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THE NORTHERN WAR 1844-1846

PRESENTATION SUMMARY

(Excerpts relating to Te Tiriti o Waitangi and He Whakaputanga - SOI: Stage One)

RECEIVED
Waitangi Tribunal
15 SEP 2010
Ministry of Justice
WELLINGTON

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September 2010

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Introduction

1. This is a summary of the report 'The Northern War 1844-1846', focusing on issues outlined in the Waitangi Tribunal's statement of issues for Te Paparahi o Te Raki stage one hearings. The Northern War report (the report) provides an historical overview of the origins and the events of the Northern War – an armed conflict fought between Ngā Puhi and the Crown in the mid-1840s. The report was commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust on behalf of Te Taitokerau claimant groups.

2. Although the report focuses on events in the mid-1840s, and therefore outside the scope of the stage one hearings, early sections of the report refer to the signing of He Whakaputanga and Te Tiriti o Waitangi. I have been asked by Claimant Counsel to prepare and present a summary of the sections of the report relating to the stage one Statement of Issues. The remainder of the report (and specifically the events of the Northern War) will be covered later as part of the Stage Two hearings.

3. The report was prepared as one of a series of technical research reports, which included a separate report on Te Tiriti and He Whakaputanga. The Northern War report covers the signing of Te Tiriti and He Whakaputanga only in so far as to understand the 'origins' of the eventual conflict in 1845-6. Because other reports cover these 1835 and 1840 events, the early sections of the Northern War report that deal with these issues are based largely on secondary sources, with some primary oral and written sources as footnoted.

4. My name is Ralph Johnson. At the time of completing the report (2005) I was based in Auckland and I currently reside in Wellington. My background and qualifications are outlined in the main report.

Approach

5. As noted above, in order to explain the origins of the Northern War, the focus has been on using documentary sources to examine the gap between Māori and British understandings of the agreement signed in 1840, which played a major part in creating ongoing misunderstandings and ultimately conflict. As British understandings are relatively clear from the English texts of the documents, and relatively well-covered in the historiography, the Northern War report (and this summary) focuses on exploring Ngā Puhi understandings and motivations leading up to Heke's decision to fell the flagstaff bearing the British flag in 1844.

6. This summary is structured as a brief overview of events and at relevant places I have provided responses to relevant SOI questions (1, 3, 5, 7 and 4).

Overview of events

7. The report starts by highlighting early points of relationship building between northern chiefs (including Ngā Puhi) and British colonial administrators in Britain and in Australia. Key points in developing the relationship between northern Māori and the Crown were: the meeting of Hongi Hika and King George III in England in 1820; the 1831 letter from a group of northern chiefs to King William IV; the appointment of James Busby as British 'Resident' in 1832; Busby's subsequent actions to arrange for the 1834 flag; He Whakaputanga (1835); and Te Tiriti o Waitangi in 1840.

Early acknowledgement of Ngā Pūhi authority

8. The first step towards a formal British presence in New Zealand was the decision to appoint James Busby as a British 'Resident' in 1832. Busby was based at Waitangi, where he was given land to occupy. Historians have often lamented Busby as a 'man'o'war without guns'. Yet to Maori, he was not expected to operate as such. Rather, Busby was described as a 'kaiwhakarite'. This was more likely to have meant an intermediary between Māori and newly arrived settlers than a chief or someone who exercised governance. As Claudia Orange has noted, chiefs who gathered at Paihia on 17

May 1833 to hear Busby's introductory address 'might well have seen the event as indicating British recognition of the Māori people as their equals.'[1]

9. Busby's instructions emphasised the continuity and strengthening of Māori authority. The New South Wales governor, Richard Bourke, directed Busby to 'encourage a more settled form of orderly rule and law so that the chiefs might eventually accept responsibility for controlling European behaviour'.[2] Specifically, Bourke instructed Busby to 'try to influence the Māori chiefs "towards some form of settled government" and "some system of jurisprudence" by which Māori Courts "may be made to claim the cognizance of all crimes committed within their territory".'[3]

10. Although this is only a brief discussion of events that have been discussed elsewhere in greater detail, the essential point noted in the report is that the early relations between the British Crown and Ngā Puhi created an expectation that Ngā Puhi authority was respected and, as the relationship developed through the 1830s to 1840, that it would be protected.

The 1834 Flag (Te Kara)

11. In 1834, Busby organised a meeting to select a flag to represent a confederation of united tribes. Behind Busby's idea for a flag was a desire to see independent Māori tribes confederate in order that they stand as an 'established government', without the need for further intervention. The decision to propose a flag was Busby's, and it served as a potent symbol. With the flag came the right for vessels constructed in New Zealand to trade overseas. Three potential designs were offered by Busby and the assembled group of chiefs chose one flag, which was immediately hoisted alongside the British flag. The raising of the 1834 flag was accorded the recognition of a 21-gun salute fired from the man-o-war *HMS Alligator*.[4]

[1] Orange, *Treaty of Waitangi*, 1987, p. 13
[2] Orange, p. 14
[3] Alan Ward, *National Overview*, Volume II, p. 18
[4] This was the recognition given to royalty or international heads of state. In the United States, the presidential salute was formally established at 21 guns in 1842.

12. The flag was gazetted at Sydney and formally acknowledged by the British Admiralty as that of an independent sovereign state.[5] As Orange has noted, 'its significance lay in Māori understanding of the event: the belief that the mana of New Zealand, closely associated with the mana of chiefs, had been recognized by the British Crown.'[6]

13. Although I have not looked at how and when Busby communicated to the chiefs the British recognition of the flag, it is hard not to imagine that the chiefs would have connected the meaning of the 1835 document with the British recognition of the flag as denoting that their mana and sovereign status had been recognised.

14. The 1834 flag was flown from a flagpole placed at Waitangi outside Busby's residence from 1834 until 1840. Busby reputedly hoisted the 1834 flag on the pole in front of his house each day.[7] In 1840, after the signing of the Treaty, the 1834 flag was replaced by the British flag on both the Waitangi and Kororareka flagstaffs.[8] The Kororareka (Maiki Hill) flagstaff had been provided by Hone Heke for the purpose of signalling vessels and flying the 1834 flag.[9] The absence of the 1834 flag from the Maiki Hill flagpole was a later cause of complaint for Hone Heke.

15. The formal recognition of the Confederation of United Tribes under their own independent flag was an important precursor to the Northern War. It demonstrated to Ngā Puhi that their authority and rangatiratanga had been recognised by the British Crown.[10] And the significance of the flag was referred to several times by chiefs later in the 1840s.

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[5] Ian Wards, *Shadow of the Land*, 1968, pp.10-11; Orange, p. 20

[6] Orange, p.20

[7] SMD Martin, *New Zealand*, p. 52, cited in O. Wilson, *Kororareka*, p. 107

[8] Judith Binney, 'The Māori and the Signing of the Treaty' in *Towards 2000*, p. 24

[9] The Kororareka flagstaff had been provided by Hone Heke for the purpose of signalling vessels and flying the 1834 flag. W C Cotton, Journal of a residence at St John's College, Te Waimate, 2 March 1844 – 25 August 1844, Micro, AML, p. 193.

[10] There were a number of other nations and smaller 'states', such as Tahiti and Hawaii, that also possessed their own flags at about this time and whom were trading with Ngā Puhi groups in the Bay of Islands.

Declaration of Independence/ He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene

16. In 1835, Busby proposed a Declaration of Independence (He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene) for the chiefs. This was a further attempt to assist Māori to form a self-governing union of tribes to prevent other nations and individuals from claiming authority. He Whakaputanga is a substantial topic in its own right. Its relevance for the study of the Northern War lies in the fact that He Whakaputanga served, at least in Ngā Puhi eyes, as a further acknowledgement of Ngā Puhi authority and part of an ongoing relationship between the British Crown and Ngā Puhi chiefs.

17. Busby drafted the Declaration of Independence in English; it was then translated into te reo Māori by Henry Williams. The chiefs signed a hand-written copy of Māori text.[11] Later in 1836 and again in 1837, Busby printed copies of He Whakaputanga and circulated copies around Te Taitokerau.[12] The English version of He Whakaputanga was never signed by any rangatira, though Busby appears to have sent only the English text to the Colonial Office for approval, without the Māori text.[13]

18. Having drawn up the document, Busby arranged a hui at Waitangi on 28 October 1835 to endorse the document. He Whakaputanga was signed by the majority of the Bay of Islands chiefs and many of those from the Hokianga. It is noted that several who assented to the 1835 agreement later refused to sign Te Tiriti o Waitangi. It is also notable that signatories included men who later chose to oppose the Crown in the Northern War, such as Hone Heke, Kawiti, Pumuka and others.*

Question 1: How did Māori understand He Whakaputanga / The Declaration? And, therefore, what was the nature of the relationship and the mutual commitments they were assenting to in signing?

[11] *Facsimiles of the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Waitangi*, Government Printer, 1976. The original signed document is in Archives New Zealand, IA 9/1

[12] Phil Parkinson and Penny Griffith, *Books in Māori 1815 – 1900 Nga Tanga Reo Māori*, 2004, p. 48

[13] Busby to Hay, 2 November 1835, reproduced in *Facsimiles*, I

* Note, in one of the printed versions the names of Te Peha and Hoane Wiremu Heke have been omitted.

19. He Whakaputanga o Te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene has been translated and discussed in studies and evidence already before the Tribunal. The report summarises key features of the agreement which had a bearing on the later conflict, and, in particular that He Whakaputanga:

- recognised that an independent chieftainship ('rangatiratanga') existed in the lands of 'Te Whakaminenga' (the Confederation of United Tribes).[14]
- asserted that the sovereign authority and mana ('ko te kingitanga, ko te mana') of their lands, rested with these rangatira of Te Whakaminenga; and
- concluded by asking the King of England to continue to be a parent to their infant state and to become a protector of its independence.[15]

20. Based on existing secondary sources the report notes that Ngā Puhi most likely understood He Whakaputanga as further acknowledgement of their mana and their rights as tangata whenua. The document was in keeping with the earlier oral discussions between Hongi and King George. And Māori who signed, saw the document as acknowledging and securing their autonomy, as well as renewing a preferential relationship with the British Crown. The document was a statement of their collective rangatiratanga, though the authority to exercise such dominion obviously did not derive from the document. It is also notable that He Whakaputanga referred to the King's assent to the 1834 flag ('i wakae ki te Kara mo matou').

21. The nature of mutual commitments in He Whakaputanga are not covered in the main report. Nevertheless I suggest that care is needed when examining concepts drawn from the 1835 document.

22. In forwarding the English translation to the Colonial Office, Busby referred to the document as 'a Declaration by the chiefs of the Northern Part of New Zealand, of the Independence of their Country, and of their having united their tribes into one State,

[14] Judith Binney, *The People and the Land*, 1990, p. 31
[15] Orange, p. 21

under the designation of "The United Tribes of New Zealand". The following year, the Colonial Office formally acknowledged the Declaration of Independence.[16]

23. It should be noted that in the formal acknowledgement, the Declaration of Independence received a conditional acceptance from the Secretary of the Colonial Office in London.[17] In what Alan Ward refers to as a 'guarded reply', Glenelg accepted the document and affirmed the support and protection of the independence of the chiefs so long as it did not impinge on the interests of British subjects.[18]

Question 3: What was the effect of He Whakaputanga/ The Declaration at 1835?

24. Whether the British Colonial Office saw the Declaration of Independence document as either a formal acceptance of complete independence, or of an 'informal empire',[19] two points are noted. First, Māori understood the British Crown to have agreed and acknowledged their independent chieftainship. This was the message that Busby effectively delivered to Ngā Puhi via the circulation of a printed signed version of He Whakaputanga. Secondly from a British perspective, and as noted by Judith Binney, the terms of the Declaration of Independence created a legal dilemma for the British, as it recognised both independence and a protectorate relationship.[20]

25. He Whakaputanga / Declaration of Independence created different and potentially conflicting understandings and, in so doing, laid the foundations for future difficulties. The gap between Ngā Puhi and British understandings implicit in the 1835 document was a major factor in the gulfs of understanding that re-surfaced in 1840 with the different texts of the Treaty, and which ultimately led to conflict in the Northern War.

The Treaty of Waitangi / Te Tiriti o Waitangi

26. The Northern War report focuses on two aspects of Te Tiriti o Waitangi:

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[16] Orange, pp.21-2
[17] Glenelg to Bourke, 25 May 1836, in *Facsimiles*, 1976
[18] Alan Ward, *National Overview*, p. 20
[19] James Belich, *Making Peoples*, 1996, p. 181
[20] Judith Binney, *The People and the Land*, 1990, p.31

- did Māori signatories to Te Tiriti believe they had maintained, or ceded, tino rangatiratanga; and
- what did individual rangatira and, specifically, those who would later choose either to oppose or to fight alongside of the Crown forces in the Northern War say about their authority and Te Tiriti at the time of the signings?

Question 5: How did Maori understand Te Tiriti / The Treaty? And therefore, what was the nature of the relationship and the mutual commitments they were assenting to in signing?

27. We have the surviving speeches of the chiefs,[21] which give an indication of how chiefs may have understood Te Tiriti. As already noted, it is important to consider that the majority of the northern chiefs present at either Waitangi, Waimate or Mangungu, signed the Māori text (Te Tiriti).

28. It is now widely accepted that the Māori and English texts of the Treaty state different things and that the two texts consequently generated different (and potentially conflicting) understandings about rights and authority.[22] Ngā Puhi signed the Maori language text of the Treaty ('Te Tiriti'). In doing so, they were guaranteed their ongoing possession of 'te tino rangatiratanga' and, in return, ceded 'kawanatanga'. Previous scholars have looked at different and competing meanings of these terms.

29. The report notes that essentially Ngā Puhi understood that the terms of Te Tiriti explicitly protected and enshrined their rights of 'te tino rangatiratanga' and all that it implied. Ngā Puhi continued to believe that through Te Tiriti they had safeguarded their highest chiefly authority, and secured the status quo through their agreement for laws of protection and goodwill from the British governor. These understandings powered subsequent expectations with regard to the actions of the Crown. It was a central reference point to which Ngā Puhi constantly returned during the 1840s.

[21] Although in English translation only and in many cases abridged.

[22] Refer Claudia Orange, Chapter 3; For more information, refer to Ruth Ross, 'Te Tiriti o Waitangi', *New Zealand Journal of History*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1972; Bruce Biggs, 'Humpty Dumpty and the Meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi in IH Kawharu, *Waitangi*, 1989, pp. 300- 313;

Signings

30. There has been some confusion in accounts of the Waitangi signing as to whether Ngā Puhi initially supported or opposed signing the Maori text of the Treaty. Claudia Orange has suggested that the majority of the discussion at Waitangi opposed the signing of Te Tiriti.[23]

31. Sir James Henare provided another explanation of Ngā Puhi motivations at the Waitangi signing. Henare explained that, after a full evening of intense discussion on 5 February, the chiefs finally reached a consensus to sign Te Tiriti the following day. He also noted, however, that in the course of normal debate 'these influential chiefs were to get up and to offer token opposition to the Treaty on the morning of the 6th.'[24] He further explained that although many historians had interpreted the Ngā Puhi opposition to the Treaty as genuine, it was, in actual fact, only 'token' opposition. As further evidence Henare highlighted that it had been the chiefs who had signaled to Hobson to come ashore and sign the Treaty on 6 February, and not the other way around, and that in his rush Hobson arrived on shore wearing his naval captain's hat, but otherwise dressed in civilian clothes.[25]

32. Anne Salmond in an earlier report on the Treaty signings noted that Heke could be counted as among those who spoke against the governor and not for him.[26] Although it is hard to be certain about the text of what Heke said at Waitangi, [27] it seems clear that he expressed sentiments of both support and opposition to the Treaty. And a speech of this nature was in keeping with Sir James Henare's oral history of the event. Furthermore, CMS Missionary, Richard Taylor, one of the most skilled in te reo Māori among the Pakeha present at the event, recorded in his formal journal back to the CMS that Heke

[23] Orange, pp. 49-50
[24] Sir James Henare in Jane Kelsey, *Labour and the Question of the Treaty 1984-1989*, 1990, pp.8-9
[25] ibid, p. 9; See also, Orange, p. 52
[26] ibid., p. 30
[27] We have only limited records of the speech and no surviving Māori language sources

was the first to speak in favour of the governor, and he was followed by the Hokianga chiefs.[28]

33. Putting aside for the moment the issue of what Heke said, evidence suggests he was among the first group, if not the first, to sign Te Tiriti. In so doing he demonstrated his clear support for Te Tiriti and the retention of te tino rangatiratanga.

'Papa pounamu tapu'

34. Another important oral account of the signing at Waitangi records how the terms used in Te Tiriti were agreed upon and the fact that the document, once signed, became a solemn and tapu compact. Rima Edwards suggests that the original version of Te Tiriti o Waitangi drawn up by Busby included the word 'mana' throughout the document. On the evening of 5 February Busby and Henry Williams consulted the Maori who were staying at Te Tii, they took the draft version down to them and consulted them. That was when the word mana was removed and changed to tino rangatiratanga and kawanatanga.[29] According to Edwards, the chiefs 'were not giving up their mana - they were allowing the Queen to build her house alongside. They were enhancing their position, not reducing it.'[30] Both the karakia and mihi delivered by the tohunga Nga Manu at Waitangi after the signing on 6 February 1840 reflected this understanding.[31]

35. By the chiefs placing their marks on Te Tiriti, the document became a tapu compact. As Rima Edwards records: 'They [the chiefs] gave their oaths to her [the Queen] (& those oaths were tapu); and she gave her oaths to them (and they were also tapu).'[32] This is a key point. It was this notion of Te Tiriti as an agreement that carried the sacred marks of the chiefs and the Queen, and which consequently could not be compromised, that powered later decisions by Ngā Puhi chiefs to protest the actions of the colonial government. It was also this understanding that lay behind the decisions of chiefs, such as

[28] Richard Taylor, 'Journal', Volume 2, January 1st 1838 - July 7th 1844, MS 302, Typescript, AML, pp.188-189
[29] Rima Edwards, pers corresp., 9 June 2006
[30] ibid.
[31] ibid.
[32] Rima Edwards, pers corresp., 9 June 2006

Te Taonui, Patuone and Nene, who, while they agreed with Heke that the Crown had breached the tapu of Te Tiriti, were themselves unwilling to act against the Crown.

36. In conclusion, the report notes that despite some debate and outward dissent shown to Te Tiriti, the majority of the major rangatira of the north signed Te Tiriti. Certainly, most if not all of the key rangatira who were later protagonists in the Northern war signed Te Tiriti. By signing they had agreed to their understanding of Te Tiriti. It is important to recognise that Ngā Puhi, in signing Te Tiriti, were seeking to renew their former arrangements and alliance with the British monarch. These they had traced to Hongi Hika and others and to others who had made 'alliances' with the Crown. The 1831 letter from the Northern chiefs to King William IV is a notable example. Those following Hongi renewed arrangements with King William's niece, Victoria, who had ascended the British throne in 1837. Whereas the British were motivated to sign the Treaty at least in part to replace previous agreements - expressly the Declaration of Independence – Ngā Puhi probably saw the Treaty rather as a renewal and further protection of existing arrangements.

Question 7: What then was the effect of Te Tiriti / The Treaty at 1840?

37. The report notes that the effect of Te Tiriti was to reaffirm Ngā Puhi understandings and expectations that their own authority and position would be retained and further protected. Ngā Puhi most likely saw the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 as building on the previous arrangements. The different texts carried different meanings and spawned different and contradictory understandings. And this laid the grounds for later conflict. On another level, however, Ngā Puhi regarded the Māori text, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, as an important and tapu agreement. A great number of the most important chiefs had placed their assent to the document and it had become inviolable. This fact alone influenced the nature of later conflict during the Northern War.

38. Another perspective of the 'effect' of Te Tiriti can be drawn from recorded responses from northern chiefs in 1840. Immediately following the signings some chiefs raised

concerns with British officials that they may have been misled in their understanding(s) of Te Tiriti. The day after the signing at Mangungu, Felton Mathew noted that a group of chiefs sought out Hobson and asked to remove their signatures from the document. 'We were followed by a war canoe the chief of which brought back his present of blankets together with a letter signed by fifty of his tribe, in which they disavowed the act of the preceding day, and refused to acknowledge allegiance to the Queen.'[33]

39. In April 1840, several Ngā Puhi leaders held urgent meetings with Hobson to discuss the Treaty and issues of authority.[34] Johnston recorded that on 7 April 1840, chiefs from Kaikohe, Taiamai and Waitangi met with the Governor to raise concerns about the meaning and import of Te Tiriti and the chiefs stated that:

> 'Our hearts are dark and gloomy from what Pakehas have told us, they say "that the Missionaries first come to pave the way for the English who have sent the governor here, that Soldiers will follow and then he will take away your lands and shoot you, which is easy as the Missionaries by making you Christian have unfitted you for defending yourselves.'

40. Johnston further recorded that:

> 'the governor in answer pointed out the reasons for these men so speaking - He told them that he was commanded by the Queen to prevent them from selling all their lands to White men, instead of coming to take them away the Queen would only buy such lands from them as they did not require and that they would see that what he said was true.
> They [the chiefs] listened with great attention and one chief rising expressed his belief in what the governor said in a grave and impressive manner and ended by saying that 'Our hearts are made light by the words of the "Kawana".' [35]

41. At the meeting, chiefs expressed their deep concerns about Te Tiriti. In an attempt to reassure Māori of the good intentions of the British Crown, Hobson re-emphasised the protective nature of Crown pre-emption.

[33] Felton Mathew to Sarah Mathew, 9 February 1840, NZ MSS 88/2, ACL, p. 9
[34] The only record I have located is John Johnston, 'Occasional Diary on New Zealand', 17 March 1840 to 28 April 1840, NZMSS 27, ACL
[35] John Johnston, 'Diary', 7 April 1840, NZMSS 27, pp. 35-36

42. Further meetings were held on 8 April 1840 where it appears chiefs again raised concerns and the governor sought to provide reassurance and the chiefs finished by emphasising their support for Te Tiriti and the Kawana. Hone Heke and Tamati Waka Nene both made statements of support for the governor:

> John Heki a chief of Carcoi [Kaikohe] slipped forward and said he and tribe would be dead on the green before a hair on the governor's head should be touched. Neni said "My father the governor need not have a dark heart," he and his tribe would come and surround him and who dared to attack him.[36]

43. These events demonstrate that Ngā Puhi were coming to the governor with their concerns about Te Tiriti at an early date (before cession had been proclaimed). In reply, Hobson strongly re-emphasised the positive terms of Te Tiriti to the apparent satisfaction of those northern chiefs.

44. The governor followed up the meetings with a printed circular letter sent to chiefs in the north and elsewhere. Dated 27 April 1840, the letter advised Māori not to believe the words of 'Pakeha kino'.[37] The document went further to reinforce the words spoken at the Waitangi and Hokianga hui, and gave Māori an express assurance that their lands would not be taken from them.[38] Remarkably, the term used to denote the Queen's authority in this official letter from Hobson and translated by the CMS missionaries (prior to the Kaitaia signing) was 'te Rangatiratanga o te KUINI' [emphasis in original], and not kawanatanga.[39]

Question 4: What, if any, was the relationship between He Whakaputanga / The Declaration and Te Tiriti / The Treaty?

45. The relationship between the two (I would argue more) events is perhaps of most significance certainly in understanding the origins of the Northern War. As seen in the report, the important point is not the effect of one document or another, but the combined effect of both documents, with earlier events which established a line of continuity, a

[36] John Johnston, Diary, 8 April 1840, NZMSS 27, p. 38
[37] Phil Parkinson and Penny Griffith, *Books in Maori 1815 – 1900*, p. 80
[38] ibid., pp. 79-80
[39] ibid., p. 80

living relationship between the Crown and the chiefs across generations. This relationship is reflected in the documents, but it does not appear limited to them.

46. An example of how the combined effect of both documents led and underscored Māori understandings and expectations is highlighted below. The main report refers to a series of surviving letters written by Ngā Puhi chiefs (signatories to He Whakaputanga) in the 1840s which provide insight into how the chiefs saw the two (1835 and 1840) agreements and the effect of the documents.[40] Perhaps the clearest example is a letter written by Hone Heke written to the Queen Victoria in 1849. Heke wrote to Queen Victoria expressing causes of the Northern War conflict and some of his concerns. The letter drew a line of continuity from the earliest meeting and entente between King George III of England Hongi Hika, later agreements in the 1830s, the flag, through to the 1840s.[41]

> E hua matou ko ratou anake kei noho mo te takiwa nei – kahore, he mano tini – otira i to matou kuwharetanga i te tini onga huihuinga, no reira ka puta mai te ra o te raruraru, rite tonu ki te kupu kotahi a Kingi Hori i tuku mai ki a Hongi. Muri iho kua he, kua puta mai ko Puhipi, he tikanga ke, ka puta mai ko Wiremu Hopihana, te Kawana tuatahi, he tikanga ke, ko te kara o Niu Tireni whakarerea ana ka whakatarea ko ta Ingarangi anake. kahore e puare i aia te Whakaminenga ki Waitangi kia rangona e te tokomaha, ko te rakau te mea nui hei tiaki i te motu nei koia ahau i pohe he ai i huna e ia. no te mea naku raua i whakaae kia noho ki uta, a Puhipi me te kawana Tuatahi. E hua he mahi tika; ka puta mai ko Pitiroi te kawana tuarua - he tikanga ke. te matau au ki te tikanga a nga Kawana, whakaae kuwhare matou, ka tohe ahau ki a ia, kia haere mai kia korero maua mo taua rakau, kahore i tai mai. Whakaarahia mai ana e ia e noa [?] ngatatau tino – he mea pani ki te ta – No reira te whawhai – no te pakeketanga o ana whakaaro no konei ahau ka hara kia koe....Na kei mea mai koe naku te hara, kahore, koia ahau ka mea atu nei ki a koe. Mau te whakaaro ki takaea o toku motu o Niu Tireni kia tukua mai – me te mana o te whenua o nga tangata.[42]

> *English Translation*
> The immense congregations of people that took place here, was what brought forth the day of trouble, which exactly agreed with what King George had said to

[40] See for example, Hone Heke, Kainga Tuanga, Wiremu Hau and Te Hira Pure to Governor, 19 July 1844, CO 209/ 28, pp. 260-1. Others are outlined in the main report.
[41] Hone Wiremu Heke ki Te Kuini o Ingarangi, 10 Hurae 1849, G 30/16, pp. 693-4
[42] Hone Wiremu Heke ki Te Kuini o Ingarangi, 10 Hurae 1849, G 30/16, pp. 695-8

> Hongi. After trouble had ensued, Mr Busby arrived with a different arrangement, and then the first governor, William Hobson, with a different one again; the flag of New Zealand was abandoned, and that of England alone displayed. He [Hobson] did not state this at the meeting at Waitangi, in order that everybody might know that the flag-staff was the great protection of these islands; and his concealing it was the cause of my error, for I was the person who consented that both Mr Busby and the first governor should live on shore, thinking that they would act rightly; then came FitzRoy, the second governor, with a different arrangement again. Not understanding the authority which accompanied the appointment of governors, and to which in our folly consented, I urged him to come here, in order that we might talk on the subject of the flag-staff; he did not come, but re-erected it, having four iron bars and covered with tar. The obstinacy of his thoughts was the cause of the war, and of my transgressing against you....Don't suppose that the fault was mine, for it was not, which is my reason for saying that it rests with you to restore the flag of my island of New Zealand, and the authority of the land of the people.[43]

47. Expectations that Ngā Puhi authority would be acknowledged and respected can be traced back to the early meetings and agreements forged between British monarchs and Ngā Puhi chiefs in the 1820s and 1830s. These expectations were carried through in the 1835 He Whakaputanga and ultimately the Māori text of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. These earlier political arrangements had signalled to Ngā Puhi, a British regard for, and recognition of Maori chiefly authority.

[43] Heke to Queen Victoria, 10 July 1849, enclosure in Grey to Earl Grey, 28 July 1849, *GBPP*, 1849 [1120], p. 17