-7>

⁵⁰⁰ Dickens, 'SEATO', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p482.

⁵⁰¹ 'New Zealand Army', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p360.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ 'New Zealand military headquarters in Singapore', New Zealand History website, accessed 15 August 2017.

URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/new-zealand-defence-force-headquarters-singapore>

McGibbon, 'Asian conflicts – Later Asian wars', Te Ara website.

⁵⁰⁴ John Crawford, 'Peace-keeping', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, pp418-419.

⁵⁰⁵ 'New Zealand Army', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p360.

Zealand's peace-keeping commitments increased significantly as the United Nations became more able to make use of collective security provisions.⁵⁰⁶ Notably, between about 1993 and 1996, a company-sized force – the largest overseas mission since the end of the Vietnam War – was deployed to the former Yugoslavia.⁵⁰⁷ And between 1999 and 2002, a battalion-sized force was deployed to East Timor in a peacekeeping role.⁵⁰⁸

As discussed earlier, the Army – along with the Navy and Air Force – was affected by significant organisational reform and funding shifts from the mid-1980s. Initially, declining budgets and rationalisation policies saw the closure and sale of a number of Army bases.⁵⁰⁹ From 1989 through to 1996, as detailed earlier in Table 1, the number of Regular Force personnel declined by about 24 percent, with some limited recovery thereafter. The reduction in personnel numbers affected some branches of the force more than others. Logistic and support units were trimmed so that more resources could be applied to the combat arms.⁵¹⁰ (Today, in spite of lower personnel numbers, the Army continues to retain two infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, and an SAS regiment.⁵¹¹) The greater retention of the Army's combat elements possibly meant that Maori were less affected by the downscaling because Maori involvement was centred upon these parts of the Army. In 2000, it was noted that Maori were 'heavily represented in the "combat" arms'.⁵¹²

Navy recruitment, 1946-2000

This part of the chapter examines issues concerning Maori recruitment and participation in the RNZN from the end of World War II through to 2000. It focuses on the extent to which Maori have been able to serve in the Navy and take advantage of recruitment opportunities. Specific issues concerning the ability of Maori to serve in leadership positions within the RNZN are discussed in the next chapter. The developments examined here extend from those that Webb describes in his report on Maori military service up to 1945. In this report, Webb explains that some Maori – an undetermined number – served in the Navy during World War II.⁵¹³ Earlier,

⁵⁰⁶ David Capie, 'Peacekeeping – Peacekeeping in the 1990s', Te Ara website, accessed 15 August 2017. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/peacekeeping/page-3>

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ David Capie, 'Peacekeeping – Bougainville and East Timor', Te Ara website, accessed 15 August 2017. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/peacekeeping/page-4>

⁵⁰⁹ 'New Zealand Army', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p360.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ 'Army Today: Order of Battle', NZ Army website, accessed 16 August 2017.

URL: <http://www.army.mil.nz/about-us/who-we-are/structure/default.htm>

⁵¹² 'Maori in the armed forces', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p303.

⁵¹³ Webb, 'Equality and Autonomy: An Overview of Māori Military Service for the Crown', pp323-324, 329.

during the interwar period, Maori had been excluded from the force, with the Navy allowing Maori to enter the service only at the beginning of 1939.⁵¹⁴

Role of the RNZN, 1946-2000

Before looking at Maori recruitment issues, some contextual information concerning the Navy is briefly provided here. This section describes the RNZN's role and operations since World War II, and it includes an overview of Navy personnel numbers and how these have changed. This is followed by a discussion that describes the influential role that Royal Navy personnel maintained within the RNZN until the late twentieth century.

After World War II, the role of the RNZN evolved in accordance with New Zealand's changing strategic interests and domestic concerns. Maintaining a military capability, the Navy has been involved in a range of overseas deployments, including – during the first 20 years covered in this report – active duties in the Korean War as well as in the Malayan Emergency and Borneo Confrontation.⁵¹⁵ More recently, the RNZN has supported a number of peacekeeping operations, including, during the 1990s, deployments to Cambodia and East Timor. In 1995-1996, two RNZN frigates were involved in policing United Nations' resolutions relating to Iraq.⁵¹⁶ In the late 1950s and early 1970s, the Navy was also involved in operations associated with the testing of nuclear weapons. In 1957, the frigates *Pukaki* and *Rotoiti* were deployed in support roles for British nuclear tests undertaken at Christmas Island, known as Operation Grapple.⁵¹⁷ Less than two decades later, in 1973, the *Otago* and then *Canterbury* were dispatched to Mururoa Atoll to protest against French nuclear testing.⁵¹⁸

Representing New Zealand's interests in other ways, the RNZN also became involved in operations to support the country's involvement in Antarctica. Notably, in the summer of 1956-1957 an RNZN ship provided transport for the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition, and between 1962 and 1971 another vessel played a

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., pp319-320.

⁵¹⁵ 'Royal New Zealand Navy: Post-war Operations', New Zealand History website, accessed 1 September 2017. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/royal-new-zealand-navy/post-war-operations>

⁵¹⁶ 'Royal New Zealand Navy: New Directions', New Zealand History website, accessed 1 September 2017. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/royal-new-zealand-navy/new-directions>

⁵¹⁷ In 1958, the *Pukaki* alone was deployed to Christmas Island. Between 15 May 1957 and 23 September 1958, RNZN personnel observed nine bomb tests. See 'The RNZN and Operation Grapple', RNZN Communicators Association website, accessed 3 August 2018.

URL: <https://rnzncomms.org/the-rnzn-and-operation-grapple/>

⁵¹⁸ Denis Fairfax, 'Royal New Zealand Navy', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p468. 'Royal New Zealand Navy: New Directions', New Zealand History website, accessed 1 September 2017.

URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/royal-new-zealand-navy/new-directions>

logistical role in the provisioning of Scott Base.⁵¹⁹ From 1946, the Navy also began to play a role in fisheries protection work, with dedicated patrol craft being added to the RNZN fleet.⁵²⁰ As noted earlier in the chapter, Navy personnel were also deployed during the 1951 waterfront strike. During the state of emergency, they replaced striking watersiders in the main ports and also crewed coastal ships and laboured in coal mines.⁵²¹ Maori were among the RNZN personnel who were involved in strike-related roles.⁵²²

As shown above in Graph 1, the Navy has been the smallest of the three armed services. From 1960 to 2000, the Navy's strength was between about 40 to 60 percent of that of the Army's – the largest of the three forces. RNZN numbers remained relatively stable from 1950 to 1990, lying between about 2500 and 3000 regular personnel. As detailed earlier, organisational changes introduced towards the end of the twentieth century resulted in a significant decline in Navy personnel numbers, as was also the case with the Army and Air Force. Between 1991 and 2001, the strength of the RNZN decreased from 2605 to 1893 – a reduction of about 27 percent. After this time, numbers would recover somewhat, though there has been some fluctuation.

Ongoing influence of the Royal Navy

Though the RNZN became formally independent from the Royal Navy in 1941, Royal Navy (RN) and ex-RN personnel continued for many years to exercise a strong influence over the force. At the highest level, RN officers controlled the RNZN's governing body – the Naval Board of New Zealand.⁵²³ Reconstituted in 1950, the

⁵¹⁹ Fairfax, 'Royal New Zealand Navy', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p468. See also 'RNZN Ships that Visited Antarctic' and 'Operation Deep Freeze', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 1 September 2017.

URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/rnzn-ships-that-visited-antarctic/>

URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/operation-deep-freeze/>

⁵²⁰ Fairfax, 'Royal New Zealand Navy', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p468. For some details of the Navy's current involvement in this work, see 'Fishery and Border Patrols' and 'Sub-Antarctic Resupply and Fishery Patrols', Navy website, accessed 1 September 2017.

URL: <http://www.navy.mil.nz/oe/ops/nz/fishery-and-border-patrols.htm>

URL: <http://www.navy.mil.nz/oe/ops/saaso/sub-antarctic-resupply-and-fishery-patrols.htm>

⁵²¹ Fairfax, 'Royal New Zealand Navy', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p466. See also 'Royal New Zealand Navy and the 1951 Waterfront Strike', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 1 September 2017.

URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/royal-new-zealand-navy-and-the-1951-waterfront-strike/>

⁵²² Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p8.

⁵²³ In 1964, governance of the RNZN became the formal responsibility of the joint-services Defence Council, which was established under the Defence Act 1964. However, until its eventual abolition in 1971, the Naval Board continued to exercise a significant level of control over the RNZN. Fairfax, 'Royal New Zealand Navy', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p469. 'Royal New Zealand Navy: New Directions', New Zealand History website. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/royal-new-zealand-navy/new-directions>

Naval Board comprised a civil member and three military members, who were respectively responsible for operations, personnel, and *materiel*.⁵²⁴ Initially, the Board's three naval members were all RN officers. In 1957, Peter Phipps became the first New Zealand officer to be appointed to the Naval Board.⁵²⁵ Phipps was appointed Second Member – the member responsible for personnel and recruitment matters. It was not until 1966 that the three positions were all held by New Zealand-born officers.⁵²⁶

Among the officers who served in the RNZN, a significant number were either RN officers on loan or ex-RN officers, which ensured that 'an RN outlook prevailed'.⁵²⁷ The RNZN's senior-most position, Chief of Naval Staff, was held by a British officer until 1960, when Peter Phipps was appointed to the position.⁵²⁸ Nevertheless, until at least the late 1970s, a strong RN component continued among the RNZN's senior officers.⁵²⁹ Describing the situation that existed when he joined the Navy in 1978, Jack Rudolf – currently the NZDF's Maori cultural advisor – recalled:

In those days all our senior officers in the Navy were from the UK; they were English officers. The protocols and procedures were very staunch English Navy, Royal Navy.⁵³⁰

The significant involvement of RN and ex-RN personnel was, in part, linked to the ongoing recruitment difficulties that the RNZN faced in the post-war years. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, all three of New Zealand's armed services experienced these problems and, as a result, they were sometimes significantly understrength. Research for this report indicates that the RNZN's recruitment difficulties may have been especially pronounced during the 1950s. As detailed earlier, it was reported in April 1952 that the Navy required an additional 800 to 1000 men.⁵³¹ Four years later, in May 1956, the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral

⁵²⁴ Commander B.D. Pope, Public Relations Officer, Navy Department, 'Defence – Armed Services: Navy, Royal New Zealand – Reconstitution', from *An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand*, 1966, Te Ara website, accessed 1 September 2017. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/1966/defence-armed-services-navy-royal-new-zealand/page-3>

⁵²⁵ Ian McGibbon, 'Phipps, Peter', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 11 December 2017. URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5p26/hipps-peter>

⁵²⁶ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p43.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., p36.

⁵²⁸ 'Royal New Zealand Navy: Introduction', New Zealand History website, accessed 1 September 2017. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/royal-new-zealand-navy>

⁵²⁹ Fairfax, 'Royal New Zealand Navy', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p468.

⁵³⁰ Jack Rudolf, quoted in Aaron Smale, 'Neptune meets Tangaroa', in Royal New Zealand Navy, *Courage, Commitment, Comradeship*, p89.

⁵³¹ 'Armed Services Need 3000 Extra Men', *Evening Post*, 23 April 1952, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, New Zealand Forces – Regular Forces – Recruitment and Settlement, 1950-1954, ANZ Wellington.

J.E.H. McBeath, advised the Minister of Defence of a continuing ‘downward trend’ of inadequate recruitment and low re-engagement figures, which threatened the Navy’s ability to meet New Zealand’s overseas commitments.⁵³² Responding to the situation, Cabinet, in March 1957, approved funding for recruitment of 150 ex-RN ratings over the following year.⁵³³ As discussed earlier, such recruitment from the United Kingdom was not uncommon and continued until at least the late 1970s, though over time the number of recruits declined and the focus narrowed to securing personnel for specialist trade positions.

Joining the RNZN – entry criteria

This section briefly discusses the RNZN’s formal entry criteria – the key requirements that all who wished to join the Navy needed to satisfy before they would be considered for selection. In respect of entry criteria relating to nationality or ethnicity, no evidence has been located that suggests that Maori were at any time formally excluded from entering the RNZN during the period covered here. At the close of World War II, for example, the RNZN’s entry regulations specified that: ‘Candidates for entry must be the sons of British born subjects.’⁵³⁴ Though not specifically mentioned, Maori were eligible for entry under this criterion because at this time all people born in New Zealand were British subjects.⁵³⁵ From the late 1940s, the RNZN sometimes explicitly communicated that Maori were able to enter the force. For example, in a 1948 draft booklet that promoted the three women’s branches of the armed services, potential applicants were advised that: ‘You must be a British subject, of European or Maori descent’.⁵³⁶

With regard to the Navy’s educational requirements, evidence from the 1950s shows that the RNZN, like the Army, set relatively low standards – for entry into its lower ranks, at least. During the 1950s, the absence of significant educational barriers was among the factors that would see an increase in the number of Maori who served in the Navy. This growth in Maori involvement, described later in the chapter, was based almost exclusively on Maori entering the force to serve as naval ratings – the ranks subordinate to warrant officers and officers. Oral evidence indicates that, for those who entered the Navy at this level, the minimum educational requirement was

⁵³² Chief of Naval Staff to Minister of Defence, 29 May 1956, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 3, Recruiting, regular force, policy, 1951-1960, ANZ Wellington.

⁵³³ Minister of Defence, memorandum for Cabinet, 21 February 1957; Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 4 March 1957, AAFD 811 W2347 box 104 k CAB 225/19/1, New Zealand Forces – Recruitment? – General, 1950-1951 [actual 1954-1957], ANZ Wellington.

⁵³⁴ Memorandum for the New Zealand Naval Board, 17 December 1945 (received), AAYT 8490 N1 box 317 13/3/30, Personnel – Recruiting – Nationality of Recruits, 1923-1951, ANZ Wellington.

⁵³⁵ Under the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948, individuals born in New Zealand became New Zealand citizens, though they also retained their status as British subjects.

⁵³⁶ Combined pamphlet – women’s services (draft), ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761, 33/20/3 part 2, ANZ Wellington, p1.

two years of secondary education.⁵³⁷ However, it seems that individuals who did not meet this standard were also sometimes able to join the force.⁵³⁸

While the Navy's entry requirements were the same for Maori and Pakeha, they did not guarantee that Maori would be treated equally during the recruitment process. Statistical evidence presented later shows a very low rate of Maori involvement during the immediate post-war years. This was possibly the result of discriminatory recruitment practices, though no evidence has been located regarding the rate at which Maori applicants successfully entered the force and how this compared with that of non-Maori. It will be explained that between 1950 and 1952 Maori involvement in the Navy began to increase, and that from early 1953 the Navy looked to encourage recruitment of Maori. While this suggests the Navy had by this stage abandoned any exclusionary policies, evidence that suggests the RNZN nevertheless continued to deliberately restrict the rate of Maori participation – albeit at a higher level – will later be considered. Evidence concerning other recruitment barriers that may have affected Maori more than Pakeha will also be discussed.

Efforts to encourage Maori recruitment, 1953-1975

In its efforts to encourage Maori enlistment, the Navy, like the Army, received assistance from the Maori Affairs Department. As noted earlier, when discussing the role that the Department played in respect of Army recruitment, Maori Affairs' efforts to promote the armed services to Maori were consistent with the Department's wider efforts to assist Maori into employment and training. The RNZN began to receive support from Maori Affairs some years before the Army, which – as detailed above – started to work more closely with the Department in about 1960.

Navy and Maori Affairs Department representatives first met to discuss Maori recruitment on 24 March 1953. It is not clear which party initiated the meeting, which was held at the offices of the Maori Affairs Department in Wellington. Two Navy personnel were present – Captain Slaughter and Commander Turner.⁵³⁹ (Slaughter, an RN officer, was Second Member of the Naval Board.⁵⁴⁰) The Maori Affairs' officials in attendance were Rangī Royal, Charles Bennett, and Michael Jones, whose positions at this time appear to have been, respectively, Controller of

⁵³⁷ During the oral hearings, Tere Tahī, who joined the RNZN in 1956, recalled that a minimum of two years of secondary education was required to enter the Navy. Tere Tahī, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p327.

⁵³⁸ Haami Hilton appears to have been able to enlist in 1958 without completing two years at high school, indicating that the requirement was not always rigidly followed. Haami Hilton, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp396-397.

⁵³⁹ Bennett, file note, 25 March 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴⁰ See Slaughter to Ropiha, 12 September 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, Recruiting for NZ Navy – Maori race, 1953-1960, ANZ Wellington.

the Maori Welfare Division, Assistant-Controller, and employment officer.⁵⁴¹ In a file note, Bennett recorded that the purpose of the meeting was ‘to discuss [the] ways and means in which we could help Navy in recruiting suitable Maoris.’ He detailed that the following two decisions had been reached:

(1) Whenever a Maori applicant came before the Navy recruitment officer, the local Welfare Officer would ‘sit in association with him’. Further, the Welfare Officer would provide advice to the recruitment officer on the background and suitability of the candidate.

(2) Maori Affairs would communicate with secondary schools in order to identify suitable Maori candidates for officer rank, with School Certificate being the minimum educational qualification required.⁵⁴²

After the meeting, the Navy began to send itineraries of upcoming recruitment tours to the Department.⁵⁴³ And, in accordance with the decisions reached at the meeting, welfare officers began attending interviews with Maori applicants. They also provided character information, which they set down in writing. The Navy eventually prepared a written form for Maori candidates, which welfare officers were expected to complete.⁵⁴⁴

In 1955, Maori Affairs sought to introduce a change that would enable welfare officers to provide greater support to Maori applicants. In February 1955, the District Officer in Rotorua wrote to the Secretary for Maori Affairs, explaining that local welfare officers believed it would be advantageous if, prior to Navy recruitment interviews, they could receive details of the names of Maori who were to appear. Where they had not had previous contact with the applicants, the welfare officers believed that the applicants were ‘at a decided disadvantage’. The District Officer explained that:

It is the experience of the Welfare Officers that most applicants are very shy and reserved and a general pep talk well in advance of the sitting, has advantages to the recruits. If the lists were submitted by the Navy Board to Welfare Officers,

⁵⁴¹ Ballara, ‘Bennett, Charles Moihi Te Arawaka’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website. Royal and Jamison, ‘Royal, Te Rangiataahua Kiniwe’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website. Reimana Rotohiko Jones, ‘Jones, Michael Rotohiko’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 20 September 2017. URL: <https://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4j10/jones-michael-rotohiko>

⁵⁴² Bennett, file note, 25 March 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴³ See, for example, Navy Secretary to Bennett, 4 November 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴⁴ See ‘Maori Welfare Officer Report’, RNZN292, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

the recruits could be contacted and schooled along in preparation for the Board.⁵⁴⁵

Believing the suggestion to have merit, the Secretary for Maori Affairs wrote to the Navy Secretary, D.A. Wraight, asking whether it would be possible for the Navy to send in lists of Maori applicants.⁵⁴⁶ Writing in response, Wraight noted that Charles Bennett and the Navy's Director of Recruiting, J.P.S. Vallant, had discussed the issue at length. He advised that it would not be possible to provide comprehensive lists of applicants ahead of interviews because many candidates, Maori and Pakeha, appeared unexpectedly before the Recruiting Board. However, in cases where it was definitely known that a Maori applicant was to appear, the Navy would advise Maori Affairs and, at the same time, request information on the suitability of the individual concerned.⁵⁴⁷ The Secretary of Maori Affairs acknowledged the Navy Secretary's response and described the proposed system to be satisfactory.⁵⁴⁸

The practice whereby welfare officers attended Navy recruitment interviews continued into the 1960s. In January 1959, the Wellington District Officer questioned the practice. Writing to Maori Affairs' head office, he explained that from time to time the Wellington office was instructed to arrange for welfare officers to attend Navy recruitment interviews when there were Maori applicants. Given the difficulty the office faced in meeting 'normal welfare duties', the District Officer suggested the commitment might easily be dispensed with, believing the Naval Recruiting Board 'well able to deal with the present day Maori boy in this matter.'⁵⁴⁹ In response, the Secretary advised that 'in the interests of the Maori boys, attendance at these meetings is important and warranted and should be continued.' Further, he noted that other districts had not raised the question.⁵⁵⁰

It is not clear when the attendance of Maori Affairs welfare officers at Navy recruitment interviews finally ended. However, the Navy continued to send

⁵⁴⁵ District Officer, Rotorua, to Secretary, Maori Affairs, 22 February 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴⁶ Secretary for Maori Affairs to Navy Secretary, 11 March 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴⁷ Navy Secretary to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 4 May 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴⁸ Secretary for Maori Affairs to Navy Secretary, 11 May 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁴⁹ Katene for District Officer to Head Office, Wellington, 30 January 1959, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵⁰ Unknown writer for Secretary for Maori Affairs to District Officer, Wellington, 30 January 1959, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

recruitment information and tour itineraries to the Department until at least the mid-1970s.⁵⁵¹

In some cases, the role of welfare officers in Navy recruitment extended beyond attending interviews with Maori applicants. Welfare officers sometimes actively promoted the Navy and encouraged young Maori to enter the force. They sought information on behalf of Maori and assisted those who were interested to complete and submit their applications.⁵⁵² Evidence presented during the oral hearings includes details of Maori who joined the Navy because of the influence of welfare officers to whom they had whakapapa connections. Ahitana Piorangi ‘Dick’ Hawea, at the age of 17, enlisted in May 1957 in Hastings or Napier. Describing the circumstances of his enlistment, Hawea explained:

After three years at high school, I left to go and work at the Tomoana Freezing Works. This was only intended as a short term thing, until I was old enough to join the Navy. I had been planning to join the Navy since talking to my uncle who was a Māori Welfare Officer in Rotorua and he was visiting us in Pōrangahau on holiday. I think my mum must have asked him to have a talk with me because he was the one who advised me strongly to join the Navy.⁵⁵³

Haami Hilton joined up the following year, in 1958, at the age of 16. He enlisted when the Naval Recruiting Board visited Hastings. Hilton had wanted to join the Navy while at high school, but his interest lessened after he left school and started working. However, after relatives became aware he had been ‘playing up’, the local welfare officer – his uncle, ‘Boy’ Tomoana – pressured him to enlist, though only after he had spoken to Hilton’s grandmother. Hilton noted that, around the same time, one of his relatives was also prompted to enlist at his uncle’s insistence.⁵⁵⁴

File evidence shows that in one district, at least, Maori Affairs continued into the 1960s to actively encourage Maori youths to consider joining the Navy. Writing to the welfare officer in Taumarunui in August 1966, the Wanganui District Officer drew attention to a lack of interest or response from school leavers and Maori youth to a career in the Navy. He attributed this to ‘a casual approach to Naval recruitment’ and to the greater emphasis placed on the Department’s trade training schemes and other employment opportunities. The District Officer asked that the option of joining the

⁵⁵¹ See, for example, Lieutenant Commander for Director of Recruiting to unspecified recipient, 16 September 1975 (received), ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/2 part 1, Maori welfare – armed services – Navy policy, 1972-1977, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵² District Officer, Rotorua, to Secretary, Maori Affairs, 22 February 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington. Also see, for example, Tomoana, Welfare Officer, Hastings, to Navy Secretary, 3 October 1956, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, Personnel – Recruiting – Entry of Maoris, 1938-1956, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵³ Ahitana Piorangi ‘Dick’ Hawea, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p342.

⁵⁵⁴ Haami Hilton, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p398.

Navy be specifically mentioned to boys who were leaving school. He noted that there were opportunities to progress to commissioned rank for those with academic ability and attainment. Others could enlist as seaman cadets and would be able to undertake training and qualifications as naval ratings.⁵⁵⁵

Writing in response, the welfare officer in Taumarunui advised the District Officer that two local boys had recently been interviewed by the Naval Recruitment Board. Further, he offered reassurance that the Taumarunui office continued to encourage careers in the Navy and other two armed services:

The boys in our area whom we feel have a chance for selection in any of the Services, be it Army, Navy or Air Force are encouraged to apply. All the pupils in our area are told of careers available whether it be Maori Affairs Trade Training Schemes or otherwise, not only by ourselves but by vocational guidance people and the services recruiting people.⁵⁵⁶

As noted above, the Navy until at least the mid-1970s continued to provide Maori Affairs with details of upcoming recruitment tours, which were typically held twice yearly. During the tours, the Naval Recruitment Board tested and interviewed individuals who wished to join the RNZN. The tours also enabled the Board to promote the Navy and provide information on careers within the service. Generally, the recruitment tours involved visits to the main centres as well as provincial cities and towns.⁵⁵⁷ Occasionally, however, the tours also took in some much smaller, rural settlements, including some where a significant proportion of the population was Maori and where there was a strong tradition of Maori military service. It seems likely that these communities were visited with the deliberate purpose of encouraging young Maori to enlist. In 1958, for example, the Board's winter tour included visits to schools at the following settlements: Tolaga Bay, Tokomaru Bay, Ruatoria, Tikitiki, Te Araroa, and Te Kaha.⁵⁵⁸

The Navy also reached potential recruits through other means, which sought to more directly convey the experience of life in the service. In an interview conducted in 2003 for the RNZN National Museum, J.K.R. Mihaere stated that his decision to join the Navy was cemented when a fisheries patrol craft took him and some fellow Opotiki College pupils on a sea journey to Whakatane. This happened in about 1955,

⁵⁵⁵ Puohotaua for District Officer to Taumarunui, 8 August 1966, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 203 31/15/1 part 1, Armed services – policy and general, 1960-1976, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵⁶ Resident Officer, Taumarunui, to Wanganui, 15 August 1966, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 203 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵⁷ See, for example, 'Itinerary for Spring Recruiting Tour, 1955 – North Island', attached to Navy Secretary to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 17 August 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁵⁸ 'North Island Itinerary for Winter Recruiting Tour 1958', attached to Navy Secretary to Secretary, Maori Affairs, 16 May 1958, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

when he was 14 years old. Mihaere, who entered the Navy in January 1957 at the age of 16, recalled that:

The day the boats came in, two of them, the sailors were dressed up in their navy blue uniforms and they looked pretty flash looking guys. I had an uncle who was in the Navy at the time and I had only seen him in his uniform, I had never seen any Petty Officers or Chiefs or Lieutenants in uniform and that impressed me a bit, the uniform, on how different it was from the Army uniform. It looked quite smart. Then we finally took our trip on the ML [motor launch] to Whakatane. We got out to the bar and a lot of my schoolmates they hadn't been to the bar before, but I was used to it and as we were going over the bar you could see the waves were getting bigger... So once we got past the bar it was smooth sailing. Halfway there a lot of my schoolmates were sick and when we got to Whakatane that sold me on the Navy.⁵⁵⁹

It is not clear whether any Maori within the RNZN were involved in recruitment work during this period. But it appears that – in the late 1960s, at least – the Navy was open to this. In another interview conducted for the RNZN National Museum, Tuta Denny explained that at the end of his 20-year term of engagement with the RNZN, he was asked if he would re-engage to work as a recruiter for a further five years. This appears to have been in 1967. Due to family considerations, Denny turned this offer down.⁵⁶⁰

Barriers that limited Maori involvement?

It has been explained that by the early 1950s the Navy began to actively encourage Maori recruitment. This section examines whether Maori, from this time, nevertheless faced barriers when seeking to join the RNZN. It looks first at a small amount of evidence concerning the Navy's recruitment process and then discusses whether there may have been a policy to limit Maori involvement in the RNZN, albeit at a level much higher than that evident before the number of Maori in the force began to grow in the early 1950s. Research for this report has failed to locate clear evidence regarding the success rate of Maori applicants and how it compared to that of non-Maori. Because of this, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about the extent to which Maori applicants were disadvantaged.

⁵⁵⁹ Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p6.

⁵⁶⁰ Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p17. Denny appears to have left the Navy in 1967, around the time he was awarded the British Empire Medal. See *Supplement to the London Gazette*, 10 June 1967, p6313. URL: <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/44328/supplement/6313/data.pdf>

The discussion of the Navy's recruitment process presented here draws on evidence that relates to the 1950s. It is based particularly on oral sources of information, including claimant evidence presented during the oral hearings. It captures the experiences of Maori who joined the RNZN to serve – initially, at least – as naval ratings. This evidence shows that individuals who wished to enter the Navy faced a staged selection process. In the first step, applicants were required to sit a written test. This obviously required a level of literacy – specifically, literacy in English. However, it was not an 'English test'. J.K.R. Mihaere, who joined the Navy in 1957, recalled that:

The test wasn't that hard because rather than an English test, although there was English in it, most of it was mathematics and I don't know why... general knowledge questions.⁵⁶¹

Applicants who passed the written test were then interviewed by the Naval Recruiting Board. Prior to the interview, a check of police records was made.⁵⁶² If the Board approved an individual's entry into the RNZN, this approval was evidently subject to subsequent physical and medical testing.⁵⁶³

Facing a panel comprised of older Pakeha men, the interview stage may have been challenging for Maori applicants, even those who received support from Maori Affairs' officials. As discussed in the previous section, the District Officer in Rotorua reported in 1955 that most Maori applicants were 'very shy' when they appeared before the Recruiting Board. He proposed the introduction of a system that would enable welfare officers to help Maori applicants better prepare for their interview, but the Navy in response advised that it was unable to meet this request.

Without clearly defined pass or fail markers, the interview stage of the recruitment process ensured that the Navy's recruiting officers were able to exercise considerable discretion as to who would be accepted in the RNZN. During an oral interview, Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, who was Director of Naval Recruiting for a period during the mid-1950s, recalled a recruitment decision that illustrates this:

I was in Rotorua once and there was a young Maori boy came up for selection, I couldn't make up my mind whether to take him or not. As I told you we always checked the Police records which was normal. He said 'oh well I have been in trouble stealing Lemonade bottles' and so I didn't know what to do with him,

⁵⁶¹ See Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p7.

⁵⁶² Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p27.

⁵⁶³ See Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p10.

take him or not. But however he came in to me about 4 o'clock and the Regulating Masters of Arms came in and said 'the Maori boy wanted to see me'. I said 'what's the problem lad'. He said, 'Oh Sir I would like to know whether you have taken me in the Navy because he said I have got to go home and milk the cows'. I said 'well how do you get home'. He said 'Oh I have got my horse tethered up outside'. So I said 'Right we take him' and he finished up as a Stoker Petty Officer.⁵⁶⁴

In this case, Vallant perhaps valued the candidate's forthcoming manner and self reliance – qualities that outweighed the record of minor criminal offences. As well as serving as Director of Naval Recruiting, Vallant, a New Zealander, was in 1966 appointed Second Member of the Naval Board.⁵⁶⁵

Oral sources indicate that Maori candidates sometimes failed the written test, and it is very likely that some also failed the interview stage.⁵⁶⁶ Non-Maori applicants, however, were also sometimes unsuccessful in gaining entry into the Navy. When responding to a question regarding Maori personnel who served with him on the *Bellona*, a vessel in the RNZN fleet between 1946 to 1957, Vallant emphasised that: 'the Maoris you had were selected by the recruiters so you didn't take what you didn't want, but the same applies to the European, you didn't take what you didn't want.'⁵⁶⁷ Here, Vallant was suggesting that acceptance into the Navy was based wholly on merit and suitability, not racial considerations.

Archival research undertaken for this report has located one piece of evidence that suggests that the RNZN, in the early 1960s, sometimes deliberately rejected Maori applicants because of their ethnicity. The evidence that indicates this is a statement that appears in a 1961 Department of Maori Affairs report on racial discrimination in New Zealand. This report, which drew together observations from departmental officers as well as officials from other government departments, was prepared in connection with the 1957 Convention on International Indigenous and Tribal Populations, which New Zealand had at this time yet to ratify.⁵⁶⁸ In a section dealing

⁵⁶⁴ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p27.

⁵⁶⁵ See Navy Secretary to Employment Officer, Maori Affairs, 4 November 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington. Commodore Joffre Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p19.

⁵⁶⁶ See, for example, Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p7.

⁵⁶⁷ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p27.

⁵⁶⁸ As discussed in the previous chapter, External Affairs expressed concern that the Convention might pose difficulties for New Zealand because discrimination against Maori existed and the government was not actively attempting to improve the situation. The 1961 Maori Affairs report provided evidence of continuing, widespread discrimination.

with discrimination in employment, the report included the following statement submitted by a welfare officer in Auckland:

The Naval Recruitment Board gave the information that the policy of the Navy is to restrict Maori enlistments to the same quota as the population ratio, 1 to 15, although more applicants are received than European on population basis.⁵⁶⁹

The 1-to-15 ratio noted in the report equates to a proportional figure of 6.7 percent. This closely matches the 1961 census results. The size of the Maori population recorded in the 1961 census was 6.9 percent of that of the total population, based upon a definition of a Maori as being a person of half or more Maori descent.⁵⁷⁰

The Auckland welfare officer's submission to Maori Affairs' head office, which might include further details about the recruitment policy, has not been located. No other evidence that clearly articulates an RNZN policy to limit Maori recruitment at this time has been found. Navy Department files concerning recruitment of Maori are available up to 1956, but beyond this date there are no files that deal specifically with Maori recruitment.⁵⁷¹ The evidence that exists for the period up to 1956 includes no details of a policy to limit the number of Maori who were entering the Navy. It is also notable that Vallant, in his oral interview, makes no mention of such a policy when he discusses Maori recruitment, though this may have been an issue he was reluctant to talk about.

As noted earlier, no evidence has been located regarding the success rate of Maori applicants and how this compared to that of non-Maori. If such evidence was available, it would help to confirm whether a deliberate policy to limit Maori enlistments did exist. As detailed in the next section, some statistical evidence has been located regarding the overall rate of Maori involvement in the RNZN. However, this evidence is inconclusive as to whether Maori enlistments were restricted in accordance with the policy described in the 1961 Maori Affairs' report. This is partly because of uncertainty about when the policy might have been introduced. Evidence from 1962 indicates that, at this time, the proportion of Maori personnel within the Navy exceeded the proportion of Maori in the general population. This does not mean that the policy to limit Maori enlistments did not exist because it is possible that it was introduced shortly before the 1961 Maori Affairs' report was prepared. If

⁵⁶⁹ Department of Maori Affairs, confidential report, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and the Indigenous Populations Convention', Appendix B, May 1961, AAAR 500 W3605 box 39 5/17/23, Discrimination against Maoris – research, 1958-1965, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁷⁰ See 'Population', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1962.

⁵⁷¹ The final file that deals with Maori recruitment into the Navy covers the period between 1938 and 1956. See AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

this was the case, it would be some years before implementation of the policy would be evident in the overall rate of Maori involvement in the Navy.

In 1962, details of the number of Maori naval personnel were produced after the Minister of Defence was questioned on the matter during a visit to Gisborne.⁵⁷² Writing to the Minister's private secretary in July 1962, the Navy Secretary, D.A. Wraight, advised that it was not possible to calculate the precise number of Maori personnel because the Navy's records did not differentiate between Maori and Pakeha. However, based upon those with Maori names, he stated there were 'certainly not less than 185 Maori ratings', which amounted to 7.3 percent of the force. But given there were also a number of Maori with European names, the Navy Secretary believed that a figure of 10 percent would be more reliable.⁵⁷³ As noted above, the 1961 census recorded the Maori population as being 6.9 percent of the total population, based upon a definition of half or more Maori descent.

If the Navy did have a policy to limit Maori enlistments as set down in the 1961 Maori Affairs report, it may have been short-lived. It is notable that in 1965 the Department of Maori Affairs prepared a further report on racial discrimination that made no mention of the Navy enlistment policy recorded five years earlier.⁵⁷⁴ However, while the 1965 report was again based on information sought from departmental officers as well as a number of other government departments, it was much briefer than the 1961 report and evidently did not involve the same level of investigation.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, any policy to limit Maori involvement in the RNZN so that it matched the proportion of Maori in the total population had clearly ended. In 2003, 19.4 percent of Navy personnel identified themselves to be Maori.⁵⁷⁵ Two years earlier, in the 2001 census, 14.7 percent of the population identified as being Maori.⁵⁷⁶ Based on this figure, the proportion of Maori in the Navy in 2003 was about 32 percent higher than the proportion of Maori in the general population. As detailed later, the NZDF began to routinely collect ethnicity data from 2003. Between the early 1960s and 2003, whole-force statistics that shed light on Maori participation in the RNZN are not available.

⁵⁷² It is unclear who sought this information. The Minister's private secretary noted only that the individual was a friend of the Minister's. Private Secretary to Navy Secretary, 20 June 1962, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁷³ Navy Secretary to Private Secretary, 11 July 1962, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁷⁴ Deputy Secretary to Minister of Maori Affairs, 18 March 1965, AAAR 500 W3605 box 39 5/17/23, ANZ Wellington. When the report was written, two of the departments that had been requested to provide information – Education and Justice – had yet to submit any details.

⁵⁷⁵ Table 2, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

⁵⁷⁶ See Table 1b, 'Ethnic Groups' report, 2001 Census of Population and Dwellings, Statistics New Zealand website, accessed 5 December 2017.

URL: <http://archive.stats.govt.nz/Census/2001-census-data/2001-census-ethnic-groups.aspx>

Evidence concerning level of Maori involvement in the RNZN, 1946-1980

This section presents evidence relating to the level of Maori involvement in the post-war Navy and how this changed. Three types of evidence are discussed here. The first is data that the RNZN provided the Statistics Department between 1947 and 1959 in connection with the Department's intercensal population estimates. This data, which differentiates between Maori and non-Maori, provides whole-force information on personnel serving at Navy bases and upon RNZN vessels. The second type of evidence is another form of data that the Navy furnished to the Statistics Department. This relates to RNZN personnel who were serving outside of New Zealand at the time that population censuses were undertaken. Relevant data has been located for the 1951, 1956, 1970, and 1976 census years. The final category of evidence discussed here is miscellaneous observations and statistical information from a variety of sources, which cover the period from about 1950 to 1965.

Most of the evidence presented here relates to the years between the late 1940s and the early 1960s. Overall, in spite of various inconsistencies and shortcomings in the quality of the evidence, it shows one clear trend: an increase, from the early 1950s, in the proportion of Maori among RNZN personnel. After about 1960, relatively little evidence is available concerning the level of Maori involvement in the Navy, and it is therefore difficult to identify any subsequent developments and patterns relating to the level of Maori participation. As noted earlier, whole-force data that provides details of the number of Maori within the RNZN again becomes available in the early 2000s.

During the period examined here, the Navy, like the Army, did not collect ethnicity data for its own purposes. Almost all efforts in this direction were undertaken to provide information to the Department of Statistics. It also appears that, for much of the period, the Navy did not formally record the ethnic status of Maori personnel. It will be explained that, in the late 1940s, in connection with the Statistics Department's requests, the Navy Office looked to identify and establish a record of Maori personnel. However, these efforts were unsuccessful and not long lasting. In July 1962, as detailed above, the Navy Secretary advised the Minister of Defence's private secretary that 'no differentiation is made between Maori and Pakeha in our records'.⁵⁷⁷

It is notable that the language that the Navy Secretary employed here was similar to that being used in the Army around this time. It shows too that the Navy had begun to embrace the ideology of integration. At an organisational level, integration

⁵⁷⁷ The Minister requested this information after being questioned on the matter during a visit to Gisborne. Private Secretary to Navy Secretary, 20 June 1962; Navy Secretary to Private Secretary, 11 July 1962, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

required Maori to serve alongside Pakeha and, more generally, it emphasised that no distinction should be made between Maori and Pakeha. While the RNZN began to encourage Maori enlistment in the early 1950s, it is evident that it later became reluctant to acknowledge and enumerate ethnic differences within the service. As noted earlier in the chapter, the Navy appears to have adopted a similar stance to the Army and Air Force when it responded to psychology student Don Murray's 1967 request for information about Maori in the armed services. While the Navy's response has not been located, one source suggests it adopted the same position as the other two services, which emphasised that no differentiation was made between personnel on the basis of ethnicity.⁵⁷⁸

Returns furnished for intercensal population estimates

Between 1947 and 1959, in years when a population census was not carried out, the Government Statistician asked the Navy Office to provide figures on the number of Maori and non-Maori personnel serving in the RNZN.⁵⁷⁹ These statistics were required for the annual population estimates that were produced during non-census years. When requesting the information, the Government Statistician noted that, for data collection purposes, a Maori was a person of half or greater Maori descent.⁵⁸⁰ As detailed earlier, the Army was also asked to provide figures for the intercensal estimates. It is likely that information was sought from the Air Force too, though evidence concerning this or any data that the Air Force collected has not been located.

In response to the Government Statistician's requests, the Navy Office provided statistics that showed the number of personnel serving at RNZN shore stations and on ships at sea. Table 9 sets out figures that the Navy Office supplied between 1947 and 1959. In order to collect this data, the Navy Secretary asked individual stations and ships to send in figures to the Navy Office.⁵⁸¹ In 1948, after data had been submitted to the Government Statistician for the second time, the Naval Board sought to establish a record of Maori personnel. In July 1948, the Navy Secretary, at the Board's direction, wrote to Devonport Naval Base and asked that, where an individual entering or re-entering the service was Maori, their race should be noted

⁵⁷⁸ In July 1967, when the Air Force was preparing its position on the matter, one RNZAF staff member noted: 'I am informed... that army/navy have indicated their reply will be along the same lines as this one.' A/AMP to Deputy Secretary Defence, 25 July 1967, minute on Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) to Secretary of Defence, 25 July 1967, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁷⁹ The first such request was made in March 1947. See Government Statistician to Naval Secretary, 24 March 1947, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, Returns – Census, 1921-1951, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸⁰ NZNB to *Bellona*, 31 March 1947, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸¹ See, for example, DNAP to NZ General, 25 March 1949, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

on their entry form.⁵⁸² The following month, again at the request of the Naval Board, the Navy Secretary requested all stations and ships to identify Maori personnel. At the same time, he also asked that the qualifications, religion, and conjugal status of all personnel be recorded.⁵⁸³

In spite of these efforts, it appears that the Navy Office failed to establish an accurate record of Maori personnel. In June 1952, Navy Secretary Wraight, writing again to Devonport, pointed out that recent entry forms had failed to record the racial status of Maori who were entering the service.⁵⁸⁴ Seeking to remedy this, the Devonport office prepared a list, based on recruitment records, of all Maori who had entered the Navy since September 1951. It included details of 40 Maori personnel.⁵⁸⁵ It seems, however, that there were subsequent lapses and omissions. In February 1956, a Navy Office staff member noted in an internal communication that records of the number of Maori and non-Maori held in the office were 'not very reliable'.⁵⁸⁶ For this reason, it seems, the Navy Secretary continued to seek Maori and non-Maori population data from individual ships and stations.

It is unclear how each station and ship went about collecting the data they supplied and whether, in each case, the same system was used and a similar level of care taken to identify Maori personnel. The extent to which each station and ship adhered to the Statistics Department's definition of Maori is uncertain. It should also be noted that the figures supplied – those that relate to shore stations, at least – might include some civilian staff alongside regular RNZN personnel. Further, the figures provided for 1957, 1958, and 1959 might include some family members who resided at the Navy's shore bases. Between 1948 and 1955, the Government Statistician sought details only of the number of 'naval personnel'. From 1957, figures were requested for 'naval personnel and families'.⁵⁸⁷

The Navy Office continued to submit intercensal data after 1959, but these figures did not distinguish between Maori and non-Maori. In March 1959, the Government Statistician advised that separate figures for each group should be provided only if

⁵⁸² Naval Secretary to Commanding Officer, HMNZS *Philomel*, 6 July 1948, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸³ Naval Secretary to Commanding Officers, 25 August 1948, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸⁴ Navy Secretary to Commanding Officer, HMNZS *Philomel*, 26 June 1952, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸⁵ Naval Officer in Charge, Auckland, to Navy Secretary, 24 July 1952, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸⁶ D.A.O.P., notes on Navy minute sheet, 23 February 1956, AAYT 8490 N1 box 568 18/36/18 part 2, Returns – Census, 1951-1958, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁸⁷ Government Statistician to Naval Secretary, 15 March 1957, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

‘practicable’.⁵⁸⁸ The following year, the Navy chose not to differentiate between Maori and non-Maori – a decision that indicates that the RNZN’s leadership may not have been confident of the accuracy of the figures it had been providing. The lack of record keeping on the ethnicity of personnel and the decision not to furnish further figures on the number of Maori personnel were both consistent with the policy of integration that the Navy was evidently embracing around this time.

⁵⁸⁸ Government Statistician to Naval Secretary, 2 March 1959, ABFK 7395 W4010 box 161 72/2/10, Periodic Reports Inspections – Census and Statistics, 1958-1971, ANZ Wellington.

Table 9: RNZN intercensal personnel returns, 1947-1959⁵⁸⁹

RNZN Base or Ship	1947		1948		1949		1950	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
HMNZS <i>Philomel</i> Main shore base, Devonport	543	15	375	10	475	8	625	11
HMNZS <i>Tamaki</i> Training base, Motuihe Island	262	9	243	12	291	8	257	9
HMNZS <i>Irirangi</i> Communications base, Waiouru	66	1	67	0	78	2	78	-
HMNZS <i>Tasman</i> Lyttelton shore base	39	-	10	0	16	-	19	-
RNZN Volunteer Reserve Divisions Auck, Wgtn, Cant, Otago.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Navy Office, Wellington	31	1	32	0	34	-	35	-
HMNZS <i>Arabis</i> (ship)	-	-	77	4	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Arbutus</i> (ship)	-	-	80	3	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Bellona</i> (ship)	521	5	577	16	561	15	554	12
HMNZS <i>Black Prince</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Endeavour</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Hawea</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	124	2	123	7
HMNZS <i>Kanieri</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	106	3	1	-
HMNZS <i>Kiwi</i> (ship)	-	-	60	3	57	3	-	-
HMNZS <i>Lachlan</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	140	3
HMNZS <i>Mako</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Paea</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Pukaki</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	115	2	122	4
HMNZS <i>Rotoiti</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	127	2
HMNZS <i>Royalist</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Stawell</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Taupo</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	125	6	128	8
HMNZS <i>Tui</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Tutira</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	125	4
Motor Launch 1183 (ship)	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	-
Motor Launch 3551 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Launch 3552 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
In Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
In United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Base/ship uncertain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Maori and Maori – totals	1462	31	1521	48	1990	49	2342	60
Combined total	1493		1569		2039		2402	
Maori percentage of combined total	2.1		3.1		2.4		2.5	
Maori percentage on ships and at Motuihe Island training base	1.8		3.7		2.8		3.1	

⁵⁸⁹ Naval Secretary to Government Statistician, 18 April 1947; 18 April 1948; 7 April 1949; AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, ANZ Wellington. Navy Secretary to Government Statistician, 3 June 1952; 16 April 1953; 6 April 1954; 18 May 1955; 29 April 1957; AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 2, ANZ Wellington. Navy Secretary to Government Statistician, 21 April 1958; 21 May 1959; ABFK 7395 W4010 box 161 72/2/10, ANZ Wellington. In 1947, figures concerning the *Bellona* were collected but not sent to the Government Statistician. See *Bellona* to NZNB, 31 March 1947, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

RNZN Base or Ship	1952		1953		1954		1955	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
HMNZS <i>Philomel</i> Main shore base, Devonport	857	27	787	26	621	29	648	31
HMNZS <i>Tamaki</i> Training base, Motuihe Island	287	22	244	7	327	28	243	12
HMNZS <i>Irirangi</i> Communications base, Waiouru	96	1	90	3	103	4	118	9
HMNZS <i>Tasman</i> Lyttelton shore base	7	-	6	-	5	-	7	1
RNZN Volunteer Reserve Divisions Auck, Wgtn, Cant, Otago.	-	-	27	-	29	-	35	-
Navy Office, Wellington	51	-	43	-	66	-	63	-
HMNZS <i>Arabis</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Arbutus</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Bellona</i> (ship)	432	22	156	13	267	23	255	15
HMNZS <i>Black Prince</i> (ship)	-	-	480	31	517	37	373	54
HMNZS <i>Endeavour</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Hawea</i> (ship)	48	1	155	7	146	13	31	5
HMNZS <i>Kanieri</i> (ship)	-	-	148	11	146	10	128	10
HMNZS <i>Kiwi</i> (ship)	77	2	39	1	40	2	39	2
HMNZS <i>Lachlan</i> (ship)	112	5	123	4	124	4	116	10
HMNZS <i>Mako</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Paea</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Pukaki</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	136	14	135	15
HMNZS <i>Rotoiti</i> (ship)	156	9	137	9	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Royalist</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Stawell</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Taupo</i> (ship)	142	14	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Tui</i> (ship)	36	-	37	2	38	3	35	6
HMNZS <i>Tutira</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Launch 1183 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Launch 3551 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1
Motor Launch 3552 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	1
In Australia	66	3	124	7	74	5	83	4
In United Kingdom	58	-	106	-	91	-	103	-
Base/ship uncertain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Maori and Maori – totals	2425	106	2702	121	2730	172	2426	176
Combined total	2531		2823		2902		2602	
Maori percentage of combined total	4.2		4.3		5.9		6.8	
Maori percentage on ships and at Motuihe Island training base	5.5		5.3		7.1		8.7	

RNZN Base or Ship	1957		1958		1959	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
HMNZS <i>Philomel</i> Main shore base, Devonport	832	37	725	39	726	56
HMNZS <i>Tamaki</i> Training base, Motuihe Island	272	32	231	31	282	18
HMNZS <i>Irirangi</i> Communications base, Waiouru	116	6	113	12	103	14
HMNZS <i>Tasman</i> Lyttelton shore base	-	-	-	-	-	-
RNZN Volunteer Reserve Divisions Auck, Wgtn, Cant, Otago.	39	-	38	-	26	-
Navy Office, Wellington	66	2	59	5	72	6
HMNZS <i>Arabis</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Arbutus</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Bellona</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Black Prince</i> (ship)	232	23	244	26	190	25
HMNZS <i>Endeavour</i> (ship)	28	3	32	4	38	1
HMNZS <i>Hawea</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Kaniere</i> (ship)	132	14	139	17	141	13
HMNZS <i>Kiwi</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Lachlan</i> (ship)	130	6	133	15	148	9
HMNZS <i>Mako</i> (ship)	9	-	8	1	7	1
HMNZS <i>Paea</i> (ship)	8	1	9	-	8	1
HMNZS <i>Pukaki</i> (ship)	126	10	144	17	150	12
HMNZS <i>Rotoiti</i> (ship)	122	10	155	9	151	12
HMNZS <i>Royalist</i> (ship)	404	50	488	38	533	49
HMNZS <i>Stawell</i> (ship)	62	1	65	4	61	5
HMNZS <i>Taupo</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Tui</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
HMNZS <i>Tutira</i> (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Launch 1183 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Launch 3551 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Launch 3552 (ship)	-	-	-	-	-	-
In Australia	47	-	52	1	24	-
In United Kingdom	121	1	134	1	126	2
Base/ship uncertain	-	-	3	-	-	-
Non-Maori and Maori – totals	2746	196	2772	220	2786	224
Combined total	2942		2992		3010	
Maori percentage of combined total	6.7		7.4		7.4	
Maori percentage on ships and at Motuihe Island training base	9.0		9.0		7.9	

Between 1949 and 1958, the figures that the Navy Office supplied for the intercensal population estimates included separate data on male and female personnel. In Table 9, this data has been combined, with no differentiation made being between male personnel and female personnel, who at this time comprised only a very small proportion of the force. Table 10 sets out the intercensal data that shows the small number of women – Maori and non-Maori – who served in the RNZN between 1949 and 1958.

Table 10: RNZN intercensal personnel returns – female personnel, 1948-1958⁵⁹⁰

RNZN Base or Ship	1949		1950		1952		1953	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
HMNZS <i>Philomel</i> Main shore base, Devonport	80	-	93	1	103	4	112	4
Navy Office, Wellington	2	-	3	-	10	-	12	-
Non-Maori and Maori – totals	82	-	96	1	113	4	124	4
Combined total	82		97		117		128	
Maori percentage of combined total	0.0		1.0		3.4		3.1	

RNZN Base or Ship	1954		1955		1957		1958	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
HMNZS <i>Philomel</i> Main shore base, Devonport	120	6	98	5	76	9	82	12
Navy Office, Wellington	12	-	13	-	13	1	5	3
Non-Maori and Maori - totals	132	6	111	5	89	10	87	15
Combined total	138		116		99		102	
Maori percentage of combined total	4.3		4.3		10.1		14.7	

Census returns

Alongside the intercensal figures, the Navy was also required to provide some data for the population censuses that were held every five years.⁵⁹¹ Research for this report has located some of these statistics – figures collected in the census years of 1951, 1956, 1971, and 1976. These statistics are less comprehensive than the figures

⁵⁹⁰ Naval Secretary to Government Statistician, 18 April 1948; 7 April 1949; AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 1, ANZ Wellington. Navy Secretary to Government Statistician, 3 June 1952; 16 April 1953; 6 April 1954; 18 May 1955; 29 April 1957; AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 2, ANZ Wellington. Navy Secretary to Government Statistician, 21 April 1958, ABFK 7395 W4010 box 161 72/2/10, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁹¹ See, for example, Government Statistician to Navy Secretary, 15 February 1956, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

that the Navy Office provided for the intercensal population estimates. While they differentiate between Maori and non-Maori, the census data relates only to personnel who were serving outside of New Zealand on the date of the census. At the request of Navy administrators, the data was supplied by the ships and personnel groups that were overseas at the time.⁵⁹² As with the intercensal figures, it is uncertain how the statistics were collected and, in particular, how Maori were identified.

Table 11 sets out the information that the RNZN provided in respect of personnel who were serving overseas at the time of 1951 and 1956 censuses.

Table 11: Census figures for RNZN personnel serving overseas, 1951 and 1956⁵⁹³

Overseas position	1951 (17 April)		1956 (17 April)	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
RNZN	404	11	757	74
Royal Navy	51	0	105	1
Other Forces (Australian training course)	47	0	48	1
Non-Maori and Maori - totals	502	11	910	76
Combined total	513		986	
Maori percentage of combined total	2.1		7.7	
Maori percentage of RNZN	2.7		8.9	
Maori percentage with Royal Navy and Other Forces	0.0		1.3	

In the cases of the 1971 and 1976 censuses, the data that the Navy produced concerned – for each year – only a single ship. It therefore sheds little light on the overall involvement of Maori in the Navy. In any given year, as the figures set out in Table 9 show, the proportion of Maori among the crews of individual ships varied considerably. The 1971 figures concern the *Otago*, which at this time was involved in a deployment to the Pacific and Asia.⁵⁹⁴ Of the 253 personnel who were recorded to be aboard the ship on 24 March 1971, 19 were noted to be Maori (7.5 percent of the crew).⁵⁹⁵ In 1976, the *Canterbury* provided data for the census, which was again held on 24 March. At this time, the ship was deployed to the United States.⁵⁹⁶ Excluding

⁵⁹² See, for example, NZNB to RNZNLO London, 12 April 1951, AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁹³ Navy Secretary to Government Statistician, 29 May 1951; 20 April 1956; AAYT 8490 N1 box 567 18/36/18 part 2, ANZ Wellington. The table does not include 1 civilian employee recorded in 1951 and 5 civilian employees recorded in 1956. The ethnicity of these individuals was not specified.

⁵⁹⁴ 'HMNZS Otago (Rothesay-class Frigate)', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 12 September 2017. URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/hmnzs-otago-rothesay-class-frigate/>

⁵⁹⁵ HMNZS *Otago* census return (23/24 March 1971), ABFK 7494 W4948 box 21 31/1/26 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁹⁶ 'HMNZS Canterbury (Leander-class Frigate)', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 12 September 2017. URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/hmnzs-canterbury-leander-class-frigate/>

four non-military dependants, 259 personnel were recorded to be on board, of whom 37 were Maori (14.3 percent of the crew).⁵⁹⁷

Other evidence concerning Maori involvement, 1946-1965

Alongside the data that the Navy gathered in connection with the intercensal population estimates and censuses, other evidence relating to the level of Maori involvement in the RNZN has been located for the post-war period. On the whole, this evidence is consistent with the intercensal population data and census data. It falls into two categories – contemporary evidence from the period and later recollections of naval personnel recorded in oral history interviews.

In respect of the first category, only two pieces of evidence are noted here. The first is a brief article that appeared in *Te Ao Hou* in 1953. It reported that 10 Maori were among the crew of the *Kaniere*, which in March 1953 had sailed to Korea.⁵⁹⁸ This figure is the same as that which the frigate supplied for the 1953 intercensal return.

The other item of contemporary evidence has already been discussed. In 1962, as detailed earlier, the Navy Secretary, Wraight, estimated the number of Maori serving in the Navy after Minister of Defence Dean Eyre had been questioned on the matter. The Navy Secretary advised that there were ‘certainly not less than 185 Maori ratings’, which amounted to 7.3 percent of the force. However, given a number of Maori used European names, he suggested that a figure of 10 percent would be more reliable.⁵⁹⁹

Oral history interviews provide another, more impressionistic source of information on the level of Maori involvement in the RNZN during the post-war period. The evidence presented here is drawn from three interviews with ex-Navy personnel. These form part of a much larger collection of interviews held at the National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy.

In the first interview, conducted in 1990, Chief Petty Officer C.W. Mason-Riseborough noted that, among the RNZN frigates that served off Korea, the *Taupo*, in particular, had a ‘large number’ of Maori, who were allowed to form their own

⁵⁹⁷ HMNZS *Canterbury* census return (23/24 March 1976), ABFK 7494 W4948 box 21 31/1/26 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁵⁹⁸ ‘News in Brief’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 4, Autumn 1953, p45. The following individuals were named: H.H. Harris, of Pungarehu, Taranaki; N. Apatu, Hastings; T. Haami, Gisborne; J.B. Karipa, Hastings; T. Pongia, Whangarei; Te Reweti, Raetihi; T.A. Ruru, Gisborne; L. Hauraki, Dannevirke; R. King, Christchurch; and R. Timu, Hastings.

⁵⁹⁹ Navy Secretary to Private Secretary, 11 July 1962, AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

mess.⁶⁰⁰ As detailed in Table 9, the Navy's intercensal figures record that on 1 April 1952 – during the middle of the frigate's year-long deployment to the theatre – there were 156 personnel aboard *Taupo*, of whom 14 (or 9.0 percent) were Maori.⁶⁰¹ Mason-Riseborough's recollection seems somewhat at odds with this figure. However, if it is compared with figures supplied for ships in previous years and for other ships in 1952, the number of Maori aboard the *Taupo* could be viewed as large. The proportion of Maori among the crew of the *Taupo* was the highest recorded up to this point.

In the second interview, Commodore Vallant spoke of the proportion of Maori aboard the *Bellona* and its replacement the *Royalist*, which entered the RNZN in 1956.⁶⁰² Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s, Vallant intermittently served upon both vessels, which were the RNZN's flagships during the period. For a time, Vallant was the commanding officer of the *Royalist*. (As detailed above, Vallant also served as Director of Naval Recruiting during the mid-1950s. And in 1966, after serving on the *Royalist*, he was appointed Second Member of the Naval Board.⁶⁰³) When asked about the number of Maori aboard the *Bellona* during his time on the ship, Vallant stated: 'we had... I guess about 10% much the same as we had on both Commissions I was in *Royalist*'.⁶⁰⁴ Except for the years 1953 and 1954 – when he was involved in Navy recruitment work – Vallant's estimate of the number of Maori on board the *Bellona* exceeds the Navy's intercensal figures. However, overall, Vallant's recollection confirms that Maori began to make up a significant proportion of the personnel serving on RNZN ships in the post-war years.

The final interview from which evidence has been drawn is a 1991 interview with Captain G.D. Pound. As an RN officer on loan, Pound served as commander of the *Royalist* from 1957 to 1958, during which time the ship was deployed to Asia.⁶⁰⁵ At two different points in his interview, Pound stated that 106 Maori served on the *Royalist*, though he noted that 'of those 106 I wouldn't be able to recognize probably

⁶⁰⁰ Chief Petty Officer C.W. Mason-Riseborough, oral interview, 14 September 1990, RNZN National Museum, quoted in McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, pp467-8, endnote 29. McGibbon notes that a statistical breakdown is not possible because of a lack of ship's rolls for this period and because ethnic background was not recorded in personnel files.

⁶⁰¹ 'HMNZS Taupo (Loch-class Frigate)', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 12 September 2017. URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/hmnzs-taupo-loch-class-frigate/>

⁶⁰² 'HMNZS Bellona (Dido-class Cruiser)', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 12 September 2017. URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/hmnzs-bellona/>

'HMNZS Royalist (Dido-class Cruiser)', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 12 September 2017. URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/hmnzs-royalist-dido-class-cruiser/>

⁶⁰³ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p19.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p27.

⁶⁰⁵ 'Pound, Captain G.D. RN, D.S.C., C.B.E.', RNZN National Museum website, accessed 12 September 2017. URL: <http://navymuseum.co.nz/pound-captain-g-d-rn-d-s-c-c-b-e/>

more than a third as Maoris'.⁶⁰⁶ As detailed in Table 9, the Navy's 1957 and 1958 intercensal figures for the *Royalist* were only 50 and 38 respectively. Without knowing how Pound's figure and the figures provided for the intercensal estimates were collected, it is not possible to account for the difference between the numbers. Overall, however, Pound's recollection of a sizeable Maori component among the *Royalist's* crew is broadly consistent with the general pattern of growth in Maori involvement in the RNZN evident in the intercensal data.

Analysis

Though there are issues concerning the reliability of the statistical and other evidence that is presented above, including uncertainty around who was deemed to be Maori, the different types of evidence nevertheless point to a significant increase in Maori involvement in the RNZN during the post-war years. In the years that immediately followed the war and through to the early 1950s, it appears that Maori continued to comprise a very small fraction of the force. The intercensal data indicates that growth in Maori participation was underway by 1952. By the end of the decade, the same data shows that about 7.4 percent of Navy personnel were Maori, with a somewhat higher rate of involvement amongst those serving on RNZN ships or based at the Motuihe Island training facility. (For those who did not join the Navy as trainee officers, basic training was carried out at Motuihe ahead of specialised training and then placement on an RNZN ship.) Beyond the 1950s, the patchy evidence that is available for the 1960s and 1970s indicates that the Navy continued to include a sizeable Maori component.

As suggested earlier, the very low rates of Maori involvement in the RNZN in the immediate post-war period possibly reflected the existence of a policy to restrict Maori entry. Increasing Maori participation from 1950 and the Navy's moves to encourage Maori recruitment from 1953 suggest that any such policy was abandoned in the early 1950s. However, as detailed earlier, some evidence has been located that suggests the Navy, by the early 1960s, had introduced a policy to limit Maori enlistments to ensure that the number accepted matched the proportion of Maori within the population as a whole. But it is not clear that this was the case, and if such a policy was introduced it may have been short-lived.

The separate data available for female personnel between 1948 and 1949, presented above in Table 10, shows that growth in Maori involvement in the RNZN was not limited to increasing numbers of Maori men. From about 1952, the WRNZNS began to include a growing proportion of Maori women. While the rate of increase was

⁶⁰⁶ Captain G.D. Pound, oral interview, 3 June 1991, transcript, DLA0059, RNZN National Museum, p8, see also p2.

initially slow, it increased sharply towards the end of the decade. In 1958, the intercensal figures record that almost 15 percent of WRNZNS personnel were Maori – a rate significantly higher than the overall rate of Maori participation in the RNZN at this time.

While the main trend identified here is of increasing Maori participation in the RNZN, the statistical and other evidence presented above provides scope for closer analysis of the nature of Maori involvement in the post-war Navy and how this changed. It has been noted that the intercensal data shows that the rate of Maori involvement on RNZN ships and among those based at the Motuihe Island training facility was somewhat greater than the overall rate of Maori participation. The only year when this was not the case was 1947. Except for at Motuihe Island, the proportion of Maori personnel serving at the Navy's shore bases was lower, though this too began to grow during the 1950s. From 1952, the number of Maori at the main base at Devonport began to increase significantly. And in the middle of the decade, Maori started to serve in greater numbers at the Waiouru communications station. In the late 1950s, Maori also began working at the Navy Office.

One shore-based area where Maori participation did not increase was amongst the regular personnel who were dedicated to the four RNZN Volunteer Reserve Divisions. As detailed in Table 9, these personnel are recorded in the intercensal figures from 1954. From this time through to 1959, when the intercensal data ends, no Maori are recorded among the small number of personnel who served in the Volunteer Reserve Divisions. The complete absence of Maori suggests the possibility that a race-based exclusion policy may have continued in respect of this part of the RNZN. Alternatively, the absence of Maori involvement might have been connected to the fact that at this time there were – as discussed in the next chapter – no Maori officers in the RNZN. It is also possible that, as the Volunteer Reserve Divisions were not a very important part of the Navy, they were manned by older and less fit regular personnel – a cohort that at this time was unlikely to have included many Maori.

The intercensal figures reveal another aspect of RNZN service where Maori involvement remained very limited. From the data presented in Table 9, it appears that very few Maori were among those who were posted overseas to Australia and the United Kingdom. First recorded in the 1952 figures, these postings were evidently undertaken for training and exchange purposes. Some Maori were initially recorded among the personnel posted to Australia, but it appears that this involvement ended in the mid-1950s. Conversely, towards the end of the decade, after no initial involvement, a few Maori are noted among RNZN personnel in the United Kingdom. Again, the very low rate of Maori participation in the overseas posting suggests that race may have been a factor, though this issue requires further investigation. Once more, the fact that Maori were under-represented at officer level is likely to be

relevant. However, not all of those who served overseas were officers.⁶⁰⁷ Other ranks were also involved in the postings, though the exact ratio between officers and other ranks is not clear. The reliability of the intercensal figures also needs to be taken into consideration. In at least one case, the data does not capture Maori involvement. While the 1954 intercensal figures record no Maori personnel in the UK, a Maori petty officer, Tuta Denny, undertook training and served on at least two RN vessels at this time.⁶⁰⁸

Maori personnel – roles within the RNZN, 1946-1980

Based largely on oral sources, this section sets out a small amount of further evidence concerning the roles that Maori RNZN personnel served in between 1946 and 1980. It focuses primarily on the experiences of those who served as naval ratings and petty officers. It expands on the discussion presented in the previous section, which identified some patterns concerning the places where Maori personnel served. It has been explained, for example, that while the number of Maori personnel serving on ships began to grow from the early 1950s, an increase in the number of Maori at shore stations and at the Navy Office in Wellington occurred more slowly. It has also been noted that, up until 1959, at least, few Maori were among the RNZN personnel who were involved in postings to Australia and, especially, to the United Kingdom.

The discussion presented here draws mainly on evidence concerning eight Maori personnel. The experiences of six of these individuals are recorded in briefs of evidence and oral submissions presented to the Tribunal during the Wai 2500 oral hearings. In respect of the other two individuals, their experiences are captured in interviews that are part of the oral history collection of the National Museum of the RNZN. The eight individuals, all of whom are males, joined the Navy between 1946 and 1970, with most enlisting in the mid to late-1950s. They all served on RNZN ships, though at least two served for a period at the Navy's Waiouru communication base.⁶⁰⁹ Statistically, the sample they represent is too small to carry any weight as an indication of the distribution of Maori across the various roles that existed in the Navy. However, their service experiences do provide an indication of the range of positions that Maori served in during the post-war years. Table 12 sets out details of the roles that the eight individuals occupied during their time in the RNZN.

⁶⁰⁷ In 1954, when Hautanga Harvey Mana Kipa was accepted into the Navy, the Navy Secretary noted that Kipa would eventually undertake training in the United Kingdom to complete a naval artificer apprenticeship. See Navy Secretary to Royal, Maori Affairs, 16 December 1954, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁰⁸ Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, pp9-10.

⁶⁰⁹ Both Tere Tahī and John Purcell served at HMNZS *Irirangi*. See: Tere Tahī, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p331; John Purcell, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp311.

Table 12: Roles within the RNZN – evidence concerning eight Maori personnel, 1946-1980

Name	Iwi	Years of service	Role/specialisation
Tuta Denny	Not specified, though Denny notes that his grandfather is Ngati Porou. Denny grew up in Christchurch.	(1) 1945-1946 (2) c.1947-1967	Coxswain; quartermaster ⁶¹⁰
Tere Tahī	Ngati Maniapoto and Tainui	1956-1964	Radio/ordinary telegraphist ⁶¹¹
John Purcell	Ngati Kahungunu and Rongowhakaata	1957-1965	Radar operator ⁶¹²
Ahitana Piorangi 'Dick' Hawea	Ngati Kahungunu	1957-1965	Anti-submarine and torpedo specialist ⁶¹³
J.K.R. Mihaere	Not specified. Grew up in or near Opotiki.	1957-mid 1970s (approx.)	Radar operator; also undertook navigator's course; eventually became a specialist diver ⁶¹⁴
Haami Hilton	Ngati Kahungunu	1958-1965	Mechanical engineer ⁶¹⁵
Denny Makara	Not specified [?]. Born in Moerewa, Northland. Later moved with family to Waima, then Papakura.	1963-c.1965	Role unclear; left the Navy after about 2 years and joined the Army (SAS) ⁶¹⁶
Charles Parkinson	Not specified [?]. From Moerewa, Northland.	late 1960s-early 1980s	Initial role unclear; eventually becomes a specialist diver ⁶¹⁷

From the experiences of the eight individuals whose roles are recorded in Table 12, it is not clear how much choice new recruits were given as to the roles they would serve in. Some of the eight indicated that they were directed into their specialisation.⁶¹⁸ On the other hand, J.K.R. Mihaere, who enlisted in 1957, recalled being offered a limited choice: 'We had a choice of being torpedoes, radar or a gunner'.⁶¹⁹ Commodore Vallant also indicated some choice was open to Maori who entered the Navy in the post-war years. When questioned about the sort of sailors that Maori made, he stated: 'Good, they were very good. Interestingly enough there seemed to be more

⁶¹⁰ Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p6.

⁶¹¹ Tere Tahī, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp328-329.

⁶¹² John Purcell, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p305.

⁶¹³ Ahitana Piorangi 'Dick' Hawea, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p343.

⁶¹⁴ Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p28.

⁶¹⁵ Haami Hilton, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p399.

⁶¹⁶ Denny Makara, Hearing Week 6, Rongomaraeroa-o-nga-hau-e-wha Marae, Waiouru Army Base, Wai 2500, #4.1.7, p374.

⁶¹⁷ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, p10.

⁶¹⁸ See, for example, Tere Tahī, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p328.

⁶¹⁹ Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p16.

[who] opted to be stokers than seaman.⁶²⁰ The true role of stoker had, in fact, ended with the demise of coal-fired boilers. After 1945, no coal-fired vessels remained in the RNZN fleet. However, the term stoker continued to be applied to those who manned and monitored oil-fired boilers. It remained in use into the late twentieth century.⁶²¹ Of the eight individuals whose positions are recorded in Table 12, only Haami Hilton, who was a mechanical engineer, might have been considered a stoker.

Maori enlistment – circumstances and motivations, 1946-1970

Based on evidence relating to the period between 1946 and 1970, this section briefly discusses the circumstances and motivations that underlay post-war Maori enlistment in the RNZN. It draws particularly on the experiences of the eight men whose experiences are discussed above in respect of the roles that Maori served in. Though this evidence concerns only a small number of individuals, it nevertheless suggests some common themes and provides a useful indication of the reasons that underlay Maori enlistment. Table 13 sets out enlistment details for each of the eight men whose experiences are examined here.

Table 13: RNZN enlistment details – evidence concerning eight Maori personnel, 1946-1970

Name	Year of enlistment	Age at enlistment	Pre-enlistment situation
Tuta Denny	(1) 1945 (2) c.1947	20 (approx.)	Completed four years at high school. Enlisted in Army in 1943 at age 16, but subsequently discharged as being underaged. Initially entered the RNZN in January 1945 at the age of 17 or 18. Served for a period overseas. Discharged upon return to New Zealand, later decided to re-enlist. ⁶²²
Tere Tahi	1956	17	Completed two years at high school. Left school after sitting and passing Navy aptitude test. Began a carpentry apprenticeship while waiting to be called up. ⁶²³
John Purcell	1957	17	Completed three years at high school. Working at freezing works at time of enlistment. ⁶²⁴
Ahitana Piorangi 'Dick' Hawea	1957	17	Completed three years at high school. Working at freezing works at time of enlistment. ⁶²⁵

⁶²⁰ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p27.

⁶²¹ Michael Wynd, RNZN National Museum, to Cleaver, 20 September 2017, held by author.

⁶²² Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, pp1-3.

⁶²³ Tere Tahi, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp325-340.

⁶²⁴ John Purcell, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp303-325. Ahitana Piorangi 'Dick' Hawea's evidence also includes details of Purcell's enlistment.

⁶²⁵ Ahitana Piorangi 'Dick' Hawea, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp341-350.

Name	Year of enlistment	Age at enlistment	Pre-enlistment situation
J.K.R. Mihaere	1957	16	Completed at least three years at high school. Involved in school cadets. Appears to have enlisted while still at school. ⁶²⁶
Haami Hilton	1958	16	Completed one-two years at high school. Doing fencing work at time of enlistment. Had earlier worked at freezing works. ⁶²⁷
Denny Makara	1963	17 (approx.)	Completed at least three years at high school. Started carpentry apprenticeship, then entered Navy after about a year. ⁶²⁸
Charles Parkinson	late 1960s	17 (approx.)	Unclear. ⁶²⁹

A feature of the enlistment experiences recorded in Table 13 is the young age at which each individual entered the RNZN. While the terms under which they enlisted are not known in every case, those who joined up in the late 1950s did so for a minimum eight-year term, which began when they turned 18. For those who enlisted before they turned 18, their minimum period of service was somewhat longer. For example, John Purcell, who enlisted in 1957 when he was about 17, served about eight-and-a-half years before his term ended.⁶³⁰

Prior to enlisting, most of the eight men had left school and were working at the time they joined up. It is notable that two – Tere Tahi and Denny Makara – had begun carpentry apprenticeships, which they gave up to enter the RNZN. Others had taken up other local work opportunities, with several working in freezing works, where jobs seem to have been readily available. Most seem to have entered the Navy in order to access experiences and training not available in the rural communities and towns they had grown up in, where opportunities were comparatively limited. And while the minimum service term imposed an obligation upon enlistees, it was no doubt also viewed as providing some economic security. Discussing the background to his enlistment in the RNZN in the late 1960s, Charles Parkinson explained:

To be honest, the main reason I enlisted was to get out of Moerewa. I didn't really want to work as a scrubcutter or at Affco (the meat works). I mean no disrespect to the men and women that work hard in those jobs; I just wanted to find the easiest way out of home. The Armed Services presented me with such an opportunity.⁶³¹

⁶²⁶ Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum.

⁶²⁷ Haami Hilton, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp393-406.

⁶²⁸ Denny Makara, Hearing Week 6, Rongomaraeroa-o-nga-hau-e-wha Marae, Waiouru Army Base, Wai 2500, #4.1.7, pp368-394.

⁶²⁹ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116.

⁶³⁰ John Purcell, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p305.

⁶³¹ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, p4.

For similar reasons, Tere Tahī's grandfather supported Tahī's interest in joining the Navy: 'In his view the Navy presented an opportunity that I would not otherwise find in Te Kūiti.'⁶³² John Purcell also focussed on the opportunity for leaving and gaining experiences outside the area where he grew up:

Joining the Navy seemed like a great opportunity for some adventure. I was very young and had only travelled beyond the Hawke's Bay once, and that was to Gisborne. I had certainly never travelled outside of New Zealand before.⁶³³

Most of the eight individuals discussed here appear to have come from families and communities where there was a strong tradition of Crown military service. A number provide details of members of previous generations who fought overseas, and some also note that among their own generation they were not alone in entering one of the armed services.⁶³⁴ Charles Parkinson's evidence includes details of the districts that Maori personnel came from during the period he served in the Navy, which was between the late 1960s and early 1980s. Discussing ship haka groups, he noted that:

it was pretty competitive; there were boys from Gisborne, Wairoa, Manutuke and Rotorua as well as those of us from the North. When some of the boys from Tainui joined later on down the track, they brought a lot of skill with them.⁶³⁵

Parkinson's evidence indicates that, into the 1970s, a significant proportion of the Navy's Maori personnel continued to be from iwi that had long been involved in Crown military service. In respect of the involvement of Tainui, Tere Tahī's service history provides evidence of some Tainui participation from the mid-1950s.⁶³⁶

Of the individuals whose experiences are examined here, the enlistment of one – Haami Hilton – was not entirely voluntary. As detailed above, Hilton and another relative enlisted under strong pressure from an uncle who was a welfare officer and concerned at Hilton's 'playing up'.⁶³⁷ Evidence presented earlier in the chapter shows that some Maori entered the Army in similar circumstances, being advised they would end up in jail if they did not enlist. For youths who did come before the judicial system, it appears that some were offered the option of entering the Navy instead of going into borstal. J.K.R. Mihaere, who enlisted in 1957, recalled:

⁶³² Tere Tahī, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp327.

⁶³³ John Purcell, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p305.

⁶³⁴ See, for example: Ahitana Piorangi 'Dick' Hawea, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p342; Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, pp7-8.

⁶³⁵ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, p4.

⁶³⁶ Tere Tahī, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp325-328.

⁶³⁷ Haami Hilton, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p398.

My cousin, he was a bit of a scallywag, and he didn't pass the [entry] test. Sadly, because he spent the next 12 years in and out of jail and I took off to the Navy. I met other sailors who had a choice, you had Borstal in those days. You either join the Navy as a stoker or you go to borstal.⁶³⁸

Mihaere believed that the Army was also presented as an option to some who were facing borstal.⁶³⁹ No evidence has been located regarding the number of individuals who entered the RNZN under these circumstances or the extent to which the option of joining the service was offered equally to Maori and non-Maori offenders.

Air Force recruitment, 1946-2000

Of the three armed services, the involvement of Maori has been least in the RNZAF. This part of the chapter examines issues surrounding Maori recruitment and participation in the RNZAF. Again, it focuses on the extent to which Maori have been able to serve in the force and take advantage of recruitment opportunities. The developments examined here continue from those that Webb describes in his report on Maori military service between 1899 and 1945. Webb explains that Maori served in the RNZAF during World War II. And, earlier, during the interwar period, he also notes evidence of some Maori involvement in the Territorial Air Force. However, it is unclear whether at this time any Maori served in the RNZAF as regular personnel.

Role of the RNZAF

This section briefly describes the RNZAF's role and activities between the end of World War II and 2000. Also, summarising details presented earlier, it provides a brief overview of Air Force personnel numbers and how these have changed.

After World War II, RNZAF squadrons took part in various military and strategic operations, beginning first with the deployment of No. 14 Squadron to Japan with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. Other operations saw No. 41 Squadron take part in the Berlin Air Lift in 1948 and 1949. Later, both of these squadrons, along with No. 75 Squadron, were involved in operations during the Malayan Emergency. In 1952, No. 14 Squadron was deployed to Cyprus as part of New Zealand's Middle East commitment. In 1955, it shifted to Singapore, where, during the same year, No. 41 Squadrons also established a base. During the Vietnam War, No. 41 Squadron undertook regular supply missions from Singapore, while No. 40.

⁶³⁸ Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p7.

⁶³⁹ When referring to those who chose to enter the Navy rather than go into borstal, Mihaere's interviewer used the term 'borstal choices'. See Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p7.

Squadron was involved in troop airlifts. Between 1967 and 1971, 30 RNZAF pilots served in Vietnam, including helicopter pilots who served with the Royal Australian Air Force. A small number also served as forward air controllers with the United States forces.⁶⁴⁰

In 1982, a new role saw RNZAF personnel deployed to Egypt as part of an international force that was involved monitoring a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. In the late 1980s, further peacekeeping duties saw Air Force personnel taking part in deployments in Sinai and Iran.⁶⁴¹ The RNZAF also continued to have a role in transporting and supplying New Zealand ground force operations. For example, between 1994 and 1996, No.40 Squadron provided air transport support to the Army contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁴² In 2003, the squadron began transporting New Zealand personnel into and out of Bamyán Province, Afghanistan.⁶⁴³

Outside of its military operations, the Air Force has also fulfilled a range of other roles. During the immediate post-war period, No. 40 Squadron played an important role in the establishment a new domestic airline.⁶⁴⁴ In 1947, the National Airways Corporation was formed largely from the squadron's aircraft and personnel, who became civilian employees. In 1948, the following year, the RNZAF organised the first experiments in aerial top dressing – an innovation that would have important economic outcomes.⁶⁴⁵ Also, as detailed earlier, Air Force personnel provided labour during the 1951 waterfront strike, forming the largest component of the military personnel deployed. During the dispute, RNZAF personnel worked in freezing works and cool stores as well as on the wharfs.⁶⁴⁶ Along with the Army and Navy, the RNZAF has over the years also played a role in supporting New Zealand's presence in Antarctica. This began in 1956, when the RNZAF provided air support for the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition. From 1965, Hercules aircraft began making annual flights to Antarctica during the summer months.⁶⁴⁷

Restructuring policies introduced towards the end of the twentieth century resulted in the closure of several long-serving RNZAF bases. The first to close, in 1991, was the Air Force Stores Depot at Te Rapa (Hamilton). In 1993, bases at Wigram (Christchurch) and Shelly Bay (Wellington) also closed.⁶⁴⁸ In 2000, the Labour-led

⁶⁴⁰ Paul A. Harrison, 'Royal New Zealand Air Force', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, pp461-462.

⁶⁴¹ Harrison, 'Royal New Zealand Air Force', p462.

⁶⁴² Ibid., p462.

⁶⁴³ 'RNZAF timeline', *New Zealand History* website, accessed 22 April 2018.

⁶⁴⁴ Harrison, 'Royal New Zealand Air Force', p461.

⁶⁴⁵ 'RNZAF timeline', *New Zealand History* website, accessed 22 April 2018.

⁶⁴⁶ 'Industrial disputes', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, pp238-239.

⁶⁴⁷ Harrison, 'Royal New Zealand Air Force', p462.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid., p462.

Government signalled major change when it cancelled a deal to acquire new combat aircraft. The following year it announced the scrapping of the RNZAF's combat wing, which saw the disbandment of No. 2, No. 14, and No. 75 Squadrons.⁶⁴⁹

As shown earlier in Graph 1, the Air Force – except for the years 1950 to 1959, when it had the greatest number of personnel – has been the second largest of the armed services. Between 1960 and 1990, RNZAF regular personnel numbers ranged between about 4000 and 4500 servicemen and women – about 80 percent of the Army's strength. The restructuring that was undertaken from around 1990 had a significant impact on the Air Force personnel numbers. Between 1990 and 2002, the number of RNZAF regular personnel fell from 4155 to 2194, a decline of about 47 percent. This meant that the Air Force became closer in size to the RNZN. Since 2002, there has been a small recovery in the number of RNZAF personnel, though this has been subject to fluctuation.

Recruitment difficulties and efforts to engage Maori, 1946-1980

It has been explained that from the beginning of the period examined in this report all three armed services experienced recruitment difficulties and were at times understrength. Competing against other employment opportunities, the challenge of attracting sufficient numbers of suitable recruits and of retaining personnel proved an ongoing problem. As detailed earlier, it was reported in April 1952, for example, that the armed services were some 3000 men short of their authorised strength. In the case of the Air Force, the shortfall was stated to be between 1000 and 1500 men, mostly 'skilled or potential tradesmen'. Under these circumstances, it was claimed, the RNZAF could not make full use of the aircraft it possessed.⁶⁵⁰ Later reports produced within the Air Force reveal the continuing nature of the recruitment difficulties that the service faced.⁶⁵¹

Compared to the Army and Navy, individuals who wished to enter the Air Force generally seem to have faced higher entry requirements – a factor that exacerbated the RNZAF's recruitment problems and possibly placed it in a worse position than the other two services. Archival evidence relating to RNZAF recruitment includes many observations from staff about how the Air Force's entry requirements – particularly, the required standards of education – made it difficult for the force to meet its recruitment targets. Educational barriers existed not only for those who wished to be aircrew, but also for recruits who desired to serve in specialised ground

⁶⁴⁹ 'RNZAF timeline', *New Zealand History* website, accessed 22 April 2018.

⁶⁵⁰ 'Armed Services Need 3000 Extra Men', *Evening Post*, 23 April 1952, extract in ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁵¹ See, for example: Deputy Director Recruiting to AMP, 1 April 1955, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 3, ANZ Wellington.

trades. In March 1961, in a memorandum prepared in connection with a review of manpower within the armed services, the Air Force's Director of Recruiting stated that the experience and expertise of RNZAF personnel needed to match an evolving, complex technology:

In the Air Force, possibly more so than in other service, it is becoming more apparent that as the complexity of modern aircraft increases, so must the skills of the operator and the servicing technician. It is therefore necessary not only to recruit a good type of man with a suitable educational background for training but to retain his accumulated skill over a long period, so the expensive training processes are not repeated more than necessary.⁶⁵²

In light of this, the Director of Recruiting argued that the Air Force's manpower requirements differed from those of the other two services, especially the Army's. He pointed out that while the Army was able to take on men for relatively short engagements of two to three years, the RNZAF expected a longer period of commitment. Furthermore, for most trades and for aircrew, the RNZAF required men who possessed a higher educational standard than that which the Army demanded.⁶⁵³

Some five years later, in November 1966, the Air Force's Director of Recruiting again commented on the link between the RNZAF's entry criteria and the difficulty of meeting recruitment targets. Reiterating earlier statements, he observed that the service was not attracting sufficient young men of the quality required. While a high number of enquiries and many applications were submitted, the entry standards ensured that about two-thirds of applicants were unsuccessful. In light of this situation, the Director of Recruiting suggested that existing standards – educational and health – should be reviewed to ensure they were as low as possible, yet still 'commensurate with our requirements'.⁶⁵⁴ While he evidently believed there was scope for adjustment, the Director of Recruiting's suggestion does not appear to have gained traction. Instead, other proposals were considered, including changes to the periods of engagement that new recruits were expected to agree to.⁶⁵⁵

Oral interviews and claimant briefs of evidence include comments that indicate that the RNZAF's generally higher educational standards may have been significant

⁶⁵² Annexure to Director of Recruiting to DPPS, 17 March 1961, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, Manning – policy, 1944-1962, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁵³ Director of Recruiting to DPPS, 17 March 1961, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington, p1.

⁶⁵⁴ Director of Recruiting to Director of Manning, 8 November 1966, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/1 part 5, Recruiting, regular force, policy, 1966-1971, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁵⁵ Director of Manning to Air Officer Commanding, RNZAF Training Group, Wigram, 5 December 1966, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/1 part 5, ANZ Wellington.

among the factors that defined the level of Maori involvement in the force. Charles Parkinson, who joined the Navy in the late 1960s, recalled that while young people from Moerewa entered all of the armed services, only a relatively small proportion were able to serve in the RNZAF – ‘it was the really smart ones that joined the Air Force.’⁶⁵⁶ J.K.R. Mihaere, who joined the Navy in 1957 and eventually became a specialist diver, explained that he had initially been interested in the RNZAF but was put off by the educational requirements:

I was keen on the Air Force for a start... you have got to pass all these exams and get to the 6th Form and I thought, no, I was looking at what I was good at and what I found out when I was going to College, I was a pretty good swimmer.⁶⁵⁷

Like the other services, the RNZAF explored a number of different options to meet the recruitment challenges it faced. For example, in the immediate post-war period, steps were taken to ensure an ongoing, albeit limited role for women. In 1949, an entrant scheme was introduced for boys aged between 16 and 17½ years of age. The scheme’s focus was to engage and train youths who would be able to serve as ‘high grade tradesmen and future NCO’s’. Applicants were required to undertake educational testing and recruitment efforts looked to secure youths of ‘all round quality’.⁶⁵⁸ Initially, about 80 boys annually entered the RNZAF through the scheme. In 1954, it was decided that entries through the scheme should be raised to a maximum of 180.⁶⁵⁹

However, the Air Force’s main answer to its manpower difficulties was overseas recruitment – specifically, recruitment from the United Kingdom. Like the Navy and to a more limited extent the Army, the RNZAF for many years relied heavily on bringing personnel in from the United Kingdom. For example, in the three years from 1952 to 1954, 892 of the 2341 individuals who entered the force – about 38 percent – were recruited from the United Kingdom.⁶⁶⁰ Similarly high rates may have continued throughout the 1950s. As detailed earlier in the chapter, Cabinet in March 1957 approved recruitment of 250 airmen and 50 airwomen during the 1957/58

⁶⁵⁶ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, p4.

⁶⁵⁷ Chief Petty Officer Diver J.K.R. Mihaere, oral interview, 8 March 2003, transcript, DLA0207, RNZN National Museum, p7.

⁶⁵⁸ ‘R.N.Z.A.F. Regular Force – Ground Trades – Boy Entrants Enlistments’, attached to Director of Manning to AMP, 9 August 1954, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington, pp2-3.

⁶⁵⁹ Minutes of meeting held on 7 October 1954, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington, p3.

⁶⁶⁰ Deputy Director of Recruiting to AMP, 1 April 1955, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 3, ANZ Wellington.

year.⁶⁶¹ All three services, it has been explained, continued to draw on overseas recruitment until at least the late 1970s, though the numbers involved declined.

While the Air Force commonly pointed to its higher entry requirements when explaining recruitment problems it experienced, not all of the RNZAF's overseas recruitment was undertaken to fulfil specialist positions. For example, it is doubtful that the airwomen who were to be recruited during the 1957/58 year were required to fill roles that involved lengthy, specialist training.⁶⁶² Later, in 1961, Air Force recruiters also investigated the possibility of recruiting from overseas 40 males for cooking and mess steward duties, both being described as 'poorly manned trades'.⁶⁶³ Over time, however, government policy appears to have required that overseas recruitment be limited to individuals with specialist training. At times, a further narrowing of policy required that recruitment could only be undertaken for positions that involved training not available in New Zealand.⁶⁶⁴

It is also notable that, while the United Kingdom was overwhelmingly the focus of overseas recruitment efforts, the Air Force sometimes explored the possibility of recruitment from other countries. For example, in 1961, in respect of the proposal to bring in 40 males for cooking and steward duties, it was suggested that Dutch immigrants could fill these roles.⁶⁶⁵ Five years later, in 1966, the Director of Recruiting reported that the possibility of sourcing 'raw recruits' from the Cook Islands and Fiji was being investigated.⁶⁶⁶ Research has not established whether these recruitment proposals were carried out.

Alongside overseas recruitment, the Air Force pursued a range of other strategies to attract suitable recruits and retain existing personnel. Pay and allowance structures were reviewed and adjusted, and changes were sometimes also made to the terms of engagement offered to new recruits. In August 1966, for example, the Air Board approved a proposal to allow recruits for some trades to be given the option of a three-year term of engagement or the standard five-year term.⁶⁶⁷ In addition to such

⁶⁶¹ Minister of Defence, memorandum for Cabinet, 21 February 1957; Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, 4 March 1957, AAFD 811 W2347 box 104 k CAB 225/19/1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁶² For an indication of the roles that female personnel filled during the mid-1950s, see: 'R.N.Z.A.F. Regular Force – Ground Trades – Boy Entrants Enlistments', attached to Director of Manning to AMP, 9 August 1954, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington, pp2-3.

⁶⁶³ Annexure to Director of Recruiting to DPPS, 17 March 1961, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁶⁴ Secretary of the Cabinet to Minister of Defence, undated (dispatched 16 May 1966), AAFD 811 W4198 box 88 CAB 223/3/1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁶⁵ Annexure to Director of Recruiting to DPPS, 17 March 1961, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁶⁶ Director of Recruiting to Director of Manning, 8 November 1966, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/1 part 5, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁶⁷ Record of Air Board decision dated 9 August 1966, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/1 part 5, ANZ Wellington.

measures, the RNZAF maintained an ongoing public recruitment campaign. Describing the extent of publicity efforts in 1961, the Director of Recruiting reported that advertising was placed in a range of print media, while ‘no cost publicity’ was obtained through various organisations and attendance at special events throughout the country. Also, recruitment officers visited secondary schools and, for career information purposes, school parties sometimes visited RNZAF training establishments. Additionally, literature and posters were regularly distributed to schools for their libraries and notice boards.⁶⁶⁸

In spite of the recruitment challenges it faced, the Air Force’s efforts to encourage enlistment of Maori were relatively limited. However, RNZAF recruiters sometimes included visits to towns and settlements where Maori were a significant proportion of the population and where there were strong traditions of Maori military service. In November 1949, for example, an RNZAF recruitment selection panel undertook a tour that included interviews at settlements in eastern Bay of Plenty and on the East Coast.⁶⁶⁹ Later, in September 1960, in accordance with a policy to increase recruitment efforts in New Zealand, an RNZAF publicity tour included visits to a number of schools in Northland, among which were schools at Kaitaia, Kaikohe, Kaeo, and Kawakawa.⁶⁷⁰ Overall, however, the Air Force did not go to great lengths to reach out to Maori, especially when compared to the efforts of the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Navy. It is notable that the Air Force did not foster a relationship with the Department of Maori Affairs in order to encourage Maori enlistment and to promote the RNZAF as an alternative to the other services. However, it will be explained later that the Air Force did initiate communication with the Maori Affairs Department in the early 1950s, but this was primarily for the purpose of establishing the suitability of Maori applicants.

Archival evidence cited for this report includes no clear statements as to why the Air Force did not more actively pursue recruitment of Maori. It is likely that the explanation partly reflected assumptions about the extent to which Maori – compared to non-Maori – would have been able to meet the higher educational entry standards required for many positions. (Forming the basis of such assumptions, the educational achievement of Maori school leavers in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, was significantly lower than that of non-Maori.) As detailed later, some RNZAF leaders harboured reservations about the character and discipline of Maori, especially if they were concentrated and served together in low-skilled positions.

⁶⁶⁸ Annexure to Director of Recruiting to DPPS, 17 March 1961, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 741 33/1/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁶⁹ Central Recruiting Selection Committee, itinerary, 23 November 1949 to 1 December 1949, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/1 part 2, Recruiting, regular force, policy, 1941-1953, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁷⁰ Publicity tour itinerary, attached to Director of Recruiting to AMP, 8 July 1960, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 3, ANZ Wellington. See also: Director of Recruiting to Director of Manning, 27 June 1960, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 3, ANZ Wellington.

Eligibility of Maori to enter the RNZAF

From the beginning of the period covered in this report, evidence concerning the eligibility criteria for entry into the Air Force shows that the service remained open to Maori. No evidence has been located to suggest that formal exclusions against Maori were introduced. Officially, Maori were able to join the RNZAF and serve alongside Pakeha. Occasionally, recruitment material specifically noted that the service was open to Maori. As noted earlier, a 1948 draft booklet on the three women's branches of the armed services advised potential applicants that: 'You must be a British subject, of European or Maori descent'.⁶⁷¹ Other evidence more implicitly suggests that Maori were able to enter the RNZAF. For example, the Royal New Zealand Air Force Act 1950 did not set out eligibility criteria, but the Act did include a provision that enabled 'aliens' to enlist with the approval of the Air Board.⁶⁷² This implies that the nationality criteria for entry covered New Zealand citizens, including Maori.

Examples of individual Maori serving in the RNZAF from the late 1940s also suggest that the Air Force's formal entry criteria allowed Maori to enlist. An early example was Albert Tauwhare of Ngai Tahu, who served in the RNZAF during World War II and later rejoined the force in 1948. According to an article published in *Te Ao Hou* in 1966, Tauwhare took part in the Berlin Air Lift during 1949 and then joined the Royal Air Force (RAF), where he served initially in 24 Commonwealth Squadron.⁶⁷³ Later examples of individual Maori entering the RNZAF include Tokomaru Bay-born Trevor Mulligan, who joined up in 1954 and went on to serve in the force for 40 years. Mulligan worked in supply roles, eventually obtaining the rank of squadron leader.⁶⁷⁴ In the early 1960s, another Maori, Barry Matena, from Taumarunui, joined the RNZAF as a boy entrant and later began training as an aircraft apprentice at a Royal Australian Air Force facility.⁶⁷⁵

Attitudes and policy concerning Maori personnel, 1946-1970

While Maori were eligible to serve in the post-war Air Force and there is evidence of Maori personnel serving after World War II, it is clear that – compared to non-Maori – they were not equally able to enter the service. The RNZAF's generally higher

⁶⁷¹ Combined pamphlet – women's services (draft), ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761, 33/20/3 part 2, ANZ Wellington, p1.

⁶⁷² Section 152, Royal New Zealand Air Force Act 1950.

⁶⁷³ 'Squadron-Leader Albert Tauwhare', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 54, March 1966, p37. See also: 'People in the News', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 26, March 1959, p20.

⁶⁷⁴ Colin Hanson, *By Such Deeds – Honour and Awards in the Royal New Zealand Air Force, 1923-1999*, Volplane Press, Christchurch, 2001, p361. See also: 'New Kaumatua honoured by title', *RNZAF News*, January 1999, p7.

⁶⁷⁵ Director of Recruiting to Resident Officer, Taumarunui, 21 May 1964, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 203 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington. 'Barry Paraone Matena', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 47, June 1964, p58.

educational standards are more likely to have affected Maori and limited Maori applications. For those Maori who did apply to join the force and were subject to RNZAF recruitment processes, it would be useful, for the purpose of establishing whether Maori faced other barriers, to compare the success rates of Maori and non-Maori applicants. Except in respect of NZDF recruitment during recent years, research for this report has located no evidence that specifically relates to this matter. However, this section, which covers the period between 1946 and 1970, sets out some relevant evidence concerning both the RNZAF's approach to Maori recruitment as well as attitudes towards Maori involvement in the force. None of this evidence articulates a deliberate policy to limit Maori participation, but it does show that key Air Force staff sometimes held negative perceptions towards Maori – views that are very likely to have influenced both RNZAF efforts to encourage Maori recruitment and the extent to which Maori applicants were accepted into the force. At the same time, it will be explained, the RNZAF – like the Army and Navy – assumed a policy whereby it would not disclose details of the ethnicity of its personnel and instead emphasised that it made no distinction between individuals of different races.

In 1951, in response to disciplinary issues concerning Maori personnel serving at the RNZAF's Te Rapa supply depot, the RNZAF introduced new recruitment procedures for Maori, which represented a more precautionary approach to Maori recruitment. Around the middle of May 1951, in connection with the problems at Te Rapa depot, the RNZAF's Director of Manning sought assistance from the Maori Affairs Department, and in response the welfare officer at Hamilton visited the base.⁶⁷⁶ It is unclear how many personnel were implicated, but the number appears to have been small – probably less than half a dozen.⁶⁷⁷ The main discipline issue concerning these individuals was absenteeism – in particular, being away from the base without permission in order to attend meetings and social functions at marae in the surrounding district.

On 18 May 1951, the Under Secretary of Maori Affairs wrote to the Director of Manning, setting out the welfare officer's report on the problems at Te Rapa. In his report, the welfare officer explained that the base was located in a district with a reasonably large Maori population, where meetings were held at marae throughout the year. Easily accessible from Te Rapa, these gatherings brought the Maori personnel into contact 'with some of the less desirable elements in that locality who

⁶⁷⁶ Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Director of Manning, 18 May 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁷⁷ As detailed later in Table 14, locality data provided in the results of the 1951 census (taken on 17 April 1951) records only three Maori as being resident at Te Rapa RNZAF base. Later, in 1968, it was recalled that the problems involved only 'a few maoris'. See: Director of Recruiting, circular letter to area offices, 26 June 1968, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

would influence these men to overstay their leave.’ The welfare officer suggested that ‘a good proportion of the Maori servicemen’ possessed a low standard of education, and he speculated they were recruited at a time when little ‘new material’ was available.

The welfare officer further advised that it had been agreed that the discipline problem at Te Rapa was an RNZAF ‘domestic’ issue that would be dealt with internally, though he noted that in one case the punishments handed out did not appear to be acting as a deterrent. In light of the situation, the commanding officer at Te Rapa was considering whether some of the Maori personnel – ‘the worst offenders’ – should be transferred to another station, where they would be less exposed to negative influences. The welfare officer supported this proposal. And, in order to lessen the risk of ‘undesirable types’ entering the force, he suggested that welfare officers provide checks on prospective recruits – ‘from the point of view of living conditions and family background’.⁶⁷⁸

The Under Secretary of Maori Affairs, evidently seeing merit in the welfare officer’s suggestion, asked the Director of Manning whether he approved the proposal.⁶⁷⁹ Writing in reply, on 29 May 1951, the Secretary of the Air Department confirmed the welfare officer’s belief that some Maori serving in the RNZAF had joined up when entry standards had been lower:

The present day standards are much higher than those which applied at the end of war and immediately thereafter, and you are correct in assuming that the majority of members of the Maori race of a low standard now serving, were recruited either at the end of the war or for the Interim Air Force.⁶⁸⁰

The Air Secretary advised that the RNZAF would take up the offer for welfare officers to undertake background checks on future Maori applicants. Further, in light of experiences at Te Rapa and given there were ‘numbers of Maoris on most RNZAF Stations’, the Air Secretary asked that welfare officers be available to assist commanding officers to deal with problems concerning Maori personnel. Maori Affairs approved this proposal, and in mid-June 1951 District welfare officers were

⁶⁷⁸ Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Director of Manning, 18 May 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁷⁹ Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Director of Manning, 18 May 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸⁰ Air Secretary to Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, 29 May 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

advised accordingly.⁶⁸¹ Soon after, RNZAF recruitment offices and commanding officers at bases were also made aware of the new arrangements.⁶⁸²

The following month, in early July 1951, a final decision was made in respect of the disciplinary issues involving Maori personnel at Te Rapa. RNZAF staff, including the commanding officer at Te Rapa, resolved that the number of Maori serving at the depot would be reduced. In order to achieve this, the withdrawn personnel were to be posted to other bases and ideally distributed between Ohakea, Whenuapai, and Hobsonville.⁶⁸³

In accordance with the arrangements that had arisen from the discipline issues at Te Rapa, Maori Affairs' welfare officers began to supply background information on all Maori applicants. These reports were provided from mid-1951 through to mid-1968, when the RNZAF decided to end the practice. Some archival evidence concerning the vetting process has been located – a Wanganui District Office file, which includes correspondence relating to a number of checks conducted by local welfare officers for the RNZAF during the period. In their reports, the welfare officers provided information on the applicant's age, education, family background, overall character, and, sometimes, appearance.⁶⁸⁴ In the early 1960s, the RNZAF also asked for specific comments on an individual's suitability and temperament for 'enjoying service life and for adjustment to service rules and regulations'.⁶⁸⁵

The majority of the background checks that welfare officers in the Wanganui District undertook concerned young women who were seeking entry into the women's branch of the Air Force. Except in a few cases, the outcome of the applications for which background checks were undertaken is not recorded. But the RNZAF did, particularly in the early stages of the vetting process, sometimes advise the District Officer as to whether or not an applicant was successful. Evidence surrounding one such case indicates that it may have been Air Force policy to refuse entry to any Maori who had a criminal record. It is unclear whether this policy applied also to Pakeha. The case in question involved a high school student who applied to enter the RNZAF in 1951. When requesting information on the boy's background, the Air

⁶⁸¹ Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, circular memorandum to Registrars and Welfare Officers, 18 June 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸² Director of Manning, circular letter to Recruiting and Reserve Centres, 21 June 1950 [1951]; Director of Manning, circular letter to RNZAF Stations, 9 July 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸³ Squadron Leader, CManO to D1, 6 July 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸⁴ See, for example: Registrar and District Officer to Secretary, Air Department, 19 October 1953, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, Maori welfare – armed services – Air Force policy, 1951-1969, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸⁵ See, for example: Squadron Leader, Officer Commanding, RNZAF Central Area Office, to Department of Maori Affairs, Wanganui, 14 May 1963, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

Secretary noted that the selection committee had been 'quite favourably impressed with his department and general outlook'.⁶⁸⁶ The welfare officer's report was positive and included a recommendation from the principal of the boy's school, who found him to be reliable and trustworthy. However, the report noted that four years previously the boy had been convicted of theft before the Juvenile Court.⁶⁸⁷ The Air Secretary subsequently advised that it had been decided that an engagement would not be offered.⁶⁸⁸

Possibly in response to such decisions, it seems that welfare officers – in the Wanganui District, at least – sometimes withheld information that might undermine an applicant's chances of gaining entry to the RNZAF. One such case relates to a request for background information made in August 1954, which concerned an 18 year old man.⁶⁸⁹ Commenting on the case, and noting the names of two individuals who knew and recommended the applicant, an official within the Wanganui District Office stated:

This opportunity may be the turning point in his whole life – one hesitant step on our part may frustrate and alter the course of a youngster who has already been under bureaucratic control for his earlier misbehaviour. The drive to free himself and improve as a citizen is already very prominent in him.⁶⁹⁰

The subsequent report submitted to the RNZAF noted that the applicant had come from 'an unhappy home', but it was wholly positive in respect of his attributes and made no mention of any earlier problems with his conduct.⁶⁹¹ It is unclear whether the applicant who was the subject of this case was successful in gaining entry to the RNZN.

Other evidence shows that, following the disciplinary issues at Te Rapa and the introduction of Maori Affairs' background checking, the RNZAF continued to recruit Maori but that among senior staff some reservations remained about the number and quality of Maori who were entering the force. In June 1952, the Director of Manning commented generally on Maori involvement in the armed services when discussing

⁶⁸⁶ Air Secretary to Welfare Officer, Maori Affairs, Wanganui, 13 November 1951, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸⁷ Welfare Officer to Registrar, Maori Affairs, Wanganui, 12 December 1951, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸⁸ Air Secretary to Registrar, Maori Affairs, Wanganui, 28 December 1951, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁸⁹ Squadron Leader, Commanding, Central Area Recruiting and Reserve Centre, to Welfare Officer, Maori Affairs, 16 August 1954, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹⁰ Unidentified writer, 7 September 1954, minute on Squadron Leader, Commanding, Central Area Recruiting and Reserve Centre, to Welfare Officer, Maori Affairs, 16 August 1954, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹¹ Registrar and District Officer to Secretary, Air Department, 8 September 1954, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 90 31/15/3 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

the possibility of Pacific Islanders being recruited into the Air Force. He expressed doubts about the existing level of Maori recruitment, but noted that it was at least possible for Maori to be assimilated into the services:

Admittedly we do accept Maoris freely into the Services (too freely, I feel), but at least they come from a community where, at any rate superficially, they are accepted on an equal footing with Europeans and, generally, by environment and education, may readily be absorbed into the Services.⁶⁹²

The Director of Manning at this time was B.R. Furkert. He appears to have been appointed in about 1951 and remained in the position until at least 1960.⁶⁹³

It is more than possible that other RNZAF staff shared the reservations that Furkert expressed in the June 1952 memorandum. It is likely that such attitudes would have influenced recruitment decisions regarding Maori applicants, and they probably also at least partly explain the limited extent to which the RNZAF actively encouraged Maori to enlist. As noted above, the Air Force, unlike the Army and Navy, did not seek to engage closely with Maori in order to promote the opportunities that existed in the service. Notably, it did not endeavour to reach out to Maori through the networks of the Maori Affairs Department. For example, there is little evidence that the RNZAF provided information to the department about upcoming recruitment tours and campaigns.

In 1955, the Director of Manning, Furkert, requested that recruiting officers begin to record the ethnicity of non-Europeans who were entering the RNZAF. Setting out his request, the Director of Manning noted only that details of 'the racial origin of non-European applicants' were required for departmental records. He stated that it was only necessary to record the information when an applicant was successful and 'does reach the very high standard required'. In the case of Maori applicants, the degree of their Maori parentage was to be noted on their entry form – 'Full Maori blood', 'More than half-Maori', 'Half Maori', 'Less than half Maori'. In the case of other non-Europeans – 'e.g., Samoan, Fijian, etc.' – their applications and accompanying recommendations were to be referred to the Air Department. The Director of Manning emphasised that recruiting officers should endeavour to obtain the required information through subtle, rather than direct questioning. He explained

⁶⁹² Director of Manning to AMP, 19 June 1952, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹³ See: Johnston, Director of Manning to A/AMP, 15 November 1951, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 761 33/20/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington; Furkert, Director of Manning, to AMP, 30 June 1960, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 760 33/20/1 part 3, ANZ Wellington.

that: 'Every endeavour... must be made to avoid giving the candidate the impression that his/her colour or racial origin unduly influences his/her enlistment.'⁶⁹⁴

It is possible that details of ethnicity began to be recorded to enable the Air Department to provide data to the Statistics Department. The RNZAF, like the Army and Navy, may have been asked to furnish information for the intercensal population returns. However, no evidence has been located to confirm either that such requests were made or that the Air Force did submit intercensal returns. Obviously, the recording of ethnicity also would have enabled the Air Force to develop a better understanding of the ethnic make up of those entering the force. Given the concerns that the Director of Manning had expressed in June 1952, the information may have been used to ensure that non-European recruitment remained within certain limits, though again no evidence to confirm this has been located. In expressing his concern that applicants might believe their race 'unduly influences his/her enlistment', Furkert's choice of wording can be interpreted as implying that race was in fact taken into consideration. This may have especially been the case for individuals who were non-European and non-Maori, whose applications appear to have become subject to an additional level of screening in the Air Department.

Some later evidence also raises questions about the extent to which the ethnicity of applicants influenced RNZAF recruitment decisions. In March 1962, the commanding officer of the Northern Area Office wrote to the Air Department, asking whether it was necessary for Maori who had changed their names to do so through a formal statutory declaration.⁶⁹⁵ The cases involved several Maori women who had applied for service in the WRNZAF using English translations of their Maori names. Another case concerned a woman who had changed her name after being accepted into the force. These cases indicate that some Maori may have believed their chances of gaining entry and being accepted into the RNZAF would be improved if they did not emphasise their Maori identity and instead appeared to be more European.

In its external communications, the Air Force – like the other two services – was reluctant to disclose information on the level of Maori involvement in the force and maintained that all personnel were treated equally regardless of their ethnicity. In 1967, when responding to Victoria University student Don Murray's request for information on the role of Maori in the military, the Air Force emphasised that no distinction was made between Maori and Pakeha personnel. As detailed earlier in the chapter, Murray sought information from the Minister of Defence on: (1) the

⁶⁹⁴ Director of Manning, circular letter to Recruiting and Reserve Centres, 22 February 1955, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹⁵ Squadron Leader, RNZAF Northern Area Office, to Air Department, 7 March 1962, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington. See also: Director of Manning to RNZAF Northern Area Office, 4 April 1962, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

percentage of Maori personnel within the armed forces; (2) the number of Maori who helped the allied war effort in World War II; and (3) the percentage of Maori men amongst the New Zealand personnel deployed to Vietnam.⁶⁹⁶ The Defence Secretary forwarded Murray's letter to the three services and requested comments on the questions it set out.⁶⁹⁷

The Air Force's response was very similar to that which the Army provided. The Navy's response has not been located, but it evidently adopted a position similar to that of the Army and Air Force. As explained earlier, there appears to have been some communication between the three services as to how they would respond to the information request.⁶⁹⁸ The Air Force's response was set out in a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) to the Secretary of Defence, dated 3 August 1967.⁶⁹⁹ This letter explained that statistical records were not kept on the race of those who joined the RNZAF. In order to establish the potential of Maori personnel, a special survey would need to be made of every RNZAF unit.⁷⁰⁰ However, the option of surveying units would be contrary to the Air Force's preference not to acknowledge the racial origins of its personnel:

the RNZAF does not favour any enquiries suggestive of racial distinction or which might appear to be a departure from its traditional practice of national identification only for all New Zealand members.⁷⁰¹

In respect of conditions of service and opportunities for advancement, the Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) claimed that all members were treated equally, as the RNZAF 'has never had cause to consider or distinguish between the racial origin of its New Zealand members.'⁷⁰²

The following year, in June 1968, the Air Force ended the practice whereby welfare officers were asked to provide background reports on Maori applicants who sought to enter the service. In a letter sent to RNZAF area offices, the Director of Recruiting explained that the reports had been initiated as a response to discipline problems involving 'a few maoris' at Te Rapa. Similar problems had not occurred and,

⁶⁹⁶ Murray to Thomson, 15 June 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹⁷ Secretary of Defence to Deputy Secretary of Defence (Navy, Army, and Air), 5 July 1967, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹⁸ A/AMP to Deputy Secretary Defence, 25 July 1967, minute on Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) to Secretary of Defence, 25 July 1967, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁶⁹⁹ Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) to Secretary of Defence, 3 August 1967, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁰⁰ A draft of the letter acknowledged that personnel files could be consulted, though it was stated this would not give a fully accurate answer. Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air), draft letter to Secretary of Defence, 25 July 1967, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁰¹ Deputy Secretary of Defence (Air) to Secretary of Defence, 3 August 1967, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

moreover, the welfare officers' reports had not contributed to this. The Director of Recruiting claimed it was the experience of recruiting officers that the reports tended to favour Maori applicants, which perhaps made 'the decision of rejecting these applicants more difficult.' Concluding his letter, he quoted at length from the Air Force response to Murray's 1967 information request, indicating that this set down 'the present RNZAF policy with regards to Maoris'.⁷⁰³

Evidence concerning level of Maori involvement in the RNZAF, 1950-2000

It has been explained that several factors are likely to have made entry into the RNZAF more difficult for Maori than Pakeha. Alongside the Air Force's educational requirements, evidence from the 1950s indicates that among RNZAF staff members there was an element that viewed Maori involvement in the force with some ambivalence. Such attitudes, along with assumptions about the ability of Maori to meet the required standards of education, probably explain why the Air Force, compared to the Army and Navy, did not actively encourage Maori recruitment. Negative perceptions towards Maori may also have meant that Maori applicants were more often declined entry, though as noted above no evidence regarding applicant success rates has been located.

This section focuses on those Maori who were successful in entering the service. In particular, it examines the level of Maori involvement in the RNZAF. The evidence presented here spans the period between 1950 and 2000, though mostly concerns the twenty years after 1950. Over this whole period, the Air Force does not appear to have gathered data on the ethnicity of its personnel, though it has been noted that in 1955 details concerning the race of new personnel began to be recorded. By the late 1960s, the RNZAF's policy was that any information that differentiated between Maori and European personnel should not be disclosed. It has been explained that the Air Force may have been asked to provide data for the intercensal population returns, but no evidence concerning this has been located.

The evidence presented here draws on official census results and other forms of evidence. As well as indicating the extent to which personnel of Maori descent served in the RNZAF, it also sheds some light on the roles that Maori occupied in the force. Overall – and reflecting the particular barriers that Maori faced – it shows that Maori involvement in the RNZAF was more limited than in the other two services.

⁷⁰³ Director of Recruiting, circular letter to area offices, 26 June 1968, ADQA 17211 Air1 box 762 33/20/4, ANZ Wellington.

Census results

As explained earlier in the section concerning Army recruitment, census results from 1936 to 1971 include some very localised population data that differentiates between Maori and non-Maori residents. Such data is available for townships and localities that lay within the boundaries of a county, including a number of RNZAF bases and depots. Table 14 sets out the data that is available for RNZAF stations between 1951 – when the first census during the period covered by this report was held – and 1971. During this period, for census purposes, an individual was deemed to be a Maori if they were of half or more Maori descent.

Though useful, the figures presented in Table 14 do not provide a comprehensive picture of Air Force personnel during the period for which locality data is available. The data does not capture all of the main RNZAF bases. Notably, no figures are available for Shelly Bay base in Wellington, which did not lie within a county. In other cases, locality data is available for only some years. While some bases closed, alterations to local government boundaries meant that others were situated within a county for only part of the period. The 1951 and 1956 figures are the most comprehensive because, with the exception of Shelly Bay, they capture all of the main RNZAF stations. After 1956, the breadth of the data lessens. In 1971, data is recorded for only two of the main RNZAF bases – Ohakea and Woodbourne. It should also be noted that the data does not capture RNZAF personnel serving overseas, though the number outside of New Zealand at any time does not appear to have been a large proportion of the force. Further, it is very likely the figures include some individuals who were not service personnel, especially family members who resided at stations.

In spite of these limitations, the locality data presented in Table 14 provides an indication of the extent of Maori involvement in the Air Force from the early 1950s through to the early 1970s. It suggests that up until the early 1960s, Maori personnel comprised a very small proportion of the RNZAF – perhaps three percent of the force. Unlike, the post-war Navy and, especially, the Army, a significant increase in Maori involvement did not occur during the 1950s. The figures presented in Table 14 indicates that Maori participation may have almost doubled between the early and mid-1960s, but it nevertheless remained modest compared to the other services and the proportion of Maori in the New Zealand population as a whole. In the 1971 census, for example, the Maori population was recorded to be 7.9 percent of the total population.⁷⁰⁴

⁷⁰⁴ 'Population', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1972.

Table 14: RNZAF base / depot – census township and locality data, 1951-1971⁷⁰⁵

RNZAF base/station/depot	Year									
	1951		1956		1961		1966		1971	
	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori	Non-Maori	Maori
Hobsonville (Waitemata County)	597	14	884	17	767	14	1026	67	-	-
Whenuapai (Waitemata County)	490	38	648	32	790	35	802	66	-	-
Te Rapa (Waipa County)	72	3	271	8	267	13	-	-	-	-
Ohakea (Manawatu County)	370	20	808	15	716	22	545	25	470	22
Woodbourne (Marlborough County)	133	3	782	17	1003	13	1050	36	965	60
Wigram (Paparua County)	424	4	712	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Weedons (Paparua County)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	139	-
Taieri (Taieri County)	310	1	459	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Maori and Maori – totals	2396	83	4564	107	3543	97	3423	194	1574	82
Combined total	2479		4671		3640		3617		1656	
Maori percentage of combined total	3.3		2.3		2.7		5.4		5.0	

⁷⁰⁵ New Zealand Census Results; 1951 (Volume I, Table 20); 1956 (Table 19); 1961 (Table 19); 1966 (Table 18); 1971 (Table 19).

In addition to the census locality data presented in Table 14, research for this report has located some relevant data collected for the 1971 census, which concerns RNZAF personnel serving overseas. The data relates specifically to No. 41 Squadron, which at this time was based in Singapore. On the 23/24 March 1971, when the census was taken, the squadron's total strength was recorded to be 105 personnel, including 2 Maori members.⁷⁰⁶ This very low rate of Maori involvement, which was much lower than the rate recorded in the 1971 locality data, indicates that Maori personnel may have generally occupied roles that did not involve overseas postings. It also raises the question as to whether Maori, owing to racial restrictions, were at this time deliberately kept back from service outside of New Zealand. However, this would have been inconsistent with the situation in the Army, where there was a significant Maori component serving overseas, including amongst the 1RNZIR personnel stationed in Singapore.

Other evidence relating to Maori participation

Alongside the available census data, a small amount of additional evidence has been located concerning the extent to which Maori were involved in the RNZAF during the second half of the twentieth century. This evidence similarly indicates a low rate of involvement and also suggests that Maori occupied a limited number of roles.

In June 1964, an article in *Te Ao Hou* included an observation about the low number of Maori serving in skilled ground trades. The article reported upon the achievements of Barry Paraone Matena of Taumarunui, who had recently been selected to train as an electrical mechanic at the Royal Australian Air Force trade training school in Wagga Wagga. It was explained that Matena, after gaining school certificate, had entered the RNZAF as a boy entrant. Selected from several other candidates for the three-year course in Australia, he was stated to be 'one of a comparatively small number of Maori boys who have so far chosen a career of this kind in the Air Force.'⁷⁰⁷ The suggestion that serving in this branch of the RNZAF was a merely matter of preference is at odds with the details that the article provides about the school certificate qualification with which Matena entered the force and that he was selected for the course over a number of other candidates.

Other evidence relating to the 1960s also shows that, while some Maori were engaged in skilled positions and also held officer rank, Maori involvement at this level of the RNZAF was generally very limited. Pugsley, for example, notes that only one Maori

⁷⁰⁶ 41 Squadron RNZAF, NZ Census 23/24 March 1971, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 21 31/1/26 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁰⁷ 'Barry Paraone Matena', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 47, June 1964, p58. See also Director of Recruiting to Resident Officer, Maori Affairs, Taumarunui, 21 May 1964, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 203 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

officer, Flying Officer Pere, served in No. 14 Squadron during its deployment to Singapore between 1964 and 1966.⁷⁰⁸ McGibbon also details that, around the same time, the RNZAF had one Maori helicopter pilot, Flight Lieutenant William (Bill) Waterhouse.⁷⁰⁹ After flying Sunderland flying boats, Waterhouse in 1967 retrained to fly helicopters, which appear to have been introduced into the RNZAF in 1962.⁷¹⁰ After being selected to fly in Vietnam, Waterhouse, at the age of 25, was in 1969 killed in a training accident near Canberra.⁷¹¹

One branch of the RNZAF where Maori participation may have been at a higher level was the WRNZAF. Some evidence suggests that by the end of World War II the WAAF included a reasonably large Maori component, and this may well have continued in the post-war years. According to an article published in *Te Ao Hou* in March 1962, which noted an upcoming anniversary celebration, some 2000 personnel were in the WAAF at war's end, 'many of them Maori women'.⁷¹² As detailed earlier, during the 1950s and 1960s the majority of the background checks undertaken by welfare officers in the Wanganui District concerned females who wished to join the Air Force. While it is unclear how many of these applicants were successful, their number suggests that Maori women believed – based on the experiences of others before them – that gaining entry into the RNZAF was a realistic career option.

However, the WRNZAF comprised only a small proportion of the post-war RNZAF. In 1960, for example, the strength of the WRNZAF was recorded to be only 287 personnel.⁷¹³ Overall, the evidence presented here is consistent with the census results discussed above: until at least 1970, Maori personnel comprised a small component within the RNZAF. And it seems this situation continued. In January 1999, in an article published in *RNZAF News*, Squadron Leader Johan Bosch, who had recently taken over the role of Air Force kaumatua, was quoted as stating there was a 'low number of Maori in the RNZAF, in comparison with the other Services'. Bosch, who was affiliated to Taitokerau iwi, stated that he aimed to raise the profile of Maori culture within the service and also address negative external perceptions. The RNZAF, he observed, was 'not generally seen as an attractive or achievable career choice for Maori youth.'⁷¹⁴ That the Air Force had a kaumatua in the late 1990s shows that by this time the RNZAF, like the other branches of the NZDF, had abandoned the policy of not distinguishing between Maori and non-Maori personnel.

⁷⁰⁸ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p73.

⁷⁰⁹ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p185.

⁷¹⁰ 'RNZAF timeline', *NZ History* website, accessed 30 October 2017.

⁷¹¹ 'Bill Waterhouse', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 67, July 1969, p3.

⁷¹² Untitled article, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 38, March 1962, p42.

⁷¹³ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1961.

⁷¹⁴ 'New Kaumatua honoured by title', *RNZAF News*, January 1999, p7.

The steps that the NZDF began to take during the 1990s to provide greater recognition of Maori culture and protocol are examined further in the next chapter.

While Maori involvement in the RNZAF remained low at the end of the 1990s, Maori nevertheless continued to enter the Air Force, with some successfully undertaking specialist training. For example, in June 1999, *RNZAF News* recorded the achievements of 24-year old Pilot Officer Angela Swann, of Ngati Porou and Rongowhakaata descent, who had become the first Maori women to complete pilot training in the RNZAF.⁷¹⁵ As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the WRNZAF had been integrated into the RNZAF in 1977, and from this time formal restrictions on employment and career opportunities for women began to be removed.

NZDF – recent developments, 2000-2017

Focussing on the years since 2000, this section discusses recent evidence concerning Maori recruitment and levels of participation in the NZDF's three branches. Significant among the developments that have occurred, the NZDF has begun to produce data on the ethnicity of its personnel. Also, it has begun to examine how individuals from different ethnic groups, as well as males and females, perform during the NZDF recruitment process. These developments mark a departure from the policy that all three services articulated during the 1960s, which emphasised that no distinction should be made between members of different ethnic groups. It has been explained that, in keeping with this policy, there was a decided reluctance to disclose information on the services' ethnic make up.

That the NZDF has in recent years started to gather and release such information reflects not only increased expectations for transparency but also an NZDF policy to establish greater ethnic diversity alongside increased female participation. The policy relates not only to Maori, the largest ethnic minority, but also to other ethnic minority groups. Research for this report has not clearly established the reasoning that underlies this policy. It may include a belief that greater ethnic diversity will, in some situations, enable increased operational effectiveness. It is more certain that recruitment objectives at least partly underlie the drive to encourage greater ethnic diversity. In a society where ethnic minorities make up an increasingly large proportion of the population, the NZDF must necessarily broaden its focus to ensure that it meets ongoing recruitment targets.

By 2000, the process of substantial rationalisation and reorganisation of New Zealand's armed services was almost at an end. As detailed earlier, significant changes began to be introduced from the mid-1980s. In the early 2000s, the final

⁷¹⁵ 'Another first for the RNZAF!', *RNZAF News*, June 1999, p3.

stages of this period of reform were marked by decisions that affected the RNZAF, which saw the RNZAF's combat wing scrapped in 2001.⁷¹⁶ These changes saw further cuts to the number RNZAF regular personnel. In 2002, following these cuts, the total number of regular personnel across the three services finally stabilised after more than a decade of steady decline. As noted earlier, numbers have recovered a little since this time but have been subject to fluctuation.

Since 2000, in spite of lower personnel numbers and some reduced air capability, the armed services have continued to carry out many of the roles that became established during the twentieth century. Today, for example, the Navy is involved in fisheries patrol work, with the Air Force also playing a role in this work.⁷¹⁷ The NZDF also retains a role in supporting New Zealand's interests in Antarctica, providing air transport and logistics personnel to the Joint Logistics Pool, which serves the New Zealand, United States, and Italian Antarctic programmes.⁷¹⁸ And since 2000 the armed services have continued to assist in domestic relief and emergency operations. The largest such operation was in response to the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, which involved more than a thousand personnel.⁷¹⁹ In 2016, the NZDF was again significantly involved in the response to the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake.⁷²⁰

In respect of overseas deployments, the most significant since 2000 have been deployments to East Timor and Afghanistan. As noted above, a battalion-sized peacekeeping force was deployed to East Timor between 1999 and 2002. Before this battalion was withdrawn, New Zealand troops began to be deployed to Afghanistan – 'New Zealand's most recent Asian war'.⁷²¹ Following the 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, the Labour-led Government agreed to send a small SAS element to support the United States-led campaign to drive out the Taliban. This decision, McGibbon comments, stemmed from influences similar to those that underlay New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War – a desire to promote relations with the United States.⁷²² (Two years later, however, New Zealand declined to join the United States-led invasion of Iraq, though non-combat assistance was later supplied.⁷²³) In 2003, a provincial reconstruction team was also deployed to Afghanistan and remained in the country until 2013.⁷²⁴ The SAS was initially

⁷¹⁶ 'RNZAF timeline', *New Zealand History* website, accessed 19 August 2017.

⁷¹⁷ New Zealand Defence Force, annual report, 2017, pp17, 20.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p17.

⁷¹⁹ New Zealand Defence Force, *The Christchurch Earthquake: The New Zealand Defence Force Responds*, New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, 2011.

⁷²⁰ New Zealand Defence Force, annual report, 2017 p12. See also 'NZDF NH90s Bring Aid Supplies to Kaikoura', media release, 15 November 2016, Navy website, accessed 1 September 2017. URL: <http://navy.mil.nz/nap/news/media-release.htm@guid=%7Bc3f890b3-54bd-4e77-904b-489af42a6950%7D.htm>

⁷²¹ McGibbon, 'Asian conflicts – Later Asian wars', Te Ara website.

⁷²² *Ibid.*

⁷²³ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*

withdrawn in 2005, but was again committed to the theatre between 2009 and 2012.⁷²⁵ Since 2013, a small number of NZDF personnel have been posted to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy near Kabul, where they have undertaken roles to support the development of the Afghan National Security Forces.⁷²⁶

In 2015, New Zealanders were deployed to Iraq as part of an international coalition against Islamic State (ISIS). Of the NZDF personnel involved, the majority have been based at the New Zealand and Australian Building Partner Capacity mission at Taji, near Baghdad, where they have been engaged in training units of the Iraqi Security Forces. Currently there are 108 NZDF personnel serving at Taji, with much smaller numbers serving in coalition-related roles in other locations.⁷²⁷ Together, these personnel appear to make up a significant proportion of the NZDF personnel who are presently deployed overseas. While current figures have not been located, in August 2017 around 265 NZDF personnel were involved in more than 20 operations and United Nations peace-keeping missions around the world.⁷²⁸

As in the early 1990s (see page 143), the NZDF, in 2000, was again asked to participate in the implementation of a broad government policy that aimed to advance the social and economic position of Maori. Known as 'Closing the Gaps', this policy was first outlined in Te Puni Kokiri's 1998 *Closing the Gaps* report. The National-led Government had broadly adopted the recommendations of this report, and in 1999 the new Labour-led Government also embraced the general policy direction, though it introduced some modifications.⁷²⁹ The NZDF was among a group of government agencies that were expected to contribute to efforts to achieve Closing the Gaps policy goals. Unlike the earlier response to proposals relating to Ka Awatea, the NZDF was more amenable to assisting with Closing the Gaps, though it had little choice in the matter. In early 2000, for example, Cabinet directed Defence to develop apprenticeship options for Maori and Pacific Islanders. The Chief of the Defence Force confirmed this, but emphasised that trade requirements and standards were not to be compromised.⁷³⁰ Steps were then taken to develop suitable options, with NZDF leaders seeking to be viewed as being constructive in order to improve

⁷²⁵ Ibid. See also 'Job well done SAS', New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 15 August 2017.
URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/2012/20120403-jwdnzsas.htm>

⁷²⁶ 'Afghanistan', New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 6 August 2018.
URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/afghanistan.htm>

⁷²⁷ 'Iraq', New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 6 August 2018.
URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/iraq.htm>

⁷²⁸ 'Overseas operations', New Zealand Defence Force website, accessed 15 August 2017.
URL: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/default.htm>

⁷²⁹ Hill, *Maori and the State*, p273.

⁷³⁰ Gallagher (for Chief of Air Staff) to Commander, RNZAF Base Woodbourne, 19 April 2000, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, Personnel – RNZAF Maori Advisory Group – Policy, 1997-2004, NZDF Archives Trentham.

relations with the Labour Government.⁷³¹ Later in the year, the NZDF also weighed up options as to how it might assist in the implementation of the Government's 'Second Chance Education' strategy, which evidently fitted within the Closing the Gaps framework.⁷³² Research undertaken for this report has failed to locate evidence regarding the role that the NZDF finally played in the implementation of the Closing the Gaps policy.

For the period examined in this section, research has identified one example of NZDF recruitment publicity that has been aimed specifically at Maori. This echoes earlier Army and Navy efforts to encourage Maori enlistment. In 2008, Te Puni Kokiri's magazine, *Kōkiri*, included a recruitment article that focussed on opportunities within all of the three services – Army, Navy, and Air Force.⁷³³ The *Kōkiri* article reiterated a number of the themes that had been expressed in earlier Army recruitment articles that were published more than 40 years previously in *Te Ao Hou*. The 2008 article emphasised, for example: the challenges and excitement of training and active deployments; the useful nature of the NZDF's operational work; the comradeship that exists within the forces; and the high rate of Maori involvement within New Zealand's armed services. Unlike the earlier recruitment campaigns, the article did not highlight the absence of discrimination against Maori, but instead emphasised a strong respect for Maori culture within the services – a theme that is examined in more detail in chapter four.

The 2008 *Kōkiri* article also favourably compared a career in the services with the limited alternative opportunities that were open to some Maori. It included the following comments from a Maori member of the Air Force, whose life in the service was described to be 'a far cry from the streets of Manurewa', where he had grown up: 'Working in a factory in South Auckland never seemed that exciting to me. Joining the Air Force is probably one of the best choices I have made in life!'⁷³⁴ The article also spoke of 'the fighting qualities of Māori' and the strong tradition of Maori military service, noting in particular the involvement of Maori in World War II and, especially, the achievements of 28 (Maori) Battalion. This tradition lived on, with Maori remaining 'heavily committed to the New Zealand Defence Force'.⁷³⁵

⁷³¹ In a letter to the commander of RNZAF Woodbourne Base, dated 21 April 2000, an NZDF staff member (writing on behalf of the Chief of Air Staff) stated that: 'The difficulty of the task is appreciated, but with the current Government's perception of Defence as being uncooperative and obstructionist, an expeditious response would be most appreciated.' Gallagher (for Chief of Air Staff) to Commander, RNZAF Base Woodbourne, 19 April 2000, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁷³² Ferguson, AC(Pers), circular memo, 8 November 2000, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁷³³ 'Our Warriors of the land, sea and air', *Kōkiri*, Issue 9, 2008, pp41-43.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, p43.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*, p41.

Details of the number of Maori personnel in each service were also provided in the *Kōkiri* recruitment article. It stated that the Army was believed to be New Zealand's single largest employer of Maori, with 1070 Maori in the service, equating to more than 20 percent of all personnel.⁷³⁶ The suggestion that the Army was the largest employer of Maori had earlier been made in the *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, which was published in 2000.⁷³⁷ Recently, Maria Bargh has reiterated it in her 2015 book, *A Hidden Economy: Māori in the Privatised Military Industry*.⁷³⁸ Bargh's research, more notably, sheds light on Maori involvement in a specific employment opportunity that in recent years has emerged for some individuals who have trained and served within the NZDF, particularly the Army. During the 1990s, Bargh explains, work opportunities within privately-owned military enterprises began to grow as these enterprises started to gain an increasing stake in international security operations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. All New Zealanders involved in this work appear to have previously served in the NZDF, with many evidently leaving the Army to secure higher wages within the privatised military industry.⁷³⁹ Bargh suggested that in 2015 that more than 200 Maori operators may have been working overseas on contracts within the industry.⁷⁴⁰

By 2008, when details of the number of Maori personnel were provided in the *Kōkiri* article, the NZDF had been gathering data on the ethnicity of its personnel for several years. This appears to have begun in 2003 and since this time ethnicity data has been collected on an annual basis. As noted above, the gathering of these statistics marks a departure from earlier policy and seems to be linked to NZDF efforts to achieve greater ethnic diversity among personnel. Research for this report has not established exactly when the policy to encourage ethnic diversity was introduced. A 2016 Ministry of Defence report on recruitment set out the NZDF's position as follows:

The New Zealand Defence Force aims to have a strong and inclusive workforce that recognises diversity is a strength that contributes to the long-term effectiveness of the organisation. However, similar to many other modern militaries, the Defence Force is not currently representative of the population at large in terms of either gender or ethnicity.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁶ Ibid., p41.

⁷³⁷ 'Maori in the armed forces', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p303.

⁷³⁸ Maria Bargh, *A Hidden Economy: Māori in the Privatised Military Industry*, Huia, Wellington, 2015, p5.

⁷³⁹ Ibid., pp28-29.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., p29.

⁷⁴¹ Ministry of Defence, Evaluation Division, *Recruitment: Barriers and Opportunities for Military Candidates*, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, July 2016, p8.

This suggests that the NZDF's ambition is not simply to have all ethnic groups represented within the force. Instead, its aim is for the force to proportionally reflect the ethnic composition of the population as a whole. Similarly, in respect of gender, its ambition is equal representation of males and females.

The ethnicity data that the NZDF has gathered since 2003 is presented in Graphs 2, 3, 4, and 5. The data is evidently based on information that personnel have provided in respect of their principal ethnic identity. A notable aspect of the results is that a significant proportion of personnel have either elected not to specify an ethnicity or they have identified themselves to be a 'New Zealander', which is not traditionally considered an ethnic group.⁷⁴² Throughout the 2003-2017 period, those in the former category have declined somewhat, while the latter group has increased considerably. In 2003, across the whole NZDF, about 17 percent of personnel specified they were a 'New Zealander'; in 2017, more than 34 percent used this term. It is uncertain what this shift represents, but clearly a growing proportion of personnel have wished to avoid ethnic classification, perhaps as a negative response to the NZDF's policy of encouraging greater ethnic diversity and the steps that in recent decades have been taken to formally recognise and support Maori culture and tikanga – a development that is discussed further in chapter four.

It is not possible to identify how many individuals of Maori descent are among those who have used the term 'New Zealander' to define their ethnicity. The category 'Maori' should not be seen as including all personnel of Maori descent, only those who consider their principal ethnic affiliation to be Maori. The graphs presented above show several trends concerning this group. Looking at the NZDF as a whole, the proportion of Maori within the Regular Force remained about the same between 2003 and 2010, but has since decreased steadily, dropping by almost one-fifth from 18.0 percent in 2010 to 14.6 percent in 2017. A decline in Maori personnel in the Army accounts for most of this decline, though the Navy's Maori component has also decreased, but to a lesser extent. In 2017, the proportion of personnel who identified themselves as Maori in the Army and Navy was the same – 17.7 percent. Within the RNZAF, the proportion of Maori has grown a little, but remains small at 6.2 percent in 2017. In the 2006 and 2013 censuses, the proportion of people in the population who identified themselves to be Maori was 13.6 and 13.8 percent respectively.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴² In respect of how ethnicity data is currently recorded, the NZDF has advised that: 'Recording ethnicity is an option step during the enlistment process. Personnel can select up to three different ethnicities, and are free to update this information at any time. The options available align with those reported by Statistics NZ, which include *New Zealander*.' Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 20 July 2018, held by author.


⁷⁴³ See Table 4 in downloadable Excel file, 'Historical population estimates tables', Statistics New Zealand website, accessed 28 July 2017.

URL:http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_projections/historical-population-tables.aspx

From 1986, census categorisation has been based on ‘affiliation’ rather than ‘degree of Maori blood’.⁷⁴⁴

The proportion of Maori among NZDF personnel who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq since February 2001 is broadly consistent with the overall rate of Maori participation in the NZDF during this period. Figures provided by the NZDF record that, during the period from 19 February 2001 to 20 July 2018, a total of 5125 personnel were involved in deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Of these individuals, 865 – or 16.4 percent – identified as Maori.⁷⁴⁵

Graph 2: NZDF – ethnicity of regular personnel, 2003-2017⁷⁴⁶




⁷⁴⁴ See text accompanying graph ‘New Zealand population by ethnicity, 1840-2006’, media item within Ian Pool, ‘Population Change’, Te Ara website, accessed 23 April 2018.

URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/graph/28720/new-zealand-population-by-ethnicity-1840-2006>


⁷⁴⁵ The following figures were recorded in respect of the other personnel who served in Afghanistan and Iraq during the period: NZ European – 1,847 (36.0 percent); New Zealander – 1,471 (28.7 percent); others – 839 (16.4 percent); unknown – 126 (2.5 percent). See Enclosure 1, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 20 July 2018, held by author.

⁷⁴⁶ Table 1, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

Graph 3: Army – ethnicity of regular personnel, 2003-2017⁷⁴⁷




Graph 4: Navy – ethnicity of regular personnel, 2003-2017⁷⁴⁸



⁷⁴⁷ Table 3, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

⁷⁴⁸ Table 2, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

Graph 5: Air Force – ethnicity of regular personnel, 2003-2017⁷⁴⁹



In connection with the aim of achieving greater ethnic diversity and higher female representation, the Ministry of Defence has recently undertaken a review that examines the specific challenges that ethnic minorities and female candidates face during the NZDF’s recruitment process.⁷⁵⁰ In 2016, the report produced from this review was released. It drew a link between the NZDF’s personnel requirements, the aim of fostering greater diversity, and the need to ensure that suitable candidates were not being rejected. The report observed that:

In order to achieve the desired mix of skills for the future force, the recruitment process must be well-executed, draw upon a wider pool of potential candidates than ever before, and focus on identifying the best fitting candidates for both the current and future force.⁷⁵¹

Based on an analysis of individuals who made applications between June 2014 and January 2015, the review considered NZDF recruitment as a whole and did not distinguish between the three services.⁷⁵² It identified a number of challenges, including, notably, that ethnic minority groups and women dropped out of the

⁷⁴⁹ Table 4, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.
⁷⁵⁰ Ministry of Defence, Evaluation Division, *Recruitment: Barriers and Opportunities for Military Candidates*, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, July 2016, p4.
⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p4.
⁷⁵² *Ibid.*, p8.

recruitment process in disproportionate numbers (compared to Pakeha in the first instance and men in the second).⁷⁵³ The report also noted that applicants with desirable characteristics were not identified early in the process and that it was possible that some candidates with valuable skills dropped-out before they reached the point of being adequately assessed.⁷⁵⁴ The review recommended that an assessment be made of the reasons why Maori and members of other ethnic groups and women disproportionately failed the recruitment process.⁷⁵⁵ Work towards this had been planned when the report was released in July 2016.⁷⁵⁶

Assessment of the economic importance of military service

This section briefly assesses the extent to which military service has been of economic importance to Maori during the period covered in this report. As noted in the introduction, little relevant and easily accessible evidence is available regarding both the average length of Maori service and the degree to which Maori personnel have undertaken vocational training applicable to employment opportunities outside of the military sector. The absence of this evidence limits the extent to which it is possible to evaluate the economic importance of military service. While the proportion of the Maori workforce engaged in military service can be estimated for particular years, the rate at which Maori have passed through the services is unclear, as is the extent to which Maori have acquired skills that have been transferable to the civilian context. With regard to the acquisition of vocational skills such as trade training, it should be noted that, even when such training was not undertaken, military service offered experiences and other training that, for some individuals, would have served to open up opportunities for employment outside of the military sector.

Though a comprehensive assessment of the economic importance of military service is not possible, evidence has been examined concerning the proportion of the Maori workforce that has engaged in armed services' employment and how this has changed. Relying partly on census results, this research has focussed on two particular years – 1966 and 2006. The evidence available for 1966 provides a picture of Maori military employment after there had been growth in Maori involvement within the services and – in respect of the Army and Navy, at least – Maori personnel had become overrepresented in comparison to the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. Also, in the mid-1960s, some 20 years before defence sector

⁷⁵³ For both Maori and women candidates, the testing and interview stages of the recruitment process are identified to be most problematic. Ministry of Defence, Evaluation Division, *Recruitment: Barriers and Opportunities*, pp6, 21, and 27.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p5.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p7.

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p37.

began to be reformed, the forces retained their post-war strength. It seems likely that the years between about 1960 and 1985 marked the highpoint of the importance of military employment within the Maori workforce.

In examining the available data for 1966, research has focussed only on evidence concerning Maori males. As explained earlier, employment opportunities for females within the armed services were, at this time, relatively limited. The 1966 census results record that the size of the Maori male workforce was 43,699, which included 788 individuals employed in the armed services.⁷⁵⁷ (As noted earlier, a Maori, for statistical purposes, was defined at this time as an individual of half or more Maori descent.) In order to calculate the proportion of the Maori male workforce that was engaged in military employment in 1966, it is necessary to make an adjustment to the second figure, 788, because this does not include individuals who were serving outside of New Zealand at the time of the census. No evidence has been located regarding the total number of Maori personnel who were serving overseas in 1966. However, indicative evidence is available for other years. As detailed earlier in Tables 7 and 8, returns provided in 1971 record 305 Maori serving overseas in the Army. The Navy also recorded 19 Maori serving in the *Otago* – a figure somewhat lower than the number who were overseas in 1956 (see Table 11) and 1976. Based on the evidence available regarding numbers serving overseas in other years, a reasonable estimate of the total number of Maori males employed in the armed services in 1966 would be in the vicinity of 1,120.⁷⁵⁸

This figure equates to about 2.6 percent of the total Maori male workforce recorded in the 1966 census. It is very likely that this overall rate of military employment obscures a higher level of involvement among Maori males who lay within the workforce's younger age cohorts. It is also probable that it obscures differences between iwi, with rates of involvement being higher among groups that had the strongest traditions of military service for the Crown. Within the younger cohorts of these iwi, it is feasible that more than five percent of males were involved in military employment in the mid-1960s. As discussed above, it is not possible to assess the full significance of this employment without knowing the rate at which Maori passed through the armed services and, along the way, gained skills that enabled them to access opportunities outside of the military sector.

In looking at the position in 2006, the data that has been examined concerns both Maori men and women. By this time, opportunities for women within the armed services had expanded and the size of New Zealand's female workforce – Maori and non-Maori – had grown significantly. As detailed below, the available evidence

⁷⁵⁷ See Table 15, Department of Statistics, *Maori Population and Dwellings, 1966*, Wellington, 1969.

⁷⁵⁸ This figure represents the 788 individuals recorded in the 1966 census as well as an estimated 305 Army personnel and 27 Navy personnel serving overseas.

shows that in 2006 the proportion of the Maori workforce engaged in military employment was lower than that recorded for Maori males 40 years earlier. Several factors explain this. Between 1989 and 2002, the defence sector reforms resulted in a significant decline in the number of regular personnel (see Table 1). For both Maori and non-Maori, these cuts obviously reduced employment opportunities within the NZDF, though it has been suggested that Maori – owing to their higher concentration in the Army’s combat arms – may have been less affected. (The previous section has also noted that, around the same time, employment opportunities began to open up within the privatised military industry.) In addition to the decline in NZDF personnel numbers, and probably of more significance, large growth in the total size of the Maori workforce also served to diminish the overall importance of military employment for Maori. This expansion resulted from an ongoing increase in the size of the Maori population as well as growth in the female workforce.

NZDF statistics detail that in June 2006 the three branches of the armed services included 1681 individuals who identified as Maori.⁷⁵⁹ In the same year, the census recorded the total size of the Maori labour force (including those unemployed or working part-time) to be 253,233. Of these individuals, 175,548 were employed on a full-time basis.⁷⁶⁰ Based on these figures, about 0.7 percent of the total Maori labour force was engaged in NZDF military employment, while the figure for those engaged in full-time work was 1.0 percent. As with the 1966 data, it is likely these statistics obscure some differences between age cohorts and, possibly, iwi. A difference between the rates of military employment for Maori males and females is also likely. Nevertheless, overall, the 2006 statistics show a decline in the importance of military employment within the Maori workforce. Decreasing numbers Maori serving within the NZDF have no doubt continued this trend. In June 2017, 1343 NZDF personnel identified as Maori – about 20 percent fewer than the figure recorded in 2006.⁷⁶¹

Conclusion

Following World War II and into the 1950s, New Zealand’s armed services were not free from exclusionary policies, practices, and attitudes that sought to limit Maori participation. This was at odds with steps that the government was taking to secure greater equality of treatment and status for Maori, and it was also contrary to the aspirations and expectations of Maori themselves. Generally, restrictions on Maori

⁷⁵⁹ Table 1, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

⁷⁶⁰ See Table 18 in downloadable Excel file, ‘2006 Census Data – QuickStats About Māori’, Statistics New Zealand website, accessed 11 August 2018.

URL:<http://archive.stats.govt.nz/Census/2006CensusHomePage/QuickStats/quickstats-about-a-subject/maori.aspx#>

⁷⁶¹ Table 1, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

involvement in the armed services during the post-war period were not explicitly set out in the services' formal entry criteria. However, as detailed in chapter one, an exclusion of this type was introduced in respect of the Interim Army in June 1946. This was removed within a few months, after the Minister of Defence became aware that Maori applicants – including former soldiers of the recent war – were being turned away from the peacetime Army on the grounds of their race.

Rather than through formal exclusions, Maori involvement in the post-war services was restricted through more subtle recruitment policies and practices. In respect of the Army, the earliest evidence that points to this concerns the first Jayforce replacement draft. Unlike the main body of the occupation force, which was composed of personnel already serving in 2NZEF, recruitment for the replacement draft was undertaken in New Zealand, beginning in February 1946. The quota set for Maori personnel was only two-thirds of that of the main body and amounted to a little more than four percent of the replacement draft – significantly less than the proportion of Maori in the total population. As a result, Maori volunteers were turned away at a higher rate than Pakeha, and at least one Maori community complained about the limited opportunities that existed for Maori. The second and final replacement draft evidently did not include a Maori quota and involved a much higher rate of Maori participation – a shift that is likely to have been linked, at least partly, to the fact that the Army in 1947 faced a greater challenge in attracting sufficient recruits. The extent to which Army recruiters subtly sought to limit Maori involvement in the main body of Kayforce – if at all – is unclear. Like Jayforce, the Maori component of Kayforce increased as efforts to attract volunteers became more difficult. It has been noted, for example, that Maori comprised almost 25 percent of the personnel who left New Zealand in the reinforcement groups that embarked between April 1952 and March 1953.

Within the regular Army, efforts to limit Maori involvement were undertaken in the Northern Military District and may have been practiced elsewhere, though no evidence has been located to confirm this. In early 1947, senior staff members at Northern Headquarters promoted a method of vetting Maori applicants that involved use of a general knowledge test – an approach that meant that Maori could be declined without showing they had been turned down on the grounds of their race. It appears that in 1952 this vetting process or a similar method was continuing to be used to limit Maori entry in some Northern sub-districts. Army Headquarters staff were aware of this and evidently comfortable with the practice.

Evidence of deliberate efforts to limit and restrict post-war Maori entry into the Navy and the Air Force is less clear. However, very low rates of Maori involvement in these services indicate that exclusionary policies, practices, and attitudes may well have informed the handling of Maori recruitment after World War II. In the case of the

Navy, intercensal population returns that the RNZN provided to the Statistics Department show that between 1946 and 1950 only about two to three percent of personnel were Maori. With regard to the Air Force, census locality data for RNZAF bases shows similarly low rates of Maori involvement up until the early 1960s. Additionally, there is evidence of Air Force staff possessing discriminatory views about Maori and their place in the force. Notably, in 1952, the RNZAF's Director of Manning expressed a personal view that Maori – in spite of their very low rate of involvement in the service at this time – were 'too freely' allowed entry into the force. Having been appointed to the position in about 1951, this individual remained the Director of Manning – a role that had key responsibilities in the area of recruitment – until at least 1960.

During the 1950s, Maori involvement in the Army and the Navy increased. Within these services, any concerns about Maori participation appear to have lessened as both services evidently became open to greater Maori involvement. It has been suggested that this shift was driven, in part, by the significant recruitment challenges that the services faced in the post-war period. These difficulties would have encouraged the services to look towards the Maori community as a potential source of recruits. While some shortfalls could be met from recruitment of personnel from the United Kingdom, there were limitations and expense associated with this recruitment and it was eventually restricted to securing personnel for specialist roles.

Intercensal population returns furnished for Army camps in the early-to-mid 1950s indicate that the proportion of Maori within the regular Army was, at this time, roughly in line with the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. Significant growth in Maori involvement stemmed from the establishment of the Regular Force battalions that from 1957 were raised for service in Malaya. (The formation of these units, it has been explained, was an important development in the shift away from planning that relied on deployment of citizen volunteers.) Within the initial battalion, 1 NZ Regiment, Army statistics show that almost one-quarter of the personnel were Maori. In about 1960, Army recruiters began to deliberately, though not exclusively, target Maori communities. The Department of Maori Affairs assisted with these efforts, viewing the Army's interest in recruiting Maori as being compatible with its own objective of assisting Maori into employment and training.

The Army's efforts to recruit Maori show that by 1960 earlier Army policies and practices that had sought to limit Maori involvement had been abandoned. In seeking to attract Maori recruits, it has been suggested that the Army, by this time, was not simply looking to make up numbers. Its recruitment efforts also reflected positive perceptions regarding the performance of Maori soldiers within the integrated force. However, Maori personnel were not only prominent among the Army units deployed to South-East Asia, they also came to form a sizeable

component within the Regular Force as a whole. In 1966, one estimate provided from within the Army suggested that the proportion of Maori personnel was ‘as high as 40%’. On the basis of other evidence, this seems unlikely, but it is clear that by this time Maori participation in the Army was considerably in excess of the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. In 2003, when the NZDF first began to routinely collect data on the ethnicity of personnel, 24.1 percent of regular Army personnel identified themselves to be Maori. Since 2003, for reasons that are unclear, the rate of Maori participation has steadily declined. In 2017, only 17.7 percent of Army personnel identified themselves as being Maori.

In the case of the Navy, intercensal population returns show that Maori involvement in the force began to grow in the early 1950s. This growth was already underway when RNZN staff and Maori Affairs officials met in March 1953 to discuss how the Department could assist the Navy to recruit Maori. At this meeting, it was agreed that welfare officers would support Maori candidates during selection interviews and would also provide the RNZN with background information on the suitability of Maori applicants. Welfare officers were involved in this work into the 1960s, with some actively promoting service opportunities within the RNZN to young Maori. The intercensal data that is available for the years from 1947 to 1959 shows that there continued to be gradual growth in the proportion of Maori personnel within the RNZN from the early 1950s through to the end of the decade. In 1959, the data indicates that the overall rate of Maori participation was about seven-and-a-half percent, with a somewhat higher rate among personnel serving on RNZN ships and at Motuihe Island training base. By this time, Maori involvement in the Navy exceeded the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. Some evidence from 1961 suggests that the Navy around this time sought to keep Maori participation in line with the composition of the general population, but it is unclear whether this was in fact the case. If such a policy did exist, it may have been relatively short-lived because Maori involvement in the force continued to grow. By 2003, almost one-fifth of RNZN personnel, 19.4 percent, identified themselves as being Maori. Since this time, the proportion of Maori personnel within the Navy has declined a little, and in 2017 17.7 percent identified as Maori – the same rate of involvement recorded for the Army.

Unlike the Army and Navy, Maori involvement in the Air Force has remained limited. The extent to which discriminatory attitudes persisted in the RNZAF and may have continued to influence the level of Maori participation in the force is unclear. However, census locality data available for RNZAF bases and depots indicates that the proportion of Maori personnel within the Air Force increased significantly in the five-year period between 1961 and 1966, rising from 2.7 to 5.4 percent. This suggests that the RNZAF became more open to Maori involvement at this time – something possibly connected with the fact that the Director of Manning

who served throughout the 1950s was replaced during this period. Another, more certain factor that explains the low level of Maori involvement in the RNZAF is that, compared to the Army and Navy, the educational requirements for entry have generally been higher. With lower standards of educational achievement, Maori have been less able to enter the force than Pakeha. In 2003, only 5.6 percent of RNZAF personnel identified themselves as Maori – very similar to the figures captured from the 1966 and 1971 census locality data. In 2017, 6.2 percent of Air Force personnel identified as Maori, a small increase on the rate of Maori involvement recorded in 2003.

In contrast to the RNZAF, educational entry requirements for both the Army and the Navy have – in respect of enlisted ranks, at least – generally been lower. This was certainly the case during the 1950s, when formal educational requirements for entry into both services were minimal. It has been stated that this was important among the factors that explain the growth in Maori involvement in the Army and Navy that occurred during the 1950s and, in the case of the Army, at least, continued into the 1960s. With limited entry barriers, service in the Army and Navy provided an opportunity for Maori, who – compared to Pakeha – generally had a narrower range of employment options.

In relation to the Army, however, it has been noted that intelligence testing introduced around the mid-1950s disadvantaged those who spoke te reo as their first language. In spite of significant overall growth in Maori involvement, some Maori may have been declined entry on the basis of this testing. Both Maori and Pakeha were required to undertake PSO testing, and no evidence has been located to suggest that it was introduced for the purpose of restricting the level of Maori participation in the force. However, it appears the testing was seen to be useful in providing an indication of the extent to which Maori would be able to perform in the Pakeha-dominated integrated force. In 1966, the ‘Maori Soldier’ memo stated that the testing, though inaccurate as a measure of the intelligence of Maori who lacked fluency in English, nevertheless provided a valuable indication of their capability to ‘measure up to the Army’s pakeha environment and requirements’.


Oral sources have shed light on the various motivations that underlay Maori enlistment during the period covered in this report. These sources show that Maori were often motivated, at least partly, by the drive to secure paid employment and to improve their economic circumstances. This appears to have been the case even among those who joined the Army on short-term engagements to participate in overseas deployments. However, Maori enlistment and the apparent greater willingness of Maori to serve in the armed forces also reflected other motivations. During the period examined here, many who joined up were following an established family tradition of military service, which they wished to continue. On the other

hand, it has been noted that some Maori from iwi that had largely avoided military service for the Crown also began entering the forces in the 1950s and 1960s. Growth in Maori involvement in the Army and Navy at this time possibly also reflected an understanding among Maori that – compared to other areas of society – overt discrimination against Maori was less common. For some Maori, and no doubt some Pakeha too, joining the forces enabled them to leave situations where there was a risk that they would, sooner or later, become entangled with the police and courts.

In the face of growing rates of Maori participation, all three services became reluctant to disclose information on the level of Maori involvement within their ranks. This reluctance was expressed during the 1960s, by which time both the Army and the Navy included a significant proportion of Maori personnel. It has been explained that the service's refusal to disclose details of Maori involvement was justified with reference to integrationist concepts. Specifically, it was emphasised that no differentiation was made between personnel on the grounds of race. It has been suggested, however, that the Army, in particular, may have been concerned about how disclosure of the high rate of Maori involvement might have affected its reputation. As discussed in chapter four, the services unwillingness to recognise ethnic difference would from 1990 begin to break down.

A reluctance to distinguish between service personnel on the grounds of race might also partly explain why the government, over the years, seems to have given little consideration to the extent to which military service has been of economic significance to Maori. Research for this report has not attempted to quantify the economic importance of military service for Maori, but – with a significantly higher rate of involvement – service in the armed forces is likely to have been of greater economic significance to Maori than Pakeha. This would especially be the case for some Maori communities where there have been ongoing high rates of service. In spite of this, and though Maori have at times been deliberately encouraged to join the forces, government decision making does not appear to have included an awareness of Maori interests. This is evident, most notably, in the decision making that was undertaken in connection with the reforms that began in the mid-1980s and that ended in the early 2000s, resulting in major cuts to personnel numbers. No evidence has been located to suggest that the government assessed how these changes would impact upon Maori.

Chapter Three: Leadership and Promotion



Lieutenant Anthony (Tony) Taroa Averill Mataira, c.1956.
Reference: Personnel file 2479036, NZDF Archives Trentham.

Introduction

Having examined, in chapter two, the ability of Maori to serve in the armed forces and changing rates of Maori participation, this chapter looks at issues concerning the place that Maori have occupied within the service's hierarchical leadership structures. In particular, it discusses the extent to which Maori have been able to serve in leadership positions and gain promotions. Barriers that have limited the ability of Maori to secure leadership roles and promotions are examined, along with efforts that have been made to encourage Maori into positions of responsibility. Issues relating to appointments and promotion in the period covered in this report are raised in at least one Wai claim – Wai 824, which alleges that Maori soldiers, men and women, were overlooked for promotion.⁷⁶² During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, a number of witnesses also discussed issues concerning leadership and promotion. Some of this evidence is cited later in the chapter.

The issues examined here are linked to developments and themes discussed earlier in the report. In respect of the Army, the fact that Maori were increasingly required to serve alongside Pakeha – invariably, from the late 1950s – potentially had implications for Maori leadership and promotion. Within the citizen-soldier force of 2NZEF, most Maori volunteers had served in 28 (Maori) Battalion, which had been officered largely by Maori. In contrast, without any such provision for separate Maori service, there were no dedicated positions for Maori officers within an integrated service context. Moreover, Maori who were appointed to leadership positions would have command over Pakeha – a development that not all Pakeha would have welcomed. The previous chapter has noted, for example, that in 1952 the commander of Northern Military District expressed regret about the prominent role that Maori were playing as CMT instructors.

On the other hand, it has been explained that the shift towards integrated Maori military service was linked to a broader post-war policy of integration, which included an emphasis on equality of treatment. The extent to which Maori were treated equally in respect of leadership and promotion opportunities is one of the key issues examined here. However, the evidence that is presented in this chapter highlights that equality of treatment differs from equality of opportunity. In respect of opportunities to serve at commissioned rank, educational requirements have presented a greater barrier to Maori because of generally lower rates of Maori educational achievement. This barrier has been important among the reasons why, across all services, the proportion of Maori among officers has been lower than that of non-Maori.

⁷⁶² Wai 824, #1.1(b), p11.

As in chapter two, the discussion in this chapter focuses on the regular forces, though a little evidence concerning the Territorial Force and citizen-soldier volunteers within Jayforce and Kayforce is also presented. The discussion primarily concerns the ability of Maori to serve as officers, though some important evidence relating to promotion of Maori within other ranks is also discussed. The focus on service of Maori at commissioned rank partly reflects the reality that this is the forces' key leadership stratum. It also reflects the fact that the available, relevant archival evidence primarily relates to issues concerning Maori and service at commissioned rank. Most of this evidence, it will be explained, concerns the Army and Navy – the forces that have had the highest overall rates of Maori participation.

Divided into three sections, the chapter separately examines leadership and promotion issues within each service, beginning first with the Army, and then following with the Navy and Air Force. Within each section, developments are discussed chronologically. Very little relevant evidence has been located in respect of the RNZAF, which reflects in part the limited extent to which Maori have served in the Air Force.

Army

Developments during the post-war period, 1946-1960

Covering the fifteen years that followed World War II, this section looks particularly at issues concerning service of Maori at commissioned rank within the regular Army. It also presents some evidence relating to the ability of Maori to gain promotions within other ranks. The previous chapter has explained that by 1960 – the end of the period examined here – the Regular Force included a significant Maori component, with growth in the number of Maori personnel linked particularly to the formation of the infantry battalions that were deployed to Malaya in the late 1950s. In spite of this growth, and though Maori were prominent among the NCOs served as CMT instructors, it will be explained that before 1960 very few Maori served at commissioned rank within the regular Army.

Before examining evidence relating to this, the involvement of Maori in leadership positions outside of the regular Army is first briefly discussed. In respect of the Territorial Force, research for this report has located little evidence concerning the extent to which Maori served at commissioned rank. In notes prepared for Defence Secretary Hunn ahead of 28 (Maori) Battalion's 1964 reunion, Captain A. Armstrong recalled that, while CMT intakes had included 'a high proportion of young Maoris',

few Maori officers had served in the Territorial battalions.⁷⁶³ Armstrong indicated that individuals who had served at commissioned rank during World War II were able to serve as officers in the Territorial Force if they had wished to do so. He stated, however, that few former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion volunteered for such service. This possibly reflected disappointment about the decision not to form a separate Maori unit. Armstrong identified five Maori officers who served in the Territorial Force. They included Major Rangī Logan, Major Monty Searancke, and Major Bill Mohi, all former officers of 28 (Maori) Battalion who served together in 1 Hawke's Bay Battalion. The two other Maori officers that Armstrong identified were Brigadier Hoani Haereroa Parata and Lieutenant-Colonel Aubrey Balzac, who respectively had command responsibilities over 3 Infantry Brigade and the Hauraki Regiment.⁷⁶⁴

In addition to the Territorial Force, leadership positions outside of the Regular Force were also open to some of the volunteers who, during the period examined here, served in Jayforce and, later, Kayforce. As discussed earlier, these deployments were comprised mainly of volunteers and included relatively small numbers of Regular Force personnel. Jayforce, it has been explained, included a separate Maori unit – D Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry Battalion. Almost all of Jayforce's Maori personnel served in this unit and it was evidently officered by Maori, being initially led by 28 (Maori) Battalion officer Major J.S. Baker.⁷⁶⁵ As recorded in Table 5, five Maori officers were among the 370 Maori who were included in the group of replacement and returning personnel who embarked from New Zealand for Japan on 15 July 1947. As detailed later, at least two Maori officers in the Regular Force served in Japan, one of whom also served in Korea.

Within Kayforce, it is unclear whether the proportion of officers among the Maori volunteers was as high as that of Jayforce. It has been explained that Kayforce was deployed as an integrated force, initially without a separate Maori unit. This may have influenced the opportunities open to Maori volunteers for service at commissioned rank. Among the Maori volunteers within Kayforce's main body, there appears to have been a single officer. In a memo to the Minister of Defence, dated 28 September 1950, the Army Secretary noted that 'one officer of Maori blood' was training for service in Korea.⁷⁶⁶ (McGibbon identifies that this individual was Captain Richard Kake, who had served in 2NZEF (including Japan) as well as in the

⁷⁶³ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid. For more information on Parata's military career, including his World War II service, see Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p325.

⁷⁶⁵ Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, p483.

⁷⁶⁶ Army Secretary to Minister of Defence, 28 September 1950, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1345 319/23/1 Staff – Personnel K-force, undated, ANZ Wellington.

Territorial Force.⁷⁶⁷) The all-Maori unit that was established in February 1954 – B Platoon of 10 Transport Company – was presumably officered by Maori and possibly resulted in an increase in the number of Maori volunteers who were trained for service at commissioned rank.

Within the Army's Regular Force, about 13 to 15 percent of personnel served as officers during the 1950s. In September 1955, for example, the regular Army, with a total strength of 3816, included 550 officers – about 14.4 percent of the force.⁷⁶⁸ In most cases, officers gained their commissions through entering the Army to directly undertake officer training and then serve at commissioned rank. In 1951, a joint-services memorandum that discussed recruitment and service conditions in New Zealand noted that only about 25 percent of Army officers had been commissioned from the ranks. The memo further noted that it was anticipated that this figure would in the future be lowered to between 15 and 20 percent.⁷⁶⁹

In the late 1940s, one main avenue existed for those who sought to enter the Army and directly obtain a commission: an individual could apply for an officer cadetship to undertake a four-year training course at the Royal Military College at Duntroon, located near Canberra in Australia.⁷⁷⁰ In 1949, 10 such cadetships were available annually. Among the conditions of entry, applicants were to be 'a British subject, the son of British subjects, and of European descent or of Maori blood.'⁷⁷¹ The required minimum standard of education was University Entrance, with passes required in the subjects of English and mathematics.⁷⁷² Applicants were to be aged between 17 and 19 years, with the exception of youths who had served within the Regular Force cadet scheme, who could be over the age of 19.⁷⁷³ Those who passed successfully through the course were commissioned at lieutenant rank.⁷⁷⁴ Alongside Duntroon cadetships, there were also some opportunities for individuals to directly obtain commissioned rank through 'special entry', which in the late 1940s was limited to those who had a university qualification or who had active service experience overseas.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁶⁷ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, p52.

⁷⁶⁸ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1956.

⁷⁶⁹ Secretary, PAO (Personnel) Committee, to Secretary, External Affairs, 9 February 1951, ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷⁰ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1947-49.

⁷⁷¹ 'Cadetships at the Royal Military College, Duntroon – 1949 Entry', ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, Duntroon Cadets: Policy, 1948-1966, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷² In 1951, some positions were made available for applicants who did not have a pass in mathematics. Adjutant-General, circular letter, 19 November 1951, ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷³ 'Cadetships at the Royal Military College, Duntroon – 1949 Entry', ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷⁴ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1947-49.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

regular Army officer training opportunities broadened significantly during the 1950s. By 1957, two further overseas cadetship schemes were operating. One of these was a two-year course at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in England. Entry to this course involved the same requirements as Duntroon, though it appears that the number of positions available was more limited.⁷⁷⁶ The other cadetship scheme introduced around this time was an even shorter, one-year course at the Officer Cadet School at Portsea, near Melbourne in Australia. Up to about 10 cadets per year were accepted into this course.⁷⁷⁷ The Portsea course was significant because the educational requirements for entry were lower than Duntroon and the age at which individuals could enter the course was wider. Applicants were expected to have passed School Certificate (though in exceptional cases this could be waived) and were to be aged between 18 and 23.⁷⁷⁸ The scheme was open not just to direct entrants. Regular Force soldiers holding NCO rank were also able to apply for Portsea cadetships.⁷⁷⁹

Alongside the overseas courses, an officer cadet training unit was also set up at Waiouru in the 1950s. As well as training officer cadets for the Territorial Force, this unit was also involved in the training of some officers who were commissioned from the Regular Force ranks.⁷⁸⁰

In all cases, officer training applicants were assessed through a staged selection process. Applicants were initially shortlisted to identify the most suitable candidates.⁷⁸¹ Those who passed this stage undertook an interview before the Regular Officer Selection Board, which made the final decision as to whether a candidate would be accepted.⁷⁸² There were sometimes difficulties in filling the positions that were available for officer training. Writing to Army Headquarters in September 1957, the commanding officer of Central Military District noted considerable concern at the lack of success in recruitment efforts for the various

⁷⁷⁶ See 'Appendix D', attached to Chief of Staff, Central Military District, circular letter, 4 September 1957, ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, Recruitment, conditions of service – Officer Cadet School Portsea, 1956-1962, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷⁷ See Chief of Staff, Central Military District, circular letter, 4 September 1957; Chief of Staff, Central Military District, circular letter, 8 April 1958, ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷⁸ Chief of Staff, Central Military District, circular letter, 4 September 1957; ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁷⁹ Adjutant-General, circular letter, 28 March 1957, ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁸⁰ 'Officer training', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p397.

⁷⁸¹ See, for example, 'Cadetships at the Royal Military College, Duntroon – 1949 Entry', ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁸² The Selection Board was composed of high-ranking officers. When it sat to interview Duntroon applicants in August 1956, for example, the Board's president was the Adjutant General, Leonard Thornton. See Adjutant-General, circular letter, 14 August 1956, ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

officer cadet schemes.⁷⁸³ It is not clear from his letter whether this problem primarily concerned the number of applicants or the suitability of those who came forward.

Individuals who undertook officer training for service in the regular Army and who received a commission were required to make a long-term commitment to the Regular Force. Officers were expected to serve until they reached a specified retiring age. This varied depending on the rank that the individual held. Those serving at the highest ranks were expected to serve for longest. For example, in 1949, the following retiring ages were specified: 47 (major), 50 (lieutenant-colonel), and 55 (colonel and brigadier).⁷⁸⁴ However, while officers were required to commit to a long period of service, they were also able to progress along a well defined career path. In the 1950s, officers were commissioned at the rank of lieutenant and, providing they were able to pass promotion examinations, could expect to be promoted to captain after six years and to major after a further 7 years. Promotion to higher ranks was subject to a selection process.⁷⁸⁵

In spite of the broadening of training opportunities that occurred during the 1950s, very few Maori trained or served as officers in the regular Army between 1946 and 1960. Research for this report has identified only about half a dozen Maori who held commissioned rank during this period. Four of these individuals were graduates of the Royal Military College at Duntroon: Bruce Poananga, Brian Poananga, Des Smith, and Anthony (Tony) Mataira. They comprised a very small proportion of the total number of the New Zealanders who trained at Duntroon. Between 1946 and the end of 1959, almost 90 New Zealanders graduated from the college. Over this period, only three Maori graduated – Brian Poananga, Smith, and Mataira.⁷⁸⁶

As detailed in the previous chapter, Bruce and Brian Poananga entered Duntroon in 1943 and 1944 respectively. Bruce Poananga was the first Maori to graduate from Duntroon. After completing his training, he was posted to Japan, where he served in D Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry Battalion. Graduating in 1946, Brian joined his brother and served beneath him in D Squadron before holding staff appointments.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸³ Brigadier, Commanding, Central Military District to Army HQ, 12 September 1957, ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁸⁴ 'Cadetships at the Royal Military College, Duntroon – 1949 Entry', ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁸⁵ 'Cadetships at the Royal Military College, Duntroon – 1949 Entry', ABFK W3593 box 62 40/11 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁸⁶ List of New Zealand graduates of RMC Duntroon (as at June 1980), ABFK 22686 W4312 item 8, Royal Military College, Duntroon, 1966-1980, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁸⁷ Poananga, 'Poananga, Brian Matauru', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

In 1952 and 1953, during the Korean War, Brian Poananga undertook a period of service at Commonwealth Divisional Headquarters.⁷⁸⁸

Des Smith also entered Duntroon as an officer cadet during World War II. In 1946, Smith graduated alongside Brian Poananga.⁷⁸⁹ It appears that some Pakeha within the Army may have been unaware that he was Maori.⁷⁹⁰ However, in a 1996 article on Maori in the armed services, Wira Gardiner identifies Smith as being one of only four Maori who had graduated from Duntroon before Gardiner began his own training there in the early 1960s.⁷⁹¹ Like the Poananga brothers, Smith was also to have a long career in the service. One source shows that Smith remained in the Army in 1964, at which time he held the rank of major and was serving in Malaya as commander of Headquarters Company of 1RNZIR.⁷⁹²

Tony Mataira applied to enter Duntroon in October 1946.⁷⁹³ He was the only Maori to enter the college in the 15 years between the end of World War II and 1960. Mataira was aged 18 when he made his application. He had attended Gisborne Boys High School, where he was involved in the school's Air Training Corps.⁷⁹⁴ The application form that Mataira completed required that applicants to indicate whether they were 'of pure European descent'. In response to this, Mataira recorded that he was Maori. Elsewhere on the form, he declared that both his father and mother were of British nationality. He also recorded that two of his relatives (a cousin and an uncle) had served as officers in 2NZEF.⁷⁹⁵

In the processing of his application, Mataira was interviewed first by the local area commander. In his report, the area commander made no comment on Mataira's ethnicity. Based on Mataira's qualifications, general attributes, and interest in serving in the Army, he strongly recommended Mataira as a candidate for selection.⁷⁹⁶ Mataira was next interviewed by Central Military District's commanding office, Colonel George Dittmer, the Pakeha officer who had initially commanded 28

⁷⁸⁸ This posting comprised two periods of service, between which Poananga left Korea for four months. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II*, pp273, 409.

⁷⁸⁹ List of New Zealand graduates of RMC Duntroon (as at June 1980), ABFK 22686 W4312 item 8, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁹⁰ In 1964, Armstrong did not record Smith as among the Maori who had graduated from Duntroon. See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁷⁹¹ Wira Gardiner, 'Colour Blind: Maori in the Forces', *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, No. 15, Summer 1996, p4.

⁷⁹² Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp210-211.

⁷⁹³ Officer cadetship application, signed 18 October 1946, Personnel file 0471170, Mataira, Anthony Taroa Averill, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁷⁹⁴ Dittmer, Commanding, Central Military District, undated report on cadetship application, Personnel file 0471170, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁶ Area Commander, Area 7, to Headquarters, Area 7, Napier, 14 November 1946, Personnel file 0471170, NZDF Archives Trentham.

(Maori) Battalion. Dittmer, in his comments, gave much more attention to the fact that Mataira was Maori. Describing Mataira's background, he recorded: 'Father, a full blooded Maori, is a Clergyman. Mother is three-quarter white. Family well respected.' Dittmer provided details of Mataira's academic record and noted that he had a good understanding of English. Overall, providing that he was able to reach the required standard in English and mathematics, Dittmer considered Mataira to be 'very suitable as a Maori representative'.⁷⁹⁷

Mataira graduated from Duntroon in 1950.⁷⁹⁸ In 1953, he was posted to Malaya to serve as a platoon commander with 1FIR.⁷⁹⁹ (The following year, Major Bruce Poananga also joined 1FIR, in which he served as a company commander.⁸⁰⁰) In 1957, when 1 NZ Regiment was formed for deployment to Malaya, Mataira, by this time a captain and aged 28 years, was appointed commander of D Company. Of the battalion's five company commanders, Mataira was the only Maori and also the only one not to have served in World War II.⁸⁰¹ Mataira later served in Vietnam, where during his tour he was second-in-command of Anzac Battalion.⁸⁰² He retired in 1977, aged 48, holding the rank of lieutenant-colonel.⁸⁰³

Alongside the four Duntroon graduates, evidence concerning only three other Maori officers has been located. One of these was former 28 (Maori) Battalion member Major J.S. Baker, who after serving in Jayforce evidently joined the regular Army and remained in the force until the mid-1950s.⁸⁰⁴ The other two Maori officers for which evidence has been located are Joe Brosnahan and Captain Henry McDonald, both of whom served with 1FIR in the mid-1950s. Former 28 (Maori) Battalion soldier Tuhaka Babbington mentioned these two individuals in a written recollection of his experiences in the post-war Army. Babbington described Brosnahan to be a young Maori officer from Hawke's Bay, and he noted that McDonald had served in 28 (Maori) Battalion.⁸⁰⁵ It is unclear when and through what avenue Brosnahan became

⁷⁹⁷ Dittmer, Commanding, Central Military District, undated report on cadetship application, Personnel file 0471170, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁷⁹⁸ List of New Zealand graduates of RMC Duntroon (as at June 1980), ABFK 22686 W4312 item 8, ANZ Wellington. In 1953, *Te Ao Hou* noted that Mataira was a son of Rev. W.P. Mataira of Manutuke. 'The third Duntroon...', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 7, Summer 1954, p64.

⁷⁹⁹ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p30.

⁸⁰⁰ 'News in Brief', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 8, Winter 1954, p46.

⁸⁰¹ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p126.

⁸⁰² McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p298.

⁸⁰³ Hassett to Mataira, 2 May 1977, Personnel file 0471170, NZDF Archives Trentham. See also 'Anthony Taroa Averill Mataira', Cenotaph website, accessed 10 January 2018.

URL: <http://www.aucklandmuseum.com/war-memorial/online-cenotaph/record/C133447>

⁸⁰⁴ 'John Sonny Baker', Cenotaph website, accessed 30 April 2018.

URL: <http://www.aucklandmuseum.com/war-memorial/online-cenotaph/record/C119940>

⁸⁰⁵ Tuhaka Babbington, 'An East Coaster who made the Army his career', published originally in *The Battalion Remembers II* booklet, 2008, and reproduced on 28th Maori Battalion website, accessed 10 January 2018.

URL: <http://28maoribattalion.org.nz/memory/an-east-coaster-who-made-army-his-career>

an officer. In 1964, he remained in the Army and held the rank of captain.⁸⁰⁶ In Cody's history of 28 (Maori) Battalion, McDonald – holding the rank of second-lieutenant – was listed among the original officers of the battalion who had Maori ancestry.⁸⁰⁷ Research has not established exactly when, after the war, McDonald entered the Regular Force and began serving as a professional soldier.⁸⁰⁸

Research undertaken for this report has found no evidence to suggest that the Army sought to encourage greater Maori participation at commissioned rank. As discussed later in the chapter, the Navy, during the same period, made active efforts to encourage Maori into officer training. However, these efforts were undertaken with the aim of securing the first Maori officer within the RNZN – a milestone that the Army had already passed. Pugsley states that the Army's educational requirements were the main barrier that determined why so few Maori served at commissioned rank during the 1950s. He explains that, though Maori began entering the Army in greater numbers and began to fill many of the NCO and warrant officer appointments, 'educational requirements held them back from commissioned rank'.⁸⁰⁹

In the notes he prepared for Defence Secretary Hunn ahead of 28 (Maori) Battalion's 1964 reunion, Captain Alan Armstrong had also pointed to 'a lack of the formal educational qualifications' when explaining why so few Maori served as officers in the post-war Regular Force. Alongside the educational barriers that Maori faced, Armstrong also believed there was 'a disinclination on the part of qualified young men to committing themselves to retiring age, which is a requirement for Regular officers.'⁸¹⁰

For Maori who were able to meet the educational requirements and who did apply to enter officer training, it is unclear how their rate of success compared with that of non-Maori, and, if Maori were declined at a higher rate, what the reasons for this were. On the basis of evidence presented earlier in this report, it seems reasonable to suggest that Maori applicants may have been disadvantaged owing to negative attitudes that some Pakeha within the Army held towards Maori and their involvement in the post-war Regular Force. For these individuals, who included

⁸⁰⁶ 'Maoris in Uniform', *Te Ao Hou*, no 46, March 1964, p42.

⁸⁰⁷ Cody, *28 (Maori) Battalion*, pp10-11.

⁸⁰⁸ In a post dated 31 August 2012 on 28 (Maori) Battalion's Facebook page, McDonald's daughter, Miriama McDonald, stated: 'My Father was Battalion, captured on Crete and spent 4 years in a POW camp before returning to fight in Malaya.' See '28th Maori Battalion', Facebook website, accessed 5 August 2018.

URL: <https://www.facebook.com/MaoriBattalion/posts/my-father-was-battalion-captured/10151220029775242/>

⁸⁰⁹ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p356; see also endnote 6, pp409-411.

⁸¹⁰ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

high-ranking officers, it is likely that the idea of Maori serving at commissioned rank within integrated units would have been difficult to accept. The concerns expressed in July 1952 by the Commander of the Northern Military District Commander, illustrate the reservations that some held about the role of Maori within the force.

Towards the end of the 1950s, however, the influence of such individuals may have been lessening. It is particularly notable that in 1957, when the first Regular Force infantry battalion was formed for service in Malaya, Tony Mataira was appointed to lead one of the four rifle companies. Interestingly, he was appointed to command D Company, which contained only 12 percent Maori – by far the smallest proportion of Maori within the four rifle companies.⁸¹¹ No evidence has been located regarding this appointment, but it suggests that those who formed the battalion were comfortable with Mataira leading a predominantly Pakeha unit – something that was entirely in line with integrationist ideology. In May 1959, a report on Mataira's performance made no mention of his being Maori or that this had any bearing on his leadership role within 1 NZ Regiment. Commenting on Mataira's performance, the battalion's commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel W.R.K. Morrison, stated simply that Mataira had: 'Proved himself to be an outstandingly good company commander. He pays attention to detail and sets his men a fine soldierly example. There is no better company commander in this unit.'⁸¹²

The abilities that Mataira and other Maori officers demonstrated would have helped to breakdown any negative attitudes that the Army's leadership held towards Maori, especially with regard to their ability to serve at commissioned rank within the integrated Regular Force. Assessments of the strength of some of the Maori officers who served during the period examined here were provided not only from within the New Zealand Army. Appraising the performance of Brian Poananga after he had completed a course at Camberley Staff College in 1957, the assessing British officer provided a very positive description of Poananga's military and personal qualities and predicted, correctly, that he 'should go far as a commander or staff officer'.⁸¹³

Though it has been suggested here that the performance of the small number of Maori officers would have helped to improve opportunities for Maori, some Maori soldiers in other ranks have stated that – on the basis of their race – they were overlooked for promotion and appointments to roles they sought. During the Wai 2500 hearings, Richard Henry Shepherd, who entered the Army in 1956, spoke of the disappointment he experienced after successfully completing an arms training

⁸¹¹ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp126-127.

⁸¹² Performance report – Mataira, 1959, Personnel file 2479036, Mataira, Anthony Taroa Averill, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁸¹³ Camberley Staff College report – Poananga, 18 November 1957, Personnel file 2479040, Poananga, Brian Matauru, NZDF Archives Trentham.

course, which he undertook soon after completing his basic training.⁸¹⁴ Though Shepherd passed the course with a high grade, outperforming most of the others on the course, he was not appointed a CMT instructor. He stated that his Pakeha colleagues were instead appointed to the available positions. Shepherd believed that his being Maori was an important factor in this decision, and he noted particularly the influence of non-commissioned officers from the United Kingdom:

The New Zealand Army in the 1950s was serviced by Pākehā officers and many of the senior non-commissioned officers recruited from Britain. These were Veterans from World War II, now in a foreign country, faced with a totally unfamiliar culture. It was difficult to relate to them and them to us. I consider that by overlooking my course results and then posting other Pākehā colleagues to instructor posts they were demonstrating bias and therefore denying me the right to future advancement. I believe the colonial influence was still strongly engrained and surfaced as a form of unconscious bias.⁸¹⁵

Maori soldiers who spoke te reo as their first language and did not possess a strong command of English appear to have been disadvantaged in respect of promotion opportunities. This issue, which will be examined further in the next section, is discussed here with reference to the PSO testing that was introduced in the 1950s. This testing was discussed in the previous chapter, which noted that individuals' SG ratings were taken into consideration when the first battalion was established for service in Malaya in 1957. Further, it was noted that in 1966 an internal Army memo, entitled 'The Maori Soldier', included an estimate that 80 percent of Maori were underrated on their SG rating. This was attributed to the lower English language abilities of the many Maori soldiers who spoke te reo as their first language. Though the memo was written in the 1960s, it is likely that the underperformance it described had existed from the time that PSO testing was introduced.

For Maori, the implications of this are likely to have been significant. From the early 1950s, at least, all recruits appear to have been subject to the testing and the results were taken into close consideration when their future potential within the force was assessed. This was discussed in a file note that was prepared in 1955 in connection with steps that were being taken to establish the Army's first SAS squadron. It explained that:

For some time now the Army has been using these tests with both recruits for the Regular Force and compulsory military trainees so that it can suggest employment for each soldier in the capacity in which he will be of most use to the Army and where he will find most satisfaction.

⁸¹⁴ Richard Henry Shepherd, Hearing Week 3, Ōtiria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p31.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid., p32.

The tests have been designed to give as much information as possible to help the Army with the selection of tradesmen and specialists, those who are thought to be potentially able to profit from specialist training, and with the early selection of potential leaders.

Vital information about recruits can be gleaned from the tests, which enables the men to be [sic] allocated to trades within the limits of their mental and physical capacity.⁸¹⁶

In light of the importance given to the test results, the underrating of Maori would have negatively impacted upon the training and promotional opportunities that were made available to some Maori soldiers.

Maori leadership and promotion, 1960-1972

Around the beginning of the period examined in this section, the Army began to actively communicate that opportunities existed for Maori to serve at commissioned rank. At about the same time, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Army also began to encourage Maori recruitment generally. From the early 1960s, the number of Maori entering officer training began to increase, evidently reflecting a rise in the number of suitable Maori applicants as well as the broader range of officer training opportunities that existed by this time. However, while the number of Maori officers increased, Maori remained very under-represented at commissioned rank at the end of the period discussed in this section. Within other ranks, evidence presented here indicates that Maori – especially those who lacked fluency in English – continued to be disadvantaged in respect of promotion opportunities.

Through the command appointments it made, the Army continued to demonstrate that Maori officers were able to serve in high ranking positions within the integrated force. In respect of the responsibilities that the small number of Maori officers held during the period examined here, Brian Poananga's appointment in 1965 as commanding officer of 1RNZIR was a notable development. With this appointment, Poananga became the first Maori to command a Regular Force battalion. He led the battalion during its second tour of Borneo, May to October 1966, and in 1967 he continued to command the battalion in Malaysia when the initial infantry companies were deployed to South Vietnam.⁸¹⁷

In its external communications, the Army looked to convey to Maori that no issue existed with Maori officers and NCO's commanding Pakeha. This is shown, for

⁸¹⁶ Undated file note (released 5 May 1955), AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/210, ANZ Wellington.

⁸¹⁷ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, pp324-326. McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p298.

example, in an Army recruitment article published in *Te Ao Hou* in September 1962, which focused on the battalion that was based in Malaya. The article emphasised not only that relations between Maori and Pakeha soldiers were harmonious, but also that Maori having command over Pakeha was commonplace and accepted as a positive feature of the New Zealand Army:

Asians used to express surprise and pleasure at the mixing of the two groups on leave and at work and in our concert party. They always commented favourably on the lack of any segregation in the unit such as Maori platoons or companies, and the sight of Maori Officers and N.C.O.'s commanding pakeha troops as well as vice versa seemed to them a practical demonstration that in New Zealand we try and practise what we preach.⁸¹⁸

As noted above, clear statements of policy regarding efforts to increase Maori participation at commissioned rank have not been located. However, elements within the Army advocated such a policy and it is expressed in some of the Army's external recruitment communications. In January 1964, in the notes he prepared for Defence Secretary Hunn ahead of 28 (Maori) Battalion's 1964 reunion, Captain Alan Armstrong asserted that: 'More Maori officers are required in the RF'. Offering a reason as to why this would be beneficial, Armstrong pointed to the positive role that Maori officers might play in supporting the many young Maori who served in the lower ranks. In this respect, Maori officers could 'make a considerable contribution amongst their own race'.⁸¹⁹

In March 1964, the same month that the Battalion held its reunion, an Army recruitment article published in *Te Ao Hou* (written possibly by Armstrong) set out the opportunities that existed for service at commissioned rank. The article provided details of the educational requirements and various options that existed for officer training, which remained unchanged from those outlined in the previous section.⁸²⁰ In light of the 'many young Maoris in the private soldier and NCO brackets', it emphasised that 'there should be a much higher proportion of Maoris commissioned as officers.' And, reiterating the sentiments that Armstrong had expressed to Hunn, the article suggested that Maori officers could 'have a tremendous influence in helping and steadying young men of their own race.'⁸²¹

File sources also show that, in the early 1960s, Army efforts to make Maori aware of opportunities for service at officer rank extended to raising awareness of

⁸¹⁸ Arena Kahi, 'Maori Soldiers in Malaya', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 40, September 1962, p21.

⁸¹⁹ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸²⁰ 'Maoris in Uniform', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 46, March 1964, pp41-42.

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*, p41.

commissioned positions within the women's branch of the Army, the NZWRAC. In April 1962, the Secretary of Maori Affairs wrote to District Officers, advising that the Adjutant General, Brigadier W.S. McKinnon, had contacted the Department and asked that it fill a vacancy for a young woman to undertake officer training. The Secretary requested that all welfare officers be urgently made aware of this opening, stressing that it was 'most important' that the post be filled by a suitable applicant.⁸²² Research has not established whether a Maori candidate was successfully put forward.

Some evidence presented during the Wai 2500 oral hearings supports the view that the Army, during the period examined here, began to more actively encourage Maori service at commissioned rank. Peter James Mason, who served in the Army between 1960 and 1985 (retiring as a warrant officer, 2nd class), stated that: 'During my time in the services the Army were very proactive in recruiting Māori as potential officers.'⁸²³ Mason acknowledged, however, that some of his Army colleagues would not agree with him on this issue.⁸²⁴

While it is evident that the Army encouraged greater Maori involvement at officer rank during the period examined here, nothing has been located to indicate that Maori were in any way exempted from the standard entry requirements for officer training. The recruitment article published in *Te Ao Hou* in March 1964 promoted the Army as offering a 'worthwhile career of service', but only for those young Maori who were able to meet its 'exacting standards'.⁸²⁵ Research for this report has examined documents that relate to the application of one Maori who was accepted into officer training during the period discussed here – Albert Kiwi, who entered Portsea in 1961.⁸²⁶ (From Raurimu, Kiwi had in 1958, at the age of 17, joined the Army as a Regular Force cadet.⁸²⁷ He gained school certificate while serving as a cadet and, before he was accepted into officer training, served in Malaya.⁸²⁸) As a case study, Kiwi's records indicate that very little consideration was given to candidates' racial background, with the focus instead on qualifications, experience, and character.⁸²⁹ Consistent with this, Army memos that list the names of the

⁸²² Puriri (for Secretary) to All District Offices, 9 April 1962, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸²³ Peter James Mason, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p69.

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ 'Maoris in Uniform', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 46, March 1964, p42.

⁸²⁶ Adjutant General, circular letter, 31 May 1961, ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸²⁷ Kiwi, enlistment application, 8 January 1958, Personnel file 845230, Kiwi, Albert Reti, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁸²⁸ Aitken, 2 NZ Regiment, to HQ NZ Army Force, 5 April 1961, Personnel file 2479033, Kiwi, Albert Reti, NZDF Archives Trentham.

⁸²⁹ See, for example, Aitken, 2 NZ Regiment, to HQ NZ Army Force, 5 April 1961, Personnel file 2479033, NZDF Archives Trentham.

individuals who had been selected to enter Portsea in the early 1960s make no mention of the ethnicity of the successful applicants.⁸³⁰

Several sources describe an increase in the number of Maori who began serving as officers from the early 1960s. In January 1964, Armstrong advised Hunn of very recent growth in Maori officer numbers, noting particularly that a number of Maori had graduated from the one-year Portsea course.⁸³¹ The March 1964 *Te Ao Hou* recruitment article detailed the names of seven Maori who had passed through Portsea in 1962 and 1963.⁸³² Albert Kiwi was amongst these individuals. Another was Eru Manuera, who had been commissioned in the Territorial Force in 1959 and transferred to the Regular Force in 1962.⁸³³ Alongside those who passed through Portsea, three Maori entered Duntroon at this time – the first since Mataira had been accepted in 1946. These were: George Mathew, Rosyln Himona, and Wira Gardiner.⁸³⁴ Within the Army's other ranks, Maori evidently continued to be strongly represented among NCOs.⁸³⁵

While Maori officer numbers increased in the early 1960s, again, no clear evidence has been located regarding the number of Maori who applied to enter officer training, their rates of success, and how these compared to those of Pakeha. In respect of the number of Maori who were able to apply to undertake officer training, the required educational standards would have continued to pose a barrier. There was an awareness of this within the Army. In January 1964, Armstrong noted that a relatively small number of Maori possessed the necessary qualifications and that, in seeking to attract these individuals, the Army faced competition from other fields of employment:

the Army must compete with civilian occupations for the comparatively small number of Maoris who gain School Certificate or more each year. Most of these young men seem to embrace welfare and other occupations where they can be of benefit to their own race.⁸³⁶

As noted above, Armstrong believed that serving as an officer in the Army also provided an opportunity for such men to serve their people.

⁸³⁰ See, for example, Adjutant General, circular letter, 21 May 1962, ACIP 8727 AD-W6 W2566 box 40 40/24 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸³¹ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸³² 'Maoris in Uniform', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 46, March 1964, p42.

⁸³³ 'People and Places', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 54, March 1966, pp26-27.

⁸³⁴ Gardiner, 'Colour Blind: Maori in the Forces', p4.

⁸³⁵ *Ibid.*, p3. Hall, *No Front Line*, p212.

⁸³⁶ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

Though there was growth in the number of Maori officers during the period discussed here, evidence from a range of sources shows that Maori remained very under-represented at commissioned rank relative to the proportion of Maori within the force as a whole. This evidence includes oral testimony presented during the Wai 2500 oral hearings. For example, William Edward (Bill) Broughton, who entered the Army in 1962, recalled that: ‘Māori servicemen were much more prominent amongst the junior ranks.’ Broughton, who retired from the service in 1987, believed that ‘it was not until the late ‘60s that Māori began to venture in numbers into the ranks of the commissioned officers.’⁸³⁷

In 1964, when the issue of forming a separate Maori unit was revisited, the small number of Maori officers who were currently serving was put forward as a reason why the establishment of a Maori battalion would be problematic. In his address to 28 (Maori) Battalion’s reunion conference, Hunn stated that: ‘There are insufficient Maori officers in the forces (either RF or TF) to staff even a small Maori unit. The time to keep the battalion going was in 1945; it is 20 years too late to re-start it now.’⁸³⁸ However, the President of the Battalion Association, K. Waaka, contended that there were enough Maori officers to form the nucleus of a battalion. He noted that Brian Poananga had recently stated that there were about 22 Maori officers serving in the regular Army, with many more serving as NCOs.⁸³⁹ Assuming that this figure was reasonably accurate, it shows that Maori officers were a very small minority amongst those who held commissioned rank. At the end of August 1964, 576 officers were recorded to be serving in the various branches of the regular Army.⁸⁴⁰ Based on this figure and that which Waaka quoted, less than four percent of officers at this time were Maori.

Limited Maori participation at commissioned rank is evident in the Army units that were deployed overseas during the period examined here. However, the proportion of Maori who served as officers in these units may have been greater than in the Regular Force as a whole because – like those who served in other ranks – the majority of Maori officers appear to have served in infantry units. Waaka, in his address to the Battalion’s reunion, indicated that most Maori who held commissioned rank were infantry officers, and he suggested that the Army should ensure sufficient Maori officers and NCOs were trained in other branches of the Army, including artillery, signals, and the Army Service Corps.⁸⁴¹

⁸³⁷ William Edward Broughton, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p148.

⁸³⁸ Hunn, ‘Maori Battalion: Vanguard or Rearguard?’, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington, p6.

⁸³⁹ Report of K. Waaka, President, 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association, 28 March 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁴⁰ ‘Defence’, *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1964.

⁸⁴¹ Report of K. Waaka, President, 28th Maori Battalion (N.Z.) Association, 28 March 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

In March 1964, *Te Ao Hou* detailed that five Maori officers were serving with the battalion stationed in Malaysia – 2 NZ Regiment. These included the padre, Captain Whakahuihui Vercoe, with the others being Captain J.P. Brosnahan and 2nd Lieutenants T.D. Brosnahan, N.A. Kotua, and Albert Kiwi.⁸⁴² Research has not established the total number of officers serving with 2 NZ Regiment at this time. However, in mid 1965, when 1RNZIR was deployed to Borneo, it was officered by 39 men, indicating that the number of Maori serving at commissioned rank within 2 NZ Regiment the previous year may have amounted to about 13 percent of the total number of officers in the unit.⁸⁴³ This is consistent with the recollections of Bill Broughton, who served in Malaysia (from 1963 to 1966) and also in Vietnam (from late 1967 to early 1969): ‘I would estimate that [of] the New Zealand servicemen who served in Malaya, about 35 to 40% of them were Māori, which I believe was not reflected in the numbers of Māori commissioned officers. Vietnam was the same.’⁸⁴⁴

Discussing the role of Maori who served as officers in Vietnam, McGibbon states that no Maori commanded any of the combat units, but he notes that in 1972 Albert Kiwi and Tamakore MacFarlane successively led one of the training teams. He also notes Tony Mataira’s position as second-in-command of the Anzac Battalion. In total, McGibbon provides details of eight Maori officers, though he does not suggest these comprised all of those Maori who served at commissioned rank. Overall, however, he states that: ‘Maori numbers in leadership positions did not reflect the overall level of Maori participation in Vietnam, especially in the battery.’⁸⁴⁵ In respect of 161 Battery, he quotes Maori gunner Lance Bombardier Bunny Tumai, who wrote in 1966: ‘The Maoris are all the workers, the Kahas [Pakehas] the bosses.’⁸⁴⁶ At the time that Tumai wrote this, New Zealand’s combat effort in Vietnam remained limited to the artillery unit. Maori officers would have become more visible with the arrival of the infantry units, but even then their numbers were limited. In an oral interview, Rangi Rata, who served with Victor 6 Company in 1971, recalled that: ‘Further up, you maybe had one in 10 Māori officers, if you were lucky. Back then, it was an unseen thing.’⁸⁴⁷

In respect of opportunities for promotion within the Army’s other ranks, it has been noted that during the period examined here Maori continued to be strongly represented among NCOs. However, Armstrong, in the notes he prepared for Hunn

⁸⁴² ‘Maoris in Uniform’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 46, March 1964, p42.

⁸⁴³ In respect of the 1RNZIR figure, see Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p295.

⁸⁴⁴ William Edward Broughton, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p148. After leaving Vietnam, Broughton spent a further period of about 9 to 12 months at Terendak Camp in Malaysia.

⁸⁴⁵ McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, p298.

⁸⁴⁶ C.R. (also known as B.T.) Tumai, letter, 1966, privately held, cited in McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, p298.

⁸⁴⁷ Rangi Rata, oral interview by Paul Diamond for the Māori Vietnam War Veterans Oral History Project, 15 December 2010, quoted in Hall, *No Front Line*, p212.

ahead of 28 (Maori) Battalion's 1964 reunion, stated that Maori soldiers were generally reluctant to take on leadership responsibilities, explaining that this was because they did not want to feel separated from their group.⁸⁴⁸ In the 'Maori Soldier' memo, which Chief of the General Staff McKinnon circularised in May 1966, it was similarly suggested that:

A Maori often feels less compulsion than a pakeha to show his worth as an individual. Therefore he does not have the same ambition for personal advancement, particularly if this advancement is likely to separate him from his fellows... Acceptance of military rank means stepping out from the mass, with consequent imputations on self-aggrandisement... For this reason many promising Maori soldiers often display an irritating reluctance to accept rank.⁸⁴⁹

During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, Richard Shepherd, who entered the Army in 1956 and remained in the service for about 30 years, stated that many Maori experienced 'the dilemma of accepting promotion'. Shepherd discussed this issue with particular reference to how promotion and rank sometimes impacted upon sibling relationships when brothers served together in the Army.⁸⁵⁰

Armstrong advised Hunn that Maori soldiers who were reluctant to advance were sometimes pressured to do so – generally, though not always, with positive results: 'Once pushed into NCO rank... and forced to make the break, they are usually firm and enterprising in command. A proportion, however, will not exert the energy to master promotion exams and courses.'⁸⁵¹ Two years later, the 'Maori Soldier' memo endorsed this approach. It suggested that commanders should consider promoting Maori soldiers regardless of their personal feelings on the matter. This would enable the soldier to refute 'accusations of vanity' and explain that they had been ordered to take the promotion. Once promoted, these individuals, with support, would inevitably, grow in confidence and perform their necessary responsibilities.⁸⁵²

While the circularised memo advocated promotion of 'promising Maori soldiers', it also stated that language difficulties sometimes seriously disadvantaged Maori, affecting both the extent to which their potential was recognised and their ability to secure promotion. As detailed in the previous chapter, the memo noted that many

⁸⁴⁸ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁴⁹ 'The Maori Soldier', attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington, p5.

⁸⁵⁰ Richard Henry Shepherd, Hearing Week 3, Ōtīria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, pp34-35.

⁸⁵¹ See untitled notes, attached to Director of Public Relations to Secretary of Defence, 28 January 1964, ABFK 7494 W4948 box 287 31/14/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁵² 'The Maori Soldier', attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington, p5.

Maori did not speak English as their first language.⁸⁵³ It emphasised that ‘many Maori soldiers are far from conversant with the nuances of the English language, even though they appear on casual acquaintance to speak it reasonably adequately.’⁸⁵⁴ The memo stated that, on the basis of how some Maori spoke English, commanders sometimes wrongly believed the soldier lacked intelligence.⁸⁵⁵ It also stated that, where potential was identified, ‘a bright Maori soldier’ would sometimes need special support if they were ‘ever to pass’ written promotion and course exams, which were evidently always in English.⁸⁵⁶

As discussed earlier, the ‘Maori Soldier’ memo also stated that Maori who did not have a strong command of English faced disadvantage through underperformance in PSO testing. The results of this testing, it has been explained, were used to identify soldiers’ leadership potential and the branch of service in which they would be best suited. In the mid-1950s, the test results carried much weight and, evidently, they were still considered useful ten years later. Owing to language difficulties, the ‘Maori Soldier’ memo noted that it had been estimated that 80 percent of Maori in the Army were underrated on their SG rating. In light of this, it suggested that, where the test was to be relied upon to indicate a Maori soldiers’ suitability for promotion within the ‘teeth’ or combat arms, one component of the test – the domino test – would probably provide the most accurate indication of the soldier’s potential. It explained that, except for the domino test, all the other tests were conducted verbally. However, even the domino test had instructions in English that had to be comprehended before the test could be completed successfully.⁸⁵⁷

Since the ‘Maori Soldier’ memo was circularised through the Chief of the General Staff’s office, Army leaders presumably would have been aware of its contents. In respect of promotion opportunities, the memo clearly conveyed that Maori who did not have a strong command of English were disadvantaged – in their ability to pass written promotion and course exams and as a result of their underperformance in PSO testing. While the memo drew attention to this issue and offered suggestions as to how Maori might be better supported, it did not advocate any major changes to the existing system and no evidence has been located to indicate that reforms were subsequently introduced. Concerns relating to the ability of Maori to operate within the Pakeha dominated integrated Army appear to have been of primary importance. As noted in the previous chapter, the ‘Maori Soldier’ identified that PSO testing had

⁸⁵³ Ibid., p3. Evidence relating to Maori soldiers’ use of Te Reo in Vietnam is consistent with the statement that at this time some Maori soldiers spoke English as their second language. See: Hall, *No Front Line*, p210, 212; McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, p299.

⁸⁵⁴ ‘The Maori Soldier’, memo attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington, p2.

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid., p4.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid., p5.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid., p5.

limited use ‘as a measure of the pure intelligence of a Maori-speaking Maori’, but it emphasised that ‘the Maori must measure up to the Army’s pakeha environment and requirements, and the SG rating will indicate his capability in this regard’.⁸⁵⁸

Recent evidence, 1972-2017

This section examines evidence relating to the ability of Maori to gain promotions and to serve in leadership positions since 1972. Again, the focus is primarily on service at commissioned rank, though evidence concerning promotion within other ranks is also discussed.

It is uncertain whether, during the period examined here, deliberate efforts have been made to encourage Maori to seek to enter Army officer training – as was the case in the early 1960s. However, the previous chapter has explained that in recent years the NZDF has advanced a policy of establishing greater ethnic and gender diversity within the three services. The extent to which this policy aims to promote diversity, not just generally, but within all levels of the Army and other two services is unclear. It has also been explained that, since 2003, the NZDF has collected data on the ethnicity of service personnel. This data differentiates between officers and other ranks, and it therefore shows that the NZDF today maintains an awareness of the ethnic make up of the personnel who serve at different levels within the three services.

The extent to which the NZDF has sought to identify obstacles that restrict Maori involvement at commissioned rank is unclear. The NZDF’s 2016 *Barriers and Opportunities* report, discussed in the previous chapter, draws upon the experiences of applicants who sought to serve as officers as well as those who wished to gain entry into the other ranks.⁸⁵⁹ However, the report’s findings do not differentiate between the recruitment outcomes of officers and other applicants. As detailed in chapter two, the report found, generally, that applicants from ethnic minority groups and women dropped out of the recruitment process in disproportionate numbers.

At the beginning of the period discussed here, officer training continued to mostly be undertaken outside of New Zealand, with the cadet courses at Duntroon and Portsea remaining the most important training avenues. In 1977, officer training capability in New Zealand was extended with the establishment of an Officer Cadet Training Company at Waiouru, which provided a 12-month course for Army officers.⁸⁶⁰ From 1985, most officer cadets began to be trained in New Zealand. The training company

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid., p5.

⁸⁵⁹ Ministry of Defence, Evaluation Division, *Recruitment: Barriers and Opportunities*, p41.

⁸⁶⁰ ‘Officer training’, entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p397.

was renamed the Officer Cadet School and expanded to provide for annual intakes of 60 cadets, including some from overseas.⁸⁶¹ During the 1990s, arrangements were made for officer cadets at Waiouru to undertake tertiary studies in addition to their Army training. Alongside the Officer Cadet School at Waiouru, a small number of cadets have continued to undertake a longer, tertiary-level training course in Australia.⁸⁶² Today, the minimum educational requirement for direct entry into officer training is NCEA Level 2 with at least 12 credits in English.⁸⁶³

Since 1972 Maori have twice been appointed to the Army's senior-most leadership position. As detailed earlier, Brian Poananga served as Chief of the General Staff between 1978 and 1981. More recently, between 2002 and 2006, Jerry Mateparae also served in the retitled Chief of Army position. Mateparae had enlisted in the Regular Force in 1972 and was later selected to undertake training as an officer cadet at Portsea, graduating from the course in 1976. After serving as Chief of Army, he was in 2006 promoted to Chief of Defence Force, New Zealand's senior-most uniformed military position. Mateparae held this position until 2011, when he retired from the NZDF.⁸⁶⁴ The appointment of Poananga and of Mateparae to the Army's senior-most position shows, obviously, that Maori are able to serve at the very highest levels of the force.

However, the appointments do not, alone, prove that Maori have not faced disadvantage or discrimination in respect of their ability to gain promotions and serve in leadership positions in the Army during the period examined here. During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, some witnesses stated that they experienced discrimination and observed, more generally, that Maori were often overlooked in respect of promotion opportunities. For example, Gregory Douglas Toatoa, who served in the Army for 22 years from 1971 to 1993, retiring as a sergeant, believed that in the late 1980s, while serving at Waiouru, he was unfairly overlooked when 'a new Sergeant (Pākehā) came in and was promoted, over me, to the rank of Staff Sergeant in two weeks of being posted.' Toatoa further stated that:

This was common for Māori soldiers and a lot would not say it, but it happened. For example, you may have three senior Māori Corporals and a Pākehā corporal posted in Papakura as prison guards, waiting to be promoted to one of two vacancies in the higher ranks, the Pākehā Corporal would get promoted over the three experienced Māori Corporals.⁸⁶⁵

⁸⁶¹ Ibid., pp397-398.

⁸⁶² Ibid., p398.

⁸⁶³ 'Army Officer', NZDF Defence Careers website, accessed 23 February 2018.

URL: <https://www.defencecareers.mil.nz/army/jobs/specialist/army-officer/>

⁸⁶⁴ 'Lt Gen The Rt Hon Sir Jerry Mateparae, GNZM, QSO', Governor-General website, accessed 22 February 2018. URL: <https://gg.govt.nz/biographies/lt-gen-rt-hon-sir-jerry-mateparae-gnzm-qso>

⁸⁶⁵ Gregory Douglas Toatoa, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p60.

Toatoa believed that, in general, it took Māori longer to be promoted into leadership roles and their advancement was typically limited: ‘Generally, Māori always stopped at Corporal in the lower ranks and those who made it to officer roles stopped at Major.’⁸⁶⁶

Other oral hearing witnesses offered a different perspective. As detailed in the previous section, Peter James Mason, who served from 1960 to 1985, retiring as a warrant officer class 2, stated that during his time in the force the Army was ‘very proactive in recruiting Māori as potential officers.’⁸⁶⁷ Another witness, Desma Kemp Ratima, who served from 1976 to 2000, retiring as a warrant office class 1, stated in respect of the enlisted ranks that ‘it appeared that all soldiers were promoted on merit and qualification’.⁸⁶⁸ He noted that ‘a great number’ of Maori served as senior NCO’s and warrant officers.⁸⁶⁹ However, Ratima observed that Maori in the officer ranks were not so plentiful and that ‘very few’ made ‘senior officer ranks’. Raising a matter discussed in the previous section, Ratima believed that Maori officers ‘often faced the dilemma of whether they were to be Māori first or officer first’. He suggested that this ‘must have been a major decider acting as a filter’ between those who served at major rank and those who served at lieutenant-colonel rank.⁸⁷⁰

One research study concerning Maori involvement in the Army provides some evidence that supports the view that Maori have not been subject to widespread discrimination in respect of promotion opportunities. In a 1995 MA thesis, Michelle Erai discusses the experiences of 21 Maori men and women who were either still serving or had left the New Zealand Army. Erai conducted in-depth interviews with nine of these individuals, while the others completed questionnaires.⁸⁷¹ She points out that owing to the small size of the sample and sampling methods, the findings of her study cannot be generalised to represent the views and experiences of all Maori in the Army, but do provide ‘a record of both the unique and shared experiences of the participants’.⁸⁷² With regard to the participants’ experiences concerning promotion, she summarises:

Most of the questionnaire respondents felt that progression through the ranks is based on personal commitment and hard work. None mentioned a perception that their ethnicity has effected [sic] the course of their career. However, a woman officer wrote that she was not allowed to hold some positions or attend certain courses because she is a woman.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁷ Peter James Mason, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p69.

⁸⁶⁸ Desma Kemp Ratima, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp74, 88.

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid., p87.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁷¹ Erai, ‘Maori Soldiers’, MA Thesis (Social Science), pii.

⁸⁷² Ibid., p25.


Most of the participants interviewed felt that being Maori had not affected their attitudes towards, or chances of promotion. Three of the women interviewed talked about a 'nagging feeling' that they had been held back in some way but were unsure whether it was because of their own abilities, their ethnicity or their gender. An NCO talked about the complicated way in which postings, overseas service, availability of positions and time in the SAS affected promotion. He was disappointed that the position of Regimental Sergeant Major in an overseas contingent was never awarded to a Maori.⁸⁷³

Overall, the evidence that has been presented in this section suggests that, though individual experiences will have differed, Maori have not, during the period examined here, been uniformly subject to widespread and systematic discrimination in respect of promotion and leadership opportunities. Other factors must therefore help to explain why there continues to be disproportionately few Maori serving at commissioned rank. Again, with Maori educational achievement continuing to be lower than that of non-Maori, the educational requirements for service at officer rank are likely to be an important factor.


As noted above, the ethnicity data that the NZDF has collected since 2003 differentiates between individuals serving at commissioned and other ranks. Based on this data, Graph 6 shows the proportion of Maori and non-Maori Army personnel among those serving at commissioned rank. Graph 7 shows the proportion of Maori among Army officers and other ranks as well as the overall rate of Maori involvement in the force. Throughout the whole period for which data is available, Maori have remained significantly under-represented at officer rank in comparison to their overall rate of participation in the Army. However, in recent years the gap between the overall rate of Maori participation and the proportion of Maori among officers has closed. This primarily reflects a decline in the proportion of Maori among other ranks, though there has been a small rise in the proportion of Maori among officers. In 2003, 6.2 percent of Army officers identified as being Maori, compared to 7.7 percent in 2017.

⁸⁷³ Ibid., p45.

Graph 6: Army – ethnicity of regular officers, 2003-2017⁸⁷⁴



Graph 7: Army – proportion of Maori among regular officers and other ranks, 2003-2017⁸⁷⁵



⁸⁷⁴ Table 3, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid.

Navy

This section looks at evidence concerning leadership and promotion in the RNZN, particularly the extent to which Maori have been able to gain officer rank.

It will be explained that Maori began serving as officers in the Navy some years later than in the Army. The first Maori to obtain a commission appears to have been Paratene Bennett, who was promoted from the ranks in 1945, near the end of World War II. This appointment evidently broke with an existing policy, under which Maori had been ineligible to serve at officer rank. Bennett, however, withdrew from the Navy not long after gaining his commission, and the exclusion against Maori appears to have become re-established. It was not until the early 1950s that the RNZN again became open to Maori serving at officer level – a shift that was linked to a broader policy to increase the number of New Zealand-born officers. As explained in the previous chapter, the Navy, at this time, with support from the Department of Maori Affairs, began to encourage Maori recruitment generally, and the overall level of Maori involvement in the force started to lift.

However, growth in the number of Maori who served at officer rank was very slow, and it appears that up until the late twentieth century very few Maori obtained commissions in the Navy. Though the Department of Maori Affairs actively promoted opportunities for Maori to enter the RNZN as officer cadets, only small numbers of Maori candidates came forward and successfully secured cadetships. Educational barriers and competition from other career options were among the factors that influenced the number of Maori who entered directly into officer training. It also appears that relatively few Maori were commissioned from the ranks. While clear numbers are unavailable, some evidence suggests that in about 1980 the number of Maori who were either serving as officers or undertaking officer training began to increase. However, ethnicity data collected since 2003 shows that – like the Army – the rate of Maori participation at this level of the RNZN remains limited, particularly when compared to the rate of Maori involvement in the Navy's lower ranks.

Commissioning of Paratene Bennett, 1945 – a temporary change of policy

Webb has discussed the commissioning of Paratene Bennett in his report on Maori military service up to 1945. Bennett's story is briefly outlined here as background to the RNZN's shift in policy in the early 1950s regarding the eligibility of Maori to serve as officers.

At the time of his commissioning, Bennett was one of a number of Maori who were serving in the RNZN at the end of World War II. A pupil of Te Aute College, he had joined the Navy in October 1944 at the age of 19. The son of Bishop F.A. Bennett, Bennett was from a large family and, at the time of his enlistment, six of his siblings were already serving in the Army and Air Force.⁸⁷⁶ These included Charles, who, as detailed earlier, served for a period as commanding officer of 28 (Maori) Battalion and, after the war, became a prominent official in the Maori Affairs Department.

After enlisting, Paratene Bennett undertook his initial training in HMNZS *Tamaki* at Motuihe Island. In February 1945, he proceeded to England to undertake flight training as a naval airman. While undertaking this course, Bennett underwent an interview with the Admiralty Board to be considered for commissioning as an officer in the RNZN.⁸⁷⁷ (As was the case with RNZAF personnel provided to the RAF, RNZN personnel were seconded to the RN and, until they returned to the RNZN's control, their promotions were determined by the British authorities.) According to Tuta Denny, who had been serving alongside Bennett at the time and who was also Maori, the opportunity to seek promotion had been open to other RNZN naval airmen, but only Bennett had applied.⁸⁷⁸

The Admiralty Board initially declined Bennett's application. Bennett later recalled that he was informed he could not be an officer because he was not of British heritage.⁸⁷⁹ Questioning this decision, Bennett contacted the New Zealand High Commissioner, W.J. Jordan, who was a strong advocate for New Zealand servicemen and women serving in Britain during the war.⁸⁸⁰ Soon after, Bennett was advised that a telegram had been received from the High Commission insisting that he be made an officer.⁸⁸¹ Archival evidence concerning this decision has not been located. It is unclear whether the New Zealand Government in Wellington had been contacted about the matter or whether the message from the High Commission emanated from Jordan alone. Either way, it is likely that the call for the Admiralty Board to reverse its decision was based at least partly on sensitivity regarding the significant contribution that Maori had made towards the New Zealand war effort, including, prominently, members of Bennett's own family.

⁸⁷⁶ Rose Evans, 'Against All Odds', *The White Ensign: Royal New Zealand Navy Museum Journal*, Issue 3, Summer 2007, p6.

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p6.

⁸⁷⁸ Denny recalled: 'We could have all [applied], but all we wanted to do was to get home.' Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p16.

⁸⁷⁹ Evans, 'Against All Odds', p6.

⁸⁸⁰ Malcolm Templeton, 'Jordan, William Joseph', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website, accessed 21 December 2017.

URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4j13/jordan-william-joseph>

⁸⁸¹ Evans, 'Against All Odds', p6.

Rather than being commissioned as a regular officer in the RNZN, Bennett – like most wartime naval officers – most likely received a short-service commission in the RNZN Volunteer Reserve. In 1946, following the end of the war, he chose to leave the Navy while on leave in New Zealand. Peter Phipps encouraged Bennett to remain in the RNZN and continue his naval career.⁸⁸² (This presumably would have involved his being transferred from RNZN Volunteer Reserve status to RNZN regular officer.) In 1946, Phipps took over command of HMNZS *Philomel*, the Navy's main base and training establishment at Devonport.⁸⁸³ (As detailed earlier, he later became the first New Zealand born officer to be appointed Chief of Naval Staff.) In spite of Phipps' encouragement, Bennett was resolved on leaving the force. While his decision seems to have partly reflected a preference for wartime service, Bennett also sought a career that would enable him to better serve the Maori people – a drive that his grandparents and parents had encouraged. The RNZN did not provide a sufficient platform for this ambition, and Bennett instead embarked on a long career in the field of teaching and education.⁸⁸⁴

Bennett's appointment as an officer in the RNZN had gained some attention among Maori and was viewed as an achievement that set a precedent for Maori service at officer rank. In 1946, at a Ngati Poneke leader's conference in Wellington, which Bennett attended, Tom Parata spoke of the distinction Bennett had brought upon Maori people and the precedent he had created for other young Maori.⁸⁸⁵ However, it appears that any precedent that Bennett set was not long lasting and that opportunities for Maori to serve as officers in the RNZN closed with his departure. Archival evidence suggests that it was not until the early 1950s that the Navy again became open to accepting Maori for commissioning as officers. While clear policy statements have not been located, the policy shift is noted in correspondence and file notes written around the time that Navy recruiters and Maori Affairs officials met in March 1953.

As detailed in the previous chapter, the purpose of this meeting, which took place on 24 March 1953, was to discuss how the Department of Maori Affairs might assist the Navy to recruit Maori. In a file note, Charles Bennett, who at this time appears to have been Assistant Controller of the Maori Welfare Division, recorded that two outcomes were reached. First, Maori Affairs agreed that welfare officers would sit in on interviews with Maori applicants and provide advice on their background and suitability. Secondly, the Department would communicate with secondary schools in order to identify suitable Maori candidates for officer rank. In respect of the latter, Bennett recorded that: 'Whatever was the position before Capt Slaughter assured us

⁸⁸² Ibid., p7.

⁸⁸³ McGibbon, 'Phipps, Peter', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara website.

⁸⁸⁴ Evans, 'Against All Odds', pp6-7.

⁸⁸⁵ *Evening Post*, 1 October 1946, cited in Evans, 'Against All Odds', p7.

in no uncertain terms that today the door is wide open for suitable Maoris to enter officer class.’⁸⁸⁶ As noted earlier, Slaughter, an RN officer, was Second Member of the Naval Board and one of two naval staff who had attended the meeting.

Subsequent correspondence shows that Maori Affairs officials understood that the policy to allow Maori to serve as naval officers was a very recent development. Writing to the Principal of Te Aute College, R.G. Webb, on 27 March 1953, the Under Secretary of Maori Affairs stated that:

My Department now has a fairly close association with the Navy Head Office officials and it is as much their hope as it is ours that there will one day be a Maori commissioned officer in the Navy. In past years Maoris have not had ready access into this field but today the position is entirely changed and the Navy is more than willing to receive Maori officer cadets on an equal basis with pakehas and with equal readiness.⁸⁸⁷

In February 1955, the Secretary for Maori Affairs, in another letter to Te Aute’s Principal, reiterated that ‘it was only recently that the path was opened’ for Maori to serve at officer rank within the RNZN.⁸⁸⁸

Efforts to encourage Maori entry into officer training, 1953-1960

By 1953, it has been explained, the Navy became open to Maori serving as officers and looked to the Maori Affairs Department to assist with recruitment of Maori for service at both commissioned and other ranks. In respect of the entry of Maori into officer training, Charles Bennett recorded after the meeting on 24 March 1953 that the Navy was ‘very keen that we should put up suitable Maori candidates.’⁸⁸⁹ As described in the previous chapter, growth in Maori involvement in the RNZN was underway by this time. Data collected by the Navy for the Department of Statistics’ intercensal population returns indicates that by the end of the 1950s about 7½ percent of Navy personnel were Maori. However, this growth was based almost entirely on recruitment of Maori into the RNZN’s lower ranks. In spite of the Navy’s shift in policy towards Maori serving at officer rank and active efforts to encourage Maori to apply for entry into officer training, only a very small number of Maori appear to have applied for and been accepted into officer training in the years that followed the March 1953 meeting. While a range of factors were at play, one of the key barriers that Maori faced was the educational requirements for entry.

⁸⁸⁶ Bennett, file note, 25 March 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁸⁷ Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Principal, Te Aute College, 27 March 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁸⁸ Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Webb, Headmaster, Te Aute College, 8 February 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁸⁹ Bennett, file note, 25 March 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

The Navy's interest in encouraging recruitment of Maori into officer training was consistent with a wider policy to increase the number of New Zealand-born officers in the force. In 1950, the RNZN's official policy was that, eventually, all officers should be New Zealanders. The *New Zealand Official Yearbook* of 1950 recorded that the Naval Board's aim was that the RNZN should be manned entirely with New Zealand officers. In the meantime, to make up for deficiencies, 'a number of officers, especially of the higher ranks, are serving on loan from the Royal Navy.'⁸⁹⁰ In June 1953, not long after the meeting that was held between Navy staff and Maori Affairs officials, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Commodore Sir Charles Madden, emphasised that officer positions were open to New Zealanders. In a press statement, Madden explained that RN officers were serving in the RNZN only because there were too few New Zealanders to fill the positions. He emphasised that senior positions in the force were 'wide open to New Zealand boys.'⁸⁹¹

While the RN-influenced Naval Board and the Chief of Naval Staff spoke of the opportunities that existed for New Zealanders to serve as officers, some oral evidence suggests that decisions made at this time were inconsistent with the objective of encouraging greater New Zealand participation at commissioned rank. In an interview held at the RNZN National Museum, New Zealand-born Commodore J.P.S. Vallant recalled how, in the post-war years, RN officers were promoted to the senior-most ranks of the RNZN ahead of New Zealand officers. Referring, it seems, to the early 1950s, Vallant stated that:

Now then once these RN chaps came in, they did the leap-frog alright, and in my book they were no better than the chaps who had made a commitment six years before to get our Navy going. And I think it was a betrayal of trust and of course it was a Royal Navy Naval Board at the time.⁸⁹²

At a later point in the interview, Vallant stated further that:

Many RNZN officers who in 1946, had thrown their lot in to get the Navy going, were never promoted beyond Lieutenant Commander. And I can say now that the bitterness still remains. And in my personal opinion many who may have got as far as Commander could have done equally as well in higher rank as those ex RN who were promoted.⁸⁹³

⁸⁹⁰ 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1950.

⁸⁹¹ 'High positions will be open', *Dominion*, 30 June 1953, clipping in ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁹² Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p22.

⁸⁹³ *Ibid.*, p42.

At the time when the RNZN became open to Maori serving as officers, there were two options for direct entry into officer training, both of which involved extensive periods of training outside New Zealand. First, boys in their sixteenth year who had reached a school certificate standard of education could enter the Navy as 'cadet midshipmen'. Under this scheme, initial training involved two years at the Royal Australian Naval College at Flinders near Melbourne. Secondly, 17 and 18 year olds who had either school certificate or university entrance could join as 'special entry cadets'. Initial training for such cadets involved about eight months at the Britannia Royal Navy College at Dartmouth in England. Following their initial training, the two types of cadets were brought together for a further period of training that lasted more than four years and was mostly undertaken upon RN vessels and in Britain, though some training could also be undertaken on Australian Navy vessels. At the completion of this training, the cadets would finally join the RNZN as sub-lieutenants, but could expect to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant within a short period.⁸⁹⁴

Only small numbers of entrants were accepted each year into the two training schemes. In 1953, it was reported that there were annually only six vacancies for cadet midshipman training at Flinders and nine vacancies for special entry cadet training at Dartmouth. Entry standards were described as being 'inflexible' and it was noted that training vacancies were sometimes not filled. However, Navy recruiters believed that the standard of applicant was improving, with a corresponding increase in the number of cadets being entered for training.⁸⁹⁵

Alongside those who gained a commission in the RNZN through direct entry into officer training, others were promoted from the lower ranks. In 1951, a joint-services memorandum on recruitment and conditions of service in the New Zealand armed forces noted that within the Navy a minimum of 25 percent of officers were commissioned from the ranks.⁸⁹⁶ These individuals were required to undertake additional training to secure their commissions.

In addition to the various entry and training requirements associated with securing a commission, it should be noted that, as with the Army, there was also an expectation that officers would serve until they reached a specified age of retirement. In the late 1950s, for example, RNZN information packages concerning the cadet midshipman and special entry cadet schemes both emphasised that: 'Entry into the Royal New Zealand Navy under this scheme will be taken to imply that the individual intends to

⁸⁹⁴ 'High positions will be open', *Dominion*, 30 June 1953, clipping in ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁶ Secretary, PAO (Personnel) Committee, to Secretary, External Affairs, 9 February 1951, ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

made the R.N.Z.N. his career and will be willing to serve until he reaches retirement age.’⁸⁹⁷

Around the time that the Navy began, in the early 1950s, to look to the possibility of Maori serving as officers, the first boy of Maori descent, Frank David Arnott, appears to have directly entered the RNZN for officer training. However, it seems that the Navy did not recognise Arnott to be Maori and that the Maori Affairs’ Department was unaware of his entry into the force. Arnott presumably did not disclose his Maori ancestry in his application, perhaps deliberately. After attending Gisborne Boys High School, Arnott entered the RNZN as a cadet midshipman.⁸⁹⁸ His personnel file has not been examined, but he appears to have begun his initial training at Flinders in about 1953. One source records that by 1955 Arnott was serving as a cadet midshipman on an RN vessel, and in 1957 he appears to have completed his training and been commissioned.⁸⁹⁹ In 1961, Arnott, with the rank of lieutenant, was based at the HMNZS *Tamaki* training base on Motuihe Island.⁹⁰⁰ Over time, the Maori Affairs Department became aware of Arnott’s position in the Navy. In 1973, *Te Ao Hou* briefly reported that Arnott, holding the rank of lieutenant commander, had been appointed ‘Senior Officer Patrol Craft’ and posted to Britain to oversee the construction of four new fishery patrol vessels. It was noted that this was the latest of ‘a number of sea-going and shore appointments’ that Arnott had filled since being commissioned.⁹⁰¹

Following the meeting with RNZN staff on 24 March 1953, Maori Affairs officials began actively promoting to Maori the opportunities that existed for youths to enter the Navy as trainee officers. The Department focused particularly on providing information to schools, hoping this would be included among the careers options put before Maori pupils. In late March 1953, for example, a letter concerning naval officer training was circularised to various secondary schools that had significant Maori rolls. Signed by the Secretary for Maori Affairs, the letter noted that the RNZN was ‘very keen to consider Maori applicants of the right type for commissioned rank’. However, those who possessed the relevant entry qualifications should not expect automatic entry. Any pupil who applied would need to be ‘of such a calibre as will measure up in every way to the high traditions of the Navy.’⁹⁰²

⁸⁹⁷ See ‘Entry as Cadet Midshipman’ and ‘Entry as Cadet (Special Entry)’, attached to Navy Secretary to Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, 8 July 1957, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁸⁹⁸ ‘Commander named’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 74, November 1973, p51.

⁸⁹⁹ ‘Personal items’, *Gisborne Photo News*, no. 17, 17 November 1955, p18. ‘Commander named’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 74, November 1973, p51.

⁹⁰⁰ ‘Wedding Bells’, *Gisborne Photo News*, no. 83, 18 May 1961, p51.

⁹⁰¹ ‘Commander named’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 74, November 1973, p51.

⁹⁰² Secretary, Maori Affairs, circular letter, ‘Sent to various Secondary schools with significant Maori Roll’, 22 May 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

Maori Affairs officials communicated especially closely with the Principal of Te Aute College, Webb, believing that it was from this school that successful Maori candidates were most likely to be produced.⁹⁰³ Writing to Webb in February 1955, the Secretary of Maori Affairs again noted the opportunity that existed for Maori to join the RNZN as a special entry cadet. He explained that the Department had for two or three years sought unsuccessfully to interest a suitable Maori boy in this career option, which he described as ‘a peak which a Maori has not yet overcome’. Maori Affairs hoped that Te Aute, in keeping with its record in other fields, would provide ‘this pioneer and pathfinder’. A successful applicant from the college would ‘add fresh lustre to the name of Te Aute and of the race’.⁹⁰⁴

Maori Affairs officials also remained in touch with RNZN recruiters and endeavoured, on at least one occasion, to encourage them to directly contact Maori boys who were believed to be potentially suitable candidates. In his oral interview, Vallant recalled that, while he was serving as Director of Naval Recruiting in the mid 1950s, Charles Bennett visited him in connection with getting a young Maori into officer training. Bennett supplied Vallant with a list that included the names of about 20 boys as well as their qualifications and other details. Vallant recalled that ‘they were the type of young men we were looking for’, but he evidently did not pursue contact with any of those listed. It seems likely that Vallant wanted formal applications as proof that an individual was genuinely interested in serving in the Navy. As detailed below, Vallant’s belief at this time was that Maori favoured other career options over serving as officers in the Navy.⁹⁰⁵

In spite of the efforts of Maori Affairs’ officials to promote RNZN officer cadetships, very few applications appear to have come forward from Maori in the years that followed the initial meeting between the Department and Navy recruiters. Where boys with suitable qualifications expressed an interest in seeking entry into the Navy as officer cadets, Maori Affairs officials looked to offer them support. During 1953 and 1954, officials looked closely at the potential of three particular individuals.⁹⁰⁶ However, it appears that only one of these boys eventually submitted an application, and this was unsuccessful because before going before the Naval Recruiting Board he

⁹⁰³ See, for example, Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Principal, Te Aute College, 27 March 1953; Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Webb, Headmaster, Te Aute College, 16 April 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁰⁴ Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Webb, Headmaster, Te Aute College, 8 February 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁰⁵ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p32. Vallant was serving as President of the Naval Recruiting Board by November 1953. See Navy Secretary to Bennett, 4 November 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁰⁶ See Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Principal, Te Aute College, 27 March 1953; Harwood, Principal, Rotorua Boys High School, to Ropiha, Maori Affairs, 10 August 1953; and Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Navy Office, 7 April 1954, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

failed the RNZN's eyesight examination.⁹⁰⁷ Ahead of the planned Recruiting Board interview, the applicant had travelled from Rotorua to Wellington to meet Maori Affairs officials. When seeking funding for the associated travel costs, Bennett advised the Secretary of Maori Affairs that it was the Navy's wish that the Department establish the boy's acceptability 'to the Maori people as a representative'. Bennett further explained that: 'Navy is conscious (and I think we are too) of the fact that this is the first Maori to enter the Navy as an officer cadet and is most anxious that the choice be a sound one in every way.'⁹⁰⁸

In September 1953, when advising the Secretary of Maori Affairs, Ropiha, of the applicant's failed eyesight test, Captain Slaughter expressed regret that the Navy could not proceed the application, and he thanked Ropiha for the efforts that Maori Affairs had made in the case. Slaughter emphasised that he was sorry that during his time as Second Naval Member, which was coming to an end, a Maori had not been recruited into the Navy's officer ranks.⁹⁰⁹

The educational requirements for entry were among the factors that explain the small number of applications that the Navy received from Maori in respect of the two officer cadet schemes. As detailed above, applicants for the midshipman scheme needed to have a school certificate standard of education, while those who applied for the special entry scheme required school certificate or university entrance. Further, the selection process required that candidates sit an academic examination that focused on particular subjects. In the case of the midshipman scheme; the level of the examination was described as being 'slightly below' School Certificate standard, while the special entry scheme test was at the same level as University Entrance.⁹¹⁰

For reasons that are unclear, the Maori Affairs Department, in its efforts to encourage applications for RNZN officer cadet training, generally emphasised and more strongly promoted the special entry scheme, which had the highest educational entry requirements.⁹¹¹ Except for those who wished to serve in one particular branch of the Navy – the Supply and Secretarial Branch – all special entry applicants needed to be able to pass a physics test. For Maori who attended some schools, this presented an obstacle. In April 1953, Te Aute's Principal advised the Under Secretary of Maori Affairs that physics was not offered at the school and that demand for the

⁹⁰⁷ Slaughter to Ropiha, 12 September 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁰⁸ Bennett to Ropiha, 20 August 1953, minute on Harwood, Principal, Rotorua Boys High School, to Ropiha, Maori Affairs, 10 August 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁰⁹ Slaughter to Ropiha, 12 September 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹¹⁰ See 'Entry as Cadet Midshipman' and 'Entry as Cadet (Special Entry)', attached to Navy Secretary to Under Secretary, Maori Affairs, 8 July 1957, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹¹¹ See, for example, Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Navy Office, 7 April 1954; Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Tamepo, 9 August 1954; Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Webb, Headmaster, Te Aute College, 8 February 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

subject was so limited that it could not be introduced at the expense of one of the other sciences.⁹¹² For this reason, the Secretary of Maori Affairs later suggested that, ‘for most Maori boys’, the best option for securing a special entry cadetship would be to opt for service in the Supply and Secretarial Branch.⁹¹³

While the educational requirements for entry would have presented a greater barrier to Maori, some would have nevertheless been able to meet the required standards. Other factors also seem to have influenced the level of applications from Maori during the 1950s. Vallant, in his oral interview, suggested that potentially suitable Maori youths overlooked the opportunity to undertake RNZN officer training in favour of other career opportunities. Recounting his meeting with Charles Bennett, where Bennett had handed him a list of the names of 20 potentially suitable Maori boys, Vallant recollected:

I said “well there is a very simple reason why we don't take any Maori boys of this calibre” and he [Bennett] said “well what’s that”. I said well none of them want to come in the Navy. I said there is Forestry, Maori Affairs, Army, Teaching you name it but there is not one who wants to come in the Navy. I said you produce this calibre of young man for us that wants to come in the Navy and you will have Maori Naval Officers at the General List level, but I said “if they don't want to come we certainly don't want them”.⁹¹⁴

No evidence has been located to suggest that the Navy, at this time, attempted to investigate why young Maori who potentially might have entered the RNZN as officer cadets seem to have viewed other options more favourably. The length of training time outside of New Zealand and the commitment to serve until retiring age may have been among the factors that discouraged applications from Maori. In respect of the length of service, naval careers sometimes impacted seriously on the extent to which individuals were able to enter into and meet family and relationship commitments.⁹¹⁵

In 1957, the Navy continued to seek to encourage Maori to apply for officer training cadetships and, in doing so, it continued to look to the Department of Maori Affairs

⁹¹² Webb to Under Secretary Maori Affairs, 20 April 1953, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹¹³ Secretary, Maori Affairs, to Webb, Headmaster, Te Aute College, 8 February 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹¹⁴ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p32.

⁹¹⁵ For example, Vallant, a Pakeha officer, recalled: ‘I don't think I ever really got around to correctly serving the Navy and my family... I don't say that they suffered, but I don't think they got the attention they should have got.’ Commodore J.P.S. Vallant, oral interview, undated, transcript, DLA0003, RNZN National Museum, p36. See also the comments of Charles Parkinson in respect of his service between the late 1960s and early 1980s. Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, pp11-12.

for assistance. At this time, it remained the understanding of both the Navy and Maori Affairs that a Maori had yet to secure an officer cadetship. On 6 June 1957, the Navy Secretary, Wraight, and another RNZN staff member, Commander Carr, met with the Under Secretary of Maori Affairs to again discuss the opportunities that existed for Maori to serve as naval officers.⁹¹⁶ (The Navy, it seems, requested this meeting.) Afterwards, the Navy Secretary wrote to the Under Secretary, expressing the Naval Board's thanks for the help that Maori Affairs was offering in connection with 'the present endeavour being made to attract Maori candidates for officer cadetships'.⁹¹⁷ With his letter, the Navy Secretary enclosed information on the two cadet schemes. Maori Affairs appears to have requested additional copies of this information for distribution to schools, and issues of *Te Ao Hou* published in December 1957 and April 1958 included advertisements that set out details of the two officer cadet schemes.⁹¹⁸

File evidence shows that in 1960, the Navy and Maori Affairs continued to discuss and consider options that might result in a Maori entering into officer training. Phipps, Chief of Naval Staff, was party to these discussions. In June 1960, a Maori Affairs official advised the Principal of Te Aute that Phipps was interested in seeing a Maori boy enter training for commissioned rank.⁹¹⁹ In response, Webb offered the name of a student he believed would be a suitable candidate.⁹²⁰ The official then spoke with Phipps, who stated he would arrange for one of his officers to 'have a look' at the boy concerned. The official advised Phipps that the 'search will continue' and he also appears to have raised the possibility of encouraging a Maori engineering student to consider a naval career.⁹²¹ The outcome of this communication is unclear.

Maori officers within the RNZN, 1960-2017

Research for this report has identified little further archival file evidence concerning the commissioning of Maori within the RNZN.⁹²² The extent to which the Navy and Maori Affairs continued to actively promote and encourage Maori entry into officer cadetships is unclear. It may be that their efforts waned after a Maori candidate was seen to successfully enter officer training. This appears to have happened in the early

⁹¹⁶ Navy Secretary to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 12 May 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

⁹¹⁸ See minute on Navy Secretary to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 12 May 1955, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington. 'Midshipmen', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 21, December 1957, p41. 'Midshipmen', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 22, April 1958, p18.

⁹¹⁹ Writer unknown, file note, 27 June 1960, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.
⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ Writer unknown, file note, 28 June 1960, ACIH 16036 MA1 box 309 17/2/7 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

⁹²² For the years beyond 1960, no Maori Affairs head office or Navy files dedicated to Maori service in the RNZN have been located. The Navy appears to have kept a file concerning the appointment of Maori officers, but this has not been found. The date range of this file is uncertain. It has the reference number 13/18/123. See file cover of AAYT 8490 N1 box 309 13/3/1 part 2, ANZ Wellington.

1960s. In December 1963, *Te Ao Hou* reported that the RNZN's first Maori midshipman, John Stewart Kiri Kiri, had recently returned to New Zealand after a period of training overseas.⁹²³

While officer cadetships had been the focus of efforts to establish a Maori at officer rank, it has been explained that this was not the only avenue by which an individual could secure a commission. A minority of naval officers obtained commissions through promotion from the lower ranks. From the available file evidence, it is doubtful that a Maori was appointed an officer in this way before 1960. Tuta Denny, in the early to mid-1960s, may have been the first Maori to have been offered such a promotion. At this time, Denny, aged between about 35 and 40 years, was serving as a Master at Arms. After re-enlisting in the RNZN in 1947, he had been in the Navy for at least 15 years. In an oral interview, Denny recalled that while attending Peter Phipps' final parade, Phipps had asked whether he would consider putting himself forward for a commission.⁹²⁴ Denny recalled that: 'At that time, they were sending a few away... and they came back as Lieutenants.'⁹²⁵ Phipps had explained that Denny would have to go to England for a couple of years, but could take his family with him. Denny turned down the offer due to family considerations.⁹²⁶

Around this time, in 1965, the RNZN introduced a new scheme for officer training, which appears to have reduced the amount of time that cadets were required to spend outside of New Zealand. Under the new scheme, entrants underwent a course of training at the Officer Training School at HMNZS *Tamaki* before proceeding to 'on the job' training at sea or study at the University of Auckland.⁹²⁷ This change does not appear to have seen any significant change in the number of Maori officers.

In a brief of evidence prepared for the Wai 2500 oral hearings, Tai Tokerau-born Charles Parkinson, who served in the RNZN between the late 1960s and early 1980s, states that the number of Maori officers was very small during his time in the service: 'There were only three Maori that were recognised as commissioned officers in the entire Navy (this would have been from about 1967 to about 1980).'⁹²⁸ At some point during the 1970s, Parkinson himself secured a commission through promotion from

⁹²³ 'The First Maori midshipman...', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 45, December 1963, p32. See also 'First Maori midshipman', John Maioha Stewart website, accessed 5 August 2018.

URL: <https://sites.google.com/site/johnmaiohastewart/his-maori-heritage/first-maori-midshipman>
⁹²⁴ It is assumed that Denny is referring here to Phipps' final parade as Chief of Naval Staff, a position from which he retired in 1963.

⁹²⁵ Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p15.

⁹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p16.

⁹²⁷ 'Officer training', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p399.

⁹²⁸ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, p5.

the lower ranks and eventually obtained the rank of lieutenant commander.⁹²⁹ Describing his rise through the ranks, Parkinson emphasised that it had required much determination:

In my head, I knew that if I wanted to move up, I needed to stop hanging with the drunks and do the mahi to earn my stripes... If you wanted to excel, you had to really push yourself.⁹³⁰

According to Parkinson, Maori, during his time, were disadvantaged in respect of the opportunities that existed to advance through the ranks. They were overlooked and not encouraged to seek promotion, and because of this many Maori left the Navy. He states that:

A lot of jobs were race-based, especially in terms of promotion and all that kind of thing. Although a lot of us had the experience and knowledge to do many jobs, we were overlooked due to our lack of education... We were not treated as equals, us as Maori... One man I remember in particular was from Te Aupouri and had served at least 20 years. He got overlooked on a number of occasions and the only reason he finally got a promotion was because he had been training other officers. Even though he got promoted, he did not get what he deserved. They basically just made him a cab driver.⁹³¹

Explaining the difficulties that Maori faced, Parkinson suggests that the Navy's RN element was a significant factor: 'I think this was because we had a lot of ex-English officers after WWII, and then a lot of us [Maori] joined in the 1960s and 1970s, at which time we were still subject to British rule.'⁹³²

Tuta Denny, who retired from the Navy around the time that Parkinson joined, had a different perspective. During his time in the RNZN, Denny evidently did not encounter or perceive any significant difference of treatment. When asked about relationships between Maori and Pakeha in the Navy, he recalled:

Well as far as I ever found and in all the time, my time in the Navy, except for one or two RN Officers, like the chap Parker Jervis for example, he was a good example of it, I found that there was no difference what so ever. I mean from Peter Phipps down. It never made a bit of difference, you either were a good guy or you were a bum, and it was exactly the same right through.⁹³³

⁹²⁹ Ibid., p3.

⁹³⁰ Ibid., p6.

⁹³¹ Ibid., p5.

⁹³² Ibid., p6.

⁹³³ Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p12.

In his brief of evidence, Parkinson states that changes introduced around 1980 (about the time he left the Navy) increased opportunities for Maori advancement. Parkinson notes that leadership courses began to be reshaped around this time.⁹³⁴ Research for this report has not investigated these changes. However, it is likely that Parkinson was referring to a new system of RNZN officer training that was introduced in 1984, for which there was three different entry paths.⁹³⁵ The extent to which this change arose from any specific aim to enable more Maori to serve in leadership positions is unclear. However, in the years that followed, the number of Maori engaged in officer training appears to have increased. In 1991, five Maori midshipmen were undertaking training.⁹³⁶


As detailed earlier in the chapter, the NZDF has since 2003 collected ethnicity data that sheds light on the proportion of Maori among officers and personnel serving in other ranks. Covering the years 2003 to 2017, Graphs 8 and 9 set out the data that relates to the Navy. Though the number of Maori who served at commissioned rank increased towards the end of the twentieth century, the graphs shows that the proportion of officers who identify themselves as Maori remains very low and significantly less than the proportion of Maori among other ranks. However, the gap between the two rates of Maori participation in the RNZN has closed a little over the period. This has mostly been the result of a decline in the proportion of Maori among other ranks, though there has been some growth in the proportion of Maori among officers. In 2003, 3.3 percent of RNZN officers identified as being Maori, compared to 5.7 percent in 2017.

⁹³⁴ Charles Parkinson, Wai 2500, #A116, p6.


⁹³⁵ 'Officer training', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p399.

⁹³⁶ Tuta Denny's interviewer, whose identity is unclear, noted this during the course of the interview with Denny. See Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p16.

Graph 8: Navy – ethnicity of regular officers, 2003-2017⁹³⁷



Graph 9: Navy – proportion of Maori among regular officers and other ranks, 2003-2017⁹³⁸



⁹³⁷ Table 2, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

⁹³⁸ Ibid.

Air Force

This section briefly discusses issues concerning promotion and service at commissioned rank within the RNZAF. Little evidence that relates specifically to Maori has been located. Unlike the Navy, the RNZAF does not appear to have made deliberate efforts to encourage Maori into officer training. The previous chapter has detailed that the proportion of Maori personnel in the Air Force was lower than the other two forces. It also noted some evidence from the 1950s that indicates that elements within RNZAF leadership looked negatively upon Maori involvement in the force. Such attitudes, along with the required educational standards, are likely to have influenced the level of Maori involvement in leadership positions within the RNZAF.

Pathways for securing commissioned rank in the Air Force have differed somewhat from the Army and Navy because, for many years, RNZAF officers were commissioned largely from the ranks. The 1951 joint-services memorandum noted that, with a few exceptions (mainly specialists and university entrants), all RNZAF officers were appointed from the ranks. However, it was anticipated that in the future only about 75 percent of officers would come through the ranks.⁹³⁹ In line with this prediction, it is evident that by 1970 there was a greater level of direct entry into the Air Force's commissioned ranks.⁹⁴⁰

Since World War II, RNZAF officer training appears to have been mostly carried out in New Zealand. From 1948, cadet pilots and aircrew undertook an initial training course at Whenuapai before undergoing an 82-week course at Wigram, after which they went onto to further, specialised training at a variety of school. In the mid-1960s, officer training became centralised in the Flying Training Wing at Wigram. Basic Officer Training was carried out there until 1993, when it instead began to be undertaken at Woodbourne.⁹⁴¹

Data on Maori participation at commissioned rank is available only from 2003. Evidence presented in chapter two shows that, before this time, some Maori did serve as officers in the RNZAF. For example, it has been noted that Albert Tauwhare, who served in the RNZAF during World War II, rejoined the force in 1948 before

⁹³⁹ Secretary, PAO (Personnel) Committee, to Secretary, External Affairs, 9 February 1951, ACIE 8798 W2619 EAW2619 box 28 87/24/2 part 1, ANZ Wellington.


⁹⁴⁰ For example, candidates for commissions in the General Duties (Flying) Branch were being drawn mainly from civil life. Some officer cadets were also being enlisted and, on completion of up to four years' military and university studies, were granted permanent commissions in the General Duties, Technical, Administrative and Supply, or Education Branches. 'Defence', *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1970.

⁹⁴¹ 'Officer training', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p398-399.

transferring to the RAF in about 1950.⁹⁴² The overall impression is that very few Maori served as officers during the post-war years and through to 2000. As detailed earlier, Pugsley has noted that only one Maori, Flying Officer Pere, served in No. 14 Squadron during its deployment to Singapore between 1964 and 1966.⁹⁴³ Around the same period, the RNZAF had one Maori helicopter pilot – Flight Lieutenant William (Bill) Waterhouse.⁹⁴⁴

The ethnicity data that the NZDF has collected since 2003 confirms a continuing low rate of Maori participation at commissioned rank within the RNZAF. Graphs 10 and 11 show the proportion of Maori among officers to be small and lower than the overall rate of Maori involvement in the RNZAF. In 2003, 2.6 percent of Air Force officers identified themselves as being Maori, compared to 3.4 percent in 2017.

Graph 10: Air Force – ethnicity of regular officers, 2003-2017⁹⁴⁵




⁹⁴² Tauwhare remained in the RAF until at least 1966, serving in a number of senior positions, including as commanding officer of the Middle East Communications Squadron. ‘Squadron-Leader Albert Tauwhare’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 54, March 1966, p37. See also: ‘People in the News’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 26, March 1959, p20.

⁹⁴³ Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p67.

⁹⁴⁴ McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, p185.

⁹⁴⁵ Table 4, Commodore Smith, Chief of Staff HQNZDF, to Cleaver, 10 October 2017, held by author.

Graph 11: Air Force – proportion of Maori among regular officers and other ranks, 2003-2017⁹⁴⁶



Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter primarily concerns the ability of Maori to serve as officers. It has been explained that in all three services there has been a low level of Maori participation at commissioned rank. This was especially the case during the post-war period. Clear statements of policy that sought to exclude or limit Maori from serving as officers at this time have not been located. However, in the case of the Navy, it is evident that an exclusionary approach prevailed from the time Paratene Bennett left the force in 1946 (when he evidently turned down the opportunity for a permanent commission) through to the early 1950s. In the case of the other two services, it is possible that the low level of Maori involvement at commissioned rank partly reflected discriminatory attitudes – discussed in the previous chapter – that were held by some senior Army and Air Force staff. But no evidence has been located regarding the number of Maori who sought to enter officer training within these services and how their rate of success compared to that of non-Maori.

In respect of the Army and Navy, efforts to encourage Maori into officer training indicate that in these services, at least, any policies and attitudes that sought to restrict Maori involvement gave way to a greater willingness for Maori participation at commissioned rank. The Navy, it has been explained, was the first to take steps in this direction, and from 1953 with support from Maori Affairs, sought to enter Maori into officer training. By 1964, the Army was also promoting opportunities for service at commissioned rank to Maori. By this stage, it has been explained, there had been

⁹⁴⁶ Ibid.

some growth in the number of Maori officers in the force. It has been suggested that the performance of the small number of Maori officers who served during the 1950s would have helped to break down any reservations concerning service of Maori at commissioned rank within the integrated force. In 1957, Tony Mataira's appointment to lead one of the four rifle companies of 1 NZ Regiment demonstrated that, by this time, the Army was prepared to put Maori into prominent leadership positions.

Though the Army and Navy – for a period, at least – encouraged Maori to enter officer training, the number of Maori who served as officers remained low, especially in the Navy. One of the main reasons for this was the formal educational requirements for entry into officer training. In the case of the Navy, the length of time that trainee officers were expected to spend outside of New Zealand might also have influenced the number of Maori who sought to serve at this level. New training opportunities introduced in the 1980s appear to have seen a small increase in the number of Maori who entered RNZN officer training. Earlier, an increase in Maori officers in the Army was also linked to new training avenues, particularly the introduction, in the late 1950s, of the one-year Portsea course. While the Army looked to increase Maori officer numbers, growth in the number of Maori entering officer training after this time was not the result of any preferential treatment. Maori, it was emphasised, would have to meet the Army's 'exacting standards'. These standards, combined with generally lower Maori educational achievement, no doubt continue to be important in explaining why Maori officer numbers remain low in all the services. Though Brian Poananga and Jerry Mateparae have shown that Maori are able to serve at the highest ranks, NZDF ethnicity data collected since 2003 records that the proportion of Maori among officers continues to be much smaller than the proportion who serve in other ranks.

In respect of promotion within the enlisted ranks, the evidence that has been presented in this chapter relates mainly to the Army. Some of this evidence shows that, in the 1950s and 1960s, Maori who spoke te reo as their first language and lacked fluency in English were disadvantaged. For such individuals, Intelligence testing conducted verbally in English and also written promotion and course exams presented obstacles for advancement and limited their service opportunities. However, for those who were not disadvantaged in this way, some were able to secure promotions and progress to positions with leadership responsibilities. Evidence cited in this chapter indicates that from the 1950s onward a significant proportion of Army NCOs were Maori.

During the Wai 2500 oral hearings, some witnesses – individuals who served from the mid-1950s onwards – stated that they believed they were overlooked for promotion because they were Maori. In respect of both the Army and the Navy, they alleged that this was not uncommon and that, for Maori personnel, advancement

through the ranks generally occurred more slowly. However, other witnesses and Maori veterans whose experiences are recorded elsewhere offer a different perspective. These individuals state – and, in some cases, emphasise – that discrimination against Maori was not something that they witnessed or experienced. On the whole, the evidence does not point to widespread and systematic discrimination against Maori in respect of promotion, though it is difficult to comment conclusively on the matter. The extent to which the services introduced policies and processes to prevent race-based discrimination has not been established. In relation to this, it is notable that, since the passage of the Race Relations Act 1971, race-based discrimination in employment decisions, including promotion, has been unlawful.⁹⁴⁷

The chapter has noted some evidence from the 1960s that suggests that Maori soldiers who were identified to have leadership potential were sometimes reluctant to take on positions of responsibility because they did not want to be separated from their friends. Captain A. Armstrong mentioned this in 1964, and two years later ‘an irritating reluctance to accept rank’ was noted in the ‘Maori Soldier’ memo. During the oral hearings, some witnesses also stated that, where members of the same whanau served together, promotion presented a difficulty if it was at odds with sibling hierarchies. The extent to which these factors have continued to influence the advancement of Maori soldiers – including their willingness to serve at commissioned rank – is unclear. The issues noted here raise questions about the overall degree to which there has been compatibility between the armed services’ leadership structures and Maori cultural preferences regarding organisation and leadership.

⁹⁴⁷ See section 5, Race Relations Act 1971. The 1977 Act was repealed and replaced by the Human Rights Act 1993. Provisions relating to employment are set out in sections 22 to 35 of the 1993 Act.

Chapter Four: Service Experiences – Other Aspects



Gunner from 161 Field Battery during a farewell for 9 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. Other battery members watch on. Photograph taken on 24 November 1969 at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province, Vietnam. Reference: PO4667.643, Australian War Memorial Collection.

Introduction

Following from the discussion of leadership and promotion, this chapter examines a number of other issues concerning the service experiences of Maori. It is divided into two parts.

The first part looks at issues relating to several different aspects of military service – pay and conditions; training and equipment; honours and recognition of service; exposure to risk; and welfare measures and discipline. Much of the evidence presented in this part of the chapter concerns the Army and relates to the period from 1957 to 1972, which spans the deployment of the first battalion to Malaya through to the end of New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam. The Wai claims that raise issues about the various aspects of military service that are discussed in the first part of the chapter primarily concern this period. Most of the evidence relating to these matters presented during the Wai 2500 oral hearings also concerns this period.

Some of the issues that the Wai claims raise about the aspects of military service examined in the first part of the chapter are of a general nature and concern matters that affected all service personnel – Maori and non-Maori. These include, for example, issues relating to the adequacy of equipment and training. It has not been possible to closely investigate these broad concerns. Instead the discussion focuses on the extent to which Maori have experienced different treatment from other service personnel. In part, it seeks to establish whether Maori were discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity. But it also looks to establish whether any special consideration was given to Maori where their interests differed from those of non-Maori. With regard to this, a key issue arises from the significant extent to which Maori in the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Navy, were over-represented when compared to the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. This over-representation meant that certain negative aspects of military service – including, for example, exposure to risk during deployment – were more likely to have a disproportionate impact upon Maori, and especially those communities that had strong traditions of military service and were highly represented in the forces.

This second part of the chapter discusses the extent to which the armed services, during the period covered in this report, have recognised and supported Maori culture, including use of te reo. It describes how the place of Maori culture within the services has changed and the influences that have contributed to this, including the role that Maori personnel have played. Issues concerning recognition of cultural needs and tikanga are raised in a number of Wai claims, and evidence concerning these matters was presented during the oral hearing weeks. The coverage provided here compliments some related discussion that Kesaia Walker will include in her health issues report. In this report, Walker will discuss tikanga in respect of the ways

that the Crown has responded to the health, social, cultural, and spiritual impacts of military service on Maori personnel. With regard to these impacts, some claimants have stated, for example, that tikanga – specifically, the whakanoa ritual – was not followed when soldiers returned from active deployment.⁹⁴⁸

Separate treatment or consideration?

Pay and conditions of service

Research for this report has located no evidence that suggests that Maori and non-Maori personnel were treated differently in respect of their pay and conditions of service. For example, nothing has been found to indicate that Maori and non-Maori who served at the same level were at any time paid different rates. Evidently reflecting this, the issues that have been raised about pay and conditions are of a general nature and do not point to separate treatment of Maori. A prominent issue concerns the policy whereby soldiers who served in Vietnam were required to pay tax.⁹⁴⁹ This was something that was experienced by all Army personnel who were deployed to the theatre. In *Grey Ghosts*, published first in 1998, Deborah Challinor noted that the taxation of pay had remained a source of grievance for some who had served in Vietnam:

Some New Zealanders were, and still are, angry about the fact that they were the only allied soldiers serving in Vietnam being taxed on what they earned there which, for some, still leaves a bitter taste.⁹⁵⁰

In his official history of New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War, which was published in 2010, McGibbon examines the taxation issue, noting that conditions of service for the regular soldiers who served in Vietnam were different from those of the non-regular personnel who had earlier served overseas, for example, during World War II and in Korea. Unlike these non-regular soldiers, those who served in Vietnam were required to pay tax. However, McGibbon points out that their rates of pay were determined on the basis that they would be taxed and, to compensate for some of the inconveniences and uncertainties they faced, a number of allowances were paid.⁹⁵¹ Further, in accordance with a decision that was made by the government in 1965, those who served in Vietnam received a deferred payment sum

⁹⁴⁸ See, for example, Wai 1477, #1.1.1(b), p12.

⁹⁴⁹ See Wai 1657, #1.1.1(a), p9. In respect of oral hearing evidence, see, for example, John Sturgess, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, p144.

⁹⁵⁰ Challinor, *Grey Ghosts*, p59.

⁹⁵¹ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p82.

on their return to New Zealand. Equating roughly to the amount of tax paid, this constituted a form of tax exemption.⁹⁵²

In 2011, the Royal New Zealand Returned and Services Association contracted Peter Cooke to further investigate the matter. After undertaking extensive archival research, Cooke reached the same conclusion as McGibbon – namely, that through the deferred lump-sum payment, ‘the NZ Government compensated service personnel at the time for paying income tax while deployed in Vietnam.’ Cooke noted, however, that the deferred payment was ‘inadequately publicized’ and ‘not explained well as an instrument of compensation’.⁹⁵³ Both of these factors, it seems, helped to create misunderstanding and a lingering resentment over the pay issue.

During the Vietnam deployment, some Army personnel expressed other grievances about their pay. Again, there does not seem to have been a racial dimension to these issues. In February 1966, concerns about pay were among several matters raised with Bill Herewini when the former 28 (Maori) Battalion officer visited New Zealand personnel serving in South-East Asia. *Te Ao Hou* published an article that described Herewini’s tour of the region. This noted that Herewini was a member of the RSA’s Dominion Executive Committee, and it was possibly in this capacity that he undertook the tour, which included visits to:

- (1) RNZAF personnel stationed at Kuching, Sarawak;
- (2) Headquarter of New Zealand Far East Land Forces at Singapore;
- (3) New Zealand seamen on board HMS *Mull of Kintyre*, a supply ship stationed at Singapore;
- (4) Headquarters of RNZAF No. 41 Squadron stationed at Changi naval base, Singapore;
- (5) 1NZIR at Terendak Camp, Malaysia; and
- (6) 161 Battery in South Vietnam.

Te Ao Hou reported that Herewini had ‘frank discussions with New Zealand servicemen, many of whom were Maoris.’ In respect of pay, younger members of 161 Battery were reported to have expressed some bitterness about the lower pay rates that gunners under 20 years of age received. It was also noted that the gunners, generally, were not pleased with new pay rates that they believed were offset by

⁹⁵² Ibid., p83.

⁹⁵³ Peter Cooke, ‘Review of taxation and deferred pay of NZ troops who served in South Vietnam’, report prepared for the Royal New Zealand Returned and Services Association, May 2011.
URL: <https://nzvietnaveterans.org.nz/images/Documents/Vietnam%20Tax%20Report-Cooke.pdf>

increased living costs. RNZN personnel serving on the HMS *Mull of Kintyre* and the RNZAF personnel stationed at Kuching also raised this issue with Herewini.⁹⁵⁴

Though no evidence has been located to suggest that Maori and Pakeha who served at the same level experienced different treatment in respect of pay and conditions, it should be noted that – as with most organisations, civil or military – rates of pay differed considerably between positions within the armed services’ hierarchies.⁹⁵⁵ This is important because, as explained in the previous chapter, the proportion of Maori personnel who have served at commissioned rank, where pay rates are highest, has been much lower than that of non-Maori. Lower representation at commissioned rank has meant, obviously, that Maori have not derived the pay benefits associated with service at this level to the same extent as non-Maori. As a result, it seems likely that the average pay of Maori service personnel has been lower than that of non-Maori.

Training and equipment

As with the matters that concern pay and conditions of service, issues that have been raised about training and equipment, which relate particularly to the Army, do not allege any difference of treatment between Maori and non-Maori personnel.⁹⁵⁶ Consistent with this, research for this report has not identified any policies or practices that resulted in Maori and non-Maori receiving different treatment in respect of the training they received or the equipment with which they were expected to carry out their duties. However, it should again be noted that higher rates of Maori involvement meant that any failings were likely to have had a greater impact on Maori.

The brief discussion presented here focuses on matters relating to equipment. These issues are evidently of primary concern to claimants, though issues regarding training are somewhat intertwined with those that relate to equipment. During the oral hearings, for example, Rihari (Dick) Dargaville commented that the training he received before being deployed to Malaysia in 1964 was ‘limited to a large degree by the resources that we had... much of our equipment was of World War II origin.’⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁵⁴ ‘W. Herewini visits New Zealand servicemen’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 55, June 1966, pp48-50.

⁹⁵⁵ See, for example, the pay scales set out in *New Zealand Army Orders*, Issue 31, 12 April 1951, pp3-4, extract in AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1345 319/23/4, Staff – promotions K-force, undated, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁵⁶ In respect of the adequacy of training see: Wai 1657, #1.1.1(a), p7; and, for example, Daryl Higgins, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, pp175-176. For issues concerning equipment, see Wai 1196, #1.1(e), p17; and, for example, Rihari Dargaville, Hearing Week 3, Ōtiria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p555, 557, 560-561.

⁹⁵⁷ Rihari Dargaville, Hearing Week 3, Ōtiria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p555.

Some non-Maori personnel have separately expressed concerns about the equipment that soldiers were deployed with to South-East Asia. As with the claimant testimony, this evidence also raises questions about the Army's preparedness for deployment and whether equipment shortcomings may have heightened the difficulties and possibly the risk that personnel faced. In a memoir that focuses on his experiences serving with 161 Battery in Vietnam, Patrick Duggan comments at some length on the equipment difficulties that he and his unit faced. Upon joining the battery at Bien Hoa in February 1966, Duggan discovered there were serious problems with the New Zealand equipment, including his New Zealand issue boots, which he was advised were 'worse than useless in the jungle'. He and fellow new arrivals therefore had to access more suitable boots from United States and Australian sources.⁹⁵⁸

Of greater concern than his personnel equipment, Duggan also found that 161 Battery's weapons were ill-suited to the deployment environment. He states that:

the guns with which we deployed were manifestly unsuitable for the conditions under which they were operating. The 105 mm L5A1 is a 'pack' howitzer, so-called because it can be broken down into 12 parts, each of which can be shifted about with a mule or other pack animal... They simply started falling apart from the moment they were put in the tropical environment of Vietnam.

Luckily, however, we had a series of Tiffies (as Army Artificers were known) who worked miracles with these aging machines.⁹⁵⁹

The Army had purchased 20 of these guns in 1963. Given Duggan's comment about their being aging, the guns may have been secondhand. Though even if this was the case, it appears they were first manufactured only in 1957.⁹⁶⁰ An article published on the Army Museum's website notes that the lightly-built L5 'was found not to be robust enough for the heavy and often continuous firing required in Vietnam.'⁹⁶¹ Army authorities looked to address the problem and, after about 18 months of use in the theatre, the guns were replaced by older, sturdier American weapons.⁹⁶²

Duggan also states there were issues with the radios that the New Zealanders were deployed with, claiming these were outdated and also unsuitable for the operating environment. Noting that the radios were 'the same sets that many of our dads had

⁹⁵⁸ Patrick Duggan, *What Have They Done to the Rain? A Kiwi Soldier's Memoir of Vietnam*, Kukupa Press, Wellington, 2011, p55.

⁹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp56-57.

⁹⁶⁰ 'Gunnery' Day Feature: Italian L5 105mm Pack Howitzer', Army Museum website, accessed 30 April 2018.

URL: <https://www.armymuseum.co.nz/blog/gunnery-day-feature-italian-l5-105mm-pack-howitzer.html>

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶² *Ibid.*

used in World War II’, Duggan states that it ‘became pretty obvious that these weren’t up to the rigours of war in the tropics’. Therefore, soon after the battery was deployed, the United States forces supplied the New Zealand the Australian units with new radios, which were replaced by even better sets soon after Duggan joined the battery. However, Duggan claims that these sets would later become a problem for New Zealand Army personnel who, some thirty years later, were required to use them when deployed for peacekeeping in East Timor in 1999.⁹⁶³ Research for this report has not confirmed that this was the case or, if the same radio sets were used in East Timor, whether they were replaced during the course of the deployment.

Exposure to risk

This section looks at issues relating to exposure to risk, specifically the extent to which decision making concerning risk has distinguished between Maori and non-Maori or has included special consideration of Maori interests. While ordinary duties and training operations have involved risk, the discussion here – reflecting the concerns that claimants have raised – focuses on decisions relating to active deployments outside of New Zealand, and it is limited to a small amount of relevant evidence that concerns the Army. The discussion concerns risks of potential physical injury as well as the psychological impacts of deployment.

Claim issues concerning risk exposure relate primarily to the Army deployments that took place between 1946 and 1972, which began with Jayforce and concluded with the withdrawal of New Zealand personnel from Vietnam. They deal particularly with the experiences of Maori soldiers in Malaya and Vietnam. Claimants have raised general issues concerning the stress that New Zealand personnel experienced during deployment, and they have alleged that, for some soldiers, the situation was exacerbated through excessive ‘front line’ exposure.⁹⁶⁴ Some claims have noted the high rate of Maori involvement in the Army forces deployed overseas. These state that, because of this high rate of involvement, Maori were disproportionately affected and, though they served voluntarily, were ‘treated as more expendable than Pākehā and other races’.⁹⁶⁵ During the oral hearings, witnesses also indicated that certain roles that involved particularly high levels of risk – notably those of jungle tracker and lead scout – were commonly filled by Maori.⁹⁶⁶

⁹⁶³ Duggan, *What Have They Done to the Rain?*, p56.

⁹⁶⁴ See Wai 861, Wai 1460, Wai 1531, and Wai 2034. Also see, for example, Ernie Stead, Hearing Week 3, Ōtiria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, pp532-535.

⁹⁶⁵ Wai 1968, #1.1.1(b), p24. During the oral hearings, Roslyn Himona stated: ‘we were about 10 to 12% of the population, 20% of the Army overseas, 35% of the Army in Vietnam and 20% of those killed in action, so we were overrepresented.’ Roslyn Nepia Himona, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p313.

⁹⁶⁶ See, for example, William Edward Broughton, Hearing Week 5, Tuahiwi Marae, Kaiapoi, Wai 2500, #4.1.6, p143; and Te Rangikaiwhiria Kemara, Hearing Week 2, Omahu Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp433-434.

With regard to this last issue, no relevant documentary evidence has been located to shed light on whether Maori were deliberately encouraged into such roles. However, with some Maori proving very capable in these positions, this may have occurred.⁹⁶⁷ In respect of the issue of Maori over-representation, research undertaken for this report has also located no evidence to suggest that the government or the Army considered or in any way acknowledged the greater level of risk that Maori – as a people – were exposed to as a result of their higher rate of involvement in the force. Yet it was well understood that Maori were over-represented in the force and, as explained in chapter two, this resulted partly from deliberate efforts to recruit Maori. As discussed below, the Army did make assessments surrounding the level of risk that personnel could reasonably be exposed to during deployments. However, these did not include any special acknowledgement of Maori interests, which is unsurprising given the prevailing integrationist ideology.

Evaluations of risk partly informed decisions about the terms and conditions under which personnel were deployed. A small amount of evidence concerning this has been located in respect of decision making related to the length of the tours of duty of personnel who served in 161 Battery in South Vietnam. This shows the Army had some awareness of the psychological pressures of deployment, but did not consider the position of Maori and the racial makeup of the unit involved. The evidence referred to here concerns an adjustment that was made to the tour length of unmarried men serving in 161 Battery. When the battery deployed in July 1965, the original conditions of service provided that single men could expect to serve approximately 18 months in the theatre, while married men would serve approximately nine months and not more than 12 months.⁹⁶⁸ Maori, it should be noted, made up about one-fifth of the personnel within 161 Battery when it was deployed.⁹⁶⁹

Issues concerning the length of the unmarried men's tour were first raised in mid-October 1965 by the battery's commanding officer, Major D.R. Kenning. In a memo to V Force Headquarters, Kenning strongly recommended that the single men's tour be reduced to that of the married men. Noting that both the United States and Australian forces had set a maximum tour length of 12 months for all personnel, he outlined a number of difficulties and shortcomings that battery personnel faced,

⁹⁶⁷ See, for example, Pugsley's comments regarding the tracking skills of Huia Woods, who from the mid-1950s spent five consecutive years on operations in Malaya. Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p144.

⁹⁶⁸ Adjutant-General, circular letter, 22 July 1965, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/236, Organisation – organisation and formation – V-force, 1965-1968, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁶⁹ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p297, 590-591. About 18 percent of the V Force's main body was Maori (based on a definition of half to full Maori descent). The main body included Headquarters as well as 161 Battery. It is assumed the Maori personnel were concentrated in the battery.

including matters relating to their living conditions, their ability to take rest and recuperation leave, and their access to welfare services. In particular, under a heading titled 'exposure to danger', Kenning emphasised that:

The chance of death or injury through Viet Cong activity exists everywhere in Viet Nam. Even Saigon is not safe from hit and run bombing attacks. (To date on operations away from Bien Hoa 161 Bty has been taking its share of casualties in dead and wounded).

Initially the effects of this are minor. However it has been found that continual exposure to this kind of danger does build up a considerable amount of tension in the soldier. The same degree of danger does not exist for NZ personnel serving in Malaysia.⁹⁷⁰

Kenning also outlined a number of health concerns:

The living conditions and climate are having an adverse effect upon the health of personnel in the Bty. The medical staff are constantly treating troops for skin and stomach complaints. However the worst health hazard is ear damage. Despite that [sic] fact that all pers working close to the guns wear earplugs, there is a high incidence of punctured eardrums and associated complaints. In addition, because the Bty is situated within the circuit pattern of the extremely busy Bien Hoa Airfield there is the constant roar of aircraft engines, particularly jet engines. Already the hearing of some pers has been affected. Continued exposure will increase the danger of permanent hearing defects.⁹⁷¹

The commanding officer at V Force Headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Foley, forwarded a copy of Kenning's report to Army Headquarters in Wellington. He commented that most of the points that Kenning had made were 'overstated or exaggerated', but recommended that further consideration be given to the tour lengths of battery members. The V Force commanding officer outlined his own perspective of the situation. He stated that leave opportunities were limited, along with access to welfare service, but believed that problems with living conditions would improve with the planned building of a cantonment. However, in respect of the general environment that the battery operated in, he admitted that:

When the battery is not on active operations, it is based on an inhospitable piece of the country, within the flight pattern of Bien Hoa airbase and some 600 yds from the runway. This airbase is constantly busy and the incessant roar of jet and other aircraft apart from causing lack of sleep is extremely nerve

⁹⁷⁰ Commanding officer, 161 Battery, to HQ NZ V Force, 19 October 1965, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/236, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁷¹ Ibid.

wracking. Constant exposure to this noise level together with the tension engendered by operations might well lead to some nervous disorders and a drop in efficiency levels.⁹⁷²

Foley also noted tension connected with continual exposure to danger, and he admitted that this, along with the other stresses that battery members faced, might eventually have a psychological impact on some personnel:

There is a risk of death or injury anywhere in Vietnam at any time, whether on operations or not and one must be constantly aware of this fact. At this juncture it is doubted that tension engendered by this aspect has had any appreciable affect [sic] on personnel. After exposure for 12 months however it may, combined with factors mentioned above adversely affect the morale of some individuals.⁹⁷³

No immediate decision concerning the matter was made. In November 1965, Army Headquarters noted that shortened tours would require recruitment to be boosted.⁹⁷⁴ When Herewini visited the battery in February 1966 the situation remained unchanged. The length of the unmarried men's tour was among the issues that battery members raised with Herewini.⁹⁷⁵ In November 1966, more than a year after the issue had first been raised, Army Headquarters eventually decided that the tour for unmarried men would be 12 months. This was still longer than that of married men, which remained at nine months.⁹⁷⁶ The exact reasoning for the adjustment is unclear. McGibbon indicates the decision was made, at least partly, to bring the New Zealand gunners' tours in line with those of their coalition counterparts.⁹⁷⁷ Research has not established whether there was any further adjustment of tour lengths for personnel within the battery prior to its withdrawal from Vietnam in May 1971.⁹⁷⁸

Recognition of service

This section briefly examines two issues relating to how Maori military service has been officially recognised. It looks first at the extent to which personnel returning from overseas deployments have been formally welcomed back to New Zealand and, secondly, it discusses recognition of service through the awarding of military medals.

⁹⁷² Commanding officer, HQ NZ V Force, to Army HQ, 23 October 1965, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/236, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁷³ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁴ Army HQ to Northern Military District and NZ V Force, 11 November 1965, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/236, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁷⁵ 'W. Herewini visits New Zealand servicemen', *Te Ao Hou*, no. 55, June 1966, p50.

⁹⁷⁶ Army HQ to Northern Military District and NZ V Force, 11 November 1965, AAYS 8638 AD1 box 1486 209/3/236, ANZ Wellington.

⁹⁷⁷ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p179.

⁹⁷⁸ 'Timeline – NZ's Vietnam War 1963-75', Vietnam War website, accessed 27 March 2018. URL: <http://vietnamwar.govt.nz/resources/timeline>

Other important issues relating to official recognition of service – those that concern access to healthcare and economic rehabilitation – are discussed in other reports. Again, the focus here is to establish whether Maori and non-Maori experienced different treatment and whether there has been any special acknowledgment of Maori interests.

Claimants have raised several concerns about the issues discussed in this section. Numerous Wai claims allege that the government failed to ensure that veterans were welcomed back to New Zealand in a way that appropriately recognised their war service.⁹⁷⁹ This issue has been raised in respect of several of the post-World War II deployments, but most especially in relation to the return of soldiers who served in Vietnam. In the case of these soldiers, some claims allege, not only the absence of a formal welcome, but that the government failed to protect their dignity and that this contributed to the difficulties that some veterans have faced in connection with their service in Vietnam.⁹⁸⁰ Some witnesses spoke of these issues during the oral hearings. Rangi Clarry Fitzgerald, for example, stated he received ‘little recognition for the active service I have provided while I was in Vietnam.’ Fitzgerald further noted that the local RSA did not welcome him on the basis that Vietnam was not considered ‘a real war.’⁹⁸¹ Non-Maori veterans have expressed sentiments similar to those that claimants have spoken of. Dave Douglas, for example, explained that: ‘You were sort of expecting to be, I suppose, welcomed with open arms, so to speak. But we weren’t you know. We were shunned.’⁹⁸²

McGibbon explains that in 1971 and 1972 some official efforts were made to welcome home and acknowledge the service of those who served in Vietnam. Specifically, he states that this happened in cases where formed units returned directly to New Zealand after their withdrawal from the theatre.⁹⁸³ In May 1971, a civic parade was held in Auckland to mark the homecoming of 161 Battery RNZA and 4 Troop NZSAS.⁹⁸⁴ Disrupted briefly by protestors, the parade was attended by Minister of Defence David Thomson. Among veterans, there has been some doubt as to the extent to which the parade constituted an official welcome. For example, Patrick Duggan, who was among the personnel who took part, has claimed that the government declined to be involved in the ceremony and that Thomson was present only in an unofficial capacity.⁹⁸⁵ McGibbon points out, however, that Thomson had

⁹⁷⁹ See, for example, Wai 246, Wai 700, Wai 762, Wai 861, Wai 1312, Wai 1460, Wai 1661, and Wai 1957.

⁹⁸⁰ See, for example, Wai 1501, Wai 1623, Wai 1657, Wai 1672, and Wai 1927.

⁹⁸¹ Rangi Clarry Fitzgerald, Hearing Week 4, Wairaka Marae, Whakatane, Wai 2500, #4.1.5, p354.

⁹⁸² Challinor, *Grey Ghosts*, p208.

⁹⁸³ McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, pp521-523.

⁹⁸⁴ ‘Homecoming’, Vietnam War website, accessed 27 March 2018.

URL: <http://vietnamwar.govt.nz/nz-vietnam-war/homecoming>

⁹⁸⁵ Duggan, *What Have They Done to the Rain?*, p166.

travelled to Auckland to welcome the troops at Whenuapai and, along with Mayor of Auckland, was on the saluting dais for the parade.⁹⁸⁶ In addition to this ceremony, McGibbon also notes that Defence Minister Arthur Faulker met the training teams at Whenuapai when they returned in December 1972. Opposed to the decision to withdrawal from Vietnam, many of the soldiers evidently dismissed this gesture as political grandstanding.⁹⁸⁷

The efforts that were made to officially welcome returning troops in 1971 and 1972 involved only a minority of the New Zealand personnel who had served in the theatre. Most returned without formal acknowledgement, including the members of 161 Battery who had earlier returned to New Zealand and, greatest in number, those who served within infantry units. McGibbon notes that, with 161 Battery being the only sizeable unit to return directly to New Zealand as a body, there were practical difficulties associated with welcoming home most of those who served in Vietnam. In particular, he notes that, after serving in Vietnam, the infantry companies initially returned to Malaysia and later to Singapore, where they were reabsorbed into 1RNZIR. About six months after leaving the theatre, most of these infantry personnel returned to New Zealand as part of battalion relief arrangements, which included men who had not served in Vietnam.⁹⁸⁸

Comparing the Vietnam homecoming experiences with those of the servicemen and -women who were involved in earlier overseas conflicts, McGibbon states that – except for the Maori battalions – most who served in the world wars dispersed as soon as their ships arrived, while Kayforce personnel returned in small groups on trans-Tasman flights.⁹⁸⁹ The parade afforded to 161 Battery and 4 Troop NZSAS was, therefore, not the norm. However, McGibbon suggests that the particular circumstances of those who returned from Vietnam may have shaped a different need for official recognition of service. In contrast:

the troops from the world wars and Korea came home as victors – or at least undefeated – from wars that were broadly supported by the general population or, in the case of Korea, largely overlooked. Returning to communities that would brook no criticism of their service, they felt no need for government validation or recognition.⁹⁹⁰

About a quarter of a century after the last New Zealand personnel were withdrawn from Vietnam, veterans of the conflict organised their own welcome-home parade

⁹⁸⁶ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p522.

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p523.

⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp523-524.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p524.

⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

through the streets of Wellington – Parade 98.⁹⁹¹ A decade later, and perhaps in recognition of the different circumstances they had faced, the Crown’s 2008 apology to Vietnam veterans included the following statement:

The Crown extends to New Zealand Viet Nam Veterans and their families an apology for the manner in which their loyal service in the name of New Zealand was not recognised as it should have been, when it should have been...⁹⁹²

With regard to the awarding of military medals, a small number of claims have raised issues about campaign medals. The Wai 2381 claim has noted that it was many years before a medal was instituted for those who served in Jayforce. This happened in 1995, when the New Zealand Service Medal 1946-1949 was introduced.⁹⁹³ The Wai 2571 claim raises issue with the fact that a New Zealand campaign medal has not been instituted for military personnel who have served in Antarctica.⁹⁹⁴ Current policies provide that campaign medals will be instituted only for ‘operational service’ and sets out a number of guiding principles, including the requirement that: ‘There must be a balance between maintaining the exclusivity of awards and recognising significant service.’⁹⁹⁵

Alongside campaign medals, there are two other main categories of military medals: gallantry and bravery medals; and long service and good conduct medals.⁹⁹⁶ Research for this report has not attempted to establish the extent to which awards of these medals have corresponded with overall rates of Maori and non-Maori involvement in the forces. However, complaints that assert a racial dimension to the decision making associated with these medals do not appear to have been made. In respect of gallantry and bravery medals, the 2007 award of the Victoria Cross for New Zealand to Lance-Corporal Bill (Willie) Henry Apiata is of particular note – this being the only Victoria Cross awarded to a New Zealander since World War II.⁹⁹⁷ Maori have also at times been prominent recipients of other gallantry and bravery medals. In the mid-1960s, Lieutenants Eru Ihaka Manuera and James Wairata Brown were both awarded the Military Cross for actions while serving in the Borneo

⁹⁹¹ Ibid., p529.

⁹⁹² ‘Ministerial Statement to Parliament – Crown apology to Viet Nam veterans’, 29 May 2008, Beehive website, accessed 29 March 2018. URL: <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ministerial-statement-parliament-crown-apology-viet-nam-veterans>

⁹⁹³ ‘New Zealand campaign medals – the New Zealand Service Medal 1946-1949’, NZDF medals website, accessed 29 March 2018. URL: <http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/category/c/c3.html>

⁹⁹⁴ The claim notes that some New Zealand personnel who have served in Antarctica have received the United States Antarctic Service Medal, though this can not be worn on a New Zealand uniform. See Wai 2571, #1.1.1, p2.

⁹⁹⁵ See ‘New Zealand campaign medals’, NZDF medals website, accessed 29 March 2018. URL: <http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/category/c/index.html>

⁹⁹⁶ See ‘Medal categories’, NZDF medals website, accessed 27 March 2018. URL: <http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/category/default.htm>

⁹⁹⁷ ‘NZ Victoria Cross winners’, NZ History website, accessed 29 March 2018. URL: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/victoria-cross/nz-vc-winners>

Confrontation.⁹⁹⁸ This medal is awarded to junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers ‘for courage and devotion to duty on active service’.⁹⁹⁹

Welfare measures and discipline

Examined together in this section, welfare and discipline are related aspects of military service. In part, welfare measures, including pastoral care, have aimed to encourage good behaviour among personnel and therefore limit the need for disciplinary procedures. The focus here, again, is to identify whether Maori have experienced different treatment from non-Maori or whether any special consideration of Maori interests has been demonstrated. Reflecting the relevant evidence that research for this report has located, the discussion presented here relates mostly to the period between 1950 and 1972 and primarily concerns the Army.

Some issues concerning discipline have been raised by claimants. The Wai 507 claim alleges that claimants who served in the armed services during the second half of the twentieth century experienced discrimination that included ‘disciplining of higher numbers of Maori soldiers than non-Maori.’¹⁰⁰⁰ Additionally, one of the briefs of evidence prepared for the oral hearings raises issues that relate to the experience of a soldier who served in Malaya: Lance Corporal Rangī Whatitiri Rongo Reihana. Drawing on Reihana’s personnel file, it details that between January 1960 and April 1961 Reihana was disciplined five times for being absent without leave. The brief of evidence does not dispute these transgressions, but suggests that Reihana’s punishments were excessive and that the discipline he received did not help him.¹⁰⁰¹

During the period examined here, no archival evidence has been located that sheds light on the rate of disciplinary action against Maori and how this compared with that of non-Maori. Similarly, no evidence has been located to show that Maori commonly received harsher punishments than non-Maori when disciplined for the same offences. But some file evidence does provide details of what appear to be strong measures against Maori. The 1951 case that concerned absenteeism among Maori personnel at the RNZAF’s Te Rapa depot is notable. As detailed in chapter two, the RNZAF, in response to the situation, reduced the number of Maori serving at the base and posted the withdrawn personnel to other bases. It is unclear whether groups of Pakeha personnel were punished similarly for such offending.

⁹⁹⁸ ‘People and places’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 54, March 1966, pp26-27; ‘N.Z. soldiers in Malaysia win valour awards’, *Te Ao Hou*, no. 56, September 1966, p25.

⁹⁹⁹ ‘British Commonwealth gallantry, meritorious and distinguished service awards – the Military Cross’, NZDF medals website, accessed 29 March 2018.
URL: <http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/category/i/i9.html>

¹⁰⁰⁰ Wai 507, #1.1(c), p2.

¹⁰⁰¹ Wiremu Reihana, 29 February 2016, Wai 2500, #A90, pp3-4.

While the available evidence does not allow for a comparison to be made between Maori and non-Maori discipline rates and levels of punishment, it is evident that Maori received some targeted welfare measures. Also, in the Army, at least, individuals who commanded Maori were by the mid-1960s encouraged to show some flexibility and understanding of Maori cultural difference. During overseas deployments, a small amount of evidence suggests that some Pakeha officers demonstrated an awareness of this when leading Maori soldiers. Compared to the other matters that have been discussed in this part of the chapter, the issues examined here provide the greatest evidence of different treatment of Maori. The extent to which these measures were effective in meeting the needs of Maori is not assessed. It is possible to comment only that the services looked to offer some support to Maori and, in a limited way, recognise their difference from Pakeha. It is likely that these efforts were motivated at least partly by a desire to minimise disciplinary problems that involved Maori personnel.

The link between discipline issues and the introduction of welfare measures is evident in the request for assistance that the RNZAF made to Maori Affairs following the problems at Te Rapa in 1951. As detailed earlier, the Air Secretary asked that Maori Affairs' welfare officers be available to assist commanding officers to deal with issues concerning Maori personnel. This proposal was approved and commanding officers at RNZAF bases were made aware of the arrangement. The extent to which welfare officers were subsequently called upon is unclear. File evidence also shows that in 1974 a welfare officer from the Wanganui District began visiting the Army camp at Waiouru. This evidently followed a request made by the camp's chaplain, Padre Harford.¹⁰⁰²

Especially on overseas deployments, some Army chaplains appear to have played an important role in supporting Maori personnel. Maori were appointed to these positions with the specific intention of providing welfare and disciplinary support for Maori servicemen. In 1953, for example, in recognition of the significant number of Maori in Kayforce, a Maori chaplain – Padre R.H. (Sam) Rangiihu – was chosen to replace one of the existing chaplains. McGibbon states that Rangiihu soon proved very valuable to the commander of the field regiment, 'on occasions intervening to buttress formal military discipline among Maori gunners.'¹⁰⁰³ Another Maori chaplain, Padre Captain Whakahuihui Vercoe, later served at Terendak Camp in Malaya and also in Vietnam. McGibbon notes that in 1966, after V Force had gone into action, it was suggested that the Force's first chaplain should be Maori. While

¹⁰⁰² Senior Welfare Officer to Potaka, 19 February 1974, ABRP 6844 W4598 box 190 31/15/1 part 1, Maori welfare – armed services – Army policy, 1951-1974.

¹⁰⁰³ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Vol II*, p295.

this was not to be the case, Vercoe was among a group of padres that rotated into the theatre from Singapore.¹⁰⁰⁴

Alongside these welfare measures, the Army also made some effort to promote greater awareness of Maori cultural difference and to encourage the application of this to 'man management' practices. One key document sets out information relating to this – the 'Maori Soldier' memo. As explained earlier, the Chief of the General Staff circularised this memo in May 1966. The memo stated, for example, that:

There is one almost universal Maori mannerism which can get a soldier into trouble in the Army. This is the Maori habit of listening to a speaker with eyes closed and head down. This is the correct demeanour when listening to speeches on a marae. It signifies concentration and polite attentiveness. Woe betide the hapless Maori soldier who tries this in a lecture – unless he has an understanding lecturer!¹⁰⁰⁵

At another point, the memo stated:

Maoris are a gregarious people. They live and work better as a group and this is why the community nature of military living appeals to many Maoris. However, a Maori alone in a pakeha platoon or section will often feel a real sense of loneliness initially (as would a pakeha perhaps in an all Maori group). If it is possible to put two or more Maoris together, this is one solution. Otherwise it will be up to the officer or an NCO to understand the reasons for, and nature of, the soldier's shyness and to seek ways to overcome it.¹⁰⁰⁶

In Vietnam, some Pakeha officers appear to have adapted their command style when dealing with units that had a large Maori component. McGibbon notes that, though the V Force's framework for discipline was based around military law and routine, 'the presence of many Maori added another disciplinary dimension'. Within units, kinship and concepts of hierarchy between Maori could sometimes be significant. Recalling his command of 161 Battery in 1970-1, John Masters recognised this and revised his leadership approach:

I would be... laying down the law... and I'd be making eye contact with them and then I'd... see two or three eyes go round like that and they would focus on X from Tolaga Bay, who was a lance bombardier or something like that or they'd focus on Y from Ngati Porou... and it took me very little time to realise that if I was to command this battery and have everyone on my side, that X and

¹⁰⁰⁴ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, pp305-306.

¹⁰⁰⁵ 'The Maori Soldier', attached to Chief of the General Staff, circular letter, 19 May 1966, AALJ 7291 W3508 box 155 236/11/2, ANZ Wellington, p5.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p6.

Y were two guys that I had to get alongside, play some darts with, play some cards with, play some chess with.¹⁰⁰⁷

In the Navy, long-serving and more senior Maori crew members appear to have sometimes played an intermediary role between commanding officers and younger Maori. During an oral interview, Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, who served between about 1947 and 1967, spoke of how he sometimes fulfilled this role when a sailor began facing welfare and disciplinary issues:

It depended on what it was, if it was ‘pissed ashore’ or something like that, it was neither here nor there. But the thing was, I would find out. On one or two occasions we had some guy who was fretting about his wife as a matter of fact. There was not only the Maoris, the Pakehas did too, because we were away a long time. He was inclined to let himself you know be late, or forget to do things.¹⁰⁰⁸

Though the evidence presented here is of a limited nature, it shows there was some targeted welfare assistance for Maori personnel and, particularly in the Army, some awareness of Maori cultural difference that sometimes influenced leadership decisions relating to discipline and ‘man management’. This contrasts with the various other aspect of military service that have been discussed, where no separate or different treatment of Maori is evident.

A place for Maori culture?

This section is broken into two time periods. The first covers the years between 1946 and 1990, when formal support for Maori culture was limited largely to the ‘performing arts’ activities of Maori cultural groups. The second time period deals with developments since 1990, when formal recognition and support for tikanga and te reo within the services has grown significantly. This shift, it will be explained, stemmed from broader changes within New Zealand – particularly, increased recognition of the status of Maori as tangata whenua and of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Maori culture in the services, 1946-1990

As discussed earlier in the report, the policy of integration extended beyond the Army’s decision in 1950 not to establish a separate Maori unit in the non-regular Territorial Force. In the 1960s, across the three services, integrationist policy, more

¹⁰⁰⁷ Major J.M. Masters, interview, Christchurch, 7 November 2005, quoted in McGibbon, *New Zealand’s Vietnam War*, p301.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Master at Arms Coxswain Tuta Denny, oral interview, 20 March 1991, transcript, DLA0049, RNZN National Museum, p12.

broadly, underpinned a reluctance to formally acknowledge and distinguish between personnel on the basis of their ethnicity. Visible expressions of Maori culture within the forces seem to have been at odds with the policy of integration, yet from the mid-1950s – as numbers of Maori personnel began to increase – Maori began, with some support from military leadership, to establish cultural groups within the Army and RNZN. It seems that these expressions of cultural difference were able to exist alongside the policy of integration because they did not undermine defence leaders' emphasis that military professionalism and a performance-based merit system – not ethnicity – were the key standards that the forces were based upon. Maori cultural groups also served a positive role in that they helped to provide New Zealand's forces with a unique identity, which in the international context was seen to be of value. Partly reflecting this, evidence relating to the formation of cultural groups and cultural group activities predominantly concerns Maori stationed or deployed outside of New Zealand.

Within the post-war Army, Maori cultural activities may have begun within Kayforce as the proportion of Maori within the force grew. Evidence concerning this dates from 1952.¹⁰⁰⁹ By 1954, haka were a common feature of the activities of personnel within 16 Field Regiment. McGibbon observes that, by this time, and in contrast to the attitude of Army authorities during Kayforce's early days, 'the Maori dimension' received 'much officially-sanctioned publicity'.¹⁰¹⁰ He notes the important role that Chaplain R.H. Rangiihu played in bringing together and leading various Maori-orientated activities. Among the performances, a Maori concert party performed in September 1954 at a United Nations carnival in Pusan, held to raise funds for hospitals.¹⁰¹¹ At the same time, within the Navy, Maori haka and concert groups were established on ships and at the main HMNZS *Philomel* shore base.¹⁰¹²

By the 1960s, Maori cultural elements were also becoming established in Army activities in New Zealand.¹⁰¹³ And overseas, they became a distinctive feature of the units based in South-East Asia. A Maori cultural group was established at Terendak Camp soon after New Zealand personnel began to be based there in 1961. During the oral hearings, Richard Shepherd stated that Padre Captain Whakahuihui Vercoe and his wife Dorothy oversaw the formation of this group. According to Shepherd, the group 'became an instant hit and the Commanding Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Les

¹⁰⁰⁹ McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War: Vol II*, p296.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp353-354.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid.*, p354. Also see: 'Maori in the armed forces', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p302.

¹⁰¹² Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, p44. Josie Healy (nee Tuhi) and Bella Moore (nee Williams), 'Keeping Maori culture alive in mid-1950s', *Navy Today*, Issue 202, August 2016, pp24-25.

¹⁰¹³ 'Maori in the armed forces', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p303.

Pearce (later Major-General Pearce) was so impressed he ordered the construction of a marae complex. General Pearce heralded the beginning of change.¹⁰¹⁴

The marae at Terendak was constructed in 1962 and became a place to hold important unit functions as well as providing a setting for the Maori concert party's performances. When 1RNZIR moved to Singapore, the marae was recreated at Nee Soon and later Dieppe Barracks.¹⁰¹⁵ In July 1972, after it became apparent that no further infantry companies would be sent to Vietnam, the marae was burnt down by soldiers who were frustrated that they would not be able to serve there in the theatre.¹⁰¹⁶ The marae was evidently rebuilt after this.¹⁰¹⁷

Describing the activities of the cultural group that was formed initially at Terendak, Shepherd recalled that:

The Cultural Group flourished over a period of 32 years stationed in South East Asia and played a major part at military ceremonial parades. Invitations streamed in from New Zealand High Commissions and Embassies and the group started to make positive contributions to New Zealand's trade and tourism opportunities. The group lifted the New Zealand profile at minimum cost to the New Zealand Government.¹⁰¹⁸

Among those involved in Maori cultural activities during the period examined here, feelings were mixed as to how they perceived their participation and, more generally, the place that Maori culture occupied. Some have viewed their involvement positively. This may particularly be the case for those who were involved early on, who found themselves in an unfamiliar environment that offered little recognition of Maori difference. Writing about their involvement in early Maori cultural performances within the Navy during the 1950s, WRNZN personnel Josie Healy (nee Tuhi) and Bella Moore (nee Williams) have stated that it helped to bring Maori together and reinforce their values and identity. Recalling their experience of entering the force, they observed: 'It is not until you are living away from home that family and culture values overcome your individual emotions.'¹⁰¹⁹ Healy and Moore describe particularly their participation in a group that was formed to be part of the welcome party for the First Sea Lord's visit to HMNZS *Philomel* in March 1956.

¹⁰¹⁴ Richard Henry Shepherd, Hearing Week 3, Ōtīria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p37. For further details regarding the construction of the marae at Terendak, also see James Te Tuhi, Wai 2500, #A83(a), pp6-7.

¹⁰¹⁵ 'Maori in the armed forces', entry in McGibbon (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p303.

¹⁰¹⁶ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p466.

¹⁰¹⁷ See 'Brian Luke De Thierry', Cenotaph website, accessed 7 August 2018.

URL: <http://www.aucklandmuseum.com/war-memorial/online-cenotaph/record/176869>

¹⁰¹⁸ Richard Henry Shepherd, Hearing Week 3, Ōtīria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p37.

¹⁰¹⁹ Healy and Moore, 'Keeping Maori culture alive in mid-1950s', p24.

Reflecting on their performance and the work required to prepare for the role, they state:

This was how we, as a group, were able to maintain our cultural values in the mid-1950s and, at the same time, grow into an organisation steeped in tradition.

We believe that a contributing factor was the group's ability to function adequately, without any fuss or pressure, and to draw on one another's strengths. The group's motivation was its commitment to kaupapa Maori, and for individuals to sustain their mana, over time. As a result, it brought a lot of joy to those involved.¹⁰²⁰

Echoing some of the sentiments expressed here, Richard Shepherd commented in respect of the establishment of the cultural group at Terendak Camp that: 'The chance to be "Māori" in a Māori environment was welcomed by soldiers and their wives, both Māori and Pākehā.'¹⁰²¹

On the other hand, reservations were also felt – about the function that the cultural groups often served and the absence of a deeper recognition of Maori values and culture. Writing about the RNZN, Aaron Smale states that Maori who were involved in cultural groups, though they took their performances very seriously, sometimes felt that 'they were being used'.¹⁰²² More generally, Smale comments:

Māori culture was somewhat sidelined in the Navy in the early days. Like New Zealand society at large, Māori culture was perceived by the Navy as useful for entertainment of foreigners, but little else. Although there were kapa haka groups in the Navy, those in authority regarded it as an extracurricular activity and those involved were expected to pursue it in their own time...¹⁰²³

In respect of tikanga, Smale comments particularly on the absence of support for Maori ways of dealing with death:

New Zealand's role in the Malayan conflict (1948-1960) led to the loss of Māori Navy servicemen and this highlighted the lack of a dedicated space to carry out a tangi. This simple but important need to grieve for comrades lost in a culturally appropriate way was not accommodated within the Navy's existing culture or structures.

¹⁰²⁰ Ibid., p25.

¹⁰²¹ Richard Henry Shepherd, Hearing Week 3, Ōtiria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p37.

¹⁰²² Smale, 'Neptune meets Tangaroa', in *Courage, Commitment, Comradeship*, p91.

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

The Māori sailors who had lost their mates were left to improvise a way to carry out their grieving rituals, which often meant holding tangi at the whanau's homes and then a wake at the pub. The conversations over a beer dwelt on the need to have a dedicated marae for the Navy.¹⁰²⁴

Recalling his experience in the Army, Wira Gardiner, who entered the force in the early 1960s and retired in 1983, has similarly commented that the Army placed little emphasis on tikanga and did not encourage Maori soldiers to develop a greater understanding of their culture:

I cannot recall any deliberate efforts by the Army to encourage us to learn about our heritage. On the few occasions we required a Maori dimension it was generally provided by NCOs and private soldiers, since few of us Maori officers were competent to deal effectively with kawa (protocol) and tikanga (correct procedures).¹⁰²⁵

Evidence presented during the oral hearings includes some discussion regarding the extent to which, before 1990, the Army supported the learning and use of te reo. Richard Shepherd stated that, in the mid-1980s, New Zealand Force Headquarters at Singapore declined to support the establishment of a kohanga reo – a decision he viewed as an example 'of discriminative action that bordered on racial prejudice'.¹⁰²⁶ Stationed in Singapore between 1984 and 1986, Shepherd – in addition to his core, military role – was 'appointed kaumātua and an advisor to the commanding officer'. He recalled that:

Wives approached me one day and expressed a wish to establish a kōhanga reo. Because they were in need of a building and other resources, a conversation had to be held with senior officers at New Zealand Force Headquarters level. I raised the issue and was firmly turned down.¹⁰²⁷

From this statement, it seems that Shepherd sought financial and material assistance from the Army. File evidence concerning any such request has not been located. During the time that Shepherd was based in Singapore, a kohanga reo did operate, relying on fundraising and donations. In a letter to New Zealand Force Headquarters, dated 31 January 1986, Lieutenant-Colonel R.N. Upton, writing on behalf of 1NZIR's commanding officer, recorded that a kohanga was holding lessons in a temporary residence. (Two teaching sessions were held each week, with 10 mothers and 12 children regularly attending.) Upton noted that the kohanga had accumulated funds from various sources: small raffles and donations from 1RNZIR's

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁵ Gardiner, 'Colour Blind: Maori in the Forces', p6.

¹⁰²⁶ Richard Henry Shepherd, Hearing Week 3, Ōtiria Marae, Moerewa, Wai 2500, #4.1.4, p32.

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid.

Maori Cultural Group, the New Zealand High Commission, the Secretary of Maori Affairs (Tamati Reedy), and individual soldiers of 1RNZIR. He requested that New Zealand Force Headquarters 'recognise and administer the Te Kohanga Reo group'.¹⁰²⁸ This subsequently occurred, with the kohanga being established as a 'NZ Force Authorised Service Organisation' in October 1986. This new status, however, did not entail access to Army funding.¹⁰²⁹

Beyond official channels of operation and policy, it is clear that the Army, for some Maori, provided a social context in which they were able mix and connect with other Maori. In respect of those who served in Vietnam, McGibbon has noted that, though individuals from different iwi were 'thrown together', many experienced an enhanced 'sense of Maori consciousness'. For some who were not fluent in te reo, participating with fluent speakers had a lasting impact. The 'Maori network', McGibbon states, was 'an important sub-stratum of V Force, with long-term implications.'¹⁰³⁰

Growing formal recognition of Maori culture, 1990-2017

From around 1990, the three armed services and the New Zealand Defence Force as a whole have introduced a number of initiatives and measures that provide significantly greater formal recognition and support for Maoritanga within the forces. Before looking at the policies and influences that drove this shift, a brief description is first provided of the various changes that have been introduced. In terms of the timing of these developments, momentum was established under the leadership of Tony Birks, who was the Army's Chief of the General Staff from 1992 to 1995 and then, from 1995 to 1999, Chief of Defence Force.¹⁰³¹

Significant among the initiatives undertaken since 1990, each of the three services have established marae – the Army in 1995, the Navy in 2000, and the Air Force in 2016.¹⁰³² Bi-cultural policies have also been introduced. Initially, the individual services established their own policies. The RNZAF, for example, introduced a

¹⁰²⁸ Upton, Lieutenant-Colonel, for Commanding Officer, to HQ NZ Force SEA, 31 January 1986, AAQG W3789 box 42 5545/1/39 part 1, Messes and Clubs – Te Kohanga Reo, 1986-1987, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰²⁹ Palairret, Wing Commander, for Commander, Headquarters, New Zealand Force South East Asia, to Secretary, Te Kohanga Reo, 14 October 1986, AAQG W3789 box 42 5545/1/39 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰³⁰ McGibbon, *New Zealand's Vietnam War*, p299. McGibbon's comments here are based on an oral history interview with Corporal R.C.A. Maaka, dated 10 June 2008.

¹⁰³¹ 'Obituary: Tony Birks', published 26 January 2002, New Zealand Herald website, accessed 15 March 2018. URL: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=836872

See also: Smale, 'Neptune meets Tangaroa', in *Courage, Commitment, Comradeship*, p93.

¹⁰³² 'Happy birthday to the spiritual home of Ngati Tu', *Army News*, Issue 468, November-December 2015, pp32-33. Robyn Tauroa, 'Te Taua Moana Marae opening', *Navy Today*, no. 44, pp22-23. Rebecca Quilliam, 'A place to stand: RNZAF Tūrangawaewae', *Air Force News*, Issue 186, November 2016, pp4-7.

bicultural policy in late 2003.¹⁰³³ Documents that relate to the development of this policy detail that consultation was undertaken with the RNZAF's Maori Advisory Group, Te Puni Kokiri, the Maori Language Commission, and the Human Rights Commission. Additionally, comments were sought from Professor Mason Durie, who was based at Massey University.¹⁰³⁴ By 2004, the NZDF had begun to develop a pan-service bicultural policy document, which was eventually finalised and signed off in July 2010.¹⁰³⁵

By 1995, policies to support use of te reo within the services were being formulated, and objectives relating to te reo were included in the bicultural policies.¹⁰³⁶ Reflecting increased recognition of te reo within the services, each of the three services adopted alternative Maori names in the mid-1990s.¹⁰³⁷ Within each of the services, Maori advisory groups or runanga provided input on the development and implementation of policies relating to Maoritanga.¹⁰³⁸ Following the introduction of the NZDF bicultural policy, an NZDF runanga was established, with one key role being to 'provide overarching cultural advice' to the NZDF. At its inaugural meeting, held in June 2010, the runanga considered and made recommendations about the kawa and tikanga that the NZDF should follow. As each service had its own kawa and tikanga, the recommendations made related only to the NZDF as a collective.¹⁰³⁹

Alongside these developments, support for Maori cultural performance was been enhanced. In 1997, a tri-service culture group travelled to London to perform at the royal tournament, highlighting the international attention that the forces gained through the activities of Maori cultural groups.¹⁰⁴⁰ Around the same time, the New

¹⁰³³ See minutes of meeting of RNZAF Air Advisory Board, 28 November 2003, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, NZDF Archives Trentham.

¹⁰³⁴ In August 2003, it was reported that the government agencies, Maori Advisory Group, and Durie all endorsed the policy, recommending only minor changes. RNZAF Air Staff minute, 11 August 2003, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, NZDF Archives Trentham. (The second page of this document is missing from the file.)

¹⁰³⁵ See NZDF Headquarters minute, Whiting, AC (Pers), information for Chairman of the Navy Runanga (Naval Staff) and RNZAF MCO (Air Staff), 23 March 2004, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, NZDF Archives Trentham. See NZDF Headquarters minute, Twomey, Tikanga and Kawa of Te Ope Kātua of Aotearoa, 25 August 2010, p1 (footnote 1), 14196 220A-6-E2 Air 5000/9 part 3, Personnel – RNZAF Maori Advisory Group – Policy, 2004-2012, NZDF Archives Trentham. For the 2010 Bicultural Policy, see Chapter 5, Part 5, Defence Force Order 3, NZDF.

¹⁰³⁶ See, for example: Hill, Aircdre, to AD Sec, 3 February 1995, ABFK 7557 W5531 box 215 Air 5000/9 part 1, Personnel – Tikanga Maori, 1994-1997, ANZ Wellington; Hanley, AD Sec, circular paper for distribution, 21 June 1995, ABFK 7557 W5531 box 215 Air 5000/9 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰³⁷ Strang, PO(M), to DCOORD(F), 10 February 1997, ABFK 7557 W5531 box 215 Air 5000/9 part 1, ANZ Wellington, p2.

¹⁰³⁸ In respect of the RNZAF Maori Advisory Group, see, for example: Bosch, Wing Commander, Administrative Order 53/05, 28 June 2005, 92871 219A-2-E4 Air 5000/9/1 part 3, Personnel – Royal New Zealand Air Force – Maori Advisory Group (MAG) – General, 2004-2005, NZDF Archives Trentham.

¹⁰³⁹ NZDF Headquarters minute, Twomey, Tikanga and Kawa of Te Ope Kātua of Aotearoa, 25 August 2010, 14196 220A-6-E2 Air 5000/9 part 3, NZDF Archives Trentham.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Smale, 'Neptune meets Tangaroa', in *Courage, Commitment, Comradeship*, p93.

Zealand Army Cultural Festival was initiated to promote kapa haka within the service. In October 2007, the fourth such festival was held. Reporting on this event, *Army News* noted the original kaupapa that Tony Birks had set down for the festival: ‘an enduring intention to foster tikanga Maori, performing arts, Te Reo (language) from within the soldiers of Ngati Tumatauenga.’¹⁰⁴¹ In April 2006, an NZDF order relating to Maori cultural activities included provision for the NZDF Maori Cultural Group (MCG) to receive ‘adequate training and revision to maintain a high performance standard’. It also provided for the group’s members to be granted release to prepare for and attend MCG activities that were deemed to be official.¹⁰⁴²

All of the changes described here, which began to be introduced from around 1990, mark a significant shift from the situation that existed earlier, when formal recognition and support for Maoritanga was limited. Though the changes have been important, it should be noted that the new policies and measures bear little influence on certain key aspects of the military and how it operates, including, for example, the organisational chain of command and, it appears, recruitment processes. In respect of this, NZDF bicultural policies emphasise the concept of partnership and that, alongside Maori traditions, there are established military traditions and standards.¹⁰⁴³ When evaluating the RNZAF’s draft bicultural policy in 2003, Mason Durie appears to have been referring to the tensions that existed between these two traditions when he made the following assessment:

Overall I think it (the policy) is sound. It does not try to do too much and is realistic, recognising the mana of the RNZAF as well as Maori interests and the interface between Maori and the forces.¹⁰⁴⁴

Little evidence has been located regarding the extent to which the initiatives introduced over the last 25 years have met the expectations of Maori personnel. Within the NZDF, a questionnaire-based cultural study was undertaken in 2011 to assess ‘the current position of Māori culture within NZDF and direction in which people may want it to go.’ It appears that those surveyed included both Maori and Pakeha. The findings of this survey noted that ‘[p]eople were satisfied with the NZDF advancement to date’, though the direction ahead was somewhat unclear. The

¹⁰⁴¹ Denise Landau, ‘Te Hokowhitu – unity, pride and passion in cultural festival’, *Army News*, issue 382, 6 November 2007, pp8-9.

¹⁰⁴² Defence Force Order 03/2006, NZDF Maori Cultural Activities, 20 April 2006, 14196 220A-6-E2 Air 5000/9 part 3, NZDF Archives Trentham.

¹⁰⁴³ See, for example, Overview (5.5.1), Chapter 5, Part 5, Defence Force Order 3, NZDF.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Durie, quoted in RNZAF Air Staff minute, 11 August 2003, 91536 219A-7-B4 Air 5000/9 part 2, NZDF Archives Trentham. (The second page of this document is missing from the file.)

findings also noted an urge – most likely among non-Maori respondents – to change certain parts of the policy from bicultural to multicultural.¹⁰⁴⁵

As suggested above, the policies introduced since 1990 reflect, within the armed services, a significantly greater level of recognition of the status of Maori as tangata whenua and of the Treaty of Waitangi. In part, this shift resulted from government action to make departments and Crown agencies more aware and responsive to Maori interests. By 1990, Defence was becoming subject to government scrutiny as to its performance in respect of Maori concerns.¹⁰⁴⁶ Within the forces, Maori personnel were conscious of efforts being made outside of the services to promote awareness of and address Maori concerns. For Maori who were serving the Crown, conversations surrounding these developments ‘weren’t always comfortable’.¹⁰⁴⁷ However, some became actively involved in pursuing greater recognition of Maori culture within the services, seeking, for example, to progress initiatives such as the building of marae.¹⁰⁴⁸

NZDF documents that relate to the policies and measures that were introduced from 1990 set out the reasoning that underpinned and drove the change. For example, in a memo dated 27 May 1994, Chief of Naval Staff J.E.N. Welch noted Treaty of Waitangi obligations as among the reasons why he was inclined to support the establishment of a RNZN marae:

The requirement to address Treaty of Waitangi issues has progressively been introduced into New Zealand legislation and Government policy since the enactment of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. For government departments (including the NZDF), the principle of partnership is a key factor in management of personnel, particularly when allied with our EEO policy. In these respects the establishments [sic] of an RNZN marae is directly in line with both the Government’s policy and the NZDF’s corporate ‘good employer’ responsibility.¹⁰⁴⁹

Further, Welch noted that the 1993 NZDF annual report had included a section entitled ‘Responsiveness to Maori’.¹⁰⁵⁰ He believed that the contents of this suggested that appreciation of tikanga should be recognised ‘as a general obligation if not a

¹⁰⁴⁵ NZDF Headquarters minute, Twomey, Cultural Study, 11 April 2011, 14196 220A-6-E2 Air 5000/9 part 3, NZDF Archives Trentham, p4.

¹⁰⁴⁶ See, for example, ‘Maori responsiveness plan’, attached to Swallow, Secretary of Defence, to Hunn, State Services Commissioner, 19 March 1990, AAFH 6790 W5510 box 322 SOC-3-1-MOD part 1, Social Services Division – Maori Policy – Responsiveness in the State Sector – Ministry Of Defence, 1988-1990, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Smale, ‘Neptune meets Tangaroa’, in *Courage, Commitment, Comradeship*, p92.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid., pp92-3. Ratima, Hearing Week 2, Omaha Marae, Hastings, Wai 2500, #4.1.3, pp70-71.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Welch, CNS, to CDF, 27 May 1994, ABFK 7557 W5531 box 215 Air 5000/9 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

¹⁰⁵⁰ See: NZDF Annual Report 1993, *AJHR*, 1993-1996, G-55, pp74-75.

specific output of the NZDF.’ Building a marae at Devonport ‘would not be incompatible with this stance.’¹⁰⁵¹

The NZDF’s 2010 bicultural policy is based upon some of the same reasoning that Welch put forward in 1993, but is linked also to goals relating to operational effectiveness – including the ability to attract and retain Maori personnel – as well as organisational pride. The policy outlines the following rationale:

Recognition of Māori as Tangata Whenua

The bicultural partnership between the Crown and Māori was established by Te Tiriti o Waitangi which:

- (1) recognises Māori as the Tangata Whenua o Aotearoa, and
- (2) accords Māori special status.

CDF as a good employer

The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) is required by s.59 of the Defence Act to comply with the principle of being a ‘good employer’ in respect of the Civil Staff. This principle includes recognition of:

- (1) the aims and aspirations of Maori (this means the interests of Māori are valued and represented);
- (2) the employment requirements of Māori (this means Māori customs and protocols are considered in employment situations, e.g. Tangihanga); and
- (3) the need for greater involvement of Māori in [the] NZDF.

Enhanced operational effectiveness

NZDF recognises that operational effectiveness is enhanced by accepting its military and bicultural heritage and applying Māori practices and customs. This bicultural approach enhances the NZDF’s:

- (1) military ethos,
- (2) fighting spirit,
- (3) camaraderie and behaviours,
- (4) unique ability to accept and engage with diverse cultures in operational settings, and
- (5) ability to attract, recruit and retain Māori members of the Armed Forces.

Enhanced organisational pride

Members of the NZDF take pride in incorporating New Zealand’s military heritage and Māori practices and customs into the way NZDF operates. This

¹⁰⁵¹ Welch, CNS, to CDF, 27 May 1994, ABFK 7557 W5531 box 215 Air 5000/9 part 1, ANZ Wellington.

projects a distinctly New Zealand perspective that is unique, strengthens cohesion and enhances New Zealand's international reputation.¹⁰⁵²

Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, issues relating to several aspects of military service have been examined: pay and conditions; training and equipment; honours and recognition of service; exposure to risk; and welfare measures and discipline. The evidence presented on these matters relates primarily to the Army and mostly concerns the period between 1957 and 1972. Research has focussed on identifying the extent to which Maori experienced different treatment from non-Maori, including whether there was any separate recognition of Maori interests where these differed from those of non-Maori. With regard to this last point, it has been noted that important issues arise from the significant extent to which Maori were over-represented in the Army and, to a lesser extent, Navy. This meant that negative aspects of military service would have a greater impact on Maori – as a people, but especially those communities where there have been strong traditions of military service for the Crown.

It has been explained that, with the exception of some evidence of different treatment in relation to welfare measures and discipline, Maori were substantially treated the same as Pakeha. For example, no evidence of different treatment has been located in respect of pay and conditions, with the same rates and rules applying to Maori and non-Maori. (It has been noted, however, that pay and conditions have differed significantly between personnel who served at different ranks, which highlights one the implications for Maori of their low level of participation at commissioned rank.) While the evidence indicates that Maori were not subject to discrimination with regard to the various aspects of military service examined, it also shows there was little awareness or recognition of Maori interests arising from over-representation. Discussion of this issue has focused on exposure to risk during active deployment. Evidence presented in this chapter shows that the Army sometimes assessed risk exposure (including the psychological impacts of deployment), but that these evaluations did not include a racial dimension.

Of the various aspects of military service examined in the first part of this chapter, evidence of separate treatment has been identified only in respect of welfare measures and discipline. This evidence does not suggest or confirm that Maori experienced discrimination in connection with welfare measures and discipline. Rather, it shows that Maori received some targeted welfare support and that, in the Army, at least, individuals who commanded Maori were, in the mid-1960s,

¹⁰⁵² Introduction (5.5.16-5.5.19), Chapter 5, Part 5, Defence Force Order 3, NZDF.

encouraged to show some flexibility and understanding of Maori cultural difference. A small amount of evidence suggests that some Pakeha officers demonstrated such awareness when leading Maori soldiers during overseas deployments. Alongside the targeted welfare measures, such as the appointment of Maori chaplains, the 'man management' strategies that focussed on Maori were introduced, at least partly, to minimise disciplinary problems.

The second part of the chapter has examined the place of Maori culture within the armed services. Specifically, it has discussed the extent to which the services have formally recognised and supported Maori culture, including use of te reo. Evidence relating to these issues shows that up until about 1990 support for Maori culture was limited largely to the activities of Maori performing arts groups as well as some ceremonial roles. During this period, Maori cultural activities appear to have been most prominent among Maori personnel who were serving overseas. Active in the Army and Navy from the early 1950s, Maori cultural groups were accepted and offered some support, partly because they served to give New Zealand's forces a distinct identity within the international context. Maori who were involved in cultural activities at this time have expressed mixed feelings about their participation and, more generally, the place that Maori culture occupied within the forces. While some have viewed cultural group activities in a positive light, others have expressed reservations about the function that the cultural groups often served and the absence of a deeper recognition of Maori values and culture, including tikanga and support of te reo.

From around 1990, changes introduced within the three armed services and the NZDF as a whole have significantly increased formal support and recognition of Maori culture and te reo within the forces. These changes have included the introduction of formal bi-cultural policies and the establishment of Maori advisory groups, which provide cultural advice, including recommendations concerning kawa and tikanga. Alongside these reforms, service marae have been built, initiatives to promote use of te reo have been introduced, and support for Maori performing arts has been enhanced. Reflecting broader change in New Zealand, the significant shift that has occurred stemmed from growing recognition of the status of Maori as tangata whenua and of the Treaty of Waitangi. Government scrutiny of the armed forces' responsiveness to Maori helped to initiate the change, and it has also been noted that some Maori personnel were active in promoting some of the initiatives, including, for example, the building of marae.

The shift that has occurred can be seen as marking the end of the long period where integrationist ideals held sway in the armed services, which was characterised by a reluctance to meaningfully differentiate between Maori and Pakeha. An important related development, noted in earlier chapters, saw the NZDF, in 2003, begin to

routinely collect data on the ethnicity of service personnel. Though formal recognition and support of Maori culture has greatly increased, it has been explained that the new policies and measures bear little influence on certain key aspects of the military and how it operates, including, for example, the organisational chain of command and, it appears, recruitment processes. In relation to this, NZDF bicultural policies emphasise the concept of partnership and that, alongside Maori traditions, there are also established military traditions and standards.

It has been noted that the NZDF's 2010 bicultural policy is based partly on the rationale that application of Maori practices and customs will enhance operational effectiveness, including the ability to attract and retain Maori personnel. However, in spite of the significant changes that have been introduced, the proportion of Maori among NZDF personnel has, for reasons that are unclear, declined in recent years. As detailed in chapter two, the proportion of Maori personnel within the NZDF decreased from 18.2 percent in 2003 to 14.6 percent in 2017, representing a 19.8 percent decline in the overall level of Maori involvement in the NZDF. A decrease in Maori personnel within the Army accounts for most of this decline.

Conclusion

As explained in chapter one, several developments in the post-war period ensured that, in the Army, all Maori would serve alongside Pakeha on an integrated basis. The shift towards integrated service represented a major departure from the way that most Maori military service had previously been organised in wartime, where the majority of Maori volunteers who served within the non-regular expeditionary forces did so separately from Pakeha, within formally-designated Maori units. It has been explained, in respect of non-regular service, that the policy of integration was determined in March 1950, when the National Government decided against establishing a separate Territorial Force unit for Maori within the CMT scheme. This decision evidently set a policy benchmark for non-regular service generally. Kayforce – the final Army deployment composed primarily of non-regular personnel – was established without a separate Maori unit. However, in the theatre, some informal groupings of Maori emerged among gun crew and, more notably, a transport platoon gained formal status as an all-Maori unit. This was the final such unit to feature within an Army force deployed overseas.

Though integrated service had a number of potentially negative implications for Maori, little consultation was undertaken with Maori before the policy of integration was introduced in respect of non-regular service. Amongst Maori, views on the issue varied, but neither the Army nor government sought to establish where the weight of Maori opinion lay. It has been explained that the decision against forming a separate Territorial Force unit for Maori was based partly on concerns about the practical difficulties that would arise if such a unit was set up, including administrative and supply difficulties. Broader integrationist ideology, which informed much of government decision making concerning Maori at this time, also underpinned the decision. In October 1949, the commanding officer of Northern Military District had argued that the formation of a separate Maori unit would introduce ‘an element of racial segregation’ and could therefore only be viewed as ‘a very retrograde step’. The most progressive option, he believed, was to have Maori and Pakeha serving alongside each other, as this would best promote equality of status between the races. For Maori, however, equality was not viewed as something that should mean they became indivisible from Pakeha or that there was no scope for recognition of a separate Maori identity. In August 1946, Ngata had demonstrated this when he expressed support for the proposal to establish a separate Maori unit in the peacetime Army.

While the March 1950 decision was an important development in respect of the non-regular Army, there had never been a tradition of separate Maori service within the Regular Force. It has been explained that two key developments concerning the Regular Force influenced the shift towards integrated Maori service. First, in

September 1946, exclusionary enlistment criteria introduced in respect of the Interim Army were removed. (These evidently represented a return to pre-war enlistment policy.) The reversal of the exclusion against Maori opened the way for Maori to serve in the integrated, post-war Regular Force, though into the 1950s some Maori were subject to discriminatory recruitment practices. The second key development concerning the Regular Force was the shift that occurred from the mid-1950s, whereby overseas deployments invariably began to be made up of regular Army personnel. Given the absence of any tradition of separate Maori service within the Regular Force, this development further limited the future possibility of Maori serving together during overseas deployments.

Following the 1950 decision against establishing an all-Maori Territorial unit, some Maori continued to call for the formation of a separate Maori unit within the Army. Given the shift towards deployment of regular personnel, it seems likely – though it was not explicitly stated – that these calls became focussed on the establishment of a Maori unit within the Regular Force. Former members of 28 (Maori) Battalion called most strongly for the creation of a separate Maori unit. Their position on the matter evidently represented the views of a wider support base, though some evidence suggests that, by the mid-1960s, at least, a generational divide had opened up, with younger Maori being less supportive of the proposal.

When countering the calls that continued to be made for the establishment of a separate Maori unit, Army leaders and Defence officials continued to note organisational obstacles, but increasingly they referenced integrationist ideology. When addressing 28 (Maori) Battalion's 1964 reunion, Hunn emphasised that the formation of racial units would amount to 'a reversal of the process of "he iwi kotahi tatou" to which New Zealand is moving inexorably.' Later, when he raised the matter in the House, East Maori MP Watene rejected the idea that the matter should be decided upon on 'the contentious basis of integration' and he appealed to the government to give serious consideration to the issue. However, nothing came of this, and in 1966 a Battalion Association panel that had been appointed to further investigate the proposal eventually recommended that the issue be put to rest.

While the policy of integration promised equality of treatment, it has been explained in chapter two that following World War II and into the 1950s New Zealand's armed services were not free from exclusionary policies, practices, and attitudes that sought to limit Maori participation. Generally, restrictions on Maori involvement in the armed services during the post-war period were not explicitly set out in the services' formal entry criteria, though such an exclusion was briefly introduced in respect of the Interim Army in 1946. Within a few months of being introduced this was removed after the Minister of Defence became aware that Maori applicants –

including former soldiers of the recent war – were being turned away from the peacetime Army of the grounds of their race.

Rather than through formal exclusions, Maori involvement in the post-war services was restricted through more subtle recruitment policies and practices. In respect of Jayforce, it has been suggested that the very small Maori quota in the initial replacement draft represented a deliberate intention to limit Maori participation. Within the regular Army, efforts to limit Maori involvement were undertaken in the Northern Military District between 1947 and 1952 and may also have been practiced elsewhere, though no evidence has been located to confirm this. In the Northern District, a vetting process was developed to limit Maori entry without showing that the applicants were being turned away on racial grounds. Army Headquarters staff were aware of this and evidently comfortable with the practice.

Evidence of deliberate efforts to limit and restrict Maori entry into the post-war Navy and the Air Force is less clear. However, statistical evidence that shows very low rates of Maori involvement in these services indicate that exclusionary policies, practices, and attitudes may well have informed the handling of Maori recruitment after World War II. Additionally, in the case of the RNZAF, there is evidence of Air Force staff possessing discriminatory views about Maori and their place in the force. In 1952, the RNZAF's Director of Manning suggested that Maori – in spite of their already very low rate of involvement in the service at this time – were 'too freely' allowed entry into the force.

During the 1950s, Maori involvement in the Army and the Navy increased. Within these services, at least, any concerns about Maori participation appear to have lessened. Both services evidently became open to greater Maori involvement. It appears this shift was driven, in part, by the significant recruitment challenges that the services faced in the post-war period.

In the case of the Army, growth in Maori involvement stemmed particularly from the establishment of the Regular Force battalions that from 1957 were raised for service in Malaya. In about 1960, Army recruiters – with assistance from the Department of Maori Affairs – began to deliberately, though not exclusively, target Maori communities. In seeking to attract Maori recruits, it has been suggested that the Army, by this time, was not simply looking to make up numbers. Its recruitment efforts also reflected positive perceptions regarding the performance of Maori soldiers within the integrated forces deployed to Malaya. But Maori personnel were not only prominent among the regular units that served in South-East Asia, they also came to form a sizeable component within the Regular Force as a whole. In 2003, when the NZDF first began to routinely collect data on the ethnicity of personnel,

24.1 percent of Regular Force personnel identified themselves to be Maori – a rate that had declined to 17.7 percent in 2017.

Growth in Maori participation in the Navy began in the early 1950s and was underway when RNZN staff and Maori Affairs officials met in March 1953 to discuss how the Department could assist the Navy to recruit Maori. By the end of the 1950s, the available data suggests that Maori involvement in the Navy exceeded the proportion of Maori in the population as a whole. By 2003, almost one-fifth of RNZN personnel, 19.4 percent, identified themselves as being Maori. Since this time, the proportion of Maori personnel within the Navy has declined a little, with 17.7 identifying as Maori in 2017 – the same rate of involvement recorded for the Army.

Unlike the Army and Navy, Maori involvement in the Air Force has remained limited, though the proportion of Maori among RNZAF personnel did increase somewhat in the early 1960s. The extent to which discriminatory attitudes persisted in the RNZAF and may have continued to influence the level of Maori participation in the force is unclear. Higher educational standards of entry are another, more certain factor that have limited Maori involvement in the RNZAF. With generally lower standards of educational achievement, Maori have been less able to enter the force than Pakeha. In 2003, only 5.6 percent of RNZAF personnel identified themselves as Maori, a figure that remained substantially unchanged in 2017, when 6.2 percent of Air Force personnel identified as Maori.

In contrast to the RNZAF, educational entry requirements for both the Army and the Navy have – in respect of enlisted ranks, at least – generally been lower. This was certainly the case during the 1950s, when formal educational requirements for entry into both services were minimal. It has been stated that this was important among the factors that explain the growth in Maori involvement in the Army and Navy that occurred during the 1950s and, in the case of the Army, at least, continued into the 1960s. With limited entry barriers, service in the Army and Navy provided an opportunity for Maori, who generally had a narrower range of employment options. However, while economic and employment considerations became important, other motivations continued to underlie Maori enlistment, including – for many – established family traditions of military service.

It has been explained that, in the face of growing rates of Maori participation, all three services became reluctant to disclose information on the level of Maori involvement within their ranks. This reluctance was expressed during the 1960s, by which time both the Army and the Navy included a significant proportion of Maori personnel. The service's refusal to disclose details of Maori involvement was justified with reference to integrationist concepts. Specifically, it was emphasised that within each service no differentiation was made between personnel on the grounds of race.

It has been suggested, however, that the Army, in particular, may have been concerned about how disclosure of the high rate of Maori involvement might have affected its reputation.

Focusing on the ability of Maori to serve as officers, chapter three has examined issues concerning the place of Maori within the service's hierarchical leadership structures. It has explained that in all three services there has been a low level of Maori participation at commissioned rank and this was especially the case during the post-war period. Clear statements of policy that sought to exclude or limit Maori from serving as officers at this time have not been located. However, in the case of the Navy, it is evident that an exclusion against Maori did exist between 1946 and the early 1950s. In the case of the other two services, the low level of Maori involvement at commissioned rank may have partly reflected discriminatory attitudes that were held by some senior Army and Air Force staff.

In respect of the Army and Navy, efforts to encourage Maori into officer training indicate that in these services, at least, any policies and attitudes that sought to restrict Maori involvement gave way to a greater willingness for Maori participation at commissioned rank. From 1953, the Navy sought to enter Maori into officer training. By 1964, the Army was also promoting such opportunities to Maori. By this stage, there had been some growth in the number of Maori officers in the force. It has been suggested that the more than competent performance of at least some of the small number of Maori officers who served during the 1950s would have helped to break down any reservations concerning service of Maori at commissioned rank within the integrated force.

Though the Army and Navy encouraged Maori to enter officer training, the number of Maori who served as officers remained low, especially in the Navy. One of the main reasons for this was the higher educational requirements for entry into officer training. In the case of the Navy, the length of time that trainee officers were expected to spend outside of New Zealand might have influenced the number of Maori who sought to serve at this level. New training opportunities introduced in the 1980s appear to have encouraged a small increase in the number of Maori who entered RNZN officer training. Earlier, an increase in Maori officers in the Army was also linked to new training avenues, particularly the introduction, in the late 1950s, of the one-year Portsea course. Though Brian Poananga and Jerry Mateparae have shown that Maori are able to serve at the highest ranks, NZDF ethnicity data collected since 2003 records that the proportion of Maori among officers continues to be much smaller than the proportion who serve in other ranks.

In respect of promotion within the enlisted ranks, the evidence that has been presented relates mainly to the Army. Some of this evidence shows that, in the 1950s

and 1960s, Maori who spoke te reo as their first language and lacked fluency in English were disadvantaged. For such individuals, promotion and course exams that were written in English presented an obstacle. Army intelligence testing that was conducted verbally in English presented another barrier. Though this testing was recognised as being inaccurate as a measure of the intelligence of Maori who lacked fluency in English, it was nevertheless thought to provide a valuable indication of their capability to 'measure up to the Army's pakeha environment and requirements'. For those Maori who did not face these disadvantages, some were able to secure promotions and progress to positions with leadership responsibilities. From the 1950s onward, a significant proportion of Army NCOs were Maori.

In oral evidence, some Maori veterans have stated that, on the grounds of their race, Maori were commonly overlooked for promotion and that advancement through the ranks typically occurred more slowly for Maori personnel. However, others have offered a different perspective, stating that discrimination against Maori was not something that they witnessed or experienced. On the whole, though it is difficult to comment conclusively on the matter, the evidence presented in this report does not point to widespread and systematic discrimination against Maori in respect of promotion. The extent to which the services introduced policies and processes to prevent race-based discrimination has not been established.

Broken into two parts, chapter four first has examined issues relating to several aspects of military service: pay and conditions; training and equipment; honours and recognition of service; exposure to risk; and welfare measures and discipline. The evidence that has been presented in respect of these matters primarily concerns the Army and relates mostly to the period between 1957 and 1972. Research has focused on identifying the extent to which Maori experienced different treatment from non-Maori, including whether there was any separate recognition of Maori interests where these differed from those of non-Maori. With regard to this last point, it has been noted that important issues arise from the significant extent to which Maori were over-represented in the Army and, to a lesser extent, Navy. This over-representation meant that negative aspects of military service would have a greater impact on Maori.

With the exception of some different treatment in relation to welfare measures and discipline, the evidence shows that Maori were substantially treated the same as Pakeha. For example, no evidence of different treatment has been located in respect of pay and conditions, with the same rates and rules applying to Maori and non-Maori. However, while the evidence indicates that Maori were not subject to discrimination, it also shows there was little awareness or recognition of Maori interests arising from over-representation. Discussion of this issue has focused on exposure to risk during active deployment. The evidence cited shows that the Army

sometimes assessed risk exposure (including the psychological impacts of deployment), but that these evaluations did not include a racial dimension.

The second part of chapter four has examined the place of Maori culture within the armed services. In particular, it discussed the extent to which the services have formally recognised and supported Maori culture, including use of te reo. Evidence relating to these issues shows that up until about 1990 support for Maori culture was limited largely to the activities of Maori performing arts groups as well as some ceremonial roles. While some Maori veterans have viewed cultural group activities in a positive light, others have expressed reservations about the function that the cultural groups often served and the absence of a deeper recognition of Maori values and culture, including tikanga and support of te reo.

From around 1990, changes introduced within the three armed services and the NZDF as a whole have significantly increased formal support and recognition of Maori culture and te reo within the forces. Reflecting broader change in New Zealand, the significant shift that has occurred stemmed from growing recognition of the status of Maori as tangata whenua and of the Treaty of Waitangi. Government scrutiny of the armed forces' responsiveness to Maori helped to initiate the change, and it has also been noted that some Maori personnel were active in promoting some of the initiatives, including, for example, the building of marae.

The shift that has occurred can be seen as marking the end of the long period where integrationist ideals held sway in the armed services. (An important related development, saw the NZDF, in 2003, begin to routinely collect data on the ethnicity of service personnel.) However, it has been noted that though formal recognition and support of Maori culture has greatly increased, the new policies and measures bear little influence on certain key aspects of the military and how it operates, including, for example, the organisational chain of command and, it appears, recruitment processes.

In relation to this, NZDF bicultural policies emphasise the concept of partnership and that, alongside Maori traditions, there are established military traditions and standards. It has been noted that the NZDF's 2010 bicultural policy is based partly on the rationale that application of Maori practices and customs will enhance operational effectiveness, including the ability to attract and retain Maori personnel. However, in spite of the significant changes that have been introduced, the proportion of Maori among NZDF personnel has, for reasons that are unclear, declined in recent years.

Research Commission

OFFICIAL

Wai 2500, #2.3.3

WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

Wai 2500

CONCERNING

the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975

AND

the Military Veterans Kaupapa Inquiry

DIRECTION COMMISSIONING RESEARCH

1. Pursuant to clause 5A of the second schedule of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the Tribunal commissions Phillip Cleaver, Historian, to prepare a report on Māori military service for the Crown, 1946-present, for the Military Veterans Kaupapa Inquiry.
2. In particular, the report should consider the following main research themes:
 - a) What were Crown and Māori understandings and expectations of the terms on which Māori provided military service to the Crown after the Second World War?
 - b) What were the major Crown policy developments, and the principal internal and external influences on these developments, regarding recruitment, terms, conditions and organisation of Māori military service within the post-1945 integrated armed services, and with what outcomes for Māori and their communities in so far as these do not relate to repatriation or health and social impacts?
 - c) What were Māori responses and strategies to Crown policies and practices regarding their service for the Crown?
 - d) What legislative, policy or practical barriers or restrictions, if any, did Māori face with regard to providing military service for the Crown?
 - e) What were Māori service experiences in terms of pay, conditions, training, discipline, promotions and honours, and exposure to risk, and how did these change over time?
 - f) How important have the armed services become for Māori since the Second World War in terms of employment, economic and cultural opportunities?
3. The commission will commence on 20 February 2017. A complete draft of the report is to be submitted by 3 November 2017 and will be circulated to claimants and the Crown for comment.

4. The commission ends on 22 December 2017, at which time one copy of the final report must be submitted for filing in unbound form, together with indexed copies of any supporting documents or transcripts. An electronic copy of the report and relevant supporting papers should also be provided in Word or Adobe Acrobat PDF format.
5. The report and any subsequent evidential material based on it must be filed through the Registrar.
6. The report may be received as evidence and the author may be cross-examined on it.
7. The Registrar is to send copies of this direction to:
 - Phillip Cleaver
 - Claimant counsel, Crown counsel and unrepresented claimants in the Military Veterans kaupapa inquiry
 - Chief Historian, Waitangi Tribunal Unit
 - Manager Research and Inquiry Facilitation, Waitangi Tribunal Unit
 - Inquiry Facilitator, Waitangi Tribunal Unit
 - Solicitor General, Crown Law Office
 - Director, Office of Treaty Settlements
 - Chief Executive, Crown Forestry Rental Trust
 - Chief Executive, Te Puni Kōkiri

DATED at Wellington on this 1st day of March 2017



Chief Judge W W Isaac
Presiding Officer
WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

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