Previous page: The fortified kainga of Ohinemutu, circa 1845. Then, as now, dwellings were built close to the much-valued geothermal resource, from which steam can be seen rising. At left, in the distance, is Mokoia Island, which also has geothermal sites. Detail from 'Mokoia from Ohinemutu, Lake Rotorua', a watercolour by John Guise Mitford. The full image is reproduced in black and white on page 1489.
The Central North Island is endowed with many water and geothermal resources, which attracted the ancestors of the claimants to settle and prosper. They drew on the bounty of these waterways and geothermal resources, and because of them they were able to make the Central North Island their home. We were told that just as the sea and its food provided those on the coast with a major source of protein, so it was with the waterways and aquatic life of the North Island interior. Many of the claims before us, therefore, relate to the importance of these resources in the cultural, spiritual, and economic life of the iwi and hapu of our inquiry region. Any loss or degradation has been, and continues to be, keenly felt.

In this part of our report, we consider these claims in some detail by analysing the way both Maori and the Crown have conceptualised, claimed, and used the resources of the Central North Island. In reviewing the story of the water and geothermal resources of the region, we identified how Maori and the Crown have talked past each other on nearly all fronts. On the one hand, Central North Island Maori claim that these resources were taonga and that the Crown has actively sought to undermine their rangatiratanga over their taonga by appropriating the resources or the right to regulate them. On the other hand, the Crown claims the right to own and/or regulate the resources as part of its right to govern for the benefit of all New Zealanders. As our review in the subsequent chapters demonstrates, two world views and two systems of law and authority have clashed. Central to this story are the relevant Treaty principles, the legal issues concerning the ownership of water (whether in lakes, rivers, or streams), fisheries, and geothermal resources, and the Crown’s regulation of these resources.

We focus on Lake Taupo-nui-a-Tia as a case study, as this lengthy story so aptly demonstrates Maori and Crown interaction in respect of a major waterway, over issues such as the introduction of trout into an important indigenous fishery; the Crown’s protection of public rights of boating, and angling access to the lake; the circumstances in which the Crown secured the use of the lake for hydroelectricity purposes; and the impacts on the environment, and Maori, due to the associated manipulations of the lake level.

We contrast that history with the story of other water resources such as springs, lakes, rivers, and estuaries within the Central North Island inquiry region. As in the Lake Taupo chapter, we consider the effects of loss of ownership and rangatiratanga over these resources. In doing so, we draw on specific case studies including: the impacts of the Crown’s environmental management regime on Lake Taupo, and on rivers and wetlands within the inquiry region such as Hamurana and Taniwha Springs, the Puarenga Stream, the Kaituna River to the Maketu estuary, and the Tarawera River and Matata estuary; and the impacts of forestry sites on land and water resources at Murupara.

Finally, we consider the nature and extent of the Central North Island iwi and hapu interest in geothermal resources, and the extent to which the Crown has recognised and provided for their customary rights and Treaty interests.

In summary, the chapters of this part are:
- Chapter 17: Te Taiao: The Environment and Natural Resources: Treaty Principles and Standards;
- Chapter 18: Lake Taupo-nui-a-Tia: Taupo Moana;
- Chapter 19: Rangatiratanga – Kawanatanga: Environmental Management; and
- Chapter 20: Ruamoko/Ruaimoko and Ngatoroirangi: The Geothermal Resources of the Central North Island.

Our key issues for this part are:
- Are the claimants’ waterways, fisheries, and geothermal
resources of the Central North Island taonga over which they exercised tino rangatiratanga?

- If so, did the Crown actively protect the tino rangatiratanga of iwi and hapu over these taonga so that they could continue to use and enjoy these resources in accordance with their own cultural preferences?

- What have been the impacts on Central North Island iwi and hapu of Crown acts, policies, and omissions affecting waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources?

We turn now to consider the relevant Treaty principles and standards for the Crown’s exercise of kawanatanga in respect of water and waterways (including fisheries), geothermal resources, and the environment.
TE TAIAR: THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
TREATY PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS

Statutory provisions for giving effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in matters of interpretation and administration should not be narrowly construed . . .

New Zealand Court of Appeal, 1995

Given the terrain and climate of the Central North Island region, its waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources were of great value to its peoples. We were told that these resources were extensively used in accordance with their traditional practices, customs, and laws. They were, it was claimed, prized as taonga over which they exercised rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga. These resources were fundamental to the life of the iwi and hapu of the region. The Crown, they contend, has not actively protected or provided for these taonga or for the right of Maori to exercise their authority over them. The Crown, on the other hand, rejects these allegations.

We received much information from the claimants on the importance of water, waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources during this inquiry. Where we have sufficient evidence to make generic or preliminary findings, we do so. Other claims we mention either as examples of points that are to be noted or as issues of particular concern to some claimants.

In all cases, and before we traverse the detailed history of the interactions between Central North Island Maori and the Crown over these resources, it is important to establish what principles and standards of the Treaty of Waitangi apply to these types of claims and the relevant duties of the Crown and Maori that flow from them.

Issues

After considering the manner in which the parties argued the issues before us, we have identified the following issues for determination in this chapter:

► What are the relevant Treaty principles and standards applicable to the claims concerning natural and physical resources and environmental management?
► Are waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources taonga over which Maori exercised rangatiratanga?
► Was introduced English common law sufficient to recognise Maori customary or native title to such natural resources?
Treaty Principles and Standards

Key Question: What are the relevant Treaty principles and standards applicable to the claims concerning natural and physical resources and environmental management?

The claimants’ case

The claimants generally look to the actual text of the Treaty of Waitangi and claim that, under article 2, the Crown guaranteed to protect their taonga (including their resources) and the exercise of their tino rangatiratanga or authority over taonga. The majority of counsel adopted either the generic submissions filed by Tom Bennion or the submissions filed by Karen Feint on the principles applicable, namely rangatiratanga, the Crown's duty to actively protect Maori interests, and its duty to provide redress.

The generic submissions on the environment, presented by Mr Bennion for the claimants, briefly state the principles he contends are relevant to claims concerning the environment, including natural and physical resources:

1. The Treaty covered all natural and physical resources, either by explicit reference or by the term ‘taonga’.
2. It provided for Treaty rights holders having self-management of resources, so long as it was their wish and desire to do so.
3. Conservation measures must be applied by the Crown as a last resort and sparingly.
4. Where the Crown delegates powers, such delegation must accord with the Treaty.
5. Equitable ‘set off’ is required where conservation measures are applied to Treaty rights holders.

The majority of claimants accept that there may be occasions where the Crown, exercising the kawanatanga which was part of the Treaty compact, may interfere in the rangatiratanga or with the property of Maori. But this power, they submitted, is constrained by a number of factors; we discuss these below. The Tribunal was also referred to the need for the Crown to take an environmental justice approach in terms of its duty of active protection and its obligation to provide redress where claims are well founded.

The Crown’s case

The Crown, for the purposes of the inquiry generally, submitted that article 1 permits the Crown to undertake the complete governance of New Zealand. Crown counsel submitted that on the terms of article 1, by the governance treated for and obtained, the Crown is the sovereign authority in New Zealand. Relying on Sir Hugh Kawharu’s interpretation of the Maori text of the Treaty, the Crown submitted that, if the Treaty means that the Crown promised to protect rangatiratanga, then so did Maori promise to acknowledge and protect kawanatanga.

The Crown submitted that from the Treaty onwards, the relationship has been between the Crown and subject. Any conception of separate sovereignty or parallel governments does not fit within the Treaty. The Crown acknowledges, however, that it is obliged to exercise its powers honourably and in accordance with the protections promised in the Treaty.

The Crown contends that tino rangatiratanga, or the ‘unqualified exercise of their chieftainship’, means more than ownership of property rights. It connotes a degree of Maori control and management over what Maori own. ”It is rangatiratanga over the subject matter of article 2 rather than over issues the preserve of Article 1.” What this means, in the Crown’s view, is that the debate is about how much ‘self-management’ is consistent with the Treaty and how this properly changes over time.

Article 3 adds a further dimension by declaring that individuals have all the rights and obligations of citizenship. Striking the right balance between the rights of people to act as individuals and the exercise of chieftainship over the subject matter of article 2 will always be a question of judgement, over which there will be a range of reasonable views.
Therefore, Crown counsel contended, the Tribunal should take a less ‘aspirational’ and less presentist approach to the issues in this inquiry. This ‘less than’ approach was to be preferred to the approach reflected in earlier Waitangi Tribunal reports. Instead, this Tribunal should focus on practical and realistically achievable ways in which the Crown and Maori can or should meet each of their on-going Treaty obligations.9

From the Crown’s perspective, Tribunal findings which address the contemporary realities of government are the most persuasive and of the greatest assistance.10 Quoting the Court of Appeal in the 1987 Lands case, Crown counsel submitted that the Tribunal must also apply the broad-based Treaty principles in a way that acknowledges that decisions must be assessed with regard to what is reasonable in the circumstances.11

The Crown acknowledges the following:

- The Crown has a duty to make informed decisions. But it argues that there is not a standard duty to consult. Rather, whether the Crown should or should not consult depends on the nature of the decision to be made. It must be judged on the particular circumstances existing at the time. The nature of the consultation will vary depending on the nature of the issues involved.12

- The Crown has a duty analogous to a fiduciary duty, but that is different from a fiduciary duty known to the common law or in equity.

- A right to development may be relevant, albeit in very limited form. The Tribunal should provide some delineation of the extent of the right.13

- The principle of options is relevant, as it exemplifies the tension that governments have felt for much of our history, namely the exercise of chiefly power under article 2 versus the rights of individual citizens under article 3.14

- The decision of the Court of Appeal in Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation is relevant.

We note that the approach we take to the interpretation of statutory provisions will be consistent with that court’s approach, as detailed in the following quotation:

Statutory provisions for giving effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in matters of interpretation and administration should not be narrowly construed. We accept that s 4 of the Conservation Act requires the Marine Mammals Protection Act and Regulations to be interpreted and administered to give effect to the principles, at least to the extent that the provisions of the Marine Mammals Protection Act and Regulations are not clearly inconsistent with the principles. Further than that it is unnecessary to go in this case . . .15

- The Crown is responsible for the parameters of the local government legislation and the related Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) within which decisions are made by local and regional councils. However, the Crown is not responsible for the particular decisions that are made by those entities.16 The Crown considers sections 6 and 8 of the RMA to be consistent with Treaty principles. The combined effect is to give significant protection to Maori interests. It contends that the Treaty itself requires a balancing of interests and that sections 6 and 7 of the Act merely indicate the interests that must be balanced in the context of the RMA. In practice, many of the matters of national importance listed in section 6 are likely to be compatible and complementary to section 6(e) and (f).

- The Treaty requires Maori interests to be given significant weight and protection. However, the Crown submitted that the Tribunal should articulate fairly a process of balancing interests that the Crown should use to meet its obligations to Maori and other citizens. Its requests that the Tribunal explain and articulate this balancing process should not be ignored, particularly in relation to the environment and future management of natural resources.17 The Crown argued that it
is unable to ‘release itself from the obligations it owes all New Zealand citizens including Maori and so must include other interests in any balancing process.’ To quote from the Crown’s submissions:

The Crown says that a careful process of balancing is more consistent with the underlying values of reciprocity reflecting the unique relationship that flows from the Treaty of Waitangi than an approach that denies the elected government the ability to act except in extremely constrained and unusual circumstances.

This issue may be most pressing in 20th century issues and environmental issues where a decision which directly affects one Maori group may directly or indirectly affect a number of other interested groups, Maori and non-Maori around the country. The Crown is required to balance the various interests involved in such a decision. Where issues of significant national infrastructure are included (as with electricity), such a balancing process must occur by considering the relative interests in the national context.

Crown counsel referred us to a number of Canadian Supreme Court decisions to emphasise the Crown’s request that this Tribunal develop a Treaty standard or a framework of treaty analysis that better reflects the multiplicity of factors and interests which a government must consider. The Crown contrasted what it perceives to be the vagueness of the Tribunal’s approach with the defined tests developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, where that court has reviewed the Canadian Government’s legislative objectives for enactments or regulations that have the effect of limiting existing aboriginal rights affirmed in section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982.

Counsel submitted that the Treaty requires that Maori interests are given particular weight and protection by the Crown. Counsel contended that the present jurisprudence, developed by the Tribunal to explain and analyse how the Crown should provide such protection, does not explain and articulate the balancing processes that the Government must engage in. In the Crown’s view, its obligation to undertake such processes cannot be ignored, and there is a need to develop and articulate them. This is particularly the case in relation to contemporary issues, such as those relating to the environment and future management of natural resources.

The claimants’ replies

A number of counsel made submissions in reply to the Crown. Jason Pou and Annette Sykes pointed out that the Crown’s submissions on the Treaty articles were, in effect, that authority and control of natural resources and nga taonga katoa rest with the Crown and were ceded to the Crown as an aspect of kawanatanga.

The corollary of this, it was submitted, is that rangatiratanga from the time of the Treaty necessarily excluded any concept of authority, control, responsibility, or stewardship in respect of natural resources and people which are taonga. This is, they said, the kind of solution proffered by the Resource Management Act. In their view, this cannot be what was intended at the time of the signing of the Treaty, and it certainly is not what the Treaty expressly declares.

Martin Taylor accepted the need for some balancing of interests, flowing from the partnership created between the Crown and Maori in relation to the Treaty. However, many of the matters protected by the Treaty are Maori property rights so fundamental that there must be constraints imposed upon the manner in which the Crown can exercise its right to govern.

The Tribunal’s analysis and findings

By its preamble, the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 is declared to be an Act to provide for the observance, and confirmation, of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Waitangi Tribunal has been established to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain matters are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty.
Under section 5 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, and in exercising any of its functions, the Tribunal must have regard to the two texts of the Treaty set out in schedule 1. For the purposes of the Act, the Tribunal has exclusive authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied in the two texts and to decide issues raised by the differences between them.

By section 6(1) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the Tribunal is required to assess claims against the principles of the Treaty. That is our jurisdiction. It is a jurisdiction that is not in any way qualified other than by the Treaty of Waitangi Act itself. We cannot avoid that jurisdiction by watering down those principles; nor can we ignore the years of Waitangi Tribunal jurisprudence devoted to environmental and natural resource management issues. We do not consider that the reports we refer to take an overly ‘presentist’ or ‘aspirational’ approach, as many of them have resulted in quite significant settlements. These reports include the Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim and the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report. Some reports have contributed to policy changes that have provided some relief for Maori claimants. Other reports, such as the Mohaka River Report and the Te Whanganui-a-Orotu Report, remain to be considered in negotiations, but the compelling nature of their findings cannot be avoided and those findings are sometimes echoed by dicta in the superior courts, as we identify below. Therefore, we believe that it would be wholly unjustifiable in terms of the evidence before us to depart from that significant body of jurisprudence.

We also accept the arguments made by the claimants that the Treaty and its principles have an enduring, if not an eternal, role in our legal system. As one of the judges of the Court of Appeal stated in 1987:

The principles of the Treaty must I think be the same today as they were when it was signed in 1840. What has changed are the circumstances to which those principles are to apply. At its making all lay in the future. 25

In identifying and discussing the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, we are also mindful that we should not lose sight of the underlying unitary nature of the Treaty principles. These principles are all inextricably linked by the two texts of the Treaty itself, the circumstances in which the Treaty was signed, and the rights and obligations of the Treaty partners to act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith. 26

In attempting to identify the Treaty principles relevant to the claims, we have been mindful of the comments made by the Privy Council in 1994 in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, when the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi were described as:

> the underlying mutual obligations and responsibilities which the Treaty places on the parties. They reflect the intent of the Treaty as a whole and include, but are not confined to, the express terms of the Treaty . . . With the passage of time, the ‘principles’ which underlie the Treaty have become much more important than its precise terms. 27

We turn now to those principles that the Tribunal considers are relevant to assessing claims to waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources, namely:

- partnership and mutual benefit, with a resultant duty to consult;
- reciprocity – the essential compact: kawanatanga (the right to govern) for rangatiratanga (autonomy and self-government);
- active protection of lands, estates, and taonga, with duties analogous to fiduciary duties;
- active protection of rangatiratanga, including in environmental management;
- options and equity of treatment; and
- redress of prejudice arising from Treaty breaches.

The overarching principles: partnership and mutual benefit

A foundation for partnership: The Waitangi Tribunal has previously said that New Zealand was founded on the basis of a Treaty that sought to give effect to the ‘high ideals of justice’ as contained in the instructions of 1839 from Lord Normanby to William Hobson. 28 Effectively, those
instructions required that Maori rights were to be protected during the settlement of the country. So it is that the twin motives of protection and colonisation are reflected in the preamble and articles of the Treaty. The Muriwhenua fishing Tribunal noted that:

Both parties expected to gain from the Treaty, the Maori from new technologies and markets, non-Maori from the acquisition of settlement rights and both from the cession of sovereignty to a supervisory state power. For Maori, access to new markets and technologies necessarily assumes a sharing with the settlers who provide them, and for non-Maori, a sharing in resources requires that Maori development be not constrained but perhaps even assisted where it can be. But neither partner in our view can demand their own benefits if there is not also an adherence to reasonable state objectives of common benefit. It ought not to be forgotten that there were pledges on both sides.39

Thus, it was a basic object of the Treaty that two peoples would live in one country. In doing so they would mutually benefit from their relationship. The Treaty was the first step in forging the foundation for a partnership.30 The Court of Appeal has described the relationship between Maori and the Crown.31 Arising from the principle of partnership were the reciprocal duties of the parties to act towards each other with reasonableness and the utmost good faith.32 So long as the honour of the Crown was upheld, Maori were to remain loyal to the Queen and fully accept her Government. The Crown in return was actively to protect Maori interests.33

A duty to consult: As we noted in chapter 3, the Crown has a duty, emerging from the principle of partnership, to consult Maori on matters of importance to them and to obtain their full, free, prior, and informed consent to anything which alters their possession of those lands, resources, and taonga guaranteed to them in article 2. The protection accorded to Maori rights in terms of the Treaty extends to the environment and natural and physical resources; first, by its express terms in both the Maori and the English texts and, secondly, by the principles of the Treaty. As a result, the Crown was and is obliged to make informed decisions about the impact of proposed omissions, policies, actions, or legislation on Maori interests in the environment and natural resources.34 On this issue, Justice Thomas noted that:

in fulfilling its duty to act reasonably and in good faith, the Crown is obliged to make informed decisions so that proper regard is had to the impact of the treaty. Particular circumstances may require the Crown to consult with Maori. Consultation and cooperation may be necessary in some cases while in other cases the Crown may have sufficient information in its possession for it to act consistently with its obligations under the treaty without specific consultation. See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General, supra, per Richardson J at 683. It also has been recognised, however, that it is not permissible for the Crown to try to limit the principles of the treaty to just consultation. Since New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General, it has been established that the principles require the active protection of Maori interests, and that to restrict this to consultation would be hollow. See Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation, supra, per Cooke P at 560.35

This is not, however, an open-ended obligation requiring consultation in all cases, for as Justice Richardson in the Lands case stated:

In truth the notion of an absolute open-ended and formless duty to consult is incapable of practical fulfilment and cannot be regarded as implicit in the Treaty. I think the better view is that the responsibility of one Treaty partner to act in good faith fairly and reasonably towards the other puts the onus on a partner, here the Crown, when acting within its sphere to make an informed decision, that is a decision where it is sufficiently informed as to the relevant facts and law to be able to say it has had proper regard to the impact of the principles of the Treaty. In that situation it will have discharged the obligation to act reasonably and in good faith.36

Although expressed in accordance with the contemporary language of ‘principles’ we find that Justice
Richardson’s view would similarly apply to circumstances prevailing from 1840 to 1975. That is because such an obligation to consult would be consistent with the terms of the Treaty, its spirit, the nature of the relationship created by the Treaty between the Crown and Maori, and its broad objectives. The test of what consultation is reasonable in the prevailing circumstances depends on the nature of the resource or taonga, and the likely effects of the policy, action, or legislation. In some circumstances, a lack of consultation with iwi and hapu over their interests will mean that the Crown cannot make an informed decision. In other cases, it can make an informed decision without consultation. In all cases, the honour of the Crown to abide by the guarantees expressly given in the Treaty and in accordance with its principles requires that the Crown act honourably and that both parties act towards each other with the utmost good faith.

**The principle of reciprocity: the essential compact or bargain**

The Crown, in exchange for kawanatanga (governance) and the right to make laws for New Zealand, solemnly promised that Maori rights, including the right to exercise tino rangatiratanga (autonomy or self-government) over their whenua (lands), their kainga (estates), and their remaining taonga (including but not limited to forests and fisheries), would be protected. This is consistent with Sir Hugh Kawharu’s evidence before the Kaituna River Tribunal, as it grappled with the meaning of the Maori terms of the Treaty, which noted that just as there is no exact equivalent in English for rangatiratanga, there is no exact equivalent in Maori for sovereignty. The nearest one can get to rangatiratanga in English is to say it means ‘all the powers privileges and mana of a chieftain’ or ‘chieftainness’, in the widest sense. Furthermore, it is essential not to lose sight of the quid pro quo of the Treaty: that the collective cession to the Crown of the power to govern was made primarily in return for the Crown’s protection of each chief’s authority within the tribal domain. Sir Hugh Kawharu’s evidence was that:

the major problem arising from the first Article turns on the issue of sovereignty, a system of power and authority (as would have been intended by the Colonial Office) that was wholly beyond the Maori experience, a network of institutions ultimately to comprise a legislature, judiciary and executive, all the paraphernalia for governing a Crown Colony.

The Maori people’s view on the other hand could only have been framed in terms of their own culture; in other words, what the Chiefs imagined they were ceding was that part of their mana and rangatiratanga that hitherto had enabled them to make war, exact retribution, consume or enslave their vanquished enemies and generally exercise power over life and death. It is totally against the run of evidence to imagine that they would wittingly have divested themselves of all their spiritually sanctioned powers – most of which powers indeed they wanted protected. They would have believed they were retaining their rangatiratanga intact apart from a licence to kill or inflict material hurt on others, retaining all their customary rights and duties as trustees for their tribal groups.}

We agree with this interpretation of what Maori would have understood by the Treaty in 1840. Therefore, given the Crown’s superior knowledge, as the drafters of the Treaty, and given that this essential compact or bargain resulted in the Crown obtaining the right to govern, it could do so only by protecting Maori interests. Justice Richardson in the Lands case reiterated this point in the following way:

There is, however, one paramount principle which I have suggested emerges from consideration of the Treaty in its historical setting: that the compact between the Crown and the Maori through which the peaceful settlement of New Zealand was contemplated called for the protection by the Crown of both Maori interests and British interests and rested on the premise that each party would act reasonably and in good faith towards the other within their respective spheres. That is I think reflected both in the nature of the Treaty and in its terms.

It was a compact through which the Crown sought from the indigenous people legitimacy for its acquisition of
government over New Zealand. Inevitably there would be some conflicts of interest. There would be some circumstances where satisfying the concerns and aspirations of one party could injure the other. If the Treaty was to be taken seriously by both parties, each would have to act in good faith and reasonably towards the other.45

Consequently, neither the Crown’s right to govern nor the guarantee of tino rangatiratanga can be absolute, for the existence of one depends on the other. It is in the nature of the partnership forged by the Treaty that the Crown and Maori should seek arrangements which acknowledge the wider responsibility of the Crown while at the same time protecting Maori tino rangatiratanga.46 There was always to be room for two peoples, as both expected to gain from the Treaty. For Maori, the benefits would include access to new technologies and markets and to a new economy; both expected to benefit from a right to settled government or governments. The arrangement assumed a sharing of natural resources. Development of those resources was always going to lead to some modification of taonga. But the key was to ensure that both the Crown and Maori had the right to participate in how such development should proceed.47 We turn now to consider the essential features of kawanatanga and rangatiratanga, as these terms relate to the environment and natural resources.

**Kawanatanga: the right to govern:** In this inquiry, the Crown has asked how it and its delegates should balance the competing interests involved in contemporary decisions about the environment and the management of resources, and how Treaty interests should be integrated into this process.48

In response, the Tribunal has identified that the Treaty provided for the right to make national laws, including conservation and resource management laws. The Tribunal has previously determined that the Crown has a responsibility to ensure that proper arrangements for the conservation, control, and management of resources are in place.49 This is a legitimate exercise of the Crown’s governance role, albeit that such legislation or regulations may constrain how people manage and use their property in certain circumstances.50

This expression of article 1 is justified, because the Crown is the only centralised body with the overview and capability necessary to assess the national status of New Zealand’s environment and natural resources and provide for all communities of interests, whilst ensuring that its actions or those of its delegates are consistent with its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. That is why the Foreshore and Seabed Tribunal found that the Crown had the authority to develop policy in respect of the coastal environment. That Tribunal pointed out that the Treaty principles of reciprocity and partnership envisaged a future for all peoples, sharing resources and developing them. Therefore, in the balancing of interests required for a successful partnership, there was a place for all interests in the coastal environment.51

We think that this assessment by the Foreshore and Seabed Tribunal is an accurate reflection of article 1 of the Treaty of Waitangi as regards the environment and natural resources generally. Logically it follows that a careful balancing of such interests is required, so long as the Crown does so in a manner consistent with its Treaty obligations. Whether its actions have been consistent with the Treaty or not will turn on the facts of each case. The Tribunal has never defined all the circumstances when the Crown should engage in such a balancing exercise, because it will vary in accordance with what is reasonable in particular circumstances. The ‘test’ is reasonableness, not perfection. No more can legally be required than what was reasonable at the time.52 There is nothing novel in a judicial body such as this Tribunal taking a case-by-case view of the matter.53

However, we can assist the Crown by referring to what other Tribunals and the courts have identified as circumstances where it would be legitimate for the Crown to undertake such a balancing exercise. In such circumstances, consultation with Maori should take place.54 The Crown may need to balance its Treaty obligations to Maori against the needs of other sectors of the community:
in exceptional circumstances such as war or impending chaos\textsuperscript{55} (and, we would add, public welfare and safety);
\item for peace and good order;\textsuperscript{56}
\item in matters involving the national interest;\textsuperscript{57}
\item in situations where the environment or certain natural resources are so endangered or depleted that they should be conserved or protected;\textsuperscript{58} and
\item where Maori interests in natural resources have been fully ascertained by the Crown and freely alienated, and/or are not subject to contest between Maori.\textsuperscript{59}

Where any of these circumstances prevail, the Crown may engage in balancing competing interests. But it ought not to undertake the balancing exercise without restraint. The Muriwhenua Fishing Tribunal’s comments on the limitations on kawanatanga remain apposite:

The cession of sovereignty or kawanatanga gives power to the Crown to legislate for all matters relating to ‘peace and good order’; and that includes the right to make laws for conservation control. Resource protection is in the interests of all persons. Those laws may need to apply to all persons alike . . .

The right [to govern] so given however is not an authority to disregard or diminish the principles in article the second, or the authority of the tribes to exercise a control. Sovereignty is limited by the rights reserved in article the second . . .\textsuperscript{60}

However, where none of the circumstances we identify above prevail, the Muriwhenua Fishing Tribunal was certain that the Crown has no right to determine for the tribes the wisest or best use of their fisheries resources for so long as the tribes regulate and enforce their own standards.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, the concept of restrained governance is not a novel concept. The Crown is so constrained by many factors in other fields, such as trade law. In the field of human rights law, to take another example, the Crown’s actions are constrained by its domestic and international obligations.\textsuperscript{62}

**Reconciling kawanatanga and rangatiratanga:** The impacts of the previous findings listed above are twofold:

1. As regards Maori rangatiratanga over the properties or taonga that they possess, the Crown’s right to provide a regulatory regime for managing natural resources cannot override Maori property interests. The national interest in conservation and resource management, including allocation of rights of access, is not a reason for negating Maori rights of property. In a similar vein, the national interest in conservation and resource management cannot be used to override the property rights of other (non-Maori) citizens. Conservation and resource management may have ‘the effect of constraining private ownership’ but cannot be used to deny its existence.\textsuperscript{63} In the *Whanganui River Report*, the Tribunal stated:

the Crown assumed the governance of New Zealand on the basis of a promise that Maori authority or rangatiratanga over their possessions would be guaranteed. It thus subscribed to a tenet of English law as old as the Magna Carta that private property interests are respected, and to a principle of colonial common law that dates at least from the 1600s that, upon British annexation of other lands, the same applies to the properties of the indigenous people.

The principles are the same in the Treaty of Waitangi, but as it was expressed, Maori were guaranteed the ‘rangatiratanga’ over that which they possessed. . . . Applied to this claim, it means that the Whanganui River should be managed by the iwi . . .

Maori rangatiratanga is not therefore to be qualified by a balancing of interests. It is not conditional, but was expressed to be protected, absolutely. It is rather that governance is qualified by the promise to protect and guarantee rangatiratanga for as long as Maori wish to retain it.\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, Maori rangatiratanga over their property rights or interests was to be respected and provided for in governance.

2. As regards imposing constraints on Maori rangatiratanga or autonomy, including the exercise of authority
over the use, allocation, development, and management of their property and taonga, resource management laws may constrain Maori ownership or Treaty interests but only for the purposes of conservation.\textsuperscript{65} Otherwise, Maori have a Treaty right to manage and to receive the benefits from their property or taonga – taonga being a broader category of interests than legal property.\textsuperscript{66} If this were not so, there would be an assumption that total control over the environment and natural resources was ceded to the Crown upon the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. The corollary of that would be that rangatiratanga from the signing of the treaty excluded any concept of authority, control, responsibility, or stewardship in respect of natural resources which are taonga. Instead, Maori would have a reduced Treaty right to be consulted and considered, the solution now found in the Resource Management Act.\textsuperscript{67} We agree with the Whanganui River Tribunal that such an interpretation must be rejected. We agree with Mr Pou and Ms Sykes, counsel for a number of claimants, that in continuing to argue this approach to what it must do to balance competing interests, the Crown’s position is tantamount to seeking a finding that the Treaty deprived Maori of their authority over their natural resources. Given the language of the Treaty, that cannot be so.\textsuperscript{68}

So, while we cannot be definitive about the circumstances in which the balancing of interests may be appropriate, we can refer to the jurisprudence that demonstrates what approach the Crown should take before it embarks (or causes its delegates to embark) on any balancing exercise, and what it should do during and after such a process. We list these matters, and the authorities for their existence, for the assistance of the Crown:

- Although the guarantees of the Treaty may be overridden in exceptional circumstances in the national interest, the national interest in conservation is not a reason for negating Maori rights of property. Resource management may have the effect of constraining private ownership but cannot be used to deny its existence.\textsuperscript{69}
- Where the Crown is uncertain as to the nature and extent of any Treaty interest, including any property interest, the Crown has a duty to ascertain the nature and extent of that interest before attempting to balance the interests of competing communities or users.\textsuperscript{70}
- Maori ownership of, and rangatiratanga over, their taonga should not be negated by the requirement of balancing unless it is in exceptional circumstances in the national interest.\textsuperscript{71}
- The Crown may develop policies granting access to other users under certain circumstances, but the unilateral transfer or expropriation of ownership and control is contrary to the Treaty.\textsuperscript{72}
- In matters of national importance, any expropriation of ownership or control by the Crown should be done only after the Crown has assessed whether there are options available to it other than the expropriation of Maori property or control.\textsuperscript{73} Alternatively, if there is no other option, the Crown must ensure that there is as little infringement as possible with its partner’s Treaty rights.
- In matters of national importance, any expropriation of ownership or control by the Crown should only be pursued following full consultation with Maori, following a good faith attempt to obtain their consent, and following the payment of proper compensation. Such expropriation or control should also follow the development of a scheme for sharing any profits the Crown derives from the use or allocation of natural resources, so that Maori receive a substantial benefit from the use or allocation of their resources.
- The Crown is obliged to provide for some system to enable Maori to exercise tino rangatiratanga over their resources or taonga in accordance with their own cultural and management preferences and in accordance with their own ways of life, albeit adapted in accordance with the right to develop.
**Rangatiratanga: the right to autonomy:** What, then, was the nature of the guarantee of rangatiratanga? The Tribunal has previously found that Maori were entitled to believe that they retained their tino rangatiratanga, described in the *Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim* as:

the exclusive control of tribal taonga for the benefit of the tribe including those living and those yet to be born. There are three main elements embodied in the guarantee of rangatiratanga. The first is that authority or control is crucial because without it the tribal base is threatened socially, culturally, economically and spiritually. The second is that the exercise of authority must recognise the spiritual source of the taonga (and indeed of the authority itself) and the reason for stewardship as being the maintenance of the tribal base for succeeding generations. Thirdly, the exercise of authority was not only over property but over persons within the kinship group and their access to tribal resources.74

The Tribunal has noted in other reports that in the Maori world-view rangatiratanga is inseparable from mana. In the *Report on the Motunui–Waitara Claim*, it was stressed that rangatiratanga denotes mana, not only to possess what one owns, but also to manage and control it in accordance with one’s own cultural preferences.75 In the *Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi*, the Tribunal defined ‘tino rangatiratanga’ as autonomy:

Maori autonomy is pivotal to the Treaty and to the partnership concept it entails. Its more particular recognition is article 2 of the Maori text. In our view, it is also the inherent right of peoples in their native territories. Further, it is the fundamental issue in the Taranaki claims and appears to be the issue most central to the affairs of colonised indigenes throughout the world.

The international term of ‘aboriginal autonomy’ or ‘aboriginal self-government’ describes the right of indigenes to constitutional status as first peoples, and their rights to manage their own policy, resources, and affairs, within minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the State. Equivalent Maori words are ‘tino rangatiratanga’, as used in the Treaty, and ‘mana motuhake’, as used since the 1860s.76

We have fully discussed the concept of rangatiratanga, or autonomy and self-government, and what these terms mean for Maori at the local, regional, and national levels, in part 11 of this report. These terms mean more than stewardship or kaitiakitanga. They imply the need for greater forms of State recognition beyond mere references to Maori customary values or concepts. Maori stewardship, for example, ‘describes an ethic of ownership but not ownership itself, while rangatiratanga includes both.’77 Rangatiratanga also includes the right to exercise authority over Maori taonga. Where Maori have suffered land or natural resource loss through the denigration or marginalisation of Maori autonomy or self-government, there will inevitably be a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi unless there were mitigating circumstances of the type mentioned above.78

Essentially, in terms of the environment and natural resources, the Maori right to autonomy and self-government means that they have the right to govern and manage their own policy, resources, and affairs with minimum Crown interference but in accordance with their duty under the Treaty to act reasonably and with the utmost good faith.

**The principle of active protection of lands, estates, and taonga**

The obligation of the Crown actively to protect taonga has consistently been recognised by the Tribunal and the courts. In the *Mohaka ki Ahuriri Report*, the Tribunal stated that the Crown has a duty actively to protect the lands, forests, fisheries, and other taonga.79 In the Privy Council, the nature and extent of this principle was described as follows:

Foremost among those ‘principles’ are the obligations which the Crown undertook of protecting and preserving Maori
property, including the Maori language as part of taonga, in return for being recognised as the legitimate government of the whole nation by Maori. The Treaty refers to this obligation in the English text as amounting to a guarantee by the Crown. This emphasises the solemn nature of the Crown’s obligation. It does not however mean that the obligation is absolute and unqualified. This would be inconsistent with the Crown’s other responsibilities as the government of New Zealand and the relationship between Maori and the Crown. This relationship the Treaty envisages should be founded on reasonableness, mutual cooperation and trust. It is therefore accepted by both parties that the Crown in carrying out its obligations is not required in protecting taonga to go beyond taking such action as is reasonable in the prevailing circumstances. While the obligation of the Crown is constant, the protective steps which it is reasonable for the Crown to take change depending on the situation which exists at any particular time.

However, the Privy Council also pointed out that the Crown’s obligation actively to protect a taonga may increase if that resource is in a vulnerable state:

Again, if as in the case with the Maori language at the present time, a taonga is in a vulnerable state, this has to be taken into account by the Crown in deciding the action it should take to fulfil its obligations and may well require the Crown to take especially vigorous action for its protection. This may arise for example, if the vulnerable state can be attributed to past breaches by the Crown of its obligations, and may extend to the situation where those breaches are due to legislated action.

As the Muriwhenua Fishing Tribunal noted, the application of this principle at any particular point must depend upon the conditions then applying, the extent to which Maori have subsequently chosen to benefit in Western terms, and the degree to which the tribal base remains preferred.

Fiduciary duties: This principle of active protection is said to create duties akin to fiduciary duties. We reject at this time the Crown’s argument that this duty is in some way less than the fiduciary duty known to the common law or equity. That is a matter still to be determined by the courts in New Zealand. In the Lands case, it was accepted that features of the partnership relationship created by the Treaty were ‘responsibilities analogous to fiduciary duties’. In the Broadcasting Assets case in the Court of Appeal, Justice McKay for a majority of the judges understood by this:

that the relationship between the Treaty parties creates responsibilities analogous to fiduciary duties. The duty of the Crown is not merely passive, but extends to active protection of Maori people in the use of their lands and waters (and in this case one would add their treasures) ‘to the fullest extent practicable’.

Lord Cooke clarified in 1993 that this meant that the Treaty ‘created an enduring relationship of a fiduciary nature akin to a partnership, each party accepting a positive duty to act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and honourably towards each other’. A full summary of the jurisprudence was provided by Justice Thomas, when he observed:

In the Treaty of Waitangi the Crown undertook the obligation to protect the Maori language in return for being recognised as the legitimate government of the whole nation by Maori. (See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513, per Lord Woolf at 517).

The Courts have further defined the obligation undertaken by the Crown. In 1987 it was held unanimously by a Full Court of this Court that the Treaty created an enduring relationship of a fiduciary nature akin to a partnership, each party accepting a positive duty to act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and honourably towards the other. See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, at 664, 673, 681–682, 693, and 701. This fiduciary obligation has been reaffirmed by this Court in a number of subsequent decisions. See Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301, at 304, Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-general of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553, at 561. No exhaustive definition of the content of the obligation has been attempted, but
it has been affirmed that the duty on the Crown is not merely passive but requires the Crown to take active and positive steps for the protection of the Maori language. It is required to take affirmative action to redress past breaches. See *New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General*, supra, at 664, 674, 693, 702, and 716–718; *Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation*, supra, at 560 and 561. In *New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General*, supra, at 517, the Judicial Committee expressed the view that, if the Maori language is in a vulnerable state, this has to be taken into account by the Crown in deciding the action it should take to fulfil its obligation. It may well require the Crown to take especially vigorous action for its protection.\(^87\)

Nothing has yet been determined by the superior courts in New Zealand to suggest that the duties analogous to fiduciary duties are inferior to the fiduciary duties known to the common law.\(^88\) What is clear is that there are Treaty duties analogous to fiduciary duties imposed on the Crown actively to protect Maori interests. It is also clear that these are not absolute duties. The Crown can take or regulate resources or taonga in breach of the terms of article 2 of the Treaty in certain circumstances, as outlined above.\(^89\) If it does so, it must act fairly and reasonably, and only after proper consultation and payment of compensation.\(^90\)

**The extent of the Crown’s duty to protect:** The Crown can make laws regulating natural resources, so long as it does so by ensuring that Maori Treaty interests are protected. Where a resource or taonga has been rendered vulnerable due to previous omissions of the Crown to protect it, then the Crown has a duty to restore the taonga. This may well require that the Crown take especially vigorous action for its protection. That is why the Privy Council noted that because the Maori language was in such a vulnerable state the Crown had a duty to provide for it in broadcasting.\(^91\) But the Crown, in carrying out its responsibilities actively to protect taonga, is not required to go beyond what is reasonable in the prevailing circumstances.\(^92\)

In some circumstances, active protection may require exclusive access for Maori. In others it may require imposing environmental controls on other users, as in the case of non-renewable resources (geothermal resources, for example) threatened by over-exploitation.

In situations where environmental controls are necessary because of the vulnerability, scarcity, or finite nature of the resources, and that vulnerability or scarcity arises from previous Treaty breaches, there may need to be an exemption for Maori from such controls.\(^93\) Alternatively, there may need to be some priority given to Maori when allocating use.\(^94\) In other cases, Maori may need special assistance or compensation to mitigate the impacts of Crown breaches.\(^95\)

Where Maori proprietary interests and their right to exercise rangatiratanga over natural resources have never been adequately acknowledged or protected by the Crown, as in the case of geothermal resources, this must constitute a prima facie breach of the Treaty principle of active protection guaranteed in article 2. So must any failure on the part of the Crown, under its power of kawanatanga, to provide a form of title that recognised customary and Treaty rights of Maori to their taonga.\(^96\)

Furthermore, where taonga were acquired by the Crown without full tribal consent, or where the sole right to regulate or allocate natural resources was vested in the Crown by dint of the common law or statute, then any failure to protect Maori rights (sometimes inchoate) taken in accordance with English law and determined under those laws, rather than the Treaty, is also a prima facie breach.\(^97\) This is because it is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty that ownership of Maori taonga could be taken away from those entitled, sometimes without being heard and by the tacit application of presumptions of English law of which Maori knew nothing.\(^98\) Likewise, for the Crown to rely on principles of the English common law to deprive Maori of their taonga, for example the presumption in common law that a lagoon or estuary is an arm of the sea, would be a breach of the Treaty principle to actively protect the property of Maori.\(^99\) The reliance on the presumption of *ad medium filum aquae* (the riparian owner owns a river...
to the centre line) was one of the reasons why the Crown acted in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty in relation to the Mohaka River.100

We see little difference in our approach from that adopted by the Manukau, Mohaka, Te Whanganui-a-Orotu, Whanganui, or Te Ika Whenua Rivers Tribunals. Our approach is also consistent with dicta from Lord Cooke, who, as President of the Court of Appeal, commented that the vesting of the beds of navigable rivers in the Crown provided for by the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act 1903 and succeeding legislation may not have been sufficiently explicit to override or dispose of the Maori concept of a river being a whole and indivisible entity. Lord Cooke added that, in relation to smaller rivers, perhaps the common law presumption of *ad medium filum aquae* might well be unreliable in determining what Maori have agreed to part with on the alienation of land.101

As the Mohaka Tribunal noted, the Treaty allowed for a new way of doing things, and it incorporated the promise that Maori rights would not just be respected but would be actively protected. The Crown could not acquire land or other resources from Maori by sleight of hand, particularly resources of significance.102

In our view also, the Crown should not expect Maori to subsidise its duty of active protection. In other words, in cases of clear Treaty breach, Central North Island Maori should not be expected by the Crown or its delegates to contribute to ameliorating the impacts of previous environmental mismanagement or failure to protect natural resources, where those resources are of importance to Maori and where such a contribution would further erode their remaining finite resources, unless Maori expressly agree. A classic example is the contribution of Maori land for lakeside or riverside reserves for the purpose of ameliorating the impacts of land utilisation options permitted under planning and natural resource management laws. In circumstances where there has been Treaty breach, the Crown's contention that the most likely sustainable, long-term solutions should involve all members of the community, including Maori, may need to be examined. The Crown should assess how best to address the issues by consulting Maori and without further impacting on Maori Treaty rights and interests if at all possible.

We conclude from our review that the principle of active protection, with its attendant duties, requires us in certain cases to measure the extent to which the Crown has discharged its duty actively to protect the taonga of the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island region. In the chapters that follow, we broadly consider a number of issues in relation to this principle. They are:

- Where the Crown has acquired natural resources that are taonga, we consider whether it did so after consultation and whether it obtained the consent of Central North Island Maori.
- Where the Crown appropriated Maori taonga to serve the national interest – or for some other justifiable reason – we consider whether it acted as a matter of last resort and whether it acted fairly, reasonably, and after consultation and payment of compensation.103
- Where the Crown appropriated taonga in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty, we consider whether there is any remaining Treaty interest, its nature and extent, and what the Crown's duty of active protection means in this context.104
- Where a taonga has been desecrated or is in a vulnerable state due to Crown policies, practice, acts, or omissions inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, we consider what actions it would be reasonable for the Crown to take to mitigate the problem. That is because when taonga are abused through over-exploitation or pollution, the claimants have argued that their values are offended. The Tribunal has previously found that in such circumstances an affront is felt by present-day kaitiaki (guardians) not just for themselves but for their tupuna in the past.105
- Finally, we consider whether it is fair, in Treaty terms, for Maori to be expected to contribute to ameliorating the impacts of previous mismanagement or failure to protect natural resources.
The principle of active protection of rangatiratanga in environmental management

The Tribunal has reported on a number of issues concerning the environment and natural and physical resources. It has considered Maori claims to rangatiratanga over ecosystems, people and communities, and natural and physical resources that are taonga. The Tribunal has found many of these claims to have been well founded.

This jurisprudence suggests that there is an underlying principle in the Treaty that the Crown has a duty actively to protect the exercise of tino rangatiratanga in environmental and resource management. Iwi and hapu were guaranteed the right to retain an effective degree of autonomy, authority, and control over their environment, including their natural and physical resources, for as long as they wished to do so. In accordance with the solemn exchange for the right to govern, the Crown was and is obliged to provide some system for the expression of rangatiratanga over their taonga and Maori title to their natural resources. In relation to land, the Waitangi Tribunal has previously stated:

In the English text, the Treaty articles guaranteed to Maori the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands for so long as they wished to retain them. The Maori text was clearer in guaranteeing to Maori the full authority of their lands. This clarified that Maori would not only possess their own land but decide and determine the laws affecting them; for example the forms of tenure and management.

We consider that this applies to all natural resources. Furthermore, the right to exercise rangatiratanga cannot be limited to resources owned by Maori, but extends to matters both tangible and intangible that they value. Thus, any system should enable Maori to make provision for intangibles while managing their resources. This would include matters such as their own customs, values, and relationships with natural resources as well as their laws, language, and knowledge of their resources.

The Crown does not accept that it can or should ‘provide for’ the cultural and spiritual relationships of Central North Island hapu and iwi with their taonga and their natural environment. It sees these relationships as personal to the iwi and not deriving from the Crown. Of course they are, but any resource management system that is developed should provide Maori with the opportunity to utilise their resources in accordance with their own cultural preferences. Otherwise, the Crown is circumscribing how they should relate to such resources. That is why we cannot accept the Crown’s view that all it needs to do, in pursuing or implementing policies that impinge upon Maori relationships with their taonga, is to be sufficiently informed so as to take these matters into account and to thereby avoid or minimise prejudice to those relationships.

What the Treaty calls for is that the Crown actively protect the exercise of rangatiratanga (including customary law and values) in environmental and resource management, not reduce the duty of active protection merely to taking these relationships and values into account. There may well be views validly held by other sections of the community on how the Crown should incorporate Maori cultural and spiritual values in legislation such as the Resource Management Act 1991, and on whether such provisions are acceptable. But these are not views the Crown should base its policies upon. Rather, it should focus on what system is needed to actively protect Maori rangatiratanga in resource management covering all matters of tangible and intangible value to Maori. Whether this is a system that gives full recognition to Maori Treaty rights over their resources, or one that integrates the exercise of tino rangatiratanga, depends on the Crown and the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island while in negotiations. Whichever system is adopted, it is clear that Maori values, customs, and law should be provided for, as they are capable of adapting to meet the new circumstances of a combined society.

Impact of land alienation on rangatiratanga: We note the submissions of the Crown that the key factor affecting Maori relationships with their natural resources or taonga was the alienation of abutting land, which ‘incrementally
and cumulatively’ caused major dislocation to the claimants’ relationships with their taonga. We agree that land alienation has restricted rights of access to waterways such as certain lakes, rivers, and geothermal resources. But as we have found in previous chapters of this report, Maori customary rights and interests in land were individualised under the native land legislation. The effects of that system, coupled with the application of presumptions of law and Crown legislation, made it possible for individuals to alienate tribal rights to many resources. Rights were transferred, sometimes piece by piece, individual share by individual share, without any further reference to the hapu or iwi and sometimes without their knowledge. This could lead to a situation where the community was deprived of its tribal base. Tribal society and leadership, the very things embodied in the Treaty guarantee of rangatiratanga, were as a result severely undermined.

Land alienation by Maori is not, with respect, the issue. How the Crown should provide for a system of resource management that allows Maori to exercise their rangatiratanga over their taonga (whether owned or not) is really the crux of the matter. The emphasis here is on empowerment of rangatiratanga, not disempowerment. Such a system will have its constraints. For just like kawanatanga, tino rangatiratanga is not absolute and carries with it obligations. There are customary constraints, such as the obligations tribes have internally to manage rights between hapu, and there are external rights that must be managed with neighbouring tribes. Then there are the obligations of kaitiakitanga or stewardship to maintain and protect resources so as to preserve a tribal base for succeeding generations.111 As we discussed in chapter 2, this is an onerous obligation, for nothing about tino rangatiratanga, nor anything in Maori customary law, confers on Maori the right to destroy natural resources.112 Then there are the obligations that Maori have as partners to the Treaty with the Crown. Maori have a duty of loyalty to the Queen, must fully accept her Government through her responsible Ministers, and must provide reasonable cooperation.113 They also have a duty to act in their dealings with the Crown with the utmost good faith, fairly, and reasonably.114 This all means that Maori must work with the Crown and they must consult and assist one another to devise arrangements for tribal control. It flows from this that they should aid one another in enforcing such a system and that they should furnish each other with information when called upon to do so.115

Even if any previous or current system required the devolution of environmental or natural resource management responsibilities to statutory bodies such as regional and local councils, the Crown cannot divest itself of its Treaty obligation actively to protect the tino rangatiratanga of the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island.116 That is because it is the Crown’s responsibility to provide for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental and resource management. It is also its duty to ensure the active protection of Maori taonga. It is the Crown that is responsible for developing the appropriate legislative regime capable of meeting its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. It is the Crown’s responsibilities that the Tribunal is focused on. Although the local government and resource management regime is now different, the words of the Mangonui Sewerage Tribunal remain apposite:

All that Councils do, they must do according to the law, and it is the Crown, through Parliament, that provides that law. Indeed, Maori bargained for ‘the necessary laws and institutions’ in the Treaty of Waitangi, but the question for us is whether the laws and institutions provided for, and the national criteria laid down for local administration, are necessary and proper having regard to the Treaty’s terms.

If they are not then it ought to be borne in mind, that Parliament retains the ultimate right to govern and can change the law. If Maori have suffered a loss in the interim, or could be prejudicially affected by some current scheme approved under the laws that conflict with the principles of the Treaty, Parliament has the authority to remedy the loss or amend the scheme.117
In chapters that follow, we look at the examples given to us in evidence regarding the manner in which the local government and resource management regimes have affected the Treaty rights of the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island. We have weighed the evidence to consider whether, in the context of our inquiry region, the local government legislation and the Resource Management Act 1991 are consistent with the Treaty. We have done so because other Tribunals have stated that the 1991 Act does not accord a priority to the protection of Maori resources and taonga; nor does it confirm Treaty rights in the exercise of rangatiratanga in resource management.\textsuperscript{118} Indeed, based on those reasons, they have found that the RMA was in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.\textsuperscript{119}

\textit{The principles of options and equity}

As we outlined above, the Treaty envisaged the protection of tribal autonomy, culture, and customs in exchange for the Crown's right to govern. This was the essential compact, the bargain or exchange. But the Treaty also conferred on individual Maori the same rights and privileges as British subjects. In the \textit{Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim}, the Tribunal noted the following in relation to the two texts of the Treaty:

\begin{quote}
Neither text prevents individual Maori from pursuing a direction of personal choice. The Treaty provided an effective option to Maori to develop along customary lines and from a traditional base, or to assimilate into a new way. Inferentially it offered a third alternative, to walk in two worlds. That same option is open to all people, is currently much in vogue and may represent the ultimate in partnership. But these are options, that is to say, it was not intended that the partner's choices could be forced.
\end{quote}

The historical record suggests Maori have consistently sought to uphold tribal ways against policies directed to amalgamation (see Ward:1974) but there is no certainty that that preference would be maintained if the forces of amalgamation were removed.

But the tribal right is also upheld. The individual, as a British subject, has the same rights (and duties) as anyone else in pursuing individual employment or gain. This may reduce the tribal need but does not necessarily displace it.\textsuperscript{120}

Thus, in some cases the Crown's Treaty obligations will be about protecting the customary rangatiratanga or autonomy and self-government of iwi and hapu over their property and taonga, consistent with the article 2 guarantee; and in other cases it will be about protecting Central North Island Maori in their individual property rights, basic human rights, and fundamental freedoms.\textsuperscript{121} The Treaty envisaged that Maori should be free to pursue either – or indeed both – options in appropriate circumstances.\textsuperscript{122}

The principles of equity and equal treatment also arise from article 3 of the Treaty. The principle of equity places an obligation on the Crown to act fairly towards Central North Island Maori by treating them equally, fairly, and impartially vis-à-vis non-Maori.\textsuperscript{123} In the \textit{Foreshore and Seabed Report}, the Tribunal noted that these principles included the right of Maori to equal protection under the law.\textsuperscript{124} Therefore the Crown cannot adopt policies that result in the effective expropriation of Maori property (under either common law or statute law) whilst others' property of a similar type is not affected. Maori also have the right to exercise the option of having their property rights defined by the courts. Taking away the right to go to court to have legal rights declared is a serious matter, and is a breach of the principles of equity and options.\textsuperscript{125}

In the context of the Central North Island, these principles are relevant to the introduction by the Crown of legislation vesting natural and physical resources in itself and/or vesting in itself the right to regulate access to those taonga.

It is also not consistent with the principle of equal treatment for the Crown to favour one Maori community over another. In the context of natural resources it would not be fair, for example, to vest property rights to a natural resource in one tribe without recognising the same or similar interest of another tribe in the same or similar resource.\textsuperscript{126} It would
not be fair or impartial to provide for the rangatiratanga of one hapu or iwi in resource management without providing the opportunity for another to participate on the same level, all other circumstances being equal.

**Prejudice and the principle of redress**

By section 6(1) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, we are required to determine whether the claimants have been prejudicially affected by any legislation or regulation, policy or practice, action or omission of the Crown inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. Therefore, it is important to establish that prejudice has resulted requiring redress. To be prejudicially affected the claimants must demonstrate that they have been restricted in the exercise or enjoyment of their rights under the Treaty. Among other grounds, it has been held that it is prejudicial to Maori if there is no recognition, protection, or priority accorded to Maori Treaty interests in legislation, policy, or actions of the Crown, over and above the general public interest, in resources including rivers, lagoons, shellfish beds, petroleum, geothermal resources, and the coastal marine area. It is also prejudicial for the Crown to appropriate, deny, or fail to ascertain or acknowledge Maori Treaty rights, including claims to proprietary interests in natural resources or taonga. In some circumstances it has been held to be equally prejudicial for the Crown to balance Maori interests against the interests of other citizens.

In all these instances, it is irrelevant whether or not the Crown considered that it was engaged in a process of actively denying rights. If the effect has been that it did prejudice Maori by matters listed in section 6 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, that is prejudice enough. The only question then is whether what was done was reasonable in the circumstances.

Once prejudice is established, it is necessary to consider the Crown’s duty to provide redress. A recent explanation of this principle is found in the *Foreshore and Seabed Report*. There, the Tribunal stated:

Where the Crown has acted in breach of the principles of the Treaty, and Maori have suffered prejudice as a result, we consider that the Crown has a clear duty to set matters right. This is the principle of redress, where the Crown is required to act so as to ‘restore the honour and integrity of the Crown and the mana and status of Maori’. Generally, the principle of redress has been considered in connection with historical claims. It is not an ‘eye for an eye’ approach, but one in which the Crown needs to restore a tribal base and tribal mana, and provide sufficient remedy to resolve the grievance. It will involve compromise on both sides, and, as the Tarawera Forest Tribunal noted, it should not create fresh injustices for others.

It follows that redress should be based upon a restorative approach, with its purpose being, in article 2 claims, to restore iwi or hapu rangatiratanga over their property or taonga where the parties agree. In some circumstances, restoration of tribal mana may require some other remedy. In others, the passing of legislation to recognise rangatiratanga, the return of land, and some other form of redress may be sufficient to achieve this result. Where there has been significant environmental damage, these measures may not be adequate. Sometimes there will be a need for a programme of restoration work. This may require the joint efforts of a number of agencies working with Maori if that is what the parties agree to. If that is an option, new regimes may need to be developed for the joint management of significant tribal or hapu taonga. There are a number of different ways the Crown and Maori could address restoration of taonga where the evidence warrants a joint approach. But that will depend on the facts of each case and is a matter best left for negotiation.

**Environmental justice**: Our approach to environmental impacts is consistent with Tom Bennion’s generic submissions for the claimants. Mr Bennion referred us to literature on environmental justice, which is essentially about the fair
or even distribution of environmental quality among people. In our view, this redress approach would require that the Crown or its delegates adequately assess and monitor the environmental effects of Crown legislation, regulation, utilisation or action, and policy or practice on the natural resources and other taonga of the claimants protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. The Crown stated that because of significant technological advances in the twentieth century, in relation to the identification, monitoring, and treatment of pollution, at least in relation to waterways, it is in a better position to recognise the scale of the problems. In doing so, we consider that the Crown should ensure that Central North Island Maori are not experiencing a disproportionate share of any negative environmental impacts resulting from previous or current Crown breaches of the Treaty. If they are, then the Crown or its delegates should give some priority to providing the remedies necessary to ameliorate those impacts. In such circumstances, Central North Island Maori should be able to enjoy environmental and natural resource protection for their taonga or waterways, because the Crown has a duty actively to protect them. It also has a duty to provide redress where Maori have been prejudicially affected. The Crown has argued that the pollution and degradation of waterways or taonga raised as examples by the claimants are currently being addressed in significant ways. We discuss, in chapter 19, whether the evidence we heard demonstrates otherwise. Here, we note that the standard of environmental justice is an important one and one we measure Crown actions against.

Finally, we note that there is evidence of the scarcity or finite nature of some resources in our inquiry region. In some circumstances this has occurred as a result of historical Treaty breaches. There is also evidence, as we discuss in chapter 19, that Maori are coping with environmental inequality and unfair treatment. In these circumstances, environmental justice theories support the Treaty principle that the Crown must restore, exempt, or provide special assistance to ameliorate the impacts of any controls the Crown or its delegates might need to impose. We have already discussed this above under the duty of active protection.

We turn now to consider whether waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources are taonga over which Maori exercised rangatiratanga.

The Exercise of Rangatiratanga over Taonga

**Key question: Are waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources taonga over which Maori exercised rangatiratanga?**

The claimants’ case

The claimants contend that the Treaty guarantees and protections cover these natural resources, with the English text referring to land, forests, fisheries, and other properties, and the Maori version referring to land, kainga (habitations or settlements), and taonga (being all things highly prized). The claimants contend that the term ‘taonga’ is a very broad one. It has been held to include physical resources. It also includes cultural matters such as language, and intangible values such as spiritual and cultural values. It has been held to include koiwi (human remains) and treasures buried with koiwi, such as waka and whare.

In relation to waterways, the claimants told us that these resources remain their taonga, that they have never freely consented to their alienation either by land sales or otherwise, and that they continue to have the right to exercise rangatiratanga over them. Legislation vesting the rights of ownership or regulation in the Crown or its delegates, or indeed in any persons other than Maori, without Maori consent, is inconsistent with the article 2 guarantee of rangatiratanga in environmental management, and thereby inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. As far as their customary fisheries are concerned, the claimants remain concerned with alleged historical Treaty
breaches concerning the introduction of trout, the impact of trout on native species including kokopu, and alleged failures to protect habitat for indigenous species.\textsuperscript{141}

In relation to geothermal resources, the claimants contend that these resources are taonga.\textsuperscript{142} The nature and extent of their Treaty interests in these resources cannot be underestimated. They claim ownership in Treaty terms of the surface and subsurface manifestations on or in their land. Despite the alienation of lands containing geothermal resources, they also claim the geothermal waters or fluids, energy, and heat of the fields or systems that make up almost the entire Taupo Volcanic Zone, from Maketu to Tongariro.\textsuperscript{143} They contend that there is no evidence of Maori willingly alienating these resources.\textsuperscript{144} They argued that the sale of land did not result in Maori giving up their traditional ownership and rangatiratanga rights, or any aboriginal title rights, over their geothermal resources.\textsuperscript{145} Alternatively, they argued that at the least they have maintained a Treaty interest, in the same way that Maori retain an interest in petroleum.\textsuperscript{146}

**The Crown’s case**

The Crown accepts that many natural resources are taonga and have been of significance or traditionally important for the claimants.\textsuperscript{147} The Crown does not accept that the guarantee of rangatiratanga under the Treaty was absolute. It reserves the right under article 1 to appropriate Maori taonga for matters of national importance and (or) allocate or regulate resources such as geothermal resources, on the basis that it must balance competing interests in the management and utilisation of such resources.\textsuperscript{148} It acknowledges that:

The Maori understanding of taonga such as rivers, waterways, lakes, lagoons, harbours, bays and oceans has been covered in detail in a number of Tribunal reports that make it clear that such resources are often highly significant to Maori well-being and ways of life. The relationship exists beyond mere ownership, use, or exclusive possession; it concerns personal and tribal identity, Maori authority and control, and the right to continuous access, subject to Maori cultural preferences.\textsuperscript{149}

As we discussed above, the Crown submitted that many of the underlying issues concerning the environment and natural and physical resources relate to patterns of land alienation. It was land alienation that resulted in fundamental restrictions on Maori rights of access to waterways, fisheries, and geothermal surface manifestations.\textsuperscript{150} The Crown does not accept that Maori can claim a form of Treaty ownership of natural water within water bodies such as Lake Taupo and the Waikato River that requires the Crown to consult with them over the use of natural water for hydro power development.\textsuperscript{151} In the Crown’s view, there is no difference in that respect between inland waterways and the right to use or control access to the water or fluids of the geothermal fields and systems of the Taupo Volcanic Zone.\textsuperscript{152} Flowing on from this, the Crown does not accept that Maori have the right to develop their waterways or geothermal resources for power development.\textsuperscript{153} The Crown, while acknowledging that geothermal resources were traditionally of importance, does not go so far as to recognise that part of the Taupo Volcanic Zone from Maketu to Tongariro is a taonga of the claimants.\textsuperscript{154} In terms of geothermal resources and other natural water bodies contained within private land, Crown counsel reminded us of the constraints on our jurisdiction under section 6(4A) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, which prevents the Tribunal making any recommendations concerning the return of any private land or for the Crown to purchase any private land.\textsuperscript{155} This means that if we were to find the claims to be well founded, we would need to be careful how we frame any recommendations, so as not to impact on private landowners and the rights that run with their land.
The Tribunal’s analysis and findings on taonga and rangatiratanga

The Treaty protected the land, estates, forests, and fisheries of the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island. It also protected their taonga or matters they highly prized. Many natural resources not explicitly identified in the English text of the Treaty are captured by the term ‘taonga katoa’ in the Maori text. The exact definition of ‘taonga’ includes more than what is listed in the English text. In other Tribunal reports the term has been defined as something of inestimable value, ‘whose worth is beyond the ken of man to calculate’. In the Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report, that Tribunal described ‘taonga’ as ‘properties of special significance’. The Ngawha Tribunal described ‘taonga’ as valued possessions or anything highly prized, often invested with the aura of spirituality and considered objects of guardianship, management, and control under the mana or rangatiratanga of the claimant group, hapu, or iwi. In the Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim, the Tribunal described the extent of the term as follows:

All resources were ‘taonga’, or something of value, derived from gods. In a very special way Maori were aware that their possession was on behalf of someone else in the future. Their myths and legends support a holistic view not only of creation but of time and of peoples.

Whether a resource falls into the definition of taonga protected by the Treaty turns on the evidence of a particular case. That evidence is sourced to and depends on Maori law and tenure, cultural values, and customary use. We turn now to consider what the Tribunal and the courts have found regarding whether water, waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources could be taonga protected by the Treaty.

Specific taonga

Water: All the resources we are concerned with in this chapter involve water. We were told many things about the importance of water as a taonga, including the following statement made on behalf of Ngati Makino:

Water [wai] originates from the separation of Ranginui and Papatuanuku, and whichever form it takes on, [during] its descent from the realms of the sky father it is recognised by Maori as the everlasting regrets, longing and loss felt in the separation of the parents and their expansive and undying love for each other. So the sense in which water has its first importance is in that relationship between Rangi and Papa. The tears that fall from the sky become the nourishment of the land itself, on which all current existence depends.

Wai sustains and is sustained by Papatuanuku. As the whenua [land] is nurtured by the wai-ahuru that protects the life within the placenta so the wai acts as a shelter for the human form that is nourished by the whenua. As Nga Roimata a Ranginui descend to settle on Papatuanuku, they gather in the many rivulets of her form, flowing through her and over her, bathing and nourishing the lover that Rangi continues to yearn for.

Water was thus the link to the deities of Maori creation, for, as the Muriwhenua Fishing Tribunal found, ‘all resources were “taonga”, or something of value, derived from gods’.

Waters that are part of a water body such as a spring, lake, lagoon, or river were possessed by Maori. In Maori thought, the water could not be divided out, as the taonga would be meaningless without it. Our views on this matter are consistent with the Whanganui River Report, where the Tribunal stated:

... Atihaunui held the river as a waterway, not a public road. It was in all respects a private, tribal waterway and access was controlled. It was also a fishery, and private fisheries are protected in English law just as they are protected in the Treaty of Waitangi.

Included in that possessed was the water. The river would be meaningless without it. The river was a waterway. The whole river was a fishery. The water was the habitat of creatures to whom Maori were related, from fish to taniwha.
The emphasis on water purity for ritualistic and other reasons was described . . . The water was treasured as the gift of Ranginui just as much as the land was respected as part of Papatuanuku . . .

Adopting the holistic thinking of Maori, water was an integral part of the river that they possessed. Though its molecules pass by, the river, as a water entity, remains. The water was their water, at least until it naturally escaped to the sea, at which point its mauri changed.\textsuperscript{162}

We accept that where, on the evidence, Central North Island iwi and hapu can establish their waterways and geothermal resources to be taonga, the waters cannot be divided out and must be considered a component part of that taonga. The issue in relation to water is about the holistic nature of the resources in Maori custom and the relationships of the people with those resources. It is also about possession akin to ownership and the right to control access to the water.\textsuperscript{163}

**Estuaries and lagoons:** The Tribunal has found that Te Whanganui a Orotu was a taonga of immense importance to the hapu who lived on the banks surrounding it.\textsuperscript{164} This finding was repeated in the *Rekohu Report* in relation to Te Whanga Lagoon on the Chatham Islands.\textsuperscript{165} The Tribunal has pointed out that the Treaty promised to protect Maori and Moriori in the full, exclusive, and undisturbed enjoyment of all those possessions that they prized; estuaries, wetlands, and lagoons are no exception.\textsuperscript{166} We adopt this position in principle in relation to the wetlands, estuaries, and lagoons of the Central North Island region.

**Rivers and streams:** Judge H Carr, in the Native Appellate Court in 1944, regarding the Whanganui River, captured the essence of what Maori understandings of a river resource were when he found that:

> It must be conceded that the pre-Treaty Maori never concerned himself with that abstruse question as to whether or not a river or lake was land covered by water. In many ways the mind of the Maori works inversely to that of the European. The Courts of the latter have laid it down for him that to possess the exclusive use of a lake or river he must own the bed thereof. To the Maori the water would be the predominating factor and the exclusive use of that water would carry with it everything below; if the land was below, then that land; if a taniwha was below, then that taniwha and the Wanganui River was not an exception to the widely held belief as to fabulous reptiles inhabiting unfathomable depths and acting as tribal guardians. The water and the land underneath it are to the Maori indivisible . . .\textsuperscript{167}

More than 45 years later, the Tribunal has accepted that Ngati Pahauwera viewed the Mohaka River as a living, indivisible entity. The Tribunal has reported on a number of claims relating to river systems that flow through or around the Central North Island, including the Ika Whenua rivers, the Kaituna River, and the Whanganui River, all of which involve complex rights and interests. In the *Report on the Kaituna River Claim*, the Tribunal noted the interconnectedness of the river systems of the region to its lakes:

Lake Rotorua does not exist on its own. It is one part of a connected series of waterways that affect each other. The outflow of the lake is through the Ohau channel which leads into Lake Rotoiti, another beautiful body of water . . . . The outflow from Lake Rotoiti is the Kaituna River, a stretch of water that flows for about 50 km from Lake Rotoiti to the sea. It is famous for the trout pools in its upper reaches, the Okere Falls not far from Lake Rotoiti and for the rapids and waterfalls to be found as it makes its way to the Maketu Estuary . . . . This estuary is large and distinctive.

[The] Kaituna [River] and Maketu Estuary are one water system starting with Lake Rotorua. All parts, the lakes, the river and estuary should be protected.\textsuperscript{168}

The same can be said of the many rivers and streams that feed into the other lakes of Rotorua and into Lake
Taupo. This sense of interconnectedness was again traversed in the *Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report*. That report concerned the mana and tino rangatiratanga of the hapu of Te Ika Whenua over the Rangitaiki, Wheao, and Whirinaki Rivers. The headwaters of these rivers are in the Urewera and on the Kaingaroa plateau. The claims related to the middle reaches of the river. The Tribunal spoke of the general importance of river systems to Maori of this district. It found that given the harsh, not very fertile land and severe climate, the iwi of Te Ika Whenua totally relied on their river system for sustenance. The iwi of Te Ika Whenua were identified as Ngati Whare, Ngati Manawa, Ngati Patuheuheu, and Ngati Huina Waka.\(^{169}\)

The Tribunal acknowledged the overlapping interests of Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Tahu, Tuhoe, and Te Arawa to different reaches of these rivers. The Tribunal found that to Ika Whenua iwi, the rivers were like a life force, a taonga of inestimable value. The rivers were a part of the psyche of Te Ika Whenua, and they formed a large part of the lives of the people. Therefore, they were regarded as taonga.\(^{170}\) This finding is consistent with the Tribunal’s finding that the Mohaka River was a taonga of Ngati Pahauwera,\(^{171}\) and that the Whanganui River was a taonga of the Ati Haunui people.\(^{172}\)

In relation to the Waikato River, the Pouakani Tribunal found that it was a taonga of Tainui iwi and Ngati Tuwharetoa:

The Waikato is a taonga of the tribes of Tainui waka and Ngati Tuwharetoa. By various actions of the Crown, or worse by the Crown’s failure to acknowledge Maori concerns about wahi tapu, fisheries, taha wairua . . . mahinga kai and other rights, the mana of these tribes has been devalued.\(^{173}\)

The Pouakani Tribunal noted that the Waikato River was just as much part of the living space and traditional resources as the land. The river was also the source of fish, especially kokopu (native trout), tuna (eels), and koura (freshwater crayfish). The river was therefore a mahinga kai, a food gathering place. In local Maori terms it was, and still is, regarded as a taonga, a highly prized resource, by the hapu who occupy its banks.\(^{174}\) (For a graphic portrayal of the extensive river and stream network of the Central North Island, refer to map 2.49 near the end of chapter 2.)

**Springs:** An example of how springs are considered taonga comes from the *Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report*, where it was claimed that the springs feeding the rivers were taonga:

The water from the puna wai (water of the spring) of a whanau is considered a taonga to that whanau as it carries the Mauri (life force) of that particular whanau. Of course all the waters of the puna wai find their way into the river and thereby join with the Mauri of the river. In essence then the very spiritual being of every whanau is part of the river . . . In this sense the river is more than a taonga(;) it is the people themselves.\(^{175}\)

From the Central North Island, Ngati Rangiwewehi presented evidence of the nature of two springs as taonga in the following terms: ‘Suffice to say that Hamurana Springs and Taniwha Springs are entwined in our hearts, minds and culture as inseparable taonga of Ngati Rangiwewehi.’\(^{176}\)

We also received evidence on the importance of the spring Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa at Kawerau, which we discuss in detail in chapter 19.

In terms of size alone, springs are clearly not on a scale with taonga such as the large lakes of the Central North Island, or the large rivers such as the Waikato River and the Tarawera River. Nevertheless, the Ngati Rangiwewehi traditional evidence demonstrates that springs, which are the source for many rivers, can be taonga of significance to the identity of a hapu or iwi, equal to the significance of the Whanganui River to the lives and identity of Te Ati Haunui a Paparangi.\(^{177}\) And just as taonga such as rivers inclusive of waters may be owned in Treaty terms, as found in the *Whanganui River Report*,\(^{178}\) likewise the springs inclusive of waters which feed rivers of importance can be owned.

The only complication to that principle arises where land within which a spring is located has been alienated.
In this regard, Ngati Rangiwhewehi asked us to consider the impact of the Crown’s purchasing policies and the use of the public works legislation resulting in the alienation of land containing Hamurana Springs and Taniwha Springs. As we described earlier in this chapter in our section on treaty principles, in cases where Maori land was acquired by the Crown in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, including its duty actively to protect Maori land and natural resources, Maori may still retain an interest in the natural resources contained within it. This is the result in the Petroleum Report, where the Tribunal stated that an alternative Treaty interest arises in such cases:

whenever legal rights are lost by means that are inconsistent with Treaty principles. When it arises, there will be a right to a remedy and a corresponding obligation on the Crown to negotiate redress for the wrongful loss of the legal right. Most importantly of all, the Treaty interest creates an entitlement to a remedy for that loss additional to any other entitlement to a remedy.180

However, in each case, the particular resource involved, and the alienation process that occurred must be examined to ascertain whether the same principles apply. This is beyond the scope of our stage one inquiry, but may be a matter that the parties can work on during negotiations.

Lakes: One large inland lake dealt with by a previous Tribunal inquiry was Lake Tutira. The Mohaka ki Ahuriri Tribunal recognised this lake as a taonga along with its eel fisheries. This finding is consistent with the decisions of other Tribunals that similar water bodies such as harbours and lagoons can be taonga protected by the Treaty.181 A classic judgment on the importance of lakes to Maori people, and one consistent with our approach, was made by Judge Acheson of the Native Land Court in 1929 concerning title to Lake Omapere.182 In that case, Judge Acheson considered the customary title to the bed of a 1200-hectare lake in the Taitokerau district. After reviewing previous determinations by the Native Land Court recognising Maori title to lakes, the judge stated:

... Maori custom and usage recognised full ownership of lakes themselves.

The bed of any lake is merely a part of that lake, and no juggling with words or ideas will ever make it other than part of that lake. The Maori was and still is a direct thinker, and he would see no more reason for separating a lake from its bed...
(as to the ownership thereof) than he would see for separating the rocks and the soil that comprise a mountain. In fact, in olden days he would have regarded it as rather a grim joke had any strangers asserted that he did not possess the beds of his own lakes.

A lake is land covered by water, and it is part of the surface of the country in which it is situated, and in essentials it is as much part of that surface and as capable of being occupied as land covered by forest or land covered by a running stream. . . . it was taken for granted that the lakes were tribal property. Nor were those lakes regarded merely as sources of food supply or merely as places where fishing rights might be exercised.

To the spiritually-minded and mentally-gifted Maori of every rangatira tribe, a lake was something that stirred the hidden forces in him. It was (and, it is hoped, always will be) something much more grand and noble than a mere sheet of water covering a muddy bed. To him, it was a striking landscape feature possessed of a ‘mauri’ or ‘indwelling life principle’ which bound it closely to the fortunes and the destiny of his tribe. Gazed upon from childhood days, it grew into his affections and his whole life until he felt it to be a vital part of himself and his people. This feeling of kinship accounts for famous Maori saying[s], such as:

‘Tongariro is the Mountain
‘Taupo is the Lake
‘Tuwharetoa is the Tribe
‘And Te Heuheu is the Man.

To the Maori, also, a lake was something that added rank, and dignity, and an intangible mana or prestige to his tribe and to himself. On that account alone it would be highly prized, and defended.

Evidence examined by Ben White concerning a number of large inland lakes, including Lake Rotorua, Lake Rotoiti, and Lake Taupo, suggests that Te Arawa considered themselves to be owners of the lakes in Rotorua and Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaungas considered themselves to be the owners of Lake Taupo. They held these lakes in accordance with their own laws and customs. Mr White’s evidence notes the existence of a body of customary law pertaining to Maori ownership of lakes by one or more hapu. That body of law extended to how rights of management and use were allocated. This evidence suggests that Maori saw themselves as owners and managers of these lakes, including their fisheries, beds, and waters. It also suggests that Maori controlled access and enforced their law on other hapu or iwi with no rights to the lakes. Mr White further concludes that lakes were imbued with great metaphysical importance and that they were to varying extents a component of Maori identity. If his evidence is added to Judge Acheson’s 1929 decision on Lake Omapere, which underscored that Maori saw lakes as whole entities and not as lake beds, then we conclude that lakes are capable of being taonga protected by the Treaty. It would be illogical to conclude otherwise. In the Whanganui River Report the Tribunal has said as much, although the emphasis there was on a river:

The river system was possessed as a taonga of central significance to Atihaunui. . . . The river was conceptualised as a whole and indivisible entity, not separated into beds, banks, and waters, nor into tidal and non-tidal, navigable and non-navigable parts. Through creation beliefs, it is a living being, an ancestor with its own mauri, mana, tapu. To Atihaunui, it was their ‘tupuna awa.’

The river, like lakes, swamps, and inshore seas, was no different from the land in that respect. These were all part of the people’s inheritance. . . .

The river was held by both the hapu and the people as a whole. [Emphasis added.]

The Crown recognises this, in its acknowledgement that lakes generally may be taonga and that Lake Taupo specifically is a taonga of Ngati Tuwharetoa. We make no findings in relation to the lakes included in the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, which include Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti, but rather note that the Crown has acknowledged, in section 7 of that Act, that Te Arawa value the lakes and the lakes’ resources as taonga. All of this suggests
that it is now beyond doubt that lakes are capable of being taonga protected by the Treaty of Waitangi.

**Fisheries:** The Tribunal has said that the Treaty obliges the Crown to provide for legislative recognition of Maori fishing grounds and fisheries and to confer upon those most closely associated with them certain rights of control.\(^{189}\) The text of the Treaty would have conveyed to Maori people that they were to be protected not only in the possession of their fishing grounds but also in the mana to control them in accordance with their own customs and having regard to their cultural preferences.\(^ {190}\) The Motunui Tribunal found that the Te Ati Awa fishing reefs and the Waitara River constituted significant traditional fishing grounds of the Te Ati Awa people. The reefs extended for some 30 to 35 miles along the coast of north Taranaki. They were not only a source of food but also of tribal pride and prestige. Particular named parts of the reefs were regarded as the property of particular hapu.\(^ {191}\) All of this indicated that Te Ati Awa exercised rangatiratanga over the reefs and the river.\(^ {192}\)

In the *Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim*, customary fisheries were also recognised as a taonga:

In the Maori idiom ‘taonga’ in relation to fisheries equates to a resource, to a source of food, an occupation, a source of goods for gift-exchange, and is a part of the complex relationship between Maori and their ancestral lands and waters. The fisheries taonga contains a vision stretching back into the past, and encompasses 1,000 years of history and legend, incorporates the mythological significance of the gods and taniwha, and of the tipuna and kaitiaki. The taonga endures through fluctuations in the occupation of tribal areas and the possession of resources over periods of time, blending into one, the whole of the land, waters, sky, animals, plants and the cosmos itself, a holistic body encompassing living and non-living elements.

This taonga requires particular resource, health and fishing practices and a sense of inherited guardianship of resources. When areas of ancestral land and adjacent fisheries are abused through over-exploitation or pollution the tangata whenua and their values are offended. The affront is felt by present-day kaitiaki (guardians) not just for themselves but for their tipuna in the past.

The Maori ‘taonga’ in terms of fisheries has a depth and breadth which goes beyond quantitative and material questions of catch volumes and cash incomes. It encompasses a deep sense of conservation and responsibility to the future which colours their thinking, attitude and behaviour towards their fisheries.

The fisheries taonga includes connections between the individual and tribe, and fish and fishing grounds in the sense not just of tenure, or ‘belonging’, but also of personal or tribal identity, blood and genealogy, and of spirit. This means that a ‘hurt’ to the environment or to the fisheries may be felt personally by a Maori person or tribe, and may hurt not only the physical being, but also the prestige, the emotions and the mana.

The fisheries taonga, like other taonga, is a manifestation of a complex Maori physico-spiritual conception of life and life’s forces. It contains economic benefits, but it is also a giver of personal identity, a symbol of social stability, and a source of emotional and spiritual strength.
This vision provided the mauri (life-force) which ensured the continued survival of the iwi Maori. Maori fisheries include, but are not limited to a narrow physical view of fisheries, fish, fishing grounds, fishing methods and the sale of those resources, for monetary gain; but they also embrace much deeper dimensions in the Maori mind, as referred to in evidence by Miraka Szazy in the context of spiritual guardianship.

Although the Muriwhenua Fishing Tribunal was referring to sea fisheries, this same reasoning applies to freshwater fisheries because they are equally important. In the Whanganui River Report, the Tribunal made several findings about the importance of freshwater fisheries: that the river was also a fishery and a habitat of creatures to whom Maori were related, from fish to taniwha; and that as a taonga it was protected by the Treaty for its qualities as a fishery among other things.

**Geothermal resources:** Previous Tribunals have found that geothermal resources are taonga. The Ngawha Tribunal had this to say:

A final observation may be made regarding the unitary character of the geothermal resource. Since the springs themselves lay within the territory over which Ngapuhi had always exercised unchallenged their rangatiratanga, it follows that in their view such rangatiratanga would have extended over the entire resource equally above and below the surface of the land and throughout the extent of its manifestation. This, we believe, was the position in 1840 and, the claimants say, it is still the case today. On all major counts, then, the Ngawha springs and the underground resource are a taonga for Ngapuhi.

Of direct relevance to our inquiry is the Preliminary Te Arawa Geothermal Report, which found that the geothermal manifestations of Whakarewarewa, Rotokawa Baths, and Rotoma Waitangi Soda Springs were taonga. That Tribunal went on to note that:

It would be invidious for this tribunal to attempt a comparative evaluation of the value to the three groups of claimants of their respective taonga. We would again stress that the value attached to such taonga is essentially for those having rangatiratanga and exercising kaitiakitanga over them to determine. But such value is not confined to, or restricted by, traditional uses of the taonga. It will include present day usage and such potential usage as may be thought appropriate by those with rangatiratanga over the taonga.

The evidence before this Tribunal, ranging across the Central North Island region from Maketu to Tongariro, was that all the hapu and iwi with geothermal resources within their territories consider them to be taonga protected by the Treaty. As the evidence on this topic is reasonably comprehensive, chapter 20 explores the nature and extent of the Maori Treaty interest in the geothermal resources of the Central North Island.

**The nature of rangatiratanga over taonga protected by the Treaty**

Having found in principle that water, waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources can be taonga, we turn now to consider how the Treaty protected them. The Treaty guaranteed Maori autonomy and self-government over what they possessed as taonga in 1840. In terms of the nature of the taonga we have described above, what Maori possessed were water resources. The Rekohu Tribunal has said:

that which was possessed was a water regime, consisting of bed, water, and contents, not merely dry land. The fact that the law that grew up in England distinguished between the ownership of land and the ownership of water in any water regime is not good ground for making that distinction here. The Treaty guaranteed whatever it was that Maori possessed, in the sense of using and enjoying, and what was possessed was a water resource. In the same way, fisheries were preserved, and of course, Te Whaanga was a fishery too. There is no point in the guarantee if it is seen to apply only to the bed.
As was explored in the *Whanganui River Report*, coupling ‘possession’ with the Crown’s guarantee of ‘ownership’ at English law is an appropriate cultural equivalent.\(^\text{200}\)

Therefore, the Treaty protected these taonga not as mere Treaty interests but as resources that Maori possessed. The closest expression known to English law to describe the nature and extent of their possession would be ownership. That ownership was expressed through Maori law and tenure, as we discussed above in chapter 2. These complex systems often involved intersecting rights and obligations. Maori were promised in the Treaty that they could exercise their own autonomy, authority, and control over their taonga in accordance with their own cultural preferences.

The Maori tenure system included the concepts of rahui, tapu, and noa. It was a system that recognised the overarching tribal control of resources and people. For example, in the case of long rivers or large inland lakes involving complex rights of many hapu and iwi, rights and interests were clearly defined. Those rights and the associated mana were passed down from generation to generation. They included the right to exercise rangatiratanga, autonomy, and control over those parts of a river within one’s sphere. Converse to that was a corresponding obligation to act as kaitiaki for the benefit of all other iwi and hapu of the river or lake. In the *Mohaka River Report*, the Tribunal noted evidence that Ngati Tuwharetoa claimed a special relationship with Ngati Pahauwera because Ngati Tuwharetoa live on the upper reaches of the Mohaka River.\(^\text{201}\) Evidence was given that if Ngati Tuwharetoa did things up-river that Ngati Pahauwera did not like, there would be consultation ‘Maori to Maori.’\(^\text{202}\) Consequently, agreements with other tribes concerning the use of parts of the rivers were negotiated.\(^\text{203}\)

That Tribunal heard evidence from the late Canon Wi Huata that the Mohaka River was traditionally known as Mohakaharara (peaceful joining) and that the river served as a unifying force.\(^\text{204}\) Thus it was that maintaining intertribal relations, reconciling competing interests, and maintaining the Mohaka River as a highway were said to be the features of rangatiratanga. While the hapu had certain rights, the ultimate authority rested in the tribe, and issues which affected the tribe as a whole could only be resolved on a tribal level. None of this could be achieved without control. In this sense tino rangatiratanga was an inherited responsibility.\(^\text{205}\) The Maori tenure system also recognised different sets of rights, some held exclusively by hapu, whanau, or individuals based on descent or through enterprise, and others held in common by more than one group.\(^\text{206}\)

Despite this complexity of intersecting rights and obligations, Maori viewed their resources as single indivisible entities. We have already referred to the Lake Omapere decision in relation to lakes. This is consistent with the views expressed in the *Whanganui River Report*. We adopt the reasoning of that Tribunal when it stated that:

In Maori terms, the Whanganui River is a water resource, a single indivisible entity comprised of water, banks, and bed. There is nothing unexpected in that. It is obvious that a river exists as a water regime and not as a dry bed. The conceptual understanding of the river as a tupuna or ancestor emphasises the Maori thought that the river exists as a single and undivided entity or essence. Rendering the native title in its own terms, then, what Atihaunui owned was a river, not a bed, and a river entire, not dissected into parts.

The Treaty guaranteed to Atihaunui the ‘full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their ... properties.’ As earlier seen, that includes the river and that must include as well the property right of access to the river water.\(^\text{207}\)

This approach to Maori tenure applies to all the natural resources we have considered above. It explains why, in the *Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report*, the Tribunal found that those iwi held a proprietary interest akin to ownership of the rivers as at 1840, according them full and unrestricted use and control of access to the waters of the rivers while in their tribal sphere of influence. We can see no reason to depart from this reasoning in relation to all other resources considered in this chapter. That is the nature of
the guarantee of Maori rangatiratanga over their land and natural resources under the Treaty.

**The Common Law and Aboriginal Title**

**Key Question: Was introduced English common law sufficient to recognise Maori customary or native title to such natural resources?**

In this section we consider the third of the issues before us, namely, whether introduced English common law relating to water bodies, fisheries, and geothermal resources was sufficient to recognise Maori customary or native title to those resources. To answer this question, we analyse the nature of land estates in English law to lay the basis for a discussion on the additional common law rules pertaining to natural resources. These rules, along with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, should have determined how the Crown would respond to Maori natural resource claims.

We have previously discussed the nature of Maori customary tenure in chapter 2 and in part III. We note and draw upon the Tribunal’s Whanganui River Report, which contains a full chapter on the interplay between Maori customary law and English common law. That Tribunal noted that the following common law rules regarding English land tenure applied in New Zealand after 1840, to the extent relevant to the circumstances of the colony:

- All land was vested in the Crown.\(^{208}\)
- All grants of transferable titles in fee simple came from the Crown.\(^ {209}\)
- Where land was purchased direct from Maori, the purchase was acknowledged in the form of a Crown grant.\(^ {210}\)
- Though the Crown granted land, it still retained the underlying or radical title.\(^ {211}\)
- The same applied if the land was appropriated for a public purpose.\(^ {212}\)
- The Crown’s unappropriated lands were sometimes called waste lands.\(^ {213}\)
- The doctrine of tenure in English law was applied in New Zealand from the commencement of colonisation.\(^ {214}\)
- After early debates, it was also admitted that Maori held all land in New Zealand according to their customs and usages.\(^ {215}\)
- This was accommodated within the English legal framework by reference to established canons of colonial common law.\(^ {216}\)
- The land was still Crown land, but the Crown’s radical title was held subject to Maori customary usages or native title until the Maori customary interest had been extinguished.\(^ {217}\)
- Subsequently, the Maori customary usage has been referred to as the aboriginal, native, or customary title and it is said to be a burden on the title of the Crown.\(^ {218}\)
- The nature of aboriginal, native, or customary title was ascertained by reference to Maori custom and Maori law and not English conceptions of land or other resources.\(^ {219}\)
- Native or customary title to land (as opposed to natural resources) was largely extinguished during the nineteenth century by a combination of purchase, expropriation, or grant of freehold title to those Maori who were determined as owners by the Native Land Court.\(^ {220}\)
- Thus, there were only two categories of land in early colonial law until 1865: Crown land (even though burdened with Maori customary title) and freehold land.\(^ {221}\)

These legal principles form the background to understanding the impact of the common law on Maori customary rights and interests in other natural resources. That is because the manner in which the common law recognised legal interests in natural resources other than land evolved from or enhanced the rights and interests of property owners.
The recognition of aboriginal, native or customary title or rights reflects the concern of the common law to protect property rights existing prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty. The doctrine of aboriginal rights and its application in New Zealand law was authoritatively stated by Lord Cooke, when he was president of the Court of Appeal:

Aboriginal title is a compendious expression to cover the rights over land and water enjoyed by the indigenous or established inhabitants of a country up to the time of its colonisation. On the acquisition of the territory, whether by settlement, cession or annexation, the colonising power acquires a radical or underlying title which goes with sovereignty. Where the colonising power has been the United Kingdom, that title vests in the Crown. But, at least in the absence of special circumstances displacing the principle, the radical title is subject to the existing native rights. They are usually, although not invariably, communal or collective. It has been authoritatively said that they cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent of the native occupiers, and then only to the Crown and in strict compliance with the provisions of any relevant statutes. It was so stated by Chapman J in R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387, 390, in a passage later expressly adopted by the Privy Council, in a judgment delivered by Lord Davey, in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371, 384.

Chapman J also spoke of the practice of extinguishing native titles by fair purchase. An extinguishment by less than fair conduct or on less than fair terms would be likely to be a breach of the fiduciary duty widely and increasingly recognised as falling on the colonising power. See the fisheries case, Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641, 655; the Sealord case at p 306; the authorities mentioned in those two cases; and now further the judgments in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Eastmain Band v James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Administrator) (1992) 99 DLR (4th) 16 and Apsassin v Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 504. It may be that the requirement of free consent has at times to yield to the necessity of the compulsory acquisition of land or other property for specific public purposes which is recognised in many societies; but there is an assumption that, on any extinguishment of the aboriginal title, proper compensation will be paid, as stated by Lord Denning, in delivering the judgment of a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the other members of which were Earl Jowitt and Lord Cohen, in Adeyinka Oyekan v Musendiku Adele [1957] 2 All ER 785, 788.

The nature and incidents of aboriginal title are matters of fact dependent on the evidence in any particular case. Yet how they are decided or assessed tends to turn, not on the evidence only, but also on the approach of the Court considering the issue. At one extreme they may be treated as approaching the full rights of proprietorship of an estate in fee recognised at common law (see for instance Mabo v State of Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 89 per Deane and Gaudron JJ). At the other extreme they may be treated as at best a mere permissive and apparently arbitrarily revocable occupancy (see, throughout, the dissenting judgment of Dawson J in the same case). Viscount Haldane’s phrase ‘a full native title of usufruct’ in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399, 408, is one of the descriptions most frequently cited.

The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 guaranteed to Maori, subject to British kawanatanga or government, their tino rangatiratanga and their taonga, or in the official English version ‘the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties . . .’. In doing so the Treaty must have been intended to preserve for them effectively the Maori customary title, as mentioned in the fisheries case at p 655.222

The nature and extent of the doctrine of aboriginal, native or customary title and whether it recognised rights in natural resources other than land over and above those protected by the Treaty of Waitangi is explored in this section. We do so for the following reasons:

- If the common law did recognise some form of Maori native or customary title or rights in natural resources, then they may be legally enforced and the...
Crown should provide a legislative system to ensure that they can be fully enjoyed. If the common law did not support the existence of such rights, or where such rights and interests were extinguished by dint of the common law or statute, the issue then becomes: What has the Crown done to protect the Treaty rights and interests of Central North Island Maori in these resources?

We turn now to consider the different categories of resources relevant to this inquiry. We note, first, that we will explore the common law as it relates to geothermal resources in chapter 20 and do not propose to do so in this section.

**Ownership of water**

The common law recognised no ownership in natural water. Water was regarded as a common resource. Rather, property in water could only be acquired by containment, otherwise known as the doctrine of capture. Therefore, a person who extracted water and contained it acquired an enforceable interest in it. In the *Whanganui River Report* the Tribunal reflected upon this and noted that the Crown very soon assumed the role of controlling the use of natural water. The Tribunal recalled that it is:

> only by deeming provisions in statutes that the Crown has asserted the ownership of water for particular purposes of specific Acts. For example, by section 3 of the Municipal Corporations Waterworks Act 1872, all waters abstracted by municipal corporations for domestic supplies were deemed to be the property of and vested in the Crown.

However, while ownership was uncertain, in early New Zealand, the Crown assumed the right to control and license private water uses by statute. Provincial laws from at least 1864 provided the legal authority for privately owned water-powered flourmills and sawmills to use water for power. Specific water rights for mining, irrigation, and hydroelectricity were established by statute, as with the Gold Fields Act 1862, Mines Act 1877, Public Works Act 1882, Water Supply Act 1891, and Water-power Act 1903. These, and their amendments, consolidated the Government’s control over water, regulated potential conflict between farming, mining, and industrial interests, prevented monopolies, and assured public access or private usages.

Today, the Crown assumes the right to control, manage, and allocate water uses – in particular, under the Resource Management Act 1991 – but the legislation does not address the question of ownership.

The common law and statutory approach to rights in natural water is to be contrasted to that of Maori, who conceptualise water as an essential component of a water regime or system which cannot be separated out from all the other components that make up that water system. This approach was clearly reflected in the evidence before us concerning Lake Taupo, which we will review in chapter 18. As with the Whanganui River, Maori native or customary title to a water regime that falls into the category of taonga – and their Treaty interest in it – extends by necessary implication to the water of that regime or system. The water is as much a part of the taonga as the bed, the adjoining banks or shores, the fisheries, and the aquatic life.

**Water systems, lakes, and springs**

The relevant English common law presumption was that non-tidal rivers and lakes were owned by adjoining property owners of land to the centre line, or to the centre point in the case of lakes, unless captured within one land block in which case rights of access were controlled by the landowners. In the case of tidal reaches of rivers and in relation to the foreshore and seabed, the Crown was presumed to hold title. Thus, it could be said that any land covered by water regimes ‘permanently or from time to time, was either Crown land or privately owned land. Sometimes these presumptions at law could be rebutted, and we explain this further below. The rules associated with each of these water regimes were adopted in New Zealand from the commencement of settlement. We turn now to consider the law pertaining to each water regime in detail.
Small inland lakes: Depending on the nature and size of a lake, different common law rules applied. If the lake was a small inland lake, there was a presumption that the title of a riparian owner extended to the middle line of the lake onto which the riparian land abuts. Further, where a small lake was captured within the land of a single owner, the presumption was that the bed of the lake belonged to that proprietor. A grant of the land in this latter situation was presumed to include the bed. In such circumstances, it is difficult to argue for separate Maori customary title to the bed of a lake divorced from the land unless it can be shown that the lake was specifically reserved. Maori customary title was effectively extinguished by the issue of a Crown grant or a Native Land Court title to land. Once registered in the land transfer system, the owner (Maori or otherwise) of the land surrounding the lake acquired an indefeasible title. The tribe or hapu as customary owner was replaced by individual owners. We discussed the impact of the process of individualisation in Part III, and we concluded that individualisation of title was imposed on Maori in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Large inland lakes: We turn now to consider what happened to large inland lakes before the enactment of any legislation vesting title in the Crown. The common law, as it was introduced in 1840, recognised that where Maori could establish native or customary title to a lake, their title remained a burden on the Crown’s radical title. A feature of Maori customary title was the notion that the lake was indivisible from its waters. If the lake was recognised as their lake in accordance with Maori custom, then the tribe or tribes with primary associations with the lake controlled access to it and its waters in a manner akin to ownership. In terms of the practice of the courts, we note that the early decisions of the Native Land Court acknowledged the Maori world-view of such water bodies and how indivisible they were in the minds of Maori. As we noted earlier in this chapter, one of the most eloquent judgments on the importance of lakes to Maori people can be found in Judge Acheson’s 1929 decision on title to Lake Omapere. Whether the presumption of the Crown’s common law radical title applied to the extensive navigable lakes and their waters in New Zealand was alluded to in Strang v Russell (1905) without being determined. In that decision the court noted case law which established that in Ireland and England the soil of large lakes did not of common right belong to the Crown. Whatever is the true position at law, the history of the Central North Island has been one of the Crown initially resisting Maori native or customary title to the large inland lakes. This occurred in 1910 when the Crown sought to prevent the Native Land Court inquiring into title applications filed by Te Arawa. The Court of Appeal underscored the right for Maori to make applications to the Native Land Court to have their title determined. This occurred in the famous case of Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1913) where the court ruled that the Native Land Court had jurisdiction to hear applications from Maori for the ownership of lakes. When the courts failed to uphold the Crown, it negotiated to secure title from Maori. As a result, the Crown moved, in 1922, to conclude a settlement with Te Arawa over 14 Rotorua lakes. The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1922 was passed to give effect to the settlement. Section 22 vested the beds of 14 Rotorua lakes in the Crown ‘freed and discharged from the Native customary title, if any’ in exchange for an annuity and certain specific rights, including fishing rights.

The history of this matter and the Crown’s acknowledged Treaty breaches concerning the Rotorua lakes have been resolved and settled by Te Arawa and the Crown. The enactment of the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, giving effect to a settlement deed dated 18 December 2004, records this agreement. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider the historical lakes claims as defined by section 13 of that Act has now been limited by the amendment to section 6 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. The Te Arawa lakes subject to the settlement are listed in section 11 of the 2006 Act as: Lakes Ngahewa, Ngapouri (also known as Opouri), Okareka, Okaro (also known as Ngakaro), Okataina, Rerewhakaaitu, Rotoehu, Rotoiti,
Rotoma, Rotomahana, Rotorua, Tarawera, Tikitapu, and Tutaeinanga. The settlement includes the water, fisheries, and aquatic life in those lakes, but does not include the islands in those lakes or the land abutting or surrounding them. It does not include the area above the beds of the lakes known as the Crown's stratum. The Crown's stratum is defined in section 11 of the 2006 Act as the space occupied by water and the space occupied by air above each of the Te Arawa lake beds listed above.

We cannot say any more regarding the large inland lakes in Rotorua which have been the subject of the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act. Nor can we inquire into claims concerning the water, fisheries, or aquatic life in those lakes. We can, however, inquire into the remaining Rotorua lakes. Title to most of these lakes was investigated by the Native Land Court, as in the case of Lake Rotokawau owned predominantly by Ngati Rangiteaorere. Lake Rotokakahi is also in Maori ownership and is controlled by the Lake Rotokakahi Board of Control. We consider issues relevant to these lakes in chapter 19.

In terms of Lake Taupo, whilst there has been a settlement of issues concerning the ownership of the lake bed and some of the beds of the large rivers that enter or leave the lake, other issues remain. Those issues include the impacts of raising the lake and managing the waters of the lake for hydro power generation. We discuss these issues in detail in chapter 18.

In relation to those lakes that were captured within a land block alienated out of Maori hands as a result of unfair Crown purchase tactics, and/or by dint of the individualisation of the land title system, we make no findings, as that would require a block by block analysis of what happened in each case. We note the special case that was raised in evidence before us regarding Rotoitipaku, and we discuss the environmental impacts on that lake in chapters 19 and 20. We note that, to the extent that the issues concern matters covered by the Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement Act 2005, they are settled and provide background only. However, the Act seems to contemplate
new matters in relation to Wai 21 being raised pursuant to any amended pleadings.

**Rivers and streams:** In general terms, the legal regime relating to rivers and streams has developed as a mixture of common law and statute law. The Whanganui River Tribunal reviewed this area of the law in detail and we do not propose to revisit their findings. We do, however, adopt their analysis of the law and their findings.

As with lakes, the general presumption of law, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that the bed of a non-tidal river or stream belonged to the owners of the lands abutting the river or stream. This presumption, that the riparian owners own the bed to the middle line of the water (*ad medium filum aquae*), applied initially to all rivers and streams. At common law the presumption applied whether the river was navigable or non-navigable. The presumption has continued in terms of small streams and rivers. But the question became whether the presumption regarding the rights of riparian owners also applied to large navigable rivers used by the Crown for transportation.

Previous Tribunals have considered this issue in some detail. The Whanganui River Tribunal noted the famous case of *Mueller v Taupiri Coalmines Limited* (1900). This judgment entrenched the view that the presumption of *ad medium filum aquae* could be rebutted at common law, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the river. That case concerned the Waikato River and land that had been subject to confiscation by the Crown. In those circumstances the presumption of *ad medium filum aquae* could be displaced in favour of the Crown. While finding in favour of the Crown, one of the judges acknowledged the prior Maori ownership of the Waikato River up to the point of confiscation, stating that:

> the lands were Native lands, the owners of which were entitled to the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession thereof guaranteed to them by the Treaty of Waitangi. These rights have from the time of the foundation of the colony been
recognised by the Crown and the Legislature. ‘The Native Land Act 1862’ [sic] recites the Treaty, and the rights of the Natives thereunder; and the whole of the legislation relating to Native lands up to the present day recognises the existence of these rights. These are also recognised by ‘The Native Rights Act 1865’ . . .

[It] is impossible to infer any dedication by the Crown [of a right of public user] so long as the soil in the river remained Native land and in the possession of the Native owners. To do so would be to assume that the sovereign power has not respected, but has improperly invaded, the Native proprietary rights. 241

Consequently, before the confiscations it would have been possible to argue that any title that the Crown might assert to large navigable rivers was subject to Maori native or customary title. After this decision, the Crown enacted legislation to deal with large navigable rivers. So for many years the issue of prior ownership was coloured by the statutory vesting of the beds of all navigable rivers in the Crown when it enacted section 14 of the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act 1903. Lord Cooke, in Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc v Attorney-General, suggested that the 1903 Act and its amendments were insufficiently ‘clear and plain’ to extinguish Maori customary title to beds of large navigable rivers. He pondered:

The vesting of the beds of navigable rivers in the Crown provided for by the Coal-mines Act Amendment 1903 and succeeding legislation may not be sufficiently explicit to override or dispose of that concept, although it is odd that the concept seems not to have been put forward in quite that way in the line of cases concerning the Wanganui River, the last of which was the decision of this Court in Re the Bed of the Wanganui River [1962] NZLR 600. Perhaps the approach which counsel for Maori argued for in that line of cases, emphasising the bed and the adjacent land more than the flow of water, is an example of the tendency against which the Privy Council warned in Amodu Tijani (at p 403) of rendering native title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under English law. Similarly, as the Waitangi Tribunal bring out in their Mohaka River Report at pp 34–38, the ad medium filum aquae rule applied in the 1962 case is inconsistent with the concept and may well be unreliable in determining what Maori have agreed to part with. 242

This view is to be contrasted with the position in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa, where Justices Keith and Anderson took a different view and suggested that section 14 of the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act was sufficient to extinguish title. 243 Clearly, if judges of this rank cannot agree, it is still an issue to be finally settled in law.

The ownership of springs at common law: With regard to the ownership of springs at common law, the resource was considered to be a water resource. As we noted above, free flowing water was not capable of ownership. In the Laws of New Zealand the ownership of water resources is described thus:

In the case of unappropriated water, whether percolating through the soil, diffused as surface water, or flowing, or gathered in a pool or small lake, within one holding, unrestricted common law rights to use the water were incident to ownership of the land. Such rights were thought to be akin to proprietary interests, since the landowner alone had the right of access to the water and therefore to appropriate it. 244

The result is that the springs are captured within the land and, therefore, ownership runs with the land. If a spring is within the confines of a block, the owner as the proprietor of the land has the right to control access to that spring. As we have discussed in relation to lakes, the water itself could not be the subject of property until contained by the riparian owner or other person having access to it by consent of the proprietor. In such cases, any common law native or customary title in the springs may have been extinguished, although the Treaty rights and interests of the claimants remain.

We do not have sufficient evidence to make a general finding concerning all springs of importance to the Central
North Island claimants. We can say, in relation to two of the examples that were raised before us, namely Hamurana and Taniwha Springs, that serious issues have been raised regarding the manner in which the Crown acquired its initial interests in these resources. As we noted in part III, the fact that the land surrounding the springs was alienated by direct Crown targeting (in the case of Hamurana) and by public works takings (in the case of Taniwha Springs) has been a source of ongoing grievance for Ngati Rangiwewehi, who continue to mourn the loss of these taonga. The issues concerning the loss of springs are, therefore, land alienation issues.

No special consideration was given in early legislation to ensure that Maori could maintain their relationship with taonga such as these, or to ensure that they could participate in the management of the springs despite the alienation of land. This is an example of the failure of the Crown’s policies and legislative regimes to recognise and provide for Maori Treaty rights and interests. It would be fair to say that, as a direct result of these systemic failings, the claimants’ relationships with Taniwha and Hamurana Springs have been prejudicially affected in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

The common law – lagoons and estuaries: The position before 2006 was that by presumption of the common law, lagoons or estuaries were considered to be arms of the sea. As such, the common law presumption was that title was vested in the Crown unless the presumption could be rebutted.

However, the presumption at common law may have been rebutted in New Zealand after the decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa, which found that the Crown’s radical title to the foreshore and seabed may be subject to Maori customary title. The Crown, however, moved quickly to settle the issues by enacting the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. The Act vests full legal and beneficial ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown and deems such land to be ‘public foreshore and seabed.’ So it seems that the common law rules were not sufficient to displace Maori native or customary title until the enactment of this legislation.

The major concern of the claimants before us relates to the drainage of estuaries and lagoons, which they allege had a significant effect on many Maori. We consider this further in chapter 19.

The common law and fisheries

It is now well established that before 1992 Maori native or customary title extended to include fishing rights and access to fisheries. This was recognised in Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General (1990) by the Court of Appeal. In that case, the court could not rule on the substantive questions of law pertaining to fishing rights, but it did suggest that there was a real possibility that the view of the law, and in particular of Maori customary fishing rights, provisionally taken by Justice Greig will prove to be right. He had found that such rights did exist.

The Court of Appeal further noted that the judgment of Justice Williamson in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer also recognised the existence of such rights. The Court of Appeal opined that in principle the extinction of customary title to land does not automatically mean the extinction of fishing rights.

The same position is held for both salt water and freshwater indigenous customary fisheries. Therefore, Maori customary freshwater fishing rights remain intact.

However, a different position is taken by the courts in New Zealand in relation to fishing for trout or other introduced species. In this respect the Court of Appeal has stated:

We are satisfied that this legislative history demonstrates beyond doubt that the appellant and his hapu did not have a Maori fishing right to take trout in the Mangawhero river.

Legislative control began with The Salmon and Trout Act 1867 before trout had been brought into New Zealand and in contemplation of their arrival. The preamble to that statute records that it was necessary that provision be made for the preservation and propagation of salmon and trout on their
arrival. The parliamentary intent is apparent from the comprehensive regulation-making powers provided by s 2 and the power of protection provided by s 4. Close control for the management and protection of trout was supported by regulatory authority to prohibit or restrict fishing for any period in any river as considered necessary; to impose any conditions and restrictions in respect of trout fishing; and to regulate times, seasons and methods of catching. The need for legislative protection and control was brought out in the debates in Parliament and is manifested in the comprehensive regime that was provided for. Clearly it was intended that any fishing for trout would be done under that regime. There is no reference to Maori fishing in the statute but that was unnecessary given the nature, purpose and comprehensiveness of the statutory regime. The terms of the statute preclude attaching Maori fishing rights to the new species imported from abroad.

The pattern of regulations and Orders in Council governing trout support and reinforce that conclusion. The nature and extent of regulatory power and actual regulatory control is inconsistent with the existence of any Maori fishing right in respect of trout. In that regard the scheme and language of the 1888 and 1890 regulations for the Wanganui Acclimatisation District presuppose the exercise of total control over fishing for trout in the district. And the additional general regulations of 28 January 1879 and the Order in Council of 21 September 1886 protecting and in effect prohibiting taking trout except as allowed in terms of particular regulations, reflect the completeness of the statutory regime. In that regard there is no substance in the submission advanced by Mr Solomon that Mr McRitchie’s hapu could have had a Maori fishing right in respect of trout in the Mangawhero river before regulatory controls were applied and which enured thereafter. There is no evidence that trout were liberated into the Mangawhero river before 1888 but, more importantly, the 1867 Act, in providing for the implementation of the fishing regime necessarily precluded any inconsistent rights from accruing and enuring.

There is nothing in the subsequent legislative history to detract from those conclusions from the legislative regime which governed fishing for trout following their introduction into New Zealand. As well, the three sets of statutory provisions between 1908 and 1938 affecting particular Maori tribes in relation to trout fishing, perhaps most clearly reflected in s 28 of the 1921 – 1922 statute and s 68 of the 1931 Act, are only explicable as recognising that but for specific provisions of that kind the Maori tribes concerned would have no right to take trout from those waters.

Finally, the Conservation Act 1987 provisions proceed on the same premise, namely that they provide for a comprehensive and exclusive code governing trout as sports fish. That is directly reflected in the provisions of s 2620 which, while conferring on occupiers of adjoining land the right to take trout without a licence, require compliance with the terms and conditions specified in the applicable anglers notice.

In summary, trout are and always have been part of a separate regime exclusively controlled by legislation and the only fishing rights are those available under those provisions.

While Maori have no common law or statutory right to fish for trout or other introduced species, whether this should be the result in Treaty terms depends on the facts before us as they concern the fisheries of the Central North Island. We discuss this further in chapters 18 and 19.

We note at this point that the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 provided for the full and final settlement of all claims based directly or indirectly on Maori rights and interests in commercial fishing, whether based in the common law or the Treaty. The relevant definition of commercial fishing is in section 2 of the Fisheries Act 1983, meaning ‘taking fish for sale’. This appears to apply to freshwater commercial fishing. The Waitangi Tribunal, therefore, has no jurisdiction to consider claims relating to commercial fishing. The Tribunal may inquire into non-commercial Maori customary fishing, which is regulated under section 10 of the 1992 Act. It may also inquire into issues concerning access to fisheries.

**Tribunal findings on the common law and aboriginal title**

In answer to the question whether the English common law was sufficient to recognise Maori customary or native
title to these resources, we conclude the answer must be that it should have been, given the nature of the doctrine of aboriginal title. However, to safeguard Maori rights, some formal recognition in legislation was needed to ensure their protection within the introduced legal order. This legislation should have acted to protect rather than defeat aboriginal title rights and prevent the application of competing common law rules such as the *ad medium filum aquae* rule and the arm of the sea doctrine. As we noted in part III, the failure of the Crown to recognise and provide for a form of title that would protect Maori rights and interests in these resources was a breach of the principles of the Treaty and contributed to the alienation of many resources. That was the case in relation to the waters of many small lakes, rivers, streams, and springs. Land alienation outside the hapu or iwi resulted in relationships with resources being severed. In relation to large inland lakes and rivers the issue of who can control access to the waters of these taonga remains a live one. We discuss this further in chapters 18 and 19. We consider the issues concerning geothermal resources in chapter 20. We note at this stage that the Crown did not recognise, and still has not recognised, the full nature and extent of Maori customary title to geothermal resources. Nor have the courts made any final determination on the issues concerning those resources. In relation to fisheries, Maori customary freshwater and sea fishing rights continue to exist, subject to the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992, though they do not extend to the right to fish for trout and other introduced species. In relation to all these natural resources, the Treaty rights and interests of claimants remain, albeit modified if there has been an alienation or other extinguishment of their aboriginal or native title.

**Conclusion**

Our review above leads us to conclude that natural water, waterways, fisheries, and geothermal resources were and are capable of being taonga possessed by Maori and over which they exercised rangatiratanga as at 1840. As such these taonga and Maori rangatiratanga over them were protected by the Treaty, either explicitly as in the case of fisheries in the English text, or as taonga in the Maori text. In some circumstances, Maori possession of natural resources will amount to something akin to ownership known and recognised in English law by the doctrine of aboriginal or native title. In other circumstances the native or customary title may amount to something less than full ownership but may still be recognised by the common law. In relation to all these natural resources, the Treaty rights and interests of claimants remain, albeit modified if there has been an alienation or other extinguishment of their aboriginal or native title. One of the continuing Treaty rights held by Maori is the right to exercise rangatiratanga in the management of their natural resources or taonga (whether they still own them or not) through their own forms of local or regional self-government or through joint-management regimes at a local or regional level.

Finally, we note that a number of statutes impact on our jurisdiction in certain limited ways. These statutes are:
- Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement Act 2005;
- Pouakani Claims Settlement Act 2000;
- Ngati Awa Claims Settlement Act 1999; and

In all respects we note that, to the extent that we refer to matters covered by these statutes, we do so only to give background. The matters raised in the statutes have not contributed to the findings we have made concerning generic issues relevant to our inquiry.

To the extent that we have covered issues that may or may not be raised before other specialist forums, we have done so because the claims before us raise issues concerning the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, which under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 this Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with.
Summary

In this chapter, we have found that:

- The following principles of the Treaty must apply to the claims before us concerning water bodies, including springs, rivers and lakes, fisheries, and geothermal resources:
  - partnership and mutual benefit, with a resultant duty to consult;
  - reciprocity – the essential compact: kawanatanga (the right to govern) for rangatiratanga (autonomy and self-government);
  - the Crown’s duty of active protection of lands, estates, and taonga, with duties analogous to fiduciary duties;
  - the Crown’s duty of active protection of rangatiratanga, including in environmental management;
  - options and equity of treatment; and
  - redress of prejudice arising from Treaty breaches.

In the succeeding chapters of this part of the report, we will apply these principles and our analysis of the common law to ascertain whether the claims before us are well founded.

- Water bodies such as springs, rivers, and lakes, and other natural resources such as fisheries and geothermal resources, can be taonga protected by the Treaty of Waitangi.

- English common law should have been sufficient to recognise Maori customary or native title to these resources, given the nature of the doctrine of aboriginal title. However, to safeguard Maori rights, some formal recognition in legislation was needed to ensure their protection within the introduced legal order.

- Maori customary or native rights to indigenous freshwater and sea fisheries remain legally enforceable so long as there is compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.

- Whether Maori customary or native title to natural resources has been extinguished or not, the claimants retain Treaty rights and interests in those resources they consider taonga, albeit in some cases modified. One of the continuing Treaty rights held by Maori is the right to exercise rangatiratanga in the management of their natural resources or taonga (whether they still own them or not), through their own forms of local or regional self-government or through joint-management regimes at a local or regional level.
Notes
1. Annette Sykes and Jason Pou, submissions in reply for Ngati Makino and others, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.133), p 37; John Kahukiwa, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Rangitihia, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.108), pp 22; Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 112
2. Tom Bennieon, generic closing submissions on the natural environment and resource management issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.78), pp 10–11
3. See for example ibid, p 13
4. Ibid, pp 14–15
5. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p 21
6. Ibid, p 21
7. Ibid, p 22
8. Ibid, pp 22–23
9. Ibid, p 23
10. Ibid, p 24
11. Ibid; and see New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA)
12. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p 28
13. Ibid, pp 31–32
15. Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553 (CA)
16. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, pp 52–53
17. Ibid, pp 36–40
18. Ibid, p 37
19. Ibid, p 37
20. Ibid, pp 38–40
21. Ibid, p 40
22. Annette Sykes and Jason Pou, amended submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Makino and others, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.133(a)), p 36
23. Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), p 24
24. Ibid, pp 25–29
25. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at p 692 per Somers J
26. Ibid, p 693 per Somers J, who stated that a breach of a Treaty provision must be a breach of the principles of the Treaty.

27. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) at p 517
29. Ibid, p 194–195
30. Ibid, pp 190–191, 194
32. Ibid, pp 664, 667, 673, 680–682, 715
33. Ibid, pp 664, 682, 715
34. Ibid, p 683
35. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA) at p 169
36. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at p 683
40. Ibid, p 13
41. Ibid, pp 13–14
42. Ibid, pp 13–14
44. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at pp 680–681
45. Ibid, pp 663–664
48. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, pp 23–24, 40
52. Taiaaroa v Minister of Justice [1995] 1 NZLR 411 (CA) at p 418
53. See, for example, Waitangi Tribunal, The Whanganui River Report (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 1999), p 341; Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553 (CA) at p 562
61. Ibid
62. For example, the requirements in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
64. Ibid, p 329
66. Ibid, p 174
68. Ibid, pp 328–329
69. Ibid, p 330
73. McGuire v Hastings District Council [2002] 2 NZLR 577 (PC) at p 594
78. Ibid, p 284
80. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) at p 517
81. Ibid
83. Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA) at pp 305–306
84. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at p 664
85. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1992] 2 NZLR 576 (CA) at p 591
86. Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA) at p 304
87. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA) at p 169
88. The issue was left open in Fenwick v Trustees of Nga Kaihautu o Te Arawa Executive Council and Others unreported, 13 April 2006, Allan J, High Court, Rotorua, CIV-2004-463-847.
91. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) at p 517
92. Ibid, pp 516–518
Environmental justice has been influenced by, is consistent with, or has itself influenced four distinct research strands, conceptualised as:

- Environmental equity – exploring the links between health, morbidity, environmental conditions, and socio-economic status.
- Ecological justice – sometimes referred to within the sustainable development discourse. It concerns the fair distribution of environments among all the inhabitants of the planet. Ecological justice addresses the wider concern for responsible relations between humans and the non-human natural world.
- Environmental human rights – asserting, as fundamental human rights, the right to live in an environment free from pollution, and ownership rights to natural resources. Support for the assertion of these rights is to be found in the Earth Charter of the UN Environment Programme. This document underlines the importance of these human rights (and, by implication, environmental justice), but it also challenges conceptions of human rights which stress individual freedoms without acknowledgement of ecological responsibilities.
- Ecological debt – developed to explain how the consumerism of developed countries is imposing direct environmental costs on less developed countries. The adjustment mechanisms to discharge that debt are being developed and worked through at the international level in relation to global climate change, the Kyoto protocol, and carbon credits.

(See Tom Bennion, generic closing submissions on the natural environment and resource management issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p 5 on geothermal resources; pt 2, pp 469–470, 472 on lakes and waterways

- Ibid, pt 2, pp 472, 484–488, 498, 504, 509, 511–512
- Ibid, p 469
- Ibid, pp 502–503
- Ibid, pp 486–487
- Ibid, p 500
- Ibid, pp 497–509
- Ibid, pp 497–503
- Ibid, p 498

Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p 5 on geothermal resources; pt 2, pp 469–470, 472 on lakes and waterways

134. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 470
135. Environmental justice has been influenced by, is consistent with, or has itself influenced four distinct research strands, conceptualised as:

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136. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 470
139. See Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 112–114, as an example.
140. Ibid, p 113
141. See for example ibid, pp 166–175
142. Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), p 52
143. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), pp 166–189; Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), p 52
144. Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), p 52
145. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), pp 161–196; Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), pp 52–53
146. Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), pp 53–55
147. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p 5 on geothermal resources; pt 2, pp 469–470, 472 on lakes and waterways
149. Ibid, p 469
150. Ibid, pp 502–503
151. Ibid, pp 486–487
152. Ibid, p 500
153. Ibid, pp 497–509
154. Ibid, pp 497–503
155. Ibid, p 498
161. Annette Sykes and Miharo Armstrong, opening submissions on behalf of Ngati Pikiao, 25 January 2005 (paper 3.3.21), p 15
163. Ibid, p 338
166. Ibid, pp 277–278
167. Native Appellate Court minute book 11, 3 April 1944, fol 114
168. Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Kaituna River Claim, 2nd ed (Wellington: Government Printing Office, 1989), pp 5–6. Note that the Kaituna River Tribunal did not consider the issue of whether the river should be re-directed through the estuary, a point that is examined in chapter 19.
170. Ibid, p 88
174. Ibid, p 289
178. Ibid, p 340
179. Martin Taylor, Donna Hall, and Marette Morrissey, opening submissions on behalf of Ngati Karenga, Ngati Rangiwehehi, Ngati Rangitewaerere, Ngati Mahi o Rangitihia, Ngati Wahiao, Ngati Tura, Ngati Te Takainga, Ngati Rongomai, Ngati Hinekura, and Ngati Te Roro o Te Rangi, 26 January 2005 (paper 3.3.14), p 4; Martin Taylor, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Rangiwehehi, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.79), pp 34–39
182. Bay of Islands Native Land Court minute book 11, 1 August 1929, fol 253–278
183. Ibid, fol 259–261
185. Ibid, pp 250–252
186. Ibid, p 250
188. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 469, 472
190. Ibid, p 51
191. Ibid, pp 6–7
192. Ibid, p 1
197. Ibid, p 19
198. Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), p 52
200. Ibid, p 278
203. Ibid, p 17
204. Ibid, p 17
205. Ibid, p 17
206. Ibid, p 15
208. Ibid, p 15
209. Ibid, p 15
210. Ibid, p 15
211. Ibid, p 15
212. Ibid, p 15
213. Ibid, p 15
214. Ibid, p 15
215. Ibid, p 16
216. Ibid
217. Ibid
218. Ibid
219. Ibid
220. Ibid
221. Ibid
222. *Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc v Attorney-General* [1994] 2 NZLR 20 (CA) at pp 23–24 per Cooke P
223. *Ferens v O’Brien* (1883) 1 QB 21
225. Ibid, pp 281–282
226. Ibid, p 16
227. Ibid, p 17
228. Ibid
229. Ibid
230. *Strang v Russell* (1905) 24 NZLR 916 at pp 925–926
231. Ibid, pp 925–927
232. *Laws NZ*, Water para 68
233. See for example *Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc v Attorney-General* [1994] 2 NZLR 20 (CA) at pp 26–27, where the Court of Appeal recognised that such customary title may exist unless extinguished.
234. *Strang v Russell* (1905) 24 NZLR 916 at pp 925–927
235. Bay of Islands Native Land Court minute book 11, 1 August 1929, fol 253–278
236. See *Johnston v O’Neill* (1911) AC 552 at p 557; see also *Bristow v Cormican* (1878) 3 App Cas 641
243. *Attorney-General v Ngati Apa* [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA) at p 688
244. *Laws NZ*, ‘Water’ para 39
246. *Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General* [1990] 2 NZLR 641 at pp 654–656
Lake Taupo is frequently described by Maori and Pakeha alike as a jewel of the central North Island. It is of immense importance to the iwi who have lived for many generations around its shores, and who are its kaitiaki. But the lake and its waters also present an illuminative case study of the treaty interaction between Crown and Maori over the ownership, use, and control of waterways.

Before embarking on our discussion, we need to draw attention to some of the different terms used by the claimants and the Crown when referring to Lake Taupo and its waters. Ngati Tuwharetoa have referred to ‘the waters of the Waikato-iti’, defining them as ‘the Tongariro River, Lake Taupo and the Waikato River’. They have also referred to the ‘Taupo waters’ which they describe as being ‘Lake Taupo and the Waikato River extending from Lake Taupo to and inclusive of the Huka Falls and the beds of rivers and streams flowing into Lake Taupo’. The latter is somewhat broader than the term ‘Taupo waters’ as defined by the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act of 1926 and the ensuing proclamation of 7 October 1926. The relevant section of the Act is reproduced at the head of this chapter; by the ensuing October proclamation parts of some tributaries were effectively excluded from the legal definition of the term ‘Taupo waters’.

The Taupo-nui-a-Tia lake . . . belongs to us the Maori of Taupo – absolutely.
Ngati Tuwharetoa petition, 1913

The bed of the lake known as Lake Taupo, and the bed of the Waikato River extending from Lake Taupo to and inclusive of the Huka Falls, together with the right to use the respective waters, are hereby declared to be the property of the Crown, freed and discharged from the Native customary title (if any) or any other Native freehold title thereto.
Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926, s 14(1)

Lake Taupo-nui-a-Tia taken from Tokaanu. Photograph by Malcolm Ross, circa 1898.
Map 18.1 shows the Taupo waters as currently defined by the deed of agreement of 1992, which bases itself on the earlier legislation and proclamation.

In this chapter, we review how the Crown acquired the bed of Lake Taupo and some of the riverbeds that form part of this water system, and how it regulated the fisheries of these waters. We review the Crown’s use of these waters for the development of a hydroelectricity infrastructure, in particular the raising of lake levels by means of the Taupo control gates. We also consider the responses of Taupo Maori to those actions, whether breaches of the Treaty have occurred, and whether Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga have suffered any prejudice.

**ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION**

There are three principal issues that need to be determined in this chapter, but in order to answer the second and third issues we must consider a number of important related questions. The first two principal issues are these:

- Are Lake Taupo waters and fisheries protected by the Treaty and did Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga exercise rangatiratanga over them?
- If so, did the Crown actively protect the taonga of the Lake Taupo waters and its fisheries and the exercise of Maori rangatiratanga over them?

As we have noted, in order to answer the second question we need to consider the following related questions:

- Did Ngati Tuwharetoa consent to the introduction of trout into Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers? What was the impact on Ngati Tuwharetoa of that introduction, and of the Crown’s assumption at the outset of the right to regulate the fishery?
- Why did the Crown embark on negotiations with Ngati Tuwharetoa about Lake Taupo in 1924? Were the Crown’s negotiations with Maori about the lake conducted, and concluded, in good faith?
- Were the 1926 agreement and its enacting legislation ‘fair and reasonable’ in the circumstances and consistent with the Treaty?

Finally, our third major issue relates to the Crown’s control of Lake Taupo from 1941 to the present day for the purposes of hydroelectric development, a key concern and grievance of the claimants:

- What were the impacts of the Crown’s control of Lake Taupo for hydroelectric development on the lake, its tributaries, and its people, and has the Treaty been breached in that respect?

In addressing that question, we have posed a series of related questions:

- Was the decision to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels consistent with the Treaty?
- What were the impacts of the control gates?
- Did the Crown provide an effective remedy or redress for the impacts in the 1940s?
- What further impacts did the Crown’s control of lake levels have after the 1940s?
- Did raising the lake levels affect the tributary rivers and the Waikato River?
- Now that it may be possible to rehabilitate affected land, are Tuwharetoa entitled to compensation if the land can no longer be farmed because of other reasons?

**LAKE TAUPO AND THE TREATY**

**KEY QUESTION: ARE LAKE TAUPO WATERS AND FISHERIES PROTECTED BY THE TREATY AND DID NGATI TUWHARETOA AND THEIR WHANAUNGA EXERCISE RANGATIRATANGA OVER THEM?**

In chapter 17, we explained the Treaty principles relating to waterways and fisheries. The Treaty envisaged a partnership between the Crown and Maori in which both parties would
Map 18.1: The ‘Taupo waters’ as defined in the proclamation of 7 October 1926 and the Deed of Agreement of 28 August 1992
exercise their due and appropriate authority and autonomy. It set up a Government (kawanatanga) for the new State of New Zealand, in which Maori would be protected in their continued exercise of their tino rangatiratanga. Article 2 of the Treaty made that guarantee for property, places, and people (and, as a result, ways of life). Fisheries were specifically guaranteed in the English text of article 2, while all prized possessions (taonga) were specifically guaranteed in the Maori text of article 2. We know from the writings of Chief protector George Clarke, published in 1842, that, as counsel submitted, rivers and waterways were intentionally included in the Treaty guarantees:

friends, perhaps you have forgotten that document which was written at Waitangi. In that document, all of the kauri, the rivers and everything else are left for the Maori to deal with as he wishes . . .

With those points in mind, we turn to the specific question for our inquiry of whether the Taupo waters and their fisheries were taonga over which the claimants exercised tino rangatiratanga and, as such, were protected by the Treaty.

The claimants’ case
Karen Feint, for Ngati Tuwharetoa, submitted that, just as with the Whanganui River, the claimants view their lakes and rivers (the ‘Taupo waters’ in their broad sense) as a taonga, consisting of the water resource as a whole. The tangata whenua evidence in this inquiry, she contended, shows that Central North Island Maori view their rivers and lakes in the same way as Te Atihau-nui view the Whanganui River – as taonga, as tupuna, as whole entities. She noted that the claimants presented evidence from the Hikuwai at the headwaters of the Waikato River at Lake Taupo all the way to Te Mataapuna, ‘from whence the waters sprang.’ In reply submissions, Ms Feint noted that it is inconceivable that, as kaitiaki of the lake, they would willingly give it up. Ngati Tuwharetoa are ancestrally bound to the lake and unable to surrender their obligations to their taonga.

The people regard their customary rights to waterways on the same basis as customary rights to land and resources. Those rights were demonstrated by and included (inter alia) rights of passage, food gathering and harvesting, daily (ordinary) uses, and special ceremonial uses.

Ngati Tuwharetoa contended that the rights were not only rights of ‘use’, because the waterways were created by the ancestors for the benefit of their descendants, who had absolute rights of control and authority (tino rangatiratanga) over the water resources, and corresponding obligations to conserve, nurture, and protect the resources. These rights included a right to the use of the water, a right to control access to the water, and a right to control any developments in the use of the water, specifically hydroelectricity. Ms Feint submitted that the Tribunal should adopt the view of the Waitangi Tribunal in the Whanganui River Report, when it noted that:

In our view, their just rights and property in the river must include the right to license others to use the river water. The right to develop and exploit a water resource is conceptually no different from a right to develop and exploit the resources on dry land.

She concluded by submitting that there can be no doubt that the waterways of Waikato-iti – the Tongariro River, Taupo-nui-a-Tia, and the Waikato River – are taonga cherished by Ngati Tuwharetoa as the waters called forth by their tipuna Tongariro. They possessed these and other lakes and rivers of the region, they were taonga, and thus article 2 guaranteed their rangatiratanga over, and the possession of, their lakes and rivers. The guarantee extended to what, in fact, Ngati Tuwharetoa possessed, in terms of their tikanga, and this was the water resource, not merely the beds of the lakes and rivers.

In reply to the Crown on the issue of hydroelectricity, Ms Feint pointed out that the Ngati Tuwharetoa claim is
not founded upon a right to generate hydroelectricity per se, but on the ‘irrefutable principle that proprietary rights in a water resource must include the right to develop the resource’. She further submitted that, while there is a compelling national objective in developing hydroelectric infrastructure, it cannot be assumed that the national interest gives the Crown unfettered rights to exercise its kawanatanga powers. The exercise of kawanatanga is qualified by the Crown’s obligation to guarantee rangatiratanga. It was submitted that the Crown had a duty to obtain Ngati Tuwharetoa’s agreement to the use of their taonga for such major development, and to explore ways in which Ngati Tuwharetoa’s Treaty interests could be provided for.17

The hapu of the Hikawai confederation or Tauhara hapu of Ngati Tuwharetoa were separately represented by Martin Taylor and Donna Hall. They say they have always had the right in customary terms to manage their own affairs.18 These hapu supported Ms Feint’s generic submission on the issues, adding that they at all times exercised rangatiratanga and control over their waterways, equating to a form of ownership.19 This control included those aspects of Lake Taupo over which they exercised rangatiratanga.20 They refer to Lake Taupo as Taupo Moana.21 Other claimants from the Tauhara hapu were represented by Hemi Te Nahu, who submitted that Lake Taupo was a taonga highly significant to the Tauhara hapu because it was and still is held in the highest regard as a symbol of who the Tauhara hapu are.22 The same claim to rangatiratanga over those parts of the lake under their authority was also made.23

Ngati Tutemohuta (claims clustered under the Nga Hapu a Tauhara Middle Charitable Trust) were represented by Aidan Warren. He submitted that Ngati Tutemohuta were concerned about Crown policies, actions, omissions, and legislation that impacted on their waters and other resources and which excluded them from the management of their environment.24 Ngati Wheoro of Tuwharetoa claim interests on the western side of Lake Taupo and were independently represented by Mr Warren.

Other customary groups claiming an interest in Lake Taupo presented submissions. Ngati Hikairo, represented by Kensington Swan, with close links to Tuwharetoa, claim interests at the southern end of Lake Taupo. Te Takere o Nga Wai, represented by Annette Sykes and Jason Pou, also presented evidence and submissions supporting the generic submissions of Ms Feint.

All the Tauhara hapu, Ngati Tutemohuta, Ngati Hikairo and Ngati Wheoro, and Te Takere o Nga Wai adopted the generic submissions of Ms Feint on waterways and Lake Taupo, to the extent that they did not differ from their own specific submissions. Therefore, to them all, Lake Taupo was a taonga. Their submissions in relation to its fisheries were also consistent with Ms Feint.

In that regard, Ms Feint submitted that freshwater fisheries and species are a vital resource to Central North Island hapu and iwi, and that they remain an integral part of the whakapapa and customary practices of those hapu and iwi.25 The relative infertility of the lands around Lake Taupo meant that the freshwater fisheries were very important to the traditional economy.26 These freshwater fisheries, Ms Feint contended, were regarded as taonga protected by the Treaty and were important in maintaining knowledge and customs.27 That protection included the fish, the fishing grounds, their significance to personal and tribal identity, and the fishery as a source of emotional and spiritual strength. Furthermore, Crown actions have polluted and degraded indigenous fisheries, leading to a depletion of stocks, and have been undertaken without the consent of the hapu and iwi of Taupo.28

Ngati Raukawa claimed that they have interests on the western side of Lake Taupo. The hapu who claim interests in the Taupo district call their ancestral rohe Te Pae o Raukawa.29 Kiriana Tan noted that in western Taupo there has been a lot of intermarriage between Raukawa and Tuwharetoa.30 This dates back to the marriage of Te Atainutai and Waitapu. Despite this intermarriage, Ngati Raukawa say that each of the hapu have maintained their own identity and acknowledge their whakapapa from their Ngati Raukawa and Ngati Tuwharetoa ancestors.31 But because Raukawa was not named as a descent tipuna during the Tauponuiatia application hearings (discussed in
parts II and III), this, she submitted, has led to the marginalisation of Ngati Raukawa interests in relation to Lake Taupo. A consequence of this omission has been that the Crown has assumed that Ngati Tuwharetoa is the only iwi that needs to be consulted about the lake. In reply submissions, Ngati Raukawa pointed to a further example of their marginalisation in the Crown’s closing submissions, which did not acknowledge Lake Taupo as a taonga of any iwi other than Ngati Tuwharetoa.

The Crown’s case

The Crown acknowledged the importance of Lake Taupo as a taonga to Ngati Tuwharetoa. It has agreed with all claimants, such as Ngati Tuwharetoa, that lakes and rivers are taonga, highly significant to Maori well-being and ways of life. The Crown has also accepted that the relationship between Maori and their taonga ‘exists beyond mere ownership, use, or exclusive possession; it concerns personal and tribal identity, Maori authority and control, and the right to continuous access, subject to Maori cultural preferences’. In addition, it accepts the importance of water as a resource to both economic development and the tangata whenua. The parties, therefore, agree that the taonga were subject to Maori authority and control, that they were vital to the claimants’ personal and tribal identity, and that Maori cultural preferences must be taken into account. This agreement between the parties is helpful.

The Crown also raised the impact of the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act 1992, noting that we have no jurisdiction in relation to commercial fisheries but acknowledging that we can consider issues relating to customary fisheries.

The Tribunal’s analysis

We do not think that there can be any criticism of the Crown’s acknowledgement of the importance of Lake Taupo as a taonga to the claimants. The historical record is clear that Ngati Tuwharetoa did consider it a taonga over which they exercised rangatiratanga. To some extent that makes our job easier. However, the Crown’s submissions do not go so far as to recognise explicitly that the waters of Lake Taupo are also part of that taonga. Nor do they accept that the tribe has a proprietary interest in those waters. In this section of the chapter, therefore, we summarise some of the important and defining evidence of what Taupo Maori mean when they discuss Lake Taupo and its waters as taonga.

Whilst acknowledging that Lake Taupo is a taonga of Ngati Tuwharetoa, it is not so clear what the Crown can acknowledge in terms of Ngati Raukawa and any other iwi with interests around the lake. That will depend very much on the outcome of further research, beyond that available for this stage one inquiry. For the purposes of this report, the Tribunal can only acknowledge that there are iwi and hapu with whakapapa from both Tuwharetoa and other tupuna bordering the lake. If it is later shown that their interests extended into Lake Taupo through Raukawa or any other tupuna rather than Tuwharetoa, then our general analysis and findings below apply equally to them as distinct customary groups.

Consequently, although we refer only to Ngati Tuwharetoa below, we do so with that caveat. Upon that basis, our discussion and findings cannot be described as confirming that Ngati Tuwharetoa held exclusive rights in Lake Taupo as at 1840. However, our discussion and findings can be used by Ngati Tuwharetoa to confirm that they had a predominant interest and that they, with their whanaunga, held exclusive rights in Lake Taupo and its waters as at 1840. We turn now to explain why.

Lake Taupo and its waters – the taonga

We heard from Ngati Tuwharetoa that Lake Taupo-nui-a-Tia and the waters of its hinterland are part of the physical and spiritual sustenance of Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga who border the lake. The imagery contained in the name is that of a tough black and yellow cloak that envelopes and protects. We were told of the ancestor Tia and his followers, exploring inland after their arrival from
Hawaiiki. Tia found this great body of water and camped beside it at Hamaria. The cliff face there resembled Tia’s cloak and the name Taupo-nui-a-Tia was given to the lake. Hapu around the lake have different stories about its creation. Mataara Wall shared his traditions with us, in which the lake was created by Ngatoroirangi. Chris Winitana explained other Tuwharetoa traditions, in which the lake and rivers were created by Tongariro. All accounts agree, however, that the taonga were created by the tupuna for their descendants.

The ancestral relationship between the Ngati Tuwharetoa claimants and the waters of Taupo and Tongariro are strong and intimate. Mr Winitana described Taupo-nui-a-Tia as the spiritual womb of Ngati Tuwharetoa:

Its waters are as amniotic fluid, life giving, cherishing, fundamental.
Ko Taupo-nui-a-Tia.44

Sean Ellison, for Te Takere o Nga Wai, provided a complementary perspective from the northern end of the lake. He spoke of the waters at the lake outlet and the spiritual links between lake and river. He described the journey from this world to the next. Mr Ellison told the Tribunal:

According to tradition, when a member of Ngati Tuwharetoa dies, Horomatangi takes him or her around the shores of Taupo-nui-a-Tia, entering the Waikato River at its headwaters at Nukuhau. From there the spirit of the deceased follows the river to its mouth, and continues on to Rerenga Wairua, the departure place of the souls of the dead, and returns to Hawaiiki. We of the Hikuwai stand at the gateway of the glittering sea of Taupo-nui-a-Tia – at the point of departure, and the point of entry. Here we have our taniwha, our spiritual guardians, the energy centres of the land, the lake and the river, which interconnect with other energy centres throughout the extent of our mother lying here, Papatuanuku. The links and connections embraced within the term whanaungatanga are not limited solely to blood or biological ties.45

Mr Winitana expanded on the spiritual attachment to the lake:

My Inland Sea, my medicinal waters offered as a gift by My Mountain; the foam and spray maker of the wake of Te Reporepo, the emblem canoe of the tribe; the womb of my existence as the cherishing waters are to the embryo; the seat of my emotions that ripple and wave in the ceaseless lapping tides of survival; the mirror of my soul upon which I reflect; my waterfall that carves the face of the earth; that renews me, restores me, rebirths me; my lake that represents the pool of life, and I but one drop; enjoined forever.46

The practicalities of this relationship are expressed in terms of customary rights and tikanga. Mr Winitana explained that each hapu living around the lake held overlapping rights that enabled them to use it for travel by canoe, which was the most effective form of travel at the time. They could also use their parts of the lake for the gathering and harvesting of plant and fish foods, and use the water for everyday uses as well as for healing and for religious rites.47 The source of their authority and right to use the lake, its water, and its aquatic life was the fact that the Taupo waterways were created for the benefit of the tribe as the descendants of the ancestors.48 This, the claimants believe, ‘conveys absolute rights of control and authority over the resource, but also obligations to conserve, nurture and protect the resource’.49 Mr Winitana was direct and succinct at this point: ‘don’t pollute it, don’t abuse it, don’t over-use it’.50 As part of their authority and rights over – and spiritual, ancestral relationship with – these taonga, Ngati Tuwharetoa believe that they own the water, as a resource which flows through their streams and rivers.51

In the worldview of Central North Island Maori, as described to us by the tangata whenua witnesses and in technical evidence, waterways and fisheries were taonga, indivisible, and the subject not just of rights but of relationships (including a spiritual dimension).

**Fisheries as taonga**

The importance of fisheries for the claimants was expressed before us by a number of witnesses. Both Mr Wall and Mr
Winitana related to us the creation of fish in the lake by Ngatoroirangi, in which he cast shreds of his cloak into the waters. These origin traditions account for the absence of eels in the lake (the first feather turned into an eel, which died), and the relationship between the native fish in the lake. First created was the koaro, and other fish ‘such as the inanga, kokopu and koura whakapapa to the koaro’.

These fish are the kai rangatira of Tuwharetoa (the delicacies that the tribe is famous for). The evidence of Ben White, Lennie and Ira Johns, and Suzanne Doig draws on the Native Land Court and other written records to outline the historical fisheries and fishing practices in the lake and rivers. We can supplement this material with Sir John Grace’s published account based on written and oral sources.

From these books and reports, we note that a volcanic eruption in AD 186 left the lake bereft of fish, leading Maori to reintroduce indigenous fish species to Lake Taupo. Mr White ties this to the traditions of Ngatoroirangi, outlined to us by Mr Wall and Mr Winitana.

The scientific evidence of Ian Kusabs also supports the evidence of the claimants. He noted that there were only a limited number of freshwater species found in Lake Taupo. His evidence was that there is some confusion over whitebait, because in Pakeha classificatory terms there is only one indigenous whitebait species present: the koaro (Galaxias brevipinnis). In 1919, the Reverend Fletcher said that two other whitebait species, kokopu and inanga, were also present, but this was because he confused the adult koaro with the kokopu. The juvenile koaro was confused with inanga. Mr Kusabs said that kokopu and inanga were never present, but noted that Maori often applied different names to a species of fish at different stages of its development. The koaro was also known as the kowaro, kokopu, hawai (black kokopu), kakawai (black kokopu), rewai (a large kokopu), and inanga. The juveniles of the koaro were ‘more commonly known as inanga’. Grace used the names ‘kokopu’ and ‘inanga’ for the adults and juveniles of the same species of galaxiid that Mr Kusabs referred to when he used the name ‘koaro’. We accept that there were a variety of names, according to time and place, but that the main native species in the lake and rivers are known to
Maori today as koaro, kokopu, inanga, koura (freshwater crayfish), and kakahi (freshwater mussels).

Although there were relatively few species in the lake, they existed in great numbers and were a very important part of the Ngati Tuwharetoa economy. Most fishing grounds, according to evidence in the Native Land Court, were close to shore (though the deeper parts of the lake were also fished). They were adjacent to particular kainga and beaches, and were under the authority, use, and management of hapu. Dr Doig notes that customary authority was exercised over the lake and its fisheries in the same way as over land, and that the hapu interests were exclusive – others were allowed to fish, but only by permission.58

We had oral evidence from Mataara Wall, who described how his hapu established kainga along the lakefront to use its resources, including native fish. He explained customary fishing techniques, and that every whanau along the eastern side of the lake had their own waka, which were used to fish and also for transport. Most of their permanent settlements were on the lake shores because of the abundance of resources, but the people moved inland to the forests during winter to exploit those resources, returning to the lake for spring and summer. With the clearing of the native forests, the introduction of Pakeha foods, and the sale of lands, this vital cycle declined.59

**Tino rangatiratanga over taonga**

The claimants in our inquiry described the nature of their tino rangatiratanga over the lake, its waters, and its fisheries. In their view, authority and customary rights were exercised over waterways as they were over the land and its resources. Mr Winitana spoke of the nature of Ngati Tuwharetoa’s customary use rights over Lake Taupo waters and fisheries as follows:

> Our customary practices involving our waterways were as defined as those which dictated land and forest utilisation. Each hapu around the lake and dissecting rivers held rights over the same. These rights allowed them to utilise the water resources in a number of generic ways:

(a) for travel by canoe, the most effective way to journey around the central plateau region

(b) for the gathering and harvesting of food resources such as the taking of kokopu, inanga, kakahi, koura and koaro

(c) for matters of daily usage such as drinking, washing, bathing, healing, swimming

(d) for matters of special ceremonial significance such as baptismal rites, war party rites, other karakia rites.60
Authority over the lake and its fisheries was exercised according to customary law, which included reciprocal arrangements with other iwi from outside the district. One such arrangement was with Ngati Porou. Jock Barrett gave us an example, where Ngati Porou would come visiting with gifts of crayfish and ‘we would give them access to the lake to go out and fish koaro . . . They were bartering days, no money exchanged hands.’ It was no great stretch, therefore, for Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga to extend their customary authority to European anglers when they arrived in the district.

Tino rangatiratanga – and, in the English, exclusive possession – was guaranteed in the Treaty. Taupo Maori claimed ‘ownership’ of the lake, its water, and its fisheries once British law became established and their authority was questioned. When Maori authority was disputed by settlers in the early twentieth century, for example, the tribes put forward their claims in unequivocal language. In 1903, Wi Parata, speaking on behalf of all the Maori electorates, told the House that Maori owned rivers, lakes, seas, and fish, and that the ‘water belongs to the Maori along with the fish that is in it.’  

In 1905, Tuwharetoa petitioned Parliament:

Let that Lake [Rotoaira] remain as a sanctuary for the beautiful fish of our ancestors, as all our (other) lakes and streams are now full of these Pakeha fish, (and) they have destroyed our fish which were assured to us by the Treaty of Waitangi; and we are prevented by law, and punished, if we go to kill these Pakeha fish, even though the lakes and streams in which these fish live are our own property.

In 1913, the tribe again petitioned Parliament, stating: ‘The Taupo-nui-a-Tia lake, where these trout fish occur, belongs to us the Maori of Taupo – absolutely.’

Under the Treaty, therefore, Tuwharetoa claimed legal ownership of their taonga – the lake, its waters, and its aquatic life. It was no light matter for Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga when the Crown and settlers began to introduce exotic fish and to assert a different law – common and statute law – and a different authority – that of the Crown – over the Lake Taupo waters in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In this regard, Mr Wall told us that, over time, ‘with the arrival of the Crown, trout and other foreign things, our responsibilities to care for the lake have been affected.’ For Maori people, this is a serious matter. Paranapa Otimi noted the decimation of Tuwharetoa’s customary fisheries in the twentieth century, and with it the loss of food supplies, associated knowledge and ritual, and mana:

The loss of knowledge is the loss of kaitiakitanga. The loss of those food resources is considered to be the fault of the hapu and the fault of the people as the kaitiaki of those taonga.

Tino rangatiratanga carried with it the corresponding obligation to care for and conserve the taonga. Tuatea Smallman explained how his people are the kaitiaki for the Tongariro River, one of the Taupo waters:

The role of kaitiaki is hard to describe in Pakeha terms, but it means something akin to being a caretaker over the land, waters and all our taonga (treasures). This role emanates from what I term the ‘departmental gods,’ or kaitiaki who protect our taonga. Those kaitiaki watch over us, but we have to play our role too. As tangata whenua we are charged with the responsibility of protecting and caring for our taonga . . . We are, and always will be, kaitiaki of the mauri of the taonga. It is not an empty role, it is very much a tangible role, and it is the essence of our beings as tangata whenua. These rights were enshrined in the Articles of the Treaty. It is not the right of the Crown, its Agents or its vassals to diminish this right.

Also, in the claimants’ view, tino rangatiratanga was not limited to how they possessed, used, and managed the taonga as at 1840. They asserted legal ownership, as we noted above, and they adapted their customary authority to include settlers, as the Treaty had envisaged. Further, the claimants argued that the leaders and experts of the tribe had always developed practices in the light of new or changing conditions. Mr Winitana placed a great deal of
importance on this point, which he equated with a right of development:

Any attempt to minimise that utilisation by straight-jacketing it to perceived traditional usages would be hotly contended. We argue that our traditional knowledge base has always been time adjusted and tested, it is not a closed system. It has always been incumbent on our experts to ensure that we are undertaking our activities in the best possible way with the best available resources. Just as happened a thousand years ago when some of our ancestors arrived here to this new land and a new knowledge of living had to be worked through, so too will it happen a thousand years later with other new knowledges now available.

The Tribunal's findings

As a result of the evidence we heard, we find that Lake Taupo waters and fresh water fisheries were taonga, exclusively possessed by Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga and over which they exercised tino rangatiratanga as at 1840. Therefore, the Crown did have a duty to actively protect both the taonga, Lake Taupo waters and fisheries, and Ngati Tuwharetoa's rangatiratanga over them. That rangatiratanga consisted of:

- possession of the taonga;
- authority over the taonga;
- a cultural and spiritual relationship with the taonga; and
- responsibility to care for the taonga.

All of these things were guaranteed and protected by the Treaty.

The Crown's Role of Active Protection

**Key Question:** Did the Crown actively protect the taonga of the Lake Taupo waters and its fisheries and the exercise of rangatiratanga over them?

The answer to this broad question is enormously complex and requires, first, a consideration of events leading to the negotiations over Lake Taupo that occurred over the period from 1910 to 1926. It also requires reviewing the nature of the interaction that took place between the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa from 1924 to 1926 resulting in the enactment of the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926. This was the Act which vested the bed of Lake Taupo in the Crown, along with the bed of the Waikato River as far as the Huka Falls, and which enabled a similar vesting – by ensuing proclamation of the Governor-General – of the beds of the lake's tributary rivers and streams (or portions thereof). By the same legislation and subsequent proclamation, the Crown vested in itself the right to use and control the waters flowing over those various beds. Secondly, we must consider the Crown's control of the lake for hydroelectric purposes, and the impacts of its actions on the Taupo waters and on Ngati Tuwharetoa and their neighbours bordering the lake.

We begin by giving a general summary of the arguments made by claimants and the Crown on the broad question above. We then move into the specific related questions at issue and relevant arguments made by the parties, followed by our analysis and findings on the issues.

The claimant's case

As we noted above, Ngati Tuwharetoa contend that they have the right to control access to and use of Lake Taupo. They also contend that they have proprietary rights to Lake Taupo waters. They argued that the harnessing of their taonga by the Crown for hydro development and
its resulting impacts on the hydrology of Lake Taupo was a breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The resulting negative impacts on the rivers and waters of Lake Taupo and the surrounding lands, and the imposition of a foreign resource management system, have denigrated Maori rangatiratanga and Maori values and beliefs that were protected by the Treaty.69

Rather than actively protecting the tino rangatiratanga of Maori, as required by the Treaty, the Crown has, through various actions, omissions, and legislation, removed from them their possession and control of their waterways. The claimants have not knowingly and willingly relinquished those rights to the Crown, as required by the Treaty. Despite the expropriation of Maori property rights in Lake Taupo waters, the claimants do not concede that Maori customary rights in water have been extinguished in terms of the Treaty and the law.70

The Crown’s case

To understand the Crown’s position on this issue, one has to identify the different strands of argument made by the Crown. In general terms, not specifically dealing with Lake Taupo, the Crown believes that there is insufficient evidence before this Tribunal to conduct a comprehensive review of the Crown’s regulation and delegation over lakes and waterways.71 The Crown further contended that the subject of claims and evidence in this inquiry reflects the tension between the Crown’s overall governance responsibility on behalf of the entire community (including Maori), and Maori concerns that rangatiratanga rights in respect of taonga be respected.72 The Crown sees the tension between article 1 and article 2 as calling for a balance to be struck between them.73

Consequently, the Crown argued that the guarantee of rangatiratanga is not an absolute one.74 There are, it was submitted, often multiple interests in the natural resources of the Central North Island and any management regime must carefully weigh the competing interests.75 The Resource Management Act 1991 achieves this.

The Crown has acknowledged that Lake Taupo is a taonga of Ngati Tuwharetoa.76 It has stated that the claims relating to Lake Taupo are multiple and complex.77 The Crown chose not to respond to all issues detailed in the claimants’ closing submissions. There are aspects that, in the Crown’s view, could be dealt with in negotiations.78

The Crown pointed out that, since 1926, when the Tuwharetoa Trust Board was created, there has been a relatively significant level of dialogue and consultation between the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa in relation to the lake. On the Crown’s side, this has often involved senior Ministers of the Crown.79 But the Crown has not conceded that Ngati Tuwharetoa have a right to own or control rights of access over and use of natural waters.80 Nor does it accept that Maori have a right at law to determine its use for the purposes of hydro development. That right, it was contended, is vested in the Crown, who allocates after carefully balancing all competing interests.81 That is because the development of hydroelectricity in the Lake Taupo and Waikato River catchment has a substantial and compelling national interest objective, which justified, in Treaty terms, the infringement of Ngati Tuwharetoa’s interests in the water resources of the region. The Crown contended that the issue of ownership of water is therefore not the critical issue. Rather, in the Crown’s view the critical issue is how the Crown dealt with Ngati Tuwharetoa in relation to the development of the hydro infrastructure.82

Further questions

Before we can discuss whether or not the Crown has actively protected the taonga of the Lake Taupo waters and Ngati Tuwharetoa’s rangatiratanga over them, we must examine a series of questions arising from Crown actions (or inactions) in respect of Lake Taupo:

► Did Ngati Tuwharetoa consent to the introduction of trout into Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers? What was the impact on Ngati Tuwharetoa of that introduction, and of the Crown’s assumption at the outset of the right to regulate the fishery?
Why did the Crown embark on negotiations with Ngati Tuwharetoa about Lake Taupo in 1924? Were the Crown’s negotiations with Maori about the lake conducted, and concluded, in good faith?

Were the 1926 agreement and its enacting legislation ‘fair and reasonable’ in the circumstances and consistent with the Treaty?

The introduction of trout into Lake Taupo waters

Did Ngati Tuwharetoa consent to the introduction of trout into Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers? What was the impact on Ngati Tuwharetoa of that introduction, and of the Crown’s assumption at the outset of the right to regulate the fishery?

We begin our analysis with this question, because the issue of customary fishing rights predates the 1926 agreement between Ngati Tuwharetoa and the Crown. In many respects, the introduction of trout became a defining moment in the history of Tuwharetoa and Crown relations.

In order to understand this point, we need to review the history of introduced fish species in Taupo waterways. It seems that, in many ways, nineteenth-century settlers wanted to recreate a ‘Britain of the South’ after they arrived here, in which the game species (including sporting fish) of the home country would be transferred to the colony. It has been argued that they considered New Zealand’s lakes and rivers to be virtually ‘empty’, because indigenous fish did not provide either acceptable eating or a sporting challenge. Consequently, they decided which species to introduce, and what laws would govern their management and the right to take them. In Taupo, the most important introductions would be trout and carp. By the introduction of trout, Lake Taupo and its tributaries have become a world-famous angling water-system.

According to Ben White, brown trout first became prolific at Taupo after the Hawke’s Bay Acclimatisation Society released large numbers in 1892, with financial aid from the Government. They were well established by the end of the 1890s, and local hotels were promoting trout fishing in the lake and its tributaries. In 1900, the Government was supposedly petitioned to release rainbow trout, in a petition signed by both Maori and Pakeha ‘Taupo residents’, because brown trout were too hard to catch for most anglers. Again, there is uncertainty over the exact date of introduction. The Auckland Acclimatisation Society released rainbow trout in 1899, 1901, and 1902, but both Pat Burstall and Ian Kusabs date the main introduction to 1903. Thousands of ova were released from 1905 to 1907, establishing rainbow trout as the dominant fish species in the lake. By 1911 anglers were coming from all around the world to catch them.

The claimants’ case

The claimants argued that Taupo waters and fisheries came to prominence between the Crown and Maori because of the Crown’s introduction of imported fish (trout). Maori protested at the effects of that introduction on their fisheries, but also charged anglers for access to the new fishery. In response to pressure from anglers and tourism development, the Crown sought to enter into negotiations with Ngati Tuwharetoa over access to Lake Taupo between 1924 and 1926.

In effect, the case for Ngati Tuwharetoa is that they had little choice but to incorporate trout into their customary way of life. Ngati Tuwharetoa claim they were not consulted over the introduction of exotic species into Lake Taupo waters. Once trout were introduced, the species aggressively, as a predator, reduced the customary fishery. Consequently, customary practices concerning the indigenous fishery were lost. In this regard, Karen Feint submitted that the introduction and management by the Crown and its agents of exotic fish such as trout has detrimentally affected the prevalence, quality, and viability of customary fisheries. Furthermore, the legislative framework that regulated customary fisheries cut across the ability of Maori to determine how they would control and use not
only their customary fisheries but also the trout resource. It also diminished their ability to maintain their traditional customs for collecting indigenous fish and other freshwater species.  

Ms Feint submitted that the agreement between the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa regarding Lake Taupo completed in 1926 was contingent upon Maori maintaining secure access to fishing rights and negotiating rights of way to fishing grounds.  

The 1926 agreement allotted the tribe a number of free licences to fish for trout. In the claimants’ view, this point, and the fact that trout have been incorporated into Ngati Tuwharetoa’s way of life, cannot be used to deny the negative impact of exotic fish on the tribe and on their taonga, the indigenous fisheries. Nor did it mitigate Tuwharetoa’s loss of authority over the lake and its fisheries, which occurred following the agreement and the unilateral action of the Crown in vesting the bed of the lake (and the right to use the waters) in itself. In reply to the Crown, Ms Feint submitted that the ongoing benefits of the 1926 agreement cannot justify the Crown vesting title to the bed in itself, as this was not needed to ensure that access for anglers (the supposed point of the agreement) could proceed.  

In the claimants’ view, the 1926 agreement led to more than the loss of ownership of the lakebed. It led to a chain of circumstances that shut Ngati Tuwharetoa out of the decision-making in relation to their access to indigenous fisheries and control of their resources. While it is true that the Crown enacted legislation and regulations vesting the sole right to take whitebait, koura, or other fish indigenous to New Zealand exclusively in Maori, this was meaningless given that the Crown did not do enough to arrest the impact of trout on indigenous species or the decline of the indigenous fisheries. Further, the Crown has been involved in key environmental changes that have damaged the claimants’ customary fisheries and it did little to arrest those impacts either. Ms Feint submitted that this was a breach of the Treaty principle of active protection.  

The Crown's case
The Crown argued, first, that there are parameters on what this Tribunal can consider in terms of fishing rights. The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 provided for the full and final settlement of all claims based directly or indirectly on Maori rights and interests in commercial fishing. The relevant definition of commercial fishing is in section 2 of the Fisheries Act 1983, meaning ‘taking fish for sale’. This applies to freshwater commercial fishing, as confirmed by the High Court in 2000. The Waitangi Tribunal, therefore, has no jurisdiction to consider claims relating to commercial fishing, or ‘any enactment that relates to commercial fishing or commercial fisheries’. The Tribunal may inquire into non-commercial Maori customary fishing, which is regulated under section 10 of the 1992 Act.  

In terms of the Crown's statutory management and control over indigenous species, the Crown argued that the historical picture is complex. There is ‘simply very little evidence relating to either the implementation of particular statutory powers of management or control over indigenous species, or of the practical outcomes of any such powers’.  

In terms of exotic species, the Crown noted that the participation of Ngati Tuwharetoa in the management and revenue of the trout fishing resource is the best-known example of iwi participation in such arrangements. The history of this arrangement, however, has not been the subject of detailed evidence. The Crown submitted, therefore, that such issues must remain matters for investigation in any future stages of this inquiry. It noted, however, that considerable ongoing benefits have flowed to Tuwharetoa as a result of the 1926 agreement (see below).  

The Tribunal’s analysis
Jurisdiction: As we noted above, the Crown submitted that the Tribunal may inquire into Treaty claims regarding non-commercial Maori customary fishing, but that
our jurisdiction is otherwise constrained by the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. We deal with this submission in our findings below.

The impact of trout: In the evidence before this Tribunal, Taupo Maori immediately assumed control and use of introduced fish. The pattern was set before the introduction of trout, when the local head of the Armed Constabulary released goldfish in 1873, which Maori named morihana (Morrison) in his honour. The import was incorporated in the food supplies and customary fishing practices of local hapu, to the extent that it became, in the words of Ringakapo Asher Payne, ‘a great delicacy of the Maori people’. Merle Ormsby explained how her people used traditional methods to catch morihana in the Tokaanu Stream, and that it was so valued as to be incorporated into their rongoa (customary health practices).

Dan Staite told us, also, of how he fished for morihana as well as eels in the Waiotapu River.

The introduction (by Pakeha) and incorporation (by Maori) of morihana set the pattern for the exercise of tino rangatiratanga over imported fisheries. Nor was this confined to any one period. Maori have continued to fish for food throughout, and whenever there was a new introduction, it was incorporated into customary fishing if at all feasible (or palatable). Robert McDowall, for example, reports that sailfin molly were introduced at Lake Taupo sometime before 1970, and reintroduced in the 1970s, and that Maori caught this fish for food.

But the most important introduction was the trout, which has established the lake and its tributaries as a world-famous angling spot. In our view, there were three main (and fairly immediate) consequences for Maori from the introduction of trout:

- The rapid growth of trout was only possible because the koaro were an abundant and easily accessible food source. Trout predation led to such a decline in this species that trout were in trouble by 1912, forcing the culling of trout to try to match its reduced food supply. By the early 1920s, this achieved a temporary recovery for trout, but the species declined again from 1927. The Department of Internal Affairs then introduced an alternative food supply, the common smelt, from 1934 to 1940. Smelt then became the most important food for trout. The effect on koaro, which were critical to Maori food supply and culture, was permanent. The koaro cannot sustain any significant fishing today.

- To replace the indigenous fish in their way of life, Maori began to incorporate trout into their food supplies and customary fishing practices (as they had already done with the morihana). The customary adoption of trout was perhaps the slowest development, as trout were not at first very palatable to Tuwharetoa. Smelt was added to the diet as well, under the generic name of inanga, although it was not as prized as the juvenile koaro because of its cucumber scent.

- Mr White points out that although acclimatisation societies and then Government departments claimed legal control of the trout fishery, Tuwharetoa also controlled ‘large parts’ of it by their ability to control access. As the main landowners around the lake and along the riverbanks, the tribe began to guide anglers
to the best fishing spots, and charge them for camping and access to fishing. We consider this to have been a valid extension of customary practices, where hapu allowed others access to their fishery in return for an equivalent, as we noted from the evidence of Jock Barrett (see above). We will return to the charging of anglers below.

All three forms of the impact from the introduction of trout – reduction of Maori customary fisheries, the incorporation of trout instead of traditional fish species, and the profiting from Pakeha angling – brought Taupo Maori into a direct contest with the Crown for control and management of the waterways and their fisheries. That is why the Ngati Tuwharetoa claim to this Tribunal focuses on the introduction and management of trout, and its impact on what they called the ‘kai rangatira’ of Maori, as a key grievance concerning their ability to control their waterways and fisheries.

The Crown, on the other hand, has queried whether there is sufficient evidence, including scientific evidence, for the Tribunal to reach a view on such matters. The evidence before us from several fisheries experts accords with the position of the Crown that there is little scientific data on the impact of introduced fish on indigenous species. Nonetheless, the technical evidence we considered (from Messrs McDowall, Burstall, and Kusabs) is confident that trout predation was responsible for the massive decline of koaro in Lake Taupo and its tributaries. Mr McDowall and Mr Kusabs also note that competition from Government-introduced smelt may have further depressed the numbers of that taonga, one of the kai rangatira of Tuwharetoa.

Environmental degradation in later years had a significant impact on all species, but the experts seem to agree that the fate of the koaro was already sealed. Mr McDowall points to studies indicating that trout can have a harmful effect on koura populations, and these were another taonga of the claimants. We see no reason to doubt the assessment of these fisheries experts.

Their expert opinion conforms with the observations of many at the time, and indeed this situation was brought to the attention of the Government most urgently by Ngati Tuwharetoa. Therefore, we do not accept the Crown’s submission that there is insufficient evidence about the impact of trout on the claimants’ indigenous fisheries. Rather, there is compelling evidence about the issue and the Crown’s knowledge of it, as our discussion in this section will show.

As early as the 1880s, the official reports of Alexander Mackay were tabled in Parliament, describing how the stocking of South Island lakes and rivers was interfering with Maori fishing and food supplies, in part because of the regulations preventing them from fishing in the traditional manner and at traditional times. In 1897, Rotorua Maori complained that they were losing their valued food supplies because of trout. In 1902, the situation of Tuwharetoa was drawn directly to the attention of Parliament. During the debate on the Fisheries Conservation Bill, Hone Heke reported that:

complaints have been sent to me by the Native hapu residing on the borders of Lake Taupo. They allege that the
introduction of fish into that water has resulted in the imported fish consuming the whitebait, koura, and kokopu. This also refers to the koura in Lake Rotorua . . . that has been the recognised result as far as the Natives are concerned. They also complain that the crayfish are being destroyed by the imported fish. The crayfish of Lake Taupo and Lake Rotorua are a very fine and delicate fish, and I think the Natives rightly complain. They further say they cannot acquire the taste of the imported fish, and that it is nothing at all compared with the delicacy and taste of the whitebait and the crayfish, which is the original fish of these waters. I would suggest for the consideration of the Acting-Premier that some means may be afforded the Natives for the purpose of trying to decrease the number of the imported fish by allowing them to catch the fish.112

An unnamed member then interjected that Maori should take out licences. Heke replied that that would not be a satisfactory solution. He described how Maori fished for trout in shallow and deeper water (using flies, nets, and a kind of sieve).113 What Taupo Maori wanted, in effect, was to be able to control both fisheries, conserving and rescuing their indigenous fish by culling trout.114

The issue was squarely before Parliament, because another member read out a letter from Rotorua Maori claiming that their fishing rights were protected by the Treaty, that imported fish were killing off the indigenous fish in Lake Rotorua, and that they should be able to fish for the new species and sell them to Pakeha (as they were not good to eat). The Government’s response was that the right to fish for free was restricted to ‘water bounded on both sides by the land of one owner’, but even so, such owners needed to be required to obey regulations instituting closed seasons.115 This right to fish for free could have been extended to Maori, as Heke asked, but no action was taken.

Given Heke’s report of Maori complaints in the Central North Island region, it is surprising that Ngati Tuwharetoa should have supported a petition, in 1900, seeking the release of rainbow trout into their lake and rivers (see above). On closer examination, however, it appears that the only source for this petition is a 1937 paper by Cecil Whitney, who claimed to have circulated a petition among both Pakeha and Maori of Taupo, ‘signed by everyone’, asking the Auckland Acclimatisation Society to stock the lake and rivers with rainbow trout.116 It may not have been an official petition to the Crown at all, and it was not reported by a select committee in 1900 or 1901.117 Curiously, it was Whitney himself who funded the Auckland society’s first releases of rainbow trout – for which he claimed to have arranged this petition.118 Also, Tony Walzl mentions that this Whitney is the fanatical angler who secretly released trout into Lake Rotoaira in violation of the Government’s promise to Tuwharetoa. He claimed to have done it in 1900 with the support of local Maori, which they strongly denied having given.119 This casts considerable doubt on the reliability of Whitney’s claim to have presented a petition with Maori support, especially given that petitions of 1905 and 1913 (see below) were to the opposite effect. In the absence of a more credible source, and in light of the countervailing petitions provided to us, we do not accept that Maori supported a 1900 petition for the release of rainbow trout.

In 1903, the year of the introduction of rainbow trout, the issue was before Parliament again. The Fisheries Conservation Bill of that year will be considered further below, when we assess the legislation governing fishing, but here we note Wi Parata’s plea that Maori Treaty rights be given expression by enabling them to fish for food without a licence, regardless of species. In response, several members recognised that there were Treaty rights affected by fisheries legislation, that native fish stocks had been impacted by introduced species, and that vital Maori food supplies had been damaged or destroyed. There were some suggestions that, as a result, Maori should not have to pay for licences to fish for the new species, and that something could and should be done to conserve native fish stocks. Walter Buchanan, for example, was sympathetic to Maori,
stating that their native fish had been ‘gobbled up to a very large extent by the imported trout’, and suggesting that ‘we should help the Native race as far as we possibly can to conserve their fish good, and not to interfere, if possible, with their methods of fishing’.120

It was not inconceivable at the turn of the century, therefore, for Parliament to have acted on the Treaty guarantees with regard to fishing, to have done something to conserve native fish in the face of predation by introduced species, and to have recognised Maori fishing rights by reserving them free fishing for all species in all waterways.121 But governments did not act on these possibilities.

We note in particular the concepts advanced by William Field, the member for Otaki, who agreed with Parata that the provisions of the Treaty were:

too apt to be forgotten in the legislation of this Parliament. It is unmistakable that in that treaty there is preserved to the Natives the right to fish freely in all rivers, streams, and lakes of the colony . . . for their food, and it is only right that the terms of that great treaty, under which the Natives practically gave up their lands to the Europeans, and which they regard and rightly regard, as the Magna Charta of their rights and liberties so far as land is concerned, should be strictly adhered to. The Natives should undoubtedly have the free right to fish for native fish, at any rate, in the streams of the colony; and if it is true that the imported fish voraciously devour the native fish, then I am not sure the Natives ought not to be allowed to fish for imported fish in the same way as they do the native fish, without having to purchase licenses.122

Not all members agreed, but we are struck by the number who did. The Colonial Secretary declined to make the promise sought by Parata, but did say he would consider what had been said about licence fees. Nonetheless, nothing concrete came of this recognised opportunity to have acted in compliance with the Treaty. This was not, as Heaton Rhodes put it, because it was impossible to eradicate trout, but because it was undesirable to do so.123

The acclimatisation societies proceeded to introduce rainbow trout into the lakes of the Central North Island region. In relation to Lake Taupo and its tributaries, they did so with the support of the Government, and Tuwharetoa petitioned the Crown in 1905. Mr Walzl has reproduced their petition:

This is a prayer from us your petitioners, who are Maoris of Taupo in the Colony of New Zealand, praying (you) to prevent (the introduction of) and not to rear European fish in our Lakes: (ie) in Rotoaira. Let that Lake remain as a sanctuary for the beautiful fish of our ancestors, as all our (other) lakes and streams are now full of these Pakeha fish, (and) they have destroyed our fish which were assured to us by the treaty of Waitangi; and we are prevented by law, and punished, if we go to kill these Pakeha fish, even though the lakes and streams in which these fish live are our own property.124

From this petition, the following points are clear:

- Tuwharetoa believed that Pakeha fish were destroying the indigenous fish in Lake Taupo and its tributaries.
- Maori rights to the indigenous fish were protected by the Treaty.
- The lakes and streams were Maori property, and Tuwharetoa considered that this gave them rights over the Pakeha fish, especially since these were consuming the indigenous fish. However, the law prevented them from taking the introduced fish, and punished them for doing so.
- Tuwharetoa wanted these wrongs redressed.

The issue was before Parliament again in 1908. The Stout–Ngata commission reported that Te Arawa had ‘suffered a grievous loss by the destruction of the indigenous fish’ by trout. The commission recommended free licences for the heads of Te Arawa whanau. Wi Pere told the House:

no license should be required by a Maori to fish. A Maori should have a free rod, and he should be allowed to go and fish in these streams when it suits him. I repeat that these pakeha fish are lean things and not fit to eat, and I should tell you that
the only fish fit for food in this country are the inanga, the kokopu, and the tuna: these are relishable fish and good to eat; but the pakeha fish should be destroyed, and they should not be allowed to propagate, because they destroy the inanga, the kokopu and the tuna.\textsuperscript{125}

The Government passed special legislation to allow up to 20 cut-price (five shilling) licences for Te Arawa. Meagre as this was, it was more than was done for Tuwharetoa in response to their 1905 petition. But the Government did make its first concession to Taupo Maori. In response to their petition of 1905, the Native Minister promised that Lake Rotoaira would be reserved for indigenous fish and no trout would be released.\textsuperscript{126}

In the absence of any remedial action by the Government in relation to Lake Taupo, Ngati Tuwharetoa petitioned the Crown again in 1913:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The Taupo-nui-a-Tia lake, where these trout fish occur, belongs to us the Maori of Taupo – absolutely.
\item Our native fish which originally abounded in this lake, such as our trout [kokopu or koaro, sometimes called 'native trout'], craw-fish, toitoi and inanga, and upon which we largely subsisted have now all been devoured by these trout fish.
\item The Pakeha had no right over our original fish which have thus been devoured by these trout, neither have the Pakeha any right over our lake itself . . . We now therefore entreat of your honourable Government to confirm the . . . resolution adopted by us so that it become a permanent law for our protection and the protection of our lake Taupo, so that Maori be not charged with licences for fishing.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{enumerate}

In 1913, the Tongariro Maori Council was authorised to allocate 20 quarter-price licences to its people (at a maximum of five shillings each).\textsuperscript{128} This may have been a response to the 1913 petition set out above, but Mr Taiaroa's evidence (from the Department of Conservation) is that it was a quid pro quo for easier Pakeha access to trout fishing on the Tongariro River.\textsuperscript{129} In the same year, the Government authorised culling to bring the trout population into line with its reduced food supply, but this was done to conserve food for trout, not Maori. The impact of trout on the koaro was brought home to us when we were told by Mr Barrett:

When we would fish up the trout, we would find their bellies were full of Koaro. We would squeeze their bellies and the Koaro would come out! Babs Konui (Rawinia's Grandfather) would hit the roof, and say 'that's where all our kai went!'\textsuperscript{130}

Recurring problems from over-predation led ultimately to the introduction of smelt in the 1930s, and the permanent near-destruction of the koaro. It was stressed in Parliament at the time that Tuwharetoa were not fishing for sport but from necessity. Without fish from their lakes and rivers, the tribe faced deprivation. This remained the case well into the twentieth century and was a very serious matter.

Other than the 1913 concession of licences and the temporary culling of trout, the Crown granted 50 free licences to the tribe as part of the 1926 agreement. In that year, Parliament was again told that 'the pakehas’ trout ate out the Maoris kouras and kokopu’ in Lake Taupo.\textsuperscript{131} These 50 licences replaced the 1913 arrangement, and were not additional to it. From 1922, after the secret release of trout in Rotoaira (noted above), Tuwharetoa were authorised to fish in that lake without having to pay for licences.\textsuperscript{132} A principle of sorts was therefore established, that in some circumstances the Crown would authorise free trout fishing, but those circumstances were fairly limited, and the Government was only interested in conserving trout, not native species.

**The Tribunal’s findings:**

We find:

\begin{itemize}
\item that imported fish species were introduced to the Taupo waters without the consent of Maori and, to a large extent, against their wishes;
\end{itemize}
that before 1926, the evidence supports the claimants’ view that the introduction of trout led to a reduction of Maori customary fisheries;
that Tuwharetoa were then forced to incorporate carp and trout into their customary fishing practices; and
that those practices included the right to control access to the lake for angling purposes.
Tuwharetoa are still advancing their rights to continue these practices, a hundred years on, as we heard in the evidence of Petera Clarke:

We found that we were unable to fish for these introduced species without a licence which is often economically beyond the reach of our hapu members. More to the point, we should not have to pay for the right to catch the introduced species which have devastated our customary food supplies.

This affected not just the lake, but the rivers also. When we do what we customarily did for food, which is go fishing, we are now called poachers, because it is not our traditional fish which are here, but ones introduced without our consent.\textsuperscript{133}

We find that the Crown was fully aware of the Treaty rights of Taupo Maori with regard to their fisheries, that it knew of the destructive impact of trout on those fisheries, and that it was made aware of the prejudice suffered by Maori as a result. Proposals were made, especially by the Maori members of Parliament, for the Government to act on the Treaty guarantees, to do something to conserve native fish in the face of predation by introduced species, and to recognise Maori fishing rights by reserving them free fishing for all species in all waterways. It made two limited responses – a handful of cheaper licences for Tongariro Maori and an agreement to exclude trout from Lake Rotoaira (which was not enforced). The Crown's actions, therefore, fell well short of what was possible in the circumstances.

Governments chose to prioritise and protect trout and anglers over indigenous fish and Taupo Maori. In doing so, the Crown breached the Treaty principles of partnership, active protection, equity, and options:

The principle of partnership was breached:

- by failing to obtain the consent of Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga to the introduction of imported fish to their waterways;
- by acting in partnership with acclimatisation societies instead, which failed to consult or work with Taupo Maori; and
- by failing to respond to Tuwharetoa’s clearly articulated rights and concerns in a fair and reasonable manner.

The Crown breached the principle of active protection by failing to protect the indigenous fishery, the fishing interests of Taupo Maori, and the Treaty rights of Taupo Maori.

It breached the principle of equity by unfairly prioritising the interests of anglers over Taupo Maori.

And, by failing to protect the interests of Taupo Maori in their indigenous fisheries, while at the same time refusing to accept that they had Treaty interests in – and a right to use, profit from, and control – the new, imported species in their waters, the Crown breached the principle of options.

We turn next to examine the Crown's regulation of freshwater fishing in more detail.

\textit{Government regulation of freshwater fishing in the early twentieth century:} A review of the historical evidence before us suggests that the following principles underlie the actions of the Crown in respect of freshwater fishing, common to officials, ministers, and Parliaments of this period:

- The inland waterways of the colony were largely ‘empty’ of useful fish.
- The acclimatisation societies were to be assisted and facilitated in stocking the ‘empty’ waterways with imported fish species, especially sporting fish.
- Freshwater fishing was more a sport than a commercial or subsistence activity, and one which generated important tourism revenues.
The Government should therefore protect the interests of anglers – overseas anglers in particular – and foster the conditions for valuable tourism.

The Government should regulate fisheries (the taking of particular species or of all fish in a fishery, the methods of taking, the seasons for taking, and the waterways in which the taking occurred) in order to manage and maintain the fisheries in the interests of recreational fishing and tourism.

Management and maintenance should be financed in part by anglers, through the payment of licence fees for use by the relevant acclimatisation society or Government department.

British game laws in respect of fishing rights, amounting to private property rights, should not be replicated in New Zealand.

The main reason for not replicating such rights was to keep fishing for sport affordable for all New Zealanders, and accessible to all New Zealanders; in other words, all New Zealanders should have access to freshwater fishing so long as they abided by regulations and paid a cheap licence fee.

There were tensions in the practical operation of these principles. There was some disagreement over how far the sanctity of private property could in fact be set aside in favour of cheap access for all. There was also tension between the angling lobby, which favoured sport fishing, and the less influential Pakeha who wanted to catch freshwater fish (especially whitebait) for sale or consumption. There was also tension between those who wanted to keep fishing affordable for the ordinary New Zealander, and the promotion of tourism, which favoured higher fees. It is clear, from considering the parliamentary debates and the outcomes in legislation, that the predominant interest in the period was that of the sporting anglers. Their interests prevailed over all others, including Maori. When a Minister said, of the members of Parliament, ‘We are all anglers’, it was hardly an exaggeration.

Crown actions in the Taupo district, operating on the principles outlined above, resulted in the stocking of Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers with trout. Much of the initial work was done by acclimatisation societies, facilitated and assisted by the Crown. But from 1906 the control of Taupo fisheries was vested in the Department of Tourist and Health Resorts. The department was responsible for employing rangers to enforce the laws and regulations governing fishing, and administered the fishing licences. Licences entitled the holder to fish anywhere in the country and the fees went to the acclimatisation societies, which worked with the Government to manage the fisheries. ‘Management’ sometimes meant little more than annual releases of trout. Internal Affairs and the Marine Department also had roles and input with regard to fishing, but the primary responsibility appears to have remained with the Tourist Department until 1926.

During that time, the Government continued to assert authority over the lake and fisheries, deciding to cull the...
trout (between 1913 and 1920) and then to experiment with introducing new food species for trout (in the 1920s). Maori had wanted to be the ones to manage the fishery and net excess trout, until they were satisfied that both trout and koaro were at acceptable numbers. But instead, the Crown worked in partnership with the acclimatisation societies, bodies representing a settler interest group, and not with the tribe. During the culling period, the licensing laws were not enforced and anyone could fish without fear of prosecution. From the 1920s, Internal Affairs resumed enforcement of licence fees and seasons. Although the Government and the societies did not agree on everything, they worked hand in glove to administer the Taupo fisheries for the benefit of anglers and tourists.

The legislative regime governing the stocking of inland waterways began in 1867, with the Salmon and Trout Act. Since this predated the introduction of these much-desired sporting fish, the Court of Appeal has determined that there was never a time in which trout per se were not subject to legislation and the authority of the Crown.

For Taupo, the introduction of brown trout in the 1890s took place under the 1884 amendment to that Act, and the Fisheries Conservation Act 1884. Broadly, these Acts established the primacy of trout as a species to be protected and propagated, giving the Government power to regulate open and closed seasons, the methods of fishing, the licensing of fishing (on payment of a fee), the appointment of rangers and the levying of fines for offences, and other quite far-reaching administrative powers. This was an assumption of authority over both waterways and fisheries.

Whilst regulation can be an appropriate exercise of kawanatanga, both the Government and the societies could have consulted Maori about the massive modification of their fisheries. In effect, this was a major interference with Maori property rights. As Parata asked Parliament in 1903: ‘why do they [the acclimatisation societies] not ask the opinions of the Maoris?’

In 1902, however, the courts found that the regulations governing licensing were in excess of what was allowed by statute. The licences issued by acclimatisation societies were invalid. Further, occupiers of private property were entitled to fish without a licence, and had the power to delegate that right to whoever they wanted. Some members of Parliament feared that this was a serious blow to angling, which in turn was considered a blow to the colony because of the significant numbers of tourists who came for that purpose.

The resultant legislation is crucial to the claims before us, because it took away property rights that were possible to landowners in Britain and, according to the Court of Appeal, existed in New Zealand as well as at 1902.

The Fisheries Conservation Amendment Act 1902 was intended to strike a balance between the rights of landowners, who would still be able to fish on their land and prevent trespass on their land – though they would be expected to give access to anglers – and the rights of poorer or ordinary New Zealanders to fish in ‘their’ waterways. The Act abolished the selling or leasing of fishing rights by landowners, except where a waterway was entirely contained within the property of a single owner. Parliament in effect removed this right from all Maori landowners abutting lakes and rivers. This was particularly important for Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers. Maori were charging anglers for access whose purpose was sport and recreation and not the taking of fish for sale.

As we noted above, the provision of access to fishing in return for an equivalent was a customary practice, extended here to incorporate Pakeha anglers. Mr Barrett, it will be recalled, described how Ngati Porou came visiting with gifts of crayfish, in return for which the claimants granted them access to the lake to fish for koaro. ‘They were bartering days,’ he told us, and ‘no money exchanged hands.’ In our view, it was a legitimate adaptation of this customary authority and practice for Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga to charge anglers for access to fish for trout.

The 1902 Act’s infringement of Maori property rights was very significant and of permanent effect. It was incorporated in the consolidating Fisheries Act of 1908. Any person ‘in lawful occupation of any land’ could still fish from that land without buying a licence. This was not an
unregulated right – landowners’ right to fish was restricted to the prescribed seasons and methods.

We have already noted the prevailing ideology among settlers that private property rights in fishing should not be created in New Zealand. But there is little doubt that Maori already possessed such rights in both Maori and British law, and that they were guaranteed by the Treaty.

In theory, the new Act treated Pakeha and Maori alike by abolishing the ability of all riparian owners to sell or lease fishing rights. But the discussion in Parliament makes it clear that Pakeha landowners were permitting free access in any case; the law, in effect, was aimed at a property right being exercised by Maori. Since the right was available under English law, it was obviously feasible for the Crown to have maintained and respected it. The dire predictions of the collapse of angling and tourism were clearly exaggerated, since both were thriving prior to and after the Act, even though Taupo Maori continued to run their own licensing system and charge anglers for access after 1902. But legal rights were now taken away, as the Government moved to end Tuwharetoa’s and their whanaunga’s practical control of Taupo fishing.

The licensing regime was further standardised in 1903, leading to quite an extensive discussion of Maori fishing rights and their objections to licensing. Wi Parata, who spoke for Maori of all districts in the absence of the other Maori members of Parliament, made the following points:

- The Fisheries Conservation Bill did not provide for Maori fishing rights.
- ‘there is also a clause in the Treaty of Waitangi which assures to them the fishing rights in their rivers, lakes, and seas. Now, you pakehas come here, and the Minister brings in a Bill to license every one that goes fishing . . .’
- ‘The water belongs to the Maori along with the fish that is in it.’
- Maori should not have to pay for a licence ‘when the rivers belong to them and the fish belong to them’. Maori should have the right to fish in their own rivers for ‘eels, whitebait, flounders, lampreys, and all other fish’ (emphasis added).
- The acclimatisation societies held meetings to discuss these questions, ‘but why do they not ask the opinions of the Maoris?’
- ‘You bring in a Bill that is one-sided. There are two sides to every question, and to Bills also.’ Parata had been sent to look after the rights of Maori – he was speaking on behalf of all Maori of both islands, as the other Maori members were absent. He protested against ‘these one-sided Bills’.
- Maori did not care about trout – it was too dry – but they ought to be able to fish for their own maintenance. ‘Instead of going to the butcher for mutton or beef, they catch the fish in their own rivers and live upon them. This custom has been handed down to them by their ancestors.’ Maori should be ‘exempt from the operation of this Bill when they desire to obtain food for themselves’, and they should not have to pay for licences anywhere in New Zealand. ‘That will bring the matter into line with the Treaty of Waitangi’.

Parata’s views were dismissed by the Government because the Bill did not require Maori to take a licence for fishing indigenous species, allowing the Government to claim that Maori rights were unaffected. This ignored the way in which regulation circumscribed the timing and methods of fishing (affecting indigenous as well as introduced species), and that Parata was in fact claiming a right to fish for all species, including introduced ones, without payment of fees. We have noted above that some members of Parliament were sympathetic both to the need to conserve Maori food supplies and to the possibility of exempting Maori from the licensing system altogether. But no action was taken and the Bill was enacted without Parata’s requested protection of Maori fishing rights.

**The Tribunal’s findings:** First, in terms of the Crown’s submission about our jurisdiction, we do not think that the
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 bears at all upon whether we can inquire into any customary right Maori may have to profit from permitting access across their lands for recreational fishing. This is because it is our view that this is not a commercial fishing right within the meaning of that Act. Maori had the right, as an expression of their rangatiratanga, to extend their customary practice of allowing reciprocal access arrangements to Pakeha anglers, whose purpose was sport and recreation and not the taking of fish for sale.

Secondly, in terms of the Crown’s regulation of freshwater fishing, we find that the Crown eroded the claimants’ rangatiratanga over their fisheries by legislation which:
- protected and facilitated the introduction of predatory salmonids, namely trout, in their waterways;
- required Maori to pay licence fees to fish for these species; and
- abolished the ability of Maori to engage in the exercise of their rangatiratanga and the adaptation of their customary fishing practices by providing access for European anglers to fish for trout in exchange for money. In other words, the Crown prohibited Maori from selling or leasing fishing rights and from controlling access to their taonga.

We further find there was no agreement to, or compensation for, these legislative infringements of Treaty rights. In particular, Parliament could have done much to bring things ‘into line with the Treaty of Waitangi’, as Parata put it, by accepting proposals for Maori to fish for food without licences.

We find that by enacting this legislation, including but not limited to the Salmon and Trout Act 1867, the Fisheries Conservation Amendment Act 1902, and the Fisheries Act 1908, the Crown was in breach of the Treaty principles of partnership and autonomy, active protection, and options.
- The Crown breached the principle of partnership and autonomy:
  - by failing to recognise Ngati Tuwharetoa’s authority over their fisheries;
  - by failing to regulate the fisheries in partnership with them;
  - by failing to consult them about the abolition of some of their fishing rights;
  - by abolishing Treaty-guaranteed fishing rights without their consent;
  - by requiring them to take out and pay for a licence to fish in their own waters (again, without consulting them or obtaining their consent to this imposition);
  - by interfering with their customary methods of fishing; and
  - by depriving them at law of their tino rangatiratanga over access to their waterways and fisheries.

The principle of active protection was breached when the Crown failed to protect Tuwharetoa’s fishing interests and their authority over waterways and fishing.

The Crown breached the principle of options by foreclosing on Tuwharetoa’s choice to manage angling as a means of generating much-needed income, and by restricting the tribe’s fishing rights to indigenous species only.

Prejudice from these Treaty breaches was delayed, however, because the Crown found it difficult to curtail the claimants’ tino rangatiratanga over their fisheries in practice. The introduction of imported fish, with its devastating impact, had been beyond the power of the claimants to prevent. Once the fish were established, it would have required the active agreement and cooperation of the Crown to have controlled trout and koaro levels in a way sustainable for both and in the interests of both Maori and anglers. We do not know if it would have worked because the Government refused to try it. Charging anglers and paying licence fees, on the other hand, were not matters on which the Government could immediately impose its will. The result was a decade or so in which Maori fishing rights and control of access were tolerated by the State, followed by negotiations for a settlement of the issue. This period
was, in our view, a key ‘lost opportunity’ for Taupo Maori fishing rights, as we explain in the next section.

**A lost opportunity: Taupo Maori fishing rights, 1910–1924:** The response of Ngati Tuwharetoa to fishing legislation circumscribing their rights was to petition against it, as we have seen, in 1905 and 1913, but they also simply ignored the legislation. In 1910, for example, the Government’s chief fisheries inspector, Lake Ayson, discovered wholesale ‘poaching’ by Maori and Pakeha at Taupo, with inland Maori coming with packhorses, spearing the trout, and taking away loads of fish. This was not in fact harming the fishery, but its management should, in the inspector’s view, be confined to the ‘proper authorities’. Inspector Ayson thought that Maori should be ‘treated liberally’ in the matter of licences, but compelled to fish only during the prescribed season. He also reported that Maori landowners were charging anglers for the right to camp and fish. In fact, riparian landownership placed control of fishing in Maori hands, and Ayson recommended that the Government should purchase the margins of the lake and rivers as soon as possible.

Ayson’s report highlighted two themes that persisted for the next 16 years. Some Taupo Maori continued to defy the licensing regime and fish for trout without a licence, and they defied (in effect) the 1902 Act and its 1908 successor by charging anglers for fishing from the banks of their rivers and in the lake. They put up notices, issued their own licences or ‘permits’, ‘cancelled’ Government licences if anglers refused to pay for Maori licences, and offered hospitality in the form of camping facilities and guiding. In effect, as Burstall notes, there were two licensing systems running side by side at Taupo, and the Maori one was the more powerful. There was an apparently unsuccessful attempt to negotiate an arrangement in 1913, involving 20 cut-price licences for Tongariro Maori in return for free access for Pakeha fishing in their river. We have no details of this arrangement but it does not appear to have lasted.

By 1923, the situation was a ‘long standing trouble’ and ‘source of irritation’ to anglers. On the first theme, the Tourist Department reported in 1925 that for years it had ‘turned a blind eye on natives fishing for food, and indeed [had] granted them a number of licences at a nominal fee.’ Some Maori continued to fish for food, as they had always customarily done. On the second theme, pressure on the Government intensified from the angling community in the early 1920s. In response to a complaint from an angler about fishing charges on the Tongariro River, the Tourist Department’s Rotorua officer reported that Maori were putting up notices charging two shillings and sixpence per day ‘for fishing rights’, and claiming to cancel anglers’ official licences if they failed to pay. The Government had turned a blind eye to this kind of activity for years, but in November 1923 the Napier Acclimatisation Society warned the Government that Waitahanui hapu were about to lease ‘sole fishing rights’ to just one or two individuals. ‘Can you help get water open for fishermen?’ they asked.

The Under-Secretary for Internal Affairs visited Waitahanui and asked the local hapu not to lease the riverbanks to just one individual. In return, he promised to discuss with his Minister and Maui Pomare how ‘best the interests of the Maoris there could be conserved while meeting the convenience of anglers’. He discovered that the hapu were acting out of economic necessity. Their daily charge for anglers was ‘divided among the tribe to buy food during the winter when work was unprocurable’. Fishing for food, and charging anglers to do so for sport, was a means of survival for Taupo Maori. In December, the Waitahanui chief, Rameka, consulted the Government further on leasing. The Minister’s reply was a virtual endorsement of their licensing system. He advised that Maori should ‘make no departure from the present practice of issuing permits to all anglers who apply for access to their properties for the purpose of fishing for trout in the Waitahanui River’. The Government, he added, wanted to settle the issue permanently, with an arrangement ‘satisfactory’ to itself, Maori, and anglers.

From this point on, officials and ministers began to consider the negotiation of a permanent agreement to secure Pakeha fishing access at Taupo (the subject of the next
Anglers and acclimatisation societies continued to press the Government in 1924, complaining that their licences supposedly entitled them to fish anywhere, but in fact did not. The complaints of the Wanganui Acclimatisation Society about camping charges on the Tongariro River led to a second investigation, this time by the local Native Land Court judge, Frank Acheson. The judge reported that Tuwharetoa knew it was now illegal to sell their fishing rights, but that they claimed they were not in fact doing so. Acheson reported that Tuwharetoa had no objection to people using the beds of the lakes and rivers, but riparian owners on the Tongariro River were anxious to restrict access in order to prevent overfishing. The camping charges were legal and he recommended caution in trying to ‘curb the activities of the natives in this matter’. Taupo Maori were usually reasonable but would ‘strongly object to any attempt to deprive them of rights which they possess over their own land’. Trouble arose, for example, when weekend visitors refused to shift their camps off Maori land when asked by the owners to do so. Acheson’s report accords with Ms Feint’s submission that during this period Tuwharetoa were in fact exercising legitimate property rights allowed to all landowners under the law.

The question intensified when Maori threatened to take an angler named Colonel Grant to court for trespass. Grant’s lawyers appealed to the Government. The Secretary for Internal Affairs thought it ‘imperative that some arrangement be come to, the present state of affairs being most unsatisfactory, both to the Government and visiting anglers’. Despite Acheson’s report, officials considered that Maori were in fact breaking the Fisheries Act 1908 with its abolition of private rights in fishing. They feared that bad publicity from visiting anglers would deter tourists from coming to New Zealand. The ideological opposition to game laws was also still powerful in the 1920s. Officials thought that Maori were defeating ‘the whole intention’ of the 1908 Act: which was passed with a view of protecting the fish, but at the same time with a view of preventing the repetition of the game and fish laws of the old country and enabling any per-
son at a reasonable fee to fish for trout in any waters in the Dominion.

While Maori owned the banks and possibly the riverbeds, they had no rights in either the water or the trout.\textsuperscript{160}

The Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Marine, the Minister of Tourism, and the Native Minister all agreed that there should be a conference with Maori to resolve this issue. At the same time, the opinion of the Solicitor General was sought: were Tuwharetoa breaking the law? The Crown Law Office replied that a fishing licence did not permit its holder to enter private land. The law officer distinguished between lake and river fishing in this respect. Maori landowners were charging a fee for fishing on the lake within 300 yards of shore, and had no legal right to make this charge. The bed of ‘this large inland Lake is, in my opinion, vested in the Crown and the Maoris have no legal right to it. It may be that they have fishing rights over the Lake, but that is, in my opinion, the extent of their rights’, the law officer wrote. He suggested that the Department of Internal Affairs notify all anglers that these charges were without justification, and that the Crown advised them not to pay and would defend any action for trespass in respect of fishing on the lake. The law officer also suggested that the Crown do the same for fishing on the riverbanks, since the damages which any owner could recover for such a trespass would be nominal, and the cost of getting it would be much more than the sum awarded. Landowners would probably only get £1. But this was for people walking over the land, not camping on it.\textsuperscript{161}

The Crown Law Office’s recommendation – encouraging anglers to defy Maori, defending cases on anglers’ behalf, and relying on the costs preventing Maori from pursuing matters in the courts – was not followed, because by then the Government planned to negotiate a solution and did not want to jeopardise its success.\textsuperscript{162} We will discuss the negotiations and subsequent agreement in the next section.

\textbf{The Tribunal’s findings:} The Crown Law Office appears to have admitted that Maori property rights existed in 1924, but then advised the Government on how to defeat them. In exercising these property rights, and also in operating their own system of licences or permits, Maori were not acting inconsistently with the Crown’s kawanatanga powers. In our view, there was no fundamental incompatibility between kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga in this respect. A dual licensing system may have been inconvenient to anglers, but inconvenience to sportsmen is not a reason for overriding Treaty obligations. In 1926, the Crown made Taupo angling subject to an extra and special licence in any case, which anglers also complained about.

Here, we note that the Crown was perfectly willing, from time to time, to share the responsibility of licensing sporting activities with the acclimatisation societies, which also at times received the fees. These interest groups evolved, as the Ngai Tahu Tribunal noted, into virtual local government bodies. They had no greater qualifications or particular expertise for their role than their participation and interest in hunting and fishing. No one could have argued that Tuwharetoa were less qualified than they to exercise licensing powers. In 1926, the Crown proved willing to share licensing fees with the tribe, and to accept a tribal board as the administrative means of doing so. Given its willingness to share sports licensing responsibilities with the societies, we think it was conceptually simple for the Crown also to have shared licensing authority with a tribal board at this time. Its failure to do so, and its insistence that Tuwharetoa cease to exercise authority in this matter, then become issues of concern in light of the Treaty.

We will return to the details of the 1926 agreement below. Here, we find the Crown to have been in breach of the Treaty principles of partnership and autonomy:

\begin{itemize}
  \item by failing to accord the same legal rights and autonomy to Maori tribes that it accorded to acclimatisation societies;
  \item by failing to enter into partnership with tribal authorities to administer the licensing of fishing and access
\end{itemize}
to Tuwharetoa’s taonga for the purpose of fishing when the opportunity existed to do so; and

- by tolerating a dual licensing system for many years, but then bringing it to an end when it could have legalised it or given legal powers of licensing to a tribal authority, and in doing so have provided for Maori autonomy, tino rangatiratanga, and rights to control access to their lake and their fisheries.

Negotiation, and the 1926 agreement and legislation

In this section, we address two questions:

- Why did the Crown embark on negotiations with Maori about Lake Taupo in 1924? Were the Crown’s negotiations with Maori over Lake Taupo conducted and concluded in good faith?
- Were the 1926 agreement and its enacting legislation ‘fair and reasonable’ in the circumstances and consistent with the Treaty?

As we have seen, Taupo Maori were soon aware of the rapid destruction of their food supplies by trout, and sought to restrict or prevent their introduction. At the same time, they quickly appreciated the economic value of guiding anglers and charging them to camp and fish from the lake shore and riverbanks. At the turn of the century, Parliament moved to maximise income from licensing of anglers, and to guarantee their access to the sport, by abolishing the rights of private landowners to sell or lease fishing rights.

In doing so, the Crown came swiftly into conflict with Taupo Maori, who continued to control and use their fisheries as they had from time immemorial. Hapu resisted paying licence fees (to which the Crown turned a blind eye) and renamed their own fees to anglers as charges for access and camping on private land. Two licensing systems ran side by side until the 1920s, when the Crown moved to extend its control over the nascent and blossoming tourist trade and obtain guaranteed access for the anglers who had paid its licence fees. This coincided with a policy on the part of the Crown to secure (or confirm) its ownership of lake beds as opportunity arose.

The Government moved on the issue and it passed legislation in 1924, authorising it to negotiate with Maori for Pakeha access to the Taupo fisheries, and for the beds of the lake and its tributary rivers. Negotiations began two years later in April 1926, with a public meeting at Waihi attended by ministers and a group of interested Maori, where a ‘sketchy’ agreement was reached on some points. In July of that year, Ngati Tuwharetoa leaders met with Prime Minister Gordon Coates in Wellington. An agreement was signed on 26 July by the Prime Minister and by Hoani Te Heuheu on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, arranging a right of way around the lake and along the rivers, and also vesting the beds of these waterways in the King.

The agreement was embodied (and amended) in the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926. The negotiation process, the 1926 agreement and legislation, Maori fishing rights, the virtual destruction of the indigenous fishery, the loss of the lake, and the Treaty-guaranteed exercise of tino rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga over these taonga are all the subject of claims before this Tribunal.

The claimants’ case

For Ngati Tuwharetoa, the Crown’s statutory acquisition of Lake Taupo, Tuwharetoa’s ‘tribal emblem’, was and is a heartfelt grievance, even though the Crown has taken some steps towards remedying its wrongful acquisition. Karen Feint submitted that the Crown acquired the beds of Taupo waters in 1926 in breach of its Treaty guarantee that Ngati Tuwharetoa could retain their taonga for so long as they wished. There was an element of compulsion in the ‘agreement’ entered into in July 1926, and Tuwharetoa did not willingly part with their taonga.

Rather, Ben White’s evidence is that the Crown would have passed legislation taking the lake anyway, and that this was known to Tuwharetoa at the time, making the arrangement a coercive one. Tuwharetoa ‘agreed’ because
they wanted to at least secure a compensation deal to replace some of the revenue lost from anglers.

Tuwharetoa argued that they were consistent, right up until 23 July 1926, in resisting the vesting of the beds of Taupo waters in the Crown. The newspaper report of the Waihi meeting of April 1926, Hoani Te Heuheu’s telegram to the Prime Minister, and the resolutions passed on the eve of the 23 July meeting all show that Tuwharetoa were determined not to part with the lake. Subsequent protests about Crown acquisition of the lake and tributary rivers are further evidence that Tuwharetoa did not wish to surrender their mana over their tribal taonga.\textsuperscript{165}

As well as employing an element of compulsion, the claimants submitted that the Crown’s conduct in negotiating with them was less than honourable in other ways. Tuwharetoa believed (and believe) that the arrangement was about a right of way for access to fishing and preserving their fishery. The Crown led Tuwharetoa to believe this, when its intention all along was to secure ownership of the lake bed. The surviving record of the April meeting at Waihi is, Ngati tuwharetoa believe, particularly damning in this respect. Mr White stated in cross-examination that the Crown ‘may not have been “totally up front” about its objectives’.\textsuperscript{164} But there was no overriding policy reason for acquiring the beds, which have now been returned to the tribe without harmful consequences to the public. Restoration of title has not prevented the public from enjoying rights of access, navigation, and fishing, and indeed, Tuwharetoa have no desire to prevent them.

Despite the decisions of the courts in relation to the Rotorua lakes, and the Solicitor General’s knowledge of how those decisions would continue to go, the Crown seems to have been driven by an attitude that Maori should not own waterways, simply because they were Maori. In the claimants’ view, the colonisers’ ideological objection to private control of access to game, another driving force, could have been achieved without owning the beds. It was more that the Crown saw Maori assertions of ownership of lake beds as undesirable, and was determined to foil them, than that it needed to do so for any genuine or overriding policy purpose.\textsuperscript{165}

In Ms Feint’s submission, a possible explanation is that the 1926 agreement, which vested the beds and the right to use the waters in the Crown, was designed to remove beyond doubt the Crown’s legal right to appropriate the waters (and parts of the beds) for its hydroelectricity schemes. Tuwharetoa believe that the Crown had already earmarked Lake Taupo and the Waikato River for hydro
schemes before taking the lake, as evidenced by the work of public works engineer, PS Hay, and yet failed to disclose this or negotiate agreement to it in 1926. Hoani Te Heuheu and others later raised the question of whether the Crown had been negotiating in bad faith, and called upon it to rectify its omission in the 1940s by negotiating a fresh agreement with them. The 1926 legislation conferred the ‘right to use the waters’ on the Crown, but this had not been discussed with Tuwharetoa in 1926. In doing so, the Crown went beyond the agreement and acted in breach of Treaty guarantees.

When it insisted on taking the beds of Taupo waters, the Crown also breached the Treaty by failing to acknowledge and provide properly for Ngati Tuwharetoa’s possession and customary ownership of the lake and rivers as whole, indivisible entities, and instead severed and took ownership of the beds. Further, the claimants argued that the arrangement was discriminatory in two ways. First, it was based on the Crown’s determination that Maori should not earn an income permissible to any private property owner, by providing access to anglers and running fishing camps. Secondly, the right of way was confined to Maori land – Pakeha private land ownership was not disturbed. The claimants feel that racism may have influenced the Crown in securing these objectives.

In Ms Feint’s submission, subsequent problems with the agreement include the following:

- The 1926 Act enabled the Crown to reserve areas from the beds for the use of Maori, and to exempt land from the right of way provisions. In 1927, the Tuwharetoa Trust Board requested exemption for 36 affected wahi tapu, pa, kainga, and other significant sites around the lake, but these became access ways because the Crown failed to reserve them.

- The lost fishing revenue had been the only income for some Maori landowners, but the Crown failed to compensate private riparian property owners for 22 years. Indeed, the trust board had to pursue the Crown through the courts before it would honour its promise of compensation. When awarded, the compensation was much lower than what had been sought.

- The one-chain public right of way has altered from what was agreed (access by foot), and problems have arisen from a public perception that they are entitled to do whatever they like on the marginal strip, and in getting to it.

- Although the beds have been returned to Tuwharetoa, they have suffered harm during the period of their removal through the uncompensated construction of the hydroelectric schemes, and lost opportunities for tourism and development during the long period of non-ownership.

**The 1926 agreement and fishing rights:** In the view of the claimants, the 1926 agreement was supposed to secure Maori fishing rights and access to fishing grounds, as well as provide compensation for loss of the one-chain strip and their profitable control of Pakeha access. They were provided with a number of free fishing licences, while the 1926 Act in turn authorised the Crown to regulate Taupo fisheries. Maori rights to indigenous fish were first specifically reserved by regulation in 1951, which gave them exclusive rights to take such fish. Little was gained from this, however, as imported fish were continually re-introduced and managed, steadily diminishing the indigenous species. The claimants’ view is that the Crown did not manage the fishery in such a way as to ensure that the indigenous fish would be protected for present or future generations. Ian Kusabs attributes the disastrous decline of the koaro to trout, and notes that numbers are too small now to be fished.

Partly as a result, Tuwharetoa have adapted their customary practices to include trout. The new fish is now part of their culture, their custom, and their fishery. They are concerned at what they consider to be the minimal share that their free licences allow them, and at changes to the legislation which greatly reduced their right to take smelt. Trout and smelt can never be an adequate substitution, nor a justification, for the loss or depletion of the indigenous species.
fish species. Those species were vital to sustenance and also to the preservation of whakapapa and ways of life. Tuwharetoa can no longer fish for their kai rangatira, and this has been a serious prejudice arising from the Crown’s failure to protect this taonga. The claimants seek the restoration of their taonga, and a greater share of the introduced species – trout and smelt in particular.170

The Crown’s case
The Crown began its submissions with Ngati Tuwharetoa’s allegation that the alienation of Lake Taupo was coerced by the Crown. This, the Crown said, was a serious allegation and required a commensurate standard of proof, which had not been met. The circumstances of the alienation are unclear and there is no definitive evidence.

The Crown accepts that, in relation to the statutory acquisition of Lake Taupo, a number of facts are known. It contended, however, that those facts do not establish the necessary standard of proof for such a serious allegation as that the Crown acted in bad faith. The main problem with the evidence is the uncertainty about what happened in the key meeting in July 1926.171

The Crown considers the facts of the negotiations to be as follows:

► In 1924, special legislation was passed to empower the Crown to negotiate with the Maori owners of the land abutting Lake Taupo, which specifically mentioned the beds and margins.

► During the 18-month delay before the first meeting, northern Taupo hapu petitioned the Crown, stating their disagreement with any cession of the lake and its tributaries, and claiming that this was the proposal of the southern people.

► There is only one account of the Waihi meeting on 21 April 1926, which limits ability to know what really happened there, but we know that Te Heuheu spoke in favour of the Crown’s proposal. A £15,000 annuity was suggested, but Coates offered 50 per cent of the fishing fees instead and said that the Government was not interested in the lake bed, just fishing rights.

There was agreement to work out the details at a later date.

► Five days later, Coates’ memorandum to the Governor-General detailed what had been agreed at Waihi, but his memorandum contradicts both the newspaper account and the later agreement. It stated that the beds of all waters would be vested in the King, and did not mention fishing rights other than in connection with trout. The Crown notes as significant that the 1926 Act enshrined Tuwharetoa’s customary fishing rights.

► On 29 April, Hoani Te Heuheu sent a telegram asking the Prime Minister to correct a report that the freehold of the lake and rivers was ceded to the Crown.

► On 21 July, 11 Tuwharetoa representatives met and agreed a set of resolutions among themselves. These conformed with Coates’ memorandum with one exception — that the beds should not be vested in the King. The outcome of the meeting with the Crown, however, was a final agreement that vested those beds in the Crown.172

The question of whether or not the Crown acted in bad faith turns on what happened at the July meeting, the details of which, the Crown submitted, are unknown.173 After all, Mr White concluded that he did not know what had made the Tuwharetoa representatives change their minds. His response to claimant counsel, who put it to him that an element of coercion must have been involved, was that this was speculation.174 Ultimately, there is insufficient evidence to make out a bad faith allegation.175 While Mr White accepted that the status of the lake as a taonga reduced the likelihood of Tuwharetoa wanting to part with it, this also was not definitive. Nor can statements allegedly made to Te Arawa four years earlier, about taking their lake compulsorily, be relied on to assert that such comments were in the minds of Tuwharetoa or were made to Tuwharetoa. Mr White gave weight to the 1924 Act’s reference to the beds and that they were going to be part of the negotiations.
The Crown concluded that the arrangements negotiated by Tuwharetoa, including the receipt of income for fishing, might as easily mean that they saw real advantage and agreed to the transfer of the lake. There is simply too much uncertainty to be sure, and the gap should not be filled by today’s standards and expectations.\footnote{176}

The Tuwharetoa response to the 1926 Act does not support the allegation of coercion. Arthur Grace reported that the majority of interested Maori were ‘fairly satisfied’. The evidence shows complaints about the rivers and fishing income, not about the vesting of the lake bed per se. Challenges from the trust board itself, using the example of metal extraction, were about getting half of the income to be derived from such sources, not about the vesting of the bed itself. The board’s concerns in 1927 related to the number of fishing licences, camping fees, the right of way, and compensation for owners of land abutting the rivers.\footnote{177}

The Crown also disputed that it acted in bad faith if it did not raise the issue of hydroelectricity generation during the negotiations. From 1903, the Crown had reserved to itself the sole right to use waters for electricity generation. Claimant counsel emphasised the 1903 survey of Lake Taupo for hydroelectric purposes. The Crown submitted that it is not clear whether this took place. Peter McBurney was unable to point to any evidence of mapping Lake Taupo to ascertain its storage potentials. The Crown, having passed the 1903 Act, was certainly aware of its rights and interest in electricity, but the absence of evidence about the 1926 negotiations prevents any conclusions about whether or not Tuwharetoa were aware of them. In reference to Hoani Te Heuheu’s letter, the Crown submitted that there is in fact no evidence of what was discussed in 1926, but it cannot be assumed that Tuwharetoa did not know of the Crown’s rights in hydroelectricity. Nor were the Crown’s intentions necessarily clear in 1926. Electricity generation had begun on the lower reaches of the Waikato River, but it is not clear that the technology existed at that time to contemplate the construction of control gates on the lake.

In summary, we do not know what was talked about, we do not know what the Crown intended with regard to the lake and electricity at the time, and we do not know whether the Crown had the technology to contemplate control gates, but we do know that the Crown already had the sole right to use water for electricity generation. It is not possible, therefore, to conclude that the Crown knew it should have spoken to Tuwharetoa about hydroelectricity generation but chose not to do so.\footnote{178}

Further, the Crown denied that it discriminated against Maori when it confined the right of way to Maori land. The Crown understands that virtually all the riparian landowners were Maori, and therefore, in practical terms, there were no non-Maori to whose land the right of way could have applied.\footnote{179}

The 1926 agreement and fishing rights: The Crown argued that, as a result of the 1926 agreement, the participation of Ngati Tuwharetoa in the management and revenue of the trout fishing resource is the best-known example of iwi participation in such arrangements. The history of this arrangement, however, has not been the subject of detailed evidence. The Crown submitted, therefore, that such issues must remain matters for investigation in any future stages of this inquiry.\footnote{180} It also noted, however, that considerable ongoing benefits have flowed to Tuwharetoa as a result of the 1926 agreement. In the last year (2004), the trust board received about $800,000 from Lake Taupo revenues (including licence fees). The board also receives 200 free fishing licences a year, which it distributes to 30 or so marae. The board and the Department of Conservation liaise about the fees and Tuwharetoa want them increased because they profit from them.\footnote{181}

The Tribunal’s analysis
The negotiation of a comprehensive agreement to resolve overlaps or conflict between kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga is, as a matter of principle, consistent with the Treaty. There was an opportunity, therefore, especially in
light of Parliament’s awareness of Maori fishing rights, for a Treaty-consistent outcome at this time.

In 1924, the issue of angler ‘irritation’ and acclimatisation society annoyance (described above) was complicated by the intrusion of two further issues: worries about foreign ownership; and a growing desire for the Crown to assert or acquire a clear legal title to the bed of Lake Taupo.

**Foreign ownership becomes an issue:** In 1924, the Government became concerned that ownership of riparian lands might end up in the hands of wealthy foreign anglers, who might prevent access for others. The profitability of recreational fishing for Maori depended on maximising the number of anglers paying their set access fees, in balance with conserving the fishery for their own and anglers’ use. But multiply owned Maori land was vulnerable to alienation, as we have noted elsewhere in this report (see part III). It was not inconceivable that the riverbanks and lake margins could be sold to anglers whose interest, unlike that of Maori, was in limiting access to a privileged few. According to explanations offered in Parliament in 1924 and 1926, this was a driving force behind the Crown’s decision to negotiate.  

Claimant counsel has queried the validity of this ‘foreigner scare’. This is important, because angler complaints and inconvenience had had no noticeable effect on the tourism industry, which the Crown wanted to protect. The only real threat, if there was one, was the alienation of Maori land to anglers who could then restrict access. In our view, it is telling that the departmental records consulted for the report filed by Te Hokowhitu a Rakeipoho Taiaroa do not mention this threat at all. One member of Parliament pointed out in 1926:

> It has been suggested by the Prime Minister that the banks of the river were in danger of being handed over to foreigners . . . Fishing has been going on in these rivers and lakes for a great number of years, and no foreigner has yet got in to take possession of the banks . . .

The only example given by Burstall is the wealthy American fisherman Zane Grey, who was supposed to have been about to acquire much of the banks of the Tongariro River. Darkie Downs explained to us that his father, and his uncle Hoka Downs, looked after tourists when they came to the Kowhai Flats area. They told him about the arrival of Zane Grey, the relationship that developed between guide and angler, and the opportunities that followed. Grey was a businessman and discussed development with Downs’ family, giving them the opportunity to move into tourism, but it was also about forestry. The whanau set up a deal with Grey to log native forest on Pihanga. From this oral evidence, it appears that the relationship involved
guiding, commercial opportunities, and development, but there was no mention of the possibility of Grey acquiring land or sole fishing rights. This evidence is also a useful corrective to the complaints on file, showing the more positive relationships possible (though unreported) between Maori and anglers.

Ownership of the bed of Lake Taupo becomes an issue: According to Mr White, the growing pressure over fishing rights and access became an opportunity to resolve the related but distinct question of ownership of the lake bed. Without this pressure, the ownership issue might otherwise have been left to lie. Mr White concludes that there was no need for the Government to get title to the lake bed in order to solve the access problem, but that ‘the opportunity was taken’ to do so as part of the Government’s evolving policy that it, not Maori, should be the owners of lake beds.

At first, elements within the Government were wary of broaching the question. On 1 May 1924, the Crown Law Office had, as we described above, offered the opinion that the bed of Lake Taupo already belonged to the Crown. The Native Minister, Gordon Coates, decided not to go ahead with any kind of negotiation for the meantime, because it might give undue importance to the access question and ‘might be the occasion for the Maori raising the larger issue of the ownership of the lake’.

Fisheries inspector Lake Ayson recommended (as he had back in 1910) that the issue of fishing and tourism should be resolved by obtaining the margins of the lake and rivers. Officials favoured this solution, so long as payment did not recognise Maori claims to the lake, the trout, or the water:

If it is shown that the Maoris will not give way unless they get some payment then it must be made quite clear that the payment itself does not recognise any legal rights of the Maoris to the trout or the lake or water running into such lake but that the payment is in exchange for an undertaking that no charge will be made by the Maoris or persons leasing land from the Maoris.

At some point, however, the Government decided to go ahead and include the ownership of the beds in the proposed negotiations. We have no evidence on why the views of Coates and officials either changed or were overruled. The 1924 Act authorised the Government to negotiate for (presumably the ownership of) the beds of the lake and its tributary rivers, but this was not explained in Parliament. This brought Lake Taupo into the ongoing struggle over whether, either as a matter of law or policy, the Crown should own the beds of New Zealand’s large waterways.

Coates reminded Parliament in 1926 that:

for many years past there has been a dispute as to the ownership of the beds of the lakes. It has been the subject of discussion for the last fifty or sixty years: in certain cases it has been the subject of negotiation.

The Crown had always ‘taken up the attitude’ that lakebeds belonged to it, but ‘the Maoris have hotly contested that claim’. There was a risk that this kind of dispute might end up in front of a commission whose findings might ‘involve the country in very heavy expenditure’. (In other words, the Crown did not expect to win, and might have had to pay a very high price for the beds.) Maori based their claim on the Treaty of Waitangi, but the Crown ‘has never admitted it’. Maori refused to accept the Crown’s view, and the discussion had become so heated as to become a persistent and dangerous grievance on their part. Other than the suggestion that the Crown had always claimed the beds, Coates’ summary appears to be accurate, as far as it goes.

In terms of law, we note the arguments that can be mounted for and against who has title to large inland lakes, which we discussed in chapter 17. Suffice it to note here that the common law admitted private ownership of lake beds, including large lakes. There has always been the opportunity for the Crown to enact laws recognising Maori customary title to such lakes. Certainly, the approach adopted
by the Native Land Court during title determination hearings was that its statutes empowered it to decide Maori customary title to lake beds. Between 1915 and 1929, the Native Land Court investigated the titles of Lakes Rotorua, Rotoiti, Waikaremoana, and Omapere. Conversely, the Crown Law Office took the position that the title of large lake beds was vested in the Crown, and that Maori had (at most) fishing rights. Maori rights could be recognised by easements but not by freehold title to lake beds.194

We need not traverse the detail of the contest over the Rotorua lakes, but we note a development of the Crown's view that if it did not, in fact, own the lake beds as a matter of law, then it should do so as a matter of policy. It then fought Maori claims through the courts, but arrived at negotiated settlements where possible. The immediate precedent was the 1922 settlement with Te Arawa, where the Crown extinguished Maori title (‘if any’) by legislation, in return for a tribal annuity.195 This outcome must have been in the mind of the Government when it decided to include the lake and river beds as a matter for negotiation at Taupo, after receiving a Crown Law Office opinion that it already owned the bed of Lake Taupo.

**Was hydroelectricity also an issue?** One of the principal components of the claimants’ case is that the Crown negotiated in bad faith, because it wanted undisputed control of the lake and its waters for hydroelectricity but failed to disclose or negotiate agreement on that point.196 Tuwharetoa have been of that view since the 1940s, when Hoani Te Heuheu first advanced it in response to the Crown's construction of the control gates. Paranapa Otimi filed the trust board's copy of a 1944 letter from Hoani Te Heuheu to the Prime Minister. In that letter, the ariki wrote:

> I take it that the negotiations in 1924–’26 had no ulterior motive or aim. I take it that the use of Taupo waters for a new purpose, namely, hydro-electric power, opens up a new question and requires fresh negotiations with us.197

This was, in effect, a challenge to the Crown to prove that it had not deceived the tribe in 1926. Since then, Tuwharetoa have come to the view that the Crown was aware of the potential use of Lake Taupo for hydro power from 1904 onwards, and had that in mind (secretly) when it acquired the lake bed during negotiations that were supposed to be about access for angling.198

The Crown argued in reply, inter alia, that the Crown's state of knowledge and intentions were actually unclear in 1926. There was no evidence, the Crown argued, of a mapping survey of Lake Taupo for hydroelectricity purposes in 1903, nor of a 'long-term agenda' to use the lake for that purpose. It was also unclear whether the Crown possessed the control gate technology to contemplate regulating lake levels at that time anyway. In other words, we cannot know whether the Crown was contemplating the use of Lake Taupo for hydroelectricity, other than that it had reserved to itself the sole right to use water for that purpose in 1903.199

In light of these claimant and Crown submissions, we have reviewed the public record of the Crown's hydroelectricity plans with care. In doing so, we have relied mainly on the Public Works Department's annual reports. The Minister of Public Works reported to Parliament in 1904 that the Government had commissioned an expert report ‘examining some of the most likely sources of power,’ which showed the ‘vast possibilities ahead of us in the matter of the utilisation of our enormous water-powers, which are evidently amongst the colony’s greatest natural resources’. He concluded: ‘So many great and potential schemes lie ready to our hand that we are embarrassed by their number and variety.’200 The department's superintending engineer, PS Hay, reported the outcomes of the survey, identifying the Waikato River as a key source of power, and Lake Taupo as the key to the potential Waikato schemes. One scheme could involve the Huka Falls, with a dam above the falls to keep the lake waters high. The Aratiatia Rapids were also an important possibility, and using them would necessitate control of the lake outlet and control of the
lake levels to keep them high. Other sites on the river also involved regulating the flow from Lake Taupo. We do not know whether control gate technology was contemplated for these various schemes, but the point does not appear to be a material one.

For the next few years, the department monitored rainfall, the rise and fall of Lake Taupo, and its total discharge into the Waikato River at various states of water level, with a view to using the Huka Falls in electricity generation. Monitoring was continuous from 1907 to 1911. In 1910, the Government decided to take up with vigour the question of developing ‘our abundant water-powers’. The Prime Minister promised Parliament that schemes would be developed until all centres were supplied with hydroelectric power, and ‘our principal sources of power have been turned to commercial advantage’. The Huka Falls, however, was too expensive and difficult to develop in the meantime. Trial survey work was, however, under way to see if Auckland’s power needs could be supplied from Taupo. This involved comparing the relative advantages of Taupo and Kaituna.

By 1917, surveys and preliminary investigations had confirmed that three key sources of power needed development in the North Island, one of which was the Waikato River. The following year, the Chief Electrical Engineer confirmed that Kaituna was not a possibility, and instead proposed possible Waikato schemes. Use of the Aratiatia Rapids required a dam that would back the water right into Lake Taupo, drowning the Huka Falls. The storage in Lake Taupo would need to be regulated to increase capacity. The other potential site was the Arapuni Gorge, which would (we infer) still rely on the storage capacity of the lake but involve no interference with it.

In the early 1920s, the Government decided to develop Arapuni instead of Aratiatia, with a view to having it ready by 1928. In addition, the Public Works Department had in mind, in 1923, ‘a large number of available powers awaiting development when required’. These included six sites on the Waikato River, one of which was the Aratiatia Rapids. The department continued to list these ‘waiting’ sites of hydro power annually. Given that Coates was Minister of Public Works at this time, he must have been aware of his department’s published plans to develop hydroelectricity schemes involving the storage capacity and water levels of Lake Taupo when he negotiated the 1926 agreement with Ngati Tuwharetoa.

The Crown’s argument that it had no long-term agenda, and that its knowledge and intentions were in fact unclear in 1926, is not supported by the evidence. Despite the decision to go with Arapuni over Aratiatia, the storage capacity of Lake Taupo was a known issue in the 1920s. Immediately after the agreement, Ngati Tuwharetoa approached the Crown with a request that it use its resources and technology to lower the level of the lake. In 1927, Public Works Department engineers advised their Minister: ‘Any future Hydro-electric schemes involving a maximum lake level would be seriously affected by the permanent lowering of this level’.

We will consider the significance of this for the negotiations below.

The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1924: The Crown set the parameters for the negotiations by legislation in late 1924. The annual ‘washing-up’ Act, the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act, made it lawful for the Native Minister to negotiate with Maori ‘claiming to be owners of the lands bordering on Taupo waters’. For the purposes of the Act, these ‘Taupo waters’ were defined as all rivers and streams flowing into Lake Taupo, the lake itself, and the Waikato River from Lake Taupo to Huka Falls. The Native Minister was authorised to negotiate an agreement regarding the fishing rights in Taupo waters, and with regard to the beds and margins of Taupo waters. In terms of fishing rights, the agreement could include special fees for Taupo licences, and the appropriation of a ‘definite proportion’ (unspecified) of those fees to Maori, to be distributed among them or applied for their benefit by methods to be agreed upon. This gave quite a lot of scope for Maori to
agree the content and method of financial compensation. Agreement about the margins was something officials had been urging, and was clearly related to the issue of access for fishing. The nature or purpose of an agreement regarding the beds, however, was not specified, nor was it explained in Parliament.

The methodology for the negotiations was prescribed in some detail. The Native Minister was to convene a meeting or meetings of people claiming to be owners. If satisfied that a ‘substantial majority’ present at the meeting, and ‘in his opinion entitled to be present’, agreed to any terms, then they could be carried out despite minority dissent. A substantial majority of Maori present needed to be satisfied, however, that the terms were ‘fair and reasonable’. The Minister also had to be satisfied that the terms were ‘fair and reasonable in the interests of the Natives concerned, and also in the public interest’. If the agreement met that test, then the Minister could submit it to the Governor-General for embodiment in an Order in Council and regulations.211

On this point, Ms Feint submitted that the necessity for this Act was not clear: why did the Native Minister need legislative authority to negotiate? She drew the Tribunal’s attention to a similar query in the departmental report supplied to Tuwharetoa by the Department of Conservation, with its guess that the Act was to impress upon Tuwharetoa the seriousness with which the Government saw the issue.212 ‘This may be so, but we think that the legislation was necessary to put beyond doubt that a lawful agreement could be reached with people ‘claiming to be owners of the land bordering Taupo waters’, rather than people who were actually and legally the owners. This provision took away the need to deal with riparian owners, arrange successions, and get consent of all owners in the manner prescribed by the Native Land Acts. It also got around the fact that Maori were not the legally recognised owners of the lake bed (in the Crown’s view), and yet their agreement was being sought about the bed. Finally, it authorised the Minister to act on the views of a majority and to set aside the wishes of a minority, rather like using the mechanism of a meeting of assembled owners. For all of these reasons, and to circumvent the Crown’s own cumbersome native title system and the rather meagre protections it contained, the provisions of the 1924 Act were necessary.
We note also that the Native Minister was vested with the sole authority to decide whether the meeting was made up of people entitled to be there – that is, the Native Minister would decide whether the people present were the rightful claimants. Nothing was prescribed about how the Minister would decide whether he was dealing with the right people or not. Again, this set aside any legal protections or due process available to riparian owners, and left everyone (whether owners or not) at the mercy of the Native Minister. The Minister was also the one who would decide whether there was a ‘substantial majority’, allowing him to act regardless of the views of a dissenting minority, even if they were riparian landowners with legal titles; nothing was prescribed about how majority approval should be ascertained.

These features of the legislation are of great concern to us in light of the need for the negotiations to be carried out in a Treaty-consistent manner. The Crown should not have thus set aside, without property owners’ consent, the legal protections it had given to them. While we agree with the principle of dealing with the tribe, it should not have been done in a way that simply ignored decades’ worth of private titles and legal rights. If the Crown was going to cut the Gordian knot, it should either have done so in a comprehensive way for all Tuwharetoa lands and resources, or alternatively it should have found a way to protect the interests that it had created while still negotiating with properly constituted tribal authorities. Nor should it have vested so much discretion in the Minister. Ngati Raukawa, who claim an interest in the lake separate from Tuwharetoa, argued that they were excluded from the 1926 agreement because they failed to get ownership of abutting lands from the Native Land Court. The 1924 Act, however, empowered the Native Minister to deal with anyone he considered to have a legitimate claim. We will return to this Ngati Raukawa claim when we consider the outcome of this Act at the 1926 Waihi meeting.

On the positive side, we consider that Parliament acted consistently with the Treaty when it required the Minister to make an agreement that he thought was ‘fair and reasonable,’ in the interests of Maori and the public. As well, he had to be satisfied that a majority of Maori present also thought it was fair and reasonable. This was an important double constraint on the Minister’s freedom of action, against which the resultant agreement should have been and can now be measured. We also note that, from the beginning, Parliament envisaged a share of the fishing fees going to Maori, and giving them the choice of distribution to individuals or application for their general benefit, by means to be agreed with them – this gave scope for the recognition of tino rangatiratanga. Finally, there was nothing improper in the Crown’s inclusion of the beds in the legislation, although we think its purpose should have been clearly set out. If the Crown wanted to negotiate about the beds then it was entitled to do so. What was important was that a fair and reasonable agreement be reached. We consider it axiomatic that such an agreement would involve proper process and some parity of bargaining power, resulting in a free and willing agreement on both sides.

The Government’s proposed draft agreement, 1925: The detail of what the Government wanted is not to be found in the 1924 Act, but rather in the proposed agreement drafted in 1925 by the Attorney-General, Sir Francis Bell, and the Native Department. It was forwarded to Cabinet for approval in March 1926. This document is useful, as it provides a yardstick for the Tribunal to measure how far the Crown departed from these early objectives, and therefore the degree of negotiation and compromise that took place at later meetings. The draft agreement vested ownership of the lake bed and riverbeds in the King, and set up a special licensing system for Taupo, with a sliding scale of fees. This would be a significant change from the then national licence regime. As part of the deal with regard to fishing rights, Tuwharetoa would get a share of free licences and half of the licence fees. In return, the Crown would get what Ayson had been requesting for years: guaranteed access for anglers to a one-chain strip along the rivers. The one-chain access to the lake, however, was
broadened from licence-holders to the whole public. We note that this is the first time that public access was even mentioned. Previously, the entire debate among officials and in Parliament had been about anglers. Steamer boats were already running on the lake, and if there was any kind of public access problem, then no one mentioned it in the records available to us.

The Government earmarked the money for distribution to property owners with land on the margins of the lake and rivers. This, presumably, was in recognition that they were the ones losing property rights in a strip of marginal land, and in the beds. The 1924 Act had left it to be agreed whether the funds would be paid out to individuals or applied more generally for their ‘benefit’, but this draft set out the Government’s view of which way this should be decided. It also imposed clear Government control of the proposed board, via the ability to regulate its composition, duties, and procedure. Thus, if the Government’s terms were agreed to, the tribal nature of the agreement would be narrowed to a tightly controlled board distributing money to individual riparian owners.\textsuperscript{214} The apparent intention to negotiate in the 1924 Act was reduced to only two points on which the Government was undecided – how many free licences Tuwharetoa would get, and how many board members had to be members of the tribe.

\textbf{Delay in negotiations:} Coates issued a notice in December 1924, calling for a meeting of interested Maori to take place in February 1925. An outbreak of infantile paralysis led to a postponement, and after two more postponements (in April and May), the Minister postponed the meeting indefinitely.\textsuperscript{215} The death of Prime Minister Massey was another reason for the delay. In the meantime, Maori continued to fish for food without licences, and to charge anglers for access to fishing. A fisheries ranger reported a wholesale and open defiance of the licensing law, and Maori belief that Coates’ notice was actually about them having the right to fish without a licence. The Tourist Department wanted to prosecute them. For years, rangers had ‘turned a blind eye on natives fishing for food’, but now ‘they are making matters too warm’. The head of the department advised prosecution, though noting that this would ‘arouse a storm among the Natives’. Coates, now the Prime Minister, urged the Minister of Tourism, William Nosworthy, not to prosecute any Taupo Maori in case it jeopardised their perceived mood of readiness to settle.\textsuperscript{216}

As well as fishing for food, Maori continued to charge anglers. In November 1925, the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs urged that the delayed meeting be held. Nothing could be scheduled for another four months, however, because all the Maori members of Parliament were off at tribal meetings.\textsuperscript{217} Some Taupo Maori became alarmed at the delay and the possible outcomes of a negotiation. In March 1926, northern Taupo hapu sent a petition disagreeing with any proposal to cede the lake and its tributaries to the Crown, dissociating themselves from what they said was the wish of the southern chiefs, who had not conferred with them. In our inquiry, the Crown put some weight on this petition, noting that the Crown's intention to acquire the bed was clearly known to Taupo Maori before the negotiations, and possibly supported by some. Also in March 1926, Attorney-General Bell, who wrote the draft agreement described above, urged Coates that it was urgent to settle the question of the bed of the lake and its tributaries, and to enable proper fees to be set for fishing – the 'Natives would be benefited, and a great advantage would accrue to Europeans'.\textsuperscript{218} Coates agreed, and a meeting was finally called at Waihi for 21 April 1926.

\textbf{The Waihi meeting, 21 April 1926:} The April meeting at Waihi was the first of two negotiations meetings. Arguably, it was the more important of the two, as this was the public meeting where the Native Minister was supposed to satisfy himself that those present claimed to be owners of lands abutting the lake and rivers, and that a substantial majority of them agreed to a ‘fair and reasonable’ arrangement. The only official notes we have from this meeting are the Minister’s introductory comments, which shed some light on how the Government’s proposals were explained at the meeting. The emphasis was entirely on the complaints
of anglers that they had to pay 'exorbitant fees'. So the Government considered it in the best interests of both Maori and Pakeha to negotiate 'an agreement in respect of fishing rights in Taupo waters, and so preserve such rights for both races' (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{219}

The meeting was attended by Coates (Prime Minister, Native Minister, and Minister of Public Works), Maui Pomare, a 'large number' of Tuwharetoa, and various officials. The only record of the meeting found by Mr White was an article in the \textit{Evening Post}, according to which:

- Hoani Te Heuheu supported the proposed settlement.
- Ngahu Huirama claimed that a cession of all Maori rights over the lakes and rivers of the area would require an annuity of £15,000, similar to the deal that Te Arawa got over their lakes.
- Coates replied that the Crown was not concerned with the ownership of the lake. 'All they wanted' was to secure to Maori some financial benefit from the lake's fishing attractions, because at present they got nothing and the Government wanted to ensure they got something. He rejected an annual payment of £15,000 and offered instead 50 per cent of licence fees. In return, Maori would cede all their fishing rights 'in and over the Taupo waters'. Coates claimed that the payment to Te Arawa was not a payment for the beds of the Rotorua lakes, but for services in the Maori wars. 'Further the Government did not want to have anything to do with the bed of Lake Taupo which was quite a different matter from the question of the fishing rights in Taupo waters.'\textsuperscript{220}

After this meeting, Coates met with the leaders of Tuwharetoa, where it was agreed that:

the Natives hand over to the Crown their fishing rights in and over Lake Taupo, in consideration of a perpetual annual payment of £3000, provided that should 50 percent of the licence fees collected be more than £3000 then such larger sum should be paid.\textsuperscript{221}

It was also agreed that the details would be worked out at a later date, especially the question of rights in the streams and rivers flowing into Lake Taupo.\textsuperscript{222}

Two other newspaper accounts are also significant. An undated story in the \textit{New Zealand Herald} referred to a telegram from Wellington that fishing rights in the rivers were to 'fall into the hands of the Crown'. According to this source, Maori at the meeting were emphatic that it had not been agreed that fishing rights in the streams and rivers were to be ceded to the Crown. A \textit{Hawke's Bay Herald} article stated that the freehold of the lake and a one-chain reserve along all rivers was ceded to the Crown for £3000.\textsuperscript{223} This led Hoani Te Heuheu to telegram the Prime Minister on 29 April 1926:

Please correct report of lake meeting appearing in \textit{Hawke's Bay Herald} Monday morning wherein it states freehold lake and one chain reserve to all rivers conceded to Crown for £3000 as such. Reports incorrect and detrimental to our interests.\textsuperscript{224}

The Government's reply was merely that a date would be set for a meeting in Wellington to discuss details of the preliminary agreement reached at Waihi.\textsuperscript{225}

In contrast to these accounts, we have Native Minister Coates’ memorandum to the Governor-General, setting out the agreement reached at Waihi and recommending an Order in Council be issued. We find this to be a very unusual document, given that the Government already considered a further meeting was still required to finalise the agreement, and that no Order in Council could in fact be promulgated. The terms were virtually identical to Bell’s old draft (see above), with only one significant exception – that £3000 would be paid annually to the board for the ‘general benefit of the Tuwharetoa Tribe’, and if the amount of licence fees exceeded that sum, then half of the excess would also be paid to the board. Remarkably, there was still a blank space left for the number of free fishing licences. At the end of this memorandum, Coates certified that a substantial majority of those present, and in his opinion entitled to be present, approved all of these terms,
and he certified that they were fair and reasonable in the interest of Maori and the public.  

Other official documents cast great doubt on Coates’ terms. Firstly, a departmental report, submitted to us by Mr Taiaroa, states that the meeting was six hours long and too short for more than a ‘sketchy outline’ to be agreed. With regard to the right of way provisions, the report quoted the following resolutions:

1. That the public shall have access to and right of passage over a margin of one chain from and around the bed of Lake Taupo.
2. Every holder of a special licence shall have access to and right of passage by foot over continuous strips of land one chain wide on each side of and along the whole length of the beds of all Taupo waters other than the Lake.
3. That the erection of fishing camps, etc., shall not be permitted on the one chain strip.

The final resolution (numbered 10) was very important, because it meant that Maori could still generate income by charging for camping on their land, since no one could camp on the strip. Coates’ account did not include this resolution, but instead stipulated that fishing camps already erected on the one-chain strip would not be excepted from the right of passage and access for anglers. Apparently, by the numbering of these resolutions on the document itself, there were other (unrecorded) resolutions.

Secondly, the document put to Tuwharetoa at the July meeting stated that details about the makeup of the board, the number of free licences, whether or not there would be camping on the one-chain strip, and the licensing of boating were issues still to be agreed. The Government’s admission that the camping issue had not been resolved is telling. The denial that the Crown wanted the beds, given that the Government was in fact set on acquiring title to the beds, at the only meeting held with ‘anything close to a comprehensive representation of Ngati Tuwharetoa is alarming.  

The explanation lies in the dilemma the Crown created for itself when it refused to admit Maori title to lake beds, while nonetheless trying to make a settlement with Maori. Bell put this starkly to Te Arawa in 1922: ‘I thought I had made it plain that the very basis of the agreement was that we did not admit you had anything to sell and therefore we had nothing to buy.’ The result for Taupo was Coates’ verbal gymnastics at Waihi, which precluded mutual understanding or agreement.

We agree with Mr White’s concerns. In light of the evidence and also of our discussion of the July meeting below,
we conclude that there was no agreement in April to cede the beds, no agreement on the rivers, and no agreement on the key issue of camping. It is harder to say what was agreed, but there appears to have been loose agreement to a one-chain strip around the lake, public access, and angling in the lake. The Crown had agreed to a £3000 annuity for this access to fishing.

The July 1926 meeting and the negotiation of the agreement: On 27 April 1926, the day after the meeting, Internal Affairs noted that the ‘present intent of the Prime Minister is that certain of the principal Maoris affected will be brought to Wellington in order that he may show them the final proposals’. Also, the Crown Law Office and the Native Department thought that legislation was probably needed to validate the agreement. The 1924 Act intended the Order in Council to have the force of law, but it was desirable to ‘put the matter absolutely beyond any question’. On 19 July, Coates’ secretary, Raumoa Balneavis, reported that the Prime Minister had invited a representation of the Ngati-Tuharetoa to meet with him in Wellington . . . to go into certain phases of the Government’s proposals in connection with the fishing rights in Taupo waters which could not be dealt with at the recent Tokaanu meeting for the want of time.

Tribal leaders met with the Prime Minister on 23 July. At this crucial meeting, a final agreement was negotiated, which was then drafted up by Apirana Ngata, Balneavis, and Newton (the latter being a clerk of the Native Land Court) and translated into Maori. The text in both languages was signed by Hoani Te Heuheu on 26 July, before being forwarded to the Prime Minister for his ‘consideration and signature’. We accept this submission in respect of the lake. This means that there is still doubt about:

- what the ‘majority’ agreed to at Waihi;
- how the Native Minister decided whether the Waihi attendees were the correct people; and
- whether the Minister carried out his responsibilities properly under the 1924 Act in that respect.

Nonetheless, we accept that the leaders who attended the July meeting were the right people to finalise matters for Tuharetoa in respect of the lake. With regard to particular rivers and their fisheries, however, these leaders themselves thought that separate compensation arrangements were necessary. River hapu took that view as well, leading to protest and dissent after the meeting.

On 21 July, five copies of the Government’s proposals were handed to Hoani Te Heuheu. This document stated that the following points had been agreed at Waihi:

- The Government would pay £3000 a year to a board for the general benefit of the Tuharetoa tribe. If fishing licence fees exceeded that amount, then one-half of the excess would also be paid to the board.
- The beds of all Taupo waters would be vested in the King as a public reserve.
- The public would have access to and right of passage over one chain around the lake.
- Fishing licence holders would have access to and right of passage over one chain along the rivers.
Still to be settled, according to the Government, were administrative details about the board, how many free licences should be granted to the tribe and who would allocate them, and the licensing of boating on the lake and rivers. The Government suggested that there should be 40 free licences, the same as agreed with Te Arawa. Also, the Government proposed that Internal Affairs permit and control erection of fishing camps on the one-chain margin, charge rent for their use, and add this income to the pot as part of the 50–50 principle. This latter point was, if the departmental records are correct, a reversal of a resolution from the Waihi meeting.236

We have two surviving records of Tuwharetoa’s position in response to these proposals. The first is alterations in handwriting on the Government paper. Apart from changes regarding the board, the tribal leaders wanted 100 free licences, to be allocated on the recommendation of the board. They also crossed out the section allowing the Government to run fishing camps on the one-chain margin and charge fees for them. They replaced it with a requirement for the Government to exclude public access from all Maori kainga or settlements on the one chain.237

The second document is a typed paper entitled ‘Fishing Rights in Taupo Waters,’ recording the ‘resolutions passed at a meeting of the Representatives of Ngati Tuwharetoa held in Wellington, 21 July 1926’. This accepted, rejected, or altered the Government’s proposals as follows:

- The £3000 annuity was specified as ‘for their fishing rights in Lake Taupo only’ (emphasis added), a very significant change to the Government’s wording of this provision.
- The beds of Taupo waters will not be vested in the King. (The word ‘not’ is underlined.)
- The public should have access to and right of passage over one chain around the lake (no change).
- Licence holders should have access to and right of passage for one chain along the other Taupo waters (no change).
- Certain areas should be excluded from time to time from public access on the recommendation of the board (a new proposal).
- Fifty free licences should be allocated on the recommendation of the board. (The number ‘100’ is typed on the document but has been crossed out and changed to ‘50’, presumably indicating a last-minute concession to the Government’s much lower suggestion of 40 licences.)
- Erection of fishing camps will not be permitted on the one chain (a rejection of the Government’s proposal).
- The Minister of Internal Affairs should licence all boats or launches plying for hire (the word ‘boats’ was added).238

The proposed changes were significant. Specifying that the annuity covered fishing rights in the lake only, and therefore (by implication) neither the beds nor the fishing rights in rivers, is a position from which the tribe has never departed. Further, the vesting of the beds in the Crown was so firmly rejected that the word ‘not’ was underlined. The Government’s one-chain proposal was accepted, but the tribe wanted to be able to recommend exceptions to public and licence-holder access. This would have been a substantive change to the narrow exceptions specified in Coates’ memorandum to the Governor-General. At some point, however, the tribe cut its request for free licences in half, presumably to bring it more into line with the Crown’s much lower figure.

On Friday 23 July, the Tuwharetoa delegation met with the Prime Minister. The only record we have of the meeting is the written agreement itself.239 Mr White was not able to locate any minutes or accounts of what happened. The only measure we have of how far the parties compromised their positions, and which won the most concessions, is to compare the Tuwharetoa resolutions with the Crown’s original proposals and the final agreement. The Government did not accept Tuwharetoa’s proposed wording that the £3000 was for fishing rights in Lake Taupo only. It did, however, accept that the owners of lands abutting the rivers ‘may’ be entitled to separate compensation because they could no
longer charge anglers for the use of their land for camping 'and fishing' (an important concession, given the supposed illegality of such charges). This was to be resolved by the appointment of a tribunal to ascertain what compensation (if any) should be paid to riparian owners. The agreement also left it open to determine what form the compensation should take. These were new provisions, and there is no way of knowing whether they were proposed by the Crown or the tribe, nor how acceptable this particular compromise was to either side. On its face, it was a major concession to Tuwharetoa.

The Government insisted on keeping the clause vesting the beds of all Taupo waters in the King as a public reserve. It also insisted on keeping the power to have fishing camps on the one chain, and to charge rents for them, but now there could be compensation for Tuwharetoa riparian owners for this loss of income. Presumably that was necessary before the tribe would agree to this provision, and to the reservation of one chain along all the rivers. As the Government had originally proposed, the camping revenues would be added to the pot for the 50–50 split, as would fines derived from poaching (a new provision). The Prime Minister later explained that the Government wanted Tuwharetoa to have as much vested interest as possible in unofficially policing poaching.

The Government agreed to Tuwharetoa's request to be able to exempt some land from the one-chain rule, and did not prescribe what kinds of land – instead, the agreement empowered the board to make recommendations to the Minister of Internal Affairs. As this power was recommendatory only, everything would depend on the Government's case-by-case agreement, which the claimants argue was ultimately withheld. The Government also agreed to a maximum of 50 free licences, which was an increase from its proposal of 40, but a significant compromise from the tribe’s original desire for 100. As noted above, we do not know when Tuwharetoa lowered their typed request for 100 to 50.

Finally, a sting in the tail, a new provision was put at the end of the agreement. This specified that legislation would give effect to the agreement, and would include such provisions of the earlier Te Arawa lakes legislation ‘as may be applicable’. This turned out to be especially significant. Some features of the Te Arawa legislation (the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1922) proved particularly controversial in the 1926 Act. These include the qualification that native title to the beds, ‘if any’, was extinguished, and the vesting of the right to use the waters in the Crown. On the positive side for Tuwharetoa, it also included the reservation of their right to catch indigenous fish. Although we have no account of the July meeting per se, we have evidence about whether or not the meaning of this provision was explained to Tuwharetoa. In 1946, a tribal deputation met with the Prime Minister and stated categorically that the right to use the waters was never discussed with them, but simply turned up in the legislation. In the absence of any countervailing evidence, we think it pretty clear that for this provision at least, Tuwharetoa had no knowledge of the exact wording of the 1922 Act and what it might mean to the substance of their own agreement with the Crown.

The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926: Section 14 of the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926 gave effect to the July agreement. Using the wording of the 1922 Te Arawa legislation, the beds of Lake Taupo and the Waikato River (to the Huka Falls), ‘together with the right to use the respective waters’, were ‘hereby declared to be the property of the Crown, freed and discharged from the Native customary title (if any) or any other Native freehold title thereto’, except for any unalienated islands. The Governor-General could reserve any portion of the bed or any Crown lands on the borders for the use of Maori, and could vest management and control of it in the board.

The right to fish for and catch for their own use any indigenous fish in the lake was reserved to Maori – such fish could be sold with the consent of the board, otherwise anyone selling fish could be fined. This also came from the Te Arawa legislation, and was not part of the agreement.
It was in keeping with the Minister’s opening remarks at Waihi, where he referred to the Government’s intention to preserve the fishing rights of both races. But what it reserved in practice remained to be defined (and circumscribed) by regulations and later legislation. There was no marginal strip and no rivers in the Te Arawa legislation, so the rest of the 1926 Act did not draw on it, other than the sections relating to the board.

Other changed or new features in the 1926 Act included the following:

- Instead of the board recommending exemptions for parts of the strip, the Governor-General could simply exempt any portion or limit public use in any way.
- The Governor-General could, by proclamation, declare the bed of any river or stream flowing into the lake, or a portion of the bed, to be Crown land ‘and thereupon . . . freed from the customary or other title of Natives, and the Crown shall have the right to use and control the waters flowing over such bed’. The one-chain reserve would only apply to such rivers. Again, this was a significant departure from the agreement. The right to use and control the waters had not been specified, nor was this wording (‘use and control’) taken from the Te Arawa legislation. While potentially favourable to some Maori, who might now get to keep part or all of their riverbeds if they were not proclaimed, the reverse would fall unfairly on those who did not.
- The rights of owners were restricted, because they lost the power to alienate or deal with the land (reserved as a strip) in any way without the consent of the Government. It appears that only licence-holders could use the strip along the rivers; in other words, owners appear to have lost the right to camp or fish on the strip themselves, unless they took out a licence. As far as we can tell, this restriction was not contemplated in the agreement, and it was certainly not spelled out in it.
- The maximum of 50 free licences could be exceeded with the agreement of the Governor-General in Council, which was a change potentially favourable to the tribe. The 20 cut-price licences allocated in 1913, on the other hand, were abolished. We do not know whether this was discussed, although it was certainly not explicit in the agreement.

On balance, these changes were so significant as to have required the specific agreement of Tuwharetoa. We do not think that the Crown could rely on the clause permitting the use of ‘applicable’ material from the Te Arawa legislation to make changes to the substance of what had been signed. It might be said that no one owns water under British law, but the Crown was vesting in itself the right to use the water under colour of an agreement with the tribe. Since legislation was needed to put matters ‘absolutely beyond any question’, we think it should have done so, rather than introducing substantial changes that had not been agreed. Such an outcome was not contemplated when the 1924 Act instructed the Native Minister to reach a ‘fair and reasonable’ arrangement with the consent of the majority.

We turn next to our findings on whether the 1926 agreement and its enacting legislation were fair and reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the Treaty.

The Tribunal’s findings

In this section, we posed the question: were the 1926 agreement and its enacting legislation fair and reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the Treaty? The answer turns on what the Crown acquired from the 1926 agreement and Act, which was:

- the right to fish in Lake Taupo and its tributaries for its licensed anglers;
- sole authority to license that fishing;
- the legal ownership of the beds of Lake Taupo and the Waikato River (to the Huka Falls);
- through the one-chain strip, physical control of public access to the lake;
- through the one-chain strip, physical control of (and guaranteed) access to the rivers for anglers, and the...
right to profit therefrom (via licences, camping fees, and so on);

▶ the right to use the waters; and

▶ the legal ownership of the riverbeds, when it chose to assert this by proclamation. (Unlike for the lake, the Crown Law Office opinion cited above was that legal ownership of these riverbeds had been vested, in Pakeha law, in riparian owners, so this was now taken from them and vested in the Crown.)

What exactly was the £3000 annuity in return for or a payment for?

Due to the Crown’s reticence on what rights Tuwharetoa actually possessed before (and were therefore being acquired), this question has to be answered quite narrowly. In the agreement (as enacted and expanded by the 1926 Act), the Crown appears to have acquired the rights and powers outlined above. But what exactly did Tuwharetoa understand themselves to be conveying to the Crown, and what exactly was the Crown paying them for?

First, because the Crown never conceded that Tuwharetoa owned the lake bed, and the legislation simply asserted that if there was a native interest then the Crown title was discharged from it, the money cannot have been intended as a payment for the bed. When the 1926 Act was debated in Parliament, one member of the House, puzzled by this, asserted that the Crown must either own lakes as of right, or it must pay the Maori owners for them.244 The position had not changed since Bell’s bald statement to Te Arawa in 1922:

I thought I had made it plain that the very basis of the agreement was that we did not admit you had anything to sell and therefore we had nothing to buy.245

Nor was the money a payment for the riverbeds, which the Crown did admit that Maori owned. These were to be taken seriatim by proclamation – the Crown might take parts or none. They could not be counted as ‘sold’ by this agreement. No money was ever paid to their legal owners for the loss of their title ad medium filum aquae. Nor was the annuity in compensation for these riparian owners’ loss of river bank income. Any income lost as a result of no longer being able to charge anglers for camping or access on the river banks was to be the subject of separate compensation. Although the courts later doubted that the Act had in fact executed this intention, the agreement is clear on the point.246

What we are left with, by default, is the Crown’s reservation of and exclusive powers over the one-chain strip. The annuity could be considered a kind of rent, although the details remained to be settled – exceptions to the one-chain reservation were possible, but these would neither lower nor increase the ‘rent’. Also, Maori were in effect agreeing to some kind of transfer or sharing of fishing rights. Exactly what was given up or retained in that respect is unclear. The legislation reserved for Maori a right to fish for indigenous species in the lake (but not the rivers), and this was further defined and altered by regulation and subsequent legislation. The exclusivity (or not) and parameters of the fishing rights being conveyed or retained are entirely opaque in the agreement, and further complicated by legislation and regulation.

Ultimately, we think that the annuity must have been understood by Ngati Tuwharetoa as a payment for securing:

• the European right to fish;

• the virtual alienation of the one-chain strip; and

• the Crown’s exclusive right to profit from both in terms of the lake (via sole licensing and exclusive rights over the strip) but not the rivers (where separate compensation ‘may’ be due). The Crown then shared this profit with the tribe, by allocating them 50 per cent of any excess over £3000.

Finally, and informally, the Government intended the 50–50 part of the annuity to encourage Tuwharetoa to act as unofficial rangers in policing the licensing laws, although it could not be considered a payment for that in legal terms.247
As a result, although the Crown declared itself to own them, it has never paid the tribe for the bed of the lake or the right to use its waters.

**The Tribunal’s findings on the £3000 annuity**

The Crown vested in itself by statute the ownership of the bed of the lake and the right to use its waters, without paying the tribe for either of these property rights. The Crown’s failure was compounded by its later refusal to compensate the tribe when new or additional uses for the lake and its waters, beyond those of fishing and access, were contemplated by the Crown. These failures, given the importance of the resource and its value to the claimants, must be considered breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles of partnership and active protection.

**What did Tuwharetoa make a full, free, and informed agreement to?**

It appears, from the evidence, that for Tuwharetoa this was an agreement about fishing rights. Although the trust board did not protest the ownership of the beds after signing the agreement, it clearly believed that Tuwharetoa had not given up their tino rangatiratanga over the lakes. From time to time, new or additional uses arose, such as the extraction of gravel from the bed or the generation of hydroelectricity from controlling the waters. When that happened, Tuwharetoa insisted either that they were entitled to half the revenue on the 50–50 principle (an entitlement which could only have come from ongoing rights in the taonga), or that their consent was required and fresh negotiations needed to secure it.\

Apart from this view of the tribal leadership, it seems clear that those present at the Waihi meeting did not agree to surrender mana or ownership of the lakes. The ‘majority’ still felt that way after the July meeting, according to WR Ngahana, although Arthur Grace reported that the majority had accepted the agreement.\

The oral history of Tuwharetoa, as put to us at our hearing in Turangi, is that the people did not intend to give up their mana over the lake, and were confused and angry at the Crown’s insistence that they had done so.\

The beds, banks, and fishing rights in the rivers, in fact everything to do with the rivers, was probably the biggest sticking point in 1926. The Tuwharetoa leadership won its main concession from the Crown in July on that issue, but the hapu most affected continued to fight afterwards.

**The Tribunal’s findings on what Tuwharetoa agreed to**

In summary, the most that can be said about the 1926 agreement is that the Crown acquired more than Maori wanted to convey, or indeed knew they had conveyed. That act of acquisition, therefore, was in breach of the Treaty.

This is partly because of the changes to the agreement when it was enacted in legislation, especially the Crown’s assertion that it had the right to use the waters of the lake. Moreover, the Act included a provision reserving to ‘Natives’ the right to catch indigenous fish, but also providing for that right to be circumscribed in various ways.

It should be remembered, in respect of the indigenous fishery, that there is no mention in the agreement (nor any of the surrounding documentation) that Tuwharetoa agreed to Crown control of that fishery. They did accept the Crown’s sole right of licensing trout fishing by accepting free licences and the reservation of the one-chain strip, but there is no evidence that they intended to give up any of their other fishing rights. The Crown’s inclusion of that part of the Te Arawa legislation in the 1926 Act can be seen as an appropriate reservation of rights, but it can also be interpreted as an assertion of authority and potential restriction of rights that had not been contemplated or intended by Tuwharetoa. The discussions had all been about the rights of anglers and licence-holders. This was especially significant in later years when, as Mr White describes, the Crown restricted the right to take indigenous fish by regulation and in the 1981 legislation (see below). Thus, the Crown gave itself powers that had not been agreed, and which were used ultimately to the detriment of Taupo Maori rights over their indigenous fisheries,
in breach of the plain meaning of article 2 and of the Treaty principles of partnership and active protection.

*Was there an element of compulsion?*

The Crown is most concerned about allegations that it negotiated in bad faith and coerced agreement to the alienation of Lake Taupo. For the Crown, the key fact is that Tuwharetoa leaders signed the agreement. There is no way of knowing why they changed their minds and compromised on their original resolution that the beds not be vested in the King. The details of the Crown and claimant arguments are provided above. The Crown’s argument turns on the lack of records for the July meeting. Without any record, it is simply not possible to say that the Crown used the same tactic with Tuwharetoa that it (allegedly) did with Te Arawa, by threatening to take the lake if agreement was not reached.

The claimants, on the other hand, are convinced that their leaders would not willingly have relinquished their taonga. The evidence of George Asher, for example, is that:

> Ngati Tuwharetoa have always maintained that the 1926 agreement had been reached for the purpose of ensuring anglers had access to fish in the Lake. How the negotiations moved on from arrangements to secure public access to the fishery to vesting the title in the Crown is not entirely clear. I have no doubt that Ngati Tuwharetoa were opposed to any suggestion that the title to the Lake be vested in the Crown. Why the delegation that went to Wellington, led by Hoani Te Heuheu, signed an agreement agreeing to vest the beds of all Taupo waters ‘in the King as a public reserve’ is a mystery. My assessment is that the only credible explanation is that an element of coercion was involved. I am quite certain that Hoani Te Heuheu and his chiefs would never have willingly given up our taonga to the Crown. These leaders would have been very aware of the power of the Crown to pass legislation taking the Lake, whether they agreed or not. It is likely therefore that faced with that eventuality, they agreed to a compromise that saw some benefit for the tribe in the form of compensation for the access arrangements.\(^{253}\)

Comparing this to the ‘agreement’ reached over Rotoaira, Mr Asher concluded, ‘it cannot be said that that sort of “agreement” is one willingly entered into by parties with equal bargaining power.’\(^{254}\)

We agree with the Crown that we cannot know what transpired at the meeting, with two exceptions. First, we rely on the evidence of Hoani Te Heuheu in 1944, and of the Tuwharetoa delegation to the Prime Minister in 1946, that hydroelectricity and the Crown’s right to use the waters were not discussed at the meeting.\(^{255}\) We see no reason to doubt that evidence. Secondly, the Crown pointed us to the agreement itself as the record of the meeting. We can place that document in context because we have the evidence to compare the initial positions of the Crown and tribe, to determine which made concessions, and the nature or degree of those concessions, at the July meeting. Our discussion above shows that the Crown only made one major compromise. It agreed to separate compensation for river bank owners (although we note that it did not pay up for 20 years and until litigation forced it to). The Crown also made two small compromises: the number of free licences was increased by 10; and it accepted a proposal for Tuwharetoa to recommend exceptions to the right of way.

Tuwharetoa agreed to public and licence-holder access via a right of way, which was the Crown’s primary fishing objective. In terms of their resolutions, the tribal leaders gave way on all of their major objections:

- the ownership of the beds of the lake and rivers;
- their desire to still control and profit directly from camping (which was transferred to the Crown – a major concession given the history cited above);
- the number of free licences (100 reduced to 50); and
- the inclusion of the rivers in the deal.

The Crown made one major concession but all the other big concessions were made by the tribe. Even without
knowing exactly what happened at the meeting, this has to raise concerns about whether there was an even playing field for negotiations, or a fair and reasonable outcome.

We accept the Crown's submission that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it negotiated in bad faith, threatened to take the lake, or coerced the Tuwharetoa leadership. How, then, to account for the unequal outcome? The scenario put to us by the Crown is that the tribe may have simply thought the fishing money a good deal and signed up willingly. The context does not allow such an optimistic reading of events. For such a taonga as Lake Taupo, so central to tribal identity, livelihood, and ways of life, there must be very clear evidence of willingness to give it up. On the contrary, all the evidence leading up to 23 July was that the tribe was determined never to relinquish it. Subsequent to 26 July, the evidence is that the tribe either believed that it had ongoing rights with the Crown in the lake, or that it had not willingly relinquished such rights.

In light of how the Crown responded to Tuwharetoa's challenges over fishing rights prior to 1926, we do not think it a genuine prospect that the Crown would have simply taken the lake by legislation if no agreement could be reached. Whether Tuwharetoa thought it a possibility in 1926, we have no way of knowing. The Crown certainly contemplated a general legislative taking of all lakes from time to time. A more realistic prospect in 1926, based on what the Crown Law Office and the Tourist Department wanted to do, was a series of prosecutions of Maori fishing without licences, at the same time as the Government defended court cases against anglers who trespassed on Maori land. In terms of legislation, something akin to the 1902 or 1908 Acts was possible, further restricting the fishing rights of Maori landowners. There were thus clear and obvious sanctions available if no agreement was reached.

This forms the inevitable context of the negotiations and the signing of the agreement. In any case, coerced or not, the tribal leaders did not willingly or knowingly give up all rights in their waterways, as we have noted. One thing is certain: there was an element of compulsion when the Crown simply rewrote important parts of the agreement in the 1926 Act, without the consent of the tribe. Doing so by legislative fiat is coercion, plain and simple. We have already noted our concern about this action of the Crown.

The Tribunal's findings on the question of compulsion

The material point is not whether Tuwharetoa were actively coerced at the July meeting, but whether they knowingly or willingly conveyed what the Crown claimed to have acquired, and whether (as required by the 1924 Act) there was a fair and reasonable outcome. The Treaty test for this is clear. The Treaty provided for the claimants to possess and have the fullest possible authority over their properties, fisheries, and taonga, unless or until they made a voluntary cession of them. The Crown's vesting of the lake bed and riverbeds in itself, as a result of the 1926 agreement, does not meet that test. We find that, on balance, the tribe did not make a free, informed, and willing cession of the beds of the Taupo waters to the Crown. We also find that it did not make a free, informed, and willing cession of its rights over the indigenous fishery and over the waters of the lake and rivers to the Crown. By vesting rights of ownership or of exclusive use and possession in itself without a full, free, informed, and willing cession by Taupo Maori, the Crown breached the plain meaning of article 2 of the Treaty, and the principles of partnership, autonomy, and active protection.

Should the Crown have negotiated over hydroelectricity?

The claimants’ allegations of bad faith include the Crown’s failure, as they put it, to disclose its interest in the lake for hydroelectricity purposes or negotiate agreement with them for such a use of its waters. Did the Crown deceive the tribe in 1926? Hoani Te Heuheu raised this issue with Prime Minister Peter Fraser in 1944, after the construction of the control gates. He wrote that the use of the lake and rivers for hydroelectric power:

raises a very important issue. We feel strongly that this issue should be faced without delay. The 1924 Act authorised the
Native Minister to negotiate with us for an agreement in respect of the fishing rights in Taupo waters, beds and margins. Those negotiations took place but no mention was made of future use for hydro-electric power.

The 1926 Act declared the bed of the Lake (Taupo) together with the right to use the waters, to be the property of the Crown.

After describing the annuity, he went on:

Again there was no mention of using Taupo’s waters for hydro electric power. I now beg to ask on behalf of the Tuwharetoa people what the Government proposed to do in this matter. I take it that the negotiations in 1924–’26 had no ulterior motive or aim. I take it that the use of Taupo waters for a new purpose, namely, hydro-electric power, opens up a new question and requires fresh negotiations with us. It will be seen how vitally question No 1 above [which concerned Parliament carrying out the Treaty] affects question No 2 [issues relating to Lake Taupo]. If Parliament in its 1926 legislation has omitted to protect our full rights as owners of Lake Taupo, I take it that Parliament will now be bound in honour to rectify that omission and that you on behalf of your Government will give us an assurance to that effect before you leave for England.

On 9 September 1946, a Tuwharetoa deputation told the Prime Minister, other ministers, and officials:

It is sufficient for us to point out that the right to use Taupo waters for Hydro-electric purposes was never discussed during the negotiations of 1926, and no such right was conferred on the Crown in the final agreement reached in Wellington on the 23 July 1926.

The subsequent legislation, however, appears to have conferred such a right if that is the meaning to be inferred from the following provision in the Act 'together with the right to use the respective waters'.

We claim now that if Parliament failed to protect our full rights as owners of Lake Taupo in its 1926 legislation, Parliament itself will now be bound in honour to rectify that omission.

We appeal to you therefore as Head of the Government to give us an assurance that this will be done, and the question of using Taupo Waters for Hydro-electric power or any purpose other than fishing, is a new matter requiring fresh negotiations with us.

We have already found above that the Crown was interested in Lake Taupo for hydroelectricity purposes in 1926. It was an immediate interest, as the Government’s decision not to lower the lake in 1927 and 1928 was based in part on the concern that any ‘future Hydro-electric schemes involving a maximum lake level would be seriously affected by the permanent lowering of this level’. It must have been in the mind of Coates at the time he negotiated the agreement. In those circumstances, the Crown was obliged to raise this with the tribe and to negotiate their agreement for its right to use their waters for this purpose, a right it gave itself in the legislation despite the fact that it had not obtained it by free and informed agreement.

In Treaty terms, the Crown needed to establish a regime in which both kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga could be exercised in respect of the lake. Such a regime would have involved, as the tribe noted in 1944 and 1946, fresh negotiations and agreement over new uses of (and benefits from) their taonga. This would have been so, under the Treaty, even if the tribe had made a willing cession of the lake bed in 1926, and had given an informed and true consent to the Government inserting its right to use the waters in the empowering Act (which it did not).

James Biddle put it like this:

The Crown knew very early on, from the beginning of the twentieth century, that it was going to use our lake and rivers for hydro generation. We had no say in the decision. As owners of the resource, we should have struck a partnership. Instead, we have been excluded from the benefits. We’ve always had a relationship with the Crown, from the mountains to the lake. Tuwharetoa have conceded a great deal for the benefit of the
nation. The Crown should have acknowledged our contribution and reciprocated in accordance with its obligations. We expected a fair deal.260

A fair deal is precisely what the tribe did not get on this point. There was still an opportunity, however, for the Crown to rectify this Treaty breach and negotiate a genuine agreement in 1939, when it sought to actively control the levels of the lake for hydroelectric purposes. If the Crown had made the kind of agreement in 1926 that Hoani Te Heuheu believed in, a partnership where each new use or benefit would be negotiated and compensated, then matters would have been rectified at that point. The quality of the relationship between the Crown and Tuwharetoa leaders, and the recognition of ongoing tino rangatiratanga over the lake, were the important things. We will revisit this matter below, when we evaluate Crown actions in 1939 and its response to Tuwharetoa concerns in the 1940s.

The Tribunal’s findings on whether the Crown should have negotiated over hydroelectricity

We are left with the question of whether the Crown acted in bad faith in 1926. First, the evidence is decisive that the right to use the waters for hydroelectric purposes was not discussed with the Tuwharetoa leaders or agreed to by them at the crucial meeting. Although the Crown is correct that we have no record of the discussions, one side to the agreement asserted with vigour that this matter was not raised. The other party to the agreement – the Government – promised to look into it but did not dispute the assertion or produce evidence to the contrary in 1946 (or after).261 In that circumstance, we may rely on the evidence of the Tuwharetoa leaders who were present at the meeting.

Secondly, rather than raising the matter and obtaining agreement, the Government relied on a clause that parts of the 1922 Te Arawa legislation could be included if applicable. As we have found above, this clause ought not to have been construed in such a way as to give the Crown material, additional powers that had not been specifically discussed and agreed.

In these two circumstances, we think the Crown did not act with that scrupulous honour and fairness required of it in negotiating agreements and acquiring or extinguishing rights, and that it therefore breached the Treaty principles of partnership, reciprocity, good government, and active protection.

What were the impacts of the settlement on Ngati Tuwharetoa fisheries and fishing rights, and should the Crown have remedied damage to the indigenous fishery?

Here, we return to Tuwharetoa’s fishing claim, discussed above. One member of Parliament, AM Samuel, of Ohinemuri, mistakenly believed that the annuity was in part a compensation settlement for the destruction of the indigenous fishery in the lakes and rivers. He told the House that he had no objection to satisfactory terms having been made with Taupo Maori for their fishing rights in the lakes and rivers, because under the Treaty of Waitangi: they were entitled to the fish in the lakes and the birds in the forests... as we have taken the native food out of the lakes by the introduction of imported fish, which are very ravenous and which feed on the indigenous fish, it is only right that we should compensate them for this loss and also for any infringement of property rights. The Government has wisely done so. Having compensated the Natives for something that they owned...262

But Samuels was the only member to think that the settlement included compensation for the loss of the indigenous fishery. He was mistaken on that point. This issue had been before Parliament on and off since 1902, so there was no excuse for the Government to have ignored it. During the debate on the agreement, Maui Pomare again reminded the House that ‘the pakehas’ trout ate out the Maoris’ kouras and kokopu.263 The free licences, said the Prime Minister, were for the tribe to fish for food.264 It was clear that in times of hardship, such as crop failure or the
Depression of the 1930s, fishing could literally be the only thing between Tuwharetoa and starvation.\footnote{265}

In sections above, we found that the Crown was aware of the devastating effects of introduced fish on Taupo fisheries from 1902, but failed to remedy the situation or provide the tribe with a viable alternative. The 1926 agreement was a pivotal opportunity to remedy matters. The annuity could have been expanded to cover compensation for it. We note here that the trust board, in the first eight years of its operation, had to spend £8000 (on average, a third of the annuity) just in buying food for the people, when it was supposed to be applying the money for longer-term benefits and development.\footnote{266} The 50 licences could easily have been increased to give the tribe greater fishing capacity. W R Ngahana asked that the agreement be amended to give every member of the tribe a free fishing licence, or at least a licence for a nominal fee.\footnote{267} In 1927, the trust board made the same appeal, asking the Government to supply licences to all members of the tribe at a nominal fee, possibly 10 shillings. The Government responded that this would not be in Tuwharetoa's interests, since they would ultimately get a half-share of licence fees, although the circular logic of this escapes us.\footnote{268}

Further, the tribe could have been trusted, as the acclimatisation societies were, to help administer and manage the licensing system. We think, at the least, that the Crown could have followed the Stout–Ngata commission's recommendation for Rotorua, and ensured that the head of every whanau had a licence.\footnote{269} This is especially so because the reservation of the one-chain strip took away Tuwharetoa's surviving private fishing rights. Under the 1908 Act, they had at least been able to fish without a licence from their own river banks, but this right was now taken away from them.\footnote{270} This was a major blow to their fishing rights, and it is not clear to us that this aspect of the agreement was discussed or understood at the time. The Government refused to agree that compensation for the loss of this right should be added to the separate compensation for river bank owners.\footnote{271} Given the Government's refusal to budge on wider licensing of the tribe, we do not think that Tuwharetoa's fishing rights were properly protected; nor was an appropriate equivalent reserved to them for their loss of their indigenous food source.

Further, Mr White described how the tribe's ability to take even indigenous species was circumscribed by regulations from time to time. In particular, after the Department of Internal Affairs introduced smelt as a new food source for trout, it became the only abundant indigenous fish in the lake. Maori fished for large quantities of smelt, causing tension as the authorities feared that they were taking food away from trout. Ultimately, the Government regulated against the taking of smelt, which was challenged in court during the prosecution of Ngawaka Wall in 1975.\footnote{272} In 1981, Parliament amended the 1926 Act so that Tuwharetoa only had the right to take fish indigenous to the lake, which excluded smelt. According to Koro Wetere, this provision was introduced at the request of the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board. The wording of the Act was changed to replace ‘Maori’ with ‘Tuwharetoa’, which may have been the point of the board’s request.\footnote{273} In any case, without further evidence we cannot address this matter fully, other than to say that the restriction on taking smelt has become a significant grievance to some hapu.\footnote{274}

Tuwharetoa have been left with a lasting and powerful grievance. They consider that the Crown reserved for them an indigenous fishery that was already worthless. Many witnesses described their distress at being unable to fish for their original food. Habitat change has intensified the loss. Mr Otimi explained the loss thus:

> Your mana is degraded when you go and place the food on the table and you know that some of the food that should be there isn’t. The tables may be groaning under the weight of the food placed on them but that is not the issue. The issue is that no matter how much food there is, the kai rangatira has not been provided because it is no longer there. Our mana is belittled. Te Heu Heu no longer has the korero or knowledge that he is the source of the fresh water koura . . .
The loss of knowledge is the loss of kaitiakitanga. The loss of those food resources is considered to be the fault of the hapu and the fault of the people as the kaitiaki of those taonga.\[275\]

The Crown is yet to remedy this lasting wrong to the Tuwharetoa people.

The Tribunal’s findings on the impacts of the settlement on fishing rights
We find the Tuwharetoa claim that their indigenous fisheries – their kai rangatira – have been virtually destroyed through actions of the Crown to be well founded. From 1902, Parliament was repeatedly informed that introduced species were destroying valuable indigenous fisheries on which Maori depended for food. Parliament was informed about Maori in general and Tuwharetoa in particular. There was some acknowledgement in Parliament that Maori Treaty rights were being thus eroded. Nonetheless, successive governments protected the interests of anglers over Maori. Parliament and governments made it clear that they considered food for trout more important than food for the Crown’s Maori citizens. A balancing of interests could have seen greater Maori control of the respective levels of trout and indigenous fish, as was requested by Heke for Tuwharetoa in 1902. We do not know whether the koaro and trout could have been managed sustainably together, as the Government gave up in the 1930s and introduced smelt to the lake as a replacement food for trout. Maori had to take third place after anglers and trout. The Crown’s knowledge of a situation repeatedly brought to its attention, without remedy, was a serious breach of the Treaty.

The failure in 1926 to remedy the wrong, or provide a full fishing equivalent to what had been lost, entrenched the breach. We accept the Tuwharetoa evidence that they have suffered significant prejudice from this infringement of their taonga and recommend that the Crown now settle this claim as part of forthcoming negotiations.

The Tribunal’s findings in terms of broader fishing rights
The Muriwhenua Tribunal defined Maori fisheries, as confirmed and guaranteed by the Treaty, to be broader than any particular species or spot; Maori fisheries included the general right to fish in a place, fishing ground, or locality, and to expand that right as time, circumstances, and technology permitted. The Muriwhenua Tribunal was looking mainly at sea fisheries, but their findings are even more apt for the relatively confined waters of Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers. There, the facts of our inquiry show that hapu fished every part of the lake, took different species at different fishing grounds and at different times of the year, and did not see their activities as limited to fish indigenous to the lake. Indeed, Taupo Maori themselves had introduced their kai rangatira to the lake at some point after the volcanic eruption that rendered aquatic life in the lake extinct. The introduction of trout was incorporated into their fishing practices, by necessity (given the speed with which the new species reduced the availability of the old). Smelt were introduced even later to help feed the trout, and these also were incorporated in tribal fishing.

The Court of Appeal has found that no customary right subsists in trout as a general proposition, because its introduction and taking has been regulated by the Crown from the beginning.\[276\] We accept that this is the law as it has developed in New Zealand. The Crown legislated the introduction of trout in Tuwharetoa's fishery in such a way that the tribe could never have asserted an exclusive interest in trout. Whether that law, however, was consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi is another issue. We note the facts of our particular inquiry: that the Crown turned a blind eye in those early years to Maori fishing for trout at Taupo, which was permitted without enforcing the Crown’s licensing regime. Taupo Maori clearly felt they had the right to take this introduced fish, and they have incorporated it into their customary practices to the extent that it is now a key element of their manaakitanga, as the Tribunal found when it visited Tuwharetoa marae. When
the Crown decided that it would no longer tolerate Taupo Maori fishing for trout without licences, this became part of the wider discussions and negotiations from 1924 to 1926 around ownership and control of the lake, tributary rivers, and access by non-Maori to these fisheries.

As part of the agreement reached in 1926, Tuwharetoa received 50 free licences per annum to fish for trout, and a share of the revenue generated by trout fishing (from fees and fines) over and above the base sum of £3000. These agreed arrangements were not static – in the 1940s, the tribe was accorded the exclusive right of fishing (including trout) in Lake Rotoaira, and in recent times the number of free fishing licences has been increased to 200. On one view, this could be interpreted as the conferment of rights by Parliament. We do not see it that way, as Parliament claimed that it was enacting the results of a negotiated agreement, in which both sides acted from an assumption of rights and authority. The Court of Appeal noted these arrangements for Tuwharetoa and considered them exceptional. In our view, the fact that they are seen as exceptional under the law, and that Parliament assumed sole authority over trout, its introduction, and its regulation without consideration of the impact on Tuwharetoa, is a significant breach of the Treaty.

Maori were confirmed and guaranteed in the exclusive possession of their fishery, for so long as they chose to retain it. Even more, their tino rangatiratanga (full authority) over it had been guaranteed. Their fishery included a right to fish for any and all species, and taking advantage of any and all developments, in Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers. The Crown’s kawanatanga powers did not extend to the introduction of new species into that fishery without agreement, especially as it became known that the new species would have a significant and deleterious impact on the indigenous fish. Counsel for Nga Rauru submitted that the Crown recognised a different principle when it negotiated agreement with the Urewera tribes for the introduction of imported fish to their waterways. The same principle should have been followed in Taupo. The fact that it was not, and that the Crown asserted a power to restrict fishing of the new species to those who had paid it for licences, was in breach of its Treaty commitments.

Further, the harmful effect of the trout on the indigenous fish, the kai rangatira of the hapu who had tino rangatiratanga over the fishery, compounded the original breach. To an extent, the Crown mitigated the breach by turning a blind eye to Maori trout fishing, and then by recognising at least a share of the fishery via free licences and a proportion of the revenues in 1926. This mitigation was slight at first, in practice as well as principle. Tuwharetoa complained early that the number of licences was woefully inadequate. A genuine equivalent to their lost fishing rights was not secured to them by the agreement. Further, there were some years before the fishery generated revenue over and above the £3000 negotiated in the agreement. There is no doubt that today, however, the fishery generates a significant income for the tribe.

To an extent, therefore, the Crown has recognised the tino rangatiratanga of Ngati Tuwharetoa in its arrangements for the trout fishery, both in 1926 and in the more recent agreement of 1992. But the Muriwhenua Tribunal was of the view that no explanation of the Treaty fisheries guarantee of ‘full, exclusive and undisturbed possession’ would ever be sufficient to render the word ‘exclusive’ to mean ‘non-exclusive’. We endorse that view, and also its rider that ‘nothing restricted the negotiation of alternative fishing arrangements’ – as long as there was willing consent from both parties. We acknowledge that, as a result of a negotiated agreement in 1926, modified in 1992 (as will be discussed below), Tuwharetoa share the benefit of the fishery with the local and central authorities that regulate it. We do not, however, have evidence or arguments on whether they share equally or sufficiently in the benefits. It is clear that while they share in the benefits to an extent, they are excluded from any real or meaningful authority over the fishery, which we take to be the habitat and...
ecosystem of Lake Taupo, its tributaries, and the Waikato River to the Huka Falls, the right to fish there, and the fish themselves (both indigenous and introduced). Taupo Maori do not make the decisions about fish, nor do they have an equal voice with those who do make the decisions.

On balance, it seems to us that the Crown has done well to acknowledge that Tuwharetoa should benefit from the fishery, and to have negotiated an agreement which gave some recognition to their rights and some ongoing benefit to the tribe. But we do not think that this recognition has gone as far as it ought, and it has been at a high price – the legal ownership of the beds, the waterway, and the whole taonga itself. Nor are we convinced that the benefits have been as great as they might, though our evidence is incomplete on this point. Authority and control over fishing – the essence of tino rangatiratanga – has not been balanced appropriately with the powers of kawanatanga. There, the history has clearly been one of Crown assumption of control, Maori resistance, irregular Crown toleration of that resistance, and then a negotiated agreement that ended Tuwharetoa authority decisively, but without their full and free consent. It is incumbent on the Crown to put that matter right today, and we trust that the restoration of tino rangatiratanga over the fisheries of Lake Taupo and its tributaries will be a significant component of any Treaty settlement negotiations.

**Were the annuity and the river compensation fair in all the circumstances?**

On the face of it, Tuwharetoa received an annuity half the size of Te Arawa’s in 1926. We have no information on how the figure was determined. We know from the *Evening Post* that £15,000 was requested. We also know from the Crown’s draft agreement that it originally planned to make the whole annuity half of the licence fees, so the £3000 minimum was an improvement on that position. The sum was not indexed to inflation, and it did not exceed £3000 until 1938, 12 years later. It increased every year, until it reached £9068 in 1960 and £12,000 in 1962. We have no other figures in evidence before us, although the Crown submitted that it is now a very valuable annuity, worth $800,000 in 2004. In the absence of further evidence, we are not in a position to say how the annuity measured up to tribal needs as compensation for their surrender of the right to charge anglers and virtually their rights of ownership over the one-chain strip. We note, however, that the principles governing the annuity were consistent with the Treaty. It provided the tribe with ongoing benefit, which was derived from sharing the various lake revenues 50–50 with the Crown. In terms of revenue from fishing (unlike control of fishing, as explained above), there was a good balance between kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga. The payment of the annuity to a tribal board was also in keeping with the Treaty.

Compensation of river bank owners for their more particular loss of income was a long-delayed affair. After litigation, there was a special hearing of claims in November 1948, some 22 years after the agreement was signed. Mr White states that £71,900 was claimed, and £45,600 was awarded. In the absence of further evidence, it is not possible for us to reach a view on whether there was a satisfactory process or outcome for these claimants.

**Did the Crown really need the lake bed?**

Finally, we need to address the question raised by claimant counsel, as to whether the Crown really needed to acquire the lake bed to meet its policy objectives. The Crown offered no submissions on why public policy or the national interest required public ownership of lakes, other than to note the generation of hydroelectricity as an important factor. The Solicitor General, JD Salmond, who in essence shaped the Crown’s lakes policy in the early twentieth century, argued that the Crown had to guarantee public rights of access, navigation, and fishing. This was why Maori could not be allowed to own lakes or lake beds, even if they did so in custom. It was unreasonable to suppose, he argued, that the Treaty of Waitangi intended to exclude the public from enjoyment of lakes.

As noted above, we found no record of any problem or complaint about public access or navigation and boating.
Steamers and boats were operating on the lake, which was being used by the public for recreation according to the manners of the time. If Maori obtained freehold title to lake beds, the public right of navigation and boating would persist unaltered under British common law, as it did in Britain with privately owned lakes. What was really at issue in 1926 was the third public ‘right’ – fishing. The 1926 agreement provided for all three features of public use. Public access to the lake was guaranteed by the one-chain strip. Navigation and boating on the lake was assumed to be in full force, and could be regulated by licensing and payment of fees under the agreement. Tuwharetoa would get half the proceeds from public navigation, once revenues exceeded the base annuity of £3000. Access for fishing was a primary point of the agreement, and was clearly secured for both the lake and rivers by the reservation of the one-chain strip. Why then, with all three forms of public use guaranteed and regulated by the agreement, did the Crown need to own the lake bed?

This brings us inescapably back to hydroelectricity. In 1903, the Crown had given itself the sole right to use water for hydroelectricity, subject to any other lawful rights. This did not mean, however, that it could simply enter a privately owned waterway and start generating electricity. Attorney-General Bell, a driver of the Taupo settlement, had warned Cabinet in 1922 that Maori ownership of the Rotorua lake beds ‘would raise very serious difficulty in the matter of fishing and possibly of the user of water for electric light and other purposes’ (emphasis added). Hence the Rotorua legislation gave the Crown the right to use the waters in 1922, and this was transcribed in the Taupo legislation in 1926. The lake bed and riverbeds would have other uses, such as the extraction of metals or as sites for hydroelectricity structures. These were all useful for the public, and legislation prescribed the manner in which private ‘land’ could be taken for each particular use, and that compensation was necessary. There was no principle in New Zealand law that the Crown should simply take private property
because in the future it might want to put parts of it to use for the public good from time to time.

Summary of findings on the negotiations and acquisition of the lake bed and waters, and regulation of the indigenous fishery

The Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa agree that Lake Tauponui-a-Tia and its rivers are taonga that were in the possession and under the authority of the claimants as at 1840. We agree with that position, and we come to this finding based on the evidence of the intensity of the Maori association with the lake and its environs, and of their use and exercise of exclusive authority over the Taupo waters and fisheries.

We have asked whether the Crown’s negotiations with Maori about the lake were conducted and concluded in good faith, and whether the 1926 agreement and Act were ‘fair and reasonable’ and consistent with the Treaty. In light of the evidence and also of our discussion of the July 1926 meeting above, we conclude that there was no agreement in April 1926 to cede the beds of Lake Taupo and the Waikato River (to the Huka Falls). There was also no agreement on the rivers and the key issue of camping. It is harder to say what was agreed, but there appears to have been loose agreement to a one-chain strip around the lake, public access, and angling in the lake. The Crown also agreed to a £3000 annuity for this access to fishing.

As far as the meeting in July 1926 is concerned, we are persuaded that the position put in 1946 by the Ngati Tuwharetoa tribal deputation who met with the Prime Minister, and who stated categorically that the right to use the waters was never discussed with them but simply turned up in the legislation, is the closest reflection of events. In the absence of any countervailing evidence, we think it pretty clear that section 14 of the Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926, vesting the right to use the waters of Lake Taupo and the Waikato River (to the Huka Falls) in the Crown, was inserted without Tuwharetoa’s knowledge. There were other important changes to the agreement written into the 1926 Act, which should have been put to Tuwharetoa for discussion and consent before their enactment. The fact that the Crown did not do so was an outcome not contemplated when the 1924 Act instructed the Native Minister to reach a ‘fair and reasonable’ arrangement with the consent of the majority of Taupo Maori.

Furthermore, the agreement cannot be considered a payment for ownership of the beds of either the lake or the rivers, nor for the ‘right to use the waters’, which was inserted in the legislation without Tuwharetoa’s knowledge or consent. Neither was agreed to at the Waihi meeting in April, yet the sum of £3000 was agreed at that meeting, and was not increased as a result of the leadership’s apparent capitulation on ownership of the bed three months later.

As a result, although the Crown declared itself to own them, it has never paid the tribe for the bed of the lake or the right to use its waters. This failure was compounded by its later refusal to compensate the tribe when new or additional uses, beyond those of fishing and access, were being implemented by the Crown. The key one, of course, was the use of the lake as a massive reservoir to store water for hydroelectricity. These failures, given the importance of the resource and its value to the claimants, must be considered breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles.

Fundamentally, these taonga are now only partly in the possession or under the authority of the claimants, after a hiatus of 65 years in which they were neither. The alienation of these taonga came about in 1926 without a full, free, and willing cession, which is in serious breach of Treaty principles. There were some positive outcomes for Tuwharetoa from the 1926 arrangements, and we have noted those. Overall, the July agreement and its empowering legislation, the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926, were arrived at in a manner inconsistent with the Treaty and are themselves in breach of the Treaty in the particulars outlined above. In 1924, Parliament required that the negotiated settlement be ‘fair and reasonable in the interests of the Natives concerned, and also in the public interest’, and this standard was not met.
We conclude that there was no overriding necessity for the Crown to own the lake bed in 1926 as a matter of public policy or in the public interest. The public rights of access, navigation, and fishing were all secured or confirmed by the 1926 agreement. If the Crown wanted to use the waters in future for hydroelectricity or the beds for various purposes, then this was something to be negotiated and compensated for when the need arose. Tuwharetoa expected nothing less, as they made clear when metal extraction and hydroelectricity became issues after the agreement.

While we are not prepared to state that the Crown’s negotiations with Maori over Lake Taupo were conducted, and concluded, in bad faith, we do find that the outcome was a breach of the Treaty’s guarantees of tino rangatiratanga and property rights. It was also a breach of the principles of active protection of taonga, and of partnership and autonomy. The Crown breached these principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by enacting legislation without free, informed, and willing Maori consent to the vesting in itself of the bed of Lake Taupo and the Waikato River (to the Huka Falls), and without explicit consent to the right to use the waters, and the right to control and regulate the indigenous fisheries.

The Crown has also failed to actively protect the indigenous fisheries taonga of the claimants or to remedy the serious and avoidable damage that has been done to their kai rangatira, with important economic, cultural, and spiritual prejudice. Also, at least until the enactment of the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act 1992, it has made no provision for Ngati Tuwharetoa to exercise rangatiratanga over their fisheries. Rather, it actively deprived Taupo Maori of their tino rangatiratanga by legislation and by policies which vested control in the Crown and its agencies. Further, the Crown actively deprived Taupo Maori of their tino rangatiratanga over the introduced fisheries in their waters, despite the opportunity to work in partnership with tribal bodies in licensing and fee-collecting, as it did with acclimatisation societies. The provisions of the 1926 agreement in terms of free licences, while commendable, did not go far enough to compensate for the harm to the indigenous fisheries or to provide a full and fair return on the replacement fishery.

**Have the Treaty breaches been mitigated by the return of the beds?**

The Crown did not need to insist on the vesting of the beds and to put the tribe through 65 years of distress and anguish, before finally returning the beds in 1992. We note, however, that under a 1992 deed of agreement, the beds have been returned to tribal ownership and a management board has been established to administer those beds. The board comprises eight members, half of whom are appointed by the Minister of Conservation in consultation with the Minister of Local Government, with the remaining half appointed by the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board. As far as it is practicable, and where not inconsistent with the deed, the management board is required to act as if it were an administering body under the Reserves Act 1977, and the beds of the Taupo waters are to be managed as if they are a reserve for recreation purposes under section 17 of that Act. Other salient features of the deed include these agreements:

- The bed of Lake Taupo vests in the trust board and is held in trust pursuant to the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955 for its beneficiaries.
- The trust board holds the ‘lake title’ in trust for the common use and benefit of all the peoples of New Zealand.
- Title to the beds of the Waikato River extending from Lake Taupo to and including Huka Falls and of the rivers or streams flowing into Lake Taupo vests in the trust board and is held in trust for the members of the Ngati Tuwharetoa hapu who adjoin the rivers and streams, and in trust for the common use and benefit of all peoples of New Zealand.
- The people of New Zealand continue to have freedom of access to Taupo waters for recreational use and enjoyment, research, and associated activities, but subject to conditions and restrictions that the
The management board considers necessary for the protection and well-being of the beds of Taupo waters and the control of the public using them.

- The trust board may grant leases or licences (with the agreement of the management board) in respect of parts of the beds of Taupo waters. Where such a lease or licence is entered into, half of the revenue is to be paid to the Crown and half to the trust board, which is to hold the money for charitable purposes as authorised by the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955.

- The beds of Taupo waters are acknowledged to be land belonging to Ngati Tuwharetoa, and the trust board shall have all the rights (including all Maori customary rights not inconsistent with law or the deed), and shall be subject to all the responsibilities and restrictions, of a landowner.

- The Crown retains control of Lake Taupo as a harbour under the Harbours Act 1959 and the Lake Taupo Regulations 1976.\textsuperscript{284}

The actual revesting of the bed of Lake Taupo in the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board occurred by way of an order of the Maori Land Court in 1993. In December 1999, the title of the beds of several rivers and streams flowing into Lake Taupo were also transferred from the Crown to Ngati Tuwharetoa through the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board. The vesting agreement relates to what are referred to as ‘Taupo waters’, being Lake Taupo and the Waikato River (to the Huka Falls) and the beds of rivers flowing into Lake Taupo.

To the extent that ownership of the beds of the lake and tributary rivers has been ‘revested in Ngati Tuwharetoa to preserve and enhance its tribal mana and rangatiratanga\textsuperscript{285}, the Treaty breaches enumerated above have been partially rectified. The deed of agreement explicitly reserves the ability of Taupo Maori to file and pursue claims under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.\textsuperscript{286} Further, it was the intention of the signatories that nothing in the deed would ‘prejudice’ any claims. It was not, in other words, envisaged as a settlement of such claims. We think that the return of the legal ownership of the beds is an important beginning to settling grievances, remedying prejudice, and restoring a Treaty relationship between the Crown and Taupo Maori, but that more is needed to compensate Taupo Maori and restore their Treaty authority and rights.\textsuperscript{287}

In particular, the Crown’s use of Lake Taupo and its waters for hydro development, and the associated impacts on the hydrology of the lake, ancestral land, wahi tapu, geothermal taonga, and the indigenous fisheries, continues to fester and needs to be addressed by the parties in negotiation, a matter to which we turn next.

### Control of the Lake for Hydroelectricity

**Key question: What were the impacts of the Crown’s control of Lake Taupo for hydroelectric development on the lake, its tributaries, and its people, and has the Treaty been breached in that respect?**

The legal authority of the Crown to pursue hydroelectric development was first prescribed in statute by the Electrical Motive Power Act 1896, which gave the Government the authority it needed to investigate the waterways of the country for the purposes of electrical supply. In 1903, the Crown enacted the Water-Power Act. Section 2 of this Act vested the Crown the sole right to use the waters in lakes and rivers for electricity generation, subject to any other lawfully held rights. This right to generate electricity from water was continued under section 306 of the Public Works Act 1928, although the legislation continued to specify that it was subject to any other lawfully held rights.

At the time the 1903 legislation was before Parliament, Hone Heke, the member for Northern Maori, remarked:

> It would not be proper for a Bill like this to take away from Maori owners the use of water-power on their lands. There is no telling what use even the Maoris may desire to put such
water-power for themselves . . . the sweeping provision of subsection (1) is going too far . . . It is an attempt to take away active [sic: Native] rights.

The Tribunal, in its *Ika Whenua Rivers Report*, noted that the Minister for Public Works replied to Heke, assuring him that any ‘vested interests held by the Natives or others would be preserved, and if required under subsection (2) would have to be paid for’. This was a reference to the Act’s wording that the Crown’s right would be ‘subject to any rights lawfully held’.

That wording was reproduced in section 306(1) of the Public Works Act 1928. The issue of Maori and Crown rights vis-à-vis water, waterways, and hydro-electricity remained a live one between 1903 and 1928. As we have noted, the Government acted to resolve the issue for Taupo waters in 1926 when it legislated for itself the power to use those waters. The similar concerns of Heke in 1903 and of Hoani Te Heuheu and Tuwharetoa in the 1940s show how Maori viewed this matter at the time, and are an essential element of what was reasonable for the Crown to have done in the circumstances.

We are concerned in this section of our report with the Waikato River hydro scheme, which has been described as one of the most intensive developments of water power in New Zealand. It uses Lake Taupo as a massive reservoir. The control gates across the outlet of Lake Taupo at the top of the Waikato River act like ‘a tap to turn on and off the water’ flowing through the gates and downstream through the seven power stations and eight dams situated on the river.

The construction of the Lake Taupo control gates occurred over the period 1940 to 1941 and they were fully operational by October 1941. The control gates enabled the Crown to control the lake’s level, which it maintained at a high level for much of the 1940s and beyond, and during seasons when the lake was normally lower. The result was that some land was flooded directly, while other areas became waterlogged and swampy due to increased groundwater. This, and the Crown’s alleged refusal to act in partnership with Tuwharetoa over controlling the lake...
level, resulted in many claims before this Tribunal. We address these claims in this section of the report.

The Tongariro Power Development scheme (TPD) falls mainly in the Waitangi Tribunal’s National Park inquiry district, but we did hear issues concerning the effects of the TPD on the Tongariro River and of the construction of the tailrace. The scheme diverts the headwaters of the Whanganui River through Lake Rotoaira and into Lake Taupo itself. In September 2006, the National Park Tribunal clarified that it intends to deal with all TPD issues arising in its inquiry district, including where the effects and impacts extend beyond the district. That being the case, and given that we have not considered all evidence in relation to the scheme, we will leave those matters to the National Park Tribunal for inquiry and reporting.

As the Crown has noted, these are large hydroelectricity schemes with complex and large-scale infrastructure. They are also of considerable national importance, a point accepted by Karen Feint for Tuwharetoa.

The claimants’ case

We heard many witnesses from the entire circumference of Lake Taupo who were concerned about the impacts of hydroelectric development on the lake and its waters. Ms Feint submitted that this evidence demonstrated the spiritual, environmental, economic, and social impacts of the schemes on Tuwharetoa bordering the lake. These included:

1. Spiritual
   - harm caused to the waters by mixing the natural flows from the mountain to the sea;
   - the death of the taniwha Matawhero as the Waikato river was diverted to build the control gates;
   - the loss of taonga;
   - The loss of wahi tapu; and
   - The loss of cultural knowledge.

2. Environmental
   - The raising of the lake level;
   - The holding of the lake level high for a sustained period over the years 1941–1947 and, as a result, raising the water table and thus impeding drainage;
   - Low lying land would be waterlogged;
   - Similar effects seen in NIWA graphs for the 1960s and 1970s;
   - Levels over the last decade have been held close to the natural mean although there is some seasonal variation due to lake controls;
   - Levels of the lake have flattened gradients of the rivers, slowing those rivers down, causing silting and or flooding. These impacts were recorded for more than twenty rivers flowing into the Lake, including the Karatau, Waihora (north western side of lake) as well as the Hatepe, Waitahau, Tauranga-Taupo and the Tongariro;
   - Lakeshore erosion;
   - Flooding of land leading to lost use for cropping and farming; and
   - Flooding and destruction of geothermal resources.

3. Social and Economic
   - Loss of food resources (and accompanying lifestyle);
   - Loss of employment on whanau farms;
   - Damage to both subsistence and development farming;
   - Outward migration in search of work; and
   - Damage to communities and a whole way of life.

For these effects, Tuwharetoa claim that they have never been adequately compensated. Instead, the Crown limited its liability by enacting the Lake Taupo Compensation Claims Act 1947, which set the level at which the compensation would be provided as 1177 feet above sea level, the Crown accepting that land below the 1177-feet level must
be ‘regarded as virtually sterilized’ in terms of its future use.\textsuperscript{299}

There were 404 claims for compensation, totalling £380,000, based on the assumed lake control at 1179 feet. The Compensation Court awarded £38,500 of damages, while £67,575 was paid out in negotiated settlements. This meant a total of £106,075 was paid out. Ms Feint submitted that the shortfall between the total amount claimed and that paid out ‘presumably’ resulted from the statutory setting of the lake level at 1177 feet.\textsuperscript{300} This resulted in 163 claims totalling £42,246 being withdrawn for lands above this level. The rest of the shortfall of £117,918 presumably occurred in connection with the 89 claims that were settled for £65,575 instead of the £185,493 that originally made up the full claims.\textsuperscript{301} The compensation regime was not adequate given that the high water tables for extended periods of time have rendered much land bordering the lake unusable for nearly 30 years.\textsuperscript{302} The compensation round in 1960 was also not adequate.

In relation to the TPD, Ms Feint submitted that the public works takings for the construction of the Tokaanau tailrace, plugging geysers that erupted during the construction, constructing the tailrace over the urupa Waiairiki, and diverting the sacred Tokaanau Stream from its natural course (degrading the mauri of the river) were all actions in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.\textsuperscript{303} The effects of the TPD are felt particularly by those living along the edge of the Tongariro River and the Tokaanau Stream. Claimants alleged that the streams flow more slowly and that siltation of the stream is resulting in increased loading at the mouth. They also noted that waterlogging and potential flooding is occurring on land at Tokaanau.\textsuperscript{304} Counsel for Ngati Hikairo was concerned with impacts on Tokaanau B2L (‘Te Pahiko’), a land block affected by the TPD and by the increased water level of Lake Taupo. Ngati Hikairo claimed that Te Pahiko is now partially submerged. They also alleged that the Tokaanau Stream is affected. They contended that David Hamilton’s evidence, that the flow of the stream would adjust when lake levels dropped again, does not sit alongside their experience and is therefore hypothetical. They received no compensation for these effects and they seek redress.\textsuperscript{305}

The Crown, Ms Feint submitted, incorrectly states that there is no evidence before the Tribunal on the TPD, when there is significant evidence from Arthur Grace, other tangata whenua witnesses, and Environment Waikato on the lower Tongariro River, the Tongariro delta, and the Tokaanau tailrace.\textsuperscript{306}

**The Crown’s case**

The Crown noted that, for the period from 1941 to the 1960s, when the the lake was often held at a higher than natural level for long periods, leading to damage to land and the ability to use land, compensation has been awarded by previous compensation commissions.\textsuperscript{307} There is no evidence of Maori owners being treated in a discriminatory manner by the statutory compensation process pursuant to the Lake Taupo Compensation Claims Act 1947.\textsuperscript{308} The Crown submitted that the Tribunal cannot properly determine whether the level set pursuant to the legislation of 1177 feet (and thus the yardstick for compensation) was unreasonable or substantively unfair. The Crown noted that there was consultation with Ngati Tuwharetoa on the legislation.\textsuperscript{309}

The Crown further submitted that there can be only limited compounding adverse effect today caused by the control gates. There are a number of other factors, including tectonic subsidence and land drainage developments, which could also have contributed to environmental change.\textsuperscript{310} The Crown emphasised that changes to the lake surrounds are complex responses to a number of different processes, including crustal movement and deformation, the impact of winds on lake levels, variations in rainfall, changes in land use, and inefficiencies in the drainage systems.\textsuperscript{311} The Crown noted that, in planning the control gates system, the Public Works Department had not appreciated
He Maunga Rongo

The damage that a sustained period of a high lake level would do to the surrounding land. The Crown noted that Mr Hamilton said that the Public Works Department had acted reasonably according to the standards of the time. The Crown acknowledged that an emphasis was put on economic considerations at the time. Nonetheless, the Crown submitted that the good faith and reasonableness requirements of the Treaty were met in these circumstances.\(^{312}\)

The Crown did not really deal with the issues concerning the TPD. It submitted that these issues should be left to the National Park inquiry.\(^{313}\) This is because the relevant research for the power scheme is on the National Park Record of Inquiry and that Tribunal has commissioned further research on the environmental impacts of the scheme.\(^{314}\)

The Tribunal’s analysis

We have discussed above the Crown’s desire to regularise public access to the lake, its negotiations with Ngati Tuwharetoa in 1926, and the passing of legislation which vested the bed of Lake Taupo and the right to use its waters in the Crown. We turn now to the history of interaction between the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa as it concerns hydro development. In particular, we are concerned with changes to the levels of Lake Taupo and the impacts of these changes on the claimant iwi.

Before proceeding with our substantive analysis, we note the disagreement between the Crown and claimants over whether TPD issues should be considered in this inquiry. Although we heard evidence on some matters, both evidence and submissions were fragmented and partial. Also, the National Park Tribunal, as we noted above, has signified its intention to deal with all TPD matters, including those where the effects fall outside its district. In these circumstances, we will leave the TPD issues raised in our inquiry for determination in the National Park inquiry.

Our analysis in this part of the chapter focuses on the following questions:

- Was the decision to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels consistent with the Treaty?
- What were the impacts of the control gates?
- Did the Crown provide an effective remedy or redress for the impacts in the 1940s?
- What further impact did the Crown’s control of lake levels have after the 1940s?
- Did raising the lake levels affect the tributary rivers and the Waikato River?
- Now that it may be possible to rehabilitate affected land, are Tuwharetoa entitled to compensation if, for other reasons, it can no longer be farmed?

In addressing these questions, the Tribunal has been assisted by substantial bodies of evidence. Contained within the documentary evidence are some gaps and some surprises, especially in relation to minimum lake levels. Detailed evidence compiled by historian Tony Walzl gives us insights into the information held by the Government and the debates which took place within Government agencies in the lead-up to the 1939 decision to install control gates, and in the 1940s when the Crown addressed claims for compensation and for damage.\(^{315}\) Detailed evidence is provided by Tuwharetoa claimants, and by Mr Walzl, about meetings between the Crown and Tuwharetoa in the 1920s, in October 1939, and in September 1946.

Substantial hydrological data, complete with time series, graphs, tabulations, and analyses has been provided by a number of hydrologists.\(^{316}\) Evidence by Horace Freestone, prepared to assist resource consent hearings on an application by Mighty River Power, draws on data banks and archives built up by the Public Works Department, the New Zealand Electricity Department, and its successors.\(^{317}\) The hydrological records are currently maintained by Opus International, consultants for Mighty River Power. A number of other expert witnesses provided evidence relating to Lake Taupo, and David Hamilton assisted the Tribunal by providing an overview and evaluation of the hydrological evidence.\(^{318}\)
Levels of Lake Taupo, recorded from 1905 onwards, have been recorded in different ways, related to different benchmarks and to different datum levels. The controlled maximum lake level, central to the present discussions, is a convenient example. When the level was set in 1939 it was to be measured as 5 feet on the gauge in Lake Taupo Harbour, or 1177 feet above minimum sea level. This figure of 1177 feet converts to 358.75 metres. In 1953, the Moturiki datum, based on mean sea level, was adopted, and the hydrological records have been adjusted accordingly. The difference is substantial: 358.75 metres becomes 357.39 metres, an adjustment of 1.36 metres. We simplify the technical discussions below: whenever we cite material in feet, it is with reference to the Lake Taupo datum used by the Ministry of Works in 1939; all references given in metres have been converted to the Moturiki datum, which is currently used by all agencies involved in power generation, environmental management, or research.

In addition to the technical evidence, we have evidence from the claimants as to the immediate and longer-term effects of the construction of the control gates and of the subsequent changes to the lake and groundwater, which we will consider in each section.

Before considering the impacts of the changes to the lake, however, we must first address the following question.

Was the decision to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels consistent with the Treaty?

The claimants’ case

The claimants acknowledged that the power to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels for the purposes of electricity was legal, in the sense that the Crown had vested such power in itself by the Water-Power Act 1903, and had done so more specifically for Lake Taupo in the 1926 legislation. Although the Crown acted within the law, the claimants alleged that it breached Treaty principles. If, as Hoani Te Heuheu wrote to the Prime Minister in 1944, the Government did not intentionally deceive the tribe in 1926, then the use of the Taupo waters for electricity was a fresh matter requiring their negotiated consent. The Crown’s use of the claimants’ taonga in this manner, without their consent, and its failure to investigate or address the tribes’ claim about it in 1944 and 1946, was in breach of the Treaty.

Also, the Government failed to consult Tuwharetoa adequately about its decision to control and raise the lake level. On this matter, the claimants made the following allegations:

► The Government failed to seek their permission to change their taonga in this way.
► The Public Works Department carried out only cursory investigation of the likely impacts on the lake shore and low-lying lands, which were known to mainly belong to the claimants.
► The Government falsely assured the claimants that the change would not affect them, when Tuwharetoa raised concerns about it.
► The Government of the day accepted that it had a responsibility to warn people who might be affected, to provide them with good information, and to prevent damage where possible.
► The Public Works Department may have deliberately concealed the likely impacts, a view to which ministers came later, while likely problems seemed obvious to the tribe and in the ‘lay’ opinion of the Minister of Internal Affairs and of the Native Department.

Finally, the claimants alleged that there was no need to raise the lake level in any case. Appropriate alternatives were possible, but there is no evidence that the Government investigated them before making its decision. When Tuwharetoa hired experts to do so in the mid-1940s, their alternative proposals came too late and may have been uneconomic by then. In any case, given the expert agreement that the lake has been held at natural levels for the last decade without significant problems for power generation, it is self-evident that the raising of the lake was unnecessary.
The Crown's case

The Crown agreed with the claimants that it vested in itself the sole right to use waters for electricity purposes generally by the Water-Power Act 1903, and specifically for the Taupo waters in 1926. It argued, however, that the evidence is insufficient to establish that it did so without consent in 1926. If the claimants are correct on that matter, then why was it not raised in 1939 when the tribe first learned of the Government's intention to actively control the lake for that purpose? Why was it not raised in 1941 when the control gates were erected? Why was it not raised until 1944 to 1946?323

Further, the Crown argued that its actions in the period from 1939 to 1941 were entirely consistent with the Treaty. Its kawanatanga right to govern included the power to develop major resources such as hydroelectric power in the national interest. Its obligation was not to seek permission to do so but rather to compensate anyone adversely affected. Nonetheless, the historical evidence has established that there was in fact an ongoing dialogue between the Government and Tuwharetoa before the gates were built, consisting of a meeting in 1939 and subsequent correspondence. During those discussions, the Public Works Department made an honest mistake. Its officials did not realise the damage that a sustained period of high lake levels would do to surrounding land. The department acted reasonably by the standards of the time, and ‘the good faith and reasonableness requirements of the Treaty were met’.324

The Tribunal's analysis

The first generation of Government power stations came on stream between 1915 and 1930.325 Electric power production and the growth of manufacturing proceeded apace.326 Attention was firmly directed to the potential of the Waikato River as a hydrological system, and a survey of the river from Arapuni to Lake Taupo was commissioned in 1933. Control of the level of Lake Taupo was seen as the main storage device in a scheme submitted by Frederick Kissel, the Chief Electrical Engineer, in 1939.327

The environmental implications of raising the lake level were noted in an internal round of memos. The assistant engineer of the Public Works Department, for example, alerted his district electrical engineer:

There are low lying areas to the South and South east of the lake which will be affected by high water levels and further investigation will be required to determine the extent of the flooding and effect on drainage, and possibly some roads will require deviation or raising.

With regard to the effect on fishing, of an increased range of water level, I am advised that a rise of water level makes little difference, but that a lowering improves for a time the condition of the fish, after which a shortage of feed will occur. Generally speaking, it would appear that an increased range of water level will not much effect [sic] trout fishing in the lake.328

The district electrical engineer referred this material to his superior in Wellington and the reply came back from the chief electrical engineer on 2 February 1939 to ‘proceed with all speed possible’.329

In spite of the detailed correspondence and consultations within the Government offices, no record has been produced that Tuwharetoa was consulted or that the implications for Tuwharetoa were considered in the context of these new proposals to vary the lake level. The possibility of flooding was recognised and elaborated on in reports made by district office to head office, but the investigations set in train by head office were desultory:

No very comprehensive survey should be attempted, but rather a few spot levels should be taken to indicate the relation of land to any proposed future lake level.

The points that should be examined are:
1. The highway and bridge at Waitahanui.
2. The road between Tokaanu and Waihi Pa.
3. The area containing cottages between Waihi and Tokaanu, and the township of Tokaanu itself.330

A level was to be run across from Tokaanu to the Tongariro River:
A few spot levels only should be necessary for this purpose. A check should be made of the level of the cultivated lands near Tauranga Taupo and Waimarino Streams and also the road bridges at these two points.\textsuperscript{331}

In a follow-up memo, the chief engineer stressed that it should be clearly understood that the information obtained is strictly confidential. No decision has yet been reached as to the maximum lake level, and I think it would be advisable not to give any information in the meantime, regarding any levels taken.\textsuperscript{332}

The media of the day were more informative and more even-handed. The \textit{Napier Daily Telegraph} weighed up the effects of higher water levels at Lake Taupo:

Although a high level of Lake Taupo is desired in the interests of hydro-electrical supply, it is claimed that a low lake level is beneficial in the Taupo district, to prevent flooding of land on the shore of the lake, which has value for farming purposes.\textsuperscript{333}

The avoidance of flooding was also a matter of concern to Maori. In August 1926, after the passing of the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926, but before the proclamation of 7 October 1926 vesting tributary rivers (or sections thereof) in the Crown, Arthur Grace wrote to Native Minister Coates:

In the event of a settlement [about the rivers] being arrived at there is one point that must be made quite clear, and that is the question of controlling the floods. For during the winter months the Tongariro floods very severely, and it is only by repairing the Banks etc that we have been able to check it in the past. Therefore if we lose control of the banks, who is going to guard our properties from floods and damages?\textsuperscript{334}

He went on:

if the floods are allowed to get the better of us, our work will all be in vain, and can only end in disaster. I suppose about 6000 acres of real good river flats will be affected. So that this is a very important point, which cannot be overlooked.\textsuperscript{335}

The article in the \textit{Napier Daily Telegraph} evidences Maori interest in water levels, especially in the wake of the 1926 floods:

A correspondent at Tokaanu, has written stating that the fact that Lake Taupo is going down to its old level is important to Maori owners of land round the lake shores, because it enables them to re-cultivate some of the finest land in New Zealand, which since 1926 has been covered with water. In the year 1920 to 1922, milking cows were grazed on that land, and this year it has again been dry enough to farm.\textsuperscript{336}

The newspaper correspondent concluded that if the lake level was raised for the benefit of electrical supplies, there would be a corresponding flooding of first-class land on the lake shores.

As preparations continued, the information about economic benefits and construction details became more specific and the likely environmental impacts were marginalised. Mr Walzl reproduces a memo compiled by the Secretary of Treasury for his Minister to present to Cabinet. The Secretary of Treasury noted the existing electricity shortage and set out the proposal in these words:

The proposals to control the level of Lake Taupo will materially assist in overcoming this shortage. At the present time the water available for generating units is at its lowest during the winter months, and it is during these months that the demand reaches its peak. The proposed expenditure should make it possible for the water to be stored in the Lake during the summer and thereby have this water available when it is most valuable. The advantage so gained would be cumulative in that as further stations are erected on the Waikato River, each station would obtain the benefit of this additional water.

The supply of electrical energy is, at the present time, one of the most profitable enterprises undertaken by the State and the expenditure is reproductive. It is understood that if the scheme is proceeded with, £5,000 only will come to charge
this financial year, and as provision for this amount has been made to the Public Works estimates, Treasury will raise no objections to the scheme and the recommendation from the Public Works Dept. is submitted for the favourable consideration of Cabinet. Very little commitment of sterling is involved.

It is understood that the Internal Affairs Department concurs in the proposals, but it would be desirable to advise the Native Department and take precautions against possible claims by natives.\(^{337}\)

When Cabinet received the proposals, questions were asked, not about the implications for Maori but about the impact that the scheme would have on fishing. Further information was requested and a decision was delayed while it was sought. In the meantime, Ngati Tuwharetoa had been alerted to the plans and formed a deputation of Maori and landowners to meet with the Minister of Internal Affairs to discuss the intentions of the Government with regards to lake levels. When they met on 17 October 1939, the Minister informed the group that he had visited the area and had been reassured by the engineer of the Public Works Department:

I see no reason to be in any way alarmed about the matter. I do not think, from the discussions I have had with the engineer, there will be damage of any account by flooding. I myself have been concerned about that aspect. The engineers consider there will be no danger of anything taking place which would interfere with the residents or with the production from the land.\(^{338}\)

John Asher from Ngati Tuwharetoa was not reassured:

I want you to appreciate this, the Public Works Department is in the habit of doing things first and then leaving others to clean up the mess. I hope it won’t be a case of that in respect of the levels of the lake which is a very vital matter to the Maori owners of land adjacent. If the lake levels rise it will be detrimental to the Maori owners and not to anyone else.\(^{339}\)

His plea did not fall on deaf ears. Eight days later, the Minister of Internal Affairs wrote to his colleague, the Minister of Works, asking him to visit Tokaanu and Taupo in person:

I am not an engineer and, consequently, am not able to estimate the flooding and damage that may be caused by the raising of the lake. I can, I think, claim to have some practical knowledge of what the effect would likely be of raising the level of a huge inland sea, such as Taupo. More particularly do I feel the possibility of the Tokaanu end of the lake suffering pretty badly by the raising of the lake. It seems to me that a goodly part of the township and a large area of native land would be affected, resulting in many claims being made by the Maoris for compensation for their loss. Together with this aspect, there is the Maori Land Development Scheme to the left of Lake Taupo which comes prominently into view in an inspection. Most of this land, which is being drained under the scheme, will be also involved. If the water which will be let loose by the raising of the lake does not actually flood the area, it will undoubtedly cause the land to become waterlogged.

I am not in a position to give any information of damage likely to be caused in the upper reaches of the rivers running into the lake, but I should say there is a strong likelihood of considerable sluggishness being created in the rivers emptying into the lake. In places of virile running rivers, there might by meandering sluggish water, tending to the flooding of low-lying lands during the periods of heavy rain.\(^{340}\)

Included in this memorandum was the suggestion that the scheme could be modified to enable the flood gates to lower the lake when additional water was not needed.\(^{341}\) When the Minister of Works responded, he replied that the alternative engineering proposal would be ‘difficult and expensive work besides interfering with existing fishing conditions in the locality’.\(^{342}\) He then added that ‘levels have been taken all over the low lying lands’ and reassured his colleague:

1. No cultivated lands will be affected.
2. With the surface drainage proposed at Tokaanu township, no damage will be sustained from lake water up to the controlled level, and it seems certain that ground
water conditions will be more favourable than they have been for many years in the past.

3. The native land which is proposed to develop near the Waimarino Stream east of the Tongariro River, is sufficiently high to be immune from any damage by lake waters if adequate drains are provided to convey swamp water to the lake. The lowest ground in the area is approximately 3 feet above the controlled water level.

The comparatively narrow strip of grass land on the banks of the Tongariro River is at all times subject to immersion when the river is in high flood. Under lake control the number of occasions on which the river will overflow will probably be increased but only to a slight extent.343

On 20 December 1939, Cabinet approved the proposal to build the control gates and raise the lake level to provide storage for the Waikato power stations.

It is clear from the above discussion that the following issues about the Cabinet’s decision must be addressed:

► Was hydroelectric development necessary in the national interest, and how should kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga rights have been exercised over the Taupo waters?
► Did the Crown consult Tuwharetoa leaders and people, and make the decision in partnership with them?
► Were there alternatives to raising the lake levels, and did the Government consider them?
► Did the Public Works Department take reasonable steps to ascertain the likely effects of raising the lake levels, and did the Government respond adequately to Tuwharetoa’s expression of concern?

The parties to our inquiry agreed that hydroelectric development was necessary in the national interest.344 In 1943, a deputation of Tuwharetoa leaders told ministers: ‘The Maori people as a whole were very sympathetic towards the Crown and fully appreciated that the major project of hydro-electricity came first, despite their selfish interests.’345 On the other hand, this did not mean that Maori should not be protected from any adverse effects. John Asher wrote in 1940:

> Whilst we appreciate the immense importance of any hydro-electric undertaking, we owners at the same time are entitled to any measure of protection affecting any lands that may be adversely touched upon.346

The Treaty principles of good government and active protection required no less. In the words of Prime Minister Fraser the same year, no Government would ‘stand by and have injustices imposed on private citizens because of Government operations’.347

Fundamentally, hydroelectric development was necessary in the national interest. For that reason, the Government had given itself the authority to control the use of water for electricity, subject to other lawful rights. As we noted above, Heke argued in 1903 that Maori had such rights over their waters, to which the Government replied that, if that was so, its legislation preserved those rights and required the Crown to purchase them.348 The issue was debated for the next 30 years, but in our view the Government included the right to use the Taupo waters in its 1926 legislation precisely because the matter had to be put beyond legal doubt. Tuwharetoa, not having made an informed or willing cession of their rights over the waters, challenged the Crown to negotiate and obtain such a cession in 1944 and 1946.
In the late 1920s, Tuwharetoa leaders approached the Government with requests for it to lower the level of the lake. The tribe wanted to improve and develop the horticultural capabilities of the rich lands abutting the lake. The Government refused these requests because, inter alia, it wanted to keep the lake level high for future hydroelectricity projects.\textsuperscript{349} The district engineers advised in 1927: 'Any future hydro-electric schemes involving a maximum lake level would be seriously affected by the permanent lowering of this level.'\textsuperscript{350} The Under-Secretary of Public Works accepted this advice, informing the Minister that any enhancement of conditions at Tokaanu and the southern end of the lake (by lowering it) would be offset because:

the value of the lake in connection with further extensions of hydro-electric development along the Waikato would be much reduced, and the cost of works at the next probable development would be much increased.\textsuperscript{351}

Tribal leaders had no choice in the 1920s but to negotiate with the Government, which was the only body with resources to carry out the physical modification required to lower the lake. The partners did not negotiate as equals: Tuwharetoa asked and the Crown said 'no'. During this process, there is no evidence that the tribe grasped the fact that the Crown intended to use and control the waters for the purpose of hydroelectricity. It was not until the mid-1940s that tribal leaders asserted that the Crown could not use their waters in this way without agreement.\textsuperscript{352} G J Anderson, writing on behalf of the Minister of Public Works, did cite hydroelectricity in announcing the Government's decision not to lower the lake. He informed the Tuwharetoa Trust Board in 1927 that 'any permanent lowering of the lake would have a prejudicial effect on future hydro-electric development'.\textsuperscript{353}

The Crown has queried why Tuwharetoa did not raise this issue before 1944, if, in fact, the tribe believed that such a use of their waters required a fresh negotiated agreement. In particular, why did the tribe not raise the issue in 1939, when it became clear that the Crown claimed not merely the right to use the waters, but the right to control the level of the waters for hydro purposes?\textsuperscript{354} We have no information on this point. As far as we can tell from the documentary evidence, tribal leaders did not raise the issue with the Government in 1939. At that point, discussion between the Treaty partners focused on the impacts of the proposal to control the lake, not the question of whether the Crown had authority on its own to exercise that control. The issue was first raised by Hoani Te Heuheu in 1944, in a letter referred to earlier in this chapter. He informed the Prime Minister that there had been 'no mention of using Taupo's waters for hydro electric power' in the negotiations of 1926:

I now beg to ask on behalf of the Tuwharetoa people what the Government proposed to do in this matter. I take it that the negotiations in 1924–'26 had no ulterior motive or aim. I take it that the use of Taupo waters for a new purpose, namely, hydro-electric power, opens up a new question and requires fresh negotiations with us. It will be seen how vitally question No 1 above [regarding Parliament carrying out the Treaty] affects question No 2 [regarding Lake Taupo]. If Parliament in its 1926 legislation has omitted to protect our full rights as owners of Lake Taupo, I take it that Parliament will now be bound in honour to rectify that omission and that you on behalf of your Government will give us an assurance to that effect before you leave for England.\textsuperscript{355}

As we discussed above, the same claim was advanced by a Tuwharetoa delegation in 1946, at a meeting with the Prime Minister, other ministers, and officials. Any use of their waters for other than fishing, argued the tribe, required new negotiations and a fresh agreement. The Prime Minister promised to look into their allegation that this matter had not in fact been agreed in 1926.\textsuperscript{356} We have no evidence that this promise was carried out.

In our view, the waters of Lake Taupo were and are a taonga of Tuwharetoa. Pre-existing rights to use the waters for electricity generation were explicitly preserved in legislation in 1903 (and in 1928) alongside the Crown’s grant of
authority to itself. The claimants and Crown are incorrect when they state that this legislation gave the Government the sole right to control the use of waters for electricity, as both Acts included a standing qualification.\(^{357}\) Maori authority over their taonga and properties included the right to control their use, and that right was not extinguished by the Water-Power Act 1903 and subsequent public works legislation. Rather, the Crown had to acquire the right from Maori. This it recognised in 1926, but it did so in a underhanded manner that breached Treaty principles and failed to extinguish the right by free and informed consent. Although the enacting legislation may have extinguished the Maori right at law, Ngati Tuwharetoa did not accept that in 1944 or in 1946. A reasonable Treaty partner, acting in good faith, would have accepted that it had not properly or sufficiently acquired the right it claimed, and would have negotiated and acquired it by agreement at that time. The tribe intended to act reasonably and to put the national interest above its ‘selfish interests,’ so an amicable agreement could surely have been reached.

**The decision to erect the control gates**

**Did the Crown consult Tuwharetoa leaders and people, and make the decision to erect the control gates in partnership with them?**

The tribe’s claim to continuing authority over their lake and over the Crown’s proposed use of it for hydropower was not accepted in the period between 1939 and 1946. The Treaty partners did not negotiate and arrive at an agreement, as they had in 1926. Rather, Tuwharetoa were left in the position of, first, asking the Crown whether they would be protected from any consequences of its decision to build the control gates, and, secondly, seeking compensation or a reversal of that decision.

In addition to the need to obtain a free, informed, and unambiguous consent to the use of their waters for hydropower, the Crown was also obliged to consult Ngati Tuwharetoa over any environmental modification that would have a significant effect on them. Prime Minister Fraser noted in 1943 that people should have received ‘sufficient warning of what was likely to happen’ – they should have been informed of whether the lake would rise, and no flooding should have come as any surprise.\(^{358}\) We think that, as well as warning and informing people of its intentions, the Government was required to consult the Maori people concerned and obtain their view on its proposal to raise the lake levels. In the mid-1940s, Tuwharetoa commissioned expert research and advice on whether there were other ways of achieving the desired water flows for electric power.\(^{359}\) This could have been done earlier, had people had sufficient notice of the Government’s intentions. Instead, Tuwharetoa met with the Government after learning of its intentions (but before they were set in stone) and received ministerial assurances that there would be absolutely no effects on them. These assurances proved so at variance with the truth that the Government later pondered how it could have been so mistaken.\(^{360}\) Genuine consultation requires sound information for informed choices, which was very clearly lacking in this instance.

**Alternatives to raising the lake levels**

**Were there alternatives to raising the lake levels and did the Government consider them?**

As we will see below, research later in the 1940s indicated that the same amount of water power could be supplied without having to raise the lake levels. By the time Tuwharetoa received this expert advice, the alternatives were (in the opinion of some) prohibitively expensive because of the investment already made in the existing control gates.\(^{361}\) We have no way of judging whether these alternatives were affordable or workable back when the gates were built, from 1939 to 1941. The evidence before us, from Mr Walzl’s assessment of the documentary record, is that the Government did not consider or investigate any alternatives to siting the control gates where it did and raising the lake levels in the manner consequent on
that decision. In our view, given the claimants’ requests in the 1920s and 1930s that the lake level be lowered, the Government had sufficient notice that a proposal to do the opposite would be a matter of concern to Tuwharetoa. If alternatives existed – and the evidence from the time is that they did – these should at least have received serious consideration. Further, the technical evidence is clear (as we will explain below) that the lake did not need to be kept at such high levels in the 1940s in order to supply the hydro requirements of the time. Ultimately, the damage done to Ngati Tuwharetoa and their taonga was unnecessary and avoidable.

**Ascertaining the effects of raising the lake levels**

Did the Public Works Department take reasonable steps to ascertain the likely effects of raising the lake levels, and did the Government respond adequately to Tuwharetoa’s expression of concern?

The evidence recited above makes it clear that the Public Works Department did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the likely effects of raising the lake levels, despite a warning from its district officers that some areas would be flooded. Inadequate research was carried out: ‘No very comprehensive survey should be attempted,’ were the instructions, ‘but rather a few spot levels should be taken to indicate the relation of land to any proposed future lake level.’ On the basis of such inadequate investigation, the department advised ministers that there would be no impact whatsoever on Maori, a view that was communicated officially to Tuwharetoa. John Asher warned that the department had a history of creating messes and leaving them for others to clean up, and the Minister of Internal Affairs was sufficiently worried to query what seemed to him – as a layman – would be obvious detrimental effects arising from the Government’s plans. The Native Minister later accused the Public Works Department of having been ‘very far from candid in its description of the probable effect of the works.’ The Prime Minister, however, preferred to think that there had been some dreadful mistake or incompetence. Either way, ministers (despite reasonable doubts) accepted the Public Works Department’s advice and conveyed false or uninformed promises and assurances to Tuwharetoa.

**The Tribunal’s findings**

In our view, the Crown failed to act in partnership with Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga in accordance with the Treaty and its own undertakings in 1926. It ought to have consulted the tribe and obtained their agreement to its use of their taonga for the generation of hydroelectricity. Similarly, its proposal to erect control gates and raise the lake level should have been the subject of full consultation with the tribe, on the basis of sound information, and reasonable alternatives should have been researched and considered. In particular, knowing of Tuwharetoa’s desire to lower (rather than raise) the lake level, the Crown was obligated to determine whether its power needs could be met without having to raise the lake level. Research from the mid-1940s suggests that there were alternatives, but they do not appear to have been considered at all in the years between 1939 and 1941. Finally, the Government did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the likely effects of raising the lake levels. Nor did it respond adequately to Tuwharetoa’s expressions of concern. Although we acquit the Crown of bad faith, we do note views from the time, both of ministers and of Tuwharetoa, that the Public Works Department had a history of concealing the truth of the impacts of its projects.

We find these actions and omissions of the Crown to have been in breach of the principles of the Treaty. We conclude that the decision to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels was not arrived at in a manner consistent with the Treaty.

**What were the impacts of the control gates?**

We turn now to consider evidence of the actual impact of the control gates on the lake, its mauri, its shores, its abutting lands, and its people.
The claimants’ case
The claimants argued that the erection of the control gates and the subsequent keeping of the lake at high levels for sustained periods, including in seasons when it would not normally be high, had very serious impacts on them, their lands, and their taonga.

Spiritual and cultural impacts: In the claimants’ view, the nature of the impacts was metaphysical as well as physical. They included:
- interrupting the natural flow of water out of the lake, damaging the mauri, and causing spiritual impurities;
- damaging the very identity of the people, which is bound up with the free flow of the Waikato River out of the lake;
- the death of the taniwha Matawhero;
- damaging or destroying wahi tapu, including urupa;
- damaging or destroying taonga;
- loss of cultural knowledge associated with the lost wahi tapu and taonga; and
- harm that comes with inability to carry out kaitiakitanga.

The claimants noted that, although some of these concerns may not have found their way into the written record, the evidence of their kaumatua is that they were and are deeply felt by the people.

Physical impacts: The technical evidence shows that the lake levels were raised as a result of installing the control gates. Not only were they raised, but the Crown held the lake at high levels almost year-round from 1941 to 1947. This caused inundation, erosion, siltation, and sluggishness in rivers, and the raising of groundwater levels. Also, the claimants argued, the technical evidence establishes that between 1947 and 1971 the lake was held at higher levels than normal, and in seasons when it would not normally be so high, for much of the time. It was not until after 1987 that it was finally allowed to revert to a fairly normal level. The physical impacts of keeping the lake so high included flooding, erosion, loss of access, transformation of arable land and pasture into swamp, and destruction of lakeshore geothermal features. Other possible causes, such as tectonic subsidence, were merely ‘red herrings’. The evidence of Prisca Eser and Michael Rosen, for example, showed the ruination of land due to waterlogging over a 17-year period, which was too short for tectonic subsidence to have been an appreciable factor.

Social and economic impacts: The claimants argued that the technical and tangata whenua evidence demonstrates the severe effects of keeping the lake so high for so long. Key lakeshore lands, vital to Maori communities for growing the crops necessary for their subsistence, were rendered unusable. Also, land being developed for pastoral farming was significantly damaged. Demographic statistics and the oral evidence both show that the blow to farming was significant and long term. Many people had to leave their farms or communities to seek work elsewhere. It is beside the point to argue that the effects on the land were not permanent – it was and is beyond the resources of the tribe to clear and drain the affected land so as to bring it back into production. Further, communities were damaged by the inability of people to remain on their lakeside lands: “This outflow of the iwi’s most precious resource – people – would in turn have undermined the social and cultural fabric of nga hapu o Ngati Tuwharetoa.”

The Crown’s case
The Crown suggested that there was (and is) a complex interaction between lake levels, tectonic subsidence, natural siltation, wind erosion, wave action (as a result of wind), and artificial control via the gates. The Tribunal must be assured that damage has been caused by Crown actions and not by some natural occurrence. The lake was never kept at a higher level than it sometimes reached in nature, and the historical evidence shows significant flooding and high levels before 1941. Much lakeshore land was already swampy and marginal before the Crown’s intervention. Nonetheless, the technical evidence shows that damage
arose because the lake was kept constantly high from 1941 to 1947, and less so (though still higher than usual, and unseasonably) until 1971. From 1987, the lake has been kept at close to normal (pre-1941) levels. As a result, any physical damage – especially from the extreme years of the 1940s – has long since abated.\footnote{371}

The Tribunal’s analysis

We received considerable technical and tangata whenua evidence on the impacts of artificially controlling Lake Taupo, which has enabled us to reach firm conclusions on the points raised by the parties.
The storage capacity of a lake, from an electricity generation perspective, is governed by the minimum and maximum control levels. Mr Hamilton uses data provided by hydrologist Horace Freestone to identify the operational parameters that were chosen by the engineers and confirmed by the decision-makers in 1939 (table 18.1). The engineers were aware of the maximum and minimum lake levels for the period 1905 to 1939, and they selected maximum and minimum control levels that were inside this range. They went on to compare the recorded lake level range (1905 to 1939) with the ‘design level range’ which was the difference between the maximum and minimum control levels. The ‘general level of lake’ was the mean lake level for the period 1905 to 1939.

The capacity of Lake Taupo, calculated by multiplying the surface area by the operating range, is 611 square kilometres multiplied by 1.53 metres, or 935 million cubic metres. Our calculation from the data in table 18.1 is that 40 per cent of that capacity is obtained by raising the lake above the mean lake level and 60 per cent by lowering the lake below the mean lake level. The construction work carried out in 1940 and 1941 was evenly balanced between the control gates, which would enable the lake levels to be raised, and work intended to facilitate the release of water from the lake and allow the lake levels to be lowered. Construction costs were carefully estimated in a June 1939 memorandum from District Engineer Anderson to the Public Works Department’s Chief Electrical Engineer, Frederick Kissel. The sum of £89,300 would be needed to create a river diversion and construct the concrete barrage that would contain the sluice gates, and £74,100 would be used to lower the river from Shand’s Rapids to the lake outlet and cut an outlet channel through the shallow area of the lake. The annual reports on public works made to Parliament for the years 1939, 1940, 1941, and 1942 confirm that the work was carried out as scheduled and control of Lake Taupo became effective on 4 September 1941.

The nature of the work done is specified in some detail in the Department of Public Works files, but the magnitude of the changes at the lake outlet is not immediately clear.
Figure 18.2: Lake Taupo water levels, showing the uncontrolled level since 1905 (simulated after 1914); the controlled level since 1941; and the 'no consents' level since 1941. [Source: Freestone in doc H29, figure 10.3]
The evidence of Mr Freestone, presented to a resource consent hearing in 2003, draws on the design specifications used in 1941 and time series data from 1905 to 2000. The design specifications, summarised in table 18.1, suggest that the outlet was lowered by 11 centimetres. Elsewhere in the same document Mr Freestone considers the regime that would operate, should Environment Waikato decline the resource consent and require the applicant to fully open the control gates. In this situation, he demonstrated to the consent hearing, the lake would drop by about 1.2 metres and continue to operate at a lower level (fig 18.2).

The difference between 11 centimetres and 1.2 metres is substantial; it was a matter of considerable surprise, which caused us to check and recheck the evidence. The tribunal questioned Mr Hamilton about this during our supplementary hearing day. The evidence of Mr Freestone stood up under scrutiny by Mr Hamilton and it stands up under scrutiny by the Tribunal. From this, we are able to reconcile the difference between the figure 18.1 evidence and the figure 18.2 evidence. The conclusion we reach is important. Our interpretation is that there was a modest deepening and a substantial enlargement of the outlet in 1940 and 1941. The engineers had, in this way, created a capacity to raise the lake by four feet above the mean lake level and to lower it by three feet below the mean lake level. The maximum control level was eventually set at two feet above the mean level.

The new regime for lake levels, which was initiated when the control gates became operational in September 1941, was based on simplistic assumptions. Correspondence contained in the Public Works Department files provides a window of insight. The engineers had access to reliable time series data on lake levels from 1904 onwards and directed their attention to a very narrow range of parameters: the recorded maximum (1178.1 feet in 1909); recorded minimum (1172 feet in 1915); and a 'general lake level' of 1175 feet. From this they made the assumption that a controlled maximum of 1177 feet was well within the natural range and would provide a margin of safety should heavy rains occur at a time when the lake was already at the controlled

**Figure 18.3: Lake Taupo water levels, 1941 to 1947** [Source: Hamilton, doc 135 figure 5.3]
maximum. Land above 1180 feet would, they believed, be unaffected; land between 1177 and 1180 feet would be ‘to some extent affected’ but the ‘total area involved is small, amounting to a few hundred acres, much of which would not be capable of development in any case.’

The control gates and the lake level regime operated within these parameters between 1941 and 1946 (figure 18.3). The new seasonal regime, with a build up of water in summer and autumn and a run down in winter, did not, however, take effect. Lake levels were held close to the controlled maximum over extended periods of time, in winter and spring as well as summer and autumn, between December 1941 and June 1946. Lake Taupo was awash, with water far in excess of that needed to operate the Arapuni power station. Environmental impacts were felt around the lake margins and in the lowlying areas adjacent to the lake and the rivers that flowed into it. There were complaints from fishermen, landowners, and residents, Maori and non-Maori. Claimant evidence summarised by Mr Hamilton (and set out in more detail below), evidence compiled by Mr Walzl from archival records, newspapers, and reports of site visits by Cabinet Ministers, as well as evidence from maps and aerial photographs collated by Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell, are all in accord about the nature of the damage done.

Beaches and fishing rocks around the lake were submerged and widespread flooding occurred. After previous flood events the waters had receded and the land had dried out. This was no longer the case. Flooding and subsequent waterlogging were most extensive around the southern end of the lake, where Tokaanu Native Township and the Tokaanu and Korohe development schemes were adversely affected. The Tauranga Taupo development scheme was similarly affected when the stream, unable to release all of its water into the lake, overflowed its banks. Maori settlements adjacent to the western shores of the lake had smaller areas of flat land and were proportionally more impacted by the rise in lake levels. Waihi, for example, suffered from a reduction in coastline, flooding of its marae site, and loss of hot springs used for bathing and cooking purposes. Waihaha, also on the western shore, is the subject of a detailed case study, complete with maps, prepared...
by Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell. When lake levels rose, the water backed up the Waihaha River and overflowed, land became waterlogged, and the problems persisted to the detriment of ecology, production, community life, and sacred places.

The Crown argued that changes to the lake surrounds are complex responses to a number of different processes, including crustal movement and deformation, the impact of winds on lake levels, variations in rainfall, changes in land use, and inefficiencies in the drainage systems. We have assessed the evidence before us on the nature and magnitude of each of the following factors: tectonic subsidence; the impact of winds; rainfall variations; wave action; changes in land use; changes in the efficiency of drainage; changes in lake levels; and changes in the volume of water held for storage.

Our conclusion is that two components in particular combined to cause the environmental impacts that were most acute during the period from 1941 to 1946: namely, modest changes in lake levels (in the order of 40 to 60 centimetres) combined with substantial changes in the volume of water held for storage over the five-year period. The result of these two factors was a marked rise in the water table levels in areas surrounding the lake. The impacts of this rise in the water table were felt well above the controlled level of the lake.

Groundwater is replenished by precipitation and percolation through the soil, especially in winter and early spring when evaporation is lowest. Because groundwater moves slowly, the level of the water table tends to follow the surface of the land. Groundwater returns to the surface by flowing into streams, rivers, or lakes or directly into the sea. Most commonly, groundwater is discharged into rivers and lakes. If, however, the water levels in rivers and lakes are raised by floods or engineering works, the discharge may be halted or even reversed. Groundwater levels close to the river or lake may be raised as a result of recharge from those bodies of water, while groundwater levels above the recharge level may build up because water added by precipitation is unable to drain away. Patterns of discharge and recharge are complex, depending on the nature of the soils and the rocks, the elevation of the land surface, and the seasonality of precipitation and evaporation.

The interplay between lake levels and groundwater levels helps us to explain why the claimants suffered the damage reported between 1941 and 1946. Three reasons can be identified. First, the lake was raised to a level beyond that needed to provide a steady supply of water for the Arapuni power station. Secondly, the lake was held at a higher than average level for longer than was necessary. Lastly, as a follow-on from item two, the lake was not lowered at the end of the period.

Flooding at the ‘Delta Camp’, on the Tongariro River delta, after the installation of the control gates. This photograph was taken by Ernest Renz, probably in 1942.
Figure 18.4: The water table and zones of saturation and aeration in relation to rivers and lakes [After H J de Blij and P O Muller, Physical Geography of the Global Environment (New York: Wiley, 1993) figure 39.7; A H Strahler and A N Strahler, Modern Physical Geography (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1992) figure 16.19]

Figure 18.5: Changes in the amount of productive land. Waihaha 3B, 1910–1945–2002 [Source: Kirkpatrick et al in doc E2, figure 12.15 p 535]
of winter and the beginning of spring when groundwater discharge is essential for agricultural and pastoral farming. The Crown had the capacity to control the maximum and the minimum lake levels, and it had a responsibility to monitor the impacts of the new control regime and adjust its operation accordingly. The operation of lake controls could have been fine-tuned and adjustments to lake levels could have been made without jeopardising the wartime need for electricity.

The problems did not cease with the end of the Second World War. Further and more localised damage related to high lake levels, flooding, and shoreline erosion was associated with flood events in 1952, 1957, and 1958. The impacts relating to the high water table have not, for the most part, been researched or monitored. There are two important exceptions brought to us as evidence, arising from the work of Prisca Eser (then at the School of Biological Sciences at Victoria University) and Michael Rosen (then at the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences, based in Taupo). They carried out a detailed study of the effects of artificially controlling lake levels on the Stump Bay wetlands to the south of Lake Taupo. They report on the specifics of the relations between surface water and groundwater and the interplay between rainfall, transpiration and lake levels: if the lake is held at a higher level, the area of swamp increases; if the lake level is lower the area of swamp decreases. Their figure 6 used evidence from aerial photographs to map the extent of wetlands in 1941, before the lake was controlled, and in 1958, when the next run of aerial photographs was taken.

The map prepared by Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell as part of the Waihaha case study in their report to the Tribunal provides parallel evidence for the smaller lowlands on the western side of the lake (figure 18.5). The small area of farm land mapped in 1910 is much reduced by 1945, and even further reduced in 2002. Land under cultivation has diminished; parts have become waterlogged and parts have reverted to bush and regrowth. Some lands adjacent to the lake were abandoned as a result of flooding during the period of controlled lake levels in the decades immediately following 1941; others, a little further distant, were abandoned as a result of rises in the water table that began in the 1940s and extend through to the present day.
Holding the lake high out of season and all year round: The seasonality of the new regime is of particular interest. Using daily lake level data provided by the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, now Mighty River Power, Dr Eser and Dr Rosen, Roddy Henderson, and Mr Hamilton have graphed the seasonal patterns of lake levels: Dr Eser and Dr Rosen compare the January-to-December pattern for 1906 to 1940 with that for 1942 to 1996; Mr Henderson disaggregates it for each of the six decades from the 1940s to the 1990s; Mr Hamilton provides a graph which compares the monthly mean lake levels before the control gates were operational (1905 to 1941) with the controlled period from 1941 to 2005, and includes, in addition, the plot for 1941 to 1947 (figure 18.6). We know from other sources, including figure 18.3, that lake levels were higher from 1942 to 1946 than they were in subsequent years. The same data also shows that lake levels fell sharply during the 1946 drought. Mr Hamilton’s inclusion of data for 1947 has almost certainly muted the contrast between the lake levels in the early 1940s and those between 1905 and 1941. Figure 18.6, nonetheless, highlights two things: the impacts in the early 1940s and the ongoing change in seasonality. The plot for 1941 to 1947 shows not only high lake levels but also the fact that these lake levels were at their highest during the October to January period, which is of prime importance for farm and garden operations. Comparison of the plots for pre-control and control phases shows that lake levels under the new regime have been higher than normal from October onwards each year.
The overall outcome: The existence of this substantial and sustained body of water, close to the maximum operational level between 1941 and 1946, had a major impact on the land areas surrounding the lake and on the streams which feed into the lake. Extensive areas to the south and east of the lake which were cultivable before 1941, or which had the potential to be drained and developed for agriculture or forestry, became permanent swamps and wetlands. Small but fertile areas on the steeper western shore, including Waihaha, became boggy and unsuitable for crop growing. A high proportion of the lands and settlements most affected were Maori. The same evidence and a similar assessment suggests that changes in lake levels and the seasonality of lake storage combined to create changes in the activity and accessibility of geothermal features close to the lake shore. Maori who had strong cultural links to the lake shore and to geothermal features were doubly affected.

We are less certain in our assessment of changes relating to wave action around the lake shore and shifts in the position of the river flowing across the Tongariro delta. The interplay between ongoing physical processes and human intervention is not clear cut. There is a strong possibility that these were affected by changes in lake levels and the new seasonality of the control regime. However, in this situation the onus was on the Crown to respond to public complaints by initiating a process of monitoring and research. This did not become part of the Crown's working agenda in the initial phase of operation. Maori complaints were received and entered into the files, but there is little evidence that they were listened to or acted on. Hydro power generation was a high priority for the Government of the day and responses to reported problems were commonly framed in terms of damage and compensation.

The tangata whenua evidence: Environment, culture, and tribal identity are interwoven in Lake Taupo waters. The Maori world view considers the lake and its waters holistically as one system: wahi tapu and wahi taonga are part of the fabric of environment and spirituality. Tuwharetoa reminded the Tribunal that the moana, Taupo-nui-a-Tia, is an emblem of the tribe, and then asked:

If the kaumatua of old were to come back to the lake today, what would they say to the old places they knew? How would they karakia to the mahinga kai that have been inundated as a result of the raised lake levels? How would they salute the tupuna residing in the rocks that have been drowned? How would they commune with their dead ancestors whose burial places have disappeared beneath the water? They would not feel on familiar territory. They would feel the dislocation, the disruption of the natural order of things, brought about by changing Taupo-nui-a-tia from a great natural lake to a hydro storage reservoir, with the many resulting effects on the surrounding lands and waterways.

The concern of Ngati Tuwharetoa is not only with the mauri of each lake and river, but also with the unnatural interference through the manipulation of water levels, and the unnatural mixing of waters with different mauri. There is, Tuwharetoa suggested, confusion, disorder, and disruption, which affects every element:

For instance, as well as the water itself, the water sustains insects and microbia all of which have their own mauri. The different types of stones on the lakes and riverbeds all have their own whakapapa. The many components of a healthy waterway work together to keep the waters clean, and enable us to sustain ourselves.

A significant portion of wahi tapu and wahi taonga are located in the lake, close to the lake shore, in or close to the rivers that flow into the lake. The birthing stone, within the lake at Hallet's Bay, is cited as one of the wahi tapu which is now covered by water. The dark coloured rock, Te Pueaea, basking place of the ancestral Gods, is also submerged. Loss of taonga, be they mahinga kai or wahi tapu, puts the knowledge base relating to these taonga at risk: if the physical site is lost, the legends, the karakia, and in some cases the waiata which are associated with them may not survive. Knowledge lost during the decades
between the 1940s and the 1980s has proved very difficult to recover in the 1990s and the twenty-first century.

A number of kaumatua, including Arthur Grace, James Hemi Biddle, George Asher, Ringakapo Asher Payne, and Stephen Asher, gave evidence about the impacts of raising the lake level in 1941.397 At this point, we set out the evidence relating to the land, the water table, and geothermal features.

Ringakapo Asher Payne was teaching at Tokaanu when the control gates became operational and lake levels began to rise. She described the impacts at the southern end of the lake thus:

Many of the places where our people used to grow crops turned into swampland as the water table rose and the water seeped through. My family’s maara became swamps instead: the land behind the school where my mother grew food is ruined, and so is the land on the other side of the Tokaanu river.398

Some of the impacts were more immediate, in the years between 1940 and 1945. Others happened after the big flood of 1958. Mrs Payne continues:

The Te Rangiita family land at Waiotaka was ruined too, even before the 1958 flood they left their home. There were a number of other families who were dairy farming who had to leave their farms. At the turn into Korohe, the land on both sides of the road is ruined. Hautu 1B7 is absolutely ruined. Alongside the Waimarino stream is ruined, the old people had good crops in there.399

Stephen Asher, nine years old at the time, described the aftermath of the 1958 flood:

After the flood the dairy farm very quickly turned to extensive swampland. As a youngster I recall going into the swamp with my grandmother and other kuia to help cut and collect flax for kete and mat making, however this activity finally had to be curtailed as the swamp became overgrown and it was too difficult and dangerous to wade through the wet to get to the flax. I don’t recall any effort being made by the authorities to reinstate the farm after the flooding, and it was accepted that the land was lost for farming. Now the land is completely useless and overgrown with willows, toetoe, flax and other scrubby bushes and scrub, and is inaccessible. Several years ago an attempt was made to drain the swamp by opening some drains, without success.400

James Biddle, brought up at Korohe near the southern end of the lake, told the Tribunal about maara kai, the food gardens which he described as essential to the community. Each family had its own plot but the work was done collectively and the produce used to feed the whanau and community and supply the marae. When the lake levels rose they had to move their planting grounds to higher land.401

Arthur Grace described the impact which the raising of the lake level had on the Tongariro River delta:

All around this area the people used to grow crops to survive. When they raised the lake it forced a lot of our people to leave their noho. Those places were wonderful crop-producing places, but when the lake was raised it became too wet and they had to shift up to higher ground and the ground was nowhere near as good. The soil on the flats was peaty. They lost out a lot what with the combination of high river and lake levels. Even pine trees have died because the ground is so wet.402

The relationship between lake levels, groundwater, and floods is a matter we have already discussed.

In addition to the impact on land, residences, and farming, the claimants also described the loss of geothermal features vital to their culture and way of life. Charles Wall and Emily Rameka, for example, told us of the Taharepa hot spring and how it was ruined by rising lake levels.403 Paranapa Otimi described the loss of 10 hot springs at Waihi:

When the Crown raised the lake level, many of the geothermal areas, the fire lifeblood of the Hapu, disappeared. Springs used for centuries to feed, heal and sustain the tribe were lost.
Our practices of upkeep and caretaking role for centuries was now gone. Turumakina lost our ability to sustain ourselves. Maria Nepia is a present-day resource manager for Ngati Tuwharetoa who consulted carefully with these and other kaumatua and built up a composite picture. She summarised:

Fluctuating lake and river levels have caused erosion and inundation of land. Our people reported that large areas of land had become swamp since the Taupo control gates were installed during the war. This is something that has personally affected many of our people as their land has become uncultivable as a result. Siltation has also been a problem in the Tongariro delta area due to decreased flows down the Tongariro River.

Ms Nepia emphasised these points:
- the destruction of wahi tapu and wahi taonga;
- the damage to the mauri of the lake by artificially raising its level and the mixing of waters;
- loss of Tuwharetoa knowledge of the environment;
- the need for Ngati Tuwharetoa, as kaitiaki, to be involved in decision-making; and
- the need for an integrated and holistic approach to environmental management.

The Tribunal’s findings

We find that the Crown held the lake at its maximum control level for almost the entire time from 1941 to 1946. This involved keeping the lake at 1177 feet (two feet higher than average), a level occasionally reached or surpassed in nature but not at all common as a sustained level or in certain seasons. As a result, Maori lakeshore blocks, wahi tapu, geothermal taonga, residences, cropping lands, and development farm lands were all subject to inundation, erosion, and a rise in groundwater that turned taonga and farm land alike into swamp. As the claimants argued, this had profound social, cultural, economic, and spiritual consequences for them.

We note, however, that some matters in the claimants’ evidence related to the effects of the TPD rather than to the control gates and the raising of lake levels. In particular, the mixing of waters (and harm to the mauri) was caused by the power scheme, not the control gates. In terms of the change to the mauri of the lake from artificial control of its level, we do not accept the claimants’ argument in its entirety. They were themselves seeking to substantially lower the lake by artificial means for the decade or so before the Crown’s installation of the control gates. The key point, perhaps, is that this was a price the tangata whenua were willing to pay to develop their lands. They had no say in the effects on their taonga when the Crown decided to do the opposite and raise the lake. Thus, the decision was not made in partnership with them. It may be that some interference with the mauri of the lake was essential in the national interest for hydroelectric development. Again, that was a matter to be agreed, not imposed, and only after all other options had been fully explored.

We turn now to the question of whether the Crown remedied this damage or provided fair and proper redress for it.

Did the Crown provide an effective remedy or redress for the impacts in the 1940s?

The impacts described above were soon brought to the Crown’s attention. There was widespread public concern and complaint from Maori and non-Maori alike from 1942 onwards. The native township of Tokaanu was the most visibly affected. Ministers of the Crown listened, visited the sites affected, and were fulsome in their acceptance of fault. Prime Minister Fraser, for example, was very specific in his statement to the Dominion on 30 June 1943:

The Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, said it was the duty of the Government to look into the matter to see whether a mistake had been made. From his own point of view it was a question whether the people got sufficient warning of what was likely to happen from the damming of the lake. If the people...
were informed that the lake would not rise then it was a bad engineering forecast and bad administration’ continued Mr. Fraser. ‘I do not mince matters. The job was not handled well, and I say that right out. The conclusion was arrived at that the areas would not be flooded. The dam was put in, the lake rose, and the sections were flooded and a good deal of harm resulted. I have nothing to say in extenuation of such lack of foresight. When people’s houses and premises were flooded it came unexpectedly to the people and to me. No Government will stand by and have injustices imposed on private citizens because of Government operations. It would be intolerable to allow them to continue.408

Claims for compensation were lodged and a number of these were dealt with on an ad hoc basis in 1942 and 1943. Money was spent to obtain a new site for Tokaanu township, shift buildings which were at risk, build a protective wall at Waihi, and pay compensation to some of those most visibly affected.409 Officials were not convinced that these arrangements were robust, and they sought approval for special legislation, which was executed in the Finance Acts of 1944 and 1945, and in the Lake Taupo Claims Compensation Act of 1947. In this section, we will address the question of whether these Acts, the compensation process, and its outcomes were consistent with the Treaty.

The claimants’ case
The claimants agreed that the Crown accepted responsibility for the harmful effects of its actions in the 1940s, but they suggested that it did so in such a way as to provide insufficient compensation and no effective remedy. First, Tuwharetoa wanted to save their cultivable and development lands instead of getting compensation. The tribe researched alternative engineering options but officials were not prepared to give them serious attention, preferring the lesser cost of paying compensation. Given that modern power needs can in fact be met from a lower lake level, the claimants cannot account for why their proposals in the 1940s were not taken seriously. Secondly, the claimants argued that the compensation paid by the Crown was woefully inadequate, in light of the harm that had been suffered, the degree to which it could have been avoided, and the profit that the Government was making from using their taonga. The 1947 Compensation Court found that there had been serious physical impacts from raising the lake, causing significant economic harm, so that, at least, was in the claimants’ favour. But there was little understanding of other kinds of harm and the resultant compensation was less than generous.410

In particular, the claimants suggested that the Lake Taupo Compensation Act 1947 set the ‘maximum working level’ of the lake at 1177 feet. Counsel cited the historical evidence of Mr Walzl:

the insistence that there could be no responsibility for any damage to land over 1177 feet, (the level at which the lake had been controlled), meant that impacts on land, that in one way or another had arisen from there being more water held in the lake for longer periods, were not acknowledged. Dozens of claims and thousands of pounds worth of damage were ignored. In fact despite the acceptance of claims and the provision of assistance at Waihi and Tokaanu, the attitude of officials was often to blame Maori for the predicament in which they found themselves suggesting that they had built too close to the water or were using the higher water levels as an excuse for poor farming.411

As a result, the claimants only received £38,500 in damages from the court and £67,575 in out-of-court settlements, a total of £106,075 from the £380,000 originally sought. Not only was this inadequate, but compensation was assessed according to land values and for individual owners without taking any account of:

► its cultural or spiritual value;
► the impact on geothermal springs and rivers;
► damage to taonga, wahi tapu, and places of great significance;
► the impact on communities; and
► the impact on the claimants’ whole way of life.412
The Crown’s case

The Crown made brief submissions on these points. As a general proposition, it suggested that, prior to the Resource Management Act, management of the environment did not usually recognise or take into account Maori values or interests ‘in a manner now regarded as important and necessary.’ It also stated that it had a responsibility, where its actions impinged upon the cultural and spiritual relationships of iwi with their taonga, to inform itself and take that relationship into account so as to avoid or minimise prejudice to it. The Crown did not comment, however, on whether or not it failed to compensate Tuwharetoa for cultural, spiritual, and intangible harm arising from the raising of the lake, or whether that would have been regarded as ‘important and necessary’ in the circumstances of the 1940s.

Rather, the Crown argued that the Government’s response was swift and sympathetic and that appropriate compensation was paid, given that the effects of flooding have been exaggerated and much of the affected land must have been marginal anyway. The Tribunal ‘cannot now properly determine whether the level set pursuant to the legislation of 1177 feet (and thus the yardstick for compensation) was unreasonable or substantively unfair.’

The historical evidence is that affected Maori and Pakeha were treated alike, that the compensation was determined according to due process, that it was fair and substantial, and that the majority of Maori owners received it.

The Tribunal’s analysis

In order to answer the question as to whether the Crown provided either an effective remedy or effective redress, we will be considering:

- Tuwharetoa’s attempt to seek an overall remedy rather than compensation or protective works, involving lowering the lake while preserving the capacity for hydro power;
- the Crown’s mix of remedy and redress, provided in its 1947 compensation process;
- whether compensation was limited to claims for damage below 1177 feet;
- whether the parameters set for compensation were fair in the circumstances and enabled the Crown to comply with the Treaty; and
- whether the compensation process and its outcome was fair in the circumstances and compliant with the Treaty.

Remedy rather than redress: Ngati Tuwharetoa seek to lower the lake: Ngati Tuwharetoa moved to widen the debate in the mid-1940s. Rather than merely seeking compensation,’ reports Walzl, ‘Ngati Tuwharetoa were exploring ways to bring an end to lakeside flooding.’ They took Ministers of the Crown to visit the localities most affected, they pointed out that compensation arrangements were narrowly construed, and they urged the Government to consider alternatives. To support these face-to-face discussions, Ngati Tuwharetoa commissioned Grant and Cooke, Registered Surveyors and Civil Engineers from Auckland, to investigate and report on the alternatives. The field work was done by Mr Glanville and reported by Grant and Cooke in January and October 1945, and used by Tuwharetoa in attempts to enter into informed dialogue with the Government. Grant and Cooke looked at the positives and the negatives of the work done by the Government engineers. They confirmed that the engineering work was well done and the control gates correctly positioned, but they underlined the problems that resulted when the lake was held near the maximum controlled level for sustained periods of time, as happened between 1941 and 1944:

Thus long seasonal stretches of low water had altogether disappeared with the result that the low-lying areas had become waterlogged and completely useless even if they had not been completely inundated.

The consultant engineers confirmed the Tuwharetoa position, articulated in 1926 when the tribal trust board first made an approach to the Crown. The consultants’
report recommended that the lake be lowered by three feet and that the controlled operational maximum be set at two feet on the lake gauge. ‘This would give sufficient fall to the drains and streams,’ wrote Grant and Cooke, ‘to enable areas to be farmed that were practically useless.’ In the months that followed, they identified the engineering work that would be needed to maintain the same hydraulic gradient as far as the Huka Falls and provide the full volume of water for the Waikato power stations. When Grant and Cooke reported in October 1945, they balanced these expenses against the savings in compensation and the benefits from the farm lands which could be restored and the swamps which could be drained.\textsuperscript{419} Armed with this report, Ngati Tuwharetoa was well equipped to engage in dialogue with its Treaty partner.

Ngati Tuwharetoa was intent on widening the options; Public Works officials, however, preferred to stay with the status quo and pay compensation. No changes were made: lake levels remained close to the maximum control level through 1944 and 1945, and claims for damage continued to come in. Legislation was drafted and the Compensation Court was established by the Finance Act (No 3) 1944.\textsuperscript{420} Claims were lodged in large numbers but the Compensation Court was slow to meet. In September 1946, Ngati Tuwharetoa met with the Prime Minister, ministers, and officials to ask that claims be heard, and to urge the Government to consider the alternatives. Referring to the Grant and Cooke option, which would allow the lake to be lowered without impacting on its use for electricity, they submitted:

\begin{quote}
We, the Natives, definitely assert that in preference to erosion claims, we would rather have a scheme somewhat of this nature adopted, not only to preserve our ancestral lands, but to be of ultimate benefit to the national wealth of the country.\textsuperscript{421}
\end{quote}

In other words, Tuwharetoa considered their capacity to contribute to the farming economy to be just as important in the national interest as the capacity of their taonga to generate electricity.

The Minister of Internal Affairs, William Parry, thanked the tribe for what he called their ‘constructive idea’, which could enable money to be spent on saving their land and keeping it in production instead of on compensation for damage. The Prime Minister noted that the question of whether the lake could be kept at a lower level, without compromising hydro power, was a highly technical question that he would refer to officials. Parry promised that it would not be ‘brushed aside’.\textsuperscript{422} The proposal was put forward again in 1947, by a different set of engineers, who thought it ‘economic’ but at the cost of destroying the Huka Falls.\textsuperscript{423}

The General Manager of the Hydro-electric Department, Frederick Kissel, investigated these proposals and rejected them. He thought them uneconomic and considered that lowering the lake would also harm rivers and fisheries. The most important consideration, as far as we can tell, was that the Government considered hydroelectricity so important in the national interest that there was insufficient reason to change the status quo. Further, it was believed that the maximum control level was within the bounds of what had been natural in any case. The question of whether a more natural seasonal rhythm could be restored without compromising power generation does not appear to have been considered.\textsuperscript{424}

The alternative advocated by Tuwharetoa, therefore, was not accepted, and the maximum control level remained unchanged through the 1950s. The Government turned from an overall remedy (restoring a lower lake level and more natural, seasonal levels) to a mix of remedy (flood protection) and redress (compensation for damage). Claims came in during 1945 and 1946, and a compensation process was established with a special Compensation Court that sat and made awards in 1947. Major flood damage occurred in 1952, 1957 and 1958: more claims were made and compensation was paid.\textsuperscript{425} We turn now to the
question of whether the primary 1947 compensation process provided either effective remedy or effective redress for the impacts described above.

**The Crown sets up a compensation process:** In 1944, the Government began the compensation process by enacting section 34 of the Finance (No 3) Act, which established a special court to hear claims relating to the taking or injurious affection of land arising from the installation of the control gates and the raising of the lake. A special court was necessary to combine (predominantly) Maori-owned and Pakeha-owned land in one process. As we described in chapter 12, Maori and general land were normally subject to different processes and courts. The special court would look at both, with the Chief Justice or a Supreme Court judge and the Chief Judge or a judge of the Native Land Court as its members.

Some 400 claims for compensation were received during the 16-month period following the passing of the Finance (No 3) Act 1944. The claims were for lands affected by the public works and ranged from £5 to £33,000. The Minister of Works was concerned that ‘damages are being sought not only for lands which are said to be inundated but also for lands lying at various higher levels which are stated to be affected by raising of the sub-surface water’. This became a key issue for the process and remains so for the claim issues raised before this Tribunal. As the Crown argued, its lawyers reached an agreement with the claimants’ lawyers in 1947 that the maximum control level of the lake should be taken as 1177 feet. This level was then set in stone by legislation (the Lake Taupo Compensation Claims Act 1947). Any setting of a higher level in the future had to be gazetted and compensated. The claimants in our inquiry argue that the 1177-feet figure was a cut-off one for lands affected and that damage to land above that level was not compensated. This, they maintain, ignored the serious effects of raising the groundwater levels and turning prime farm land (above 1177 feet) into swamp. We turn now to address that question.

**Was compensation limited to claims for damage below 1177 feet?** The claimants based their argument on the evidence of their historian, Mr Walzl, who argued that the Government refused to accept any liability for damage to land above the 1177-feet level. After reviewing the documents cited by Mr Walzl, it is our view that this is not correct. The Government was aware of the problems of waterlogged land above its maximum control level. Its officials accepted that land below 1177 feet: must for the future be regarded as virtually sterilized – ie available for little but rough grazing at irregular periods the occasions and lengths of which will not be known in advance so as to enable a regular farm programme for their use to be adopted. Such lands, the Crown solicitor concluded, would never again be usable for buildings or agriculture. Above that level, however, there had been occasional flooding but also, more importantly, there were lands ‘which are stated to be affected by raising of the sub-surface water’.

The Crown solicitor instructed the Government’s valuers to consider the situation of land between 1177 and 1178 feet, which might be subject to flooding. He also asked them to evaluate the effects of the 1177-feet level on land above it in terms of creating or aggravating bogginess, damage from the raising of the water table, and drainage. Many of the claims lodged with the special Compensation Court related to land above the 1177-feet mark.

Some of the claims filed in the 1940s, however, were based on actual or potential damage from an idea that the lake had been controlled at its maximum possible level (1179 feet). We accept the evidence that the functional level of the lake in the 1940s was 1177 feet. The claimants’ and Crown’s lawyers agreed at the time on a 1177-feet figure and that any higher levels in future would need to
be notified and compensated. This agreement was based on the Government’s information to the claimants that it had controlled the lake at that level. The claimants in our inquiry state that 163 claims (for £42,246) had to be withdrawn as a result. Those claims were based on calculations of damage that had (or would have) arisen from a lake level of 1179 feet.\footnote{We lack information on the nature and extent of those claims but, on the face of it, they cannot all have been valid because the lake was not actually controlled at that level.}

Nonetheless, heavy weather during the period did take the lake above 1177 feet – the system was designed to hold and retain this additional water. The graphs show that there were a number of such events in the 1940s (see figures 18.2 and 18.3). It seems to us, therefore, that it may have been unfair to rule out all claims for damage just because the lake was not deliberately kept above 1177 feet. Keeping it at the maximum control level left Maori landowners at the mercy of the weather, in a way that they would not have been if the lake had been controlled at a more natural (and seasonal) level.

It is clear, however, that the Compensation Court could (and did) consider claims for damage to land abutting the lake, based on the lake having been kept for sustained periods at a level of 1177 feet. In doing so, it was not limited to considering damage below the 1177-feet mark. How far the waterlogged state of land – and damage – above that level was actually caused by keeping the lake so high was something that then had to be proven to the court. Due to a lack of evidence before us (especially about the out-of-court agreements), we do not know to what extent high groundwater levels and flooding over the 1177-feet level were actually taken into account in the compensation arrangements that followed.

**What other parameters were set for assessing compensation and were they reasonable in the circumstances?** The claimants argued that:

compensation was assessed according to land valuations, without any account being taken of its spiritual or cultural value, or the impact on geothermal springs or rivers, and without considering the impact on a way of life.\footnote{At first, the Finance (No 3) Act 1944 set up a compensation process that, although it had a special court, was limited to considering the usual kinds of ‘injurious affection’ contemplated in the public works legislation (see chapter 12). This limited the court to calculating any diminishment in value of the land affected. Other kinds of damage and harm could not be considered.\footnote{The Native Department was rightly concerned about this situation. The under-secretary advised his Minister that ‘Maoris will suffer a great deal of loss which could not be awarded to them as compensation on the principles mentioned.’\footnote{This included various kinds of personal damages, such as lost commercial opportunities. In particular, considering the claimants’ argument, the department was concerned about the loss of geothermal features, losses to the community that could not be encompassed by the title system, and the loss of vital historical and cultural associations with ancestral lands and taonga.}

First, there was the example of the loss of a house at the highly-prized ancestral settlement of Tokaanu, which could not be compensated just by providing a house somewhere else:

Even if the Government gives him [a Tokaanu homeowner], as it will be submitted it should, the freehold of his new house, subject to his paying now or over a period of years the difference in value between the new and the old house, he may lose a very great deal. The Maori has a great attachment to his land. It has belonged to his people, his hapu, or his family for generations. It is his and the compulsory taking of his home...}
removes from him all the traditions and loyalties belonging to his home.\textsuperscript{439}

Secondly, there was the loss of hot pools at Waihi ‘apparently irremediably’, which was a ‘communal loss, but the principle would compensate only the owners of the particular piece of land, and as owners of that land’.\textsuperscript{440} In other words, the individualised title system would not allow for the proper compensation of communal rights (see chapter 8). Also, individual owners of the titles could only be compensated for land, not for loss of the hot pools.

The Public Works Department did not agree. It opposed ‘claims of a personal nature’ and missed the point entirely about the claimants’ way of life and the historical and cultural value of land and hot pools injuriously affected. ‘I can see little distinction,’ wrote the under-secretary with regard to the Tokaanu housing example, ‘between the Native claims in respect of the dwellinghouses and the claims of a European on the same account.’\textsuperscript{441} Nor could he see why communal losses could not be compensated under the ordinary system. Acting on the Native Department’s concerns was ‘unnecessary’ and would create an unfortunate precedent.\textsuperscript{442}

Nonetheless, the Native Department’s views indicate that the Crown was aware in the 1940s of the issues that have led to today’s claim before this Tribunal: that its compensation failed to take proper account of geothermal features, cultural and spiritual elements, and harm to the claimants’ way of life. That knowledge was not limited to the Native Department and its Minister. From other statements and actions regarding Waihi and Tokaanu in the 1940s, the Government of the day was clearly capable both of understanding Maori concerns about the vital importance of their communal hot pools and their historical and cultural associations with their ancestral land, and of taking them into account when trying to rectify problems from raising the lake levels. The claimants themselves, in meetings with officials and ministers, as well as with Maori members of the Government such as Eruera Tirikatene, kept raising these matters and getting at least some attention and response to them.\textsuperscript{443}

In those circumstances, the Government of the 1940s should have been capable of acknowledging and taking such matters into account when setting parameters for compensation. If they failed to do so, it was unreasonable in the circumstances and in breach of the Treaty.

Given its knowledge of matters at Waihi and Tokaanu, and the advice of the Native Department cited above, the creation of the special Compensation Court was an opportunity for the Government to step outside the normal public works process and set up a Treaty-compliant process. The Native Department won some success in 1945, when section 36 of the Finance (No 2) Act extended the right of compensation:

\begin{quote}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textit{a person shall be deemed to have been injuriously affected by reason of the aforesaid acts within the meaning of this subsection if he has suffered an injury by reason of anything which would have been a tort if it had been done without statutory authority.}\textsuperscript{444}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{quote}

The Native Minister was concerned that the court might interpret this section too narrowly and he warned the Minister of Works that the legislation would be amended to ‘give effect to the real intention of the Government’ if that happened.\textsuperscript{445} Everything then depended on whether this amendment would in fact meet the Native Department’s concerns, and how the court applied its jurisdiction in evaluating the claims.

\textbf{Was the compensation process and its outcome fair in the circumstances and compliant with the Treaty?} The claimants’ position is that they received £38,500 in damages and £67,575 in negotiated settlements. This represented a payment of £106,075 out of an initial claim for £380,000, with a shortfall of £269,898.\textsuperscript{446} There are some problems with these figures. First, the amount of £38,500 was an
error in a Maori Land Board document, reproduced in Mr Walzl’s report.\textsuperscript{447} The correct figure is £35,800.\textsuperscript{448} Secondly, that sum is the total amount of compensation awarded by the court and agreed in out-of-court settlements. The court awarded £15,994 in damages, and it recorded negotiated agreements to the amount of £19,824, which together made up the ‘approximate’ total of £35,800 in compensation. In its decision, the court noted that negotiated settlements had reduced the amounts claimed by £67,575, the figure which Ms Feint mistakenly believed to have been awarded.\textsuperscript{449}

Thirdly, the exact sum claimed initially is unclear. Ms Feint cited the figure of £380,000, which came from a 1947 memorandum by the Minister of Works.\textsuperscript{550} In Parliament, Thomas Bloodworth suggested that that figure was an estimate of what the claims might be worth if paid in full, a suggestion that was not contradicted by the Government.\textsuperscript{451} In September 1947, the Chief Land Purchase Officer stated that there were 389 claims from Maori, involving roughly 28,000 acres and claiming £269,766.\textsuperscript{452} We rely on the thinking of the time that, if paid in full, the claims could have been worth around £380,000. The actual compensation, at about one-tenth of that figure, raises questions about the fairness of the outcome.

Unfortunately, we lack comprehensive evidence on how the court arrived at its awards, how and why it rejected certain claims, and the basis of agreement between the parties in their out-of-court settlements. This makes it difficult for us to comment on the fairness of the process or its outcomes. Why, for example, did the Native Affairs Board lodge a claim for £19,632 in respect of the Tokaanu development scheme and settle it out of court for £5360? The original claim was on the basis that land had, or would, become unsuitable for farming if the lake was held at the incorrect 1179-feet level.\textsuperscript{453} Does that explain the massive reduction in the amount agreed? Or were other factors at work? We have no way of knowing.

In terms of how the court interpreted its jurisdiction, it appears from the available evidence that it concentrated mainly on damage to farm land, loss of access, drainage, and future prospects of subdivision for commercial development.\textsuperscript{454} According to the Crown solicitor in the case, Mr A Currie, personal damages (possible under the Finance (No 2) Act 1945) were only awarded once, for claim 382. Otherwise, the court concentrated on damage to land.\textsuperscript{455} Claim 382 was made by Barnett Otene for £562, for loss of stock and boats when ‘water was let flow from the control gates without warning.’\textsuperscript{456} The claim was settled by agreement between the parties for £360.\textsuperscript{457} If Currie was correct, then the Native Department’s amendment had had almost no effect, and the intention of the Government was in fact defeated.

In terms of geothermal features, the court examined evidence and decided:

\begin{itemize}
  \item some differences of opinion have been shown to exist as to the effect, if any, the raising of the lake level has had on sites of thermal activity, but on the evidence the Court is not justified in attributing to the rise in the lake level the variations in thermal activity which have been described and which are common in other districts of thermal activity.\textsuperscript{458}
\end{itemize}

We do not have the evidence on which the court relied in coming to this decision. In his closing submission, the Crown solicitor argued that the issue was one of commercial value. Had the hot springs and geyser potential for commercialisation? The answer, in his view, was ‘no’. They were used for cooking (and, presumably, other personal uses) but that was neither here nor there. In any case:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Apparently thermal activity moves from spot to spot and from pool to pool. The outlets get blocked and break out in fresh places . . . The actual pools come and go. The thermal activity is there all the time and can be achieved by boring, but no one at Tokaanu has shown any wish to put down a bore, but are content to follow the hot water from pool to pool.\textsuperscript{459}
\end{itemize}

The claimants’ solicitor argued that the Tokaanu hot pools were used by the community for cooking. The geyser was a valuable tourist attraction that had played every 15 minutes until the lake level was raised, and it had not played since.\textsuperscript{460} The court appears to have accepted the
Crown's arguments, although we have no information as to the reason.

The claimants in our inquiry are adamant that many remarkable and specific surface manifestations, in the form of hot pools and springs, were damaged or destroyed by the raising of the lake. Such also was the view of the Native Department and Public Works Department at the time. Both departments accepted, for example, that compensation was due for the lost hot pools at Waihi. As a result of the court's decision, the claim about the destruction of the only geyser at Tokaanu (for example) was rejected, despite the Government's acceptance beforehand that geothermal features at that township had been damaged.

Although we do not know exactly what the court of 1947 was relying on, the evidence available to us is that geothermal features were in fact changed (in some cases permanently) by the raising of the lake over such a long and intense period. Chris Bromley of the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences submitted that changes in lake levels affect lakeshore and nearby hot springs, geysers, and other such features through inundation, erosion, and rises in groundwater. Such changes can be permanent, even if lake levels revert to their original state. Charlotte Severne's evidence was to the same effect, although she noted that higher lake levels could improve as well as damage some springs. Mr Hamilton accepted their expertise and concluded that hot springs were affected by the raising of the lake, especially during the sustained high levels of the 1940s. The Crown did not refute this evidence. Brett O'Shaughnessy, for Environment Bay of Plenty, accepted under cross-examination that if new geothermal features spring up elsewhere, that does not negate the loss of special hot pools and taonga to Maori. We agree. Compensation was certainly due for the loss of such taonga and the impact of their loss on the claimants' culture, heritage, and way of life.

It is also clear, from the evidence available to us, that the Native Department concerns of 1944 were well founded. There is no suggestion, from any of the records about the compensation and the reasons for its award, that the impact on communities rather than individual title-owners was considered, or that any account was taken of the cultural and historical significance of land and places. This was a major flaw in the process and helps to account for the very small amount of damages awarded.

Finally, we note questions about the nature of the compensation and its effectiveness. Many awards were based not on compensating for damage but on prevention or rectification of damage. They were earmarked for the moving of buildings, facilities for drainage, building protective walls, and other such activities. It was noted at the time that the court only had power to award money as compensation, so its stipulations as to how that money should be spent (even where it was noting agreements between parties) were of no legal effect. The money was paid first to Maori land boards, not claimants. We have no comprehensive evidence on its ultimate fate. The available evidence suggests that some of it was held by the boards for many years, that some awards were too low to pay for the recommended protective works (which were not done), and that some of it was paid out to individuals. Terry Hearn suggests that the Maori Land Court had to get involved, titles had to be sorted out, and sums for survey liens and rates arrears deducted, before individual owners got payments. Awards on the development scheme blocks were divided between owners and the Native Department. We are not able to gauge the results with any certainty.

The Crown argued that there is no evidence of any discrimination between Maori (the great majority affected) and Pakeha. The Crown also submitted:

In relation to the 1947 compensation commission Mr McBurney is of the view that the majority of the money was paid to Maori land owners. He is not aware of what proportion of the money was paid to Maori owners in 1960.

In summary considering the compensation for the lake levels Mr McBurney considers that the Crown responded in an appropriate manner to the claims for damage with regards to lake levels. McBurney considers that the compensation process followed the due process procedure.
We have reviewed the evidence on which this submission is based. First, the Crown's argument that Peter McBurney believed that a majority of the money was paid out to the owners is based on the following cross-examination:

McKechnie  In relation to the 1947 compensation, are you aware of how much of that was paid to Maori landowners?
McBurney  In relation to which?
McKechnie  The ’47 compensation.
McBurney  No. But I think the feeling I had was that there was a majority of Maori landowners. Hmm.

We do not consider that this exchange can support any certainty that the majority of money was paid to the owners. Mr McBurney’s report does not come to this conclusion.

Secondly, the Crown relied on Mr McBurney’s evidence to conclude that it responded appropriately to claims for damages, both in terms of compensation and in terms of following due process. In his report, Mr McBurney states that the payment of compensation followed due process and was appropriate and ‘substantial’ – but still only, by his calculation, 25 per cent of what had been claimed. Sometimes, however, even due process failed to arrive at a fair result.

We agree with the Crown’s submission that due process was followed, although we are not sure of the extent to which Tuwharetoa were actually in control of their own case. They appear to have received a fair hearing. The Compensation Court followed proper procedure, but it may not have interpreted its jurisdiction entirely correctly. We note the Crown solicitor’s view that its section 36 jurisdiction was only applied to one claim out of some 380. We also note the legal tangle left in its wake, where some of its decisions related to land blocks rather than owners, some required works that it did not have authority to order, and all had to be carried out by Maori land boards unsure of their exact responsibilities. There is no suggestion, however, that the claimants were treated unfairly by the court. It simply failed, as the Native Department feared it would, to give weight to (and pay compensation for) matters of great spiritual and cultural significance to the claimants. The legislation governing jurisdiction should have explicitly provided for this. In that respect, Tuwharetoa’s claim before this Tribunal is well founded.

**What was the economic impact on Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga?** The claimants argue that farm land immediately abutting the lake was damaged or rendered unusable, while more distant land became waterlogged and (to an extent) unusable. This had a disproportionate effect on them because their settlements, kainga, best agricultural lands, and (as a result) many of their wahi tapu, were close to the lake shore. The Native Department at the time confirmed that not all things were equal and that Tuwharetoa could not simply substitute other, less rich, less valued, less historic, and fundamentally less useful land for what had been lost or impaired. This very matter, the under-secretary informed the Minister, must be able to be taken into account in arranging compensation and alternative sites of residence. We do not have the full minutes and proceedings of the Compensation Court on our inquiry record, and we lack technical evidence and interpretation on how far, in economic terms, the compensation (or protective works) provided fair redress.

The economic impact was greatest on two fronts: first, much prized crop-growing land necessary for the subsistence economy was either lost or damaged; and secondly, the land development schemes necessary for Tuwharetoa’s development in the western economy were seriously affected. For both points, we have observations from officials and tribal leaders of the time, the evidence of tangata whenua witnesses in our inquiry, and the findings of the 1947 compensation inquiry. The court held in 1947 that the raising of the lake, with consequent ‘banking up of streams leading into the lake’, had caused inundation, erosion of lake shores and river banks, and impeded drainage so as to ‘convert otherwise dry land into damp or boggy areas’. This had been shown to have affected ‘large farming areas’ in the development schemes, the Crown had...
acknowledged it, and the claims had been settled. The effects on farm land were not, in the court's view, a matter of major contest. Rather, the parties differed on how far potential residential and camp sites had been affected, and whether geothermal features had been changed as a result of raising the lake.  

In our view, this is decisive. As Ms Feint noted, both tribal leaders and the Native Department explained the problems with cogency. She cited the chairman of the Waihi Pah Committee, Wiri Mariu, who wrote to the Minister of Works in 1945:

Taking the majority of the Tuwharetoa Tribe living around the lake, their cropping lands are under water or rendered useless, and has interfered greatly with the means of living and has to depend on buying potatoes when they can due to shortage at the present time, and that is an unknown thing here before the lake was interfered with.

In 1944, the Under-Secretary of the Native Department observed with regard to Waitahanui:

At Waitahanui the whole of the agricultural and grazing land of the Maoris has been soured and rendered useless. The principle wanted by the Public Works Department [compensation for diminished value] would probably give the full value of that land, but would allow nothing for the fact that the Maoris have no similar area in the district, can obtain no similar area because there is not one, and for some years have had to and for all time will have to purchase vegetables, milk &c. at considerable cost and inconvenience from Taupo.

The Crown’s challenge to this evidence was mainly that there was natural flooding before 1941 and these lands must, therefore, have been more marginal than the claimants would have us believe. The historical evidence is clear, however, that Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga were able to maintain their traditional lifestyle around the lake before 1941. The keeping of the lake at a sustained high level from 1941 to 1947 changed this position and had immediate as well as long-term effects. The Crown conceded that the lake was kept at high levels on a fairly sustained basis for 30 years (through to the end of the 1960s). The ability for land to really start recovering – or at least to be available for salvaging – must surely have been, by the Crown's own reasoning, very restricted before the 1970s. The evidence of Stephen Asher suggests that families had to leave their farms and did not return, and that clearing the scrub and draining the land again was simply not economic.

After reviewing the evidence, we accept the submission of Ms Feint:

The land represented future opportunity as well, and when it was rendered unproductive, any possibility of future development was ruled out. Some of the land affected was already under development schemes, but was abandoned and is now considered uneconomic to develop. The loss of an ability to sustain the communities through the loss of land is likely to have been a contributing factor in the drift of outward migration from this period onwards. In cross-examination, Walzl drew the link with the outflow of Tuwharetoa from the rohe, noting that according to Pool & Sceats there was disproportionate migration in this period, as Tuwharetoa people were forced off their lands and into the cash economy, where they went to the towns and cities to find work. This outflow of the iwi’s most precious resource – people – would in turn have undermined the social and cultural fabric of nga hapu o Ngati Tuwharetoa.

Were there mitigating factors? The events described here would have resulted in more severe hardship for Tuwharetoa, in the 1940s and 1950s especially, but for the employment opportunities that opened up in the cities, in hydroelectric construction, and in forestry. John Martin notes that Maori were employed in substantial numbers in central North Island hydro projects.

Many Maori families, and many young men and young women, migrated out of the rural areas surrounding Lake Taupo during these decades. The environmental damage was felt immediately, but the economic flow-on effects were perhaps mitigated until the 1980s, when significant numbers of Tuwharetoa outmigrants became unemployed.
in the wake of restructuring. Their agricultural lands, abandoned in the 1940s and 1950s, were not there for them to fall back on. In social and cultural terms, however, communities were profoundly affected, their relationship with their ancestral land and taonga damaged, their viability weakened, and their ability to farm some of their better quality land was compromised. Even if there were jobs available elsewhere, this does not lessen the Treaty breach or the prejudice suffered as a result.

**The Tribunal’s findings**

It was not inevitable that the use of Lake Taupo for hydroelectricity would become a question of compensation for damage. Tuwharetoa accepted that hydroelectricity was a matter of national importance, but considered their own communities and their potential contribution to the farming economy to have the same weight. They sought a way (which the Government had not sought in 1939) to use the Taupo waters to the same effect for electricity without having to raise and keep the lake at the maximum control level. Engineers proposed various solutions, which the Government rejected as uneconomic and possibly harmful to other interests. We are not satisfied that what the Minister of Internal Affairs called the tribe’s ‘constructive idea’ was given due consideration. Nonetheless, alternatives to raising the lake were not accepted, so it became a matter of limiting or rectifying damage and paying compensation. In the absence of detailed technical evidence on the merits of the different schemes proposed in the 1940s, we make no finding of Treaty breach in respect of the Government’s rejection of them.

As noted above, we are unable to say with any certainty exactly what happened to the compensation and the proposed remedial work, nor to determine whether the payment of a mere £35,800 was fair in terms of the immediate damages suffered. In our preliminary view, the payment was far too low in comparison with what was being claimed, with what those claims were probably worth in 1947, and with what the Government was making from the use of Tuwharetoa’s taonga. We note the view of both the Native Department and Mr Bloodworth, in the Legislative Council, that the Government’s profit from using the Taupo waters was far in excess of what was being claimed in compensation for the damage it had caused. Mr Bloodworth pointed out that the Government was saving enormous amounts of money and coal by using Lake Taupo, while the department noted the Crown’s profit on top of that:

> It should also be remembered that the increased revenue obtained – by the Government from controlling the Lake is said to approximate £800,000 per annum. It is suggested that in these circumstances compensation should be full and adequate as promised by the Prime Minister, and that personal damage satisfactorily proven to the special Court should be compensated. 

In other words, the Government could afford to be fair and even to be generous. In our preliminary view, it was not.

We also find the Crown in breach of the Treaty for not ensuring that the court gave full compensation for personal damages, despite its intention (in the Finance (No 2) Act 1945) that it do so.

Ultimately, compensation and protective works (if the former actually reached its intended recipients and if the latter were actually carried out) were not sufficient remedy or redress. Significant parts of the claimants’ most valued, better-quality farm land was compromised beyond their ability to rectify it. Families had to abandon their farms; the tribe and its communities around the lake were weakened; and jobs elsewhere did not really make up for that. The Treaty guaranteed the right of Maori to maintain their traditional lifestyle, to engage fully in the Pakeha farming economy, or to do both and walk in two worlds. Because Tuwharetoa’s southern development schemes and better arable land were so close to the lake shore, their ability to benefit from this Treaty principle of options was foreclosed by the Crown’s decision to raise the lake level and keep it high for long and sustained periods. They suffered significant social and economic harm as a result. Part of the tragedy is that this was avoidable; the lake has not been kept so
high since the 1980s, and the consensus of expert evidence is that it never needed to be in the first place.

We find, too, that geothermal features ought to have been included in the compensation but were not. We find the Crown in breach of the principles of the Treaty for not rectifying the court’s award on that point.

In addition, we find that the Crown knew of, should have compensated, and should have taken special care to remedy where possible the harm to Tuwharetoa in respect of the enormous spiritual and cultural value to them of their ancestral land, wahi tapu, and taonga. We find that the Crown was aware of damage to Maori communal rights and practices, to Maori communities and their livelihoods, and ultimately to their whole way of life. In failing to compensate for those kinds of harm, and in failing to remove or rectify the cause of that prejudice, the Crown breached the principles of the Treaty.

Overall, the Crown’s acts of omission were unreasonable in the circumstances and in breach of the Treaty principles of partnership, reciprocity, active protection, and options. The claimants have suffered significant prejudice.

What further impact did the Crown’s control of lake levels have after the 1940s?

The parties’ cases

Claimants and the Crown did not make detailed submissions on the post-1940s effects of controlling the level of the lake. Broadly, they agreed that the facts are as follows:

- Lake levels were maintained at a higher than natural level for most of the time, including out of season, from the 1940s to 1971.
- Lake levels have been held at a fairly natural level since 1987.\(^{489}\)

The main difference between the parties is the claimants’ contention that the damage inflicted in the 1940s was long-term and, in effect, permanent, because they were not in a position to do anything about it when (or if) land became recoverable.\(^{490}\) The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that any effects of flooding or a higher water table have ‘long since abated’.\(^{491}\)

Also, the parties disagree about the second round of compensation in the 1960s, which occurred as a result of fresh flooding. The Crown argued that the compensation was fair and sufficient to cover all
damage to property, but that there is insufficient evidence to determine whether it was actually paid to the intended recipients.\textsuperscript{492} The claimants contended that the compensation was for exceptional flooding, not for the continued holding of the lake at an unnaturally high level both for sustained periods of the year and for decades. That, they argued, has never been compensated. Ngati Tuwharetoa have never been compensated for the true value of their land in a cultural – let alone an economic – sense, and nor has their loss of wahi tapu ever been remedied. In their view, the damage to their way of life has been significant and remains so to this day, without compensation.\textsuperscript{493}

\textit{The Tribunal’s analysis}

In our view, the damage was greatest, and the losses sustained by the claimants were most acute, during the period 1941 to 1946, but the impacts did not end there. The evidence relating to the actions of the Crown between the 1950s and the 1980s, however, is sparse compared to that presented to us for the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Nevertheless, we do have detailed data series on lake levels, some important simulations, and commentaries on these by Mr Freestone, referred to above and reproduced in figure 18.2. Figure 18.7, also provided by Mr Freestone, is a useful supplement to figure 18.2, as we focus on lake levels and the decisions and actions that were important during the extended period of operation from 1946 through to the present day. Figure 18.7 plots lake levels from 1905 to 2000 and adds, for convenient reference, the maximum and minimum control levels.\textsuperscript{494}

\textit{Was the 1960 compensation full and fair in the circumstances?} In the Government’s view, all compensation for keeping the lake at 1177 feet was completed in the 1940s. Only exceptional flooding, taking the lake above the maximum control level, required fresh compensation. A combination of high lake levels and floods in 1952, 1956, and 1958 did in fact result in more damage to lands and property and further rounds of compensation claims. The Compensation Court of 1960, however, confined claims to the 6½ months in 1956 and 1957 in which the Government had kept the lake above the maximum control level.\textsuperscript{495}

Some of the facts about the resultant compensation are established in the reports of Mr Walzl and Mr McBurney. There were 266 claims for a value of £146,016, which was reduced to £95,549 at the hearings in 1960. The total compensation awarded (including claims settled by agreement) was £28,651. Of that sum, £4,651 was interest payable on damage dating back to 1956, so that the compensation itself was only some £24,000.\textsuperscript{496} The money was paid to the Maori Trustee for distribution to the owners, minus £822 paid directly to lessees. The Maori Trustee deducted £5021 for costs and expenses. A further £292 was deducted for payment to two European claimants.\textsuperscript{497} In addition, the claimants’ costs were ‘very heavy’ (in the view of the Crown’s solicitor), due to the number of claims (and witnesses), the cost of surveys for evidence, and the legal fees. The court awarded them costs of £5000, which left a claimed shortfall of £6000.\textsuperscript{498} Assuming that that shortfall had to be paid directly or indirectly from the compensation, this means that the Maori owners received as little as £16,516 (just over 10 per cent of their original claim). The Crown’s land purchase officer thought this a ‘satisfactory’ result for the Government.\textsuperscript{499} As Crown counsel noted in our inquiry, however, we cannot be sure that this sum eventually made it from the Maori Trustee to the correct people.\textsuperscript{500} Stephen Asher’s evidence was that his whanau did eventually receive their compensation, years too late to save their dairy farm.\textsuperscript{501}

According to the court, the explanation for the disparity between the amount claimed (£146,016) and that awarded (£28,651) was the nature of the claims themselves. First, according to a strictly economic view of land (by which standard the court judged it), the land was not very valuable even before it was flooded or made swampy. Secondly, many of the claims were actually for unremedied damage from the lake having been at the 1947 maximum control level, or from river flooding, or from the claimants’ ‘own neglect’ to fix or clear drains and to drain affected areas. The court blamed the failure to rehabilitate lands in part
on the Maori owners or occupiers for having done ‘little to help themselves’ but also on the Government’s failure to monitor the situation or to provide technical assistance and advice. The Government does not appear to have acted on the court’s view that it should be providing technical assistance to Maori. From the evidence available to us, high groundwater levels would have persisted anyway, for at least a decade after the court’s decision, making rehabilitation of the land difficult.

In the language of the day, the Lake Taupo Control Compensation Court was expressing the Crown’s Treaty duty of active protection. It called for greater ‘supervision’ of Maori farmers to ensure that the necessary drainage was carried out, and for the Government to provide both technical expertise and assistance to ensure that it could actually be done. Further, the Crown’s solicitor in the case advised the Government to take a more proactive role. He suggested that much closer monitoring of lake levels was possible and that Maori should be assisted and compensated on the spot, instead of both sides having to await lengthy and expensive litigation. Ever since 1947, he argued, officials must have known what land and people were likely to be affected by raising the lake further, and what the effects were likely to have been.

The Ministry of Works’ response to this advice was that it was na""ive. First, the Commissioner of Works argued that not all the effects of raising the lake (or of flooding) could be foreseen. He agreed that ‘some good purpose might have been served’ if engineers and valuers had inspected the properties and damage while the lake level was actually above the maximum, but dismissed it as a waste of their valuable time. It was better to wait and see what claims would actually be made by the owners. Secondly, 260 of the 266 claims had related to Maori land in multiple ownership. In a damning indictment of the Crown’s title system (which we have discussed in detail in part III), he argued that this fact alone made it ‘quite impracticable to settle most of these claims by negotiations either before or after the claims were received’. To save itself the bother, the commissioner suggested that, if the lake ever had to be raised above the maximum level again, the Government should just keep it there and compensation should be paid once and for all. Unofficially, it was noted that, given the enormous disparity between the original claims and the amount eventually paid, it was much better for the Crown to wait and battle it out in court.

We do not have sufficient evidence to determine whether a fair process or a fair outcome was achieved in terms of compensating Maori owners of particular properties in 1960. We are not in a position to determine whether immediate damage to their property was fairly compensated. We note, however, that our findings for the 1940s compensation also apply to this second round, in so far as the 1960s compensation did not cover the full cultural and spiritual impact of loss of wahi tapu and of ancestral land. The 1960 court judged the affected land as follows: ‘in most cases where land is now claimed to be valueless or of little value, it probably had no great value before the 1956/57 raising of the lake’. This way of looking at the value of land was reflected in the low compensation awards it made. As we noted above, the Native Department in the 1940s had been very concerned that the unique value of this ancestral land to Taupo Maori would not be taken into account in compensation. The department’s concerns were justified, equally in 1960 as in 1947. In our preliminary view, low compensation (around 10 per cent of what had been claimed), based on a narrow, Eurocentric valuation, was both a known risk (and therefore avoidable) and inconsistent with the Treaty.

The claimants’ view of the value to them of their land, and the uselessness of swapping it for monetary compensation, had been reiterated to the Government in 1957. Concerned that the lake levels might be raised even further by diverting rivers into Lake Taupo for that purpose, 164 members of Ngati Tuwharetoa petitioned the Crown:

Our principal settlements, housing sites and cultiva""tions are situated along the edges of Lake Taupo so that any further raising of the Lake Levels will deprive us of much if not all of such amenities. . . . If these are lost to us no amount of
compensation will make good such loss as our lands are more important to us and our coming generations than money which [can] be frittered away. . . . We have lost enough lands through the original raising of the Lake Levels so that we are definitely opposed to losing any further lands.\textsuperscript{509}

Finally, we note that Stephen Asher gave us an important example of how land which is now technically recoverable is still overgrown with scrub, inaccessible, and needs active draining before the effects of the 1950s flooding can be rectified, even if the water table is no longer so high.\textsuperscript{510}

\textbf{Was the lake still controlled at a high level after the 1940s?} A number of factors converged in the late 1950s and 1960s to encourage more careful research and investigation into optimum systems for the management of active storage of water in Lake Taupo. By 1958, when there was a major flood, the New Zealand Electricity Department (NZED) had a very large investment in dams and generating equipment on the Waikato River. The flood triggered a review and report, and the report made officials aware of the need for flood management schemes.\textsuperscript{511} Around the same time, plans were being drawn up to divert the headwaters of
the Rangitikei, Whangaehu, and Whanganui catchments into the Lake Taupo catchment. Designed to increase the capacity of the Waikato power stations, the Tongariro Power Development scheme (TPD) posed challenges in terms of water control and water management and triggered more intensive hydrological research. Within NZED, new engineering skills were developed to plan new generating plants and integrate the various components of the national electricity supply system. As each new power station was planned – be it coal fired, gas fired, geothermal, or hydroelectric – there was a reassessment of which stations would be base load facilities and which would be used to meet peak demand at particular times of the day and particular seasons of the year. Large data banks were built up and NZED specialists were able to engage in comprehensive monitoring and systems analysis. The role of hydroelectric power could now be considered in the context of overall generating capacity.

The primary objectives in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were to maximise the benefits from water and minimise the risks to plant and equipment. Flood control schemes, for example, were implemented in 1961 and refined in 1975. Mr Freestone comments that ‘the rules were developed from extensive computer modelling and were tested using real hydrological data’. The primary object was to ensure the safety of the dams and hydraulic structures within the Waikato River system. The secondary objective, to be achieved if possible, was downstream flood relief. No evidence has been presented to us of consultation with Maori or consideration of environmental effects on Lake Taupo or its surrounds.

The construction of the TPD was carried out between 1964 and 1983. The scheme diverts water from a number of rivers draining the slopes of Mount Tongariro, through a series of canals and a power station, into Lake Rotoaira. From there, it passes through the Tokaanu Power Station into the south end of Lake Taupo. Power is generated at Rangipo and Tokaanu, but the primary intent of the diversions is to generate additional power in each of the stations on the Waikato River. The diversions have the capacity to increase the flow of water into Lake Taupo by some 30 cubic metres per second, which is equivalent to some 19 per cent of the average inflow into Lake Taupo. The diversions have increased the flow of water through Lake Taupo without raising the lake level. A Tongariro offset agreement, operational from 1977 onwards, includes provision to stop the flow of ‘foreign water’ into Lake Taupo whenever the lake level is in danger of rising to the maximum control level.

Substantial discussions were held with iwi, especially Ngati Tuwharetoa, in advance of construction, since the canals and the structures would impinge on Maori-owned land and the town of Turangi would be substantially enlarged to house construction facilities and workers. The impacts of these, and the nature of the discussions with iwi, are considered in detail in the Waitangi Tribunal’s Turangi Township Report 1995, Turangi Township Remedies Report, and Whanganui River Report, and are being addressed further in the National Park inquiry.

Within NZED during the 1960s, there were reassessments of the most appropriate maximum operating levels for the lake. Mr Freestone, in a summary diagram (reproduced here as figure 18.8) and in text discussion, provides important but partial insights. For reasons which are not reported, the maximum control level of 357.387 metres was replaced by ‘informal inhouse operating procedures that provided for constrained operation prior to that level being reached’. Questions can be posed, but we do not have evidence at this point: did NZED make this move in response to Maori concerns; or to minimise compensation claims; or to protect dams and structures on the Waikato River? We do not know the reasons, but we know from the evidence of Mr Freestone that the maximum operating level was lowered to 357.24 metres.

The major flood in February 1958 triggered a careful assessment of risks in relation to the seasonality of intense rainfall events. The hydrologists were aware that the two largest flood events, in February 1907 and February
1958, were related to tropical cyclones. From this it was assumed that the risks were greatest in summer and a split-level operating regime was introduced in November 1968. The maximum operating level would continue at 357.25 metres from April to December but would be lowered to 357.10 metres from January to March when the risk of tropical cyclones is greatest. A more recent flood event, in July 1998, was comparable in magnitude to the February floods of 1907 and 1958. The hydrologists reassessed the risks and the costs, and asked that the 2003 resource consent for the maximum operating level revert to a single level of 357.25 metres.

The importance of the two-step operating regime, which lasted from 1968 to 2003, is two-fold: on the one hand it demonstrated a willingness to adjust lake levels on the basis of scientific observation and analysis; on the other hand, for the period from November 1968 to August 2003, summer operating levels did not exceed 357.10 metres.

The combined effect of these adjustments (that is, the informal, in-house operating procedures, the flood rules, and the split-level operating maximum) can be seen in figures 18.2 and 18.8. Lake Taupo had become an increasingly controlled lake; yet, from the 1970s onwards, the controlled levels of the lake have been comparable in some ways to the natural levels the lake would have had, had there been no control gates and no enlargement of the lake outlet. Figure 18.2 does, however, remind us that the lake has been controlled closer to the maximum controlled level, and the capacity to lower the lake by means of the enlarged lake outlet has been under-utilised. The seasonality of the controlled regime remains an important feature.

The Tribunal’s findings

Fundamentally, we accept the evidence of our expert hydrologist, Mr Hamilton, and the agreement between the parties, that the lake was held unnaturally (and unseasonably) high for sustained periods, with subsequent flooding and waterlogging of land, between 1941 and 1971. The Government has held the lake at a more natural (though still controlled) level since 1987.

We also accept the claimants’ evidence that some of the effects of the flooding and the higher water table have been permanent, in economic, cultural, and spiritual senses. We have already found that, in the 1940s, geothermal taonga were destroyed, wahi tapu were damaged, destroyed, or rendered inaccessible, the tribe’s way of life was affected, and farmable land was rendered unusable. This situation was then exacerbated by the number of decades in which the lake was kept at high levels for sustained and unreasonable periods. Farmable land remained unusable for a long time as a result and now requires capital and active ‘rehabilitation’ to reverse the long-term effects of flooding and high groundwater.

The claimants’ evidence that they have suffered cultural, spiritual, and economic harm was only challenged by the Crown in terms of the latter point. We make no findings on whether compensation for flood damage to particular properties in the 1960s was adequate. We lack sufficient evidence on the point. Our broader finding – that the claimants suffered cultural, spiritual, and some economic harm that has never been compensated – stands. In many ways, as Tuwharetoa explained to the Crown in 1957, no monetary compensation would have been enough. The land was a taonga and some of it also contained wahi tapu and other taonga. Money ‘that can be frittered away’ was no substitute for the loss of those taonga. The Compensation Court’s judgement of the land as of ‘no great value’ before it became waterlogged was inappropriate and avoidable in the circumstances. Had the great cultural and spiritual value of their ancestral taonga been taken into account, we find that the court could never have awarded such low compensation to Ngati Tuwharetoa as it did in 1960. Both the Native Department (in the 1940s) and Ngati Tuwharetoa (in the 1950s) reminded the Government of the great value of this ancestral land to Taupo Maori. This advice was ignored. We find the Crown in breach of the Treaty principle of active protection.

Also, from the evidence available to us, the compensation was paid to the Maori Trustee for distribution to individual owners. In our view, compensation ought not
to have been made as payments to individuals that could be ‘frittered away’. Part of the compensation should have taken the form of a sizeable capital injection to remedy (as far as possible) the effects of keeping the lake too high. The Crown’s Treaty duty of active protection required it to – at the very least – have followed the advice of the Lake Taupo Compensation Court. It ought to have monitored the situation and provided assistance and technical advice to Maori, so that their land could be drained and rehabilitated where possible. In our view, the effectiveness of such assistance would have been limited by the long period at which the lake was kept unnecessarily high. Even so, had such assistance been provided to the Asher whanau, for example, they might not have needed to abandon their dairy farm.

Secondly, the Crown solicitor advised that the Government should act at once when it took the lake above the maximum control level, providing assistance and compensation on the spot. The fact that this could not be done because, in the Government’s view, its title system made it impossible to find or negotiate with the legal owners, demonstrates the serious prejudice to Taupo Maori arising from Treaty breaches identified in part III of this report. Here, we find the Crown in breach of the Treaty for failing to compensate Maori in such a manner that the core problem was actually remedied, despite advice at the time that it could have done so.

Further, in the claimants’ view, the whole situation was fundamentally unnecessary because the Crown could have pursued other policies that kept the lake level lower, without harming the national interest in electricity. We have already found that part of their claim to be well founded. The technical evidence is that the lake was held higher than necessary for the operation of the Arapuni power station in the 1940s and of the Waikato system as a whole from the 1950s onwards.

The claimants argued that they could have been better – if not fully – compensated for their loss in the 1940s and again in subsequent decades. We agree. The Treaty breaches of the 1940s were compounded by the ongoing failure to actively protect Tuwharetoa’s taonga and interests in subsequent decades, and by the failure to compensate them appropriately for avoidable losses.

**Did raising the lake levels affect the tributary rivers and the Waikato River?**

**Tributaries**

In terms of the tributary rivers, we received too little evidence for more than a very broad view to be reached. In his technical evidence, David Hamilton argued that holding the lake at high levels for sustained (and sometimes unreasonable) periods may have had the effect of reducing water flows and increasing siltation, which in turn would have resulted in rivers flooding. Finally, in his view, river flows would return to ‘normal’ when the lake was kept at more natural levels. Merle Ormsby of Ngati Hikairo gave evidence of just such an impact on the Tokaanu Stream, resulting in two forms of prejudice: first, her community lost their beach and the ability to collect kakahi; and, secondly, her whanau had to move off their farm. They received no compensation for either loss. Under cross-examination, Mr Hamilton agreed with counsel for Ngati Hikairo that the Tokaanu Stream would have been one of the tributaries affected by siltation and flooding as a result of the Crown’s control of lake levels. There were other contributing factors, such as the diversion of water for the TPD. In Mr Hamilton’s evidence, the Tokaanu Stream would gradually have adjusted to the now lower habitual lake level. In Mrs Ormsby’s evidence, her whanau’s land has not recovered.

**The Tribunal’s preliminary findings on tributaries**

Although we lack detailed and systematic evidence on the effects of raising Lake Taupo on its tributaries, and of how often and to what extent claimants were affected, we accept the generic point that flooding and waterlogging undoubtedly happened for a significant period of time. We also accept the Ngati Hikairo submission that the Tokaanu Stream is an example of how raising the lake level contributed to loss of (or damage to) their taonga. We make
preliminary findings that the Treaty principle of active protection, and the property guarantees of article 2, have been breached in respect of Lake Taupo’s tributaries. We are not in a position to determine the frequency or duration of the breach, other than to say that it must have been common during the period from 1941 to 1971. As with other problems arising from the Crown’s control of lake levels, it appears that there were long-term effects that now require active rehabilitation to correct (if they can now be corrected). We are not in a position to judge the degree of prejudice, without systematic evidence of particular events. Parties should discuss the specifics in their negotiations.

The Waikato River
The upper and middle portions of the Waikato River, from the lake outlet to Waipapa, are included in the Central North Island inquiry region. Two sorts of environmental impacts are potentially important: those relating to the control gates and the flows of water through Lake Taupo, and those relating to the construction of dams and the creation of artificial lakes in the Waikato valley. We deal with the first issue in this chapter.

The evidence brought to the Tribunal in relation to the Waikato River is less extensive than that relating to Lake Taupo. But we can say that there are two types of downriver impacts that we would identify: those relating to the creation of hydro lakes, and those resulting from changes in the river flow. The construction work involving dams, roads, and construction sites, and the dams and diversions themselves, had obvious physical and spiritual impacts on the landscape, the wahi tapu, and the wahi taonga.532

There is evidence, contained in the files of the Public Works Department and reported by Mr Walzl, that fluctuations in the flow of the Waikato River in the period following the completion of the control gates had impacts on farms and gardens downstream. In February 1952, for example, Mr J Teriki informed the Department of Public Works that his potato crop had sustained heavy damage because of flooding, which he linked to the operation of the control gates. Mr Werahiko, who lived close to the river at Ohaki Pa near Mihi Bridge, made a similar complaint: District Engineer Caldwell investigated, found the evidence was credible, and suggested compensation.533 Other examples, however, show that the significant modification of the river itself, rather than high lake levels, were to blame. These include the impacts on Ngati Whaoa, who point to the construction of the Ohakuri Dam which opened in 1961. As a result of those developments, Ngati Whaoa land at Te Paraki was affected by flooding, including the flooding of a sacred cave.534 There was evidence concerning Orakei Korako, where families were moved off land that was to have been submerged.535 This evidence was traversed at length by witnesses for claimants from Ngati Tahu and Ngati Whaoa.536 It was clear to us that the modification of the river has had more impact on the claimants than the control of lake levels.

Nonetheless, John McConchie, a geomorphologist from Victoria University, has provided Environment Waikato with a substantial report on the effects of hydroelectric operations on the Waikato River, which we have considered.537 Our conclusion, based on the hydrological evidence provided by Mr Freestone and Mr Hamilton, the historical
evidence contained in Mr Walzl’s report, and the research results and the arguments advanced by Dr McConchie, is this: there was, in the 1940s and the 1950s, a significant amount of flooding caused by ill-considered control of lake levels. This flooding impacted on the Waikato valley.538

As a result, during the period from 1940 to 1950 erosion processes were accelerated and small fertile areas of land close to the river were damaged because the river was badly regulated and lake levels were too high to allow for flood mitigation. Dr McConchie argues that: ‘Periods of erosion usually coincide with periods of spillage, when the dams cannot hold any more flood water’.539

By the 1970s, however, the Waikato River as a whole was a much more controlled system and flood mitigation measures were in place. The risks of erosion and flooding in the controlled situation were less than they had been prior to 1941 and considerably less than they were immediately after 1941. From the erosion perspective, the completed electricity system has had ‘positive geomorphic effects’.540 Floods have still occurred, but the impact has been less serious. Therefore, the impact for landowners abutting the river has been mitigated, although the cultural and spiritual effects and the associated harm to the mauri of the waters has not. We do not have systematic evidence as to whether or how far Maori groups affected by these problems have been compensated.

**The Tribunal’s preliminary findings on the Waikato River**

In the absence of detailed evidence and submissions, we make a preliminary finding that Maori tribal groups living alongside the Waikato River in our inquiry region have been affected by flooding and river problems caused in part by the Crown’s control of lake levels. In our preliminary view, they have suffered prejudice.

**Now that it may be possible to rehabilitate affected land, are Tuwharetoa entitled to compensation if it can no longer be farmed because of other reasons?**

One of the major issues debated before us was the question of contemporary management of the ecology of the Taupo waters. Inevitably, that question carries significant implications for the management of land abutting the waters. In particular, a key problem is the clarity of the lake water, which has deteriorated in recent years. We received evidence on the cause of that deterioration, in which the focus was the flow of nitrates into the lake as a result of human habitation. We did not, however, receive firm evidence on how the changes to the lake’s ecology arising from control of lake levels by the gates and increased throughput of water via the TPD have affected water purity. Ultimately, if the Crown is correct that the effects of controlling the lake at a high level between 1941 and 1971 have abated, then it should now be possible to rehabilitate affected land. Active assistance from the Crown would, it appears, be required. But the question is complicated by the vital issue of water purity. If nitrates from land use are the key cause of its deterioration, then responsible environmental management requires restrictions on that use. Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga now face the prospect that they will not be allowed to use land that can be rehabilitated, as well as much other land near the lake. Treaty issues arise in terms of the principle of active protection – of the lake and of tino rangatiratanga over it and abutting ancestral land – and of redress (remedying past breaches).

**The claimants’ case**

The claimants argued that they want the waters of their taonga – Lake Taupo – to be kept pure and pristine. They also want to ensure that outcome by assuming their Treaty-guaranteed right to manage and control the lake. Further, they submitted that they have always supported development and been willing to do their share in the national interest, but that they have paid a disproportionately high share of the costs for a disproportionately low share of the benefits. Much of their lakeshore land, still waterlogged or
overgrown with scrub as a result of the Crown’s control of lake levels, cannot now be rehabilitated without capital. If rehabilitated, that land could be used for a variety of purposes, including tourism. Further, other land has been tied up in forestry or proposed reserves, with the result that 46 per cent of their lake lands remain undeveloped. Private landowners, on the other hand, have benefited from farming development, tourism, and residential development around the lake. Tuwharetoa will not be able to do the same, they argued, if present land use is locked down permanently in order to prevent new sources of nitrates from polluting the lake. The tribe want to ensure water purity but object to paying the main price for it, while others continue to profit from historical development facilitated by the Crown.\textsuperscript{541}

\textbf{The Crown’s case}

The Crown accepted that water resources such as Lake Taupo are vitally important to tangata whenua, but argued that they are vitally important to others as well. The claimants have been consulted in the development of proposed land-use limitations and their interests have been taken into account.\textsuperscript{542} The problem cannot be solved without an approach that involves all land users, including the claimants. The Crown noted the evidence of George Asher, that the policy is still a proposal and that Tuwharetoa have been fully consulted on it and are in discussions with the Government and local authorities.\textsuperscript{543} Technological advances have improved the monitoring of pollution and the identification of its causes, so that correct actions can now be taken in a way that would not have been possible earlier. Sustainable long-term solutions require all members of the community to own the problem and share in solving it.\textsuperscript{544}

The Crown conceded, however, that much Tuwharetoa land was tied up in proposed reserves from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the objective of preserving water purity. In its view, there was significant consultation with and agreement from some Maori owners, and it is not clear that any land was ever alienated from Maori ownership per se. The Crown does not accept that Tuwharetoa have paid a disproportionate price for protecting water purity.\textsuperscript{545}

\textbf{The Tribunal’s analysis and findings}

In terms of land affected by the Crown’s control of lake levels, the issue appears to us to be very clear. We have evidence from Stephen Asher, Merle Ormsby, Dulcie Gardiner, and others that their land has not recovered from the effects of the raising of the lake levels.\textsuperscript{546} According to our technical witness, Mr Hamilton, groundwater levels, siltation of rivers and rivermouths, and other impacts ought to have recovered gradually when the lake levels were brought back to a more natural regime after 1987. But the claimants have pointed to instances where this cannot happen without active rehabilitation, which (as they submitted) is uneconomic.\textsuperscript{547} Their evidence is supported by the specific studies of Dr Eser and Dr Rosen at Stump Bay, and of Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell at Waihaha, that the water table is still higher than it should be in some areas.\textsuperscript{548} This may be in part because although the lake is now held at a more natural level, it is still held unseasonably high in spring and early summer, the crucial months for land recovery. In any case, the claimants may now be limited in the use that they could put such land to, even if they could afford to drain and restore it, in order to protect water purity.

In our view, the Crown’s Treaty obligation is clear. The principle of redress requires it to remedy past breaches. It ought to assist Maori to rehabilitate affected lakeshore properties, just as it ought to have done in the 1960s (which was, in part, the view of the Compensation Court at that time). Every decade that goes by without such assistance compounds the Treaty breach and the prejudice. But rehabilitation may be a pointless exercise if land use (rightly) must be restricted to secure the quality of the lake waters. That is a decision for Ngati Tuwharetoa, in partnership with the Crown (which must actively protect their interests.) Having deprived Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga of the use and enjoyment of this ancestral land by its unnecessary raising of the lake, the Crown is obligated to provide fair
redress. In our view, if the decision is made in partnership that land use must be restricted, the Crown should compensate the claimants for what will then become permanent deprivation of the use and enjoyment of this taonga.

We make no comment here on the broader issue of development and water purity vis-à-vis Tuwharetoa’s other lands abutting the lake.

**Summary of findings relating to the Crown’s control of Lake Taupo for hydroelectric development**

We have said in this section that we leave matters associated with the Tongariro Power Development scheme for inquiry and reporting by the National Park Tribunal. Our focus here has been on allegations about Crown acts or omissions in relation to the construction of control gates at the outlet of Lake Taupo and regulation of the lake level, for the purposes of generating electric power.

Both the Crown and claimants agreed that hydroelectric power development was necessary in the national interest. Our analysis and findings therefore focus on issues arising in the following seven areas:

**Kawanatanga and rangatiratanga**

We note that the Crown initially gave itself the authority to control the use of water for electricity, subject to other lawful rights. Maori authority over their taonga and properties included the right to control their use, and that right was not extinguished by the Water-Power Act 1903. Indeed, the Government specifically acknowledged in 1903 that, if Maori had any such rights, then the legislation introduced that year preserved them and required the Crown to pay for them. In our view, the Government arrogated to itself the sole right to use the Taupo waters in its 1926 legislation precisely because the matter had to be put beyond legal doubt. We are not persuaded that Ngati Tuwharetoa made an informed or willing cession of their rights over the water for any purpose other than fishing.

In Treaty terms, the Crown needed to establish a regime in which both kawanatanga and rangatiratanga could be exercised in respect of the lake. Such a regime would have involved fresh negotiations and agreement over new uses of (and benefits from) tribal taonga. This would have been so, under the Treaty, even if the tribe had made a willing cession of the lake bed in 1926, and had given an informed and true consent to the Government inserting its right to use the waters into the empowering Act. It did neither.

We find that the Crown failed to act in partnership with Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga as required by the Treaty and the Crown’s own undertakings in 1926. It ought to have consulted those iwi and hapu affected and obtained their agreement to its use of their taonga for the purpose of hydroelectric power generation.

**The design and consultation phase**

In assessing Treaty compliance in this phase, we looked at the adequacy or otherwise of the Crown’s consultation with iwi and hapu, and the adequacy or otherwise of its assessment of the potential impact of raising the lake level.

With regard to consultation, we believe that the Crown’s proposal to erect control gates and raise the lake level should have been the subject of consultation with the iwi and hapu concerned. Full discussion of the measures that were proposed, and reasonable alternatives, should have formed part of the consultation. In particular, knowing of Ngati Tuwharetoa’s desire to lower, rather than raise, the lake level so as to make land available for agricultural production, the Crown was obligated to determine whether its power needs could be met without raising the lake level. To the contrary, however, it had apparently already decided in 1927 that ‘any permanent lowering of the lake would have a prejudicial effect on future hydro-electric development’ and told Ngati Tuwharetoa so.\(^{549}\) It did not shift from that view.

With regard to the assessment of potential impact, we are of the opinion that the Government did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the likely effects of raising the lake levels, and nor did it respond adequately to Tuwharetoa’s expressions of concern. Although we acquit the Crown of bad faith, we note views from the time, both of ministers...
and of Tuwharetoa, that the Public Works Department had a history of concealing the truth of the impacts of its projects.

We find these actions and omissions of the Crown to have been in breach of the principles of the Treaty and we conclude that the decision to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels was not arrived at in a manner consistent with the Treaty.

The construction and initial operation phase
The construction of the control gates took place between 1940 and 1941, and they were fully operational by October 1941. Close scrutiny of the evidence reveals that during the construction period there was a modest deepening and substantial enlargement of the outlet from Lake Taupo. The engineers had, in this way, created a capacity to raise the lake by four feet above the general lake level but also, importantly in our view, to lower it by three feet below the general lake level. Despite this, the Crown was convinced that it needed to raise the lake level to generate power and held the lake at the maximum control level, set at two feet higher than the general lake level, for almost the entire time from 1941 to 1946. It also held the lake higher than the general lake level for unseasonably long periods in the years after that. As a result, Maori lakeshore blocks, wahi tapu, geothermal taonga, residences, cropping lands, and development farm lands were all subject to inundation, erosion, and a rise in groundwater that turned taonga and farm land alike to swamp. As the claimants argued, this had profound social, cultural, economic, and spiritual consequences for them.

The claimants also asserted adverse effects stemming from a change to the mauri of the lake, which they said resulted from artificially controlling the water level. We do not entirely accept their arguments, since they themselves had been seeking to lower the lake by artificial means in the period leading up to the installation of the control gates – a price they were evidently willing to pay to develop their lands. They had no say, however, in the effects on their taonga and its mauri when the Crown decided to do the opposite and raise the lake level. We consider that changing the lake level was a matter to be agreed, not imposed.

Engineers proposed various solutions to the problem of flooding, which the Government rejected as uneconomic and possibly harmful to other interests. One such report, commissioned by Ngati Tuwharetoa in 1945, showed that the lake level could be considerably lowered without losing generating capacity. The report balanced the cost of some additional engineering work needed against the savings that could be made in compensation and the benefits from being able to reclaim swamped and waterlogged land for productive use. We are not satisfied that this constructive proposal was given due consideration. Instead, the Crown focused on protective works and on paying compensation.

However, in the absence of detailed technical evidence on the merits of the different schemes proposed in the 1940s, we make no finding of Treaty breach in respect of the Government’s rejection of them.

Compensation
With regard to compensation, our preliminary view is that the amount paid was far too low in comparison with what was being claimed. We note here the opinion of the Native Department and a member of the Legislative Council that the Government’s profit in using the Taupo waters was far in excess of what was being claimed in compensation for the damage caused. We also find the Crown in breach of the Treaty for not ensuring that the court gave full compensation for personal damages, despite its intention (in the Finance (No 2) Act 1945) that it should do so. Further, we find that geothermal features ought to have been included in any assessment of compensation, but were not. We find the Crown in breach of the principles of the Treaty for not rectifying the court’s award on that point.

We find that the Crown knew of, should have compensated, and should have taken special care to remedy where possible the harm to Ngati Tuwharetoa in respect of their ancestral land, wahi tapu, and taonga. We also find that the Crown was aware of damage to Maori communal rights and practices, to Maori communities and their livelihoods,
and ultimately to their whole way of life. In failing to compensate for those kinds of harm, and in failing to remove or rectify the cause of that prejudice, the Crown breached the principles of the Treaty.

Overall, we find that the Crown’s acts of omission were unreasonable in the circumstances and in breach of the Treaty principles of partnership, reciprocity, active protection, and options. The claimants have suffered significant social and economic prejudice.

**Impact post-1940**

We accept the evidence of our expert hydrologist, Mr Hamilton, and the agreement between the parties that the lake was held unnaturally (and unseasonably) high for sustained periods, with subsequent flooding and waterlogging of land, between 1941 and 1971. We also accept the claimants’ evidence that some of the economic, cultural, and spiritual effects of the flooding and the higher water table have been enduring.

We make no findings on whether compensation for flood damage to particular properties in the 1960s was adequate. We lack sufficient evidence on the point. However, both the Native Department (in the 1940s) and Ngati Tuwharetoa (in the 1950s) reminded the Government of the great value of this ancestral land to Taupo Maori. In addition, some of it contained wahi tapu and other taonga. The Compensation Court’s judgement of the land as of ‘no great value’ before it became waterlogged was therefore inappropriate.

Further, the Crown’s duty of active protection required it, at the very least, to monitor the situation with regard to flooding and waterlogging and provide assistance and technical advice to Maori, so that their land could be drained and rehabilitated where possible. In addition, the Crown solicitor advised the Government that when the lake was taken above the maximum level it should act at once and provide assistance and compensation on the spot. The fact that this was not done because, in the Government’s view, its own title system made it impossible to find or negotiate with the legal owners, demonstrates the serious prejudice to Taupo Maori arising from Treaty breaches identified in part III of this report.

We find the Crown in breach of the Treaty for failing to compensate Maori in such a manner that the core problem of water damage could be remedied, despite advice at the time that it could have done so. We also reiterate our finding, above, that the whole situation was fundamentally unnecessary because the Crown could have pursued other policies that kept the lake levels lower without harming the national interest in electricity.

The Treaty breaches of the 1940s were compounded by the ongoing failure actively to protect Tuwharetoa’s taonga and interests in subsequent decades, and by the failure to compensate them appropriately for avoidable losses.

**Effects on tributaries and the Waikato River**

Although we lack detailed and systematic evidence of the full impact on tributaries, we accept the generic point that flooding and waterlogging undoubtedly happened for a significant period of time. We also accept the Ngati Hikairo submission that the Tokaanu Stream is an example of how raising the lake levels contributed to loss of (or damage to) their taonga. We make preliminary findings that the Treaty principle of active protection, and the property guarantees of article 2, have been breached in respect of Lake Taupo’s tributaries. We are not in a position to determine the frequency or duration of the breach, other than to say that it is likely to have been common during the period between 1941 and 1971, nor to judge the degree of prejudice. It appears, however, that there were long-term negative effects which now require active remedial work, wherever such rehabilitation is possible.

And in the absence of detailed evidence and submissions on the Waikato River, we make a preliminary finding that the tribal groups living alongside the river within our inquiry region have been affected by flooding and river problems caused in part by the Crown’s control of lake levels. It is our preliminary view that they have suffered prejudice.
The possibility of land rehabilitation
The claimants’ evidence is that their land has not recovered from the effects of raising the lake levels. Despite the opinion of our technical witness, Mr Hamilton, that there should have been a gradual recovery after 1987 (since which time the lake has been operated in accordance with a more natural regime), the claimants’ evidence is supported by studies that show the water table remains higher than it should be in some areas. This may, in part, be because the lake still tends to be held unseasonably high in spring and early summer, which are crucial months for land recovery. In our view, the Crown has an obligation to assist Maori to rehabilitate affected properties, and every decade that goes by without such assistance compounds the Treaty breach and the prejudice.

However, we observe that Maori may now be limited in the use to which they could put any such rehabilitated land, because of growing concerns about protecting water purity in the lake. This is an issue that Ngati Tuwharetoa must address, in partnership with the Crown (which must actively protect their interests). But in our view, if the decision is made in partnership that land use must be restricted, then the Crown should compensate the claimants for what will then become permanent deprivation of the full use and enjoyment of this taonga.

We make no comment in this chapter on the broader issue of development and water purity in relation to Tuwharetoa’s other lands abutting the lake.

Summary

Agreements between the Crown and claimants
- The Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa agree that Lake Taupo-nui-a-Tia and its rivers are taonga that were in the possession and under the authority of the claimants as at 1840.
- The Crown and claimants agree that hydroelectric power development was necessary in the national interest.

Treaty breaches
- The Crown eroded the claimants’ rangatiratanga over their valuable freshwater fisheries at Taupo, particularly by protecting and facilitating the introduction of trout into their waterways, without agreement with Maori or compensation to them for the damage to their indigenous fishery.
- Also in breach of the Treaty, it failed to accord the same legal rights and autonomy to tribes that it accorded to acclimatisation societies, and failed to enter into partnership with tribal authorities to administer the licensing of fishing and access to their lake.
- In 1926, despite Crown negotiations with Ngati Tuwharetoa, and despite an agreement being entered into between the Crown and the iwi (which the 1924 Act had indicated should be ‘fair and reasonable’), we find that Lake Taupo, including its bed, was alienated from the iwi without their full, free, and willing cession. This was in serious breach of the plain meaning of article 2 of the Treaty, and the Treaty principles of partnership, autonomy, and active protection.

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The 1926 legislation, ostensibly giving effect to the agreement entered into by the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa, in fact contained significant changes. Perhaps the most far-reaching of these were that the Crown, by this Act, vested in itself the rights to ‘use and control’ the Taupo waters and control and regulate the indigenous (as well as the introduced) fishery. Ngati Tuwharetoa had not given their consent to any such changes.

The annuity which the Crown agreed to pay to the new Tuwharetoa Trust Board at this time was for control of commercial boating and public fishing (including access and the letting of campsites), and cannot be considered a payment for the loss of ownership of either the lake or the rivers, or for the right to ‘use and control’ the Taupo waters. The Crown has never paid the tribe for the bed of the lake or the right to use its waters.

Neither in 1926, nor subsequently, did the Crown negotiate with the iwi the right to use their waters for hydro-electricity purposes. Nor did it compensate the tribe, then or later, for this use.

To the extent that ownership of the beds of the lake and tributary rivers has been revested in Ngati Tuwharetoa, some of the above Treaty breaches have been partially rectified.

The Crown failed to actively protect the indigenous fisheries of Taupo iwi and hapu. There has been limited recognition of Ngati Tuwharetoa rangatiratanga in Crown arrangements for the trout fishery, but they are still excluded from a real or meaningful authority over the Taupo fishery as a whole (including the habitat and ecosystem, the fish, and the right to fish).

With regard to raising the lake levels for hydro development, the Government failed to give serious consideration to alternative solutions; its impact assessment was inadequate; and its consultation with Taupo iwi and hapu was deficient. We find these acts and omissions to have been in breach of the principles of the Treaty, and conclude that the decision to erect the control gates and raise the lake levels was not arrived at in a manner consistent with the Treaty.

The Crown knew of the harm caused to Ngati Tuwharetoa in respect of the flooding or waterlogging of their ancestral land, wahi tapu, and taonga. It should have properly compensated them and, where possible, taken special care to remedy the damage. We find that the Crown’s acts of omission in this context were in breach of the Treaty principles of partnership, reciprocity, active protection, and options.

We also make a preliminary finding that the Treaty principle of active protection, and the property guarantees of article 2, have been breached in respect of Lake Taupo’s tributaries.

**Prejudice**

Taupo iwi and hapu lost much of their indigenous fishery, resulting in serious economic, cultural, and spiritual prejudice. In its place, they acquired only a limited stake in the replacement (introduced) fishery. The provision of a number of free licences to Taupo Maori, and a provision for ongoing economic benefit to the tribe from the fishery, while commendable, did not go far enough.
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Raised lake levels over extended periods, and at unseasonable times, resulted in Maori lakeshore blocks, wahi tapu, geothermal taonga, residences, cropping lands, and development farm lands all being subject to inundation, erosion, and a rise in groundwater that turned taonga and farm land alike into swamp. Some of the economic, cultural, and spiritual effects have been enduring.

The Crown’s view that it was difficult to provide compensation and/or assistance to affected Maori, because of problems associated with its own title system and with multiple ownership, demonstrates the serious prejudice arising from Treaty breaches identified in part III of this report.

In our view, the Crown has an obligation to assist Maori to rehabilitate affected properties, and every decade that goes by without such assistance compounds the Treaty breach and prejudice.

If the decision is made, by Taupo Maori and the Crown in partnership, that the pastoral use of rehabilitated land must be restricted to protect the quality of the lake’s water, the Crown should compensate the claimants for what will then become permanent deprivation of the full use and enjoyment of this taonga.

It is our preliminary view that tribal groups living alongside the Waikato River have suffered prejudice from flooding and river problems caused in part by the Crown’s control of the level of Lake Taupo.

Notes
3. By the deed of agreement of 28 August 1992 between the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa, the beds of the Taupo waters have been returned to tribal ownership, and a management board has been established to administer them.
4. Te Karere o Niu Tireni, vol 1, no 7, July 1842, in appendices to Tom Bennion, generic closing submissions on natural environment and resource management issues, various dates (paper 3.3.78(a))
5. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 107, 110
6. Ibid, p 107
7. Ibid, p 107
8. Karen Feint, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.142), p 36
10. Ibid
12. Ibid, pp 110–111
14. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 112
15. Ibid
17. Karen Feint, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.142), pp 40–41
18. Martin Taylor, opening submissions on behalf of the Hikwai confederation, 26 January 2005 (paper 3.3.15), p 3
19. Martin Taylor, closing submissions on behalf of Tauhara hapu, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.92), p 8
20. Ibid, pp 8, 10
21. Ibid, p 6
22. Hemi Te Nahu, closing submissions on behalf of Tauhara hapu, 5 September 2005 (paper 3.3.89), p 29
23. Ibid, pp 4–5, 29
25. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 166
27. Ibid, p 167
28. Ibid, pp 167–168
29. Kiriana Tan, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Raukawa, 5 September 2005 (paper 3.3.80), p 16
30. Ibid, p 17
31. Ibid,
32. Ibid, p 97
33. Aidan Warren and Rachel Hall, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tutemohuta and Karanga Hapu, Ngati Whaoa and Raukawa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.135), pp 37–39
34. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 472
35. Ibid, p 469
36. Ibid
37. Ibid
38. Ibid, pt 1, pp 60–62
39. Ibid, pt 2, p 472
40. There are close and supportive relationships between the 25 hapu of Ngati Tuwharetoa and other iwi and hapu who claim manawhenua in the larger Taupo region. These include Ngati Raukawa, Ngati Maniapoto, and Ngati Kurapoto (see ch 2).
42. Mataara Wall, brief of evidence (English version), undated (doc D1), p 5
43. Chris Winitana, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E32), pp 17–20
44. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 108; Chris Winitana, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E32), p 18
45. Sean Ellison, brief of evidence (English version), 28 February 2005 (doc C25(a)), pp 38–39. Mr Ellison acknowledges the knowledge shared with him by Taxi Kapua.
46. Chris Winitana, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E32), pp 9–10
47. Ibid, p 20
48. Ibid, p 16
50. Chris Winitana, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E32), p 16
51. Petere Clarke, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D13), p 19
52. Mataara Wall, brief of evidence (English version), undated (doc D1), p 5–6
53. Paranapa Otimi, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E16(b)), p 3
55. See John Te H Grace, Tuwharetoa: A History of the Maori People of the Taupo District (Wellington: Reed, 1959)
59. Mataara Wall, brief of evidence (English version), undated (doc D1), pp 16, 19
60. Chris Winitana, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E32), p 20
62. Wi Parata, 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol 126, p 115
65. Mataara Wall, brief of evidence (English version), undated (doc D1), p 16
66. Paranapa Otimi, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E16(b)), p 3
67. Tuatea Smallman, brief of evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc E31), pp 2–4
68. Chris Winitana, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E32), p 16
69. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 107–111
70. Ibid, pp 109–114
71. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 469
72. Ibid, p 465
73. Ibid
74. Ibid
75. Ibid
76. Ibid, p 472
77. Ibid
78. Ibid
79. Ibid
80. Ibid, p 485
81. Ibid, pp 486–487
82. Ibid, p 472
84. Ian Kusabs, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc E27), p 8; see also Pat Burstall, ‘Trout Fishery – History and Management’, in DJ
He Maunga Rongo

85. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p.169
86. Ibid
87. Ibid, p.170
88. Ibid, pp.172–174
89. Karen Feint, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.142), p.36
90. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p.171
91. Ibid, pp.169–175
92. Ibid, pp.169–170
93. Ibid, p.174
94. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt.1, pp.60–62
95. Ibid, pt.2, p.470
96. Ibid, p.471
97. Ibid, p.472
100. Ngahopi Te Aomarama (Daniel Staite), brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc C29), pp.6–7
103. Hone Heke, 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol.122, p.605
105. Te Hokowhitu Tairaoa, brief of evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc E22), p.4
106. Terewhakakotahi Charles Wall, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D18), p.3
108. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt.2, p.471
112. Hone Heke, 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol.122, p.605
113. Ibid
114. Although culling was later undertaken, the Government’s ultimate solution was to maximise the trout population and introduce an alternative food species for it in the 1930s (after the 1926 agreement).
115. 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol.122, pp.606–608
117. See AJHR, 1900, vol.3, and AJHR, 1901, vol.4
120. Walter Buchanan, 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol.126, p.119
121. 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol.126, pp.115–122
122. William Field, 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol.126, pp.119–120
123. Heaton Rhodes, 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol.126, p.116
128. Reserves and Other Lands Disposal and Public Bodies Empowering Act 1913, s.121
129. ‘History of s.14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairaoa (doc E22(a)), p.2
132. We note this for completeness’ sake, as Lake Rotoaira and its issues fall within the National Park inquiry.
133. Petera Clarke, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D13), p.19

136. Hone Heke, 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol 122, p 605


138. Wi Parata, 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol 126, p 115


140. T M Wilford, 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol 122, p 602

141. 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol 122, p 601

142. Fisheries Conservation Amendment Act 1902, ss 4–6

143. Jock Barrett, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc E10), p 16

144. Fisheries Act 1908, s 90

145. 24 September 1902, NZPD, 1902, vol 122, pp 601–602

146. Wi Parata, 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol 126, p 115

147. 30 September 1903, NZPD, 1903, vol 126, pp 116–122

148. Lake Ayson, ‘Report on Fisheries of New Zealand’, 10 June 1913, AJHR, 1913, H-15(b)

149. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Taiaroa (doc E22(a)), pp 1–19


151. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Taiaroa (doc E22(a)), p 1


153. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Taiaroa (doc E22(a)), pp 2–3

154. Ibid, pp 3–8

155. Ibid, pp 3–4


157. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Taiaroa (doc E22(a)), pp 6, 8

158. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 17

159. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Taiaroa (doc E22(a)), p 6

160. Ibid, p 9

161. Ibid, pp 11–12

162. Ibid, p 12

163. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 117–129

164. Ibid, p 126

165. Ibid, pp 117–129

166. Ibid, pp 130–133

167. Ibid, pp 163–164

168. Ibid, pp 117–129

169. Ibid

170. Ibid, pp 166–177

171. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 475

172. Ibid, pp 476–478

173. Ibid, pp 478–479

174. Ibid

175. Ibid

176. Ibid, pp 479–480

177. Ibid, pp 480–481

178. Ibid, pp 486–488

179. Ibid, p 482

180. Ibid, pp 471–472

181. Ibid, pp 483–485

182. 1 November 1924, NZPD, 1924, vol 205, p 1047; 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, pp 285–286

183. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 118–119

184. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Taiaroa (doc E22(a)), pp 1–19

185. A M Samuel, 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, p 287


187. Whakapumautanga Downs, brief of evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc E29), pp 2–4

189. *History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926*, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairaoa (doc E22(a)), pp 13–14


191. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairaoa (doc E22(a)), p 14

192. Gordon Coates, 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, p 285


195. Ibid

196. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 130–133

197. Hoani Te Heuheu to Peter Fraser, letter, 13 March 1944 (doc E16(c))


199. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 486–487


202. See the Annual Reports of the Chief Engineer, AJHR, 1907–1911, D-1


204. Ibid, app g, p 95

205. Ibid, app h, p 100


208. E Parry, ‘Hydro-Electric Development. North Island Scheme’, report of the Chief Electrical Engineer to William Fraser, 26 October 1918, AJHR, 1918, D-1(a), p 10


211. Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1924, s 29

212. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 119–120

213. Kiriana Tan, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Raukawa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.80)

214. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairaoa (doc E22(a)), pp 19–22

215. Ibid, p 18


221. Ibid

222. Ibid

223. Ibid, pp 179–180

224. Ibid, p 180

225. Ibid

226. Minister of Native Affairs to Governor-General, 26 April 1926, in Ben White (comp), supporting documents to *Inland Waterways: Lakes*, various dates (doc A55(b)), pp 180–182

227. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairaoa (doc E22(a)), p 22


229. Minister of Native Affairs to Governor-General, 26 April 1926, in Ben White (comp), supporting documents to *Inland Waterways: Lakes*, various dates (doc A55(b)), pp 183–186


231. Ibid, p 120

232. ‘History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926’, Department of Conservation, February 1990,
supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairāoa (doc E22(a)), p 23
233. Ibid, p 23
234. Raumoa Balneavis to Gordon Coates, 26 July 1926 (in Nicholas Bayley and Tim Shoebridge (assisted by Charles Dawson), 'Indexed Document Bank on Land Use in the Twentieth Century for the Central North Island Inquiry Region', April 2005 (doc g1), p 2306
235. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 482
237. Ibid, pp 2319–2320
238. Ibid, pp 2316–2317; 'Resolutions passed at a Meeting of Ngati Tuwharetoa at Wellington, 21 July 1926', in Ben White (comp), supporting documents to Inland Waterways: Lakes, various dates (doc A55(b)), pp 174–175
239. The following analysis is taken from the text of the 26 July agreement: see Minister of Native Affairs to Governor-General, 26 April 1926, in Ben White (comp), supporting documents to Inland Waterways: Lakes, various dates (doc A55(b)), pp 201–203
241. All of the above provisions are contained in the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926, s 14
242. Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926, s 17
243. 'History of s 14 Maori Land Amendment and Maori Land Claims Adjustment Act 1926', Department of Conservation, February 1990, supporting document to brief of evidence of Te Hokowhitu Tairāoa (doc E22(a)), p 23
244. A M Samuel, 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, p 287
246. Minister of Native Affairs to Governor-General, 26 April 1926, in Ben White (comp), supporting documents to Inland Waterways: Lakes, various dates (doc A55(b)), pp 197–199
247. Gordon Coates, 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, p 286
248. Ben White, Inland Waterways: Lakes, Rangahaua Whanui Series (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1998), pp 188–190; Hoani Te Heuheu to Peter Fraser, letter, 13 March 1944 (doc e16(c))
250. Paranapa Otimi, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc e16), p 17; George Asher, brief of evidence, 29 April 2005 (doc e39), pp 15–16
252. Ibid, pp 195–198
253. George Asher, brief of evidence, 29 April 2005 (doc e39), pp 15–16
254. Ibid, p 16
255. Hoani Te Heuheu to Peter Fraser, letter, 13 March 1944 (doc e16(c)); Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc e1), p 118–119
256. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 479
257. Hoani Te Heuheu to Peter Fraser, letter, 13 March 1944 (doc e16(c))
258. Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc e1), p 118
259. District Engineers to Engineer-in-Chief, 28 March 1927 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc e1), p 19)
260. James Biddle, brief of evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc e33), p 7
263. Maui Pomare, 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, p 289
264. Gordon Coates, 3 September 1926, NZPD, 1926, vol 211, p 286
266. Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board, ‘75 Years’, PowerPoint presentation, undated (doc e54)
268. Ibid, p 189
269. Ibid, p 105
270. Ibid, p 191
271. Ibid, p 192
272. Ibid, pp 195–198
274. Harvey Karaitiana, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc e8)
275. Paranapa Otimi, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc e16(b)), p 3
276. McRitchie v Taranaki Fish and Game Council [1999] 2 NZLR 139 (CA)
277. Ibid, p 161
278. Annette Sykes and Jason Pou, summary of closing submissions for Nga Rauru o Nga Potiki in the Urewera inquiry, 7 September 2005 (paper 3.3.97(a)), pp 124, 233–235, 280–284
281. Ibid, p 194
282. Ibid, pp 110–111
284. Deed of agreement between the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa regarding Lake Taupo waters, 28 August 1992, in Ben White (comp), *Supporting Documents to Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report*, Rangahaua Whanui Series, various dates (doc A55(b)), pp 205–211
285. Ibid, p 206
286. Ibid, p 209, s 3.6
287. After the pre-publication release of part v of this report in July 2007, the Crown and Ngati Tuwharetoa reached an agreement in September 2007 that varied the terms of the 1992 settlement. As that development came after the release of our report, we can take no account of it.
290. Water-Power Act 1903, s2(1) (as quoted in ibid, p 43)
292. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 128
294. Waitangi Tribunal, memorandum directing consideration of TPD issues, 8 September 2006 (Wai 1130, paper 2.3.48)
295. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 484–485; Karen Feint, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.142), p 40
296. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 143–145
297. Ibid, pp 145–155
298. Ibid, pp 155–156
299. Ibid, p 159
300. Ibid, pp 159–160
301. Ibid, p 160
302. Karen Feint, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.142), p 42
303. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 160–165
304. Raewyn Wakefield, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Hikairo, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.64), pp 49–51
305. Ibid, pp 47–48, 51, 55–58
306. Karen Feint, submissions in reply on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 1 November 2005 (paper 3.3.142), p 43
307. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 488
308. Ibid, p 490
309. Ibid, p 490
310. Ibid, p 489
311. Ibid, pp 454–455, 489–490
312. Ibid, p 490
313. Ibid, p 378
314. Ibid, p 379
315. Tony Walzl, ‘Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme’, report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1); also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2
316. These include: Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H29); Graham Hancox, evidence, concerning the geological and seismo-tectonic setting of the Taupo/Waikato catchment etc, undated (doc H31); Darryl Hicks, evidence concerning the geomorphic characteristics and processes of Lake Taupo etc, undated (doc H32); Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc H34); Roddy Henderson, mean monthly lake levels, prepared from data used during Mighty River Power consent hearings, 1996 (doc 149); Roddy Henderson, lake level data 1941–1971, NIWA, undated (doc 13). See also Prisca Eser and Michael Rosen, ‘Effects of Artificially Controlling Levels of Lake Taupo, North Island, New Zealand on the Stump Bay Wetland’, *New Zealand Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research*, vol 34, no 2 (June 2000), pp 217–230 (doc 111)
317. Mr Freestone’s evidence (doc H29) was presented to the Waikato Regional Council hearing committee that considered an application by Mighty River Power for authority to continue the operation of the Taupo–Waikato hydro system from 2001 onwards: see Environment Waikato Regional Council, ‘Mighty River Power Taupo–Waikato Consents Decision Report’, 29 August 2003 (doc H28).
318. David Hamilton, ‘Lake Taupo Hydrology Review’, report commissioned by Waitangi Tribunal, July 2005 (doc 135). Mr Hamilton was also questioned at some length by counsel and the Tribunal: see David Hamilton, evidence given under cross-examination, supplementary hearing, 8 August 2005 (transcript 4.1.10)
319. The more formal way to describe ‘minimum sea level’ is as ‘Minimum Chart Datum’ for a particular port. The zero of the chart datum is often the level of the Lowest Astronomical Tide (LAT). Because tides vary from place to place, the zero on the chart datum for each port is
different. The 1953 Moturiki datum was established as a way of standardising land elevations over a larger area to a mean sea level (MSL) at a particular place. Moturiki, being the site of a tidal water level gauge at the entrance to Tauranga Harbour, was the datum applied at Lake Taupo.

321. Ibid, pp 134–142
322. Ibid, pp 158–160
323. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 485–487
324. Ibid, p 490
328. Assistant Engineer to District Electrical Engineer, 13 December 1938 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, *Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme*, report commissioned by cfRT, February 2005 (doc e1), p 32; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc e1(a)), vol 2, pp 653–656). The field studies and the local reports were done by Engineering Assistants, Jenks and Wallace, and the reports sent to the Chief Electrical Engineer in Wellington were written by Anderson, the District Electrical Engineer.
329. Chief Electrical Engineer to District Electrical Engineer, 2 February 1939 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, *Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme*, report commissioned by cfRT, February 2005 (doc e1), p 32; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc e1(a)), vol 2, pp 651–652)
330. Ibid
331. Ibid
332. Chief Electrical Engineer to District Electrical Engineer, 19 May 1939 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, *Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme*, report commissioned by cfRT, February 2005 (doc e1), p 34; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc e1(a)), vol 2, p 647)


347. Dominion, 30 June 1943 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 104)


350. District Engineers to Engineer-in-Chief, 28 March 1927 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 19

351. Under-Secretary to Minister for Public Works, 3 May 1927 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 19


353. G J Anderson to PA Grace, 9 May 1927 (in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, p 773)

354. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 487

355. Hoani Te Heuheu to Peter Fraser, letter, 13 March 1944 (doc E16(c))


357. Water-Power Act 1903, s 2; Public Works Act 1928, s 306

358. Dominion, 30 June 1943 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 104; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, p 693); see also Hawke's Bay Herald Tribune, 6 July 1943


360. Ibid, pp 40–45, 104–105

361. Ibid, pp 108–120

362. Ibid, pp 31–45

363. Ibid, p 32

364. Ibid, pp 31–45

365. Native Minister to Under-Secretary, 17 January 1944 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 108)


367. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 144–146

368. Ibid, pp 146–151

369. Ibid, pp 151–157

370. Ibid, p 157

371. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 454–457


373. See ibid, tbl 5.2, p 20; Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H129), tbl 14.4, p 61

374. 'Control of Lake Taupo', Anderson to Chief Electrical Engineer, 14 June 1939 (in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, pp 637–639)


376. Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H129), fig 10.3, p 75

377. David Hamilton, evidence given under cross-examination, supplementary hearing, 8 August 2005 (transcript 4.1.10), pp 3–53 and especially pp 23–39

378. See Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Tongariro Power Development Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E2), p 36; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, pp 613, 634

379. J Wood to Under-Secretary of Native Department, 17 November, 1939 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 52; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, p 614)


381. Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), pp 49–100; and Russell Kirkpatrick, Katarina Belshaw, and John Campbell, 'Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and
Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000', report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3), chs 3, 12

382. These effects are reported in detail in Tony Walz, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), pp 59–65.


384. Graham Hancox, evidence, concerning the geological and seismo-tectonic setting of the Taupo/Waikato catchment etc, undated (doc H31) and Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H129) provide the detailed discussion and analysis. David Hamilton, 'Lake Taupo Hydrology Review', report commissioned by Waitangi Tribunal, July 2005 (doc 135) provides a summary and evaluation. We were greatly assisted by the estimates given for the order of magnitude of these processes as they operate at Lake Taupo. Hancox estimated that the order of magnitude for changes produced by the tectonic processes is six to 10 millimetres per year. According to Hamilton (p 23) variations in lake levels caused by winds and seiching are in the order of 10 to 20 millimetres.


387. This is the situation in temperate countries, including New Zealand. It does not apply in the tropics where the seasonality is different: see RC Ward and M Robinson, Principles of Hydrology (London and New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p 189, and fig 6.10, p 190


389. The air photos were in each case part of a national aerial mapping schema, not triggered by events at Lake Taupo. We have checked the records to see if either years experienced exceptional rainfall. We have annual rainfall records, and 30-year average rainfall figures, for Chateau Tongariro in the Tongariro National Park. The annual average rainfall there was 2914 mm. The annual figure for 1941 was 2994 mm, a little moister than average but within 5 to 10 per cent of the annual average. The situation in 1958 is less clear-cut and may or may not have impacted on the air photo evidence. The annual rainfall for 1958 was 3199 mm, still within the 10 per cent band, but it included a major flood event in February, 1958. Sources: New Zealand Meteorological Service, Meteorological Observations, miscellaneous publication 109 (Wellington; New Zealand Meteorological Service; New Zealand Meteorological Service, Rainfall Normals for New Zealand for the Period 1941–1970 miscellaneous publication 145 (Wellington: New Zealand Meteorological Service, 1973), p 16; and Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H129), tbl 6.1, p 17


391. See Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell, 'Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000', report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3), ch 12, especially figure 12.15 (p 355), which maps the amount of productive land in each of the years 1910, 1945, and 2002.


394. Ibid, p 3

395. Ibid, p 6

396. See John Te H Grace, Tuwharetoa: A History of the Maori People of the Taupo District (Wellington: Reed, 1959) for a description of how Ngatoroirangi left four of his ancestral gods in the lake (p 67). Grace adds:

‘there is a very dark-coloured rock situated just offshore, a mile northward of the Motutere promontory. It is called Te Pueaea and to it, at certain times of the year, come the four gods from their subterranean homes, to bask in the sun. The old-time Taupo Maori says that this rock turned red whenever disaster threatened Ngati Tuwharetoa or when the death of a prominent chief of chieftainness was to take place. Since the raising of the lake level for hydro-electric purposes the rock has been submerged.’

397. Arthur Grace, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc E26); James Biddle, brief of evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc E33); George Asher, brief of evidence, 29 April 2005 (doc E39); Ringakapo Asher Payne, brief of
evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc E41); John Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45).


399. Ibid, pp 11–12.


406. Ibid.


408. Dominion, 30 June 1943 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, ‘Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme,’ report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 104; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, pp 693); see also Hawke’s Bay Herald Tribune, 6 July 1943.

409. Tony Walzl, ‘Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme,’ report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), pp 100–101. Compensation was paid to Maori claimants from vote Public Works under the authority of the Public Works Act 1928 and via the administration of the Native Land Court.


413. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 465.

414. Ibid, p 466.

415. Ibid, p 472.

416. Ibid, p 490.


420. The Compensation Court would be made up of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (or alternate) and the Chief Judge (or alternate) of the Native Land Court. Claims were to be lodged within 12 months (later extended to 16 months): see Tony Walzl, ‘Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme,’ report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 115.

421. Deputation to Prime Minister, 9 September 1946 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, ‘Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme,’ report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 117; see also Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 1, pp 137–152.


423. Ibid, p 123.


426. Land Purchase Officer to Under-Secretary Public Works, 12 February 1947, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, pp 746–749; see also Rotorua Morning Post, 25 November, 1947.


428. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 490, fn 1663; Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 1, pp 320a, vol 2, p 707.


433. ‘Instructions for Valuers,’ in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 2, pp 704–705.

1396
434. Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, pp 319a–339a

435. Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, pp 320a, 338a–339a; Chief Land Purchase Officer to Under Secretary, 1 September 1947, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol2, p 698b

436. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 160


438. Under-Secretary to Native Minister, 22 November 1944 (as quoted in Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), p 110)

439. Under-Secretary to Native Minister, 22 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, p 92

440. Ibid

441. Under-Secretary to Minister of Works, 24 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol2, p 717–718

442. Ibid

443. Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), pp 60–63 (for hot pools), 70–81, 84–86, 109, 111 (for the importance of historical and cultural associations with ancestral land and taonga)

444. Finance (No 2) Act 1945, s 36

445. Native Minister to Minister of Works, 12 December 1945, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol2, p 709

446. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 160


448. Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, p 339a

449. Ibid, pp 321a–339a


451. Thomas Bloodworth, 26 September 1947, NZPD, 1947, vol 278, p 632

452. Chief Land Purchase Officer to Under-Secretary, 1 September 1947, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol2, p 698b


454. This conclusion is based on a review of primary documents in Terry Hearn (comp), supporting documents to 'Taupo–Kaingaroa Twentieth Century Overview', volume 6, various dates (doc A68(f)), pp 1–181, 253–378.

455. A F Currie to Registrar, 30 January 1948, in ibid, p 292

456. Solicitor for the Claimants, claim to compensation under the Public Works Act 1928 and the Finance Act (No 3) 1944, 1946, in Terry Hearn (comp), supporting documents to 'Taupo–Kaingaroa Twentieth Century Overview', volume 6, various dates (doc A68(f)), p 86

457. Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, p 337a

458. Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, p 321a

459. Legal submissions, 1947, in Terry Hearn (comp), supporting documents to 'Taupo–Kaingaroa Twentieth Century Overview', volume 6, various dates (doc A68(f)), pp 318–319

460. Ibid, p 280

461. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 152, 154

462. Under-Secretary to Native Minister, 22 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, p 92; Under-Secretary to Minister of Works, 24 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol2, p 717

463. Rejected claim 69, Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol1, p 339a; Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (doc E1), pp 127, 162–163

464. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc H34)

465. Charlotte Severne, brief of evidence, 15 April 2005 (doc E7)


467. Brett O'Shaughnessy, evidence given under cross-examination, eighth hearing, 11–15 July 2005 (transcript 4.1.9), p 387

468. Lake Taupo Control Compensation Court, general correspondence file, in Terry Hearn (comp), supporting documents to 'Taupo–Kaingaroa Twentieth Century Overview', volume 6, various dates (doc A68(f)), pp 1–181, 253–378

469. Terry Hearn (comp), supporting documents to 'Taupo–Kaingaroa Twentieth Century Overview', volume 6, various dates (doc A68(f)), pp 1–181, 253–378; see also Tony Walzl, 'Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Waikato River Hydro Scheme', report commissioned by CFRT,
February 2005 (doc E1); and Peter McBurney, 'Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings (Taupo–Rotorua) c1880s–1980', report commissioned by CFRT, revised version, April 2005 (doc A82(b))


472. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 490–491

473. Ibid, pp 491–492

474. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), pp 135–136


476. Ibid, pp 348, 372–373

477. Under-Secretary to Native Minister, 22 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 1, pp 90–92

478. Lake Taupo Compensation Court decision, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 1, p 320a

479. Ibid, pp 320a–321a

480. Wiri Mariu to Minister of Works, 1945 (as quoted in Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 155

481. Under-Secretary to Native Minister, 22 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 1, p 92

482. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 488–490

483. Ibid, p 488–489

484. John Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), pp 2–4

485. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 156


488. Under-Secretary to Native Minister, 22 November 1944, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), vol 1, p 92; see also Thomas Bloodworth, 26 September 1947, NZPD, 1947, vol 278, p 632

489. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 147, 158, 164; Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 455, 489


491. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 457

492. Ibid, pp 489, 491–492


494. Fig 10.4 is taken from Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H29), p 35, fig 10.1, which was prepared for Mighty River Power and presented in 2002 at the Waikato Regional Council Resource Consents Hearing in respect of the Waikato Hydro System. A similar figure is available in David Hamilton, 'Lake Taupo Hydrology Review', report commissioned by Waitangi Tribunal, July 2005 (doc 135), p 19, fig 5.1.

495. Decision of the Lake Taupo Control Compensation Court, 30 November 1960, in Peter McBurney (comp), 'Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings', supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), pp 2280–2281


497. Memorandum for Maori Trustee, 8 November 1962, in Peter McBurney (comp), 'Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings', supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), p 2246

498. AJ Quill to Commissioner of Works, 9 June 1961; and Lake Taupo Control Compensation Court, memorandum as to costs, 31 May 1961, in Peter McBurney (comp), 'Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings', supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), pp 2254–2258

499. Chief Land Purchase Officer to Commissioner of Works, 3 February 1961, in Peter McBurney (comp), 'Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings', supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), p 2267
Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 491

John Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), pp 3–4

Decision of the Lake Taupo Control Compensation Court, 30 November 1960, in Peter McBurney (comp), ‘Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings’, supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), pp 2283–2285

Ibid, pp 2283–2284


Commissioner of Works to Controller and Auditor General, 6 July 1961, in Peter McBurney (comp), ‘Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings’, supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), p 2250


Decision of the Lake Taupo Control Compensation Court, 30 November 1960, in Peter McBurney (comp), ‘Scenery Preservation and Public Works Takings’, supporting documents, various dates (doc A82(c)), p 2285


John Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45)

There are references to the review in Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H29), p 27, but the report is not referenced or brought into the record of documents.

Detailed evidence of this will be presented to the National Park Inquiry. See Tony Walzl, ‘Hydro-Electricity Issues: The Tongariro Power Development Scheme’, report commissioned by CFRT, February 2005 (Wai 1200, doc E2 and Wai 1350, doc A8).


Horace Freestone, evidence concerning catchment, hydrology, etc, undated (doc H29), p 11, see also tbl 11.1, ‘Timeline of major events and actions affecting the Taupo/Waikato catchment’


529. Merle Ormsby, brief of evidence, 25 April 2005 (doc E49), pp 12–15; Raewyn Wakefield, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Hikairo, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.64), pp 49–51

530. David Hamilton, evidence given under cross-examination, supplementary hearing, 8 August 2005 (transcript 4.1.10), pp 33–34

531. Ibid


534. Michael Sharp and Jolene Patuawa, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Whaoa, 8 September 2005 (paper 3.3.59), pp 42–43

535. Tony Walzl, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p 241; Kiriana Tan, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Raukawa, 5 September 2005 (paper 3.3.80), pp 44–46

536. Michael Sharp and Jolene Patuawa, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Whaoa, 8 September 2005 (paper 3.3.59), pp 42–44; Hemi Te Nahu and Maryanne Crapp, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tahu, 5 September 2005 (paper 3.3.88), pp 24–26, 45

537. John McConchie, hydrological evidence regarding the Waikato-Taupo hydro system, evidence prepared for the Mighty River Power consent application to Environment Waikato, undated (doc H33)

538. McConchie would use the word ‘uncontrolled’ to characterise the operation of the gates during this period, where we have used the phrase ‘ill-considered controls’. Water flows were more erratic than they had been before the 1940s, and less controlled than they were from the late 1960s onwards: see ibid.

539. Ibid, p 84

540. Ibid, p 83. McConchie notes that there is more water moving through the system since the Tongariro diversions have been in place, but argues convincingly that this is more than balanced by ‘controlled energy dissipation’.

541. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 115, 210–213, 238–240

542. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 437

543. Ibid, p 496

544. Ibid, p 470

545. Ibid, pp 491–496


547. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 249


549. GJ Anderson to PA Grace, 9 May 1927, in Tony Walzl (comp), supporting documents for reports on hydroelectricity issues, 2 vols, various dates (doc E1(a)), p 773

550. It will be recalled that ‘general lake level’ is the term used for the mean lake level during the period 1905 to 1939.
Chapter 19

Rangati Ratanga – Kawanatanga: Environmental Management

According to Maori, from Rangi and Papa came Wainui. Wainui is the Spiritual Guardian of all the waters of this world, whether it is sea, fresh or lagoon waters, that is Wainui. My ancestors say in the time when mountains could roam, the waters would converse.¹

Evidence of Tamati Kruger, 22 June 2005

The Tribunal made it clear from the commencement of this stage one inquiry that it did not intend to conduct a full investigation into environmental change in the Central North Island inquiry region from 1840. Instead, the inquiry focused on the management of natural resources.

On that basis, this chapter returns to the general theme of the entire report, namely the consistent demand from Central North Island iwi and hapu for recognition of their tino rangatiratanga over their taonga. This Treaty guarantee assured to Maori the right to exercise their autonomy by managing their own affairs, policies, and resources within the minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the State.

In this chapter, we refer to issues raised by claimants concerning both historical and current resource management regimes. In particular, we focus on evidence of the claimants, the Crown, and the two regional councils in the Central North Island in relation to lakes, natural water, rivers and streams, and their movement into wetlands and estuaries. In relation to the latter, we note the effects of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 and the restrictions on our jurisdiction in relation to the coastal area. However, we have traversed material concerning these areas where they form part of our discussion on impacts from river-works.

**Issues**

Taking into account the submissions from the parties and the nature of the evidence remaining for consideration, we have reduced the main issues for determination in this chapter to the following:

- To what extent has the Crown provided for Maori rangatiratanga in the environmental management of waterways?
- What has been the prejudice to Maori, if any, of any failure to provide for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental management of waterways?

Unsurprisingly, many of the environmental issues raised by the claimants deal with water and waterways, fisheries and geothermal resources. The location of a number of the waterways, lakes, and springs referred to in this chapter can be seen in map 19.1.
Map 19.1: Waterways of the Rotorua inquiry district
Allegations about the loss of authority and control over natural resources, and over water resources in particular, are central concerns for the claimants. The Crown acknowledges that many of the claimants’ concerns relate to Crown regulation of the natural environment and issues such as environmental degradation and pollution. We turn to the detail of their respective positions on this issue.

**The claimants’ case**

The claimants broadly allege that the Crown has failed to actively protect their rangatiratanga in resource management, and that this has impacted on their ability to manage and protect their taonga. Thus, the Crown has not enabled them to make decisions about the allocation of rights to access and use natural resources they consider to be taonga protected under the treaty of Waitangi, nor to make such decisions regarding the general management of those resources. The claimants contend that, at least until the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), only limited provision was made for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental management in the Central North Island. Tom Bennion submitted that because Maori interests in the environment were simply not considered in legislation before 1977, it goes without saying that the delegations of power under it also failed to consider the Maori interests under the Treaty. We were referred by various counsel for the claimants to examples where the delegation to local and regional authorities had failed to address the claimants’ concerns leading to significant prejudice.

In terms of the RMA, Mr Bennion acknowledged that there was widespread consultation with Maori preceding the enactment of the legislation, and that the RMA contains provisions which accord Maori issues a high level of standing. There are, for example, provisions that require local and regional councils to consult Maori when preparing regional and district policies and plans. There are provisions requiring similar consultation in terms of coastal planning. The Department of Conservation manages the coastal marine area, and the Minister of Conservation retains significant responsibilities in terms of the coastal environment. But Mr Bennion also submitted that the RMA fails to comply with the Treaty principles in a number of important respects. We deal with those arguments in our analysis below.

Ngati Tutemohuta alleged that the Crown – in continually excluding them from the management of the environment – has been, and continues to be, in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was contended that the Crown has allowed the ongoing exclusion of Maori from legislation concerning the environment and the delegation of authority to local government. This has marginalised Ngati Tutemohuta’s effective participation in environmental management. Other claimants pointed to the general failure to recognise their Treaty rights in water-resources or taonga over which the Treaty guaranteed Maori rangatiratanga.

**The Crown’s case**

The Crown concedes that undoubtedly the pre-Resource Management Act environmental management regimes did not generally recognise or take into account Maori values and interests in a manner now regarded as important and necessary.

The Crown does not accept that the RMA is deficient in terms of the principles of the Treaty. It says that the guarantee of rangatiratanga is not an absolute one. In its view, there are often multiple interests in natural resources within the Central North Island, and any management regime must necessarily carefully weigh these competing interests. The Crown contends that the current resource management regime contains important provisions recognising
that weight should be attached to Maori values and interests in environmental decision-making. Therefore, there is no proposal to substantially amend that legislation by, for example, amending section 8 of the Act, as recommended previously by the Waitangi Tribunal.\textsuperscript{11}

In the Crown’s view, the RMA, the Conservation Act 1987, and the Local Government Act 2002 provide a more comprehensive basis for the consideration of Maori interests in taonga such as lakes and waterways than the pre-1991 resource management regime.\textsuperscript{12}

The Crown submitted that the delegation of powers and functions to subordinate entities of government is complex. Crown counsel pointed to the system in place from the inception of the colony, the creation of provincial governments, and the eventual complex system of local government that emerged and proliferated before the local government reorganisation of 1989.\textsuperscript{13} The Crown argued that the Local Government Amendment Act 2002 provided for article 2 rights and Maori representation in local government. The Crown contended that the current RMA scheme struck an appropriate balance in terms of meeting its obligations under the Treaty with its responsibilities to provide for resource management and the needs of other New Zealanders. In its view, the greater participation of Maori in local government would address, in a practical manner, many of the concerns Maori have about the Act.

\textbf{Third-party submissions}

Both Environment Waikato and Environment Bay of Plenty submitted that it is the responsibility of the Crown to take account of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Mai Chen, for Environment Waikato, pointed to section 4 of the Local Government Act 2002 and contended that it clarifies the position. Section 4 of the Act provides:

\begin{quote}
In order to recognise and respect the Crown’s responsibility to take appropriate account of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and to maintain and improve opportunities for Maori to contribute to local government decision-making processes, Parts 2 and 6 provide principles and requirements for local authorities that are intended to facilitate participation by Maori in local authority decision-making processes.
\end{quote}

It was also submitted that in all environmental management issues, regional councils are guided by the overriding purpose of the RMA as set out in section 5 which requires the sustainable management of natural and physical resources.\textsuperscript{14} We note that the regional councils acknowledge that they must have specific regard to those matters listed in sections 6 to 8 of the Act, but, and as Ms Chen submitted, these matters are taken into account when decisions are evaluated against this guiding principle.\textsuperscript{15} In other words, the ability of the regional councils to recognise Maori rangatiratanga in resource management, or any Maori ownership interests in natural resources protected by the Treaty, is limited by the legislative framework of the Act.

\textbf{The Tribunal’s analysis}

We agree with Mr Bennion in his generic submissions for the claimants that the Crown has not provided for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental management. We start here by referring to chapter 2 where we set out the nature of the relationship Maori enjoyed with their natural resources and their management of them before 1840. We also considered this issue in chapters 17 and 18 in terms of springs, lakes, fisheries, and some of the rivers of the Central North Island. In chapter 20, we examine the relationship Maori had with geothermal resources and their management of them. In summary, and for the purposes of this chapter, we know that at 1840 the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island exercised their own authority, management, and control in accordance with tikanga over:

\begin{itemize}
\item the surface of land and its many resources;
\item all things on the land – forests, plants and wildlife resources;
\end{itemize}
On occasion, there was some concession to Maori concerns where Maori-owned land was affected by a proposed drainage or river work, or where the land was appropriated under the public works legislation. The Crown did, on occasion, provide some representation on local management boards. Representation on the boards was invariably shared with other members of the community, and appointment did not depend on an iwi or hapu mandate. We discuss the examples relevant to our case studies below.

There was also the opportunity for Maori involvement in some local government administration, as we discussed in part II of this report, and later, under the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945. There were, of course, the specific iwi statutory boards – such as the Te Arawa Maori Trust Board, and the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board – established to deal with the benefits of natural resource settlements. But these entities had no district-wide powers to manage all iwi or hapu resources. There does seem to have been some interaction through the Native Affairs Department, and there is evidence that Maori were consulted, but that evidence is limited, and raises more questions than answers, as we discuss below.

So no statutes of general application made any adequate provision either for iwi and hapu representation, or their customary rights and interests. Overall there seems little doubt that there was limited recognition given – in the general environmental regulatory regime before 1991 – to the right of Central North Island iwi or hapu to freely determine the form of local self-government they wished to use to manage the allocation and utilisation of their resources. As a result, they were forced to participate in an environmental resource management regime that reduced their rangatiratanga to little more than a consultative role. This led to significant prejudice, as their views were marginalised in general environmental management in favour of a process that balanced their interests against those of other users.

The Town and Country Planning Act 1953, and the Counties Act 1956, likewise made no provision for such
matters until after the Maori Land March in 1975. It was only after the review of the Act in the 1970s that the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 included section 3(1)(g) recognising ‘the relationship of Maori people, their culture and traditions with their ancestral land’, as a matter of national importance. It was a similar story with the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, which nationalised all uses of natural water – a matter we return to below. That statute did not make any express provision for Maori cultural and spiritual values and relationships with their waterways, but the High Court decision in the Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority (1987) imported recognition of those values into that regime. This decision had little time to become embedded, however, before the major local government and resource management law reform process of the 1980s.21

The Resource Management Act, along with a number of other statutes such as the Conservation Act 1987 and the Environment Act 1986 were the results of that review. The RMA is, along with the local government legislation, the primary legislation that we are concerned with in this chapter. As noted by the Whanganui River Tribunal:

Between 1986 and 1991, Parliament reviewed all legislation for the protection and use of New Zealand’s natural resources. A new legislative framework was established for the management of natural resources, and changes were made to the way that management decisions are made and carried out. The legislative package is principally represented in the Environment Act 1986, the Conservation Act 1987, and the Resource Management Act 1991.22

The Whanganui River Report contains, in chapter 10, a full discussion of the nature of the different statutes enacted as a result of the resource management law reforms. We do not propose to traverse those details in full again. Rather, we adopt the analysis therein provided while noting that there have been some amendments to the legislation relevant to the claims before us since that report. Where required, we address those in the analysis that follows. The only Act that we consider in detail in this section is the RMA.

Before we move to that analysis, we note that there was broad consultation with Maori regarding the Act. During the reforms, two papers released by the Ministry for the Environment are worth mentioning here. The first specifically advised that ‘the Government has agreed that the Resource Management Law Reform’ was ‘not the appropriate place to resolve ownership grievances, and that issues relating to Maori ownership of resources [were] not to be dealt with in this review’.23 The second paper, released in December 1988, noted that there should be ‘substantial recognition of the special interests of the tangata whenua in water’.24 This concern for Maori interests in natural water does not seem to have found its way into the RMA other than in the most general of ways. Rather, the Crown’s rights – founded in the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act 1903, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1921, and the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 – were preserved by the clause that would become section 354 of the RMA. Therefore, while issues of ownership of water resources were in theory pushed to the side and left unresolved, the Crown preserved its monopoly over the right to regulate the use of these resources and any benefits that derive from the management of them.

**The Resource Management Act 1991**

As we discussed in chapter 17, subject to the overriding and legitimate exercise of the Crown’s authority under article 1 of the Treaty of Waitangi, the position of the Maori Treaty partner with respect to the management of waterways is quite different from that of other New Zealanders. The Crown’s duty is to reflect this special position in legislative terms. The Crown cannot assume that under its article 1 power it has the sole right to manage the natural environment, either through a centralised or a delegated form of resource management. To the extent that any legislative framework is enacted that does not reflect this, such regime cannot be consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.
We turn now to consider the Resource Management Act. On its face, there has been some attempt made by the Crown to explicitly provide for Maori values and relationships with respect to their natural resources. The most relevant parts of the Act for our purposes are:

- the part II provisions of the Act;
- the consultation provisions regarding plans and policies; and
- section 33 and the joint management approach.

The issue, then, is the sufficiency of these provisions to meet the standards necessary for the Act to be consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by providing for Maori rangatiratanga over their natural resources.

The part II provisions of the Resource Management Act

Section five sets out the Act’s purpose as follows:

1. The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources.

2. In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while –

   a. Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and
   b. Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and
   c. Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment.

Under section 6 of the Act:

In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall recognise and provide for seven matters of national importance:

- The preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment (including the coastal marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers and their margins, and the protection of them from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development;
- The protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development;
- The protection of areas of significant indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna;
- The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga;
- The protection of historic heritage from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development;
- The protection of recognised customary activities.

Under section 7:

In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall have particular regard to –

- kaitiakitanga;
- the ethic of stewardship;
- the efficient use and development of natural and physical resources;
- the efficiency of the end use of energy;
- the maintenance and enhancement of amenity values;
- Intrinsic values of ecosystems;
- [Repealed].
- maintenance and enhancement of the quality of the environment;
- any finite characteristics of natural and physical resources;
- the protection of the habitat of trout and salmon.
He Maunga Rongo

(k) the effects of climate change:
(l) the benefits to be derived from the use and development of renewable energy.

Finally, section 8 provides that:

In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).

We accept the submissions made by Ms Chen for Environment Waikato that sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 set out a hierarchy of priorities and values to be considered during procedures under the RMA, and we discuss them more fully in chapter 20 of this report. All persons exercising powers and functions under the Act are to be guided by the express purpose of the Act as set out in section 5 – that is, the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. They must also have regard to matters listed in sections 6, 7, and 8: all factors listed contribute to an evaluation that must be done to fulfil the principal purpose of the Act in section 5. In the process, priority goes to matters of national importance in section 6 over matters listed in sections 7 and 8.

It is now settled law that those exercising powers under the RMA are not required to act in a manner consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Rather, they must engage in balancing each of these factors. Thus, all matters listed in sections 6 to 8 are evaluated one against the other. In chapter 17, we considered whether such an approach to Treaty rights is consistent with Treaty principles and concluded, as the Whanganui River Tribunal did, that it is not.

Furthermore – and again as Ms Chen points out – there is case law that suggests that section 8 does not give rise to any obligation on a decision maker under the RMA to consider additional obligations, beyond those listed in sections 6(e) and 7(a) of the Act. Thus, principles such as the partnership principle – with its accommodation between kawanatanga and rangatiratanga, its mutual benefit, and its reciprocity – cannot be weighed in the balance. Only those matters listed in sections 6 to 8 can. We also note the tendency in the legislation to overlook the fact that the kaitiakitanga listed in section 7 can exist only where there is rangatiratanga, because they are inextricably linked.

The consultation provisions regarding plans and policies: We note that the RMA splits responsibilities for national, regional, and local policy development and planning between the Minister for the Environment and the Minister of Conservation, regional councils, and district councils. In chapter 20, we review the extent to which planning documents under the Act reflect (if at all), Maori Treaty rights and interests by reference to issues concerning geothermal resources.

In preparing a regional policy statement or plan, clause 3(1)(d) of the first schedule to the Act requires local authorities to consult with tangata whenua through iwi authorities and tribal runanga. There are two obvious tensions arising from this approach. These are:

- How to deal with unstructured and under-financed groups not aligned with an iwi authority or tribal runanga. We note here that we were impressed with the amount of effort that both Environment Bay of Plenty and Environment Waikato have made in developing consultation processes with Maori. Environment Bay of Plenty, for example, had identified that there were 35 iwi groups within their region alone, most of whom were under-resourced and unable to participate in the initial planning processes of the council. This was recognised as early as 1993.

The common theme in the evidence before us was the very real challenges Maori face in effectively participating in RMA processes. It is clear that this continues to be a problem, even for hapu as organised as Ngati Kurauia at the southern end of Lake Taupo;

- The extent to which consultation may raise expectations amongst Maori that some enforceable...
recognition of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, including the guarantee to Maori of rangatiratanga, in the management of their resources will follow. Inevitably, owing to the circumscribed nature of the RMA, Maori will be disappointed and disillusioned, and blame those at the coal face – regional and district councils – when the real problem is the legislation itself. Essentially the problem remains that plans and policies can reflect only what the Act authorises and, as our study in chapter 20 demonstrates, that is not sufficient to ensure that Maori Treaty rights and interests are protected. The systemic problem is the legislation itself, not the adequacy or otherwise of the consultation processes adopted.

We also note the duty that section 35A imposes on local authorities to keep and maintain a record of the contact details for iwi authorities and any groups representing hapu; any iwi and hapu planning documents that have received local authority recognition; and those areas of the local authority’s region or district over which one or more iwi or hapu exercise kaitiakitanga. Again, this is a useful tool. However, recognition of iwi planning documents does not mean that those documents can be implemented. In addition, section 66(2A) of the RMA requires local and regional councils to take into account relevant planning documents recognised by an iwi authority lodged with them, but only to the extent that the content has a bearing on resource management issues in the region.

**Section 33 and the joint-management approach introduced under the Resource Management Act Amendment Act 2005:** The Resource Management Act does contemplate the possibility of a transfer of powers (never used in the Central North Island) to iwi authorities or runanga under section 33. There is also the possibility of negotiating a joint management agreement under the Resource Management Act Amendment Act 2005 (section 4 and section 36B of the RMA). We discuss the advantages of the joint management process in more detail below, but see this as a further mechanism that can be used to enable hapu and iwi to exercise some role in the management of their taonga. We note that where this is contemplated, there needs to be some careful consideration given to funding Maori participate in such arrangements. That is because, as Mr Warren for Ngati Tutemohuta has pointed out, the overwhelming evidence is that while Maori do not shirk from their responsibilities and obligations, they lack the resources – both economic and human – to assume such a role without support. That aside, the continued exclusion of Maori from any meaningful decision-making role under the RMA must be addressed and there is no doubt that these provisions could be used.

**The Tribunal’s findings**

On the basis of our discussions in this chapter (and the other chapters of part V), we begin by rejecting the Crown’s contention that the RMA is consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In doing so, we accept the submissions made by Mr Bennion that, while the Act is an advance on previous legislation, it still fails to accord with Treaty principles. It fails in the following important respects:

- During the reforms of the 1980s, the Crown indicated that ownership issues were not to be dealt with by the RMA. But the Crown then preserved its rights to control access to natural water, which it promptly delegated to regional or district councils. It also preserved its rights conferred by the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act 1903. Thus, while the section of the Coal-mines legislation vesting ownership in the Crown of all beds of navigable rivers was repealed, as was section 21 of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, section 354(1) of the RMA provides that the Crown’s rights conferred by these statutes continue. So the Crown’s position has never been diminished by the RMA. Conversely, the Maori position has been diminished. Their rights and interests have not progressed much further than where they were pre-1991. We take this view because section 6 simply indicates...
that the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, wahi tapu, and other taonga is a matter of national importance. Other than broadening the category of taonga that may be considered, this provision takes Maori little further than the Town and County Act 1977. Furthermore, taking into account kaitiakitanga, as listed in section 7, does not recognise that, in order to exercise kaitiakitanga, there had to be rangatiratanga. If that may not be taken into account when considering the meaning of kaitiakitanga and its relevance to the ‘matter of national importance’, then what is left? The answer has to be Maori cultural and spiritual values. This again takes Maori no further than was recognised in the Huakina Development Trust (1987) High Court decision. Finally, in terms of section 8 of the Act, all that can be considered may be restricted to those matters listed in part II. Therefore, we ask, what has been gained? The only answer must be perhaps a greater right to be consulted. Although not as sophisticated, that was already a feature of the pre-1991 regime.

The Crown's justification for these lack of gains for Maori is that there are a multitude of groups with interests in many of these resources, and only the Crown or its delegates may fairly and independently determine rights of allocation and use. Furthermore, only it or its delegates should be responsible for their management. The arguments are absolutist in the sense that they rely totally on article 1 of the Treaty of Waitangi and the right to govern. We reject such a contention on the basis that the Treaty right to govern in article 1 was also subject to the guarantee in article 2 of protection for what Maori possessed and the exercise of rangatiratanga over those possessions. We discussed the full extent of the Treaty guarantees in chapter 17.

There is no requirement on regional or district councils, when making decisions under the RMA, to give effect to Maori concerns because they are Treaty rights-holders. Contrast that with the requirement to give full expression to the purpose of the Act as set out in section 5. An example of the approach they must take comes from the decision in Te Runanga o Ati Awa ki Whakarongotai Inc v Kapiti District Council, where the majority of the Environment Court found that:

> We cannot see any way in which the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, the principles of s 7, or the principles of s 6 can be applied in a manner which would cause us to set to one side the all embracing community thrust of s 5, aimed as it is in the present case, at a living community suffering extraordinary difficulties and grief as a result of substandard arterials.30

While we recognise, in certain circumstances, the need to provide for all communities, an approach that can set aside Maori concerns in the manner described above is not acceptable. In our view, alternative options would need to be explored first before a proposal got to the point where it became a contest between competing interests.

The RMA fails to deal with the key issue of contested ownership of resources. As Mr Bennion pointed out, the Act itself does not recognise or allow those exercising powers under it to recognise situations where ownership of resources is contested by Maori.31 A consent authority, for example, cannot use this information to refuse an application for a resource consent. Rather, all a consent authority needs to assess is whether such access is consistent with the sustainable management of the resource and the other requirements of the Act. In other words, the consent authorities may not act in a manner consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, because they must act in accordance with the Act’s statutory regime.32 In this respect, we point to the evidence concerning geothermal resources which we discuss in detail in chapter 20.

As we discuss below and in chapter 20, the RMA fails to deal with historical issues. It does not look
backwards in any substantial way. As a result, the his-
toric degradation, damage, or pollution of a taonga
cannot be raised as more than background during
resource consent processes under the Act. Nor can a
consent authority consider the historical issues con-
cerning how an iwi or hapu has lost their ownership
of a resource or taonga.33 There is no requirement for
consent authorities to consider how Maori have been
placed historically in terms of these resources. While
they may do so, they are not required to do so by the
RMA.

We note the option for transfer of power under sec-
tion 33 of the Act. But it has never been used in the
Central North Island. We also note that while a local
authority may agree to enter into a joint-management
agreement under the Resource Management Act
Amendment Act 2005 (section 4 and section 36B of
the RMA), it is not required to do so. Herein lies the
problem for Maori: decisions to enter joint-manage-
ment arrangements are at the discretion of a local
or regional authority. This subordinates iwi or hapu
rangatiratanga because they cannot expect that such
decisions will be made or reviewed in accordance
with Treaty principles. Such agreements could only
ever operate in a manner consistent with the RMA,
which, as we have explained, is deficient in Treaty
terms.

As we note in detail in chapter 20, consultation with
Maori in the resource consent process is not a statu-
tory requirement under the Act unless they are recog-
nised landowners who may be affected by the grant of
a consent. (See section 36A of the Act.) Rather, con-
sultation is a matter left to the discretion of the staff
of the consent authority or the applicant for the con-
sent. While we note the decisions of the Environment
Court and the High Court suggesting that it would
be good practice to engage in such consultation, it is
unlikely that the failure to consult (given the new sec-
tion 36A of the Act), could now be used as the basis
for rejecting a resource consent application.34

Prejudice arising from the failure to provide
for rangatiratanga

Key question: What has been the prejudice to Maori,
if any, of any failure to provide for Maori rangatira-
tanga in environmental management of waterways?

We have considered a number of examples to ascertain
whether there has been prejudice to Central North Island
Maori because the Crown has failed to adequately provide
for Maori rangatiratanga in resource management. In the
main, this turns on how the Crown has delegated powers
and responsibilities to local authorities and other statu-
tory bodies charged with managing natural resources con-
sidered to be taonga by the claimants.

As we noted above, the right of Maori to exercise their
autonomy by managing their own policy, resources, and
affairs, within the minimum parameters necessary for the
proper operation of the State, extends to their waterways.
We turn now to the evidence that points to:

- historical difficulties that Maori have faced under the
pre-1991 resource management regime; and
- ongoing difficulties for iwi and hapu leading to prej-
udice under the RMA because of the Crown’s fail-
ure to provide for their rangatiratanga in resource
management.

The management of lakes

The health of the Central North Island lakes has been a
matter of widespread concern to claimants, to government
agencies, to district and regional councils and to residents
and recreational users. The major activities that have dom-
inated the economic life and landscape of the volcanic pla-
teau have each had impacts on water quality. We do not
intend to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the environ-
mental impacts on the lakes within our inquiry region, but
rather to adopt the University of Waikato researchers’ list
as a summary overview:

- The conversion of hill and riparian forests to pas-
toral agriculture has resulted in run-off, washing
animal waste, sediment, and fertiliser residues into waterways.

- Urbanisation, including tourist development, has added to the pressures, especially on Lakes Taupo and Rotorua. Waste water, especially from sewerage systems, is leaching unnecessary amounts of nutrients into the lake.
- Large-scale afforestation, with a single species of trees, has increased sediment discharge during the land-development phase. Wood-processing industries have increased the flow of toxic and non-toxic wastes into lakes.
- Lakes have been overfed with nutrients to the point that eutroph sets in, oxygen is depleted, water clarity lessens, and there are possibilities of toxic algae bloom.\(^{35}\)

We are also aware that there is significant dialogue between iwi, central government, and local government in this context, and that special management arrangements have been adopted for Te Arawa. However, that does not allow the Crown to escape from the primary point, as put by the claimants, that the damage has been done and it is the Crown that has a Treaty responsibility to rectify it. The burden of rectification should not be transferred to Maori. We agree with the conclusion reached by Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell:

Environmental legislation such as the Resource Management Act, and better management practices from local and regional councils, have gone some way to arresting the trend of environmental degradation. However, this is at the time when Te Arawa and Tuwharetoa are about to emerge as players in the region. They are likely to be unfairly handicapped in their efforts to develop their own resources as they are forced by restrictive legislation to pay the price of unchecked development . . . through most of the twentieth century.\(^{36}\)

Large-scale economic developments in agriculture, forestry, tourism, and hydroelectric power generation have brought prosperity to the nation, to the region, and to the cities and towns within the region. But these same developments, together with residential and holiday home developments, have impacted massively on the quality of the water in the lakes. The Crown acknowledges the problems and states that it is aware of the different sources of pollution in the Rotorua lakes and their tributaries. It notes that these matters are now the subject of catchment-wide mitigation measures.\(^{37}\) But it remains the Crown’s view, that the best way of dealing with these issues is through RMA processes, ‘given the reality of on-going land use in the Rotorua area’.

### The Rotorua lakes

The significance of the Rotorua lakes to Te Arawa is well documented and need not be rehearsed here.\(^{38}\) We have repeated some of the traditional history concerning the lakes in chapter 2.

However, as an example of the environmental concerns raised before the Tribunal in terms of the historical management of the lakes, we refer to issues raised by Ngati Hurungaterangi, Ngati Taeotu, and Ngati Kahu. D Shaw has described their history at Ngapuna in *Ngapuna: The Past Outlook for the Future*, a monograph produced in 1990 for the Ngapuna combined marae committee.

The claimants relied on the evidence provided in the report by Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell.\(^{39}\) Ngapuna is situated on the south-eastern side of Lake Rotorua. It is sited on alluvial land, near the Puarenga Stream, one of the largest flowing into Lake Rotorua.\(^{40}\) The Puarenga Stream runs through the Whakarewarewa Village and is where children dive for coins thrown by tourists. Environmental issues affecting the water catchment around Ngapuna include the impact of farming developments, wood-processing industries, and urban and industrial expansion.

The claimants allege that the surrounds of the Ngapuna Marae, the suburban community where many Ngapuna residents live, the Puarenga Stream, the Ngapuna wetlands, beach, swimming holes, and the Ngapuna geothermal sinter flats have all been affected by the mismanagement of
the immediate water catchment. This mismanagement has resulted in adverse impacts from domestic, forestry, and industrial waste disposal. Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell identify the following historical causes:

- the Rotorua municipal sewage scheme in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s;
- run-off from Whakarewarewa Forest spray irrigation in the 1980s and 1990s;
- run-off and leaching into groundwater from the old municipal dump site and the new municipal dump site;
- discharge from the Waipa State Sawmill and the Peka and Ngapuna industrial parks; and
- run-off and air pollution from State Highway 5 and State Highway 30.

The legislative history of water management forms the backdrop to the claimants’ concerns. Basically, the claimants allege that they have been prejudiced by the historical failure of the environmental legislation to deal with Maori issues. This, combined with the low level of environmental awareness, poor zoning requirements and land-use choices, and minimal legislative protection, has adversely affected their cultural way of life. The impact was particular felt at Ngapuna, which was once predominantly rural and comprised largely Maori land. Subsistence production was an important part of the lives of the claimants until 1965. We were advised that many Maori left Ngapuna as a result of land sales following the partition of the Maori land there. The Ngapuna lands were once to be included in the Ngapuna consolidation scheme. Difficulties with the scheme meant that it was never finalised. The object of the combined partition was to provide house sites with titles that could be registered. The scheme was approved by the Maori Land Court in 1961, and finalised in 1965. Despite many leaving, a number of Maori residents remained to face the impacts of development.

In the late 1960s, the decision was made to locate the Rotorua municipal sewerage scheme at Ngapuna. Pursuant to a water right, sewage was pumped directly from these works into the Puarenga Stream, which itself flowed into Lake Rotorua. There was widespread concern that Lake Rotorua was eutrophic and that the metropolitan sewerage scheme would continue to contribute to the problem. In the 1960s, Lake Rotorua was famously described as an ‘unflushed toilet’.

Reports commissioned in the 1970s resulted in proposals for modifications to the existing sewerage system for Rotorua which would reduce the amount of treated effluent and discharge it by a new pipeline not into Lake Rotorua, but into the Kaituna River. The pipeline scheme was the subject of claims to the Waitangi Tribunal, which reported on the claims in the Report on the Kaituna River Claim (1989) and recommended that land-disposal options be considered as an alternative. That Tribunal considered the impact of pumping effluent into the Puarenga Stream. Their comments bear repeating here:

At present the treated effluent from the City’s Waste Water Treatment Plant is discharged to the Puarenga Stream and enters the lake at the bay a short distance away. He [Dr WF Donovan of Bioresearches Ltd] noted the acid conditions of the bay and that the phosphorus discharge from the plant appeared to be largely removed as the stream water flowed across it. A reduction in coliform bacteria was also attributed to a die-off in Sulphur Bay waters. In brief, the potential of the treatment plant effluent in terms of its nutrient concentration to lake waters is reduced by the passage of the effluent through that bay. We noted also that for those same reasons Sulphur Bay does not support fish or plant life. It is associated with thermal activity, has a visibly cloudy appearance and is not used by the Maori people or the general public for recreational or food-gathering purposes.

The eventual outcome was that the Crown subsidised a spray irrigation system, which removed liquid effluent into the Whakarewarewa pine forest, not into the lake or the Kaituna River. The water right authorising the Rotorua District Council to discharge treated city effluent into the Whakarewarewa forest was granted on 23 September 1988 by the Bay of Plenty Catchment Board under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 for a period of 12 years expiring.
He Maunga Rongo

55 The rotorua District Council was granted a resource consent under the RMA to continue this scheme. This solution was sound in concept and, for the most part, protected Lake rotorua from further discharge for a period. It seems however, that intensive spraying in the forest has subsequently caused leakage of nutrients via the puarenga Stream.

58 as we note below, this has required further work on a new proposal to divert water from Lake rotorua via a wall from the Ohau Channel direct to Okere Falls and into the Kaituna River. The irony does not escape us, given the Tribunal’s role in the past.

Another contributor to the environmental concerns of the claimants has been the impact of the Waipa State Sawmill, set up in 1939 by the New Zealand Forest Service. This operation, as more trees were milled in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, expanded to become a very large-scale operation. From the 1950s to the late 1980s, pentachlorophenol was used, in large quantities, for timber preservation, with the result that the Waipa site became one of the most contaminated in New Zealand. Soil and dust were contaminated, and contaminated groundwater migrated towards the Waipa Stream, a tributary of the Puarenga Stream. There were arguments before us regarding the accuracy of the measurement of contamination involved, but that does not detract from the point that some contamination occurred. It was not until 1991 that the Government and the New Zealand Forestry Corporation banned the use of pentachlorophenol. The Forestry Corporation began to remove contaminated dust and intercept contaminated groundwater from 1993, and has thus mitigated to an extent some of the problems. During resource consent hearings, Maori, including the Whakarewarewa Maori Committee, have publicly expressed concern about the impact of this contamination on the health of their communities.

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64 Around the mid-1960s, the Rotorua County Council zoned substantial portions of Ngapuna as industrial. Industrial development has continued at Ngapuna in the Peka and Puarenga industrial parks, and sawmills have continued to operate close to residential areas. Water discharge consents under the RMA – for a number of industries to discharge waste water into the drains and streams which run through residential areas, adjacent to the children’s playground, and eventually into the streams and wetlands – were raised as continuing issues.

66 Aside from the Ngapuna and Puarenga Stream examples, other claimants – particularly from Ngati Rangiteaorere, Ngati Hinekura, Ngati Te Takinga, Ngati Rongomai, Ngati Rangiunuora, Ngati Makino and Ngati Tamakari – raised issues concerning the management of the lakes. Te Ariki Morehu told us about his frustration at the management practices of statutory authorities during their various and many historical attempts to deal with nitrates, weed, and other pollutants entering Lake Rotoiti via the Ohau
Channel from Lake Rotorua. He also told us about the works at Okere Falls. He alleged that this had occurred with minimal tangata whenua participation. Mr Whata-Wickliffe raised similar concerns about the management of the lakes and tributaries.

Nutrient loading in the lakes has been an ongoing concern. The largest nutrient inputs into Lake Rotorua by 1991 were run-off from pastoral farms, septic effluent, and urban run-off. Lake Rotokaiti has also been affected as the waters discharge from Lake Rotorua via the Ohau Channel. The land-use patterns around the Rotorua lakes have contributed to the problem. Moves to retire land to protect against nutrient loading were discussed before us. As early as the late 1970s, the local authority in Rotorua had implemented a policy of encouraging the ‘retirement’ of land around some Rotorua lakes, so that water run-off from the land would not carry nutrients into the lakes. According to Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell, and as an example of what measures have been taken, 16 kilometres of fencing around Lake Rotoiti has been erected around the water’s edge and 22,000 revegetation plants have been planted. This scheme has not been implemented without its critics, and some of the evidence before us, from Pirihiira Fenwick for example, raised historical concerns regarding the limited participation of tangata whenua in decisions affecting the lakes, and the burden placed on Maori landowners to contribute land to the schemes.

There was, however, insufficient technical evidence to take many of the issues raised by the claimants before us any further at this Stage One level. Furthermore, we note that historical issues concerning the lakes are now ‘settled’ by the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006 and, given the new management regime that has been introduced, it is unlikely that future management issues will need to be addressed any further at any time soon. That does not preclude the parties from researching the effects of historical pollution on specific communities such as Ngapuna, and the way that that pollution is managed, for the purposes of negotiations.

Nevertheless, there are other issues raised in this chapter concerning matters that, in our view, are not settled by the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006. By section 11 of that Act, ‘Te Arawa lakes’ means:

(a) Lakes Ngahewa, Ngapouri (also known as Opouri), Okareka, Okaro (also known as Ngakaro), Okataina, Rerewhakaaitu, Rotoehu, Rotoiti, Rotoma, Rotomahana, Rotorua, Tarawera, Tikitapu, and Tutaeananga; and
(b) the water, fisheries, and aquatic life in those lakes; but
(c) does not include the islands in those lakes or the land abutting or surrounding those lakes.

The schedules to the Deed of the Settlement of the Te Arawa Lakes Historical Claims and Remaining Annuity Issues, and in particular schedule 1, deal with a number of relationships, including protocols between the Te Arawa Lakes Trust with the Department of Conservation, the Minister of Fisheries and the Minister for the Environment. These protocols do not override the RMA or restrict the ability of the Crown to interact with or consult any persons, including iwi, hapu, marae, or whanau or other representative of tangata whenua. Finally, the protocols refer to the rivers and streams flowing into and out of any one of the Te Arawa lakes, but these references are not sufficient to exclude our jurisdiction in terms of these tributaries, given the precise definition of the Te Arawa lakes in section 11.

We particularly note the establishment of the Rotorua Lakes Strategy Group comprising representatives from the Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Rotorua District Council. Pursuant to section 48 of the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, the Group is deemed a permanent joint committee within the meaning of clause 30(1)(b) of schedule 7 of the Local Government Act 2002. The Group is a permanent committee and must not be discharged unless each organisation agrees to it being discharged. Under section 49 of the 2006 Act, the purpose of the Group is to contribute to the promotion of the sustainable management of the Rotorua lakes and their catchments,
for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations, while recognising and providing for the traditional relationship of Te Arawa with their ancestral lakes. Under section 51(5), the trustees of the Te Arawa Lakes Trust have the right to attend any meeting of the Group; but they do not have the right to attend meetings of the Bay of Plenty Regional Council or the Rotorua District Council merely because of their status as members of the Group. We recognise the important developments under the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, but these developments do not prevent the application of the RMA with all its attendant systemic issues discussed above in this chapter. Furthermore, neither the 2006 Act nor the Deed settles all aspects of claims concerning water resources outside the lakes.79 We have, therefore, focused later in this chapter on a number of case studies concerning natural water and waterways or bodies from the Rotorua district.

However, we turn now to consider the impacts of the Crown’s failure to provide for Maori rangatiratanga in the management of Lake Taupo and the impacts on Ngati Tuwharetoa as the owners of riparian lands around the lake.

Lake Taupo: the ‘proposed Taupo Basin reserves scheme’ and the current proposed variation under the Resource Management Act
The claimants’ case
Ms Feint for Ngati Tuwharetoa told us about the Taupo Basin reserves scheme,80 which evolved out of the 1960s Government policy to review and restrict land use around the shores of Lake Taupo to protect it from increasing nitrification.81 Parcels of land proposed and designated as reserves under this scheme are shown in map 19.2. The scheme was ultimately never implemented. But the case for Ngati Tuwharetoa was that the scheme was effectively in operation for a period of ‘nigh twenty years’ and that this caused prejudice to Maori landowners by restricting their ability to use their lands.82 The Tuwharetoa Maori Trust...
Board backed the scheme because rates would be deferred on Maori-owned land. However, an important condition of their consent was that if the owners wished, the proposed reserve zoning designation would be lifted, or there would be an exchange of land (rather than sale) acceptable to the owners. Ms Feint contended that the Crown's assurance that it would not take Maori land for the Taupo lakeshore reserves scheme compulsorily was crucial to the board's support for the scheme.

Ms Feint pointed out that while lands were never taken for the scheme, the property rights of landowners were affected by the placing of the 'Proposed Lakeshore Reserve' designation over the land. This, combined with rural zoning, prevented the owners developing the land even though it was not officially reserved. Attempts made by landowners at Waihaha underscored how difficult it was for the residents to have such designations lifted. Ms Feint points out that it has been large-scale development permitted by the Crown or its delegates that has contributed to the environmental issues concerning the lake, yet Tuwharetoa were being asked to fix these problems by surrendering their ancestral lands round the lake. Hence, Ms Feint contends that this scheme was an example of Ngati Tuwharetoa being expected to shoulder the burden of environmental protection for Lake Taupo.

The Crown's case

The Crown, in response, argues that environmental protection of Lake Taupo is a complex issue and is subject to considerable, ongoing commitment by regional and central government. The Crown acknowledges that Tuwharetoa and other Maori are major landowners in the catchment, owning 110,627 hectares or 41 per cent of the land there. This excludes the lakebed itself. The Crown noted that nitrogen is the primary pollutant of Lake Taupo. It contends that nitrogen output levels are highest from urban and pastoral land, but are low from forestry and undeveloped land. Of the pastoral land, 47 per cent of the farms are owned by Tuwharetoa and other Maori landowners, and the remaining farms are split equally between Crown and private interests. Tuwharetoa owns 55 per cent of the forestry land in the catchment. Forestry, the Crown submits, is important in the ongoing environmental management of the area. The Crown notes that George Asher considered that the Crown investment in the Lake Taupo and Lake Rotoa Forest Trusts has had the 'greatest positive impact' on the lake and waterways of the catchment. Of the undeveloped land in the catchment, 67 per cent is owned by the Crown and is principally Department of Conservation land. The balance, a third, is owned by Ngati Tuwharetoa.

In these circumstances, initiatives to reduce nitrogen levels will target land with high nitrogen outputs. As a result Ngati Tuwharetoa and other Maori landowners' pastoral interests were and are going to be affected.

The Crown argued that the Taupo Basin reserves scheme – although covering a large amount of land at its inception – was subject to a process of consultation, in which Ngati Tuwharetoa was deeply involved. The lakeshore reserves proposal, as initially envisaged, did not eventuate. Little land was alienated, with only one example being recorded: 17 acres at Waitahanui taken to retire a rating debt, rather than as an acquisition for the reserves scheme. The Crown submits that the scheme was not a 'land grab' as contended in evidence for the claimants, but was rather intended to preserve the water quality and health of Lake Taupo, a 'significant taonga for Tuwharetoa and a considerable national asset'. The Crown contended that there were significant difficulties in quantifying the area of land where reserve designations were used and the length of time they remained in place. The land area was significantly less when the proposed reserves zoning regulations were placed over the land. Of the 18,601 hectares targeted for the scheme in 1984, only 5500 hectares by that time had been gazetted. It is not known how much of this land was Maori land.

The Crown also submits that there was limited prejudice caused by the scheme because:

- there is no evidence Maori land was taken;
the area of land originally proposed to be included in the scheme was significantly reduced when the proposed reserves zoning designations were placed over the land;

the Taupo County Council’s Rates Remission and Postponement Act 1970 was enacted to assist owners where there were large rate demands and the land could not be developed due to the reserve designation;

the zoning designations can be changed, as the evidence of Mr Chrystall demonstrated; and

there is insufficient evidence before us to substantiate the claim that the designations prevented the development of Tuwharetoa lands, and saw the iwi carrying a disproportionate share of the burden.94

The Crown made only limited comment on the Environment Waikato nitrates policy to be incorporated into planning documents under the Resource Management Act. The Crown considered that, given the poor water quality of Lake Taupo, protective measures are necessary. An approach that involves all land users was the only viable method, given the nature of the challenges faced to improve water quality.95

Environment Waikato submissions
The issues concerning the proposed Taupo Basin reserves scheme were historical issues so were not the subject of any direct response from Environment Waikato. It did make submissions on its proposal to vary its regional plan to reduce nitrate emissions, and we discuss those submissions below.

The Tribunal’s analysis regarding the management of Lake Taupo
As we noted in chapter 18, all parties agree that Lake Taupo is a taonga of Ngati Tuwharetoa. We found that Ngati Tuwharetoa’s Treaty rights extended to a right to the use and control of access to ‘Taupo waters’ and to rights to develop those waters. As we have found, Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga possessed the lakes and rivers of their region as taonga, and article 2 guaranteed their rangatiratanga over and possession of them. In our analysis, we first consider the origins and impacts of the Taupo Basin reserves scheme on Ngati Tuwharetoa, which was a feature of land-use planning before the RMA. We then discuss the current nitrate policy adopted by Environment Waikato under the RMA and ascertain its effects, if any, on Ngati Tuwharetoa and their relationship with their lands and Lake Taupo. Finally, we assess what the implications of these different policies and schemes have been for Ngati Tuwharetoa’s exercise of their rangatiratanga.

Origins and nature of the Taupo Basin reserves scheme
The Taupo Basin reserves scheme followed widespread concern expressed by the public and a local body, the Taupo County Council, in the 1950s and early 1960s about the state of the lake’s water and surrounding countryside. The Taupo County Council sent a deputation to meet with the Honourable Mr Seath, Minister of Internal Affairs, with proposals ‘designed to preserve the natural beauties and attractions of Lake Taupo by creating reserves along the shores of the lake’.96 The proposed scheme required that land around the lake and some of its tributaries be reserved. Following a report from Taupo County Council in 1964 and a central government officials’ report in 1966, central and local government initiated the Taupo Basin reserves scheme in 1968.97 The intention was to preserve the lake’s water quality by preventing further sediment and nitrate loading.98 Both problems were a direct outcome of large-scale developments and of farming practices, including the clearing of the bush and the establishment and fertilising of pasture.99

Cabinet moved on the proposal by appointing an ‘Officials Committee on Lake Taupo Reserves’, which included representatives of the Department of Maori Affairs. This committee recognised that the county’s proposal was ‘likely to be strongly opposed by Maori owners of land involved’.100 In fact, Ngati Tuwharetoa’s concerns regarding the scheme were publicly aired at the Prichard–Waetford committee of inquiry charged with investigating
Maori land use in June 1965. This did not stop officials from moving to identify land available for the reserves scheme. The *Taupo Times* reported in March 1966 that the investigations into the Taupo reserves were the biggest ever undertaken by a Cabinet subcommittee, ‘with thousands of maps, aerial photographs, plans and reports being considered’.

The Cabinet subcommittee received the officials’ report in early 1966. The 18-page report noted that the Taupo scheme was ‘desirable and practicable, and that the Taupo County Council should be commended for its foresight and imagination in initiating the proposal’. The committee identified 38,000 acres for inclusion in the scheme. By far the greatest area of non-Crown land earmarked for the reserves belonged to Maori. Though there is dispute about how much land was eventually included, all parties before us agree that a significant proportion of the total land identified for the proposed reserves was Maori land or Crown land. The breakdown identified by officials before the scheme was implemented was as follows in table 19.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Area (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maori land</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown land and reserves</td>
<td>12,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freehold land</td>
<td>2,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State forest land</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, it can be seen from table 19.1 that the success of the scheme would depend on the cooperation of Maori landowners.

There was an additional concern: the land around the greater Lake Taupo area was the largest undeveloped area of land in the country at the time and demonstrably capable of higher production. The officials’ committee recommended a number of matters, including the setting-up of a study group to consider future use of undeveloped land on the eastern side of Lake Taupo and that the Government should guide development along the lines of ‘preferred use’ to be recommended by the group. The committee finally recommended that:

- **(a)** No special controlling authority be set up.
- **(b)** The reserves set aside be administered by the Department of Lands and Survey and by the local authorities in accordance with the policy for the administration of other reserves.
- **(c)** A policy based on the Government’s decision on the Taupo County Council’s proposals be laid down for the protection of the Taupo basin.
- **(d)** A committee, to be called the Taupo Basin Co-ordinating Committee, be set up comprising representatives of the interested Government Departments and local authorities with power to co-opt and to be responsible to the Minister of Internal Affairs, to ensure that effective liaison is maintained and to advise Government on any steps necessary to maintain adherence to the policy laid down.

Cabinet approved the scheme in principle in October 1966. A publicity leaflet about the Lake Taupo Reserves Scheme was circulated at the time and it included a summary of the scheme and the recommendations of the officials’ committee approved in principle by Cabinet.

It is apparent from the official report that the Crown promoted the idea of using designations to control development. A note from the Taupo county engineer, G.B. Burton, indicated that this was done. We also know that Taumarunui and Taupo councils moved to limit urban development and designate several thousand acres as lakeshore reserve. David Chrystall told us that the designations imposed ‘compromised the whole question of “voluntary negotiation”’ for land and that once reserve designation was part of a district scheme, acquisition became ‘enforcement by Statute’.

We also know that Ngati Tuwharetoa held a hui in 1967 to discuss the scheme. The hui expressed concerns about
the Crown’s power to compulsorily take the land: ‘uppermost was the thought that the Government could use a proclamation to obtain the land.’ A general feeling was reported that the iwi should retain its tribal lands – a suggestion for creating a Maori reserve was not strongly supported. Certainly, the prospect of using these powers was not far from the minds in the Taupo County Council. Ngati Tuwharetoa did eventually agree to the reserves plan, but only on certain conditions. Mr McBurney notes that Ngati Tuwharetoa expected:

the land to be set aside as ‘proper reserves, for all time, for the use of the people and with adequate roading.’ Once again Tuwharetoa asked that suitable areas be earmarked for subdivisions. The Trust Board expressed a preference for afforestation rather than land development for farming on both the eastern and western shores of the lake. They also gave approval for the provision of a marina at Tokaanu . . . the Trust Board representative, Councillor L. E. Grace, stated that the Maori owners now felt that they could negotiate in the required land transfers.

The next event relevant to our inquiry occurred in June 1968, when the Reserves Study Group, proposed by officials in 1966, completed its report. It recommended the creation of solid forestry zones to the north and south of the lake, with a solid farming zone to the south-east. These recommendations appear to have been rejected. However, Cabinet did eventually agree to the establishment of the Taupo Basin Coordinating Committee. The Ngati Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board and Maori landowners were represented on the committee. During the initial meeting of this committee, participants were told that the Government had no intention of using its powers to acquire land by way of compulsory acquisition. Two subcommittees dealing with roading and river reserves were also established. Maori were not represented on either of these committees.

As Mr McBurney notes, it would take years to acquire lands for the scheme. In many cases, however, acquisition of the land was unnecessary as both the Taupo County Council and the Taumarunui County Council in their district schemes could impose a reserve designation over the land under the Town and County Planning Act. This allowed the councils to identify land as ‘proposed lakeshore reserve’, which restricted owners’ use of the property without either local or central government having to buy or arrange an exchange for the affected land, or compensate the owners.

We note that as early as 1970, Ngati Tuwharetoa began expressing concerns that the scheme was not progressing in the manner that they had contemplated. On 7 September 1970, the full Taupo Basin Coordinating Committee met in Wellington and agreed to permit Mr R Feist, legal representative for Ngati Tuwharetoa, to attend for the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board. He raised the board’s fears that procedures under the Town and Country Planning Act would defeat the stated policy of negotiation and agreement in the designation and acquisition of Maori land for reserves. He continued:

In many cases, no objections had been lodged to the proposed district scheme as the Maori owners had expected that negotiations would eventually be open to them. Reference was made to the five appeals now before the Town and County Planning Appeal Board which had been adjourned by consent of the Taupo County Council. Should these appeals be unsuccessful would the negotiation and agreement procedure be later available to his clients? They could abandon their appeals on the basis that the final decision would be arrived at by voluntary negotiation.

Assurances were given to Maori owners that their land would not be taken by compulsion, but that ‘a pre-requisite to the reserves scheme was that local authorities were required to produce district schemes under the Town and Country Planning Act.’ The Government had stipulated that no negotiations were to take place until the district schemes had been completed.

Thenceforth, the issue of the designations continued to plague Maori landowners. Mr McBurney cites many examples of objections from Maori landowners of several blocks.
affected by the designations. This includes one objection in 1984, from Hepi Hoani Te Heuheu, Rangikamutua Downs, and Huri Maniapoto, as trustees of the Tauranga-Taupo block, to the ‘proposed lakeshore reserve’ designation being applied to a part of that block. The claimants before us also cite examples of Maori landowners discovering that their land had been designated proposed lakeshore reserve with no notification, and, failing in their attempts to negotiate alternatives with the councils involved.

Failure to respect and provide for the rangatiratanga of Ngati Tuwharetoa

We note that the case for Ngati Tuwharetoa reflects their general concern that their resources have been targeted by the Crown, and that the Taupo Basin reserves scheme was another example of many previous initiatives in which the Crown focused on their property to further national objectives.

Ngati Tuwharetoa now say that there were elements of coercion involved for their leadership when they agreed to the Taupo Basin reserves scheme. The evidence indicates that the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board had little choice but to agree to the scheme. The alternative was complete loss of control of their taonga. Stephen Asher’s evidence, for example, was that the Taupo County Council and the Crown deliberately excluded Ngati Tuwharetoa when developing the reserves scheme. When the iwi became aware of what was proposed there was a ‘very strong’ belief that it was strategically necessary to support the scheme otherwise the Crown would simply take the land it wanted. Support remained conditional and reluctant, offered on the basis of:

- no compulsory acquisition of land under the Public Works Act;
- a rating exemption, which included writing off unpaid rates; and
- a proviso that if owners wished to develop land then the reserve designation would be lifted or land acceptable to the owners would be provided in exchange.

It was Mr Asher’s evidence that the Taupo County Council designated areas of Maori land as ‘proposed lakeshore reserve’ and left this designation in place, even after the scheme was no longer considered necessary. In his view, the council did not honour its undertaking to remove the designation on request. The results were twofold:

- For the Maori owners, the designation inhibited development. If they did succeed in having the designation removed, the land became rateable and therefore immediately incurred a cost, but was still not able to be developed because of the ‘very restrictive’ rural
zoning. Attempts to change the zoning were costly and unlikely to succeed, as the lakeshore reserve had priority and the council’s district scheme was restrictive in nature.

The Taupo County Council and the Crown effectively gained the lakeshore reserve without ever having to pay for it. No money was provided to acquire or lease the land, or to compensate the owners, yet the reserve designation, the potential rates burden, and the rural zoning meant the owners were unable to use it.

Waihaha is an example of the impact of the proposed reserves scheme. David Chrystall, an architect and town and country planner, was approached to do some work on behalf of the Waihaha landowners. In particular, Hariata Cairns wished to improve her house. Mr Chrystall discovered that some of the land on Waihaha 3B2 had been designated ‘proposed lakeshore reserve’ by the Taumarunui County Council. None of the shareholders in the Waihaha block had been notified. In addition to the reserve designation, the zoning of the land was rural. Some of the land on the lakeshore was designated residential, but most of that area was swampland and could not be used.

Mr Chrystall told us of his long struggle to help the Maori landowners at Waihaha to have the ‘proposed lakeshore reserve’ designation and underlying rural zoning lifted. His evidence demonstrates both how difficult it was for Maori to have the designation removed, and how confusing the process was.

In 1971, a formal objection to the designation was filed for the owners, and submissions were presented to the Taumarunui County Council. In December 1973, the decision of the county was released disallowing the objection, and leaving a three-chain reserve designation along the lakeshore with the rest of the block zoned rural. An appeal was lodged in February 1974 and heard in December 1975 by the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board. On discovering that the council had not considered all material made available either by the owners or the Ministry of Works, the appeal board adjourned the hearing and encouraged the parties to resolve the matter by negotiation. Attempts to reach a settlement failed. In 1976, the county made application for the appeal board to reconvene the hearing on the grounds that agreement was not possible. According to Mr Chrystall, the appeal board declined to do so, preferring to make the district scheme operative with Waihaha 3B2, 3C, and 3E2 excluded.

Mrs Gardiner gave a further example of the impact of the Taupo Lakeshore Reserve scheme on Maori landowners. After returning to Turangi in 1983 they applied for building consent to put a tomato hothouse on their property. They discovered that a section of their land next to their whanau papakainga was proposed lakeshore reserve. The reserve section is four or five kilometres away from the lake and behind Maunganamu. As a result they were not able to build the hothouse. The Gardiners had no notification of the proposed lakeshore reserve designation being applied to their land.

Mr McBurney suggests that from the mid-1970s widespread opposition and lack of money combined with the Reserves Act 1977 – which made acquisition of Maori land more difficult – to defeat the Taupo Basin reserves scheme. In 1978 the Taumarunui County Council deleted the reserve designations it had made because of lack of progress with the scheme. A 1989 report by Peter Crawford, planning and inspection manager at the Taupo County Council, found that the rates relief had resulted in owners having no incentive to use the land. Additionally, many members of the public were under the impression that land designated as proposed lakeshore reserve was publicly owned, though in fact it remained private land. Crawford also concluded that the council had not dealt with owners promptly and fairly, and recommended that compensation be paid. This was not done. In 1989, the Taupo County Council finally abandoned the scheme.

Although the Taupo Basin reserves scheme was never fully implemented, the de facto form of the scheme existed for 20 years, preventing Ngati Tuwharetoa from using their land. The impact of the scheme was felt for a long time afterwards. Many Maori landowners, Stephen Asher told
us, think that the lakeshore reserve scheme is still in place, and consequently believe that the use and development of their land is restricted. In his view, the Crown and the local authority have failed to dispel this belief.¹⁴⁵

Ngati Tuwharetoa say they always understood that the owners were to have the right to have designations lifted. But, as we have seen from the Waihaha example, that was probably never going to be possible given the requirements concerning district schemes. In this community, Maori landowners found themselves unable to use or develop their land because of the joint effects of the reserve designation and rural zoning.¹⁴⁶ Mr McBurney documents in detail the history behind the sale of land at Waitahanui Spit for non-payment of rates.¹⁴⁷ The Maori Land Court ordered the sales, but we note and agree with Mr McBurney that there was no need to order the sale of prime lakeside lands to meet the unpaid rates. These lands were to be sold to the Crown and included in the Taupo Basin reserves scheme. We consider that the impacts for the owners such as Harvey Karaitiana were unfortunate and extremely unfair.

The claimants say that the conditions under which Ngati Tuwharetoa engaged with and initially approved the proposed lakeshore reserve scheme were not honoured and, as a result, their rangatiratanga over their taonga and their lands was undermined. On our reading of the evidence, we agree with them. In the end, it is not how much land was alienated that is the issue here. It is the fact that their lands were subjected to these designations for such a lengthy period. That is the issue that the Crown must confront.

The Resource Management Act and ‘control’ by Environment Waikato

Even though the Taupo Basin reserves scheme was finally abandoned in the 1980s, concerns regarding the clarity of Lake Taupo continued. By 1997, there were anxieties that lake clarity was continuing to be compromised by the ever-increasing levels of nitrate flowing into the lake. In that year, local citizens formed a Lakes and Waterways Action Group to advocate for the protection of the lake. In 2001 the Lake Taupo Accord was signed by Ngati Tuwharetoa, the Government, and Environment Waikato.¹⁴⁸ We have listened to and read the scientific submissions relating to the waters of Lake Taupo. We are not convinced that nitrogen levels alone are the reason for the changes in lake clarity and water quality. Both have been profoundly influenced by the implementation of the Tongariro Power Development scheme, with a consequent inflow of sediment, and by changes in the seasonality of lake levels and the impact of this on the microbiology of the lake. Nitrogen levels are a simple parameter, attractive from the perspective of economic and physical planners. Research programmes, designed to measure and reduce nitrogen levels, are soundly based but narrowly construed: they overlook other important dimensions of the problem.

Be that as it may, in 2000 an issues and options paper was developed for managing water quality in Lake Taupo.¹⁴⁹ This formed the basis of much discussion with the public and Ngati Tuwharetoa.¹⁵⁰ The Taupo-nui-a-Tia 2020 project began in 2001, supported by the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board, the Government, the Taupo District Council, and Environment Waikato for the purpose of supporting ‘community values for the future.’¹⁵¹ This began with a three-year project (from 2001 to 2004) funded by the Ministry for the Environment to develop a long-term plan for the sustainable development of the Lake Taupo catchment. The project addressed 14 different community values for the catchment, including a subset of values related to water quality.¹⁵² Consultations were held with iwi and community groups, including the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board and the Lakes and Waterways Action Group.

As a result of this initial project, the 2020 Joint Management Group was formed to consult more widely and prepare the 2020 Taupo-nui-a-Tia Action Plan.¹⁵³ The project brought together the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board, Environment Waikato, the Taupo District Council, the Department of Conservation, the Department of Internal Affairs, and the Lakes and Waterways Action Group.¹⁵⁴ We note that the plan was signed by the Ariki, Tumu Te Heuheu, and asserts the values of Ngati
Tuwharetoa (as distinct from those of the community) in the following terms:

The hapu of Ngati Tuwharetoa assert their custodial and customary right of tino rangatiratanga over Taupo-Nui-A-Tia and will collectively sustain and protect the mauri of these tribal taonga.\textsuperscript{155}

According to the evidence we heard, Environment Waikato appears to acknowledge that Ngati Tuwharetoa is the ‘iwi with mana whenua in the Lake Taupo catchment’. It acknowledges that ‘generations of Ngati Tuwharetoa have lived within the Taupo rohe and developed tikanga and kawa that reflect a special and unique relationship with the environment’.\textsuperscript{156} It notes that Ngati Tuwharetoa holds title to the bed and the tributaries of the lake and that ‘accordingly Ngati Tuwharetoa are the kaitiaki of the lake’.\textsuperscript{157} However, nothing was given to us in evidence indicating that Environment Waikato acknowledges the ‘rangatiratanga’ of Ngati Tuwharetoa with respect to the lake. As we noted above, to do so would take their role beyond that prescribed by the Resource Management Act.

Maria Nepia, an employee of the Ngati Tuwharetoa Trust Board, explained that Ngati Tuwharetoa have a strong desire to be involved in decision-making and policy development. She referred us to their Environmental Iwi Management Plan, and she noted that it developed from a strong frustration at being excluded from decision-making.\textsuperscript{158} Ms Nepia referred us to the issues Ngati Tuwharetoa identified in their Iwi Management Plan regarding:

- the inadequate implementation of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by statutory authorities;
- occasions when consultation was superficial, and the aspirations of nga hapu o Tuwharetoa were not given appropriate recognition;
- the reduction of Treaty principles in legislation to consultation rather than partnership; and
- a lack of partnership between Ngati Tuwharetoa and local and regional authorities.\textsuperscript{159}

The involvement of Ngati Tuwharetoa in the 2020 project was critically important to the tribe as it ‘brought about the development of key tribal planning documents and the way to meaningfully implement them’.\textsuperscript{160} But Ms Nepia continued:

The downfall to 2020 Taupo-nui-a-Tia Action Plan is that it is a non-statutory document within the meaning of the Resource Management Act 1991, so it is only through the good will and commitment of the authorities that the Plan can be implemented. Added to that difficulty is the ongoing issue of lack of capacity within the tribe to get involved at this next step of implementation.\textsuperscript{161}

Ms Nepia’s evidence is consistent with the statutory scheme of the RMA and with the evidence given by Environment Waikato. In this respect, Robert Petch (the manager of the resource information group) told us that it was the responsibility of Environment Waikato (not Ngati Tuwharetoa) ‘to control the use of land for the purpose of maintaining and enhancing the quality of water in Lake Taupo’.\textsuperscript{162}

The 2020 Action Plan recognises the interests of Ngati Tuwharetoa and their right to exercise their rangatiratanga as kaitiaki of Lake Taupo. However, Environment Waikato remains bound by the RMA in their ongoing management of the lake. Nitrogen is seen as the primary culprit affecting water quality, and Environment Waikato has determined that the magnitude of the problem is too great to be solved by voluntary restraint. It is now proposing that restraints on existing use of land be enforced to prevent escalation of the problem. It has proposed a variation in the regional plan which will control land use and nitrogen flows; and that the Crown, Environment Waikato, and the Taupo District Council will each contribute to a public fund of $81.5 million. Of this, $67.5 million will be set aside for permanent nitrogen reductions, either by land purchase and conversion to forestry, or by direct purchase of nitrogen, where land cannot be purchased.\textsuperscript{163} The scheme will also support activities such as research, education and advice.\textsuperscript{164} A consultative draft of the Proposed Regional
Plan Variation 5 – Lake Taupo Catchment was released in September 2004. The process of public notification and submission, and any reference to the Environment Court, was expected to be completed by the end of 2007.165

Mr Petch advised that in undertaking its statutory role, 'Environment Waikato alone cannot solve all the issues raised by Ngati Tuwharetoa relating to the lake, its future management, and the well-being of future generations of Ngati Tuwharetoa.'166 What it has attempted to do is 'mitigate the impacts [of its policies] on Ngati Tuwharetoa and on the rest of the community to the extent possible within the RMA and through the application of public funds.'167

In our view, the next section of Mr Petch’s evidence demonstrates the limitations of the Crown’s delegations to local authorities as he makes it clear that Environment Waikato will only deal with matters that they are required to deal with under the RMA. So Ngati Tuwharetoa’s concerns regarding land use and the impact on the lake are being subsumed into the RMA process – and after three years of work. The following evidence demonstrates that Ngati Tuwharetoa’s rangatiratanga is almost irrelevant to the process of planning, with far-reaching implications for their future land development options. Mr Petch told us:

Environment Waikato has identified matters that are part of its responsibilities under the RMA. These include:
- the purpose of the RMA – to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources, as set out in section 5;
- matters of national importance in section 6;
- having particular regard to the matters outlined in sections 7 and 8; and
- matters relating to the discharge of contaminants in section 15.

Environment Waikato has taken into account all of these matters in drafting a Variation to the Proposed Waikato Regional Plan for the Lake Taupo catchments. Fundamentally, it is those provisions in part II of the RMA that are most relevant to the concerns raised by Ngati Tuwharetoa in this process.

Section 30 of the RMA describes the functions of regional councils. This provides the mandate for Environment Waikato to undertake the Protecting Lake Taupo Project.

Environment Waikato has recognised there are significant costs to the rural community of ongoing restrictions on nitrogen leaching. In reaching a judgement on the preferred policy approach, the key provision is section 32 of the RMA. This requires Environment Waikato, before notifying the Taupo [Regional Plan] Variation, to prepare an evaluation report which:

- Examines the extent to which each objective in the Variation is the ‘most appropriate’ way of achieving the purpose of the Act;
- Examines whether, having regard to their efficiency and effectiveness, the policies and rules in the Variation are the ‘most appropriate’ for achieving the objectives; and
- Takes into account:
  (i) The costs and benefits of the policies and rules; and
  (ii) The risk of acting or of not acting if there is uncertain or insufficient information about the state of the Lake and the extent and impact of nitrogen discharges to the Lake.

Environment Waikato acknowledges the special issues generated by the policy approach that is required by such a sensitive and precious taonga as Lake Taupo. Some of the issues identified by Ngati Tuwharetoa are beyond the scope of the RMA to manage fully and would likely fail a section 32 analysis for effectiveness and efficiency.

As understood by Environment Waikato, one of the key points of contention for Ngati Tuwharetoa in relation to the protection of the Lake’s water quality, is the history of land development in the catchment, and the alleged actions and inactions of Government that have led to the current land use activities carried out by Ngati Tuwharetoa on its extensive and varied land-holdings in the catchment.

Throughout the past five years, Environment Waikato has been clear that the issues generated due to the history of Ngati Tuwharetoa land development in the catchment, and
their relationship to future social, cultural and economic well-being of the iwi, are a matter for discussion between Ngati Tuwharetoa and the Crown.

Environment Waikato is aware that placing nitrogen restrictions on all land in the catchment means that traditional land development options that increase nitrogen are constrained and potential future income from these types of development is foregone. For instance, land that is currently farmed as a dry stock farm (moderate nitrogen leaching), may have been intended to be converted into a dairy farming operation (high nitrogen leaching potential). Under the Proposed Variation, this is only possible if the proposed nitrogen increase is offset by a corresponding decrease elsewhere in the catchment. A landowner under this regulatory regime would incur additional costs if they wished to pursue this development opportunity.

The section 32 analysis prepared by Environment Waikato explores a wide range of alternative policy and method approaches. I set out some of the matters assessed and justification for the policy approach chosen in the following sections of my evidence.

Overall, Environment Waikato believes that the preferred policy approach in the Proposed Variation has taken into account part II matters to the extent appropriate by a Local Government agency, and it is set up for a robust and transparent debate through the First Schedule process of the RMA, which begins when the Variation is notified on 9 July 2005.168

Environment Waikato intended to put in place a variety of mitigation measures in respect of their proposed variation. It was proposed that an independent commissioner endorsed by Ngati Tuwharetoa would be appointed to assist with decision-making on cultural matters during the public hearing process for the proposed variation to the plan under the RMA.169 It was also proposed that a place would be created for a representative of the tribe to sit on the joint committee to administer the public fund. Ultimately, decisions regarding these matters are vested in the regional and local authorities and the Environment Court under the Act. Ngati Tuwharetoa does not have the authority to make these decisions. As Ms Feint pointed out, this lack of power places the iwi in the invidious position of seeking to protect the lake, but having to oppose Environment Waikato’s proposed variation because of the inequitable impacts its enforcement of the status quo, in terms of land use, will have on Ngati Tuwharetoa.170

George Asher reflected Ngati Tuwharetoa’s perception that the policy confirms the historical intentions of the Crown to maintain its ‘public good’ investment in the lake. His evidence was that the Crown’s policies concerning land use form part of the long story of Crown intervention in the Ngati Tuwharetoa rohe. He noted that a ‘consistent thread’ in this story has been the use of Ngati Tuwharetoa’s resources in the name of the ‘national interest’ and, by implication, not Ngati Tuwharetoa’s interests.171 Pointing out that environmental protection is an important current policy direction for local and regional councils, Mr Asher expressed his concern that this will impact disproportionately on Ngati Tuwharetoa. As he put it:

Tuwharetoa land owners will be penalised in the further utilisation of their lands without acknowledgement of the fact that they are not the main contributors to the problem, and indeed those who will benefit will be those who have alienated our ancestral lands and used them to create the unstable environmental conditions that are now the focus of control and regulation.

While the imposition of Crown policy has contributed to the significant loss of Ngati Tuwharetoa’s ancestral land, the vast area of land that now remains in its undeveloped state within the Rohe may have limited future utility. The scenario is based on the existing priority placed on environmental management and the demonstrated reluctance of regulatory authorities to make special provision for land that has been affected by historical anomalies. It is unlikely that, under these conditions, such lands will fulfil the expectations of owners to provide a viable economic base for future owners.

As an alternative Ngati Tuwharetoa’s future wellbeing may be determined more effectively by unlocking the shackles that prevent us from exercising our capacity to control, manage
and obtain access to key taonga or resources associated with our ancestral land. Ngati Tuwharetoa have been greatly prejudiced by the imposition of statutes and policy that has limited or denied our customary rights to water, geothermal, fishery and tourism resources.\textsuperscript{172}

**The Tribunal’s findings on prejudice of the Taupo Basin reserves scheme (pre- and post-resource management act)**

The proposed Taupo Basin reserves scheme resulted in uncertainty about the nature and extent of Ngati Tuwharetoa land development rights, and those of other Maori landowners, around Lake Taupo. After 20 years of confusion and ambiguity, much land around the lake remained undeveloped, despite some forestry development. We cannot know for sure whether there is a direct link between the reserve scheme and the underdevelopment of land, but we can say that the planning process did not assist or enable land development. Rather, the adoption of policies in preparation for the implementation of the reserves scheme resulted in Ngati Tuwharetoa shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden of environmental protection. The expectation that Ngati Tuwharetoa and other Maori landowners should assume this responsibility has continued under the RMA. Ngati Tuwharetoa now find themselves facing possible impacts from another regional land-use policy with long-term effects. The restrictions proposed may reduce the opportunities for Tuwharetoa landowners to participate in new economic activities now opening up for them. We refer, in particular, to the conversion of low-productivity sheep farms to high-productivity dairy farms. In keeping with the concepts of environmental justice, as discussed in chapter 17, this would seem to be an unjust result and one that is not consistent with the guarantees of the Treaty and the obligation on the Crown to respect the tino rangatiratanga of Ngati Tuwharetoa over their taonga. Given that Maori are major landowners around the lake, they will have to carry the main burden of lake restoration from their own resources or from the quantum of any cash settlement which they negotiate from the public fund.

The Crown’s continued expectation that Ngati Tuwharetoa must assume, along with other New Zealanders, the challenges of addressing the water quality of Lake Taupo is not consistent with its Treaty of Waitangi guarantees. When it asserted control over the Taupo district those guarantees extended to Ngati Tuwharetoa and Ngati Raukawa. Article 2 guarantees to them their property rights, and the Crown has an obligation to provide for Ngati Tuwharetoa rangatiratanga in the management of its taonga, including the waters. Historical land-use policies and major public works developments have impacted on the lake. The Crown has been one of the main developers in the Lake Taupo catchment. Challenges that have been created should lie with the Crown, not Ngati Tuwharetoa.

For the Crown to argue that Ngati Tuwharetoa have the right to participate in the special committees and groups established to implement the new nitrates policy as proposed in the Variation to the Regional Plan is also not an adequate response. These entities are ad hoc and piecemeal responses, and they do not address the issue of how Ngati Tuwharetoa rangatiratanga should be legally recognised in the RMA legislative regime. This form of participation is unsatisfactory because there is no guarantee that Ngati Tuwharetoa’s concerns will be given adequate weight in Treaty terms. At the same time Ngati Tuwharetoa’s ability to use their lands around the lake is being restricted.

**Conclusion**

The evidence presented for the claimants indicates again that the current RMA regime is incapable of ensuring Ngati Tuwharetoa rangatiratanga over their taonga, Lake Taupo. They have no control over the process, have no meaningful decision-making role under the Act, and are not able to engage or negotiate a consent with those charged with exercising responsibilities under the Act.
The Management of Natural Water and Springs

A number of claimants asserted that as at 1840 they possessed the water and water resources within the Central North Island, guaranteed protection by the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi. The fundamental cultural and spiritual significance of water was summed up for us by one witness, who described water in this way: ‘ko wai au? I am water, I am spirit.’ Nearly all claimant submissions concerning springs, rivers, and streams asserted that the Crown's regulation of waterways through environmental legislation and delegation to local authorities has meant that they cannot exercise rangatiratanga over those water resources. The examples we refer to come from the Rotorua district, and we focus here on the claims of Ngati Rangiwhewehi as they provided a large amount of evidence on the issues that have broadly affected all claimants with similar taonga. (For a map of hot- and cold-water springs in the Central North Island region refer to map 20.3, chapter 20.)

The claimants' case

Ngati Rangiwhewehi say that they continue to own and exercise rangatiratanga over the water resources of the Hamurana Springs–Kaikaitahuna River resource, and the Taniwha Springs–Awhou River resource. Mr Taylor contended that as the circumstances of these alienations were in breach of the Treaty then the claimants still have a proprietary interest in the springs. He argued that the evidence of the claimants demonstrated that they regarded the springs as their taonga, over which they exercised rangatiratanga, ownership, and control. Mr Taylor submitted that the manner in which Ngati Rangiwhewehi exercised rangatiratanga over these water resources was analogous to the manner in which the Tribunal found the Whanganui River to be a taonga. As in that case, the manner in which Ngati Rangiwhewehi owned, managed, used, and controlled these resources was an entirely holistic one. Mr Taylor submitted that they managed the water, the bed and banks, and the resource within, as one united resource. Mr Taylor submitted that the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Deed does not settle claims to these water resources or their tributaries that flow into the lakes covered by the Settlement. As the land within which these springs were located was alienated in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi, the claimants seek a number of findings: for the return of the land; for compensation for land alienation; for compensation for the environmental effects on the Awhou River; and for the cancellation of resource consents to extract water. They also seek a finding that Ngati Rangiwhewehi own the water of these resources.

The Crown's case

The Crown suggests that the focus, in evidence, on Hamurana and Taniwha Springs fails to recognise there are many springs still in Maori ownership. The Crown notes the example of Fairy Springs Land Trust (Maori Land), and the mapping of the Land History and Alienation Database, which records many springs that appear to be on Maori land.

The Crown contends that there were no public works elements to the Hamurana Springs claim. We take this to imply that the Crown believes the land at Hamurana was taken by fair means. The Crown further submits that the public works acquisition of land at Taniwha Springs satisfied the requirements for such acquisitions; that the owners were compensated $4200 plus interest; and that the owners had legal representation during negotiations. It submits that there is no evidence of bad faith. The Crown contends that there is no ongoing Treaty obligation of the Crown arising from this public works taking. It notes that Mr Flavell advised that there are ongoing discussions with the council concerning water extraction.
The Tribunal’s analysis of the management of water and springs

To claim these springs, Ngati Rangiwehehi started in the usual manner by describing who they are and their relationship to the resources within their tribal domain. We were told that there are seven hapu of the iwi: Ngati Kereru; Ngati Ngata; Ngati Te Purei; Ngati Rehu; Ngati Tawhaki; Ngati Whakakeu; and Ngati Whakaokorau.187

We were told that Ngati Rangiwehehi is based primarily in and around the former 42,747 acre block known as Mangorewa–Kaharoa.188 However, they also claim interests in a large number of other blocks, including south to Pukeroa–Oruawhata, into Lake Rotorua including Mokoia, east to Ohau Taupiri and up to the coast at Te Puke.189 According to Kere Cookson-Ua:

Most of the lands within Ngati Rangiwehehi’s domain were covered in bush and forest. The ngahere was a rich source of food and played an integral role in the lives of Ngati Rangiwehehi. The fresh water springs and rivers within Mangorewa Kaharoa also provided sustenance for the local inhabitants the most popular of which being eels, kokopu, inanga, toitoi, koura, and towards the end of the nineteenth century, trout. Today there are a number of historic sites in and around Hamurana and Taniwha Springs including kainga, urupa, mahinga kai, and traditional pa sites.190

In this part of the report, however, we are principally concerned with the claims to Mangorewa–Kaharoa, situated on the northern shores of Lake Rotorua, which went through the Native Land Court in 1882. The application for title investigation was filed by Ngati Rangiwehehi. There were a number of competing claimant hapu and iwi including Waitaha, Tapuika, Ngati Pikiao, and Ngai Te Rangi. The bulk of the block was awarded to Ngati Rangiwehehi.191

We note that Mr Cookson-Ua described the Ngati Rangiwehehi relationship with the waters in their territory in following terms:

Water has traditionally been viewed as treasured resource throughout the geothermal lakes district … Freshwater springs can be utilised in a variety of ways as well. This has certainly proved to be the experience of those living around Awahou. The employment of freshwater was used for the endowment of tapu or mana. Protecting people by practices involving the use of water is common and forms part of the fabric in Maori society. A well known whakatauki which indicates the special quality of water is . . . ‘Me pewhea? Me kawe rawa i a ki te wai, kia wehe te tapu, ka takakau au’ or ‘What is there to do? Naught else but to be taken to the waters to remove the tapu, and thus set me free.’192

Thus, water on its own can be taonga and is often referred to this way. This approach is consistent with our views on the nature of taonga as we set out in chapter 17.

Hamurana Springs

Hamurana Springs are situated at the northern end of Lake Rotorua. As we noted in part III of this report, the Mangorewa–Kaharoa block was partitioned and Hamurana Springs Reserve, containing about 86 acres, falls within the boundaries of the Mangorewa–Kaharoa 1 block awarded to the Crown in 1896. Within this block are 15 freshwater springs with one of the most famous being Puna-i-Hangarua. These springs supply the Kaikaitahuna River belonging to Ngati Okotahi (described by Stafford as another hapu of Ngati Rangiwehehi). This was the home of the female taniwha Hinerua.193

There were many kainga on this part of the Mangorewa–Kaharoa block as identified by Stafford and repeated in evidence before us.194 One of the larger ones was at Ngahuapiri. This settlement and extensive cultivation area was east of the Kaikaitahuna River.195 However, the Kaikaitahuna settlements spread along the banks of the river and around the various springs.196 The area was well populated. Ngahuapiri, for example, was visited by Sir George Grey in December 1849. He described it as the largest settlement on the north side of Lake Rotorua.197 Equally important to Ngati Rangiwehehi history was the area adjacent to the Pekapeka Spring, one of the series of springs...
on the Kaikaitahuna River. According to Stafford, this was a settlement area of 'Ngati Te Okotahi where Hikairo, the great Ngati Rangiwewehi chief, spent much of his time.'

**Taniwha Springs**

Taniwha Springs are located within Part Mangorewa–Kaharoa 6E3 No 2 (Pekehaua Puna Reserve). This block is about 2.5 kilometres from the township of Ngongotaha on the north-western side of Lake Rotorua. There are 16 springs within this block, and they are known as the Taniwha Springs. Te Warouri and other adjacent springs are the major water for the Te Awahou Stream. Awahou Marae is on this river.

As we noted above, it was the lair of the taniwha, Pekehaua. According to tradition, Pekehaua would ‘emerge from his lair (the spring) to waylay, kill and eat any unwary travellers passing through the area’, but he was eventually killed by the chief Pitaka. The Awahou Stream runs through Taniwha Springs into Lake Rotorua. According to Stafford, the settlement of Awahou is now the headquarters and main marae of Ngati Rangiwewehi. He states that the people of Awahou were, in the main, ‘supporters of the Waikato King movement and later the Hauhau forces during the land wars of the 1860s and early 1870s.’ He notes that at the ‘conclusion of those wars, a large house was built specifically for Te Kooti’s use whenever he visited this district.’

**Hamurana and Taniwha Springs as taonga**

From the evidence presented to us on customary gathering and fishing, the video footage, and oral testimonies, it is clear to us that the Taniwha and Hamurana Springs were taonga of great significance to Ngati Rangiwewehi. They depended on them for sustenance, as the springs supplied the Awahou and Kaikaitahuna Rivers. They were held in accordance with custom and tikanga Maori. For example, the relationship with these water resources is retold to each generation through the stories of Ngati Rangiwewehi settlement, through haka and waiata, and through the accounts of the taniwha who dwelt in their depths. In this
last respect we note that their tribal pepeha or proverb identifies those features of the landscape that are important to their identity including the waters of Pekehaua. According to Stafford this taniwha lived:

deep within Te Waro-uri, a major spring within the junction of the Hamurana and Central Rds near Te Awahou. This and other adjacent springs contribute the major water supply to Te Awahou stream. The same name, Pekehaua, was also often applied to a fortified pa site overlooking the spring and immediately to the east. The pa is, however, perhaps more accurately, Pukerua.

Hamurana Springs was the home of the female taniwha Hinerua. Mr Cookson-Ua records that the ‘fresh water springs at Taniwha and Hamurana Springs reserves are connected by underground waterways which were traversed by both taniwha, who maintained the links between the springs by meeting from time to time. There are stories of other taniwha still present at Awahou.

The taniwha stories represent for Maori both the nature of the resources and what they possessed. Ngati Rangiwewehi possessed the springs, including the waters and their links with other waterways, and the lands associated with the springs. As we heard in the evidence, the findings of the Whanganui River Report remain apposite – namely that Ngati Rangiwewehi possessed water resources, and the waters of the springs were central to those resources. Thus, through stories, haka, and song, the influence of Ngati Rangiwewehi over these springs has been recorded from ancient times to the present and for future generations. We are in no doubt that they were and remain taonga that should have been protected by the Crown in accordance with the guarantees of the Treaty of Waitangi.

The result of the actions of the Crown and the Rotorua County Council with regard to Hamurana and Taniwha Springs is that the claimants lost their lands and taonga. The alienation of land and water resources as a result of Crown actions – whether by dint of the common law or by statute – is a feature of the many of the claims before us. The loss of these two springs provides important examples of the impacts of such loss. We suggested in part III that the alienation of the land on which these springs are situated was an issue that should, after further research, be addressed by the parties in negotiations.

In terms of Hamurana Springs, we have found in part III that the land within which these springs were located was expressly targeted by the Crown for acquisition, in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. We also discussed the impact on the claimants in part IV in terms of the loss of tourism potential from the Hamurana Springs. The springs had potential to be used in this and other ways for the benefit of the iwi, had they remained in Maori ownership.

Taking of the Taniwha Springs under the Public Works Act

Ngongotaha has been serviced by a public water supply since 1924. Urban growth in this area led to demands for more water. Other sites were considered but the Taniwha Springs option was chosen. The Rotorua County Council took part of the Pekehaua Puna reserve (0.336.6 acres) also known as Mangorewa–Kaharoa 6E3 No 2, effective from 22 December 1966. This was done under the Public Works Act 1928. Road clearance took place; a pump site was located at the site; and the operation commenced in November 1967. We discussed, in part III, the systemic breaches of the public works legislation and we referred to Taniwha Springs as an example of the issues concerning that legislation. Although some compensation was paid, it was paid after the event and consultation with Ngati Rangiwewehi as a tribal body also occurred after the event.

Extraction of water under the Counties Act 1956 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967

It is at this point that a further problem was created for Ngati Rangiwewehi. The Rotorua County Council had authority to declare a water supply area for the purpose of constructing waterworks under section 226 of the Counties Act 1956. The legislation authorised the council’s extraction of the water from the springs. Under section
265 waterworks were defined as ‘including all streams and waters and all rights appertaining thereto and all land’. In 1967 under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, the Crown moved to nationalise the use of natural water by assuming the right to allocate its use. It instituted a comprehensive scheme for the management of natural water, which effectively rendered null and void all the former common law rights of riparian owners to control access to water on their land. The purpose of the Act was described in the long title as follows:

An Act to promote a national policy in respect of natural water, and to make better provision for the conservation, allocation, use and quality of natural water, and for promoting soil conservation and preventing damage by flood and erosion, and for promoting and controlling multiple uses of natural water and the drainage of land and for ensuring that adequate account is taken of the needs of primary and secondary industry, water supplies of local authorities, fisheries, wildlife habitats and all recreational uses of natural water.

For our purposes, in terms of Taniwha Springs, the most important section of the 1967 Act was section 21(1), which provided:

Except as expressly authorised by under this Act . . . or as expressly under any other Act . . . the sole right to dam any river or stream, or to divert or take natural water, or discharge natural water or waste into any natural water, is hereby vested in the Crown subject to the provisions of this Act.

In terms of Taniwha Springs, existing uses were preserved by section 21(2) of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967.

Ngati Rangiwehehi say that the Crown has failed to provide a water-management regime that recognises Ngati Rangiwehehi’s continuing Treaty interest in these their springs and their rangatiratanga over this taonga. Ngati Rangiwehehi claim they were not adequately consulted regarding the impact of water extraction on their remaining springs and the Awahou River.

The Waitangi Tribunal has already found that the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 breached the Treaty of Waitangi. We do not propose to detail those findings again here. What we can say is that, in this context, there was some consultation with one owner of the land before the land being taken. We note he was told that the draw-off would not affect the main spring, and that the pump station would not detract from the scenic value of the area.

Impact of the Resource Management Act on the management of water and springs

The 1967 Act, even though repealed, continues to influence the current law. This is reflected in section 354 of the RMA, which provides:

Crown’s existing rights to resources to continue
1. Without limiting the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 but subject to subsection (2), it is hereby declared that the repeal by this Act or the Crown Minerals Act 1991 of any enactment, including in particular . . .

(b) Section 21 of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 . . .
shall not affect any right, interest, or title, to any land or water acquired, accrued, established by, or vested in, the Crown before the date on which this Act comes into force, and every such right, interest, and title shall continue after that date as if those enactments had not been repealed.

The primary basis for the control of water now falls squarely under sections 14 and 15 of the RMA. Effectively all takings, use, damming, diversion, or discharge require a resource consent unless it is expressly authorised by a rule, regional plan, or is for domestic purposes (section 14(1)–(3)), or is an existing lawful activity (section 20). Only a regional council can issue consents. Thus, Environment Bay of Plenty is now charged with the function of making decisions regarding the waters of the springs.

Mr Flavell told us that Ngati Rangiwehehi were in discussions with the Rotorua District Council regarding the
springs. We note that a resource consent application from the Rotorua District Council to take further water from Taniwha Springs was made in 2004 to Environment Bay of Plenty. We do not know the outcome of the RMA process, but we do know that Ngati Rangiwewehi expressed frustration at having to work through the process.\textsuperscript{219}

The Tribunal’s findings on prejudice to Maori with regard to water and springs (pre- and post-Resource Management Act)

Nothing in the evidence before 1970 suggests that Ngati Rangiwewehi (as an iwi) were adequately consulted, in Treaty terms, about the management of the Taniwha Springs. This demonstrates the flaws in the legislation of that period. There was no requirement to produce evidence that tangata whenua had been consulted before an existing right was confirmed or a new water right granted under section 21 of the 1967 Act. It contained no provision requiring decision-makers to act consistently with any existing Maori Treaty interest in such resources, and it did not provide for their right to manage them. Our findings, therefore, are consistent with those made in the Whanganui River Report.\textsuperscript{220}

In situations such as Taniwha Springs, the legislation that permitted the continuation of water rights without consultation with Maori was also in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi because the Rotorua County Council and the Bay of Plenty Catchment Board were not able to consider the significance of these springs to Ngati Rangiwewehi. Water has been extracted from their taonga without their consent, impacting on their ability to care for the springs and the Awahou River.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, the delegation of powers to these statutory bodies was inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, leading to serious prejudice for Ngati Rangiwewehi.

In terms of Hamurana Springs, the ability of Ngati Rangiwewehi to exercise some degree of control over them was lost with the alienation of the land. But we consider that because of previous actions of the Crown the iwi continue to have a historical Treaty interest in Hamurana Springs and this should be recognised in any water-management regime. Ngati Rangiwewehi clearly have rights and interests in Taniwha Springs.

This brings us back to the problems with the RMA which we have already identified and discussed – in particular, the way in which historical Treaty issues are not generally matters that a consent authority can have regard to. Furthermore, for as long as section 8 of the Act remains deficient in Treaty terms, it is unlikely that the impact of water extraction on Ngati Rangiwewehi, their relationship with these taonga, and any environmental effects on the remaining Taniwha Springs, can ever be addressed in a manner consistent with the guarantees of the Treaty of Waitangi. These issues should be revisited during negotiations and the possibility of a joint-management agreement considered.

The Management of Rivers, Streams, and Wetlands

A number of allegations have been made in relation to pollution of rivers, streams, and wetlands. In chapter 17, we discussed how beds of large, navigable rivers became vested in the Crown under the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act 1903. However, a number of claims also concerned the impact of Crown policies on non-navigable rivers and streams. We merely note here that the question of whether a river is defined as a large, ‘navigable’ river is complex.

As we noted in chapter 17, ownership of non-navigable rivers and streams (as with navigable rivers) was governed by the \textit{ad medium filum aquae} rule. The rule recognises that title to the centre line of a river or stream vests in riparian owners of lands abutting rivers and streams. Counsel for Ngati Rangitahi pointed to the use made by the Crown of section 110 of the Land Act 1892 when the Crown sold lands abutting foreshore, rivers, lakes, or streams wider than 33 feet. Under this legislation, the Crown could set aside a one-chain strip as a reserve to be vested in the
Crown. The reserves were meant to preserve public access to these areas. The claimants alleged that the Crown used this legislation to gain ownership of sections of the Tarawera and Rangitaiki Rivers based on the ad medium filum rule. In this regard they refer to the basis for the grant to the Eastern Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission of the right to remove shingle and sand from the Tarawera and Rangitaiki Rivers in 1963. That Maori may have competing aboriginal title rights was not considered.

The claimants’ case
A number of claims address river and drainage works carried out without consultation with Maori and without their consent. Counsel for Ngati Whaoa raised the issue with regard to the wetlands in the Waiotapu Valley, where that drainage scheme created ‘a farmer and dairy cow platform’ on land alienated from Ngati Whaoa. Ngati Rangitahi raise similar concerns in relation to the Rangitaiki Land Drainage Scheme and its impacts at Matata. Tapuika’s concerns relate to the drainage and river straightening of the Kaituna River and the impacts on the Maketu Estuary. Tapuika claim that the Crown has ignored Tapuika as tangata whenua in its management of this environment. The same concerns were expressed by Te Ahi Kaa Roa o Make. Counsel contended that following the diversion of the Kaituna River tangata whenua experienced significant impacts, including: erosion of the beach; decline in shellfish populations; changes to the estuarine vegetation; and silting-up of the estuary itself. Counsel submitted that they wish to have their right to exercise self-government at the iwi and local level recognised so that they may make the decisions pertaining to the way the river and estuary is managed.

The Crown’s case
The Crown has chosen not to reply on general issues concerning the ownership of rivers and streams. It has chosen to deal with river issues either as environmental concerns or as part of its response to the evidence from the University of Waikato, discussed in chapter 16 above. It has not responded to the detail of every allegation of every claimant raised in evidence, noting that there is simply insufficient research available for the Tribunal to consider them in the context of a stage one inquiry.

The Crown did make submissions on the Kaituna Basin and the modification of the Kaituna River for flood protection purposes. The Crown submits that the case study in the Kirkpatrick report was a ‘narrow and fairly selective inquiry of local Government records and interviews with some tangata whenua still living in the area’. The Crown contends that benefits from the scheme were important and that there was little evidence for Kirkpatrick et al to suggest that tangata whenua did not seek the benefits of the scheme.

The Tribunal’s analysis regarding claims to the Kaituna River to Maketu
The claimants rely primarily on the report of Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell from the University of Waikato for the Central North Island inquiry, which examines the alleged prejudice suffered by Maori as a result of the impact of environmental change. The authors were commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust. They consulted with the claimant iwi, jointly identified a number of environmental concerns, and carried out 10 case studies that were based on existing scientific reports, cartographic resources, claimant observations, and their own field observations. The completed report is a substantial but selective document, strongly supported by maps, graphs, tables, cartographic representations, and photographs.

The University of Waikato report came under intense scrutiny by the Crown, by other interested parties, and by the Tribunal itself during this inquiry. Evidence of this scrutiny can be found in the transcripts of hearings and the various closing submissions. Even though some criticisms can be levelled at the methodology adopted by the
He Maunga Rongo

university team, there are aspects of the report that provide useful evidence highlighting issues raised by the claimants. In chapter 18 on Lake Taupo-nui-a-Tia and chapter 20 on geothermal resources we refer to the report as a source of evidence. In this chapter, we use the report as it relates to the drainage of wetlands and the straightening and diversion of the Kaituna River as it flows through the fertile lowland areas adjacent to the Maketu Estuary and the Bay of Plenty coast. We also draw on other evidence available to the Tribunal.

We note the implications of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992, for our jurisdiction. We refer to the estuaries and the fisheries only as background to the essence of the claims before us – namely, that the Crown's delegation of authority to local authorities was inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. We turn now to the two examples from the inquiry region where major river diversion and drainage work have been completed with significant effects.

The nature of the Kaituna River system to Maketu

The Kaituna River runs from an outlet from Lake Rotoiti, at Okere Falls, to the coast at Maketu. It is a relatively short river, being only 51.5 kilometres in length. The river falls quite rapidly to the coast, but the gradient decreases considerably around Te Puke. Although the river is short, its catchment is relatively large with six tributaries of some significance. These are the Mangorewa, Waiari, Raparapahoe, Parawhenua, Ohineangaanga, and Kopura. A useful description of the river comes from the 1970s, after some modification, but before the major developments from 1970 to 1990:

For the first 16 miles [25.75 km] the river flows through a gorge, deeply incised into the soft ignimbrite rock which is characteristic of this area. At Mungarangi bridge 15 miles [24.1 km] from the sea the river emerges onto a narrow flood plain which gradually widens. Downstream of the Matai bridge, nine river miles [14.5 km] from the sea, the river flows out onto the Kaituna basin, a low lying swampy area of 16,000 acres [6475 ha] near Te Puke. The river follows a tortuous course through this swampland until it enters the sea at Te Tumu through a cutting in the sand-hills made in 1957. Formerly the river flowed parallel to the coast for a further 2½ miles [3.6 km] to the east through Maketu Estuary to enter the sea at the township of Maketu.

Maori settlement was concentrated at the upper reaches of the river around the Rotorua lakes. On the lower reaches it was concentrated along the flood plains, the mouths of the tributaries, the swamps or wetlands, and the Maketu Estuary. These were the habitats in which the indigenous flora and fauna tended to be most diverse and rich. Geoff Park expands:

The importance of lowland swamps in the traditional Maori landscape was multifaceted. They watered and gave access to vast areas of country, birds were attracted to them for food and native fish that came to spawn. Dominating the swamps were rushes, reeds, flax and kahikatea or white pine. Mature, fruiting kahikatea were a seasonal mecca for birds and people. Waikaka (mudfish), a traditional delicacy for presentation at feasts, hibernated during summer drought beneath kahikatea roots. They and myriad indigenous fish species such as inanga, koaro and kokopu migrated through the estuaries and lagoons.

The claimants before us associated with the various reaches of the Kaituna River – from its upper reaches to the Maketu Estuary – are Ngati Pikiao (Ngati Tamakari, Ngati Te Takiha, Ngati Rangiunuora, Ngati Hinekura, Ngati Rongomai), Waitaha, Ngati Makino, Tapuika, Ngati Whakaue, Tuhourangi, Ngati Rangiwehehi, Ngati Whakahemo, Ngati Pukeko, Ngai Te Rangi, Ngati Puku o Hakoma, and Ngati Pukenga.

As noted above, a number of these claimants have raised issues concerning the management of the river and the estuary. We have selected this evidence as an example of the manner in which the delegation to local and regional
authorities has impacted on the rights and interests of the claimants under the Treaty of Waitangi in their rivers, streams, and estuaries.

**Kaituna River: the upper reaches as a taonga**
The Kaituna River drains both Lakes Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti, in addition to the area between Okere Falls and the sea. In 1984, the Waitangi Tribunal dealt with claims concerning the Kaituna River filed on behalf of Ngati Pikiao (including some of the hapu and iwi listed above). With regard to the upper reaches, that Tribunal recorded the evidence of Mata Morehu who described the course of the Kaituna River from Lake Rotoiti downstream. He spoke of Te Wai-i-rangi, ‘a lovely clear pool from which the river flows on into a green tunnel of vegetation’, as a place where tapu was lifted; and he spoke of ‘burial caves that line the river in the steep gorges through which it runs’. That Tribunal heard evidence about the importance of the river for collecting raw materials and the use of its waters to prepare those materials for weaving. The Tribunal was left in no doubt that the river was a taonga owned by the claimants at 1840 and that it ‘had been owned for many generations’.

We note here the position of Environment Bay of Plenty with regard to their approach to the Kaituna River system. They told us that under the Resource Management Act, the regional council intends to implement a strategy to manage Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti, the Kaituna River, and the Maketu Estuary. In 2005, it applied for a consent to construct a diversion wall to divert nutrients from Lake Rotorua down the Kaituna and away from Lake Rotoiti to prevent eutrophication of Rotoiti. We were told:

> The nutrient-laden water from the lakes descends down the river system irrespective of whether the wall is installed, but the wall will result in less of the nutrients being diverted into Rotoiti. Due to the turbulence and continual movement of water along the Kaituna River, the nutrients will not result in algal blooms occurring in the river or estuary. If this wall is not put in place, the eutrophication of Rotoiti will result and in turn the Kaituna river and eventually the Maketu estuary will become contaminated with blue/green algal blooms.

With the establishment of the Rotorua Lakes Strategy Group, the Te Arawa Lakes Trust now has a voice in the management of the lakes and the catchments of the lakes, but they cannot influence the RMA process. In addition, we note that all Maori concerned about the impacts of the proposal on the Kaituna River to Maketu would need to participate in the RMA consent process for their views to be heard. The problem is that the RMA hearing process can only take their views into account, rather than give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. This is not what the Treaty guaranteed to Maori, and given they have Treaty rights and interests in the waters it seems to us that there are real issues here about the equity of the situation.

**Kaituna lowlands as a taonga**
The Kaituna lowlands were one of those locales where transformation of wetlands took place very early in colonial history. The environment of this lowland area stands in strong contrast to the inland areas of the Central North Island. This portion of the inquiry district is more temperate, has a longer growing season, and is more bountiful in terms of biological resources. Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell, drawing on Land Information New Zealand sources, described the lower Kaituna Plains as an amalgam of riverine and coastal environments. The area was subject to periodic flooding and was very swampy before it was drained for farming. Soils were either recent alluvium, which was fertile, or peat soils formed under swamp conditions. The area was flat and low-lying and the Kaituna River had very little gradient. The Kaituna River thus followed a meandering course through the swamps to the Maketu Estuary.

The lower Kaituna River and the Maketu Estuary were bountiful areas for Maori, and as a consequence were well populated with the majority of marae located on better-
drained sites closer to the river or the estuary. This location of kainga and settlements ensured that the river remained the ‘locus of [Maori] community life’ until at least 1944 (before the post-war urban migration). These areas were part of an extensive ecosystem of grass plains, swamps, and tidal flats. The swamps and the smaller streams within the swamps were rich habitats for freshwater fish and for bird life, and the tidal areas were home to a vast array of birds, saltwater fish, and other coastal marine life.

Eels were an especially important part of the resource base. Don Stafford has recorded the importance of this resource as described to him by informants:

To think of the Kaituna River is to think of eels. The name itself comes from the prolific supply of eels it carries – and the value that they have had for the Maori, as a food supply for more than six hundred years. They were specialists at taking eels and centuries of experience had taught them just where, when and how to fish the Kaituna. There wouldn’t be a square metre of the river they hadn’t examined in years past, and all the prime eeling places were individually named and jealously guarded by those claiming authority over them.

Inanga (whitebait) provided similar, but much more seasonal, bounty. Whitebait catches through until the 1930s were legendary and were often recorded in photographic collections and on postcards.

The swamps and forests of the Kaituna lowlands were important sources of materials for meeting houses and for the raranga and tukutuku which were part of the interior artwork. They were also sources of material for rongoa, important for traditional healing. There were wahi tapu and wahi taonga within the swamps and wetlands, and the river itself contained wahi tapu. Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell report:

The meandering waters of the Kaituna also held tremendous spiritual value for the Tapuika people. One extremely important waiwhi tapu was a bend in the river that was the resting place of the Tapuika taniwha, Te Mapu. Tapuika oral traditions refer to the kuia, Tuparahaki and the role she had in persuading Te Mapu to leave, thereby forging the Parawhenuamea Stream & other tributaries as he departed.

We heard evidence from several witnesses on the importance of the low-lying areas of the Kaituna River. The late Te Keepa Marsh provided detailed evidence for Tapuika regarding the lands and waters radiating out from the area near Rangiuru towards the Maketu peninsula:

Tapuika’s understanding was that they were one with the land, forests and waters. As descendants of the god Puhaorangi, Tapuika maintains the belief that they represent the link between the heavens and the earth.

Tapuika’s knowledge of the environment within the Takapu led to rotational land use, moving from various pa (wa kainga) according to the seasonal cycle of the stars, moon, sun and the wind.

Mr Marsh detailed the seasonal cycle, punctuated by the positioning of celestial objects and the flowering of marker plants such as the pohutukawa. He described an annual movement of people and changing activities. This included: bird catching in the forest until Matariki, followed by movement down to the mara lands for cultivation and planting; then to the coastal areas for fishing and kaimoana; followed by movement back to the mara for harvesting and food storage; before returning to the forests when the kiore and manu ‘were fat from the berries’ and ready to harvest. The relationship that Tapuika had with their reach of the river and wetlands was spiritual as well as physical and biological, Mr Marsh elaborated:

The rivers, streams and wetlands within the Takapu o Tapuika were an important source of food, building materials, clothing and dyes. However, the relationship between the hapu of Tapuika and its waterways was not solely constrained to food gathering and other uses but also incorporated an intrinsic connection with the mauri of the waterways and
the tribal kaitiaki or taniwha whose rangatiratanga over the streams and rivers provided further evidence of Tapuika’s mana over the Takapu.255

The evidence continued and is more specific in relation to some of the sacred places:

The Parawhenuamea stream is a marsh stream named after the Goddess of Freshwater. It is said to be carved by the taniwha Mapu as he left his lair on the Kaituna River and made his way up the Pakipaki to join the colony of taniwha there. In the waiata Tenei Te Aroha the Parawhenuamea was referred to as ‘te pukaitanga o nga taniwha’ and was held in great respect by the hapu that lived around its environs.256

Mr Marsh identified the main swamp marshes and wetlands by name and then explained why they are so important:

In traditional times the swamps played an important role as the ‘ate’ or liver that filtered and cleansed the water through the plant life that grew in the swamps. During the waipuke the swamps or repo would absorb the flood waters and control the silt that was swept into the streams and tidal estuaries.257

The Kaituna River Tribunal also heard evidence from Ngati Pikiao of the importance of the river and the Maketu Estuary for fishing.258 That Tribunal stated:

*Kai moana* (food from the sea) has great significance for the Maori. It is almost as unthinkable for a Maori to entertain guests without seafood as it is for a European to offer a meal that has no meat. Maketu and the Kaituna River have been a rich source of fish, shellfish, eels, fresh-water crayfish (koura) and many other kinds of food. The estuary has been important for this purpose for generation after generation.259

The tributaries of the Kaituna were identified in evidence and associated with particular iwi. Waitaha for example, referred in their tribal pepeha to Raparapahoe.260 The Ohineangaanga Stream is a wahi tapu that was used for battle rites.261 The Waiari River was identified as a boundary between Waitaha and Tapuika.262 But both iwi often moved...
in and out of their respective territories, probably because of their kin relationships through their respective ancestors Tia and Hei. Mr McCausland also identified pa on the Waiaari to the mouth of the Kaituna River.

Ngai Te Rangi, and particularly its hapu Ngai Tukairangi, also claim traditional interests at Te Tumu. They acknowledge that Te Arawa occupied Maketu, east of the Kaituna River, but they assert rights from Papamoia to Te Tumu. We are not in a position to confirm issues of mana whenua, but we agree with counsel that the evidence in the Central North Island inquiry does record their interests in this area. Ngai Whakahemo, Ngati Pukeko, Ngati Puku o Hakoma, Ngati Pukenga, Waitaha, Makino, and Tapuika, not to mention the Te Arawa toa claimants, also overlap with these interests.

The Tribunal’s findings regarding the management of the Kaituna River

After reviewing the evidence, we were left in no doubt that the Kaituna River from Okere Falls to Maketu was a taonga of immeasurable value possessed at 1840 and over which Maori exercised rangatiratanga. As a river system, it remains a taonga to this day.

Swamp drainage

The Kaituna lowlands in the 1880s and 1890s were prepared for cultivation to support the development of farm settlement. In the lower Kaituna environment, this involved drainage as well as tree felling and fencing. Lands were sold, some settler drains were dug, and some farms were created. For many potential settlers, however, the drainage challenge was beyond the resources or the technology available to them. George Bolton, writing about the adjacent Te Puke swamp, describes the problems faced in the 1880s:

I found three rivers flowed into the swamp and lost themselves in it and that our drainage operations would be the drainage of these three rivers. I made up my mind that if we drained that swamp we would be draining not only our 5,000 acres and the 6,000 acres we could buy, but we would also be draining 9,000 or 10,000 acres besides for the benefit of other people.

The first drainage board, the Te Puke Land Drainage Board was constituted under the Land Drainage Act 1893 and its district covered lands west of the Kaituna River. The Act defined a watercourse over which the board’s powers should be exercised as ‘a passage through which water flows’.

The Tumu-Kaituna Drainage Board was constituted under the Land Drainage Act 1904. Its district covered the Kaituna wetlands. It elected its first board in 1906 and used the provisions of the Local Bodies Loans Act 1908 to set about raising funds to create and maintain drains. Together, the drainage boards exercised jurisdiction over a combined area of 19,531 acres.

The Crown then passed the Land Drainage Act 1908. Under section 17 of the Act, such bodies were given extensive powers to undertake river diversion and drainage works. Under section 2 of the Act, a drain included ‘every passage, natural watercourse, or channel on or underground through which water flows continuously or otherwise, except a navigable river’. A watercourse was defined as ‘all rivers, streams, and channels through which water flows’. The two drainage boards operated from 1910 until 1950, laying drains and widening, deepening, and straightening rivers: bush was felled, swamps were drained, peat was burnt, and pastures were established.

Impact of drainage and flood control works

As a consequence of the drainage work, farmers in the newly created farming districts began to experience damage from flooding. Floods were a frequent occurrence, but the swamps were no longer present to absorb the floodwaters. Some 16 flood events were recorded for the Kaituna between 1907 and 1959 and were beyond the mandate or the capacity of the drainage boards to contain.
were flooded, livestock were drowned, pastures destroyed, and houses and fences damaged. It seems that the river breached at Te Tumu during the 1907 flood.275

From the 1920s onwards, Government legislation and Government loan finance supported a round of river engineering works to prevent flooding of farms and homes. A Kaituna River district was created in 1921 under the provisions of the River Boards Acts of 1908 and 1913. Under these Acts, powers were granted to carry out river works to prevent flooding. Under section 73 of the 1908 Act, the legislation applied to all rivers and streams, including navigable rivers. Around 1924, a cut called ‘Ford’s Cut’ was proposed for Maketu. A diversion was established near Te Tumu with the intention of changing the course of the river so that instead of flowing in the existing loop that ran close to the coast, it would flow directly into the Maketu Estuary.276

Five years later, the Kaituna River District Act 1926 was passed. That Act provided for the establishment of a river board for the Kaituna district with broad general powers under the Land Drainage Act 1908 and for:

- effectively preventing or minimising the flooding of the district either by surface water or by floods and freshes in the Kaituna River or any of its tributaries; or
- improving the land in the district by lowering the surface level of the water of the Kaituna River or any of its tributaries.277

The new river board was given extensive special powers to:

- From time to time, divert wholly or in part any drain, stream, or river, or close up any outlet or inlet to or from the same, or make any fresh outlet or inlet to or from the same.
- From time to time make, maintain, alter, or discontinue in, on, over, through, or across any land within the district such overflow or other channels, as it may consider necessary or the purpose of carrying out its operations.
- Purchase any low-lying, tidal, or waste land, whether within the river district or within three miles of the boundaries thereof, that could, in its opinion, be advantageously reclaimed in the course of its operations, and could reclaim the same.
- Order the occupier, or in case there is no occupier, then the owner, of any land on the bank of any river or stream within its jurisdiction to remove anything whatsoever, whether in such river or stream or (except in the case of buildings) within half a chain from the nearest margin of such river or stream, which obstructed or impeded the free flow of such river or stream, or damaged or was likely, in its opinion, to damage the bed or banks thereof, or which constricted or was likely, in its opinion, to constrict the channel of such river or stream in such manner as to impede the free flow of the water. The jurisdiction of the River Board was to extend for the space of one mile beyond the up-stream boundary of the district.278

The Te Arawa Trust Board contributed funds to the scheme, as recorded in the Kaituna River District Act 1926. From 1925 to 1958, portions of the riverbed were dredged and stopbanks built. Evidence from historical maps reproduced in Stokes (1980) and Johnson and Vercoe (1981) shows that the river mouth continued to migrate between Te Tumu in the west and Maketu in the east, but was still discharging at the Maketu site in 1944.279

The works undertaken to this point were sufficient to minimise the impacts of minor floods, but were ineffectual in the face of major floods, such as one in July 1951 that inundated 15,000 acres of farm land and led to a demand for larger and more decisive action.280 On 2 February 1957, the Te Tumu cut was made through the sand hills at Te Tumu, allowing the river to enter the ocean and thus shortening the river’s course by 3.6 kilometres.281 However, within two days high seas had closed the cut and a second cut was made. The river has continued flowing via this
Map 19.3: Drainage in the Te Puke and Te Tumu–Kaituna areas, around 1920  
[After E Stokes, A History of Tauranga County, 1980, p 309, 
reproduced in Kirkpatrick et al, doc E3, p 448]
course to the sea ever since.\textsuperscript{282} Predictably, these works had major impacts on the Maketu Estuary.\textsuperscript{283}

According to the \textit{New Zealand Drainage and River Board Review} in 1953, ‘with the emphasis on increased food production, the farmers of the district have carried out intensive land drainage where such was possible, and made their lands as fully productive as possible.’\textsuperscript{284} What we do not know is whether this work was done with the assistance of the drainage boards. The two boards were dissolved and their powers and functions were transferred to the Kaituna River Board in 1950.

The responsibilities of the Kaituna River Board were transferred to the Tauranga County Council in 1959 by an amendment to the Kaituna River District Act 1926. The council retained responsibility under the 1926 Act and became the Western Bay of Plenty District Council on 1 November 1989. The council now exercises functions under the Kaituna River District Act 1926, a local Act, to the extent that it does not conflict with the RMA.

River control passed to the catchment boards under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council established under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941. By 1970, new Government structures were in place and the Crown – under the terms of the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 – was willing to provide loans and subsidies for major flood-control schemes.

\textbf{The lower Kaituna major scheme}

By 1970, the scene was set for larger and more expensive engineering works to take place in the lower Kaituna catchment area. The Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission, with the support of the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council and the Ministry of Works, responded to farmers and ratepayers seeking flood protection and better drainage for low-lying farmlands.\textsuperscript{285} The intention, as stated in the plan, was to protect lands adjacent to the river against a hundred-year flood from the Kaituna and its tributaries and to provide improved drainage for some 5600 hectares of farm-land. Work was done in stages, as Government subsidies were negotiated and a series of contracts were tendered, between 1970 and 1992.\textsuperscript{286} The machinery used was very large compared with that used in the earlier periods. The impacts on the river and the adjacent landscape were massive. One contract alone, tendered in 1982, involved the excavation of more than 740,000 cubic metres of material and the construction of some 6.9 kilometres of stopbanks.\textsuperscript{287} One of the first projects was a diversion at Te Tumu that allowed the river to flow more directly to the ocean by blocking the entrance to the loop on which Ford’s Cut was located.\textsuperscript{288}

When Environment Bay of Plenty (the successor to the Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission) published its asset management plan in 2003 it summarised the current state of river control and drainage work in the Kaituna area. These included 69 kilometres of stopbanks, 88 kilometres of canals and drains, six pump stations, and a mole structure at the river mouth. The value of these assets was estimated at $28.5 million.\textsuperscript{289} These works created a new physical and political landscape, modifying the river system and creating a partnership between the Crown and the local authority, funded by the Crown and by ratepayers. All benefited, but Maori were marginalised in the process. We turn now to explain why.

\textbf{The Maketu Estuary}

A key component of the river works was the construction of Te Tumu cut and the diversion of the Kaituna River directly into the ocean, bypassing the Maketu estuary. The various changes to the path of the lower Kaituna River discussed in this section of the chapter are shown in maps 19.3 and 19.4. There have, as a result of these engineering works, been impacts on the ecology and the productivity of the estuary. The Crown was aware that this work would have impacts on the estuary when it gave the authority and the finance for the Kaituna River Board to proceed with this work in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{290} In a 1948 report held in the files of the Ministry of Works, prepared for the Kaituna River Board, engineer Andrew Murray warned that:
If the whole of the Kaituna River flow were diverted through this [cut] the harbour and fishing grounds of Maketu, so much prized by the Maori would be eliminated. That would have to be paid for in compensation for this effect would be difficult of assessment, but it would be considerable.291

Maori concerns were explicitly recognised and known by the Ministry of Works. Mr Murray’s advice was, however, overridden. When H A Acheson of the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council reported in 1953, he presented the case for the diversion of the river into the ocean at Te Tumu. Mr Acheson foresaw the possibility of ‘deterioration to Maketu boating and fishing’, but put forward the counter proposition:

there is every possibility that the establishment of Te Tumu outlet will, in the years to come, enable the reclamation of the Maketu Estuary adding about 550 acres to the farming land.292

Evidence given to Philip Tortell in 1984 suggests that the Kaituna River Board preferred the advice of their own consulting engineer, but were put under pressure by the Ministry of Works engineers to accept the advice given by Acheson.293

The Kaituna River Board proposal, reworked to include the Te Tumu cut, was approved by the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council, and the Government subsidy was confirmed. Work on the diversion was carried out in February 1956. The Kaituna River was shortened by 3.6 kilometres and the Te Tumu cut was made permanent. The movement of the Kaituna River water through the estuary ceased, as did the tidal flushing of salt water. Inevitably, this had an impact on the coastal ecology. We accept the evidence for the claimants and Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell that the effects on the fisheries, the mauri of the waters, and amenity values of the river to the estuary were great.294

The changes brought about by this new configuration were clearly evident by the 1980s. The level of public concern rose to the point where the Commission for the Environment appointed Terry Loomis, a social anthropologist, to undertake a social study. In addition, Dr Tortell documented public opinion, reviewed all available information, and initiated a process of public consultation.295 Maori values and Maori concerns were included in both documents.296 This exercise in research and public consultation coincided with the hearing of the Waitangi Tribunal claim Wai 4, brought by Ngati Pikiao to address environmental issues in the upper Kaituna catchment area.

The nature of the environmental impacts is clear from the Tortell report. Research-based insights and a wide range of community, visitor, local government, and central government perspectives were drawn together and a clear consensus emerged.297 There had been a substantial build-up of sand in the tidal estuary and pollution had reached levels that made swimming in the water or eating the shellfish unsafe. There had been significant changes to the ecology, and many of the species important in the past could no longer be found. Both recreational and commercial fishing had declined, the recreational environment had deteriorated, and fewer visitors were coming for day trips or overnight stays. The impacts were felt by all residents and were very evident to holiday visitors who had been coming to Maketu on a regular basis.

Dr Loomis and Dr Tortell worked carefully to ensure that Maori were included in the consultation process. They succeeded in this, and a number of the impacts reported reflect concerns about customary use and kaitiakitanga; and water quality and its impact on kaimoana and manaakitanga. For example:

The decline in shellfish meant that residents could not obtain the seafood essential to augment family budgets, particularly in the lower-income households. Furthermore, it had been taken as an affront to customary rights which Maori people had enjoyed in obtaining kai moana from the estuary. Kai moana was not simply a cultural frill. It was an important ingredient in communal feasts, an important aspect of resource control and had deep spiritual significance as a link between the people, their ancestors and the land.298
Tania Pecotic expressed the feeling of many Maketu Maori:

In my childhood we lived off whitebait, pipi, fish and various varieties of seafood and water fowl contained in the Estuary. Now we must hunt for the shell beds and be satisfied with crabs only.299

A kaumatua, recalling the titiko (estuarine mud snails) and the pipi which were bountiful in former times stated:

for many Pakehas, shell-fish are just an appetiser. But for us, with some potatoes, kumaras and other things, it is often the main course.300

Tortell expanded by linking the concerns shared by Maori during his research at Maketu with the evidence being presented by their whanaunga to the Waitangi Tribunal sitting at Mourea in the upper Kaituna:

Traditionally it is part of the mana of a community to be able to look after its manuhiri (guests) in a gracious manner by offering them plenty of kai as well as aroha. If the hosts could not give such a gift, their mana suffered and they were whakama (shamed, embarrassed). It was a situation not merely of emotional discomfort, but of spiritual and political deterioration which no Maori individual or community wished to fall into. The degradation of available kai moana at Maketu had placed the people of Ngati Whakaue, Ngati Pikiao and other Arawa tribes from further inland in just such a predicament.301

Dr Tortell, building on the Loomis research and working with an advisory group which included the Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission, Tauranga County, the Ministry of Works, and the Wildlife Service, summarised the results of consultation and a literature search, and then prepared a set of options for future action. The options were three: first, to maintain the outlet at Te Tumu; second, a partial return of the river to the estuary; or, finally, a total return of the river to the estuary.

The Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission then drafted proposals for the release of river flow back into the estuary. Because of financial constraints, the matter was referred to the Crown to provide assistance. Ministers considered this request, and in 1988 the Department of Conservation was directed by Cabinet to develop a strategy for the restoration of the health of the Maketu Estuary.302

A restoration strategy was approved by Cabinet, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Western Bay of Plenty District Council, and finally the Maketu community, at a meeting convened by the Honourable Peter Tapsell, the member for Eastern Maori.303 He later recorded that the Cabinet approved in principle the restoration strategies set out by the Department of Conservation and had agreed to provide substantial funding to have some controlled river flow returned back into the estuary (subject to regional and local authorities paying a share for monitoring).304

The Department of Conservation then made applications for water rights. The first would allow 800,000 cubic metres of water per day (at a maximum rate of 20 cubic metres per second) to be diverted, by way of a flap-gated diversion control structure, from the Kaituna river into the Maketu Estuary, via Ford’s Cut.305 A maximum initial flow of two cubic metres per second was proposed. The second application sought to take natural water from the Kaituna river, to discharge natural water containing waste onto land, and to divert natural water as part of certain proposed sand dredging and spit stabilisation works.306 The Bay of Plenty Regional Council granted the first application, but considerably reduced the amount of water that could be diverted from the requested 800,000 cubic metres per day to just 100,000 cubic metres each tidal cycle. An appeal was lodged with the Planning Tribunal. Hearings were held under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, and the appeal was dismissed.307 The new diversion gates were opened in June 1996, and have operated as approved and, along with other portions of the Kaituna River, are monitored by Environment Bay of Plenty.
Maori response to the river works: the Te Tumu cut and its impact

There was major concern from local Maori, recorded in a letter to the Honourable Apirana Ngata, about the transfer of authority to the Tauranga Harbour Board in 1924. This letter was signed by 66 Maori residents from Maketu objecting to their moana coming under the 'mana' of the Tauranga Harbour Board.308 They objected on the basis that:

- the area was famous, and revered as the final resting place of Te Arawa waka;
- there were urupa at Maketu, used from ancient times;
- there were fisheries on which Maori depended, such as fish, pipi, mussels, pāua, kina, and eels; and
- that the anchoring stones of the Te Arawa waka were present in the estuary and were under the care of Pakeha who had become part of the Maori community.309

We have no evidence of what became of this protest. We refer to it to point out how maintaining local autonomy and some control over the estuary was important to Maori resident at Maketu.

In 1927, the Kaituna River Board took out a loan of £4,000 for the purpose of 're-establishing and safeguarding' the 'old natural outlet of the Kaituna River under the protection of the Maketu Bluff and securing the Outfall Channel continuously in its re-opened course, and for lowering the level of the Kaituna River'.310 The Te Arawa Trust Board donated £1,000 towards the project.311 Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell did not know if the works were completed.312

However, an examination of the relevant law indicates that the works must have been done. Section 34 of the Kaituna River District Act 1926 records this future contribution; its purpose; and the benefits that flowed to Te Arawa on payment of the money; namely an exemption from any rates to meet the costs of the outlet scheme. The Act records:

On payment of £1,000 by Arawa District Trust Board towards Maketu outlet [Maori] lands owned by members of Arawa tribe not to be rated.

Inasmuch as the River Board has in progress a certain scheme of operations (hereinafter in this section referred to as the outlet scheme) for the diversion of the outlet of the Kaituna River so as to reopen the old outlet at Maketu of that river, which said old outlet was entirely closed in or about the year nineteen hundred and seven by the action of natural forces and has since remained closed: And inasmuch as the Arawa District Trust Board (being the Board constituted under the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1922, and hereinafter in this section referred to as the Trust Board) has undertaken to pay by way of contribution towards the cost of the outlet scheme the sum of £1,000 (hereinafter referred to as the said contribution):

(1) Upon and after payment by the Trust Board to the River Board of the said contribution, or of that sum which together with any sum or sums paid by the Trust Board to the River Board makes up the amount of the said contribution, the River Board shall not make on any Native any demand of payment of any rate whatsoever made and levied in respect of the outlet scheme by reason of the fact that such Native is the owner or occupier of any Native land or of any share or interest therein, notwithstanding that such Native land or any part thereof may have been included in any classification made in respect of the outlet scheme pursuant to the provisions of this Act or in any separate rating-area; but this subsection shall not be construed to exempt from payment of rates any owner or occupier (other than a Native) of any Native land or any interest therein.

(2) If the River Board shall raise a special loan in respect of the outlet scheme, any rate made and levied as security for such loan shall be so calculated as to yield a sufficient sum annually after allowing for the exemptions provided for in subsection one of this section.
(3) The said contribution or any part thereof, as and when received by the River Board from the Trust Board, shall be expended by the River Board solely in or towards the furtherance of the outlet scheme and not otherwise.

(4) For the purposes of this section the term ‘Native land’ shall have the meaning ascribed to it by section two of the Native Land Act 1909; and the word ‘Native’ shall mean a member of the Arawa Tribe or a descendant of a member of that tribe.

It appears that the Te Arawa Trust Board was involved because a number of Maori land titles were the subject of the Maketu consolidation scheme and were vested in the Te Arawa Trust Board. However, once the full impacts of diversion became apparent, it seems that the board regretted having been involved in the scheme. In 1984, it told researchers for the Commission for the Environment:

In the early days the Trust Board voted to contribute funds toward the drainage works in the lower Kaituna River, including the Te Tumu cut. In light of subsequent effects on the estuary it now believes it was misled into believing the cut would benefit the local landowners. Today, as always, the Trust is bound to support the interests of their beneficiaries. It stands behind the local Ngati Whakaue and Ngati Pikiau people in their request that the estuary and their traditional Kai moana be restored as guaranteed in the Treaty of Waitangi.

In 1994, the Planning Tribunal recorded that Maketu Maori put their concerns regarding the migration of the river mouth towards Maketu to the Government. The Planning Tribunal noted that between 1922 and 1926 the newly formed Kaituna River Board work on Ford’s Cut was implemented (Mr Ford being the then owner of the land concerned), in an attempt to direct the river back into the estuary. In the short term, the diversion appeared successful, until the river broke out at Te Tumu in 1928.

However, the local Maori people do not appear to have supported the major cut in 1957. We note that Stafford records the events surrounding the Te Tumu cut made in 1957 and states:

the Maori people were concerned that their pipi beds, which had provided a rich source of food for centuries, would disappear once the lagoon and its flow of salt and fresh water dried out. However, despite the protestations, plans went ahead, on the basis that the 16,000 acres of farmland to be protected from flooding was of more consequence than the Maketu lagoon.

We do note that after an extensive search Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell were unable to find any evidence that Tapuika or any other Maori of Maketu – other than (perhaps) the Te Arawa Trust Board – were consulted over the Te Tumu cut. This is important, because a number of these iwi associated with the lower Kaituna and Maketu area were not listed as hapu represented by the Te Arawa Trust Board under the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1922.

The Tribunal’s analysis with regard to the management of the Kaituna River (pre-Resource Management Act)

In our view, there were benefits – principally relief from flood events – to be gained from the river and drainage work undertaken by the Crown and its delegates. We note that some compromise between Maori and European over the management of the Kaituna to Maketu was necessary. European settlement was welcomed by Maori (at least in the early years of contact), and it was contemplated by the Treaty of Waitangi. Both parties were to mutually benefit from it. But on our view of the evidence, the actions taken with respect to the Kaituna to Maketu had such major implications for the cultural way of life of Maori that a partnership in development terms was required. In such situations, the affected iwi and hapu should have been fully involved in all decisions made so that options that had the least impact on their way of life, and their Treaty rights and interests, could have been more fully explored.

However, we find that whether the actions of the Crown or its delegates were legally authorised – by common law under the ad medium filum aquae rule; the arm of
the sea doctrine; the Land Act 1892; the Coal-mines Act Amendment Act 1903; or the myriad of local government statutes passed to authorise various bodies to undertake drainage and river control works – the Crown failed to provide for rangatiratanga or self-government of the iwi associated with the Kaituna River system to Maketu from 1880 to 1991. They have not had a meaningful role in its management, although, as was the case in the 1920s, they clearly had a desire to be intimately involved in the management of their river system to Maketu. This has led to serious prejudice for the iwi and hapu concerned, which we describe in the following sections.

**Undermining Maori rangatiratanga**

In 1984, the Kaituna River Tribunal noted the almost total lack of consideration given to Maori values and beliefs, let alone Treaty rights and interests, by central and local authorities charged with responsibility for managing the river and the proposals to discharge effluent into the river. We agree, and note that this case study is an example of the negative impact that the Crown’s delegation of powers over river and drainage works to local authorities has had on Maori rights and interests. In this case, there has also been a substantial and unquantifiable impact on the mauri of the river and the estuary as a result of the policies, legislation, and initiatives in the lower Kaituna districts. All these interventions were made under the authority of statutory schemes for which the Crown was responsible, and with minimal acknowledgement of Maori rights and interests.

This case study is yet another example of the failure of the resource management regime before the RMA to recognise and provide for Maori rangatiratanga in the management of water resources. At 1840, Maori possessed the Kaituna River from Okere Falls to Maketu in a manner akin to ownership. They held it in accordance with their culture and customary law.

As a stage one inquiry we have not been able to consider the extent of continuing Maori ownership of land bordering the river. Nevertheless, whether Maori continue to own land or not, the Crown guaranteed that their right to exercise rangatiratanga in the management of taonga such as this river system would be protected under the Treaty of Waitangi.

On the evidence before us, between the 1880s (when settlement and drainage began) and the 1920s, the Crown did not take such Maori interests into account in any significant way. The provision for such interests was not made in any of the relevant legislative schemes that were used to manage the Kaituna River and the Kaituna Estuary. Although there appears to have been some consultation with the Te Arawa Trust Board on some aspects of the works completed at the Maketu Estuary, there was limited or no consultation with iwi such as Ngai Te Rangi, Tapuika, Waitaha, and the Maori residents of Maketu directly affected. In the 1950s, there were easily identifiable Maori communities and organisations that the Crown could have consulted. For example, there were people at the Ngati Whakaue Marae in Maketu, and other marae important to Ngai Te Rangi, Waitaha and Tapuika could have been identified. There were Maori committees established under the Maori Social and Economic and Social Advancement Act 1948 still in existence at the time. However, none of these bodies had any statutory authority with respect to the river or the estuary.

**Wahi tapu and wahi taonga**

River and drainage work has had a major impact on wahi tapu and wahi taonga within the Kaituna River and within the swamps and forests of the Kaituna lowlands. The largest and most visible actions were those that took place between 1970 and 1992 when major engineering works took place to deepen and straighten the Kaituna River. Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell record:

> These works were to be the start of a series of activities that drastically modified the river course from State Highway 2, to the ocean. The magnitude of the task is perhaps reflected in the use of the massive Rapier W90 walking dragline . . . The extent of the modification of this stretch of the river is shown
in . . . composites of survey plans produced in conjunction with the scheme. As the figures show, together with the diversion at Te Tumu, many kilometres have been removed from the path of the river. Amongst the most critical of these was the destruction of Te Mapu’s corner, the waahi tapu where Te Mapu was lured away by Tuparahaki.

There were activities also upriver from the State Highway. For example, Contract K.15 (1983) was for the clearing of willows along both sides of the 10.5 km of river up to the Maungarangi Bridge. This area saw channel straightening and stopbanking take place although it was designed to provide a lower level of protection than the lower stretches of the river.

Mr Marsh, in particular, provided evidence about the nature and spiritual importance of these taonga. We note further that although Maori landowners were entitled to compensation under the Land Drainage Act 1908, Maori were not entitled to compensation for loss of their fisheries or eel weirs.

Loss of culture and custom

Drainage work resulted in swamps being cleared and replaced by farmland, and channel works and stopbanks have increased the river flow, as has the Te Tumu cut. The tangible losses suffered by iwi and hapu as a result of these initiatives include loss of access to mahinga kai, destruction of wetlands and forests, and deterioration of the Maketu Estuary. Cultural losses include visual separation of community from river by the stopbanks, destruction of eeling sites, and loss of amenity for swimming and family gatherings. There are also losses such as those described below:

Most important, however, has been the spiritual damage that has been done in the measures to improve and maintain the agricultural productivity of the lower Kaituna area. The bends in the river were home to important taniwha. These have been virtually destroyed, particularly in the area coastalward of the State Highway. The loss of waahi tapu as a result of the works does not appear to have been taken into account in the planning of the drainage and protection schemes.

All these, together, impact on tribal identity and tribal mana. We are in no doubt that it was inevitable that the mauri of the river and the estuary system would be diminished, and that diminishing resources and Government regulation would undermine the kaitiaki role of tangata whenua. We are also in no doubt that as the supply of foods important for manaakitanga was curtailed, the mana of the people came under adverse and negative pressure.

In the closing submissions for Environment Bay of Plenty, Tapuika’s claims to lack of consultation relating to the Kaituna River Scheme (pursuant to the Kaituna River District Act 1926) were noted. In response, counsel contended that, as the regional council was not in existence at the time, it should not be held responsible for the acts of another separate and distinct legal entity. Who, then, is responsible? The answer must be the Crown, who enacted the defective legislative scheme in the Kaituna River District Act 1926.

The Tribunal’s findings on prejudice with regard to the management of the Kaituna River (pre- and post-Resource Management Act)

This case study points to the problems we identified in part II of this report; namely, that before the advent of the Resource Management Act the Crown had not adequately addressed the right of Maori to autonomy and self-government at the local, regional, and national level. While the Te Arawa Trust Board may have been an important model of regional self-government for its time, consultation with them was never going to deal with the concerns of all the hapu and iwi directly affected. A more localised form of self-government was needed with some link to a regional body. There was also a need to provide a legal connection between such structures and the local government and resource management framework.
To some degree, this has now been achieved by the establishment of the joint Rotorua Lakes Strategy Group and the Joint Maketu Estuary Steering Group. There is no doubt, in our view, that the reintroduction of the Kaituna River into the Maketu Estuary in 1996 was, for Te Arawa tangata whenua, a significant sign that a new relationship with the Crown and its statutory delegates was possible. To continue to strengthen this relationship, more needs to be done at a local level to include Ngati Makino, Tapuika, Waitaha, Ngai Te Rangi and other iwi with rights and interests in the lower reaches of the Kaituna River. For instance, Rereamanu Wihapi told us that the concerns of Tapuika regarding the use and management of the Waiari Stream (a tributary of the Kaituna River) for effluent disposal are still being marginalised. Mr Wihapi advised:

The local Councils take water from the Waiari stream without consulting us. More water is to be taken for developments in the Papamoa area. In addition effluent from the Te Puke township is discharged into Waiari stream from the local Council’s sewerage scheme. In respect of the Kaituna itself we are facing a proposal by Mighty River Power to establish a hydro electric power station on the river.325

It is also clear that, despite all the work done to increase the level of Maori participation in the RMA consent process, the Treaty rights of tangata whenua are only one set of matters that must be taken into account during the hearing of a resource consent. If tangata whenua concerns – including the historical issues that have prejudiced their interests – are to be fully addressed in the RMA consent process, all those exercising powers and functions under the Act should be required to act in a manner consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. This would require an amendment to the RMA. In the interim, and as a minimum, a joint-management agreement over the lower reaches of the Kaituna River to Maketu should be a point of discussion in negotiations.326

The Tribunal’s analysis with regard to the management of Te Awa o Te Atua – Tarawera to Matata

The nature of the Tarawera River system from Tarawera to Matata

The Tarawera River is part of the Tarawera lake system (an interconnected series of seven small and medium-sized lakes formed through volcanic action). Lake Tarawera, from which the river originates, is the largest of the lakes. According to Environment Waikato:

Lake Tarawera is generally believed to be fed by five other lake catchments within the Lake Tarawera system. Lake Rotokakahi (Green Lake) drains into Lake Tarawera via the Te Wairoa Stream while Lake Okareka does so via the Waitangi Spring and over ground via a man-made overflow structure. Lakes Tikitapu (Blue Lake), Okataina and Rotomahana have no visible outlets, but are believed to drain by sub-surface flow to Lake Tarawera. Lake Okaro drains via a surface flow into Lake Rotomahana. Part of the water draining from Lake Rerewhakaaitu is understood to flow through the crater basin to Kaue Springs and then into Lake Rotomahana.327

The Tarawera River begins at the Lake Tarawera outlet. The river is fed by a number of tributaries as it flows north-east. It then enters a subterranean chamber before exiting at the Tarawera Falls where it drops 65 metres into the Tarawera Valley. It continues on a reasonably steep gradient to Kawerau, and then quickly fans out through undulating country to exist at the Pacific Coast, just east of Matata.

As the Tarawera River meandered to the coast, it once bounded the large Rangitaiki swamp. The Ngati Awa Tribunal noted that the:

vegetation there was mainly raupo, flax, and rushes, with ti-tree and cabbage trees on the higher ridges. The swamp provided Maori with food; in particular, eels, fish, and birds. (The drainage of the swamp uncovered the remains of many eel weirs in the old watercourses.) The swamp also provided Maori with flax and raupo, allowed easy movement within the
Ngati Awa territory, and offered a place of refuge. The higher land in the swamp and the land along the river banks also provided places for the cultivation of kumara, potatoes, maize, wheat, and melons, and a flour mill operated at Matata before 1900.328

It was at Matata Harbour that the rivers Tarawera and Rangitaiki flowed into the sea.

The Tarawera River system to Matata as a taonga

Te Awa o Te Atua (Tarawera River) was named by Ngatoroirangi after the Te Arawa waka landed at Matata.329 We have previously outlined the different stories associated with these events in full in part I of this report. But in summary, we also know that after beaching here, Ngatoroirangi advised Tamatekapua to seek assistance of Toroa, captain of the Mataatua waka. After Toroa completed the appropriate karakia, Te Arawa was released and headed west back to Maketu. According to some, this was when Toroa and Tamatekapua decided that Te Awa o Te Atua would be the boundary between Mataatua and Te Arawa.330 We heard a slightly different version of these events from witnesses for Ngati Rangitiki.331 Henare Pryor, among others, told us their oral history surrounding this event.332 What is agreed is that Ngatoroirangi travelled the river to Ruawahia–Tarawera, thus underscoring the importance of the river and its name.

Thus, the river has always been important to the tribes of Te Arawa waka. In this latter respect, Tipene Marr listed various places on the river commencing from Lake Tarawera to the sea, including: Tapahoro – a pa site at the headwaters; Te Waipuna a Mokonuiarangi; Te Tuahu a Rangiaohia; Te Kahao o Rongomai; Te Auheke o Tionga and Te Taketake a Tu (above and below the Tarawera Falls); Te Awa a Kaipara; Maungawhakamanu; Tumutara – Ngahuia Pa; Te Whanautanga a Tuhourangi (birthplace of Tuhourangi); and Otaramuturangi urupa at Matata.333 Mr Marr noted that the Rangiaohia marae of Ngati Rangitiki was built in 1899, and then rebuilt in 1927.334

We were told about the use made by Ngati Rangitiki of the Tarawera River and its wetlands as a fishery and as a travel route inland.335 Mr Paterson’s evidence indicated that the wetlands on the lower reaches of the Tarawera were considered to be a major source of food and resources for tangata whenua.336 We saw its beauty through their eyes when we were shown the video prepared for this inquiry. Most travel was by walking track with Onepu Springs being an integral part of the journey.337 Particularly important was the harbour at Matata as a fishery and as a port. The harbour was deep enough for large ships to enter. Morris Raureti, who was born in 1935, told of earlier times when there was a harbour fed by the three rivers flowing into its tidal reaches.338 These were the Tarawera, the Rangitaiki, and the Orini.339 Mr Pryor reiterated the historic importance of the harbour lost at Matata.340

A representative from Ngati Tuwharetoa Te Atua Reretahi also claimed the river as a taonga to Matata and expressed similar concerns.341 The relationship of Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau with the area was previously explored by the Ngati Awa Tribunal in the following way:

At Matata is Otaramuturangi (now threatened by erosion following a road cutting), and we were referred to a number of other sites from there to Otamarakau, where Tuwharetoa was born. There, the remains can still be found of his birthplace, the pa of his grandmother, Hine te Ariki. In the inland hill country, we were shown Whakahoro, Pukemaire, and the cave at Otari. We passed also Matatu, Huratoki, Whakaparau (on Maungawhakamanu), Otuhoepu, Nokonoho, and Te Takangoaopa in the Tarawera valley and surrounding hills.342

Ngati Tuwharetoa’s relationship with the river and Matata, along with those of Ngati Awa was recognised by the Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau cross-claims Tribunal.343 In that Tribunal’s view, that the Crown should also recognise Ngati Rangitiki ‘as tangata whenua in and around Matata alongside Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau and Ngati Awa.’344
The Tribunal’s findings on the management of the Tarawera River

We were left in no doubt that the Tarawera River system to Matata, was a taonga of great significance to a number of hapu and iwi of the Central North Island, including Tuhourangi, Ngati Rangitihi, Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau, and Ngati Awa. What is clear is that Maori possessed the river system in a manner akin to ownership as at 1840, and that they exercised rangatiratanga over it. Much has taken place since ancient times, and boundaries have ebbed and flowed. Therefore we recognise that there were a number of iwi with interests in the Tarawera River to Matata, but we are not in a position, and nor is it necessary, to make any decisions on mana whenua for the purposes of this stage one inquiry. What is more important is that all agree that the river was an important taonga over which, at the least, the tribes above exercised rangatiratanga over those reaches of the river where they asserted mana and authority.

Impact of drainage and flood control works

Ngati Rangitihi raised concerns regarding the Rangitaiki drainage scheme. This scheme was introduced in 1910 to drain the wetland that made up the plains so that the area could be used for farming. It entailed making a ‘cut’ at Thornton to divert the Rangitaiki River straight into the sea (in 1914) and the diverting of the Tarawera River away from the Matata Lagoon so that it could flow directly into the sea (in 1917).\(^{345}\) The major concern for Ngati Rangitihi is the impact of the scheme on the river and the loss of a viable harbour at Matata, which has affected livelihoods in some cases. They allege that the decisions affecting them were not made with their consent, nor were they made with regard to their rangatiratanga.\(^{346}\)

We heard limited independent evidence on the impact of the scheme on Ngati Rangitihi, but we note that the Ngati Awa Tribunal commented generally on its impacts on Ngati Awa. That Tribunal noted that the Rangitaiki Swamp was bounded by the Tarawera River to the west and the Whakatane River to the east. Running through the middle was the Rangitaiki River, which had ‘tortuous access to the coast’, and so spread across the land as it slowly wends its way to the ocean. All three rivers, but especially the Rangitaiki, were prone to flooding, and the area had a number of lagoons, some very deep. The Tribunal noted that the flooding of the swamp caused many problems for the local Maori. They stated that:

> in 1870, Donald McLean was told of the problems that recent floods caused the ‘Whakatane people’. In 1891, Maori living next to the Rangitaiki and Whakatane Rivers and at Matata lost their potato crops, and the flood rose to two and a half feet in their maize fields.\(^{347}\)

The drainage of the Rangitaiki Swamp resulted in the loss of a valuable food resource but it also brought relief from flooding. Systematic drainage work began in 1910, assisted by the 1894 declaration of a Rangitaiki River Land Drainage District. The district comprised roughly the area between the Tarawera and Whakatane Rivers, and extended from a mile north of Te Teko to the sea.\(^{348}\) In 1910, the Rangitaiki Land Drainage District was abolished and the powers of the drainage board were vested in the Minister of Lands.\(^{349}\)

The Ngati Awa Tribunal records that:

> Between 1894 and 1910, the settlers attempted to drain the land. There is also some evidence that Maori attempted to drain their land and create roads during this period, and by the early twentieth century some had extensive cultivations. However, the attempts were not successful, and in 1910 the Government took over the drainage scheme and passed the Rangitaiki Land Drainage Act. The project became a major public work, and many drains were cut through the land to allow the water to flow quickly to the sea, including, in 1914, a channel to provide the Rangitaiki with a direct outlet. In 1915, JB Thompson, the chief drainage engineer, estimated that 75 percent of the area was permanently free from flooding and workable in all seasons, although the drains needed to be made deeper before the land could be considered

\(^{344}\)
permanently drained. The work nevertheless continued for many years, and 40 years later the scheme was still struggling with the flooding of the rivers. Although the quality of the land did not live up to initial expectations, the area is now excellent dairy farmland. However, the drainage meant the destruction of the lagoons and the wetlands and, with them, the food that they provided.\textsuperscript{350}

The Ngati Rangitihia claimants allege that the cuts to the two rivers, Rangitaiki and Tarawera, were actions undertaken and completed without their active participation and consent. They contend that, as there was no statutory requirement to consider Maori values and concerns, let alone their Treaty rights, these matters were given limited consideration. They have particularly focused on the cuts to the rivers and the impact on the former Matata Harbour. Mr Paterson, for example, told us that leaders of Ngati Rangitihia travelled to Rotorua to protest the proposals to divert the Rangitaiki to the sea.\textsuperscript{351} We do not know the history behind this meeting or the outcome, but we do know that the cut was made in 1914.

We also know that the cut for the Tarawera River was made three years later in 1917. The claimants also point to the Rangitaiki Land Drainage Act 1956, which set up a board with power to make bylaws and undertake drainage work.\textsuperscript{352} Ngati Rangitihia note that this Act made no provision for Maori representation or participation of any significance such as to give effect to their rangatiratanga.

Once the river cuts were made, the harbour turned into what is now called the Matata Lagoon.\textsuperscript{353} Although it is a remnant of what it once was, both Henare Pryor and Morris Raureti told us that tangata whenua continued to use the ‘lagoon’ as a coastal fishery. The tide would bring saltwater fish into the lagoon. When the tide receded, the people could fish for eels and whitebait on the rivers.\textsuperscript{354} This fishing activity was still happening at Matata at least while the older witnesses Patricia Rondon, Henare Pryor, Morris Raureti, and Clem Huriwaka were young. Mr Pryor and Mr Raureti told us about the range of fishing activities that took place. Mr Huriwaka told us:

\begin{quote}
I lived in Matata during the depression – I cannot remember a day of being hungry – we used to go back and get breakfast from the river, hunting, fishing and eeling . . . This was until the rivers got dammed and the fresh water wasn’t drinkable.\textsuperscript{355}
\end{quote}

So life continued, but in 1954 further change occurred when the Tasman Pulp and Paper Mill began production.\textsuperscript{356} All claimants from Kawerau and Matata who gave evidence before us have recorded adverse impacts on the water quality of the Tarawera River and the Matata Lagoon from this time. There now seems little doubt that the authority of the Tasman Pulp and Paper Enabling Act 1952 enabled the mill to discharge waste at unacceptable levels into the Tarawera River. The Ngati Awa Tribunal noted that these discharges were responsible for ‘killing all fish life downstream’ and that in 1966, ‘the Government required the mill to filter and monitor its waste-water.’\textsuperscript{357} The claimants allege that the pollution in the Tarawera River prompted the Rangitaiki Drainage Board and the Bay of Plenty Catchment Board to undertake further work at Matata, with the erection of a floodgate between the start of the Tarawera River and the Matata Lagoon.\textsuperscript{358} We were told by Environment Bay of Plenty that they have investigated every complaint made
about the operation of the Mill and have been involved in two prosecutions. We do not know whether those prosecutions related to any discharges into the Tarawera River.

The Tribunal’s findings regarding the management of the Tarawera River (pre- and post-Resource Management Act)

This case study points again to the problems with the legislation for the management of waterways before the Resource Management Act in 1991. Major modification to the Tarawera River took place under a legislative regime that did not recognise Maori cultural values, or their relationships with the river. The failures to address these issues had major implications for the cultural way of life of Maori. It is clear to us that this is another instance where development ought to have been undertaken in partnership with hapu and iwi. As we noted above, in such situations the affected iwi and hapu should have been fully involved in all decisions made so that options that had the least impact on their way of life, and their Treaty rights and interests could have been more fully explored.

As with the previous example concerning the Kaituna to Maketu river system, the need for an amendment to the RMA is apparent given that the mill continues to discharge contaminants into the Tarawera River. While we acknowledge the work of Environment Bay of Plenty in monitoring the conditions of the mill’s resource consent process, there are ongoing Treaty issues and historical issues for tangata whenua that need to be addressed. Under the current regime this cannot be done. In the interim, and as a minimum, a joint-management agreement over the lower reaches of the Tarawera River (Kawerau to Matata) should be a point of discussion in negotiations and it should include all iwi with an interest in the river.

The management of the Murupara log yard soil and water contamination

As noted by Dr Kirkpatrick, Ms Belshaw, and Dr Campbell, hydroelectricity schemes (Aniwhenua, Wheao, and Matahina Dams), afforestation (Kaingaroa and Matahina Forests), and land clearing for agriculture have contributed greatly to significant environmental changes. The Waitangi Tribunal has previously reported on the impacts of the hydrodevelopment of the rivers of the Kaingaroa in the Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report so we do not propose to traverse those issues again.

The claimants’ case

The evidence on Murupara was led for Ngati Haka Patuheuheu. Ngati Manawa were in settlement negotiations with the Crown, but did maintain a watching brief. Ngati Whare did not appear before us. The claimants relied on the evidence of Kirkpatrick and his team to highlight their concerns regarding the pollution of waterways in their districts over which they claim rangatiratanga.

The Crown’s case

The Crown has conceded that a number of the case studies presented to this Tribunal involved the discharge of pollution at a level now regarded as quite unacceptable by Maori and the wider community. That Maori values were adversely affected is not denied. But the Crown contends that these problems are now being addressed in significant ways. Its submissions thus turn on how the issues are being addressed. We explore this issue further below.

The Tribunal’s analysis with regard to Murupara water and soil contamination

The Murupara example is a smaller, more localised, issue. Nevertheless it brings issues relating to water and soil pollution into sharp focus. In this case, there is a single agency responsible, pollution took place over five decades, and recent attempts to clean up the site concerned have been only partially successful.
In the decade after the Second World War, Murupara was selected by the Crown as the site for a large pulp and paper mill, which would process wood from the Kaingaroa forests. Despite the protests of Ngati Manawa that they would lose their valuable river flats, the land was taken under the Public Works Act 1928. The mill did not eventuate but the land was retained and became the site for a rail head and logging yard. Up to one million net tonnes of logs pass through the Murupara yards each year on their way to the pulp and paper mill at Kawerau.

There has been extensive pollution of land on and adjacent to the Murupara log yard caused by the logs stored on the site. Pollution from the site has entered the Wairohia Stream which contains wahi tapu associated with burial practices. The stream runs into the Rangitaiki River and thus enters the entire catchment from that point to the sea.

Attempts have been made, during the 1990s, to clean up the site by use of settling ponds, but these are only a partial success. Soil and water are still polluted, the site is visually unattractive, and the wahi taonga flax beds are overgrown with blackberry and other weeds. We note the issues concerning this site will be addressed in more detail by the Urewera Tribunal.

The Tribunal’s findings with regard to Murupara water and soil contamination (pre- and post-Resource Management Act)

Representatives of the claimants expressed concerns regarding the condition of their waterways, the diminishing traditional eel fisheries, and the health of the people. It seems to us that given the extent of the afforestation in this area, further research should address environmental effects from the industry on waterways and the health of the people.

Summary of Key Chapter Findings

As we noted above, the Treaty of Waitangi envisaged that Maori would continue to exercise their autonomy by managing their own policy, resources, and affairs, within the minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the State. In answer to the question to what extent did or has the Crown provided for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental management, the answer must be that it did not do so before 1991 to any significant degree, and has not adequately done so since 1991.

While the RMA is an advance on the earlier legislative regime, as is the Act’s amendment of 2005, the Act is still inadequate in Treaty terms. We discuss the initiatives that the Crown has taken in terms of enacting the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori Constituency Empowering) Act 2001 and the Local Government Act 2002 in more detail in Chapter 20. We note here that the initiatives were an advance on the previous local government regime. However, the evidence is that Maori representation is still too limited. Central North Island iwi and hapu groups still have no direct right to attend meetings of councils or consent hearings other than as members of the public, applicants, or concerned parties. In particular, participation is not based on tribal or hapu representation and cannot have any meaningful effect on outcomes under the RMA. The evidence of Raewyn Bennett and Tipene Marr before us, both of whom were councillors on Environment Bay of...
Plenty, was that there were too few Maori on the council and that their views were often marginalised. But no matter how many Maori are represented on local or regional authorities, the authorities are bound to give effect to the statutory scheme of the RMA in the manner we have described above. Not even the Joint Rotorua Lake Strategy Group can influence the RMA process.

In short, Maori in the Central North Island have suffered major environmental disadvantage as a result of not being adequately recognised in the resource management process. Increasing the level of Maori representation in local government does not address the issue of how to ensure decisions made under the RMA are Treaty-consistent. Only a further amendment to the Act will enable those exercising powers and duties under it to act in a manner consistent with the Treaty. This would address past problems and ensure that present activities, done under resource consents, do not impinge on the Treaty rights and interests of the claimants. Our view is that an amendment is necessary to section 8 of the RMA and we return to this point in chapter 20.

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**Summary**

**The Tribunal’s Findings**

In this chapter we have examined two issues:

1. To what extent has the Crown provided for Maori rangatiratanga in the environmental management of waterways?
2. What has been the prejudice to Maori, if any, of any failure to provide for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental management of waterways?

In relation to issue one, we made the following findings:

- After the Treaty of Waitangi, the Crown had a duty to actively protect Central North Island Maori rangatiratanga or autonomy and self-government over their waterways in the environmental management regime of the time.

- This is because the Treaty of Waitangi envisaged that Maori would continue to exercise their autonomy by managing their own policy, resources, and affairs, within the minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the State.


- The Crown’s delegation of resource management authority to local authorities before the RMA without providing for the tino rangatiratanga of Central North Island Maori was, therefore, inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

*continues on following page*
The Resource Management Act 1991 is not a regime consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi because:

- it fails to address the full nature and extent of Maori customary rights, their Treaty interests, or their historical relationship, in and with natural water and other waterways that are taonga to Central North Island Maori;
- its procedures, save for certain sections discussed in detail both in this chapter and in chapter 20, fail to assure Maori of anything more than the right to be consulted in certain circumstances. Other than that, their customary rights and Treaty interests are weighed in a process that requires a balancing of those rights and interests against the purpose of the RMA and its principles outlined in sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Act, and the concerns of other sectors of the public; and
- it fails to address the situation of Central North Island Maori who do not seek recognition of their absolute rangatiratanga or right to autonomy and self-government over their waterways, but rather the right to negotiate their resource management arrangements in accordance with the principles of partnership and the Treaty of Waitangi.

Even with joint management regimes in place, the RMA will still need to be amended.

An amendment to section 8, or the insertion of some new provision in the Act, is the only mechanism that can assure Maori that their rangatiratanga or autonomy and self-government can be appropriately considered in RMA processes.

In relation to issue two, we made the following findings.

- Many waterways of the Central North Island are important taonga over which the exercise of their rangatiratanga was guaranteed to Maori by the Treaty of Waitangi.
- Because of the failure of the Crown’s environmental management regimes from 1840 to 2005 to provide for Maori rangatiratanga or autonomy and self-government over their resources at the local and regional level, Central North Island Maori have been seriously prejudiced in a number of ways.
- We considered particular case studies concerning the management of lakes, springs, rivers, wetlands and estuaries, which demonstrated the prejudice caused to Central North Island Maori by the Crown’s failure to recognise their rangatiratanga in environmental management. We outlined the nature and the extent of that prejudice in those particular cases, and the disproportionate impacts on Maori that have resulted.
- One result has been the loss of Central North Island Maori control and kaitiaki practices associated with many of their waterways or taonga, and in some cases the diminishment or degradation of such taonga.
Notes

1. Tamati Kruger, oral evidence, translation filed on 22 June 2005 (doc c21(d)), p 32
2. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 434
3. Tom Bennion, generic closing submissions concerning environmental and resource management issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.78), p 18
4. Ibid
5. Ibid, p 20
6. Ibid
7. Aidan Warren, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tutemohuta and Karanga Hapu, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.84), p 151
8. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), p 435
9. Ibid, p 465
10. Ibid
11. Ibid, pp 465–466
12. Ibid, p 470
13. Ibid, p 467
14. Mai Chen and Lecretia Seales, closing submissions for Waikato Regional Council, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.112), p 5
15. Ibid
16. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 435
18. Ibid, pp 352–353
19. Ibid, pp 457–474
21. Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188
25. Ngati Maru Iwi Authority Inc v Auckland City Council unreported, 27 October 2002, Baragwanath J, High Court Auckland, Auckland AP18-SW01
29. Aidan Warren, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tutemohuta and Karanga Hapu, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.84), p 154
30. Te Runanga o Ait Awa ki Whakarongotai Inc v Kapiti District Council, 30 July 2003, Judge Treadwell, Commissioners Howie and Menzies, Environment Court, Wellington, w 50–03, para 84
31. Tom Bennion, generic closing submissions concerning environmental and resource management issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.78), pp 18–19
32. Ibid, pp 19–20
33. Ibid, p 19
34. P Cooney and TC Waikato, closing submissions of counsel for Environment Bay of Plenty, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.114), p 9; Mai Chen and Lecretia Seales, closing submissions for Waikato Regional Council, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.112), pp 4–5
36. Ibid, p 147
37. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 460
38. For example, see Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell, ‘Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000’, report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3), p 130
39. Ibid, pp 148–196
40. Ibid, pp 154, 157
41. Ibid, pp 148–196, esp figures 4.1–4.3, 4.5, 4.12–4.14 and the photographs provided in figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21, 4.22. See also table 4.1 which logs complaints relating to McAlpines sawmill and drain between 1998 and 2002.
43. Ibid
44. See Rotorua minute book 132, pp 188–199, 259–260; Rotorua minute book 116, pp 41–51
46. Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell, ‘Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental
Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000, report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3), p 181


50. Ibid, p 25


53. Ibid, pp 27–29

54. Ibid, pp 27–29

55. Ibid, pp 27–29

56. Ibid, p 172

57. Ibid, p 173

58. Ibid, p 174

59. Ibid, p 174


Wai 275 (Tahunaroa and Waitahanui Blocks claim); and (B) Wai 363 (Tahuourangi Taonga Tukiuho claim); and (C) Wai 675 (Lake Okataina and Surrounding Lands claim); and (D) Wai 791 (Volcanic Interior Plateau claim); and (E) Wai 837 (Ngati Whaoa Rohe claim); and (F) Wai 911 (Ngati Tahu and Ngati Whaoa Lands and Resources claim); and (G) Wai 918 (Lake Rotorua and Rotorua Airport claim); and (H) Wai 936 (Ngati Rangiteaorere Lake Rotorua claim); and (I) Wai 996 (Ngati Whakatane claim); and (J) Wai 1103 (Ngati Hinemihi Te Ariki and Punaromia Land claim). (2) However, Te Arawa lakes historical claims does not include – (a) a claim that a member of Te Arawa, or an iwi, hapu, group, family, or whanau referred to in section 12(1)(c) may have that is founded on a right arising as a result of being descended from an ancestor who is not a Te Arawa ancestor; or (b) any claim that Te Arawa has or may have to the extent that the claim does not arise from or relate to all or any of the Te Arawa lakes, the 1922 arrangements, or the annuity, including (but not limited to) any claim relating to – (i) the land abutting or surrounding the Te Arawa lakes; or (ii) the islands in those lakes; or (iii) resources not related to those lakes; or (iv) Crown acts or omissions not arising from or relating to those lakes; or (v) the Ohau Channel between Lakes Rotorua and Rototiti; or (c) a claim that a representative entity may have to the extent that the claim is, or is based on, a claim referred to in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b). (3) Subsection (1)(a) is not limited by subsection (1)(b) or (c).

85. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p136 (cited in Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 493

86. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p136 (cited in Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 493

87. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 491

88. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 491

89. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p136 (cited in Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 493

90. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p136 (cited in Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 493

91. Ibid, pp 492–493

92. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p136 (cited in Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 493

93. Peter McBurney, evidence given under cross-examination, fifth hearing, 2–6 May 2005 (transcript 4.1.6), p136 (cited in Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 493

94. Ibid, pp 495–496

95. Ibid, p 496

96. Interdepartmental Officials Committee Report 1966 in doc A82(c), p1930


98. Committee on Lake Shore Reserves – Report to the Taupo County Council (March 1964), (doc 11, appendix 11)


102. Ibid, p 232


108. Interdepartmental Officials Committee Report 1966 in doc A82(c), p 1928
111. Ibid
112. See An Environmental Study of the Lake Taupo Catchment (doc I1), app 4, p 14
115. Ibid (pp 241–242)
117. Ibid, pp 243–244
118. Ibid
119. Ibid, p 244
120. Ibid, pp 244–248
121. Ibid, p 248
125. Ibid (p 262)
127. Ibid, pp 273–274
128. See, for example, David Chrystall, brief of evidence, 26 April 2005 (doc E44), p 13; Dulcie Gardiner, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc E25), pp 7–8
129. Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), pp 8–9
130. Ibid, p 9
133. Ibid, pp 13–18
134. Ibid, p 14
135. Ibid, p 17
136. Ibid, p 18
137. Ibid
138. Ibid
140. Ibid
142. Peter Crawford (quoted in Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), annexure 3, p 16)
143. Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), annexure 3, p 17
144. Peter Crawford (quoted in Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), annexure 3, pp 17, 19)
146. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 213. Stephen Asher notes that the rural zoning underlay the reserve designation, so that the land was doubly bound: Stephen Asher, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E45), p 9.
149. Ibid, p 13
150. Ibid, p 15
151. Ibid
152. Ibid

154. 2020 Taupo-nui-a-Tia Action Plan (doc E5(b)), app 2, pp 59–84


156. Ibid, p 11

157. Ibid

158. Maria Nepia, brief of evidence, 20 April 2005 (doc E5), p 4

159. Ibid, p 5

160. Ibid, p 6

161. Ibid


163. Ibid, p 25

164. Ibid, p 13

165. Ibid, p 21

166. Ibid, p 8

167. Ibid

168. Ibid, pp 8–10

169. Mai Chen and Lecretia Seales, closing submissions for Waikato Regional Council, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.112), p 24

170. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), p 115

171. George Te Waaka Eruera Asher, brief of evidence, 29 April 2005 (doc E39), p 19

172. Ibid, pp 21, 22–23

173. Sean Dansey Ellison, brief of evidence (Maori version), 28 February 2005 (Maori) (doc C25); Sean Ellison, brief of evidence (English version), 28 February 2005 (doc C25(a))

174. See, for example, Richard Boast and Liz McPherson, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Hineuru, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.63), p 97

175. Martin Taylor, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Rangiwewehi, September 2005 (paper 3.3.79), pp 33–34

176. Ibid, pp 33–34

177. Ibid, pp 34–35

178. Ibid, p 35

179. Ibid, pp 35–36

180. Ibid, p 41

181. Ibid, pp 39–40

182. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, pp 552–553

183. Ibid, pp 552–553

184. Ibid, p 374

185. Martin Taylor, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Rangiwewehi, September 2005 (paper 3.3.79)

186. Ibid

187. Te Ururoa Flavell, brief of evidence, April 2005 (doc F41), p 5

188. Ibid, p 5

189. Ibid, pp 6–9


193. Ibid, p 4; Don Stafford, Landmarks of Te Arawa, 2 vols (Auckland: Reed, 1994), vol 1, p 27

194. Te Ururoa Flavell, brief of evidence, April 2005 (doc F41), pp 10–22


196. Ibid, p 28

197. Ibid, pp 55–56

198. Ibid, p 83

199. Ibid

200. Ibid, p 144

201. Ibid, p 19


203. Ibid

204. Te Ururoa Flavell, brief of evidence, April 2005 (doc F41), pp 5–7

205. Don Stafford, Landmarks of Te Arawa, 2 vols (Auckland: Reed, 1994), vol 1, p 83


207. Ibid

208. Ibid, p 61

209. Ibid, p 47

210. Ibid

211. Ibid, pp 48–49


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218. Ibid


221. Kere Cookson-Ua, 'Pekehua Puna Reserve and Hamurana Springs Reserve', report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, February 1996 (doc G12), pp 63–64

222. Richard Boast and Liz McPherson, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Rangitihiti, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.62), p 129

223. Ibid

224. Ibid, p 130

225. Michael Sharp and Jolene Patuawa, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Whaoa, 8 September 2005 (paper 3.3.59), p 49

226. Rereamanu Wihapi, brief of evidence, undated (doc B21), pp 6–8

227. Annette Sykes and Jason Pou, closing submissions on behalf of Te Ahi Kaa Roa o Maketu, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.75), p 21

228. Ibid, pp 7–12

229. Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damen Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 458

230. Ibid

231. Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell, 'Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000', report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3). The report is supported by a comprehensive document bank (doc E3(b)).


233. Ibid, p 423

234. Ibid, p 424

235. Ibid


240. Ibid, p 10

241. Ibid

242. Ibid

243. Ibid, p 31

244. P Cooney and TC Waikato, closing submissions of counsel for Environment Bay of Plenty, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.114), p 12

245. Ibid


247. Ibid

248. Ibid

249. Ibid, pp 427–432

250. Ibid, p 434

251. Don Stafford, Pakiwaitara: Te Arawa Stories of Rotorua (Auckland: Reed, 1999), p 68

252. See, for example, the postcard reproduced in Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell, 'Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000', report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3), p 438

253. Ibid, p 425


255. Ibid, p 10

256. Ibid, p 11

257. Ibid, p 13


259. Ibid, p 7
260. Tame McCausland, brief of evidence, 16 February 2005 (doc B54), p 7
261. Ibid, p 21
262. Ibid, p 15
263. Ibid
264. Ibid, pp 30–31
265. Hauata Palmer, brief of evidence, undated (doc B29); Kihi Ngatai, brief of evidence on behalf of Ngai Te Rangi and Ngai Tukairangi, undated (doc B32); Colin Reeder, brief of evidence, 20 May 2005 (doc F99); Charles (Jack) Morehu, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F19)
266. Spencer Webster and Steven Clark, closing submissions on behalf of Ngai Te Rangi and Ngai Tukairangi, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.68), pp 3–11
272. Ibid
273. Ibid, p 447
274. Ibid, p 450
275. Ibid, pp 450–452
276. Ibid, p 452–453
277. Kaituna River District Act 1926, s 3
278. Ibid, s 4
280. Ibid, pp 450–453
286. Ibid, pp 455–458
287. Ibid, p 456–457
288. Ibid, p 456
289. Ibid, pp 464–465
290. Ibid, p 460
291. Andrew Murray, A Preliminary Report on Control of the Kaituna River (Public Works Department, Hamilton, 1948) p 4
292. This is a direct quotation from AR Acheson, Kaituna River Board: Flood Protection and Drainage Scheme, 297,980, unpublished report from the Soil Conservation Engineer in Wellington to the Kaituna River Board, 1954, summarised in Philip Tortell, Maketu Estuary: Environmental Issues and Options (Wellington: Commission for the Environment, 1984), p 28; Russell Kirkpatrick, Katarina Belshaw, and John Campbell (Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000), report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3) and the Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission date this report as October 1953, Tortell as 1954.

295. The commission at this point was headed by Ken Piddington.


297. Philip Tortell, Maketu Estuary: Environmental Issues and Options (Wellington: Commission for the Environment, 1984), sec 2.2 9 pp 8–17. Tortell also reports that residents drew attention to a 1978 study by Ken Murray who found a marked decline in numbers of shellfish 'particularly pipis, large green mussels, blue mussels and rock oysters' and were bitter that no action had been taken when this documentation was available for some time (p 14).

298. Ibid, p 13


302. D Paterson v Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Minister of Conservation, p 11

303. Ibid

304. Raewyn Bennett, supporting documents, 27 April 2005 (doc F24(a)), p 47

305. D Paterson v Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Minister of Conservation, p 1

306. Ibid

307. Ibid. We note that at this hearing Ngai Te Rangi stated that they wished to maintain the benefit of a river outlet at Te Tumu. Therefore, it appears that maintaining a flow at Te Tumu is important to them, but we can not know for sure.

308. Raewyn Bennett, supporting documents, 27 April 2005 (doc F24(a)), pp 4–6

309. Ibid

310. New Zealand Gazette, 1 September 1927, no 62, p 2818


312. Ibid, p 451

313. Henry McRae, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F16), annexures


315. D Paterson v Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Minister of Conservation, unreported, A54/94, p 8

316. Ibid


321. Te Keepa Stewart Marsh, brief of evidence, 27 June 2005 (doc F123)

322. Hone Te Anga and Others v The Kawa Drainage Board (1914) 33 NZLR at p 1139; 16 GLR 696


324. P Cooney and T C Waikato, closing submissions of counsel for Environment Bay of Plenty, 14 October 2005, p 14

325. Rereamanu Wihapi, brief of evidence, undated (doc B21), p 8

326. See sections 4 and 36a of the Resource Management Act as inserted by the Resource Management Amendment Act 2005

327. Eastern Bay of Plenty, Tarawera Catchment Plan (2004), p 26


330. Tame McCausland, brief of evidence, 16 February 2005 (doc B54), p 4

331. David Potter, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B3), p 10

332. Henry Pryor, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B17), p 3

Rangatiratanga – Kawanatanga: Environmental Management


Morris Raureti, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B16), pp 1–2

Andre Paterson, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B2), pp 7–8

David Potter, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B3), p 28

Morris Raureti, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B16), pp 2–3

Andre Paterson, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B1), p 17

Henry Pryor, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B17), p 4

Anthony Olsen, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B24), pp 4–5


P Cooney and TC Waikato, closing submissions of counsel for Environment Bay of Plenty, 14 October 2005, p 16

See sections 4 and 36A of the RMA as inserted by the Resource Management Amendment Act 2005

Russell Kirkpatrick, Kataraina Belshaw, and John Campbell ‘Land based Cultural Resources and Waterways and Environmental Impacts (Rotorua, Taupo and Kaingaroa) 1840–2000’, report commissioned by CFRT, December 2004 (doc E3), p 244


Among the first immigrants who came from Hawaiki to New Zealand, was also the chief Ngatoroirangi (heaven’s runner or the traveller in the heavens). He landed at Maketu on the East Coast of the North Island. Thence he set off with his slave Ngauruhoe for the purpose of exploring the new country. He travels through the country: stamps springs of water from the ground to moisten scorched valleys; scales hills and mountains, and beholds towards the South a big mountain, the Tongariro (literally ‘towards South’). He determines on ascending this mountain in order to obtain a better view of the country...

Then he ascends the snow-clad Tongariro; they suffered severely from the cold, and the chief shouted to his sisters who had remained upon Whaka[a]ri, to send him some fire. The sisters heard his call and sent him the sacred fire they had brought from Hawaiki. They sent it to him through two Taniwhas (mountain and water spirits living underground), Pupu and Te Haeata, by a subterranean passage to the top of Tongariro. The fire arrived just in time to save the life of the chief, but poor Ngauruhoe was dead when the chief turned to give him the fire. On this account the hole, through which the fire made its appearance, the active crater of Tongariro, is called to this day after the slave Ngauruhoe; and the sacred fire still burns to this very day within the whole underground passage between Whak[a]ri and the Tongariro: it burns at Motou-Hora, Oka-karu, Roto-ehu, Roto-iti, Roto-rua, Roto-mahana, Paerua, Orakei-korako, Taupo, where it blazed forth when the Taniwhas brought it. Hence the innumerable hot springs at all the places mentioned. [Emphasis added.]

Iwikau Te Heuheu, as told to Hochstetter, 1859

Hochstetter reflects in 1859: ‘This legend affords a remarkable instance of the accurate observation of the natives, who have thus indicated the true line of the chief volcanic action upon the North Island.’

**Introduction**

It is certainly not without significance that the Crown chose to give the name Waiairiki to the Maori Land Court district and the Maori electoral district that encompass a large part of our Central North Island inquiry region – waiariki being warm baths or pools, heated by geothermal activity. It is well known that geothermal activity of the Central North Island enabled Maori to live and thrive in environments that would otherwise be cold and inhospitable. The hot waters provided heating, cooking, and bathing facilities; recreational amenities; and a multiplicity of healing and therapeutic uses. Hot springs, pools, and geysers close to and under larger lakes and rivers provided essentials and amenities for those who established permanent settlements close by. Geothermal features located inland,
The major link between water and geothermal activity is vitally important to understanding the manner in which the Crown has classified geothermal activity for management purposes. The Crown recognises that water is a key to the operation of the geothermal fields and has vested regional management in Environment Bay of Plenty and Environment Waikato. We note that in the deed of settlement signed in September 2006 between the Crown and about one-half of Te Arawa (the Affiliate Iwi and Hapu), the parties define the subterranean geothermal resource as including energy and water. The definition of the geothermal resource in the deed is ‘the geothermal energy and geothermal water located in the Rotorua Region Geothermal System’, but does not for the purposes of the deed include ‘any geothermal water and geothermal energy above ground on land that is owned by the Crown.’

Schedule 3 lists the description of the 12 geothermal fields which make up the Rotorua Region Geothermal System. These are listed as: Rotoma; Taheke–Tikitere; Rotorua; Horohoro; Waikite–Waiotapu–Waimangu; Reporoa; Atiamuri; Te Kopia; Orakei Korako; Ohaaki/Broadlands; Nga Tamariki; and Rotokawa. Furthermore, we note that the historical account in the deed of settlement states:

‘The geothermal resource has always been highly valued and treasured by the Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi/Hapu, who consider it a taonga over which they have exercised rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga….’

Despite the loss of lands containing geothermal surface features the geothermal resource was, and still is, central to the lifestyle and identity of Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi/Hapu. For example, hot pools and ngawha were, and are, used for cooking, bathing, heating and medicinal purposes.

The deed provides for a non-exclusive geothermal statutory acknowledgement, comprising:

(a) A description of the Geothermal Resource
(b) A reference to the text of the statement by the Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi/Hapu of their cultural, spiritual, historical, and traditional association with and the use of the

Definitions

We list here the following definitions used in this chapter. We use variously the terms (a) Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ), (b) the subterranean geothermal resource, and (c) the common underlying heat and energy or heat flow to describe what we understand to be the features of the Taupo Volcanic Zone. We use the term geothermal fields to describe the 17 hot water, heat, and energy systems of the Central North Island. And we use the term geothermal surface features, to describe geysers, hot pools, mud pools, fumaroles, and sinter deposits that all form part of the bundle of rights commonly associated with land ownership known in western law.
He Maunga Rongo

Geothermal Resource, the text of which is set out in Part 2 Schedule 3;
(c) An acknowledgement by the Crown of the Statement of Association;
(d) The other matters required by this Deed; and
(e) Any appropriate provisions to enable the Settlement Legislation to refer to the Statement of Association.

All Te Arawa have a similar interest in what has been called in the deed the ‘Rotorua Region Geothermal System’, whether they have settled their claims or not. That is because they have a shared history, shared whakapapa, shared customary use and reliance on the geothermal resource, and a shared interest through their combined status as the Te Arawa Confederation of Tribes. Their interests held in the Rotorua region geothermal system are similar to those of other tribes of the Rotorua region who appeared before this Tribunal. In terms of the Kawerau area, we note that the interests of Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau in the geothermal taonga of that place are recognised by sections 45 and 46 of the Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement Act 2005. These sections also provide a definition of what is meant by the term the Kawerau geothermal system:

45. Interpretation
In this subpart—
geothermal energy and geothermal water—
(a) have the same meanings as in section 2(1) of the Resource Management Act 1991; but
(b) for the purposes of paragraph (a), do not include any geothermal energy or geothermal water above the ground on land that is not owned by the Crown

geothermal statutory acknowledgement means an acknowledgement made by the Crown under section 46 in respect of the geothermal energy and geothermal water located in the Kawerau Geothermal system on the terms set out in Schedule 5.16 of the deed of settlement

Kawerau Geothermal system means the geothermal system within the boundary generally indicated on SO 61730 South Auckland Land District.

46. Geothermal statutory acknowledgement by the Crown
The Crown acknowledges the statements made by Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) of their particular cultural, spiritual, historical, and traditional association with, and use of, the geothermal energy and geothermal water located in the Kawerau Geothermal system as set out in Schedule 5.16 of the deed of settlement.

We note that neither of the examples from the Affiliates Te Arawa deed of settlement, nor the Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) settlement deed, precludes, at this stage, our jurisdiction concerning claims in the Rotorua district or claims from other tribes concerning the Kawerau area.

The Nature of the Subterranean Resource: the Taupo Volcanic Zone
The Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ) is an active volcanic zone created by the collision of two earth crustal blocks and the subduction of the Pacific plate in relation to the Indo-Australian plate. The zone extends from White Island offshore in the Bay of Plenty, through the Rotorua and Taupo lakes to Tongariro and Ruapehu. Lake Rotorua was formed by a volcanic eruption some 100,000 years ago; Lake Taupo was formed by an eruption 22,000 years ago and modified by a much more recent eruption around AD 180, which breached the lake outlet and scattered volcanic ash over the volcanic plateau and places as far afield as Hawke’s Bay. Within the TVZ are some 17 major geothermal fields where surface water penetrates deep into the earth, is heated by encountering magma which has intruded into the fractured crust of the TVZ, and emerges as boiling water.
The pressures within the TVZ have increased the temperature of rocks below the surface, and fractures within the rocks allow surface water to penetrate deep into the earth. Each of these 17 geothermal fields has its own unique combination of surface features, including hot springs, mud pools, geysers, fumaroles, and sinter deposits.

Geoffrey Cox and Bruce Hayward summarise present-day scientific understanding of the TVZ in these words:

The Taupo Volcanic Zone is home to 17 major geothermal fields, including all those in New Zealand that discharge boiling water. These occur here because in this area the crust reaches a temperature of at least 350°C at a depth of less than 5 km. Ground water infiltrating from above is heated (but due to the pressure at this depth does not boil), then driven upwards by convection, often along faults in the crust. At shallow depths the water boils, and a mixture of steam and water is formed, which finds its way to the surface by whatever routes are available to it. Hot springs are more likely to occur in valleys, steam fumaroles on hillsides. However, virtually every geothermal system has unique characteristics that have a major influence on its surface appearance.

There are three scales of geothermal activity which help us to understand the features within the TVZ: at macro-scale, geothermal activity is often related to earth crustal processes and correlates with earthquake activity; at regional scale, it is part of a set of 17 nested geothermal fields situated within the TVZ; at local level, there are the particular fields with a range and diversity of surface features – the visible signs of the subterranean geothermal resource, the TVZ.

Scientists from the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences have considered the make-up and dynamic of the TVZ. Scientists agree that geothermal activity originates deep within the earth's crust. Concentrated geothermal heat may be associated with molten igneous material and may, from time to time and in spectacular fashion, reach the surface in the form of molten lava or volcanic ash. Geothermal heating and volcanic activity are both associated with the pressures generated by the movement of the large tectonic plates which form the surface of the earth. Cox and Hayward, for example, describe New Zealand as a restless country and attribute earthquakes, and the volcanic activity which is so marked in the TVZ, to the collision between the Pacific plate and the Indo-Australian plate. The outcome of this collision, in the area below the North Island, is the subduction of the Pacific plate and the generation of intense heat below the TVZ (figure 20.1). Hancox also showed this visually and vividly in a cross section showing the subduction zone under the Central North Island and its relationship to the TVZ. "The Taupo Volcanic Zone', writes Hancox, 'is a zone of active volcanism, extensional faulting, earthquakes, high geothermal heat flow, and tectonic deformation."

Much of this knowledge is, however, recent. In particular, the theory of plate tectonics was not developed until the late 1960s (although based, it is true, on earlier ideas). Using these insights, Western scientists have been able to provide an explanation for the link between different geothermal fields within a volcanic zone.

The Nature of the Maori Claims before the Tribunal

The primary claims of Central North Island Maori in respect of the geothermal resources are: that Maori possessed these resources in a manner akin to ownership; that the Crown guaranteed to protect their taonga and their right to exercise rangatiratanga over these taonga and to manage them in accordance with their own cultural preferences; and that as an incident of their ownership they are entitled to develop or to receive benefits from its use. We discuss below the (much earlier) Maori understanding of the TVZ in more detail. For now, we note that the
Figure 20.1: Plate tectonics and volcanism in the Central North Island [Source: Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), (doc A56), figure 2, p 5]
geothermal resources which Maori claim as taonga comprise three aspects:

- The geothermal surface features form part of the bundle of rights that run with land. Maori have different terms for the varying aspects of the resource as it is brought to the surface. These are waiariki (in Rotorua the term means 'chiefly waters' to honour Ngatoroirangi), a warm bath or hot water pool; ngawha, a hot boiling water or mud pool; and puia, a geyser or cone-shaped stemming feature. They also used other byproducts from the resources as we explain below. In relation to these features, underground heat, generated by nuclear or tectonic processes, is transferred to the surface of the earth wherever rock formations allow groundwater to penetrate deeply enough to come in contact with heated rock. Such transfers are – by comparison with volcanic activity – steady, much less spectacular, and much more sustained. A range of surface features, including hot pools, mud pools, geysers, fumaroles and sinter deposits, are created where heated water or steam reaches the surface. Variations in activity level are related to the supply of groundwater, rather than changes in the underlying rock temperature. As heated water seeps through rocks, a range of minerals are dissolved and brought to the surface, producing a distinctive water chemistry and habitats that support a unique combination of plants, animals, and micro-organisms. The main surface features that we received some evidence on were: geothermal seeps at Maketu and Matata; hot springs at Moutohora/Whale Island, Awakeri, Waitangi Soda Springs, Kaingaroa (Te Puna Takatahi a Ngatoroirangi and others), Onepu springs on the Tarawera River, Manaohau, Pukehinahau, Tarawera Springs (Napier-Taupo road), and Mangakino.

- The geothermal water or fluids, and geothermal heat and energy, located in the geothermal fields. Scientists make a distinction between surface geothermal features – such as hot pools or geysers – and the larger geothermal fields of which they are part. The geothermal fields include two main components that are relevant to the claims. These are the underground material containing heat or energy, and the groundwater circulating through the heat source; and the surface features where heat and energy are released. The geothermal fields of the TVZ that claimants or their evidence refer to are: Kawerau–Putauaki–Tarawera; Rotoma–Tikorangi–Puhupuhu; Rotorua including Tikitere–Taheke and Rotokawa–Mokoia Island; Atiamuri; Horohoro; Waikite–Waiotapu–Waimangu; Reporoa; Te Kopia; Orakei Korako; Ngatamariki; Hokai; Ohaaki–Broadlands; Rotokawa; Wairakei–Tauhara; Horomatangi; Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipua; and Tongariro–Ketetahi.

- The subterranean resource which is the TVZ.

We were told that geothermal activity was central to Central North Island Maori and their ways of life. As we discuss below, these claims are based on a number of factors. The late Dame Evelyn Stokes brought together information on traditional Maori settlement patterns and scientific evidence in a number of publications. Two of her maps are especially helpful in this context. The first of these, prepared by DSIR scientists MA Mongillo and L Clelland, shows the TVZ and the geothermal systems, hot springs and volcanoes (see map 20.1). Alongside that, Dame Evelyn places another map, drafted for the New Zealand Historical Atlas, which shows marae in relation to geothermal fields (map 20.2). The close physical relationship between Maori settlement patterns and geothermal features is clearly evident. At the time of colonisation, Central North Island Maori understanding of the geothermal resource through day-to-day observation and use, on top of knowledge inherited over generations, was likely to have been considerably in advance of that of most newly arrived settlers and politicians.

We were told that Maori depended on the heat, energy, and water of their geothermal resource to sustain their way of life in a climate that was quite different from that of their
Map 20.1: The Taupo Volcanic Zone  
Map 20.2: Marae in relation to principal geothermal fields  [Source: Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), (doc A56), figure 4, p 9, and New Zealand Historical Atlas, plate 91]
Pacific homelands. This is what they claim as their taonga and – while other components of a geothermal system may influence the nature of the geothermal fluid or water, the temperature of a field or the number of surface manifestations – it is the water, the heat, and the energy that mattered most to Maori. That was their taonga. And where it emerged they lived or gathered; and when it moved, they moved. This is the point that Maori of the Central North Island understood through their stories of Ngatoroirangi. Furthermore, their taonga is what they say it is.

**Issues Regarding Geothermal Resources**

In chapter 17, we explained that the Tribunal has previously found that geothermal resources owned by Maori can be taonga, and that the Crown has a duty to actively protect Maori interests in those taonga. Here, we ascertain whether that is true in the context of the claims argued before us, and what the consequential nature and extent is of the Maori interest in the geothermal fields and underlying common heat and energy system (the TVZ).

Mr Taylor, for the claimants, noted that in the final statement of issues for the Central North Island inquiry, we indicated that generic issues already considered would not be revisited. The Tribunal lists the issues dealt with in the *Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims* in that category. But Mr Taylor is correct that the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunal did not make findings on all issues of concern in the Central North Island inquiry. Mr Taylor submitted, and we agree, that the issue of ownership of the whole underlying resource is a generic issue that is still to be considered.

A further issue yet to be determined is whether breaches of the Treaty by the Crown in respect of the alienation of land within which there is geothermal activity means there remains a continuing Maori interest in the fields and the subterranean resource (TVZ). Mr Taylor invited us to consider the claims to continuing ownership of the fields and the TVZ on the basis that this is ‘a touchstone issue’; for many Central North Island Maori the TVZ is ‘a fundamental resource . . . at the heart of their history and identity.’

He argued that the *Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims* report provided no adequate analysis of the issue of ownership under the Treaty. Furthermore, the Kaingaroa and Taupo claimants, and many claimants from Rotorua, were not parties to the previous Te Arawa Geothermal inquiry. In addition, Mr Taylor contended that there have been significant developments in Treaty jurisprudence since the Tribunal’s previous geothermal reports, in relation to taonga which, he submitted, are virtually indistinguishable from the geothermal taonga. The *Whanganui River Report* is one such development of key importance.

Mr Taylor argued that many of the additional issues of control such as those under the Resource Management Act 1991 need to be revisited to assess the adequacy of the Crown’s response to the previous Geothermal Reports. Mr Taylor submitted, therefore, that the *Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims* should not limit the scope of this inquiry.

Conversely, the Crown rejects any Maori claim to ownership of geothermal resources, arguing that any rights to use such resources are tied to the ownership of the surface land. No customary rights can exist to the geothermal fields and the TVZ, given that all land in the Central North Island has either been alienated, or had a Crown grant or Native Land Court title issued for it. The Crown says that there has been limited fresh evidence on geothermal matters since the Ngawha and Te Arawa geothermal inquiries in 1993, so there is no basis for this Tribunal ‘greatly to expand or supplement’ the findings of those earlier Tribunals.

We do not agree. A substantial body of evidence now exists covering the entire Central North Island – from Maketu and Matata to Tongariro – which was not available to previous Tribunals. Regarding the *Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims*, we agree with Mr Taylor that neither the Taupo nor the Kaingaroa claimants (nor indeed many of the Rotorua
The sharing of Maori knowledge was an important feature of Maori and European interaction during the early colonial years of New Zealand's shared history. The early history of the cultural interaction over geothermal resources demonstrates that many Maori and Europeans began their relationships with each other on a positive basis as Maori guided European travellers through the wonderland of the
interior volcanic plateau. So, we consider what was known of geothermal resources from both the Maori and the European worldviews of the early colonial period. In doing so, we consider whether the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ of the Central North Island were possessed by Maori as at 1840 and whether they considered them taonga over which they exercised rangatiratanga, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi.

The claimants’ case

Mr Taylor presented the generic submissions on geothermal resources to the Tribunal. He began by describing the primary claims of Central North Island Maori in respect to geothermal taonga as follows:

- a claim for ownership of the underlying geothermal resources of the Central North Island as a whole, as a taonga, in the same manner that Te Ati Haunui a Paparangi iwi were found to own the Whanganui River in the Tribunal’s Whanganui River Report; and
- claims for the return of particular geothermal surface features which have been wrongly alienated from Central North Island Maori.

The following rights are also claimed:

- preferential development rights of geothermal resources;
- control or greater control of geothermal resources, including protection of their own surface manifestations of the resource; and
- rights to determine and receive the revenue generated by the use of geothermal resources by third parties, and to be free from any charging regimes themselves.

Mr Taylor submitted that if ownership is found, then the above rights are incidents of ownership due to Maori, but currently denied by the Crown. If outright ownership is rejected, the above rights are still claimed, but will depend on the fact that:

- Maori still retain an interest in the geothermal resource through retention of portions of thermally active land and surface features; and
- much of the land in the Central North Island containing geothermal resources has been wrongfully alienated from Maori.

Primary arguments based on possession akin to ownership

Mr Taylor, for the claimants, submitted that the geothermal resources, over which the Central North Island sits, are taonga protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. They are an important cultural link to the claimants’ past, as well as being of central importance to their community and their way of life. The claimants’ evidence demonstrated a broad range of customary use of the resource, including for washing, for birthing and bathing of newborn infants, for burial and preparation for burial, for therapeutic properties, healing and medicine, for heating, for preparation of kumara for planting after the winter, for food preparation, cooking, scalding for food preservation, and for utu or ritual killings. Mr Taylor noted this intensity of customary use. He submitted that:

though the specific use may have varied from place to place, extensive use was made of the resource wherever it was found, to the extent that it formed a central part of Maori life.

He noted that the late Dame Evelyn Stokes, in identifying factors for permanent Maori settlement, included as an important factor access to geothermal heat.

In addition to physical uses, there was also the spiritual and cultural significance of the geothermal taonga and the people’s identification with them. Mr Taylor stressed the spiritual and cultural association with the entire TVZ through the story of Ngatoroirangi. Ngatoroirangi is one of the key ancestors to most iwi of the Central North Island, being the tohunga of Te Arawa waka and an early explorer of the region. The accounts of his exploits locate the coming of the subterranean geothermal resource within the
whakapapa of the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island. This is an essential feature of the stories concerning him, and it is fundamental to claiming rights in geothermal resources. Mr Taylor submitted that just as land is secured by ancestral rights because of the discovery or exploits of tupuna (ancestors), so is the right to geothermal activity. Thus, it was through Ngatoroirangi that the people of the region acquired the geothermal system of the TVZ. It is through Ngatoroirangi’s exploits, and through the long use and occupation of sites by Maori in and around geothermal sites in pursuit of geothermal heat, that ownership and the right to use and manage the whole of the TVZ within the Central North Island is claimed. The nature of the interest this has given rise to can be seen as a ‘claim to the resource to the exclusion of outsiders.’

Mr Taylor argued that the story of Ngatoroirangi demonstrates that Maori knew the subterranean nature of the fields and the TVZ, particularly the aspect of the story where Ngatoroirangi called on his sisters to bring him warmth. Either they (in some stories) or Ngatoroirangi’s taniwha (in other stories) came from Hawaiki, stopping at White Island (Whakaari) before moving on to Tongariro ‘via a subterranean passage’ leaving a trail of waiariki and geothermal features as they stopped at Kawerau, Rotorua, Waiotapu, Orakei Korako, Te Ohaaki, and Taupo. This, argued Mr Taylor, shows a Maori understanding of what scientists describe as the TVZ. Mr Taylor then submitted that it is a fundamental feature of the story of Ngatoroirangi that, before he arrived, the whenua (land) was in place without the geothermal waters. Geothermal activity was therefore separate in creation to the whenua itself. This is consistent with the Maori creation story and we discuss our views on this further below.

Mr Taylor contended that what Central North Island Maori possessed in Treaty terms were geothermal taonga, and that means the whole of the geothermal resource. Although there may have been specific rights in relation to the use and control of particular fields or features, the common Maori conception, the common reliance, and the common descent mean that those Maori with a geothermal interests were possessed of the whole of the geothermal resource in the region, being the Taupo volcanic zone. Mr Taylor then considered whether a geothermal resource passed with the sale of land. This turned on whether geothermal taonga were considered separate from the land or not. Mr Taylor contended that the underlying geothermal resource (TVZ) was a taonga, separate and unique in itself. This was not inconsistent with Maori thought:

All of nature’s resources were interlinked in Maori mythology, but all were also separate resources. The fisheries, the birds of a particular forest, a particular maunga, were all separate taonga.

He opined that it is in ‘the nature of resources, of value, and of human beings, that all things have a separateness at this level’. Relying on the Whanganui River Report, Mr Taylor contended that ‘separateness plays no real part in [the] assessment of taonga.’ The only questions that should be asked are, what was the taonga and was it alienated? He submitted that in the Whanganui River Report:

The Tribunal found that there was no contemplation that the river was sold with the riparian land. It was not in Maori’s contemplation, nor within their system of belief. That river is regarded as having its own mauri, its own value, its own origin. Though it flows through the land, and is obviously accessible from any land beside it which is sold, this access did not mean according to the Report that the rights to the river had passed with the land. The river was not wholly dependant or enclosed within the land.

Using that line of argument, Mr Taylor contends that land sales merely granted access to geothermal surface features and ‘such use rights as clearly go with it’. Granting of access did not diminish rangatiratanga over the resource,
as often the grant of access to a taonga will imply terms of permission or access under the control of kaitiaki of the resource. As often the grant of access to a taonga will imply terms of permission or access under the control of kaitiaki of the resource.54 ‘Granting of access [did] not equal the abandonment of control.’55 What this means is that while the land with surface manifestations may have been sold, that did not alienate [Maori] rights to control, develop and exploit the underlying geothermal field(s).56 As the Whanganui Tribunal found, the grant of access by land sales did not diminish the property, control, or rangatiratanga of the tribe.57 Therefore, ‘it is a question of fact what rights were granted’ to third parties. ‘The separateness or otherwise of the taonga in practical terms is an aspect of this assessment of fact, along with the intention of the parties and such other things.’58

Mr Taylor contended that the Maori customary right to the fields and the subterranean geothermal resource (TVZ) may be recognised by the common law as it has never been expressly extinguished.59 Under the common law, ‘plain and clear language is required to extinguish aboriginal title,’ and the language in the various statutes passed to vest control of access and management in the Crown since 1840 has not met this test for extinguishment.60

**Alternative arguments – based on a majority Treaty interest**

Mr Taylor noted the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunal recognised ‘that there was likely to be an additional Treaty interest’ in geothermal resources ‘wrongfully alienated from Maori as a result of breaches of the Treaty. The Tribunal deferred assessment of this until such time as more general claims [to loss of land] were assessed’61 Taylor stated that there have been serious and systematic breaches of the Treaty in the Central North Island region which have led to the large-scale loss of land containing geothermal features or fields.62 He submitted that, as a result of the remedial interest identified by the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunal, we would be justified in finding that Maori have an interest in the geothermal resource which ought to be characterised as being the majority interest.63 He submitted the following factors to justify this approach:

- Most Maori who held geothermal land have sought to retain a foothold in that land. This not only symbolises but is in fact the reality of the importance of geothermal activity to Central North Island Maori.
- There is evidence that the Crown particularly targeted some lands with geothermal surface features for purchase or compulsory acquisition and those resources should be handed back to the traditional owners.64

He stressed that the claimants in support of the generic submissions were not seeking a legal finding of legal ownership, rather their claims were to the geothermal resource entire in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty of Waitangi.65 The Tribunal should follow the approach in the Petroleum Report and find that Maori continued to have a ‘Treaty interest’.66 An example of where this finding could be made relates to the Wairakei–Tauhara geothermal field in Taupo and the Tauhara Middle 1 purchase.67 Mr Taylor also submitted that where there is evidence of ‘a particularly targeted approach by the Crown to alienating particular surface features or geothermal fields’, then those resources should be handed back to Maori.68

**The Crown’s case**

**Primary arguments based on possession akin to ownership**

The Crown ‘accepts that the geothermal resources were traditionally of importance’ to Maori for a range of purposes, including cooking, bathing, and medicinal, and that these resources are still of importance to the present day.69

The Crown contended that ‘the Ngatoroirangi legend, reflecting the interlinking of the resource as a whole, is not a sufficient ground for a valid Treaty claim to Maori ownership’ of the geothermal resource. The Crown stated that ‘[m]any of the subsurface resources across the region are only linked at a very deep level and are not linked through a hydraulic link.’70 (Presumably, this is an explicit rejection of the concept of a subterranean passage through which the sisters or taniwha of Ngatoroirangi travelled to bring geothermal fire to Aotearoa.) Secondly, the Crown implied that any claim to customary ownership based on
the story should also be rejected as the Ngatoroirangi story is a blend of myth and legend. A claim to customary ownership requires proof. Because of the manner in which the claims have been conceptualised to this Tribunal, it is:

difficult to separate customary law from the matrix of history, legend and memory. The contents of customary law can be elusive [in this context] and, to some extent, are vulnerable to subjective and varying interpretations.\textsuperscript{71}

The implication is that it is too difficult to identify the nature and extent of customary rights – to geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ – such as those based on the many variations of the Ngatoroirangi story.

The Crown submitted that any Maori rights are tied to the ownership of the surface land. This ‘is consistent with the concept of the resource being a holistic whole’. The Crown also denied that any common law aboriginal title or rights to the resource have survived. That is because by the creation of a Crown grant or Crown derived title such as those gained through the Native Land Court, all common law aboriginal title over that land was extinguished. Where the subterranean geothermal resource is currently manifest on private property,

the indefeasibility mechanisms of the Land Transfer Act would have operated to extinguish any common law aboriginal title to such land. In such cases, the terms of the original Crown purchase deeds [or private purchase deed] would, thus, be irrelevant.\textsuperscript{72}

It is the issue of the Crown grant or new form of title derived from the Crown that is sufficient to extinguish aboriginal title. Furthermore, to the extent that the Crown became the legal owner of certain lake and riverbeds, it also gained control of the subterranean geothermal resource and access to it.

But in any case, the Crown argued, the issue of legal ownership cannot and should not be decided in this jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{73} Such issues ‘are complex’ and may be:

dependent upon evidence relating to specific sites. The Tribunal is not a court and well understands that it cannot make binding legal determinations. The practice and procedure of the Tribunal reflects its statutory function and the type of evidence which comes before it. It is not designed primarily to hear the detailed legal argument that would be involved in common law aboriginal title or rights claims. Issues relating to such title are best left to the courts.\textsuperscript{74}

The Crown contended that ‘[m]ost of the transactions (eg, those of Rotorua, Wairakei, and Tokaanu) occurred relatively late in the 19th century. By that time, Central North Island Maori would have had a very clear understanding that the alienation of land containing geothermal resources would result in a complete transfer of all or any rights of ownership in the resource found in that land, as well as to the land itself.’\textsuperscript{75}

In terms of the Treaty claim to ownership, the Crown referred to the generic submissions for the claimants on geothermal resources, noting that the claimants made extensive reference to the Whanganui River Report in support of their claim to the whole resource. The Crown contended that the nature of the subterranean geothermal resource, albeit water, ‘is fundamentally different from a river resource and the findings of the Whanganui River Report accordingly do not apply.’ The Crown stated that the subterranean geothermal resource:

is manifest across a wide land mass, much of which is today in private ownership under the provisions of the Land Transfer Act. Many of the features of the resource are located in the subsurface, without ready access, and are not contained in a . . . single channel (as the Whanganui River is).’

The Crown opined:

that the Whanganui River is, and was, often the boundary between different pieces of land. . . . [I]n contrast to the Whanganui River, there has been no real evidence of attempts by Central North Island Maori to claim or retain interests in geothermal resources in land alienated by them.
Counsel further asserted that:

Maori have consistently held on to some key geothermal lands in recognition that alienation of the lands in which the [subterranean] resource is manifest would lead to a loss of rights to use and control the resource. The evidence in the Whanganui River Report is otherwise . . .

There, 'sale of land adjacent to the river did not necessarily result in the original Maori landowners no longer using the River, or continuing to claim ownership of it.'

The Crown submitted that '[m]any of the geothermal resources in the CNI region are contained within privately owned land.' Because of that, section 6(4A) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 affects any recommendations we might make. In answer to the question on the extent of private land interests involved, Crown counsel noted that a map prepared by Environment Waikato provides some basis for answering the question. Crown counsel also noted that some geothermal lands, for example Kuirau Park, are in local authority ownership.

The Crown's response to alternative arguments – based on a majority Treaty interest

The Crown informed us that:

it has rejected the findings of the Tribunal Petroleum Report which contended for an on-going Treaty interest in the petroleum resource. The Crown also does not accept the notion of Maori having preferential development rights in relation to the geothermal resource, or to Maori having veto rights over use and development of that resource by non-Maori third party users.

'The Crown submitted that '[t]he claim made that Maori have lost through land alienation access to, and use of, many geothermal resources, needs to be put into perspective.' The Crown identified the following lands with geothermal surface features remaining in Maori ownership: Ohinemutu; Whakarewarewa Village; Mokoia Island; Rotokawa Baths; and within the east Lake Rotorua Geothermal Field; Tikitere; Waitangi Soda Springs; Mokai (Tuaropaki Trust); Ohaaki; Orakei Korako; Waipahihi; Maori land at Tokaanu, and Maori land at Waihi. 'Maori shareholders in Tarawera Forests Ltd also have interests in the Rotoma geothermal field . . . now owned by Tarawera Forests Limited.' The Crown contends that Central North Island Maori have continued to enjoy traditional use of those geothermal surface features for which they can control access by virtue of retaining land in which they are manifest. The point here is that, according to the Crown, Maori have not been significantly or seriously prejudiced by previous Crown actions in terms of its historical purchasing or acquiring of any other lands.

Tribunal analysis on geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, the TVZ as taonga and the exercise of rangatiratanga

To resolve the different positions taken by the Crown and Maori, we must return to first principles. This requires considering how Maori conceptualised geothermal activity and how they expressed their rangatiratanga over it. We need to do so because in answering the question of whether geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ are taonga protected by the Treaty, it is the Maori conception of these resources that must determine their status as taonga, and the question must be asked in the context of the social and cultural framework of Maori. We do not rely solely on modern commentaries, but also look to other evidence including early colonial accounts of the Maori relationship with geothermal features. During the inquiry, we were presented with a substantial body of evidence on traditional iwi and hapu understandings and use of the geothermal features, heat, and energy of the Central North Island region. We turn to consider all this evidence to ascertain whether the hapu and iwi of the Central North Island may claim the geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ as taonga. We also consider whether they traditionally exercised rangatiratanga over those resources and whether they possessed them in a manner akin to ownership as at 1840.
Map 20.3: Hot and cold springs in the Central North Island  [Source: CFRT, 'Maps of the Central North Island Inquiry Districts, Part 2', (doc D35), plate 10]
**Creation**

To establish their claim to geothermal activity within the TVZ as taonga, the claimants began with an explanation of creation. Chris Winitana explained to us the role of whakapapa in the worldview and tribal identity of this region, thus setting the scene for the traditions we will discuss below:

We are a race of oral tradition. As a result our ancestors perfected the art of genealogical recital as a way of summa-
rising vast amounts of historical information. The names in recitals to do with our spiritual creation lore are descriptive cosmog[o]nic signposts which seek to holistically capture from spiritual to physical (as opposed to just the physical) the essence of creation at that point in time.\(^1\)

We are able to extract, from the larger set of traditions recounted by Mr Winitana and other claimants, a set of nested stories which trace the lineage of geothermal activity. The foundation story involves the separation of the primal parents Ranginui and Papatuanuku, the grief of the parents which follows the separation, and the emotional and physical stress suffered by Ruaimoko, the baby of the family. One of the other children, Rakahore, the father of bedrock and stone, found a solution which satisfied some but not all the family. Mr Winitana begins by setting out the problem:

After the separation of Ranginui and Papatuanuku by Tane-
tokorangi, Tawhirimatea warred with his brothers. Ruaimoko the baby of the family was still suckling at the breast of Papatuanuku. She kept him close to her (he potiki piripoho) out of fear that he may be hurt in the battles that consumed the earth. At the same time, she and Rangi still grieved for each other because of their separation. As a result their tears flowed and threatened to flood the world. Io-the-compassionate advised Tane to turn his mother over so that Rangi would no longer have to look upon her face, be reminded of their separation, and produce a new flood of tears. With the aid of Tangaroa and Tawhirimatea, Papatuanuku was indeed turned over to Muriwaihou ki Rarohenga. As the brothers were undertaking their mammoth task, Ruaimoko, their younger, implored them to retrieve him from his mother’s breast so that he might join them. He did not want to be left by himself for all eternity.\(^2\)

Mr Winitana then outlined the solution and the consequences:

After much discussion, the brothers decided the follow-
ing; Ruaimoko would be left with their mother to placate her in her time of loneliness and sorrow; one of the brothers Rakahore (the father of bedrock and stone) imbued the sacred ‘ahi tamou’ heat into the bedrock of Papatuanuku that the pair would at least be warm and comfortable in their new position. Ruaimoko, of course, disagreed with the arrangements and vowed to take revenge on his brothers by shaking the world and causing earthquakes to devour their offspring.\(^3\)

Nesting inside this primary story is a second set of stories. Creation is not yet complete, and as the family grows in number the interplay between family members continues, causing the creation of geothermal water, energy, and heat:

Later on, Tane-te-waiora married Hine-tu-pari-maunga and produced Putoto (magma) and Parawhenuamea (water). Putoto went on to produce lava and other volcanic fires sourced back to the original heat imbued into the bedrock of Papatuanuku.

The younger sister of Mahuika (the goddess of the fire of man), whose name was Hine Tapeka, was assigned by Tane to oversee the hidden fire children (lava) who bubbled deep with the core of the earth. However, the heat often became so intense, that Ruaimoko was caused to move about in discom-
fort and in the process he produced earthquakes. His move-
ments weakened the fabric of the earth’s crust, giving escape routes to Te Ahi Tapu a Tapeka (the sacred fire of Tapeka) and geothermal and volcanic activity was born to the world.

The vents are today seen as the volcanoes that erupt, the geyser blowholes, the mud pools and the hot water springs...
of the land. They are controlled by Hine-puia. She opens and closes them to release the pressure built up from Ruaimoko’s movements.\footnote{Lava flows and volcanoes, geysers, mud pools, and hot springs are the visible signs of this cosmic whakapapa. Thus, it is no surprise that there are many stories that relate how volcanic mountains moved and waned across the land. In one story, for example, war was waged between Taranaki and Tongariro over the mountain Pihanga.\footnote{These stories all point to the connectedness of the mountains with geothermal fire and energy of the TVZ, a matter Dame Evelyn Stokes recorded:}}

The Tribunal’s finding on the creation story

In the creation story, Papatuanuku (the earth) lived before becoming pregnant with Ruaimoko – who clearly came after. He would for all eternity remain unborn because of the deeds of his brothers. So the Earth was imbued with magma and other heat conductors and in this way Ruaimoko was given heat and energy to ease his discomfort. Therefore, this story (sometimes described as myth or legend) tells us that in the Maori mind, the creation of geothermal activity followed the existence of the Earth and land, and that since the creation they have been valued as a major source of energy and heat. The Maori relationship with geothermal activity is, thereby, conceptualised as an ancient one. Furthermore, Maori link to the creation of resources by personifying them and by establishing whakapapa to Papatuanuku, Ranginui, and their children. This point was captured by the Whanganui River Tribunal when it noted that:

\[\text{By whakapapa, Maori link also to the gods, and since the gods produced not only people but all life-forms, and even things that have a force of their own – the mountains, rivers, wind, and rain – Maori see themselves as related to these things in a personal way.}\]

From the Central North Island, this point was well made in evidence for Ngati Whakaue of Ohinemutu:

\[\text{Ngati Whakaue as are other Maori tribes are descended from Rangi (the sky father) and Papa (the earth mother) who so long ago were separated by their children. Ngati Whakaue accept again like other Maori that the sky and earth are complementary to each other and are therefore inter-related. There is recognition of the children of Rangi and Papa as deities in control of the different aspects of our world.}\]

So, in Maori thought, they relate in the same personal way to the gods of creation. The story illustrates the manner in which the major tribes of the Central North Island conceptualised and explained creation. It also explains how geothermal activity originated. We turn to consider how Maori say the resources were transported to Aotearoa, New Zealand, and how their relationship with the resource evolved.

\[\text{The arrival of geothermal activity}\]

More immediate in time and in location to the stories of creation is the third set of nested traditions. The Ngatoroirangi stories link Hawaiki with the coming of geothermal activity to the Central North Island. Ngatoroirangi was a specialist navigator and priest of the
He Maunga Rongo

Te Arawa canoe who came from the islands of the Pacific (Rangiatea), arrived in Aotearoa and explored the central interior of the Central North Island. One of the first written accounts of his story was recorded from Wiremu Maihi Te Rangikaheke, a notable chief of Ngati Kereru and Ngati Rangiwhewehi:

[Original account]

Aa, ka uu atu a Hinemoa ki Mokoia. Ko te tino waahi i uu ai ia he wairariki, ko Waikimihia te ingoa. He wairariki hoki te ingoa ki nga taangata o Roto-rua, he wai wera, he wai mahana te ingoa ki nga iwi atu ra rawa; he wai nohoanga tangata. Kei runga atu hoki o te wairariki ra te kaanga o Tuu-taanekai.

Ko te take o te ritenga o teenei ingoa o te wairariki, koia tee-enei toona ritenga. E kore teenei mea te wai wera e tae mai ki teenei motu, ki Aotea-roa nei i teeraa atu o te rangatira, o te tohunga. Na Ngaatoroirangi anake i karanga atu ki Hawaiki, ka haria mai e oona tuaahine. Koia ka toro haere i teenei motu. Ko te nohoanga o Nga-toro-i-rangi i karangatia ai kia haria mai te wai wera nei ko Tongariro, maunga hukarere i Taupoo ra. Oti ra, me aata koorero e au. I muri rawa iho e eetahi mahi tohunga a Ngaatoro-i-rangi i te whitinga mai ki teenei motu ka haere atu ia ki Taupoo. Ka kiteri anake i a ia te tini maunga ra e tuu mai ana, he mea raarangi tonu te tuu. Ko nga ingoa o eenei maunga ko Tonga-riro, ko Ngauru[f]hoere, ko Pare-te-tai-tonga, ko Ruapehu. He maunga ikeike eenei, ngaro katoa ai i te hukarere. Na, ko te mea i whakataetae ai te maiaa nei ko ti piki atu ki nga keokeonga o eenei maunga. Ka tae atu raatou koo oona moookai ki te take o nga maunga nei, ka karanga atu ia, ‘hei konei koutou noho ai. Me tino piki atu ki runga i nga maunga nei, kei kore he tangata hei piki piki e eenei maunga, kei mana rawa atu te haupapa o eenei maunga, aa, ka kaha rawa atu te hautopenga o te maatao ki te tangata. Engari, e hoa ma, ki te tae atu ki runga i eenei maunga takatakahai ai, me taku tohu ano, ka ora te tangata me te kai. Ki te kore au e tae atu, ka mate te tangata me te kai’. Ka ako iho ia ki nga hoa, ‘I muri i a au, kaua e kai ake kia eke atu au ki runga i te tihi o te tuatahi o nga maunga nei, aa, kia kiteri koutou i te putanga whakareretanga mai o taku tohu ki teenei maunga.

Ko te tohu teenei i a au i runga, e puta mai nga whatitiri me nga uira, me nga ua. Ka kiteri koutou ka ngaro haere nga haunganga o runga i nga maunga nei, he i te tae atu moohio ai kua pau te mana o eenei maunga, ka nui ake toooku’. Ka mutu eenei kupu, ka piki atu ia. He tino at a piki atu teenei tohunga. Mo runga noa mai te raa ka noho waenganui ia e piki ana. Poutuu maaroo noa te ra, ka nui te maunga nei ki muri, ka iti ki mua i a ia. Ka puta mai te matekai ki oona hoa, ka mahara hoki, ‘Ee, kua mate too taatou hoa i te mana o te maunga nei’.

'Ka titiro ake hoki oona pononga ki te rangi. Me runga i nga maunga nei, anoo te hukarere ka makere iho i te rangi, pououri kerekere ana. No reira i moohio ai oona pononga kua mate too raatou ariki.

Kai ana ratou i te kai mo oo ratou puku. Kai rawa ake, kua eke rawa a Ngatoro-i-rangi ki te tihi o Tonga-riro. Eke rawa ake kua huupaitia i te maaeke. Huia ruatia e too raatou kainga i te kai ko ki kina nui rawa te kaha o te maaeke ki a ia, ka ngaro rawa ia i te hauhunga ki raro. Kua pououri toona ngaakau, kua wareware raatou ki aana kupu tuatahi. No te mea kua takahia aana kupu e aana pononga, kua puta mai te riri o te aroha o te atua ki a ia, ka whakatahuritia aana ingoa ngiha ake i te ora. Ka whakatika ake ia ki runga, ka ahu toona ngaakau me toona mata ki Hawaiki, ka puaki toona reo ki oona tuupuna, ‘E kui ma, e-e! Haria mai he ahi mooku. Ka mate au i te maaeke,’ Kote kai karea aana kupu, ko te rua. Teenei rawa ake nga kuia ra te haere mai nei te kai te kore o wai. Taa rawa mai te manawa kei Whakaari. Kei rera e kaa ana te ahi a nga kuia ra.

Heoi anoo, ka toro haere ki teenei motu. Peenei anoo na, kua tae atu oona kuia ki a ia, me te mau atu anoo i te ahi moona.

Kite rawa ake ia, e puta ake a nui atu i tae atu te maunga, ka puia. Ehara! Kua pau te kaha o te hauhunga, kua ora rawa ia. Na, me kaua oona hoa i kai, e kore e nui te maaeke ki teenei motu. No konei i meinga ai teenei mea te wai wera he wai-ariki, no te mea, na te tino ariki teenei mea i karanga, i tae mai ai ki teenei motu ngiha ai. Koia i peenei aia toona ingoa he wai-ariki; kaore, he wai wera kee te ingoa.
[English translation]

So Hine-moa landed at Mokoia. The exact place she landed at was a hot spring named Waikimihia. The people of Rotorua use the term 'chiefly-water', while other people call it hot-water or warm-water. Hot, but a place where people bathe. Tuu-taanekai’s home was above that hot spring.

The origin of this name ‘chiefly-water’ is as follows: thermal water did not come to Aotearoa because of any other chief or priest, but by Ngatoro-i-rangi alone, who called for it and it was brought by his sisters. And so it spread in this island. The place from which Ngaatoro called for the hot-water was Tongariro, the snow-covered mountain yonder at Taupoo. Well then I had better tell the whole story.

Immediately after performing certain priestly rites on crossing to this island Ngatoro-i-rangi proceeded to go to Tau-poo. He found many mountains standing there in a line. These mountains’ names are Tonga-riro, Pare-te-tai-tonga, and Ruapehu. They are lofty mountains all of them hidden by snow. Now the thing attempted as a challenge by this hero was the climbing to the top most peaks of these mountains. He and his servants reached the base of the mountains and he called out, ‘You remain here. I must climb these mountains lest no man climb them and the power of the ice of the mountains be increased, and the destructive power of the cold over mankind become all powerful. But my friends, if I reach the tops of these mountains and tread there together with my sign, man and food will triumph. If I do not reach there man and food will perish.’

He instructed his companions, ‘After I leave do not eat until I have climbed to the peak of the first of the mountains and you have seen the sudden appearance of my sign above this mountain. The sign that I am on top will be thunder and lightning and rain. When you see that the snow of the mountains is hidden you will know that their power is exhausted and that my power is greater’. His words ended off and he climbed. He left at early morning. When the sun was on high he was halfway up. When the sun was at the Zenith most of the mountain was behind him and a small part only lay ahead.

His companions became hungry and thought, ‘Oh our companion has been killed by the power of the mountain’. His servants looked by to the sky and all was dark. So his servants ‘knew’ that their lord was dead.

They ate food for their bellies. At the very time they were eating, Ngatoro-i-rangi had reached the peak Tonga-riro. As he topped the mountain he was smitten by the cold. Doubled up by their eating the food, the cold was very severe upon him. His heart was troubled because they were not attentive to his first words, because his words had been trampled upon by his servants the wrath of the god came forth against him. Presently his head was buried beneath the snow and the god felt compassion for him and turned his heart towards life.

He stood up and turned his heart and his face towards Hawaiki and spoke to his ancestors, ‘old ladies bring me some fire. I am dying of cold’. He spoke once and twice and then the old ladies were coming across the surface of the water. They only took breath at White Island. There the fire of the old ladies is still burning. Then it spread onto this island like this the old ladies coming to him and bearing fire for him. He saw it appearing from the mountain and steaming. Lo, the power of the frost abated and he was restored. Now, if his friends had not eaten, cold would not be severe in this country. It is from these circumstances that hot pools are called ‘chiefly-water’ because the thermal water was called here by the high chief and arrived and spread here. That is why it is called chiefly water and not hot water.  

Dr Ballara, Dame Evelyn, and Mr Maxwell between them have identified many versions of the Ngatoroirangi story. Parallel versions of the same story, in Maori and in English, are available in the Maori Oral History Atlas, published in 1990 by the New Zealand Geographic Board. Although accounts vary, these stories have a consistent focus on Ngatoroirangi as the reason for the origins of geothermal activity and energy in Aotearoa. The story of Ngatoroirangi is still being told today. Mr Winitana recounts the Tuwharetoa tradition best known to him:
When [our ancestor Ngatoroirangi] arrived at these parts he ascended Tongariro. He reached the summit and was overcome by a snow blizzard. Knowing that he would most certainly perish in the storm, he invoked his ancestors Te Pupu and Te Hoata, the elders of the fire clan of Hine-tapeka, to come to his aid. He implored Kautetetu to produce the fire born of friction that he needed to save his life. He called to his sisters Kuwai and Haungaroa, who were still in the homeland Hawaiki, and they sent their fire ancestors to help their brother. Te Pupu and Te Hoata traveled underground with their precious gift and at different places along their route emerged to ensure they were traveling in the right direction. These places became geothermal or volcanic spots and include Whakaari [White Island], Tarawera, Paeroa, Orakei-korako, Wairakei, Taupo, Tuaropaki and Tokaanu. The fire emerged at the summit of Tongariro and the old priest was saved.

Iwikau Te Heuheu in 1859 also used the Ngatoroirangi story to describe the coming of geothermal fire and energy to Aotearoa, and he added other names to the places where those who brought geothermal activity stopped, namely: Motou-Hora (Whale Island) at Whakatane; Okakaru, Rotoehu, Rotorua, and Rotomahana. His use of the story is discussed further below. Mataara Wall of Ngati Tutemohuta recounted the story from the north-eastern shores of Lake Taupo about Ngatoroirangi’s discovery of Tauhara Maunga and the proverb ‘Mai i te Awa-[o]-te-Atua ki Tauhara, mai i Tauhara ki Tongariro’ (from Te Awa o te Atua to Tauhara to Tongariro).

Ngatoroirangi was, and still is, venerated in Maori thought. Places were named after him such as Te Ohaaki o Ngatoroirangi (the legacy or bequest of Ngatoroirangi), which is associated with Ngati Tahu and Ngati Whaoa. Te Arawa sing to honour him at places such as Ohinemutu. He, and Tia, are revered by Tuwharetoa as the ancestors responsible for the discovery and settlement of Lake Taupo. Indeed, the Te Heuheu dynasty directly descend from him. At Ohinemutu, Ngati Whakaue evidence is that:

The inter-relationship between the environment and the people has continued from the time Ngat[o]rorirangi sought warmth from his sisters in Hawaiki until today this very incident again translated into song and poetry in a moteatea very widely known throughout this region.

Part and parcel of Ngati Whakaue’s environment is the geothermal resource that exists in Ohinemutu which has been used traditionally for domestic and cultural purposes since our forefather[s’] arrival.

The Tribunal’s finding on geothermal activity

We find that from the stories we have evidence on, no matter how much they vary, Ngatoroirangi is recognised by all the major Central North Island iwi and hapu for bringing geothermal activity to Aotearoa. The Ngatoroirangi stories are consistent on this point.

The stories demonstrate that, in the Central North Island, Maori thought that at the time of his arrival the whenua (land) was in place without the geothermal waters, heat and energy of the TVZ. It was Ngatoroirangi who called to his sisters for geothermal activity to be brought to Aotearoa. As a result, one must conclude that Maori conceived of the arrival of geothermal activity as being separate in time from when the land was created. It emerged in Aotearoa through the specific and deliberate acts of Ngatoroirangi, as Mr Winitana explained:

These histories reaffirm our position that it is through the specific and deliberate acts of our blood ancestor Ngatoroirangi that the geothermal resources of the region came into existence. As his descendants we enjoyed the full breadth of his geothermal legacy to us: that enjoyment was unhindered and unquestioned for numerous centuries until the arrival of the colonialist.

Maori saw geothermal activity as separate in creation from the whenua, as it came later. It is this difference which creates the distinction between land and geothermal activity, carrying as they do two different histories of
creation and arrival. In this respect, the submissions made by Mr Taylor that the subterranean geothermal resource is considered by Maori to be separate from the land, and the submissions made by the Crown that the geothermal resources are ‘holistically considered part of the land’, are both partially correct. Both sit with what the evidence of the Ngatoroirangi stories demonstrates – that the traditional Maori conception of the geothermal activity is that it is unitary in nature. This is consistent with the findings of the Ngawha Tribunal.99 It is separate from the land or other resource before its manifestations emerge as energy, heat, water, or mud from the surface. At the point of their emergence (either below or above the surface), access to the subterranean geothermal resource becomes linked to the resource into which it emerges, which may be land, a river, or a lake.

Dr Ballara explains this tendency in Maori thought to separate out resources from land, even though normally those resources may also be land:

There was a tendency in Maori thinking to separate the land from the resources it bore, regarding each as a different kind of property. This was to become a problem in the days of land sales, when Europeans including Crown officers, when purchasing lands, assumed they had bought the resources along with the land. Thomas Chapman, then based on Mokoia, Rotorua, and a frequent sojourner at Te Ngae, recorded an incident in which he sent one of his ‘lads’ to square off some large, loose stones for building purposes which were lying on land purchased by the mission. ‘A party came and desired him to leave off trespassing upon those stones. But you have sold the land – Yes, but we did not sell the stones’.100

The Ngatoroirangi stories, therefore, illustrate the manner in which the major tribes of the Central North Island conceptualised and explained how the geothermal activity was transported to Aotearoa, New Zealand and how their relationship with it has evolved. As has been observed in the Maori Oral History Atlas, Ngatoroirangi’s ‘exploits on the mountains of the central North Island establish the depth of early Maori knowledge of the geology of the volcanic and geothermal regions’.101

Ngatoroirangi – travelling across the Central North Island
In relation to the Mataatua waka, to which Ngati Awa, Ngati Haka Patuheuheu, and Tuhoe relate, Te Hau o Te
Rangi Tutua and Joe Mason of Ngati Awa have in the past recorded the linkages through Toroa (captain of the Mataatua waka). It seems that Ngatoroirangi instructed Tamatekapua to seek Toroa so as to free the Te Arawa waka at Te Awa o te Atua (Tarawera River) by reciting a karakia still used today. Mr Maxwell concludes that ‘[i]n this way the traditions relating to Toroa of the Mataatua canoe, Tamatekapua and Ngatoroirangi of the Te Arawa canoe are bound together by their respective deeds.’ We also have the connection of Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau to Ngatoroirangi. Tuwharetoa was a direct descendant of Ngatoroirangi from whom Ngati Tuwharetoa take their name. He was born at Otamarakau, but was taken to Waitahanui near Kawerau when very young. Dame Evelyn and Mr Maxwell highlight the commonalities of the traditions and affirm the importance of the local variations. Dame Evelyn notes:

Most of the traditions from Mataatua, Te Arawa and Tuwharetoa sources ascribe the origin of geothermal activity in the Taupo Volcanic Zone to the exploits of Ngatoroirangi, and his sisters Kuiwai and Haungaroa, aided by the atua Te Pupu and Te Hoata (or Te Haetaa).

Some versions of the Ngatoroirangi story have the sacred fires being carried by the taniwha Pupu and Te Haetaa; others by Ngatoroirangi’s sisters Kuiwai and Haungaroa. In some cases, they are called to provide help from Hawaiki; in other cases, they are already closer at hand, on Whakaari/White Island. Some of the traditions say that they travelled underground and brought fire to the surface whenever they came up to see where they were; in other cases, they travelled above the surface of the land, dropping fires as they journeyed.

The Ngatoroirangi story crosses the Kaingaroa Plains to Ngati Manawa where the evidence of the Kawharu report describes Ngatoroirangi’s impact on the lands in that district:

During his travels throughout the country including the famed journey from Maketu to Tongariro, he named several places in Kaingaroa including Wairapukao, the spring Te Puna Takatahi a Ngatoroirangi, which is near Wairapukao (on the southwest boundary of the Kaingaroa No 1 block), Tokatoka, Kowhatuwhakairi and Pokapoka (Opotiki Minute Book (OMB) 1 1878:132, 134, 159, 181). Ngati Manawa traditions today state that it was Ngatoroirangi’s sisters who named these places. According to traditions recorded by Stafford, Ngatoroirangi also named Te Awa a (o) te Atua, now known as the Tarawera River (Stafford 1967: 21).

Best records, based on his Mataatua sources, that while Ngatoroirangi’s sisters, Kuiwai and Haungaroa, crossed the Kaingaroa Plains, the latter took a long time to complete a meal there. Thus, the name for the area became Kainga-roa-a-Haungaroa. The sisters travelled on past Ti whakaawe in Kainga-roa (enchanted ti trees... which ever recede as a traveller advances’) and Te Puna-takatahi a Ngatoroirangi. A sequel to the story, recounted by John Te Herekiekie Grace, has the sisters Kuiwai and Haungaroa, travelling across the Kaingaroa Plains towards Tauhara, in search of their brother Ngatoroirangi, who had returned to Maketu in the Bay of Plenty:

Now, one of the gods that Ngatoroirangi brought from Hawaiki was Horomatangi. It came to the god’s notice that Kuiwai and her sister were in the vicinity of Tauhara Mountain so this deity decided he would go to Taupo and direct the new arrivals to the Bay of Plenty. He dived into the sea off White Island and travelling underground, emerged from the waters of Taupo. As he came to the surface he blew pumice and water high into the air. From above the lake he saw Kuiwai and her party in the distance... In order to advise Kuiwai and her sister where Ngatoroirangi could be found, the god went back into his tunnel and exhaled his breath with such force that he caused the Karapiti blowhole. The white steam rose straight and high into the heavens and then turned in the direction of Maketu. Kuiwai observed this and knew where to find Ngatoroirangi.

The Karapiti blowhole was at Wairakei, and Horomatangi is the name of the geothermal system under Lake Taupo.
The importance of Horomatangi continues in the minds of Ngati Tuwharetoa as demonstrated by reference to Jim Maniapoto’s evidence when he told us:

Motutaiko was the island pa site . . . linking with the Horomatangi Reef (kaitiaki of Tuwharetoa) and the underworld, which links our lake with the volcanic passage from Hawaiki. According to our people, a whirlpool appears northwest of the island and this is our entry into the geothermal passage back to Hawaiki.110

Another mention of Horomatangi comes from Mr Winitana, who told us that Horomatangi was one of the water guardians in Lake Taupo. He recounted how Horomatangi (the taniwha guardian) is the male spouse of Hurukareao, another entity that lives in the Tokaanu Stream and thermal pool area. He then recited the genealogy for the different taniwha, thus again demonstrating the tendency in Maori thought to continue the very personalised relationships that Maori have with their resources.111

The Tribunal’s findings on the Ngatoroirangi story

This evidence demonstrates that in Maori thought there are fundamental linkages in the Ngatoroirangi story between the three districts of Rotorua, Kaingaroa, and Taupo, converging via ‘the geothermal passage’ to Hawaiki. Those same linkages bind the geothermal fields and the subterranean geothermal resource to the people through whakapapa or genealogy. Given the links between Ngati Raukawa, Te Arawa, and Ngati Tuwharetoa, we believe that the same linkage to the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ of the Central North Island can be made. The Ngatoroirangi story cements their relationships with the geothermal resource of the Central North Island and with one another. Mr Ellison comments on the wider connections: ‘These stories are merely examples of the vast number of connections between the people of the CNI.112

In addition, the Horomatangi aspect of the Ngatoroirangi story further demonstrates that Maori see the subterranean geothermal resource as separate to the resource from which it emerges (in this case, Lake Taupo), but also part of it, once it emerges (in this case, Horomatangi becomes a kaitiaki or guardian) linking Ngati Tuwharetoa back through the subterranean geothermal passage to Hawaiki.

Establishing rights in tikanga terms to geothermal resources

In chapter 2 of this report we have discussed the nature of Maori tenure, and how rights and interests in resources were allocated. The methods for acquiring rights include relationship building as well as discovery; ancestry, conquest, gift, or inheritance and/or occupation. Maori would lay claim to land and resources using one or more of these grounds for title. That modus of asserting mana and establishing rights to land, with an emphasis on occupation because of the weighting accorded it by the Native Land Court, is recorded in that court’s early minute books from the mid – to-late nineteenth century, and examples of this are discussed in detail in chapters 2 and 9.

The different stories of Ngatoroirangi and his exploits, or those of his sisters, brother or taniwha, were used in the Native Land Court to establish rights to lands with geothermal surface features and the geothermal fields. Ngati Tuwharetoa claimed their interests in the Kaingaroa 1 block based on Ngatoroirangi’s travels in that district, along with occupation rights.113 During the Pokohu block hearings in 1881, prized red ochre (kokowai) pits were referred to, and one witness for Ngati Pou claimed that the mana had passed from Ngatoroirangi to tuwharetoa, and that Pou had inherited it from his father, Tuwharetoa. He went on to say, ‘It was through Ngatoroirangi that Tuwharetoa obtained his right to this land.’ Under cross-examination, he accepted that Ngati Rangitihia ancestors also descended from Ngatoroirangi. It seems that both Ngati Rangitihia and Ngati Pou accepted that the mana of the land originated with Ngatoroirangi.114

Another example comes from the Rotorua district and relates to Tikitere, ‘a large field of geothermal activity lying under the Rotorua–Whakatane highway, about three miles east of the Te Ngae junction.’ It also relates to the
Rotokawa baths lying next to Lake Rotokawa. The mountain ranges behind these geothermal features are known as the Whakapoungakau Ranges. It was here that the sisters and the younger brother of Ngatoroirangi rested on their way to save him. It was here that the sisters lost their younger brother Tanewhakaraka, whom they never saw again, and the name Whakapoungakau (hearts rendered full of sadness) speaks to the love of their brother whom they lost. They also left waiariki and ngawha here for him as an act of love. Tanewhakaraka stayed on in this area and he was named as one the main ancestors from whom rights and interests in land were established before the Native Land Court. The principal conductor for the Ngati Rangiteaorere and Ngati Uenukukopako tribes, Tamati Hapimana, opened the case, naming Tanewhakaraka as one of the ancestors he was claiming under. He said:

My name is Tamati Hapimana. I live at Mokoia. I belong to Ngati Uenukukopako. [I] know the whole of this land now before the court and I claim it. My claims are ancestry, conquest, protecting it and occupation.

1. Uenukukopako
2. Rangiteaorere
3. Tanewhakaraka

Mr Maxwell was convinced this was the same Tanewhakaraka who was the younger brother of Ngatoroirangi. It was because of his relationship with Ngatoroirangi that his descendants were able to claim rights and interests in lands containing geothermal surface features and geothermal fields. Mr Winitana explains:

Our genealogy annotated at the head of this document tells us that we are direct descendants of Ngatoroirangi. He called up the fire and caused the geothermal activity. He did this so that he might live. He benefited to the optimum degree in bringing the fire here: it saved his life. Our seamless worldview that is holistic in nature tells us that his benefit is our benefit. The very reason he climbed the Tongariro range was with our benefit in mind; and that was to claim these lands for us, the generations unborn. The legacy, to give us a place to stand forever, is real for we have lived here uninterrupted for many hundreds of years. By exactly the same token any spin-offs of his ascent to the summit, motivated as he was to bring benefit to his offspring, are also naturally ours by right.

**The Tribunal’s findings on iwi and hapu establishment of rights**

The evidence in this section demonstrates that the stories of Ngatoroirangi, his exploits, and those of his sisters and younger brother, were used in some cases as the basis for the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island to assert their mana, or claim inherited rights to land, or both, where the subterranean geothermal resource had emerged. Whether such claims were upheld is not the point. Rather it is that the story was used in this way which is our focus. The Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal noted that the use of such beliefs,

whether allegory, myth or history [can] serve to impart ownership rights, certainly on the basis of discovery and subsequent unbroken occupation and control over whatever resource was regarded as essential for the people’s well-being.

Dame Evelyn, in her work on Wairakei, has a section entitled ‘Maori use and occupation’ where she comments on what occupation means in the context of geothermal sites such as Wairakei:

Occupation rights were maintained by periodic use of the land and resources, visits for various purposes such as fishing, birding, using hot pools, gathering fern root or other edible products, digging and processing kokowai. In other words, ahi ka was sustained by recognition of such uses and did not necessarily imply continuous occupation.

The Maori word for the term ‘occupation’ is ‘ahi ka’, literally, keeping the fires burning on the land. This calls to mind the expression used by Iwikau Te Heuheu that the fires of the subterranean passage as at 1859 ‘still burn to
this very day’ on land held under his mana. In our view, the customary evidence provides strong support for a finding that all the ingredients for Central North Island Maori claims to lands with geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ are present.

There is nothing new or presentist in recognising such an approach, for the Native Land Court minutes are replete with people recounting their claims by reference to such stories of the ancestors, described by the Crown as ‘legend’. Therefore, the notion that it is too difficult to separate customary law from the matrix of history, legend and memory, as submitted by the Crown, must be rejected because it is not the historical certainty of the story that is important, rather it is the use made of it over many generations.

While we agree that the Ngatoroirangi stories have been ‘vulnerable to subjective and varying interpretations’, it is hardly novel to observe that there are variations in oral traditions. What is more remarkable is the universal knowledge of the stories in Central North Island. They are hardly artefacts of a long-gone past. Nothing was clearer to us than their central importance till the present in the history and worldviews of the peoples of the Central North Island, and their claim to the resource. Variations in the stories by no means negate their significance as a way of claiming rights and interests to natural resources. Rather, the stories portray the following essential points:

- Ngatoroirangi, with other ancestors such as Tia, discovered the land;
- Ngatoroirangi called for geothermal fire which was brought to him by various actors. The resource therefore follows the creation of the land and can emerge from land, lakes, rivers, or the sea;
- Ngatoroirangi or other actors in the stories were ancestors of many of the claimant hapu and iwi of the Central North Island;
- as a result of his exploits, these claimant hapu and iwi permanently settled the lands around the geothermal activity he provided;
- they became dependant on the geothermal fire and energy, water and steam that he discovered; and
- they used his legacy of geothermal heat, water, and energy as the basis for asserting their mana over land.

Other tribes of the region – such as Ngati Pukenga, Ngati Maniapoto, Ngai Te Rangi, and others – may use different stories to explain the nature and extent of the geothermal resources in their areas, but for the majority of the Central North Island claimants this, in its various forms, is the story that they claim gives them possession or ownership of the TVZ.

**Maori understandings of the geothermal resource**

We now look to what the stories tell us about the extent of the Maori interest in the geothermal resource. In our view, the relationships between localised surface features within the geothermal fields, the subterranean fields, and the more fundamental earth-shaping processes (TVZ) are as clearly evident in Te Arawa and Ngati Tuwharetoa traditions as they are in the evidence of the scientists travelling the region during the period from 1840 to 1860.

In this respect, matauranga Maori and Western science as understood in that period were, we believe, in substantial accord. Our recognition of this consistency of approach, we stress again, is not a presentist view of these Maori traditions of the Ngatoroirangi stories. There is evidence that early scientists acknowledged and remarked on the similarity of the views of iwi and hapu of the Central North Island to what was known to western science about the geothermal activity of this region. Here, we are talking about both the surface and subsurface features that manifest on land and under lakes and rivers, the energy, heat, waters, and fluids within the geothermal fields and the subterranean resource (TVZ) being the common heat and energy system or flow.

To illustrate this crucial point, we refer to an encounter that took place in March or April of 1859. The Austrian geologist Ferdinand von Hochstetter, carrying out field explorations in the Waikato and Central North Island
Among the first immigrants who came from Hawaiki to New Zealand, was also the chief Ngatoroirangi (heaven’s runner or the traveller in the heavens). He landed at Maketu on the East Coast of the North Island. Thence he set off with his slave Ngauruhoe for the purpose of exploring the new country. He travels through the country: stamps springs of water from the ground to moisten scorched valleys; scales hills and mountains, and beholds towards the south a big mountain, the Tongariro (literally ‘towards South’). He determines on ascending this mountain in order to get a better view of the country . . . Then he ascends the snow-clad Tongariro; they suffered severely from the cold, and the chief shouted to his sisters who had remained upon Whaka[a]ri, to send him some fire. The sisters heard his call and sent him the sacred fire they had brought from Hawaiki. They sent it to him through the two Taniwhas (mountain and water spirits living underground, Pupu and Te Haeta), by a subterranean passage to the top of Tongariro. The fire arrived just in time to save the life of the chief; but poor Ngauruhoe was dead when the chief turned to give him the fire. On this account the hole, through which the fire made its appearance, the active crater of Tongariro, is called to this day after the slave Ngauruhoe; and the sacred fire still burns to this very day within the whole underground passage between Whaka[a]ri and the Tongariro; it burns at Motou-Hora [Moutohora], Oka-karu, Roto-ehu, Roto-itī, Roto-rua, Roto-mahana, Paeroa, Orakei-korako, Taupo, where it blazed forth when the Taniwhas brought it. Hence the innumerable hot springs at all the places mentioned.125 [Emphasis added]

Hochstetter reflects: “This legend affords a remarkable instance of the accurate observation of the natives, who have thus indicated the true line of the chief volcanic action upon the North Island.”126
The story is illustrative of early Central North Island Maori observations of the nature and extent of the subterranean geothermal resource, the geothermal fields and the surface manifestations, even if the detail about how it all linked together was not scientifically known. What is more, Maori knew as much as any Western scientist in the field at that time. They, along with scientists of Western origins, have increased their knowledge with the introduction of new technology. We agree with Professor Boast when he pointed out that the Ngatoroirangi story tells us that Maori saw the whole of the resource for what it was – that ultimately at the magma level it was an indivisible or common system:

The obvious point is that the various areas of thermal activity in the Rotorua – Taupo region were seen as manifestations of a single interconnected resource or system. The concept of subterranean fires or tunnels linking the various thermal areas points to a clear understanding that a single geothermal resource existed brought from the ancestral homeland of Hawaiki.

The evidence of Maori association to fields and the TVZ is also readily apparent to Environment Waikato. Environment Waikato’s regional policy statement, which refers to the division of the regional geothermal resource into management units known as geothermal systems, contains this acknowledgement:

A geothermal system is an individual body of geothermal energy and water not believed to be hydrologically connected to any other in the upper few kilometres of the Earth’s Crust. At lower depths, it is accepted that there is a common heat source, and this is consistent with Maori understanding of the geothermal resource. In some cases there is no doubt over the near-surface hydrological separation between particular geothermal systems. A geothermal system may have several heat upflows supporting separate geothermal fields that are linked to each other by sub-surface lateral flow. A geothermal system may support an isolated hot spring, a group of surface features, or several groups of features. Alternatively, there may be no visible expression at the surface. [Emphasis added.]

Maori knowledge of the common heat and energy system and the impact of groundwater includes an understanding of the connection between springs in a geothermal field. In relation to the waiariki at Rotokawa, Mr Maxwell notes the Ngati Uenukukopako (from whom several claimants are descended even though the hapu itself is not represented as a claimant before us) had a good understanding of the geology of the geothermal activity, a body of knowledge that emerged from ‘generations of not only [usage], but also keen observation.’ In this respect, he quotes Hiko Hohepa, whom he describes as a ‘tohunga whakapapa of Te Arawa’:

\[
\text{te korero o matou na kuia, na koroua, ka mea mai ratou, ko nga wai i raro i te whenua, e rere mai ana i nga moana o Okataina, o Okareka, ko era moana, ka rere mai te wai, ka ua ana, ka kii nga roto i te wai, ana ka rere i raro i te whenua, nga wai o nga moana i runga o Whakapoungakau. Ana ka rere mai ana ki Rotokawa ko ratou e mea mai ana, ka wera nga wai.}
\]

In relation to the old people’s understanding of the fluctuations of water temperature, the fact that when it rains the water of the waiariki get hotter, if it doesn’t rain the water gets colder. . . . the old people said that the water under the land flowed from Lakes Okataina and Okareka. When it rains, these Lakes fill with water and flow under Whakapoungakau, coming to Rotokawa that causes the waiariki to become hot.

This accords with the scientific view that variations in activity level are related to the supply of groundwater, rather than changes in the underlying rock temperature. Whether scientifically the water table was affected at Rotokawa in quite the way described by Mr Hohepa is not known to this Tribunal, but the value of the commentary from him is that Maori obviously associated the changes in temperature with an increase in groundwater. This is consistent with the Crown’s acknowledgment that a degree of Maori knowledge about the interconnectedness of geothermal springs is apparent. In fact, it was unusual for Maori not
to give a name to the surface manifestations on their land. This practice or custom was described by one early traveller wending his way through the Paeroa Ranges in the area of influence claimed by Ngati Whaoa, Tuhourangi, and Ngati Tahu: ‘All springs or body of springs, are Christened as the maoris [sic] called it – these are Christened Kopia.’

We heard evidence that we understand will be more fully dealt with in the National Park Inquiry, linking that knowledge to Tongariro, whence the call for help from Ngatoroirangi came. Merle Maata Ormsby told us about the Ketetahi Springs on Mount Tongariro. They were widely known by Ngati Hikairo for their therapeutic and healing qualities. Mrs Ormsby spoke of Amoroa Nikora, who had a good understanding of the springs, going there regularly:

The last tipuna that I know with a good understanding of the springs was a kuia called Amoroa Nikora. She was well into her 90s when she died and she used to go up to the Springs regularly. She used to walk up to the springs from the bottom of Tongariro where she lived, even into her 90s. She based her wellness on her ability to walk up to the Springs . . .

The last year of her life when she could no longer make the journey up to the Springs, she was taken up there by helicopter. Her family organised this trip for her because of her strong feelings for that place, and her yearning to be there. The thermal pools in Tokaanu were not the same for her. She based her wellness on her ability to walk up to the Springs . . .

At Whakarewarewa, to cite another example, Ngati Wahiao can name every hot pool, mud pool, geyser, fissure, and stream, knowing how they are connected to each other and ‘their respective function, the daily physical associations’ – all these things, we were told, providing ‘a rich tapestry of knowledge, understanding and commitment, which for our people over time strengthens our identity’: who they are, where they are and why. This degree of knowledge was well documented for most of the major geothermal fields of the Central North Island, as our review below demonstrates.

The Tribunal’s finding on Maori understandings of the geothermal resource

In our view, the story of Ngatoroirangi illustrates that Central North Island Maori knew that at some point far underground their geothermal fields emerged from the common heat and energy system or flow – the TVZ. They depended on its geothermal fluid or waters, heat, and energy across the various geothermal fields of the Central North Island because that heat and energy was needed to sustain their ways of life. The evidence of their settlement patterns, and the accounts of early Pakeha travellers, accord with our view. Maori possessed what they held as at 1840 and that had to be geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the subterranean resource (TVZ).

The nature of the rights and interests – rangatiratanga, kaitiakitanga, and customary law

We have already described generally the nature and significance of rangatiratanga (autonomy and control) in chapters 17 and 19, which looked at the connotation of the term both for environmental and for resource management. In terms of Maori rangatiratanga over geothermal resources, the evidence before us is that Central North Island Maori exercised a high degree of autonomy and control over the geothermal surface features and fields within their spheres of influence and ‘jealously’ guarded them. When the first European travellers worked their way through the region, the manner in which Maori exercised their rangatiratanga, autonomy and control, was understandably not well apprehended, but the nature and extent of the control still emerges from some of that evidence of early encounters. An example comes from Bidwill in his Rambles in New Zealand, published in 1841:

I accordingly went to a place where they pointed out three men sitting gravely; the one in front was the chief. He
was a remarkably fine man, upwards of six feet high, and very strongly built – a complete giant. He was also very handsome. . . . He did not appear in a particularly good temper, and after about five minutes’ talk he suddenly arose from his seat, and began to walk up and down, and stamp, talking all the time with great animation. He at last worked himself into a most terrible pitch of fury, at which I only laughed. The cause of complaint was my having ascended Tongadido [sic]. . . . He could not help saying, however, that if he had thought I could have gone up the mountain, he would have prevented my ever trying it, and requested me not to tell any other [Pakeha] of it on any account.136

Ernest Dieffenbach, the first Western-trained scientist to live and work in New Zealand, during 1839 to 1841, found on visiting Taupo that, because of Bidwill’s unauthorised climb of Tongariro, Te Heu Heu Mananui had issued instructions forbidding anyone else ascending it.137 Dieffenbach explained:

We could not persuade the natives to allow us to ascend the [principal] cone, which we might have accomplished in four hours. The head chief of the Taupo tribes, Te Heu Heu, was absent on a war excursion to Wanganui, and before he went he had laid a solemn ‘tapu’ on the mountain, and until his return they could not grant us permission to ascend it. This ‘tapu’ was imposed in consequence of a European traveller of the name of Bidwill having gone to the top without permission, which had caused great vexation, as the mountain is held in traditional veneration, and is much dreaded by the natives, being, as they tell you, the ‘backbone of their tupuna’, or great ancestor, and having a white head, like their present chieftain.138

Maori, in this example, are clearly controlling, managing and protecting Mount Tongariro both through direct action (actively preventing climbs), and through customary law (the use of tapu).139 Mana and rangatiratanga are clearly at play here. The mana to stop people climbing the mountain is coupled with the imposition of customary law.
as an element of rangatiratanga. With this control came inherent responsibilities to act as kaitiaki of the mountain for future generations to value and enjoy.\textsuperscript{140} Therefore, autonomy, authority, customary law, and kaitiakitanga are all essential elements of rangatiratanga.\textsuperscript{141} This view of the matter is again consistent with the views of the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal, which stated that:

As was to be accepted later by the Maori Land Court, recognition of ‘title’, in precontact times, was based on the twin factors of discovery or conquest, and occupation. One without the other would have been insufficient. A tribal or sub tribal group that could successfully assert and sustain such a claim would be regarded as exercising their ‘mana whenua’ (literally authority over the land). Having first secured a domain for itself, a group would then set about ensuring its political integrity and its survival. The effectiveness of its organization to achieve these ends would in turn be proportional to the effectiveness of its rangatiratanga in all relevant spheres of social action. Thus the care for and fostering of resources was an integral part (but only a part) of rangatiratanga, and where resources were clearly demarcated, the rangatiratanga in respect of them could equally well be described as kaitiakitanga (guardianship).\textsuperscript{142}

In terms of Maori customary law, Professor Boast considered that Maori uses of geothermal surface features were ‘carefully regulated by a linked body of rules and concepts which need to be thought of as nothing less than Maori customary law of resource management’.\textsuperscript{143} Professor Boast argues, on the basis of his analysis of early accounts from European travellers, that rights to use the pools at Ohinemutu, for example, had been allocated according to a ‘recognised framework’, with pools being designated for certain purposes and some people, but not others, having certain rights.\textsuperscript{144} Dr John Johnson (the first colonial surgeon) recorded Maori information at Ohinemutu in 1847 about the allocation of property rights, with some springs being communal for the benefit of the hapu or iwi and others belonging to families.\textsuperscript{145} Professor Boast argues that there was ‘a ranking of use rights’ which can be discerned in the early contact sources.\textsuperscript{146}

Shades of this customary law and kaitiakitanga in practice can be discerned from the evidence of Hiko Hohepa who Mr Maxwell records as follows:

\textquote{Ae he tika tonu tena korero, he tapu nga waiariki nei ki a matau, Koiraa pea tetahi, kaua te tangata e mau kakahu ka kuhu atu ana ki roto i te wai. Kaua e horoi kakahu i roto i te wai. Kaua e tukuna nga tamaraki kia haututu haere i runga i te wai. Koiraa katoa nga mea tapu o nga waiariki . . . He pai noa iho te kai . . . Mehemea, he mate to te wahine, kaua e kuhu atu ki roto i te wai . . . Mai raano era tikanga . . . kia pai te noho i roto i nga waiariki, na te mea kare kau te tangata e mau kakahu ana . . . kia pai te noho.}

That[‘]s right, these waiariki are tapu. For instance people aren’t allowed to wear clothes in the water. You don’t wash clothes in the water. Children aren’t allowed to muck about. All these are tapu things in the water. Although its alright to eat in them. Women who are menstruating must not bathe in the water. These customs are old, and handed down to us. Another is respect the nudity of other bathers.\textsuperscript{147}

The evidence we have reviewed that considers how rangatiratanga was exercised, suggests that there were three layers of Maori rights and interests in relation to the geothermal resource, namely:

- over geothermal surface features that form part of the bundle of rights akin to those associated with land ownership;
- over the specific fields; and
- over the subterranean resource being the underlying common heat and energy system known as the TVZ.

In relation to the first layer of rights, the particular hapu or iwi associated with the land and geothermal surface features are the principal holders of rights of rangatiratanga exercising authority and control over access to the geothermal resource and they are the kaitiaki or stewards of them.
Within this layer, and by the operation of customary law, use rights were allocated, the complexity of which requires further research beyond the scope of this inquiry.\textsuperscript{148}

The second layer of rights attach to the geothermal fields. Again, the particular hapu or iwi associated with the geothermal fields are the principal holders of rights of rangatiratanga – exercising authority and control over access to the geothermal surface features and the geothermal fields – and they are the kaitiaki or stewards of them. Within this layer and by the operation of customary law, use rights were allocated, the complexity of which requires further research beyond the scope of this inquiry.\textsuperscript{149}

The third layer of rights attach to the subterranean resource, the underlying common heat and energy system of the TVZ. The latter is what all the hapu and iwi of the Central North Island share because they all depend on the presence of the TVZ to sustain their fields and geothermal surface features.

The rights and interests within these three distinct layers are not in conflict, but are mutually compatible. We agree with Professor Boast that at this level:

It is possible, indeed likely, that the Ngatoro-i-Rangi narrative had not only the purpose of explaining the origin of the hot springs and other geothermal features: it also had a political purpose. The Ngatoro-i-Rangi account seems to be principally developed amongst Arawa and Tuwharetoa (although it seems to be well known to Ngati Awa as well). The story links the origin of geothermal energy not, of course, simply to any ancestor, but specifically to an Arawa-Tuwharetoa ancestor. The hot springs were a legacy to, and in the broadest sense the patrimony of, all iwi associated with the Arawa canoe: a kind of national property.\textsuperscript{150}

This political aspect of the resource relates to the rangatiratanga of hapu and iwi and the exercise of their authority over it. Such an approach is consistent with the views of the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal, which found that the Ngawha Springs, being discovered by an important ancestor, are of immense value not only to the claimant hapu of Ngawha, but to all Ngapuhi.\textsuperscript{151} The Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal referred to the unitary character of the geothermal resource (in the circumstances of that claim), and they noted that since the springs lay within the territory over which Ngapuhi had always exercised unchallenged rangatiratanga, it followed that the iwi would have considered that their rangatiratanga extended over the entire resource equally above and below the surface of the land and throughout the extent of its manifestation.\textsuperscript{152}

We can see no difference between the way in which Maori conceptualised the geothermal resource and that in which they conceptualised a river system. Each has some unitary character to it. Equally, what Maori believed they possessed in terms of Maori customary law, in both cases, was a taonga – the river system or the geothermal system. Central North Island Maori believed they possessed the geothermal surface features and geothermal fields within their tribal domains. Collectively, that authority and control extended over the subterranean resource, the underlying common heat and energy system or flow (TVZ). While there were specific rights in relation to the use and control of particular fields or features, ‘the common Maori conception, the common Maori reliance, and the common descent’ mean that those Maori with a geothermal interest were possessed of the whole of the geothermal resource within the Central North Island, that is the TVZ.\textsuperscript{153} In other words, every iwi and hapu with original interests through links with Ngatoroirangi has ancestral rights and associations in the taonga as a whole. How they were then allocated depended on the exercise of customary law, and different rules applied to protect the resources.

\textit{The Tribunal’s findings on the nature of the rights and interests in the geothermal resource}

The evidence thus demonstrates that different iwi and hapu held different parts of the underlying common heat and energy system where it appeared in the geothermal fields, or at surface level, or both. Within each sphere of influence, just as with a river system, the different hapu and iwi
of the Central North Island exercised rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga responsibilities.

In chapter 17, we discussed how such overlapping iwi and hapu interests were negotiated in the context of the Mohaka River system between Ngati Tuwharetoa and Ngati Pahauwera. Both at the intra- and inter-iwi level, the Maori system of tenure recognised that rights of occupation and use were often divided among iwi, hapu, whanau, and on occasion, individuals. But the right of control and authority was solely reserved to the hapu or iwi who exercised rangatiratanga or autonomy. The evidence from the Central North Island is that different whanau, hapu, and iwi became acknowledged as those holding rangatiratanga or mana whenua over their geothermal surface features and the geothermal fields in their area, but collectively they possessed and exercised rangatiratanga over the subterranean resource (TVZ).

Therefore we find that at 1840 when the Treaty was signed the Crown guaranteed that in exchange for kawanatanga it would protect Central North Island Maori in the exercise of their tino rangatiratanga and authority at the regional level over the entire underlying common heat and energy system known as the TVZ. It also guaranteed to protect the autonomy and authority of each of the iwi and hapu residing at the district level in the exercise of their tino rangatiratanga over the specific geothermal resources and fields of that zone.

Do Central North Island Maori describe geothermal resources as taonga?

We have discussed in chapter 17 the nature of taonga, noting that the term has been summarised to mean anything highly prized. In addition, we noted that the Ngawha and Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunals in 1993 found that geothermal resources may be taonga protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. Those Tribunals came to their respective views on the basis of the manner in which Maori would have conceptualised the resource. We can see no divergence in the evidence before us to demonstrate that Maori in the Central North Island held any different understanding of the nature of taonga.

From our review above, clearly Maori believed that geothermal resources, comprising surface features, their fields, and the subterranean resource (TVZ), were important, highly prized, and protected as taonga. Many of the witnesses before us confirmed their importance in the Central North Island by referring to them as taonga. From the Taheke area, we have the following statement in the evidence reflecting the unitary nature of the taonga:

The people have always assumed ownership of the resource and acted accordingly. Ownership is based on occupation of the lands, their development and consequent productivity. Ken Eru, the chairman of the block maintains that the below surface resource belongs also to them. The water is used for bathing, the sulphur manifests itself on the surface but has its origins below and everything that grows has sustenance from below the surface.

In terms of surface manifestations, we have one of the most important statements of how that aspect of the taonga was perceived. Hiko Hohepa described the waiariki at Rotokawa as ‘he taonga waiariki’ in the following terms:

Te taonga he mea tino nui, i roto i te whakaaro o te tangata, he taonga tera. Kare kau ke he mea tua atu i te taonga, nga waiariki nei, na he taonga, he mea nui, i roto, he painga mo te tangata, nga waiariki nei ne, ko te painga ana oranga, he oranga mo te tinana i roto i nga waiariki, me ahua mate katoa, kei roto i nga waiariki nei na.

A taonga is something great, within the thoughts of people, that’s a taonga. There is nothing greater than a taonga, these hot pools are taonga, a great thing in our minds, because of their goodness is health, health for the body, for all sorts of complaints, health lies in these hot pools.
The Tribunal’s findings on geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ as taonga

We find that geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ, are taonga. To adopt the expression of Mr Hohepa, they are something great, within the thoughts of the people. Charlotte Severne, a researcher and expert on the geothermal resources of the Taupo region, described the geothermal fields within the Ngati Tuwharetoa rohe as representing a number of taonga relating to Ngatoroirangi’s legacy. Witnesses for Te Takere o Nga Wai linked the tangata whenua to the geothermal taonga through whakapapa to Ruamoko/Ruaimoko and Ngatoroirangi. It is clear that the people of the Central North Island describe their geothermal resources (both surface and subsurface), and the underlying common heat and energy system, as taonga.

Customary and spiritual significance of geothermal resources

We received overwhelming evidence relating to the customary and spiritual significance by Central North Island iwi, hapu, and whanau who used geothermal activity and see themselves as the custodians or kaitiaki of their geothermal resources. Geothermal activity was a source of considerable social cohesion for whanau, hapu, and iwi. After 1840, geothermal activity also attracted travellers from afar who came seeking enjoyment or healing and thus provided local residents with important opportunities to exercise manaakitanga – initially for Maori, but later for travellers from many other lands.

The evidence relating to customary and spiritual significance comes to us from two very different cultural perspectives. On the one hand there is the evidence of kaumatua and kuia of successive generations, who have told their stories to the Native Land Court, to researchers such as Paora Maxwell, Evelyn Stokes, Bruce Stirling, Richard Boast, Jonathan Mane-Wheoki, Merata Kawharu’s team, or directly to the Tribunal. On the other hand there are written accounts provided by scientists, tourists, and residents, over a period of 150 years, from a variety of European perspectives. These have been presented to the Tribunal and interpreted for us by present-day scholars: Professor Boast and Dame Evelyn have, again, been particularly helpful and perceptive. Dame Evelyn recorded the use of pools as wahi tapu, some as burial places and others associated with particular chiefs or tohunga.

The customary uses of geothermal activity in areas which became important for tourism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been reported in some detail in evidence to the Tribunal which considered the Te Arawa representative geothermal resource claims and reported in 1993. Issues concerned with tourism and geothermal power generation have already been considered in part IV of this report.

Dame Evelyn pointed out that in general the favourite site for permanent Maori settlement was one within easy reach of forest, water in a river or lake, cultivable land, and geothermal heat.

We turn here to considering evidence about those geothermal resources, which are particularly rich and which were and are well used by Central North Island Maori. We begin with Tongariro in the south-west and then move progressively towards the north-east to Whakaari. We have relied on physical descriptions of the different

‘Ketetahi Steam Holes, Tongariro’. An undated photograph by the Burton Brothers of Dunedin.
geothermal manifestations discussed below taken from the Environment Waikato and Environment Bay of Plenty websites merely to assist the reader to locate the resource and understand its modern-day features. (Some of these manifestations have been modified since the 1800s.) We have identified who claims geothermal taonga where that is known; but none of our comments should be taken to exclude any other or more dominant interests that other hapu or iwi may have to the geothermal fields or springs we discuss below.

**Tongariro–Ketetahi**

Edward Jerningham Wakefield (son of Edward Gibbon Wakefield) travelled to Taupo in 1841, later describing his journey in *Adventure in New Zealand* (1845). He recorded that when his party reached Lake Rotoaira they stayed at the lakeside village of Tukituki. He described what Professor Boast considers to be Ketetahi in the following terms:

> Half-way up the steep N.E face of this mountain, a boiling spring juts out, which is considered by the natives a sovereign remedy for some diseases: they travel from all parts to benefit by its healing qualities; Watanui, the head chief of the Ngatirakawa tribe, is stated to have obtained here a wonderful cure.\(^{164}\)

The mountain was obviously important to Ngati Tuwharetoa as the evidence above concerning the tapu placed on it by Te Heuheu demonstrates. Dame Evelyn records that in the Ngati Tuwharetoa perspective, 'the ariki family of Te Heuheu, the paramount chief, and the mountain Tongariro are inextricably linked.'\(^{165}\)

We can also see, from the evidence recording Wakefield’s observations, that Ketetahi Springs were important for their curative properties. This is consistent with Merle Ormsby’s evidence when she told us about these springs. They were widely known by Ngati Hikairo for their therapeutic and healing qualities.\(^{166}\) We note that Maori have ownership of the small piece of remaining land within which the Ketetahi Springs are located.

**Environment Waikato:** According to Environment Waikato, the Tongariro geothermal system also includes the Tongariro summit craters and the nearby Te Maari craters. The Tongariro geothermal system has: three to five acid geysers; hot springs and pools, steam and gas vents, fumaroles, mud pools, sulphur deposits and a hot stream.

**Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua**

The Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua area on the southern shores of Lake Taupo was a favoured one for Maori settlement: soils were fertile; lake and river resources were close at hand, and geothermal activity more than counterbalanced the rigours of cold winters. Te Rapa – on the shores of Lake Taupo – between modern Waihi and Tokaanu township, was the home of the ariki Te Heuheu Mananui. Early Pakeha explorers like Edward Jerningham Wakefield, and Dieffenbach, who were both visitors in 1841, were favourably impressed with the resources and the village.\(^{167}\) The famous artist George French Angas arrived in Te Rapa in October 1844 and famously depicted life there, including the use of geothermal features.\(^{168}\) In 1846, Te Rapa, with Te Heuheu Mananui and perhaps as many as 60 other people, was buried in landslide debris from Hipaua, the geothermal slope behind the village.\(^{169}\)

**Waihi–Hipaua**

At Waihi, given that Tuwharetoa was a direct descendant of Ngatoroirangi, the importance of his exploits cannot be overlooked, as every aspect of life has some connection to his legacy. For example, the cliffs and the steam that rise above Waihi are known as Hipaua, the entranceway to the goddess of geothermal fire. The whare tupuna at Waihi is named after her, and holds the illustrious name Hine Tapeka.\(^{170}\)

The southern shores of Lake Taupo are also marked by a multiplicity of smaller geothermal features, each one locally named and locally important to particular whanau and hapu. Maori settlement has concentrated at points on the lake shore where there is more geothermal activ-
TOKAANU DISTRICT:
The Maori Landscape

ity. Paranapa Otimi explained the seasonal dynamic to the Tribunal:

In the old days with the onset of winter the snowline would reach the lake and Tuwharetoa Hapu would come to live during the winter months because the geothermal resource Te Ahi Tamou could sustain hundreds of people. Houses were built to accommodate them some of which still stand today. Dried fish, preserved birds, pits of stored vegs, raised pigs poultry and even Hapu milking cows were shared communally during Te wa o te Hotoke (the cold season). Even up to the late 1940s and 1950s Waihi village would grow with hundreds of people living there during this time of the year. As spring would arrive people would move back to their Hapu areas around the lake resowing crops, planting Hapu gardens and fishing various areas of the lake.171

Mr Otimi went on to name and describe 13 geothermal sites which are known to have existed in the immediate vicinity at Waihi.172 We set these out in table form (see table 20.1).

Waihi Kahakaharoa was a major congregating area where at least 30 people could bathe at one time and enjoy one another’s company. Mr Otimi added that these sites were all in an area half a kilometre long and about 100 metres wide.

Environment Waikato: Today there remain several geysers, sinter deposits, and other natural features. This system has several geysers, sinter deposits, hot springs and pools, steaming cliffs, fumaroles, steam vents, and seepages.

Tokaanu

As we noted above, in 1859 Hochstetter visited and wrote that there were more than 500 puia still in the Tokaanu area.173 We have noted in part IV of this report that in the 1870s, the Government of the day was interested in the tourist potential of geothermal areas. The Honourable William Fox visited Tokaanu as part of his larger research project, searching out possibilities. Tokaanu, with a group of ‘active and quiescent springs’, caught his attention:

The Native village which bears that name is erected in the midst of them, and they are used for the various purposes of bathing, cooking, and other domestic uses, by a population of two or three hundred…

A fine clear creek of cold water, five or six yards wide, runs through the settlement, on both shores of which are many puia and ngawhas, some violently boiling and others of various degrees of heat and ebullition.174

Fox reported to the Premier; his report was printed and tourism was promoted by two Pakeha entrepreneurs – George Blake in the 1880s, and William Strew in the 1890s. Each provided accommodation for adventurous tourists crossing from Lake Taupo to the Whanganui River. Willis’s Guide Book in 1894 described Tokaanu as an outpost on the new tourist route and highlighted the geothermal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of site</th>
<th>Role of the resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotopotakataka</td>
<td>a spring for sacred rituals of food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Kiri o Pahau</td>
<td>healing spring for ailments and recovery from battle wounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Korua</td>
<td>a hollow of water used for bathing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngapuauaki</td>
<td>bursting boiling water, used for food and run-off for bathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waihi Te Korua</td>
<td>hot and cold spring for healing, medicinal and bathing purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waihiparehopu</td>
<td>captured rising waters used as cooking and bathing spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rorohei</td>
<td>a bathing pool for relaxation before sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Paraki</td>
<td>a cooking and bathing pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Pakihi o Te Oinga</td>
<td>the bathing pool where Te Oinga beautified herself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waihi Kahakaharoa</td>
<td>a trench of rising geothermal water used for bathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Tuki</td>
<td>the beating waters used for bathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraki Tuarua</td>
<td>Nanny Wiki’s bath used to cook and bathe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whakatara</td>
<td>a bathing place for high born, [and] our visitors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20.1: Geothermal sites close to the lake shore at Waihi
wonders: geyser, puia, ngawha and mud volcanoes were the chief local attractions:

Te Korokoro a Te Poinga (The Throat of Te Poinga) . . . is a caldron of constantly-boiling water of about ten ft. in diameter at top. The sides, which are formed of pink sinter, are undermined; . . . the boiling water is always rolling in and out of the cavity. At intervals of about a minute, the water bursts up in a great dome the whole width of the caldron, from three to five ft. high.\textsuperscript{175}

The use and enjoyment of the geothermal resources in Tokaanu has remained an important feature of Maori life since traditional times. Merle Ormsby and Dulcie Gardiner, in evidence to the Tribunal, describe some of the customary uses which continued through until the 1930s and 1940s. Mrs Ormsby shares some of her memories of growing up in Tokaanu: Hinekapa, she recollects, was a pool used by men and women to warm up after catching morihana (carp) in the river, and Te Mimi o Taara was a pool where she used to bathe and wash her hair:

This pool was unique because the minerals in it were different. Whatever the minerals were in this pool, it would cause our hair to come out beautiful and shiny as if we had used shampoo.\textsuperscript{176}

Mrs Ormsby told the Tribunal that they were still using Te Mimi o Taara up until 1979, but added that 'as the lake levels were raised the surrounding area became wet and soggy, making access difficult'.\textsuperscript{177} Other pools were used for domestic cooking and for hui and others again were used for hot baths whenever people had any sort of aches and pains. ‘The hot pools were a way of life for us’, says Mrs Ormsby. ‘All the hapu benefited from the geothermal resources.’\textsuperscript{178}

Mrs Gardiner gave similar evidence, and added that each family had its own thermal pool. She used the example of her koro to describe the relationship between geothermal activity and gardening:
Koro Kuru had his mara over where the Ministry of Works have now put their power development. That area is called Mahinahina. He used to come over here to tend to his mara which was his pride and joy . . . Koro Kuru had special mara because of the geothermal activity underneath and he was able to grow corn, kumara, kamokamo and melon. He also had raupo houses, one to store his vegetables and the other for him to stay in if he had to stay overnight because he had not completed all the mahi. He also had his own thermal pool there . . . Koro Kuru’s mara, raupo whare and puia are now completely lost because of the canal.  

My whanau was very reliant on mara kai. We grew our own pumpkins and potatoes and if we got a warm spot in Tokaanu we would grow kumara. We didn’t buy potatoes, kumara, pumpkins, onions and corn. We grew them. It was a joint whanau mahi. It was extremely important that we had an annual mara. Each year the whanau would get together, my mother and her adopted siblings . . . and they would decide which family plot the mara would be grown for that year.

It is clear, from the evidence provided by Mrs Gardiner and Mrs Ormsby, that the geothermal heat and energy in the pools and in the soil sustained a way of life and supported high-quality garden cultivation in an environment that would otherwise have been far from hospitable.

**Horomatangi**  
We have previously reviewed the story of Horomatangi and his role in the Ngatoroirangi stories above. At Hirangi, we were told about Horomatangi by Mr Winitana and Mr Maniapoto. Horomatangi was the god or taniwha associated with Ngatoroirangi.  

He is also associated with the reef and whirlpool that, Mr Maniapoto told us, links Ngati Tuwharetoa through the geothermal subterranean passage back to Hawaiki. There is an early account of this field. Hochstetter was told about it when he visited in 1859:

> Horomatangi is said to be an old man and as red as fire. Thus the natives assert to have seen him. He lives in a cave on the island Motutaiko in the lake. There he watches the passing canoes, dashing forth from his lurking-place as soon as he espies one. He churns up the water in mad surges bubbling up like the big spout Pirori near Tokanu; together with the water he throws up large stones, which falling upon the passing canoes upset them. He devours whatever comes within his reach; carrying on his work of treachery and destruction both in fine and bad weather. The natives point out a place, situated almost in the centre of the lake between the island Motutaiko and Te Karaka Point, as chiefly dangerous, avoiding even in the finest weather to venture here too close to the heart of the evil spirit. Even when the general surface of the lake appears smooth, the water on this spot is in boiling commotion; in stormy weather it appears as one large patch of foam. The canoes passing over it are said to be turned from their course. These phenomena being real matters of fact, the observer might be tempted to suppose the existence of a spouting submarine spring at that place, or even of submarine volcanic eruptions.

Horomatangi has moreover special relatives, the Kaukapapas, distinguished by peculiar attributes, and on that account held in great esteem. Te Toko of Oruanui, a village north of Lake Taupo, is said to be such a Kaukapa, often disappearing suddenly, reappearing at Lake Rotorua, and returning with equal suddenness. In like manner Te Ihu at Tapua[e]haruru is reported as being able to live with Horomatangi under water in the cave on the Island Motutaiko . . . Such and a great many similar stories are in vogue about the lake.

Only recently, Dame Evelyn notes, active fumaroles have been identified and photographed on the bed of Lake Taupo in the vicinity of Horomatangi Reef, which is thought to be the main vent for the great Taupo eruption about AD 200 (see map 20.6).

**Environment Waikato:** Horomatangi Reef is a pristine geothermal system on the bed of Lake Taupo. The Horomatangi Reef overlies an underwater geothermal system on the bed of Lake Taupo, with two distinct hydrothermal vent areas producing hot water and gases.
Map 20.6: Taupo moana and the Horomatangi reef [Source: Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), (doc A56), figure 6, p 40]
Hydrothermal chimneys up to 30 centimetres tall have been built up by thermophilic micro-organisms. This field was recently discovered, according to Environment Waikato.

**Tauhara–Wairakei**

Tauhara–Wairakei is one of the largest and most spectacular geothermal fields in the TVZ. The geothermal manifestations are all part of one field. The area covers Wairakei Valley, Waiora Valley, Waipuwerawera Valley, Tauhara North, Tauhara South, and Onekeneke Valley. There were springs within Onekeneke Valley and the small Waipahihi Stream that runs from the springs to the lake. We note that heading east on the Napier–Taupo Road is Tarawera Springs, a taonga for Ngati Hineuru, and a highly valued resource to both Ngati Tuwharetoa and Ngati Kahungunu.

In the vicinity of the town of Taupo, kainga were associated with geothermal activity in this area. Dame Evelyn notes that the principal centres of Maori settlement were 'at Waipahihi (where there were hot springs)'; at Nukuhau and Tapuaeharuru (the outlet of the Waikato River), and 'on the riverbank at Patuiwi and Otumuheke, also a geothermal area.'

**Tauhara Maunga**

Tauhara Mountain, above the town of Taupo, has a number of geothermal surface features. Joycelyn Rameka told us that her people lived on the mountain, but eventually moved to the lower valley to be closer to the surface geothermal features of this area. This accords with the account of George Cooper, who accompanied Governor Grey in the summer of 1850–51. He reported that the land base around Tauhara was 'covered nearly to the top with patches of cultivations, cleared from amidst the timber with which the mountain is clothed.'

The story of Ngatoroirangi pervades the landscape of Tauhara. A waiairiki called Taharepa was named after him to honour his descent from Mount Tauhara on his way south to Tongariro. At the lake's edge, near Waipahihi Village, Ngatoroirangi built a tuahu (altar), calling it Taharepa. Taha means 'the side or margin' and repa means 'flax cloak, or garment'. It was here he scattered threads, performing the religious rites necessary to create inanga or kokopu. Taharepa hot spring was named after this event.

According to the claimants, Taharepa should have been included within the Waipahihi reserve. The full name for this area is Waipahihi a Tia (the squelching water of Tia), named while Tia moved south-east after his arrival at Lake Taupo, to avoid Ngatoroirangi. Near Taharepa, water squelched up from under his feet, hence the name. Waipahihi was reserved from the purchase of the Tauhara Middle block.

Another aspect of the Ngatoroirangi story can be found in the name of the dining room at Waipahihi Marae. It is named Kuiwai, after one of the sisters who brought geothermal fire to Aotearoa.

Dame Evelyn notes that by 1874 William Fox, travelling in the area, described the small Waipahihi Stream: 'a warm stream a yard or two wide crosses the road and meanders to into the lake.' He also noted that if followed inland on the 'Maori track a narrow gorge is reached, in which the small stream expands into two considerable pools [Onekeneke], varying in depth from a few inches to several feet.'

Mrs Rameka and Mr Mataara Wall are among those who provided evidence from Waipahihi. Mrs Rameka explained the use of springs: one hot spring was used for cooking, the cold spring for drinking water, and the third spring for bathing. The Waipahihi geothermal stream was once the major supplier of hot water for Waipahihi, and it was used for bathing, washing, and cooking. The hot water was once hot enough to be harnessed for washing dishes and pots in the marae kitchen. Mr Mataara Wall explains that use:

Ngawha were such an important resource for our people and many of our ancestors created permanent settlements close to ngawha because of the obvious benefits of cooking and bathing. We continue to use some of the water from these streams today.
Map 20.8: Wairakei-Tauhara place names [Source: Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), (docA56), figure 20, p. 131]
In relation to Wairakei, (Te Huka and Karapiti), Geoffrey Rameka gave evidence to the tribunal which underscored the importance of this area in spiritual as well as practical terms. Ruaimoko/Ruaumoko, the youngest child of Ranginui and Papatuanuku, had a hand in its creation.

It was one of the staging places where Kuiwai and Haungaroa surfaced to maintain direction as they brought life-giving fire from Hawaiki to Ngatoroirangi on Tongariro maunga. As we noted above in some stories, it is where Horomatangi blew with such force that he created the Karapiti Blowhole.

These legends, Mr Rameka emphasised, are crucial pieces of tribal history and form ‘the basis of who we are and what we are all about’. For the tangata whenua, the geothermal surface features and the field of Wairakei are an integral part of their identity. They claim that through their whakapapa the people are very closely related to the geothermal resources at Wairakei. And they value them as taonga which they respect and hold dear. Mr Rameka went on to tell the Tribunal that these were geothermal resources regularly used by his ancestors, and he added that, generally, they were ‘welcoming and accommodating of others who also wished to partake in the wonders and therapeutic properties of a number of streams’.

Dame Evelyn carried out a comprehensive study of the evidence relating to customary uses of Wairakei geothermal area, drawing on accounts by Pakeha visitors and the Native Land Court records. As she notes, Maori customary use of this area is explored in the Native Land Court, which met in April 1868 dealing with the Oruanui block, and in March 1872, August 1877, and 1881–1882 dealing with the Wairakei block. Dame Evelyn notes the presence of Ngati Tuwharetoa interests in the area when she adds:

The geothermal resources of Wairakei were used by several tribes of northern Tuwharetoa. There was little permanent settlement on the Wairakei Block in the nineteenth century. People came from the large settlements around Taupo lakeshore and Waikato riverbank above Huka Falls, and bush margins at Oruanui. They lived in temporary encampments at Wairakei while they processed kokowai (red ochre), dug for fern root and fished for kokopu... Given the nature of the customary evidence led before the Native Land Court it would also be fair to say that people with whakapapa from Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Raukawa, and Te Arawa were also claiming interests. That evidence from the minute books was summarised by Dame Evelyn in the following way:

In summary, the resources at Wairakei which were most highly valued were kokowai and the therapeutic and healing properties of the hot pools, in particular Matarakukia and Te Kiriohinekai. Most of the hot pools, geysers and fumaroles had Maori names, often associated with ancestors, and were wahi tapu.

Dr Severne noted that:

Kokowai (red ochre), a valued mineral that is a by-product of geothermal activity, was processed at Wairakei and traded extensively throughout the motu. Kokowai was dug up and processed at Okurawai (Taupo Minute Book 01 pg 65) and...
along Kiriohinekai Stream and its source the Piroriori Spring in the Wairakei Block (Erueti Tarakainga Taupo Minute Book 1 pg 226-240). Kokowai was a valuable commodity used in the ceremonial exchanges and cemented tribal relationships (Stokes 1991).210

Kokowai was used as a source of red colouring for painting and dye work.211 Wairakei was thus an important geothermal field for Taupo Maori, and Mr Rameka reflected:

Consider if you will, Wairakei being the centre of your universe. For my tipuna, this was often the case, for it contained:

(a) a fully equipped and insulated home surrounded by gullies and hills;
(b) a kitchen containing a variety of heated cooking pools and pits;
(c) a laundry containing water of varying temperatures;
(d) a bathroom with a variety of pools and streams to suit individual needs;
(e) a health clinic comprising a variety of rongoa in the form of pools, streams and vegetation, where old bones were regenerated and young ones repaired; and
(f) a factory where kokowai was processed and used for trade with other tribes.212

Environment Waikato: Environment Waikato describe this field as marked by hot springs and pools, fumaroles, steaming ground, mud pools, craters, hot seepages, a rare mud geyser, and sinter terraces. It also covers Waiora Valley. The Craters of the Moon (Karapiti) geothermal area is part of this geothermal field.

Mangakino

The use of springs at Mangakino did not feature at all in the evidence before us. That evidence may feature further in the King Country inquiry.

Environment Waikato: Mangakino has no natural surface features remaining. After the creation of Lake Maraetai, the hot springs are now underwater (including one that produced sinter).

Mokai

Mokai is about 25 kilometres north-west of Taupo. The Mokai geothermal field sits firmly within the Ngatoroirangi tradition: kuia interviewed by Dame Evelyn in the course of her research described the hot springs as children of Kuiwai and Haungaroa, sisters of Ngatoroirangi.213

Dame Evelyn discussed the Mokai area as attractive for settlement because of its proximity to the areas of bush around Titiraupenga.214 The same point was made by the Pouakani Tribunal after reviewing the Native Land Court records:

With its proximity to forests, swamps, cultivable land and geothermal resources, clearly the Mokai area was an attractive place in the relatively harsh climate and sterile pumice country north and west of Lake Taupo. The other significant group of settlements were those strung out along the bush margins of Titiraupenga.215

Compared to Wairakei or Rotorua, the Mokai field is not as spectacular at surface level.216 Located out of sight of the Waikato River or Lake Taupo, it received much less attention from European travellers. Ensign Best and Ernst Dieffenbach were there, however, in April 1841: Dieffenbach recorded ‘four larger and three smaller Tufas’, warm ground used for cooking food, and a complete volcanic range of miniature hills.217 Both men recorded that they visited the puia Ohineariki and the Tuhuatahi group of springs.218 There were also the Parakiri Springs in this area.

A succinct entry in the Waikato minute books of the Native Land Court clarifies the importance of the geothermal resources at Mokai: ‘All bathe’, said Hitiri Te Paerata, ‘but I am the owner’.219 According to Dame Evelyn, he was ‘emphatic that the hot springs were just as much part of the resources and living space of the people as the forest and cultivations’.220 Werohia Te Hiko responded, claiming
the springs for Ngati Wairangi. It seems the parties negotiated an agreement over Ohineariki and Parakiri, with Te Heuheu reporting as much to the Native Land Court. All three hot springs remain in Maori ownership.

The dependency on this field continued into the twentieth century. We were told that the tangata whenua at Mokai exercised ownership, and their whanaunga from Raukawa, Tuwharetoa and Tainui visited and enjoyed the hot pools. Huirama William Te Hiko (kaumatua of Ngati Raukawa) told us about life at Mokai as he was growing up. It was then a kainga with wharenui. He remembered the hot baths being used for bathing and for rongoa (health) purposes by the ‘old people’ when he was young. The baths were called Hineariki. He also remembers the stern warnings he received about the dangers of the geyser area and, after noting his view that the Crown wanted the geysers because of the money that can be made, he stated ‘if you have mana over the geysers, you have mana over the money.’

There are at least two blocks of land still held in Maori ownership at Mokai: Tuaropaki and Waipapa. Mr Te Hiko gave us some history of these blocks and their development by the Department of Maori Affairs. He then explained that the Tuaropaki block is now administered as Maori land by an ahu whenua trust. It seems that the seclusion and a lack of spectacular scenery seems to have saved Mokai from the attentions of entrepreneurs or Government officials for many years. The land has generally remained in Maori ownership.

*Environment Waikato:* Today, hot springs, mud pools, steaming ground and seepages form part of this field. There are present, sinter-depositing chloride springs and a rare mud geyser. It is noted that the Tuaropaki Trust owns part of the land overlying the Mokai geothermal system.

**Rotokawa**

Leaving Tauhara and heading towards Rotorua, Lake Rotokawa (Bitter Lake) is a ‘particularly important resource, both for its geothermal activity and the bird life.’ The main area of surface geothermal activity is on the northern shore of the lake. The cave, Rua Hoata – famous for its red ochre rock drawings – was located in the vicinity. It was destroyed when a large section of the river bank collapsed in 1987. Early Pakeha visitors to the area recorded many geothermal features there, including ‘sulphur deposits, hydrothermal eruption craters (at least 25), [an] acid lake (Lake Rotokawa), surface alteration, sinter deposits, warm and steaming ground, mud pools, [and] hot and warm springs.’

The importance of the geothermal resources at Lake Rotokawa was well traversed in the evidence before the Native Land Court. After analysing the evidence before the court, Dame Evelyn notes the extensive use of the resources here and the large number of kainga in this vicinity. Professor Boast quotes this example, from the evidence given by Hera Peka who stated:

I went first [to Lake Rotokawa] from Ohake [Ohaaki] ... We went there to burn kokowai and take ducks at Rotokawa. We stayed at Te Takapou and from there we went to Te Ripo a kainga where kokowai was prepared. We came by canoe, from Ohake. When we got to Te Ripo, Parekawa and Peahama stayed there burning kokowai. The kokowai was got at Te Kupenga. We left there and came on to Ngawapurua, then the canoe was dragged overland [ie from the Waikato River] to Rotokawa, and in the morning the lake was worked. It was always worked in the early morning. Having finished working the lake we went on to Ngawapurua to make huahua, Whilst there we lived on Putere (fern root). Te Pou was the putere ground there. Te Whakatuapiki was the ngawha (hot spring) in which the putere was cooked – it is close to ngawapurua – from there we came to Takapou and on to Ohake and from thence after some time to Hapua in the Tutukau Block – it is a large kainga.

Customary uses included cooking, gathering kokowai, ritual bathing of warriors, and health and medicinal pur-
Map 20.10: Geothermal and other sites along the Waikato River [After: Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), (doc A56), figure 20, p 80]
poses. Poihipi Te Kume, under cross-examination, claimed that:

all the land is ngawha. A ngawha is water too hot to stand in.
A waiariki is water hot enough to allow it to be used for bathing. A ngawha is a natural formation. Waiariki are generally formed baths – artificially.

When asked whether there were ngawha or waiariki away from Lake Rotokawa, he said ‘Yes, on the hill side among the manuka. On the Parariki stream there are ngawha – no waiariki.’ He was then asked, ‘My witness says this waiariki is between Otawarauhuru and Te Rua Hoata on the banks of the Waikato – do you know this?’ and his answer was ‘I have never been along the banks of the Waikato so could not see it.’
Hare Matenga referred to the Parariki Stream (between the Tauhara North and Kaingaroa 2 blocks), noting kainga (villages) and whare (houses) along the banks. He spoke of the ngawha and waiariki that had been used since ancient times in this vicinity. He also spoke of another waiariki on Kaingaroa 2 being ‘a made one’, and he concluded: ‘That was why the kainga was occupied because of these waiariki and the cultivations mentioned.’
These descriptions accord with the area of Rotokawa as it is known today within the Tauhara North 1 and Kaingaroa 2 blocks Te Kupenga, opposite Te Toke. This block has recently been repurchased by customary owners.

Dame Evelyn noted that along this stretch of the Waikato River there is much geothermal activity:

Some hot springs well up from the bed of the Waikato and can be detected by bubbles of gas and moving pumice fragments. These are associated with rua taniwha, homes of taniwha, protective beings, who can be found in most rivers. The taniwha of Te Ohaaki, for example, has his home in a cave, now flooded by Lake Ohakuri, beside the marae. He travels to the ngawha, Ohaaki Pool, and on occasion joins other taniwha of Taupo Moana. Several rua taniwha are associated with the rhyolite outcrop and Waikato river bed, up-stream of Nihoroa. One was associated with an ancestor who was drowned there and became a taniwha.

Environment Waikato: The Maori landowners of Tauhara North 1 with the Department of Conservation are caring for the geothermal lake, the geothermal Parariki Stream, and the hot springs by the Waikato River. There are springs in this system along the Waikato River which are affected by river level fluctuations from hydroelectric generation.

Orakei Korako

Orakei Korako (Place of Adorning) is located in a scenic valley on the Waikato River, between Mihinui and Atiamuri. Here, there were geothermal features on both sides of the river; and the surface features included geysers as well as hot springs. Orakei Korako was an important site for early Maori settlement, and has a long history of Maori use with documented sites of habitation scattered throughout the area. For example, in the Fletcher and Galvin study conducted in 2002, the authors were able to identify over 80 features and sites of cultural significance, including many pa, kainga, cultivations, bird and rat snaring places, as well as important caves and urupa.

In the early years of European contact, Orakei Korako was established as a regular stopping place for travellers moving between Rotorua and Taupo. The route from Rotorua followed the Paeroa Range to Te Kopia, before crossing the Waikato River at Orakei Korako. Ngati Tahu ran a ferry operation at this point. A number of European travellers visited in the nineteenth century and left a published or manuscript record. Among them were Reverend Richard Taylor and Hochstetter in the 1850s; Lieutenant H S Bates in 1860, and John Ernest Tinne and James H Kerry-Nicholls in the 1870s and 1880s. In 1874, William Fox reported to the Premier and to Parliament on the results of his survey of the hot springs districts of the North Island, writing:

It presents one of the most remarkable groups of hot springs and fumaroles in the lake country or anywhere in the world, and is capable of varied adaptation to sanitary purposes . . . The principal open waiariki, or bath, is a very remarkable one.
It lies immediately beneath a Native village which crests the high bank on top of extensive old fortifications.²⁴⁴

Hochstetter also described the visual impact of the geothermal resources and the Maori village within the geothermal area in vivid prose, counted 76 points where geothermal activity was evident, and drew a sketch map which was (in his words) ‘but a faint illustration of the grandeur and peculiarity of the natural scenery at Orakei Korako.’²⁴⁵ Taylor’s prose is more subdued, but he is especially helpful for us when he describes the papakainga and the manner in which customary uses are embedded in the geothermal landscape:

At Orakei Korako, on the Waikato, the boiling springs are almost innumerable; some of them shoot up a volume of water to a considerable height, and are little, if at all, inferior to the Geyser of Iceland. A village is placed in the midst of them; the reason assigned for living in such a singular locality was, that as there is no necessity for fires, all their cooking being done in the hot springs, the women’s backs are not broken with carrying fuel, and further, from the warmth of the ground they were enabled to raise their crops several weeks earlier than their neighbours; but as a counterbalance for these advantages, many fatal accidents occur from persons, especially strangers and children, falling into these fearful caldrons . . .²⁴⁶

The settlement was huge at one stage, but two events in the late 1890s impacted on the community, forcing people to leave. The first was a major eruption of the Rahurahu geyser (known to Europeans as ‘The Terrific’). Evidently the explosion of the geyser was of such force and its ‘volume sound and force were so appalling that the Natives fled the place.’²⁴⁷ The second was the rerouting of the main road to Taupo.²⁴⁸ Urbanisation also had its impact later. Ngati Tahu moved, and left only a small number of people to act as kaitiaki for Orakei Korako.

Kahurangi Te Hiko, in her evidence to the Tribunal, remembered Orakei Korako as it was when she grew up there in the 1920s, living in the house of her koro and kuia. She told the Tribunal about their large gardens where they grew riwai, kumara, and other vegetables. Mrs Te Hiko remembered her mother, Herapeka, and her kuia, Hae Hae, using the hot pools to cook, to clean, and to bathe in.
Hot pools were also used for health purposes. ‘The pools were a source of spiritual cleansing and would be used to ease any aching muscles and bones’, she added.249

The image provided for us, by Pakeha visitors and by Mrs Te Hiko, is that of a Maori way of life integrating the resources of river, soil, hot pools, and geothermal heat. We are also aware, from these same sources, that the resources and the hospitality of whanau were shared with tourists and visitors on a communal basis. Between the 1870s and the 1930s, travellers and tourists were provided with simple accommodation, good food, the enjoyment of hot pools, and interpretation of the geothermal landscape, all at modest cost.250

Environment Waikato: In 1961, Lake Ohakuri was formed for hydro power generation. This raised the Waikato River level by 18 metres at Orakei Korako, flooding approximately 200 alkaline hot springs and 70 geysers. That part of Orakei Korako that has survived this event is managed for the Maori landowners as a tourist attraction. The system is now protected from further development. Thirty-five active geysers and around 100 hot springs remain, plus mud pools and sinter deposits.

**Ohaaki–Broadlands**

This geothermal area – known to Maori as Te Ohaaki o Ngatoroirangi (the Legacy or Bequest of Ngatoroirangi – underlies the Waikato River in the Reporoa Basin. Its geothermal features were described by travellers, including Taylor in 1845, but generally – given their remoteness from lakes and mountains – they escaped the attention of tourist and health spa developers. Occupation had been seasonal, but following the devastation of villages at Lake Tarawera in 1886 the population of Ohaaki increased and became more permanent. The customary evidence presented in the Native Land Court suggests that the Ohaaki–Broadlands area was a kainga and a place to come to during seasonal migrations, and that is how ahi ka was exercised here.255 

The applications were strongly contested, but the nature of the customary use was clearly evident. The ngawha here were used for cooking, bathing, and the steeping of mats.
The customary occupation of the area was evidenced by place names and stories, and the identification of pools, cooking areas, and urupa.\textsuperscript{252} The land block associated with Ohaaki is Tahorakuri. As Dame Evelyn noted, it comprised all the land 'from Aratiatia to a point about five kilometres upstream from Orakei Korako.'\textsuperscript{253} The title was first investigated by the Native Land Court in 1887, and the entire block was awarded to Ngati Tahu.\textsuperscript{254} Ngati Whaoa claim they have traditional rights here as well.\textsuperscript{255} During the 1880s, lands on the east bank of the Waikato river from Reporoa were purchased from Ngati Tahu.\textsuperscript{256} This land passed into European hands and became known as Broadlands. In 1899, the remaining part of Tahorakuri block was partitioned into four sections: Waimahana, Te Ohaaki, and Kaimanawa in the east, and Waikari in the south-west corner.\textsuperscript{257}

The principal surface feature here was the Ohaaki Pool. Edward Earl Vaile, who purchased 53,000 acres of land at Broadlands in 1906, lived there for more than three decades and wrote \textit{Pioneering the Pumice}. He describes the Ohaaki Pool used by his Maori neighbours across the river:

> The Ohaki natives possess a wonderful great boiling pool with a beautiful lacework pattern around the edges – the most handsome pool in the whole thermal area. They have led the overflow into two useful baths in which the temperatures can be controlled. It is a peculiar fact that a heavy southerly wind causes the water to fall below the outlet and the overflow ceases. When first I saw this I thought something was about to happen, but the Maoris assured me there was nothing unusual about it. They also have a 'champagne' pool (that is one which will effervesce when sand is thrown into it), numerous small cooking pools, and a beautiful sulphur cave.\textsuperscript{258}

All the geothermal resources of the area were utilised until the 1960s. For example, Mrs Hurihanganui told us that during her grandmother’s time at Ohaaki, the elders would tap ‘into the side of the riverbank and drain the spring water into a spa created with rocks.’\textsuperscript{259} Tony Mark Reihana, giving claimant evidence for Ngati Tahu told us ‘at Ohaaki our ngawha were used for bathing, cooking and washing and some ngawha were used for ailments.’\textsuperscript{260} Dame Evelyn combines a wider range of evidence to give us an overview of the configuration of settlement and customary use in relation to the geothermal features.\textsuperscript{261} Small kainga are located close to bathing pools on the river bank and cooking holes (umu) in the hot ground a little farther distant from the river. Deeper holes containing mud or hot water, in areas more dangerous to access, were used as urupa. Dame Evelyn continues:

> At Te Ohaaki the main thermal area is near the marae. The big ngawha, now known as the Ohaaki Pool, is of considerable historical significance to Ngati Tahu . . . There were also ochre beds in the thermal area here. Mud and hot water from selected spots in this area had special curative powers . . . (one) place of special significance was Te Ana a Rangipatoto, from which a white substance was extracted . . .

\textit{Environment Waikato}: Historically, there were alkaline hot springs and bathing pools at Ohaaki. Some of these springs and a sacred cave were flooded when the river level was raised to fill Lake Ohakuri for the hydroelectric power scheme in 1961. The Ohaaki Ngawha (boiling pool) is the dominant remaining natural feature of the field. Before the area was developed, the large Ohaaki Ngawha with its clear, pale, turquoise-blue water and extensive white sinter terrace was described as ‘the most handsome pool in the whole thermal area.’

\textbf{Reporoa}

According to Hiko Hohepa, Reporoa was where the sisters of Ngatoroirangi travelled, leaving warm waters and boiling pools.\textsuperscript{255} Dame Evelyn notes that there were springs at Orangikereru (Golden Springs), on the Waiotapu River near Reporoa.\textsuperscript{264} 

\textit{Environment Waikato}: The features of this system include hot springs and pools, steaming ground, sinter deposits, mud pools, and seepages. Two springs are still
Atiamuri

Mataara Wall refers to Atiamuri, describing its legendary history associated with the ancestor Tia. Dame Evelyn notes that Ngati Tahu lived here at the pa of Pohaturoa and they also had kainga at Orakei Korako, Ohaaki, Reporoa, Aratiatia, and Rotokawa. Huirama William Te Hiko described Atiamuri as occupied by Ngati Whaita, who had a pa at Ongaroto. In evidence before us, Kim Te Tua referred to ‘Atiamuri Aniwaniwa Hauru’ and Ohakuri as famous for their steaming hot waiariki. She told us that, because of the water being hot, koura and tuna were easy to catch in hinaki in the Waikato at Niho o te Kiore. Later she mentions that Poaka had mud pools in an area west of Maroanuiatia.

Atiamuri was of strategic military importance to both Maori and Pakeha during the early period of European settlement. Mr Stirling refers to an account by the Surveyor-General of ‘hot springs just across the river’ at Atiamuri. At the Tauponuiatia hearings, Tuwharetoa claimed Atiamuri as falling within their sphere of influence. Mr Stirling refers to Ihakara Kahuao as securing the reconveyance of the area as a reserve for his hapu when Tatua West block was sold to private purchasers, in the early 1880s. Hira Rangimatini – believing a reserve between Atiamuri and Te Niho-o-te-Kiore of 600 acres was to be given to Ihakara Kahuao – told Bryce that the area was a permanent settlement and cultivation of his people. In fact the purchasers had agreed to re-convey 400 acres at Te Niho-o-te-Kiore to Rangimatini, and 200 acres at Atiamuri – evidently to Kahuao. Mr Stirling describes the subsequent history of the Atiamuri reserve as ‘unknown’, with no title or other information available.

Environment Waikato: Atiamuri geothermal system contains three chloride springs. Three hot alkaline chloride springs were known, but only two are depositing sinter at present. These are known as the Whangapoa Springs. In the arm of Lake Atiamuri, another small hot spring was flooded when the lake was filled in the 1960s. South of the two main hot springs is an explosion crater about 20 metres in diameter and approximately 10 metres deep. There are various other hot springs, mud pools, hydrothermal eruption craters, and extensive ancient sinter deposits scattered throughout the farm land. The land surrounding the Whangapoa Springs was gifted by Carter Holt Harvey to the Department of Conservation after 2000.

Ngatamariki

There were hot springs at Ngatamariki and Orangi-manauhea on the track from the Wairewarewa kainga of Ngati Tahu to Orakei Korako. This field now falls within the vicinity of the Pt Tahorakuri A2 block. Tahorakuri went through the Native Land Court as part of the Tauponuiatia hearing in 1886–1887. In 1930, 41 of the partitions it had been divided into were amalgamated to facilitate the sale of part of the block to Perpetual Forests Ltd. The newly rejoined block was then split into two; the Maori owners kept 2537 hectares and Perpetual Forests got the rest, known as Pt Tahorakuri A2, which included Ngatamariki.

Environment Waikato: Ngatamariki is considered to be a highly dynamic area and, since 1995, some springs have formed, others have dried up, and there has been a hydrothermal eruption. There are two large alkaline-chloride pools surrounded by bubbling acidic pools and many springs and pools and there are six areas of sinter-depositing springs. One spring has a dense brilliant white calcite sinter deposit two metres wide, for five metres along its outflow. In late 1998, a new geyser appeared at Ngatamariki after a bank collapsed and blocked a natural upwelling of geothermal fluid.

Te Kopia

During the early years of European contact, the route from Rotorua to Taupo followed the Paeroa Range to Te Kopia and then on to Orakei Korako. Hochstetter was one of the
early travellers, and he described springs along the base of the Paeroa fault, including the ‘great fountain Te Kopiha’.

Frederick Tiffen, travelling through to Rotomahana, stayed the night at Te Kopia where there was an ‘old hut or two’ and several springs. He said of the springs:

These springs were situated on a rough flat and a person had to walk very carefully about them or there is a good chance of sinking into some soft matter or other, perhaps scalding . . . All springs, or body of springs, are christened as the maoris [sic] called it – these are christened Kopia . . .

This field is in the vicinity of the Rotomahana–Parekarangi area. This block was one of the first Rotorua blocks investigated by the Native Land Court in 1882. The block was claimed by a number of hapu and iwi. Ngati Whaoa specifically identified Te Kopia. Ngati Whaoa claimed ancestral rights that were based on the arrival of their ancestor Whaoa, with his father Maaka, a brother to Tia and Tamatekapua and an uncle of Ngatoroirangi. Ngati Whaoa rights to Paeroa and Waiotapu date from this time. Both Tuhourangi and Ngati Whaoa were awarded land in the area by the court. The land was also subject to claims from other iwi, including Ngati Tahu. In evidence before us, we were told that Te Kopia is considered to be a taonga by Ngati Whaoa.

Environment Waikato: The geothermal area of the reserve has steaming cliffs and ground, craters, a mud geyser, hot springs, sinter deposits, and fumaroles. These features are found in the scenic reserve administered by the Department of Conservation. ‘Te Kopia Mud Geyser erupts a column of grey muddy water 5 to 10 m high as a single shot accompanied by a loud bang. These eruptions occur every 10 to 30 minutes when the geyser is active.’

Whangairorohe
The Whangairorohe geothermal field is within the vicinity of the Rotomahana–Parekarangi block first investigated by the Native Land Court in 1882. As noted above, this block was claimed by a number of hapu and iwi of Te Arawa. However, the area of the block near the Paeroa Range was subject to claims by Ngati Whaoa, Tuhourangi, and Ngati Tahu. Ngati Whaoa claimed on the basis of their many cultivations, mahinga kai, and the geothermal resources of the Paeroa Range. They named Whangairorohe on the Waikato River during the hearing. Tuhourangi, Ngati Whaoa, and Ngati Tahu were awarded land in the area by the court in its 1882 judgment.

Environment Waikato: The geothermal field contains several hot springs. ‘A hot spring perched on a cliff . . . and some springs in the bed of the Waikato River’ are features here. Extensive sinter deposits show that the system was once more active.

Waiotapu–Waikite–Waimangu/Rotomahana
The Waiotapu–Waikite–Waimangu/Rotomahana field is within the vicinity of the Paeroa East block and the Rotomahana–Parekarangi blocks. The Paeroa East block was first investigated as to title in 1881. It was reheard in 1882, and partitioned in the same year. The block, comprising 79,820 acres, was situated between the Rotomahana–Parekarangi block and the northern Kaingaroa 1 and 2 blocks. Dr Kawharu’s team notes that the ‘Paeroa East block included the valuable sites of Maungakakaramea and the Waiotapu thermal valley running down to the Waikato River, though it did not include the Paeroa Range, which was later included in the Rotomahana–Parekarangi’ block. Ngati Whaoa and Ngati Tahu claimed separate interests. Tuhourangi also claimed land in this area. It was within this area that Whaoa settled, with others who traced their descent from Te Arawa waka. Ngati Whaoa claims were based on ancestry and constant occupation. Ngati Whaoa were eventually awarded the bulk of the Paeroa East block. However there were other iwi claiming interests including Ngati Rangitiki, Ngati Tahu, and Tuhourangi.

Waiotapu
Waiotapu lies about five kilometres south of Rainbow Mountain Scenic Reserve. Teressa Hurihanganui discussed the importance of these geothermal sites for Ngati
Whaoa. They were used for treatment of specific ailments and purposes, traditional cooking processes, and tourism. She claimed that her tipuna had an in-depth knowledge of geothermal networks. She noted that in 1890, Miriata and Aporo developed a hostel at a geothermal site in the Waiotapu Valley. This was specifically to cater for the tourist trade, and Aporo sold samples of the minerals produced from the geothermal activity. He would charge a toll for people travelling to Waiotapu. There is some recognition of this in the work of Dame Evelyn. Walter Pererika Rika, for Ngati Whaoa, told us the geothermal areas of Waiotapu and Kakaramea (Rainbow Mountain) were used for cooking, bathing, and medicinal purposes.

Environment Waikato: The Waiotapu geothermal area has: five known geysers; hot springs, mud pools, fumaroles, craters, and steaming ground. Several hot springs deposit sinters. Two of the springs are unique in New Zealand for very different reasons. The first, Champagne Pool, is a large spring approximately 30 metres wide, which is actively growing two hectares of sinter terrace. The second, Hakareteke Geyser, is the only sinter-depositing geyser with acidic waters in New Zealand. According to Environment Waikato this field is possibly connected to the Waikite and Waimangu fields.

Kakaramea–Rainbow Mountain
Mount Kakaramea was named for its source of kokowai (red ochre), a valuable resource in itself. As noted above, Mr Rika for Ngati Whaoa told us the geothermal areas of Waiotapu and Kakaramea were used for cooking, bathing and medicinal purposes. The mountain was located on the Paeroa East 1A West block awarded to the Crown by the Native Land Court in 1887 as part of the partitioning of Paeroa East. Under the Scenery Preservation Act 1903, Rainbow Mountain was first gazetted as a scenic reserve in 1903.

Waikite
In 1845, Donald McLean was an early visitor to the area, noting that he had to pass through a kainga (village) named Paeroa which lies between Rainbow Mountain and Waikite Valley. Ngati Whaoa and Tuhourangi claimed this area during the Native Land Court investigation into the customary ownership of Rotomahana–Parekarangi. Ngati Tahu contested the claims made by Ngati Whaoa. The Native Land Court eventually made an award in favour of Tuhourangi and Ngati Whaoa to the Paeroa Range.

Environment Waikato: Waikite field may be connected to the Waiotapu and Waimangu fields. Waikite has hot springs, geysers, warm lakes, craters, and sulphur deposits. The sinter now present around the Manuroa Spring extends for more than one metre around the pool edges and in thick deposits along the outflow channel. Manuroa is believed to have the largest volume of outflow of all sinter springs in New Zealand.

Rotomahana–Waimangu
Early visitors to this area crossed Lake Tarawera to arrive at Rotomahana. Dr Johnson, travelling in the area in 1847, was one of the early Europeans to see the Pink and White Terraces, describing them as ‘one of the most singular scenes that imagination can picture.’ Johnson gave the names of the terraces as Wakataroa and Wakatarata. He noted steaming cliffs, alum found in crevices of rocks, and evidence of habitation, and he wrote:

After thus passing onwards fo[r] about three hundred yards, we came to a more extended piece of ground, comparatively free from springs, and the natives had erected some huts, and formed wai ariki, and hot plates, as at Ohinemutu, for their use when they reside here in the winter, which they do for the sake of warmth, and this comfort they may assuredly can enjoy to any extent that may suit their feelings.

We discuss the importance to Maori of tourism in this area in part IV of this report. What is important to note here is the obvious and dedicated use of the resource at a time well before tourism became focused on Lake Rotomahana. Maori were coming here during the winter...
for the heat. When Mount Tarawera erupted on 10 June 1886, the Pink and White Terraces were destroyed and Lake Rotomahana exploded. The eruption opened the earth along a 17-kilometre line and it formed the seven craters that make up the Waimangu Volcanic Valley.  

This field falls within the Rotomahana–Parekarangi/Tarawera–Ruawahia area. Tuhourangi applied to have the first of these blocks investigated by the Native Land Court in 1882. Owing to the size of the block (230,000 acres), there were many competing claimants to the block, including Ngati Rangitihia. A rehearing of the block took place in 1887, at a time when, according to Dr Kawharu, ‘Tuhourangi and Rangitihia were still in mourning’ following the Tarawera eruption. The block stretched from the boundaries of the Pukeroa–Oroawhata and Rotorua–Patetere blocks in the north, south to the Waikato River in the vicinity of Orakei Korako and across the Paeroa Range. It spanned from the Horohoro bluffs in the west across to the Tarawera and Rerewhakaiti lakes in the east. Tuhourangi and Rangitihia both received awards to the area around Lake Rotomahana. Dr Kawharu’s team, referring to evidence before the Native Land Court, states that the witnesses called the White Terrace, Te Tarata, and the Pink Terrace, Otukapuarangi. Dame Evelyn completed a comprehensive review of the resources that were part of this area, and of customary uses of them, before the eruption.

Environment Bay of Plenty: There are surface geothermal features and activity present at Waimangu, on the western shore of Lake Rotomahana, and the southern shore of Lake Tarawera.

Tarawera–Kawerau

Mount Tarawera and the Tarawera River: Maori occupation of the region by Ngati Rangitihia and Tuhourangi has been well documented. A major Tuhourangi settlement, Te Wairoa, was a place of central importance during the early years of Maori and European contact as guides took travellers to view the geothermal resources of the region, the most famous of which were the spectacular Pink and White Terraces. Dr Johnson, on his way to Rotomahana in 1847, described crossing Lake Tarawera from Ruakareo (Te Wairoa) in a canoe to reach a small village (Koutu) situated at the mouth of the stream by which the warm water of Lake Rotomahana flowed out into Lake Tarawera. Dame Evelyn notes that there were geothermal areas located at Te Ariki, the isthmus between Lakes Tarawera and Mahana.

As we discussed above the wondrous formations of the Pink and White Terraces and many other geothermal features both at Tarawera and Rotomahana were destroyed in the Tarawera Eruption of 1886. We note the many stories of Ngatoroirangi as he travelled from Te Awa o Te Atua (Tarawera River) to Mount Ruawhia-Tarawera and where he fought the taniwha (in some stories) or tohunga /priest (in others) of that maunga.

We also noted that Lake Rotomahana was captured within the Rotomahana–Parekarangi block. Mount Tarawera, Lake Tarawera and the headwaters of the Tarawera River, were caught up in the Ruawhia block hearings of the Native Land Court in 1891. Ruawhia was the name given to the central peak of Mount Tarawera. There were three in total. Ngati Rangitihia claimed that Ruawhia was wahi tapu, a site of significance for them and that ‘[a]ll the descendants of Ngati Rangitihia were buried on their maunga. ’

The Ruawhia block was estimated to be 20,000 acres. Ngati Rangitihia lodged the claim for this block, claiming interests based on mana, ancestry (take tupuna), bravery (take toa), and permanent occupation. The counter-claimants were Tuhourangi. ‘The Court awarded all interests in the Ruawhia block to Ngati Rangitihia.’

On the importance of the Tarawera River for Ngati Rangitihia, David Potter told us about the many uses that Ngati Rangitihia made of the resources from Mount Tarawera to Kawerau, an area they shared with Tuhourangi and a number of other iwi.

Reuben Perenara of Ngati Rangitihia noted that his people used geothermal resources for: medicinal purposes; cooking and food preparation; central heating; washing
Photograph of Lake Rotomahana, taken circa 1908, showing thermal steam seeping from the cliffs above the water.

The 'White Terrace', sometime between 1880 and 1886. Before the Tarawera eruption on 10 June 1886, Te Tarata (the White Terrace) and Te Otukapuarangi (the Pink Terrace) were valued by Maori not only for their beauty but for their practical benefits, offering, for example, a cascade of bathing pools of decreasing temperatures.
Two warm springs are found in the Mangakotukutuku and Waiaute Streams. Environment Waikato completed a thermal infrared survey between the Tarawera River lake outlet and Kawerau which indicated ‘that thermal anomalies occur almost continuously’ to the Mangakotukutuku Stream confluence with the Tarawera River.

**Kawerau/Bay of Plenty**

We have referred above to the Crown’s settlement with Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau regarding their historical Treaty claims, and the fact that we have no jurisdiction to inquire into those claims. We heard evidence, however, from Ngati Tuwharetoa Te Atua Reretahi Ngai Tamarangi in respect of their amended claim, Wai 21(a), which was specifically excluded from the settlement.

David Potter told us about the many uses that Ngati Rangitihi made of the resources from Lake Tarawera along Te Awa o Te Atua to Kawerau:

The Tarawera River was our road inland as far as Onepu Springs, which was almost the halfway point when travelling to and from our inland Pa at Lake Tarawera. It was a day’s journey to Onepu and another on to Lake Tarawera. Mostly travelling was done on foot between Matata and Onepu following a route out through Awakaponga and then along the edge of the hills (to stay clear of the swamp) to Onepu. The geothermal area at Onepu was very popular with Ngati Rangitihi because we could bath in the hot pools and cook our food in the boiling water springs. The only other area where we could bath in warm water was at the pink and white terraces at Lake Tarawera. Both these areas were used for a Tohi rite, where the newborn baby is given its first bath and named.

Dame Evelyn noted there is evidence that there was geothermal activity in 1944 along the Tarawera River for about nine kilometres in length around the Onepu Springs. She quoted the following evidence:

Several groups of springs on different fractures [fault lines] may be included in this extensive area, within which occur hot and boiling springs, mud pools and volcanoes, steaming ponds...
discharging by warm streams, sinter sheets, sulphur-bearing patches, fumaroles, collapse holes empty or filled with milky water, and other phenomena similar to those of other better-known hot springs of the Taupo-Rotorua graben. Indeed, the impression gained is that this Ruruanga-Onepu area is one of the more active of the whole region.325

We refer now to the story of Tuwharetoa. Through the evidence of Tomairangi Kiira Lance Fox we learnt how ‘Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa’, a freshwater spring, got its name. It is named after Tuwharetoa (a direct descendant of Ngatoroirangi, and from whom Ngati Tuwharetoa take their name). The young Tuwharetoa moved to the Kawerau area with his parents, soon after his birth, and the story as told to us is repeated below:

A very young Manaia [Tuwharetoa] was once left in the care of his grandparents Waitaha Ariki Kore and Hine te Ariki at Waitahanui Pa, while his parents Hahuru and Mawake Taupo were visiting relatives in the surrounding areas Putauaki, Tuhepo, Otamaraou, Omataroa. They were away for quite some time, Manaia started crying for nourishment. Hine te Ariki instructed Waitaha Ariki Kore to fetch some water from a certain area to feed the child. She had an intimate knowledge of the area that she had used as her playground.

He went in to the upper reaches of the gully, to a rocky outcrop and struck the rock with his taiaha to produce beautiful clear spring water.

He filled his calabash (hue) and took the water back to Hine te Ariki who in turn, fed it to young Manaia. The baby's crying stopped. That spring is known as ‘Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa’ – (The life giving water of Tuwharetoa) as it has the same temperature and was likened to mother's breast milk.326

The story continues to ‘Te Kete Poutama’ at Waitahanui Pa, just west of Lake Rotoitipaku:

Waitaha Ariki Kore and Hine te Ariki then moved inland to Te Rotoiti Paku and established another Pa there called Waitahanui Pa. The lake and the geothermal resources (Ngawha’s for bathing, cooking) and the abundance of kai, made this area ideal for the establishment of a principal Pa.327

Dame Evelyn notes that the famous Tuwharetoa spring was at Otakaora.328 Mereheeni Helen Fox described Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa as an ancestral spring noting that it is situated on Maori land owned by her whanau. She told us that:

Te Wai u o Tuwharetoa ancestral spring’s output or volume of water is approximately 1 million gallons per 24 hours. This water flowed into what was once a beautiful lake called Rotoitipaku, with the Okararu a big hot boiling pool. This lake together with Waitahanui Pa and the surrounding hills, a valley is full of Maori lore and traditions. About 3 to 4 chains down from the ancestral spring is where Tohia o te Rangi took on single-handed a marauding tribe from Tuhourangi, Rotoiti who had killed Te Rama Apakura of Tuwharetoa at Waikamihia at Umuhika, this side of Matata. The odds were unfortunately too great for Tohia, and he fell to the numerous taiaha. This particular spot is called Otakaora but is now submerged by the rise of water created by the blockage of its natural course to the Tarawera river by the Tasman Company.329

Lake Rotoitipaku was by all accounts a significant resource. As the lake fed by Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa, it was a wahi taonga for iwi and a significant mahinga kai and geothermal resource for those who lived close by. This general area was once home to some 300 people who lived together and enjoyed these local resources.330 Clem Park told us about Lake Rotoitipaku with its mud pools, ngawha, and terraces of silicate.

I will tell you about Rotoitipaku. Rotoitipaku was a lake of wonder. At the northern end the water was cool and clear. At the southern end of the lake, there were mud pools, ngawha and terraces of silicate surrounded by the boiling water. Into this Te Wai-u-o-Tuwharetoa flowed.331 Wayne Huia Peters remembers using Lake Rotoitipaku for food and play.332 He told us what Rotoitipaku meant to him:
Like everyone, I developed a love for the place. Not only because it provided food and it was our playground, but this lake and whenua had a wairua that I could finally understand. Our lake, our whenua, our kaitiaki, our tipuna, we were all the same – I was them, they were me.\(^{334}\)

Albert Te Rito remembered the lake as a source of eel, carp, and crayfish, and the lake and its surrounds as an area rich in food, birds, and eggs. There were hot springs for multiple uses, and warm ground used to sprout kumara for early planting.\(^{335}\)

Environment Bay of Plenty: This field is about 19 to 35 square kilometres at 500 metres depth. Natural thermal activities include hot springs, seepages, steaming ground, and hot ground. According to Environment Bay of Plenty, the heat sources of the Kawerau field are probably Putauaki (Mount Edgecumbe) and the vicinity of Mount Tarawera.\(^{336}\)

Awakeri
Mr Maxwell records that on their journey inland, the sisters Kuiwai and Haungaroa rested at places like Awakeri, also known as Puukahu.\(^{337}\) The latter means 'boil up'.\(^{338}\) Awakeri is a more modern name. The springs were captured in the 300-acre block known as Rangitaiki lot 12. Until 1935, there were kainga on the land, the people cultivated crops, and their dead were buried in caves on the block.\(^{339}\) The original pools were described as holes in the ground, fed by both the large ngawha and the cold spring. The temperature was regulated by adjusting the water from the ngawha with the water from the waipuna being fed into it.\(^{340}\)

Environment Bay of Plenty: These hot springs comprise weak mineralised bicarbonate/chloride waters.

Matata
There were hot springs at Matata which Ngati Awa, Ngati Rangititi, Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau, Ngati Makino, and Ngati Awa claim is within their sphere of influence.

**Whakaari – White Island and Moutohora (Whale Island)**
Within the Mataatua traditions, the interconnectedness of scattered occurrences of geothermal activity was well understood. The links between Ruawahia (Tarawera), Putauaki (Edgecumbe), and Whakaari (White Island), for example, were discussed in evidence before the Waitangi Tribunal hearing the Ngati Awa claims.

There is evidence from Mr Maxwell and Dame Evelyn that links Ngati Awa with the Ngatoroirangi story. First, Ngatoroirangi named Whakaari or White Island as he travelled by on his way to Moehau.\(^{341}\) Whakaari means 'that which is made visible'. It was on Whakaari that Ngatoroirangi’s sisters or taniwha stopped to rest before continuing on to Tongariro. Secondly, Ngatoroirangi is the name of the one of the mountains on the north-west of the island.\(^{342}\) Finally, Mr Maxwell refers to waiata sung by Ngati Awa recalling the Ngatoroirangi tradition.\(^{343}\) The Ngati Awa Tribunal noted there is evidence that Whakaari was used by Ngati Awa into the twentieth century along with Te Whanau a Te Ehutu from Te Kaha.\(^{344}\)

Mr Maxwell discusses the Ngati Awa use of Moutohora (Whale Island). This island was a permanent settlement and was valued for a number of its natural resources,
including the ngawha at Waiariki (Sulphur Bay). The ngawha were used as a heat, energy, and water resource.

In the Ngati Awa Raupatu Report, that Tribunal referred to Nga Moutere o Rurima which consisted of four outcrops 19 kilometres off Whakatane Harbour that were owned by Maori landowners. Mr Potter also described the geothermal resources on the Rurima Islands administered by Ngati Awa with the Department of Conservation. Mr Potter claimed that Ngati Rangitihi transported products from the geothermal resources on these islands to Matata:

The Rurima Islands have a geothermal area that has become less and less active since 1963. It was a source of sulphur which Ngati Rangitihi used for medicine. The sulphur was powdered and mixed with shark oil and honey. The mixture was then either eaten as a medicine or applied as an ointment to sores. This was a standard remedy for other skin problems as well as a cure, the use of which dated back many hundreds of years. It was still used as a remedy by the old people in Matata up till the 1950s.

Environment Bay of Plenty: On Whakaari, the field is marked by hydrothermally altered ground, high temperature, fumaroles, solfatara, sulphur and silica residue deposits, acidic hot-water flows, and hot ground. On Moutohora, there is also hydrothermally altered ground, fumaroles, sulphur deposits, silica residues, solfatara, acid hot-water seeps, and steaming ground.

Horohoro
The Horohoro geothermal field is located about 15 kilometres south-west of Rotorua City. This field is within the area claimed by Ngati Whakaue and Ngati Raukawa. As we have seen in chapter 2, both iwi have close kinship connections with Ngati Kea and Ngati Tuara. The Kawharu team notes that these hapu claimed on the basis of ancestry, occupation, and their dead buried on the land. Witnesses stressed that their main basis for claiming in terms of ancestry was the whakapapa connections they had to Kearoa, the wife of Ngatoroirangi.

Environment Waikato: The Horohoro geothermal system has extensive old sinters and many hydrothermal eruption craters, but currently there are only two hot springs depositing small sinters in this field. No boiling springs or geysers have been known at the site. Horohoro is a naturally waning geothermal system with very extensive old sinters, dried-up spring basins, and big explosion craters.

Rotorua geothermal field
The Tribunal has been provided with an abundance of material relating to the customary uses of the geothermal resources at Rotorua. In this portion of the report, we will focus on Ohinemutu and Whakarewarewa, the two villages closest to present-day Rotorua, which are now deeply involved in tourist activity. Professor Boast and Dame Evelyn have each carried out extensive research into the writings of early European visitors and have reported in detail. Mr Maxwell, of Ngati Rangiwehi, provides complementary material based on oral evidence collected from kaumatua in 1991. He combines academic skills with traditional knowledge and networks and responded with relish to the challenge of ‘going from one hot pool to the next, talking to people’.
Jonathan Mane-Wheoki, a Nga Puhi academic and art historian with close links to the Maori arts and crafts community, including the weavers and carvers at Rotorua, has provided a detailed report which is specific to Ngati Wahiao and Whakarewarewa.\textsuperscript{353} Mr Mane-Wheoki worked closely with Ngati Wahiao kaumatua, examined the records of the Rotorua hearings of the Native Land Court, and acknowledges the work done by Peter Waaka in a 1982 thesis and Professor Boast in a 1992 report to Te Puni Kokiri.\textsuperscript{354}

One publication, written by Makereti Papakura who was born in Whakarewarewa in 1872, occupies a special niche in New Zealand scholarship. Makereti grew up to become Guide Maggie Papakura, married an English visitor, and went to live in a country home near Oxford where she enrolled at Oxford University to study for a degree in anthropology.\textsuperscript{355} She returned to Whakarewarewa in 1926 to seek the approval of her kuia and koroua to present a thesis on Maori customary knowledge, and to carry out the interviews and the fieldwork needed for the task. Her work was completed and awaiting examination when she died suddenly in April 1930. Her supervisor and mentor, T K Penniman, and her kaumatua joined forces to prepare the thesis for publication in London in 1938 with the title \textit{The Old-Time Maori}.\textsuperscript{356} Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, who wrote the introduction which sets the scene for a 1986 edition, reflects:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The Old-Time Maori} emerged not from the erudite ponderings of an amateur historian writing within the kauri walls of his villa on raupatu land; rather, this work came, quizzically, from the faraway cloisters of prestigious Oxford – and the pen of a Maori woman who ‘should have known her place’ . . . Makereti’s ethnography offers a rare vision of community and culture – unprecedented, and unmatched, even to this very day.\textsuperscript{357}
\end{quote}

These resources, some specific to Ohinemutu or Whakarewarewa, and some reporting on a wider spectrum of geothermal areas, were expanded and made complete for the purposes of the Tribunal by the oral and written evidence presented by kaumatua. In the paragraphs which follow we concentrate, first, on Whakarewarewa, in the valley some four to five kilometres inland from Rotorua, and, secondly, on the evidence relating to Ohinemutu and Tawera, on the shores of Lake Rotorua adjacent to what is now the downtown area of Rotorua city.

We note that, in evidence given to the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Claims Tribunal, the
Whakarewarewa claimants stated that they well understood the Rotorua geothermal field. They claimed that allocation of iwi, hapu, and whanau rights in geothermal resources [and the geothermal field] at Rotorua had long been successfully managed according to the rules of Maori customary law. The Tribunal found that:

Ngati Wahiao and their close relations Tuhourangi between them have rangatiratanga over the land occupied by them at Whakarewarewa and over their highly valued taonga, of which they are, and have been for more than a century, the kaitiaki.

The Tribunal also noted the interests of Ngati Whakaue in the geothermal resources at Ohinemutu were acknowledged by other claimants, but the extent of the Ngati Whakaue claims in the geothermal resources of Whakarewarewa now in Crown control was a matter that was still to be heard and, therefore, it offered no comments on Ngati Whakaue ownership or exercise of their mana.

We considered this issue in part III of our report.

Whakarewarewa
The thermal valley at Whakarewarewa, inland from Ohinemutu and what is now the Rotorua city centre, has long been a significant thermal resource. Mita Taupopoki, in his evidence to the Native Land Court in the 1880s, described the importance of the area for resources such as tawa berries, raupo, and kokowai. Mr Mane-Wheoki summarises the evidence of continued customary use of the Whakarewarewa geothermal amenities, ‘the ngawha for bathing, healing and cooking – and the resources – raupo, flax, pigments and mud’, from the period of early settlement onwards. He adds that foodstuffs gathered elsewhere in the rohe of Ngati Wahiao were brought to Whakarewarewa for baking and processing. It is clear from this combined evidence that the area was regularly visited for bathing, food preparation, and resource extraction. There were also special pools where the dead were prepared for burial, and there were burial places in caves in the valley.

Peter Waaka’s research carried out in the 1980s suggests that permanent settled occupation by Ngati Wahiao took place in the 1860s and 1870s and was subsequently boosted when Tuhourangi relatives, displaced by the Tarawera eruption in 1886, were invited to move there. Regular seasonal visits and resource use thus gave way to permanent settlement and sophisticated development of the waiariki for heating, cooking, and healing purposes. Mita Taupopoki described to the Native Land Court the ways in which the waiariki waiora, the healing waters, became popular for invalids and tourists from the 1870s onwards.

Makereti Papakura, writing in Oxford in the 1920s, drew on her memories of growing up in Whakarewarewa in the 1870s and 1880s. Whakarewarewa village was her family’s primary home but they still returned to their former home at Parekarangi during the seasons for planting and harvesting potatoes and other foods which could not be grown in the geothermal area. Makereti described methods of cooking in these words:

In parts of the geothermal district, food was cooked in the boiling or steam holes. At Whakarewarewa where I lived with my koroua Maihi te Kakauparaoa and his sister Marara who brought me up, we never had any fires at all. All the food was either boiled or steamed. Kumara, potatoes, or taro would be placed in a tukohu, a basket made for this purpose from the leaves of the toetoe (pampas grass), and the plaited string at the top would be pulled, so closing its mouth. This would then be placed in the parekohuru (boiling spring), and the end of the string would be tied to a peg in the ground near the edge of the hole. After a quarter of an hour or so the tukohu would be lifted out and placed in a hangi, or natural steam oven dug and prepared in the ground, and left for about ten minutes to steam. The basket of kumara or potatoes could also be rinsed through the boiling hole and put into the steam hole straight away without boiling. Food cooked in these hot springs was very nice to taste. Meat, birds, or fish were generally steamed and tasted good.
Our ancestral meetinghouse, Wahiao remains the principal gathering place, in the heart of the village. It is central to our identity. It is surrounded by smaller whare (Little Wahiao) and some modern homes, shops and the Catholic and Anglican Church houses.\(^{368}\)

She described the dynamic which is familiar to those who come from many parts of the world to visit as tourists:

The real life in the pa occurs in the Rahui. The Rahui is a specially designated area of the village that consists of approximately 2.3 acres of volcanic reserve where the thermal resource provides for the hapu’s daily needs – steam and boiling hot water for cooking and a copious flow of crystal clear mineral from the main reservoir Parekohuru for bathing in and also for laundering. Traditional bathing and cooking practices are the daily norm at Whakarewarewa. A wholly interactive experience that keeps people connected to each other and to their natural world even though most homes are fitted out with state-of-the-art cooking, washing and cleaning appliances.\(^{369}\)

This is the economic base, what Huia Te Hau called the tourist product. But there is another contemporary and ongoing dynamic, hidden from the tourist gaze. Again, Huia Te Hau elaborated:

The thermal waters of the region are regarded as nga waia-riki – the waters of the gods. Each day the numbers in the village swell at bathing time in the morning and in the evening as tribal members return briefly to bathe. The bathing ritual is unique to the Iwi of the volcanic plateau, but none more regular and socially interactive than the baths at Whakarewarewa. Bathing protocol is strictly adhered to, ensuring respect, modesty and personal safety. We all bathe together. The bathing temperatures are regulated by the wind and the availability of the copious streams of hot water, to people’s liking. We only use what runs over the surface of the ground. There are no thermal bores anywhere in the pa, never have been. Bathing in the Rahui does not take place usually during the day, as this is the time for when the tourists come to visit.\(^{370}\)

Huia Te Hau, in evidence to the Tribunal given in 2005, underscored the sustained relationship between Ngati Wahiao and the geothermal resources at Whakarewarewa:

Our mythology and legends are rich with examples of humans, gods and the thermal elements – the pursuit of Hatu Patu by the bird woman Kurungaituku who met her fate in a boiling pool in Whakarewarewa is a particular favourite. The names of every hot pool, mud pool, geyser, fissure, stream and in the thermal valley, how they are connected to each other and their respective function, the daily physical associations – all of these things provide a rich tapestry of knowledge, understanding and commitment, which for our people over time strengthens our identity – who we are, where we are and why. Naturally in our time, all of this comes with inherent responsibilities to care for what we have and ensure its sustainability for the future generations to value and enjoy.\(^{367}\)

Huia Te Hau told the Tribunal that the resources at Whakarewarewa had long provided the peoples with ‘life’s basic needs, warmth and comfort and an economic base’. Life has changed in recent times, improvements have been made, but many traditional features of daily life continue. Huia Te Hau elaborated on the continuities of customary use in the contemporary world:
Cooking and other customary uses continue on a communal basis:

In separate areas in the Rahui, the cooking is done in steam hangi pits or in the boiling pools set-aside for this purpose. These communal kitchen facilities are used everyday. Food cooked in this manner is convenient, cost effective and never fails. Steamed puddings, casseroles, meats and vegetables, seafood. Absolutely delicious. There are separate hot pools for preparing food (especially wild game, pigs, poultry). There are times during the day when the main pool Parekohuru is used for the preparation of weaving materials – harakeke, kiekie.

**Ohinemutu**

The Reverend W R Wade, a superintendent of the Church Missionary Society press, visited Rotorua in 1838. He describes Ohinemutu as a place where hot springs were used for cooking and bathing and where the warmth of the ground was used to assist the propagation of kumara:

[Ohinemutu], the largest of the Rotorua pas, is situated on a peninsular projection, which may be said to be the very seat of the principal boiling springs. The houses of the natives stand on ground which is almost everywhere warm, and in some places hot: and the springs at their doors, or just at hand, serve as ever boiling pots, in which they easily cook their food. Indian corn has been seen, placed with care in a calabash, quietly stewing in a still corner: and potatoes or kumara are readily let into or drawn out of the boiling water by means of baskets constructed for that purpose.

Wade goes on to describe the manner in which geothermal heat is used to counter the cold winters and assist the cultivation of kumara in a structure equivalent to a greenhouse:

If you go into the houses erected on warm spots, after the doors or windows, or apertures so-called, have been shut, you are instantly reminded of the highest temperatures of English hot-houses. This warmth is both grateful and useful to the natives, particularly in the winter season. Early in the spring, they place their kumaras in baskets, in these natural hot-houses, leaving them for a month or six weeks to grow out. The weather by that time being sufficiently warm to allow of their being planted out in prepared beds, the plants are then put into the ground in rows, and sheltered from the winds and morning frosts, by broom twigs, about three feet long, placed upright, so as to form a screen along the rows.

Dr Johnson, wrote a series of articles in *The New Zealander*. Dr Johnson was especially interested in the medicinal uses of the hot pools:

There is no doubt however, but they possess valuable medicinal qualities both for internal use, and external application, as the Natives cure many diseases by simple immersion in them, but I should imagine that their uniform heat is the most active agent in the cure. However, an accurate analysis . . . would throw light on their use in specific diseases, and it would be desirable that such should be made under the auspices of Government.
Hochstetter was in Rotorua in April 1857. A keen observer of earth processes, he was most impressed by the dynamics of the ‘hundreds of vents of multiple form and shape’ which ‘bubble, gush and steam’. He went on to describe the customary uses associated with these features:

The natives have separate bathing springs, separate cooking springs, and others in which they do their washing. In places, where merely hot steam emerges from the ground they have erected vapour baths (Turkish baths), built huts for the winter on the warm sinter flats of the spring deposit . . . The whole atmosphere in and around Ohinemutu is always full of steam and sulphurous gases.375

These historical accounts are complemented by the memories of the Ngati Whakaue kaumatua and rangatahi who gave evidence to the Tribunal in 2005. Grace Ransfield, Joseph Donovan, Tuhipo Kereopa, Miki Raana, Lori Paul, Miriama Douglas, Alfie McRae, and Brett Bonnington shared their stories of growing up in the geothermal world which was Ohinemutu.376 Grace Ransfield reminded the Tribunal of the hazards of living with ngawha and the need for children to learn at an early age about walking through the ngawha areas of the village.377

Collectively, these speakers made it very clear that customary uses continued on into the contemporary world. Miki Raana, for example, described the customary uses for pools and springs:

These were used in traditional times for the easing of pain, cooking, heating, washing, bathing, and plant preparation. Ngati Whakaue used traditional management methods to regulate the use and utilisation of these springs and pools.378

He added that the geothermal source provided heating as well as steam cooking facilities for homes and for local marae as well as bathing facilities. He himself is one of the guardians/caretakers of a family bath known as the ‘Rangihauapapa’.379 Miriama Douglas gave similar evidence:

I can remember as a child in Ohinemutu that we constantly used the geothermal resource for cooking, bathing and cleaning and on various occasions for kumara preparation, heating and medicinal purposes.380

Alongside these practical roles, the geothermal features provided a strong social role. Tuhipo Kereopa remembers vividly:

There used to be an open-air bath opposite Constance Te Kiri’s in Ohinemutu. I enjoyed bath time as a child as it was a great social time. It was a chance to find out from extended whanau what was going on. Our family couldn’t afford to go [to] the movies, but our cousins could. We used to get a scene-by-scene account of the movie showing at the local cinema.381

Joseph Donovan identified three strands to the ongoing social dynamic between people and geothermal source. These are his words:

- Geothermal life is part of belonging to Ohinemutu Village. It forms part of the daily life of the residents.
- The resource is more than just water for bathing. It is essential to the health and well being of the villagers, especially the kaumatua. The ability to soak and relax in the waters is part of their health lifestyle.
- There is a culture and way of doing things, which is based around the waters. It involves a communal and shared lifestyle. You have to share and that dictates the protocols for use. As a member of the village community, I have come to understand what the rules are. Leave things as you find them; do not be wasteful and think about your neighbours needs.382

The development of tourism since the 1880s, and the growth of Rotorua city since the Second World War, may have impacted on communal bathing on a larger scale, but customary uses continue at the hapu and whanau level. Lori Paul told the Tribunal:

Our whanau own the ngawha on our property. It is communally owned by all of us. It is not owned by the public of Rotorua. We have fully used the ngawha across many
generations. In my lifetime – at least 4 generations. Our use of the ngawha is customary and current. I wish to keep this aspect of my whanau’s lifestyle alive for my grandchildren.\textsuperscript{383}

The kaitiaki roles of the customary managers are clearly evident. Brett Bonnington spelt out the ways in which the geothermal resources, and the geothermal field, are harnessed and coordinated in the contemporary world:

The big ngawha, which is full of boiling water, is used for cooking koura, crayfish and scalding wild pigs and game stock. The smaller ngawha is used for boil-ups, steam pudding, brawn (pig’s head). We cook in big pots, it usually takes 3–4 hours depending on what’s being steamed.\textsuperscript{384}

Mr Bonnington adds that 90 per cent of the cooking in winter is done through the ngawha, and he goes on to describe the dynamic of the larger link-ups:

This is the cooking system we use when we are catering for marae or village functions. Once a week (Wednesday) we will have an Ohinemutu get-together where the village residents will donate food, which will be cooked in the ngawha and lifted at about 6.30pm. The village is all able to attend and discuss the week’s events. The menu will depend on what is being donated – from wild pork to oysters.\textsuperscript{385}

These ngawha are a backup to the 3 marae situated in the village and we will often help each other to cater for outside hosted functions . . . \textsuperscript{386}

Moving round the lake towards Kuirau, Grace Ransfield talked about cooking koura in the hot water running from the ngawha on the Arataua at the mouth of the Utuhina Stream and on the shores of Lake Rotorua.\textsuperscript{387}

**Kuirau–Tarewa Pounamu**

Professor Boast notes that Wade in 1838 went from Ohinemutu to visit ‘a valley of hot springs at no great distance’. Professor Boast is of the view that this was Kuirau or Kuiarau where there is a boiling lake.\textsuperscript{388} This land is situated within the junction of Ranolf Street and Lake Road. Here, Wade noted that:

In some places there were holes, from which steam constantly issued; and though nothing but steam was to be seen, you might hear the water boiling and bubbling at a furious rate beneath. These holes are a singular convenience to the natives, who lay fern top or other litter over them so as to condense the steam, and then place their garments at the top to get rid, by an easy process, of all vermin; as animal life is speedily destroyed by the sulphurous vapour.\textsuperscript{389}

At the Kuirau Park, and after a long period of dormancy from 1989 to 2001, geothermal activity has increased with hot and boiling outflows revitalising cooler and non-flowing springs.\textsuperscript{390} It was claimed before us that in modern times there was a large waiariki called Papatangi, lying in Kuirau Park and a ngawha on the side of the road popular with children. These, it was stated, were popular bathing pools.\textsuperscript{391}

Ngatarewa Pounamu or Tarewa involves land bordering both sides of the present Tarewa Road, following the course to the Utuhina River between Lake Road and Old Taupo Road.\textsuperscript{392} We know there was a settlement at Tarewa during early colonial times because, in 1859, Hochstetter described it and the many hot springs he found there.\textsuperscript{393}

There are naturally surfacing ngawha throughout the vicinity, and we heard evidence of how they are cared for by different whanau as their personal taonga. The ngawha around the marae were and are used for cooking and bathing. Grace Ransfield spoke about baths that adjoin the Tarewa Pounamu Marae and another at the Raharuhi homestead.\textsuperscript{394} “The bathing facilities at Tarewa Pounamu Pa would be used by tourists with Contiki Tours. The money gathered would go towards bath maintenance as distinct from marae maintenance.”\textsuperscript{395} Ngawha were also used to heat the marae.\textsuperscript{396}

To sum up this area of Ohinemutu, Kuirau, and Tarewa, we refer to the translated words of the late Hamuera Mitchell (senior) and his evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal in February 1993:
Ko Hamuera Taiporutu Mitere ahu!

... I am the kaumatua of these Ngati Whakaue's and we adhere to these principles. I wish to say that my vision is failing, and my hearing is likewise failing, please bear with me in any omissions because of my failing faculties ... otherwise my name Sir is Hamuera Taiporutu Mitchell. ... [track 2] I live here sir, this is my home, this is my marae out here in Te Papaiouru, I was born here and I grew up here, my wife is from Ngati Whatua. I am one of those few people, privileged to have seen and lived with the elders the koeke, the people who had all the knowledge and information and I am their descendant. ... [track 3] This house Sir is our Whare Tapere, where we come to entertain ourselves, our whare runanga where we have conferences, our whare puni where we sleep from time to time, and our whare wananga where we hold our historical deliberations. ... This Sir, is the fourth building named after Tamatekapua, the first building was built on Mokoia. ... that was about 1872 when the first building was built. In 1894 a second one was built, I don't know the time of the third, and now we are in the fourth building here. All the effigies around the walls Sir are of our ancestors, some of them were carved with modern steel chisels and others with stone chisels. The stone chiselled carvings were brought over from Mokoia. The original floor of this house was mother earth. It was not till later that we were blessed with timber to put down a timber flooring. Otherwise whilst it was only the earth we laid fern down and slept on that and the place was quite warm. ... [track 6] ... That whole lake is how we get the name Te Ure o Uenukukopako. Pull all the subtribes of that lake together, we call them Te Ure o Uenukukopako. I'm talking about the Ngati Whakaue here, it's safe to say that almost 90% of that is thermal. In the winter, you could see the steam rising along the lakeshore, and people used to come along the lakeshore, and if they want a bath, just dig a hole in the sand. I myself used to do that (as a child). That's why I say the majority is all thermal. [track 7] From Wharenui there we get on to the block. You hit the Puarenga Stream. That is the stream coming through the Whakarewarewa region. From the Puarenga to the Utuhina Stream on the western side of Rotorua. The landing between those two streams is what they call the Pukeroa Oruawhata block is almost 100% thermal, us here in Ohinemutu. It is an area comprising 4000 acres, of which 3000 acres have been disposed of which leaves a balance of 1000 acres, which Ngati Whakaue donated for the benefit of the town. And that is where I think you have heard we have minor controversies with the government and their handling of our reserves, haven't been quite satisfactory. Now I'll pass on to the Ohinemutu block ... We're at Ohinemutu now, this comes from Ihenga who lost his daughter here, she was only a child, she came out the back here and told her father she was going to see her relations in Ngongotaha, but did not return. Ihenga sent his people out half east and half west. The group that went west, found her body just past Ngongotaha they found her entrails on a stump at Hakaikuku. When they examined the human entrails they decided it was hers. The people came back to their chief and he just broke down and sobbed for his daughter then he exclaimed (I may not be quite right but it will be close enough), o e hine mutu kau ta tawa noho tae. That's how you get that name Ohinemutu. Well we are the descendants of course. Now I'll come back to Ohinemutu proper. The area of Ohinemutu extends from the catholic church to the Utuhina bridge. That is Ohinemutu. It was a very virile and still very virile today. And in those days there were no roads, just ordinary footpaths. The homes were back to back, I would say the population then was around 800, that's how close it was. We are the descendants today, and you won't see so many in Ohinemutu for the simple reason we had to comply with firstly the Borough and then City Council. [track 8] ... I'll get down to the ngawhas here, we lived here. We just lived ... I would say it was one of the most populated Maori quarters in NZ, because we were only separated by wire fences, and some times no fence at all it was like a boarding house. And that's how ... I remember some of those places back then, I remember my home over here had three houses on it. My home over here had two houses on it. That's how they were back to back, you could hear them chatting in the morning like cockatiels. That's how Ngati Whakaue was in those days, and this place is 100% geothermal. All along the lakeshore was geothermal ... we would go fishing for morihana ah kanga [sic], we had no clothes, (no
pakehas around in those days aye), and we would catch a few and tie them on a string, we would be shivering then we would dig a hole in the mea by the lake and the water would come up and we'd be warm. If we wanted to cook our fish straight away, we’d dig another hole, and cook our breakfast. [track 9] That’s how we were in the old days, we lived it we spoke it we sang it and we slept in it. Right over here, that’s why it’s called Te Papaiouru, a Papa is a slab of stone. Ouru is a ngawha that’s one boiling over there. That’s why they call it Te Papaiouru. We used to sleep right in front here where it was warm, we would put our mattress there in those days, it was warm, the whole place was warm. I’ll take you around quickly after we finished here, you’ll have to leave your shoes on, otherwise you’ll scald your feet. Now, we regarded Ohinemutu specially, with great faith and sincerity that we treated our pieces of land and our of course ngawhas with decoration . . . , we even treated them like persons at times. We would speak to them, quite often the ngawha would change in the degree of heat, it would be quite cold, so we speak to them, and say ‘ata e koro, hei tamata koe i tenei ata’ and it would come back and say ‘hei ano apopo koe ka hoki’. I can hear Bishop Kingi, he’s always talking to them every morning . . . But we’ve got hot pools all over the place in Ohinemutu. That’s how we feel about them, that’s how we feel about them today. Very rarely, do we dispose of any of our lands here. Very very rarely. There may only be about two or three sections that have gone. We try to retain them. Sometimes the elders are from Ngapuhi, we never see them and then we hear that they have disposed of it. So we buy them back. That’s how we are. We are very very close in that respect. Ngati Pikiao has their own . . . The next closest would be the Whaka people. They’re in the same position. But we often cooked in ours, we used our hotpools for medicine I myself, I was standing naked, when I was born my gran used to take me down to the hot pool, and she would scrape my feet and they would be straightened by these . . . that’s how I got the hundred yards at the high school. That’s how we were and that’s how we are now. And we always used our ngawhas for cooking and we always had rows (arguments) over our ngawhas. Its just the way we felt, we respected our ngawhas very very much. Even now, trying to keep people away from here, they come down right in front of Mr Bishop Kingi’s place. I don’t know where they’re from Ngapuhi or Ngati Whatua, but they’re strangers to me. That’s the way it is happening everyday. That’s the way Ngati Whakae was brought up, and still is today. [track 10] We leave Ohinemutu, over the river a place called Koutu. About 200 acres. Same thing applies there, but the strength of hotpools there would be 40 to 50%. Another piece of land over there called Haumaipihi owned by Mr Kingi. A very venerated place in that, our guardian Whakae, that’s where he always rested [at the hospital] when he would fly around Rotorua, he was what they call an ‘atua’ and the people feared him and still respected him, because he was to save my people at certain types of tribal wars. I don’t know whether you seen at the hospital the frame there all in concrete. So Bishop Kingi is a descendant of that man. From there to Koutu and from Koutu to Kaora?? [inaudible]. That’s where the geothermal finished. The ngawhas come and they go. They’re very temperamental. We look after them, we would be worried if they didn’t come back. We used them when I was a child, for health purposes, cleansing, cooking. We use them today, every day. We have songs, waiatas for our ngawhas here. [Elders singing waiata.] Mr Mitchell continues . . . Ko kohue ki te Ruapeka, Te Ruapeka is shown here, that is a thermal pool, we all bathed there in those days hence this song was created for that particular place. Now we’ll sing another one’. [Elders singing waiata.] Mr Mitchell continues . . . Now Muruika, that’s where the church is, that’s sacred ground there. From there right to the point, that’s Muruika. Its 100% thermal, it’s a place where chiefs have been buried, its unique, we have a chief buried there at the moment. Some relation of Mr Kingi. Ihaia Pipi is buried there, right on a hot spring called Te Rina. They have names, all the pieces here in Ohinemutu. The other one is over here Te [inaudible] o te Matua, that’s him with the Angel. [Elders singing waiata.] Mr Mitchell continues . . . Just to show you just how much we regard our springs, that we even composed songs for them. These are the songs . . . That’s our chief there with the angel there. When we go around, I’ll show you all these spots. [track 11] If you want me to go through the different pieces of ground here in Ohinemutu, I know them all, I know
their ancestral names, would that be of use to you people? I think we'll leave them till we go around. Ko pirangi au ki te whakatai, mea, Kua pou taku hou. Ka pu te ruha, kua pou taku hou. (J Malcolm). Mr Chairman, The speaker suggests we take time out to look at these sites. It would give him a rest.397

Environment Bay of Plenty: Environment Bay of Plenty describes the Rotorua area’s natural features as numerous hot and boiling springs, geysers, bubbling mud pools, fumaroles, and steaming ground, sinter deposits, solfatara, and geothermal vegetation.398

The council notes that the Tarewa group of springs ceased activity by November 1981. But the springs have now refilled and resumed boiling and overflowing. During the many years of dry and cold inactivity these vents became filled in with soil and debris, which progressively camouflaged the true nature of these holes. Because these holes were dormant, and had been so since the 1940s to the 1960s, building development was allowed to proceed. As a result of these springs resuming, boiling overflows have affected houses at Tarewa.399

East Rotorua geothermal field – Mokoia–Karamuramu and Rotokawa

We turn now to that part of the Rotorua geothermal field known as East Lake Rotorua. This field is thought to include the springs on Mokoia Island and the Rotorua Lake Rotokawa (as opposed to Rotokawa in the Taupo district) and the Rotokawa Baths.400 ‘Te Arawa own most of the land over this field, including the bed of Lake Rotorua.

Mokoia

Te Motutapu a Tinirau, or Mokoia Island, has been a place rich in history for the iwi and hapu of the area, and in particular Ngati Uenukukopako, Ngati Rangiwhewehi, Ngati Whakaue, and Ngati Rangiteaorere. This history is captured by Dr Kawharu’s team who concluded that “[i]n sum, following Uenukukopako’s conquest, his mana was established and maintained through his sons at Mokoia and on the mainland around Lake Rotorua between Kawaha and Weriweri.401 We refer to this evidence merely to establish the long Maori presence on the island without adopting a view about whether this analysis is correct in mana whenua terms.

Along with the traditional history, which includes battles fought with Nga Puhi when they raided the district before 1840, Professor Boast has provided accounts of early Europeans travelling through the Rotorua district and commenting on Mokoia.402 Wade, for example, noting the Maori use of the hot spring on Mokoia, wrote:

The natives had ingeniously divided the pool of water into two compartments, connected with each other by a narrow channel, and each having an outlet to the lake. It was so contrived that they could always keep the larger compartment as a constant warm bath, regulating its temperature by letting in hot or cold water, as required. I only saw one old woman comfortably sitting in it; but Mr Chapman informed me that he had seen it crammed full, with about fifty naked natives, men, women, and children, thus keeping up their . . . warmth on a cold evening.403

He must be referring here to Tutanekai and Hinemoa’s Pool, Waikimihia. Mokoia is a Maori reservation administered under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 and is held by trustees for the common use and benefit of Ngati Whakaue, Ngati Uenukukopako, Ngati Rangiwhewehi, and Ngati Rangiteaorere. The reservation trustees administer the surface pools and springs on Mokoia.404

Rotokawa (Rotorua)

According to Mr Maxwell, Rotokawa baths or Waikawa lying next to Lake Rotokawa was the ‘hub of Ngati Uenukukopako life.405 People have always lived around the baths that are found here, and at Karamuramu there are a series of baths and ngawha on the lake shore.

Hiko Hohepa remembered the waiariki at Rotokawa as gathering places where the old people talked about everything from community politics, the traditions of the people, naming of the stars and everyday life events.406 Rotokawa was considered particularly good for arthritis,
whewhe (boils), skin diseases, and aiding the healing of broken bones.407

The Rotokawa baths are part of the former Whakapoungakau–Puukepoto block awarded to Ngati Uenukukopako and Ngati Rangiteaorere in 1882.408 The southern portion was subdivided into nine allotments. Rotokawa baths lie in Whakapoungakau 15 or Kakahoroa. The Rotokawa baths are still in Maori ownership as a Maori reservation administered under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 for the benefit of Ngati Uenukukopako, Ngati Rangiteaorere, and te roro o te rangi.409 But the lake was lost to the Crown to address survey costs.410

*Environment Bay of Plenty:* There are hot springs along the east coast of Mokoia Island, with minor silica sinters. There are also warm seeps along the eastern shore of Lake Rotorua.411

**Tikitere**

As noted above, Tikitere (called Hell’s Gate in 1885 by George Sala, the famous reporter) is a large field of geothermal activity lying on the Rotorua–Whakatane highway, about three miles east of the Te Ngae junction.412 Tikitere is the name for the entire geothermal valley. The people of the valley say that since the time of Tanewhakaraka (the younger brother of Ngatoroirangi), Tikitere has been occupied by his descendants and those who intermarried with Ngati Rangiteaorere.413 It has been, they say, a place of permanent settlement, and the waters were used for bathing, cooking, and medicinal purposes.414

We had evidence of European encounters with the people of this settlement and the geothermal resources of this field around 1840.415 Governor Grey, for example, was moved to propose a hospital at Tikitere during his visit in 1846. This was because of the vast numbers of natives who visited the area for the benefit of the warm sulphur baths for the cure of scrofula and other cutaneous diseases.416 In 1848 Thomas Henry Smith, the resident magistrate, watched Maori make a ‘bath by digging a hole between two streams, one being hot, the other being cold, and diverting the water to the hole to regulate the temperature.’417

Here, there were waterfall baths such as Te Mimi o te Kakahi or Kakahi Falls, ngawha (such as Te Hinu) of oily consistency, Te Korokoro springs (the throat with gurgling sounds like a death rattle), and the hot lakes Waikare (rippling waters), reputed to be the biggest single area of hot water in any geothermal area in the district.418 There are also cold-water springs and streams in this area, many of them named.

Mr Whata-Wickliffe described the Whakapoungakau Springs (Hell’s Gate). He claimed they were used by Te Takinga and Rangiteaorere. The claimant would bathe there as a child. They also used the springs for cooking.419 Horace Barney Wiringi Meroiti for Ngati Tuteniu also expressed their interests in the Tikitere thermal area.420

Ngati Rangiteaorere used these resources for economic benefit by guiding visitors or providing them with the opportunity to access the resources. As owners, they have maintained this practice until the present, although for a 20-year period during the twentieth century the land was leased to outsiders.421 They have also mined the sulphur in the past.422

*Environment Bay of Plenty:* Here, there are hot boiling springs (both acid sulphate and chloride bicarbonate), gas discharges, fumaroles, steaming ground, solfatara, and sulphur deposits. It is noted that hydrothermal explosion craters exist here.

**Rotoiti–Rotoma–Rotoehu**

During the Preliminary Te Arawa Geothermal Inquiry, the surface manifestations of geothermal activity within the rohe of the hapu of Ngati Pikiao were presented as part of the Ngatoroirangi story. These manifestations were to be found on Rotoiti 15, Rotoma Inc, Matawhaura, Waitangi 3, Waitangi 2, and Rotoiti Central Basin, including the bed of Lake Rotoiti, Taheke, Paehinahina Mourea, Manupirua baths, Taheke 8C, Ruahine–Kuharua, and Puaretu reservation.423 We also heard from Ngati Te Takinga and Ngati Rangiteaorere. From the evidence we did receive within this broad area, the prominent geothermal features for the claimants are discussed below.
Rotoiti–Mourea–Taheke

Hochstetter in 1859 recorded geothermal features at Tikitere, Karapo, Te Korokoro, Te Waikari, Te Tarata, Harakeke, Ngunguru, Tihipapa, Papakiore, and Ruahine. At Ruahine, he noted Maori using the hot steam vents for cooking and described the area thus:

Ruahine has the appearance of an active crater. Its crater-like basin lies on a hillside sloping towards Rotoiti; on its floor boils black mud, which is spattered several feet high in the air by the rising and bursting steam bubbles. The column of steam rising here is designated by the natives Te Whata kai a Punikirangi, i.e. as the place where food is hung up for Punikirangi. Yellow masses of flowers of sulphur adhere to the variegated beds of clay. Black muddy water flows out of the mud pool. The valley in front of the basin, however, is covered with sulphur and sinter incrustations, from which steam rises from more than a hundred small vents. Here, too, the greatest caution is needed not to break through into boiling mud. The natives use the vents emitting pure steam for cooking.424

At the south-western end of Lake Rotoiti, is Mourea–Paehinahina, once an amalgamation of the Mourea, Paehinahina, and Whakapoungakau 3 blocks. The land has been known by several different titles – Taheke Papakainga, Mourea Papakainga, Tikitere development block, and Paehinahina – and is now known as Paehinahina–Mourea. We were told that this broad area includes a geothermal field capable of generating enough power to source the whole of Rotorua.425 It has many ngawha, waiariki, and puia, including the Manupirua Springs, on the southern shores of Lake Rotoiti, within the original Paehinahina–Mourea block.

The Manupirua Springs are considered to be waiariki that Kuwai and Haungaroa left in their path on the way to save their brother Ngatoroirangi. After reviewing the evidence before the Native Land Court, Mr Maxwell notes there were several pa in the immediate vicinity of Manupirua, the main two being Paehinahina and at Puketeo Pa.426 There ‘were large plantations of kumara at and around Manupirua in pre-European times.427 It was highly regarded for its curative properties.428 Gilbert Mair came to live at Manupirua, and eventually the baths became a popular tourist attraction.429 Access is only possible by boat or waka.430

We were also told about the Papakiore Springs, used by many hapu from the 1800s.431 Papakiore was used as a bathing place, cooking ngawha, and healing pool.432 It was popular for its medicinal properties and for healing injuries. The waters and muds were famous for healing skin ailments. In the vicinity is Tihipapa, a valuable cooking area. Both these cooking areas were used by the people of Rakeiao Marae.433

The Ruahine Springs are located east of Papakiore.434 The puia or geyser here is called Ruahine’s cauldron.435 The mud was used for aches and medicinal purposes.436 Other geothermal areas were used for bathing (Paramena); as a footbath (Manuaute); as a bathing pool on the water’s edge of Lake Rotoiti (Te Rei, Parengarenga); and there were two ngawha, Otutarata, and Waihunuhunu.437 The Waihunuhunu and the Terei baths, just west of the Manupirua Springs, were known for their curative properties. They too can only be accessed by waka or boat.438

Mr Whata-Wickliffe spoke of the Tumuna Point Springs near Te Takinga Pa. The geothermal feature here is below the sandy surface and still visible today. Tumuna Springs have been used for bathing by Mr Whata-Wickliffe and his whanau since he was young.439 We note that John Fenwick told us that his whanau own this block and that it has sand beaches on either side and is geothermally active under foot.440

Other springs important to Ngati Te Takino were described by Mr Whata-Wickliffe. These were the Wairau Springs, used from the 1800s by various hapu. There are also the Waitupapaku Springs, used from the 1800s to cleanse Ngati Te Takino’s dead after battle. Today Waitupapaku Springs are known for spiritual encounters that occur there.441

Moorea Koutu is the land that runs from Moerua to the delta where the Ohau Channel flows into Lake Rotoiti. Erana Waiomio told us Te Takinga Marae is situated within this area.442
Okere–Ruahine–Kuharua
The Okere–Ruahine–Kuharua block was an amalgamation of two, and lies on the north-western arm of Lake Rotoiti. The Kuharua block is directly to the east of Te Weta Bay. The block is associated with Kahumatamomoe (the son of Tamatekapua and nephew of Ngatoroirangi). Mr Maxwell records that Mr Whata-Wickliffe can remember warm water seeping out of the base of the cliff. Geothermal activity is still visible. The Ruahine block provides yet another reference to the sisters of Ngatoroirangi. The Onepu Stream flows through this block.

Taheke
Taheke has geothermal lands. According to Dr Kawharu’s team, within the Taheke block lived a number of hapu and iwi, including Ngati Te Takinga, Ngati Pikiao, Ngati Hinerangi, Ngati Rangiunuora, Ngati Hinekura and Kawiti. Ngati Makino, Ngati Rongomai, and Ngati Parua also have traditional interests. In 1910, after a number of appeals against the court’s ownership determinations, and a compensation hearing, the Taheke block was partitioned into Pungarehu, Mourea Papakainga, Kaokaoroa, Waiatatuhi, Pukahukiwi, Te Karaka 1 and 2, Taheke Papakainga, Kuharua, Otaramarae, Ruahine and Ruahine 1, Waipapa 1 and 2, Taheke 3-5, Wainui, Te Akau, and Kohangakaeae. Taheke 8C and associated blocks include geothermally active land. It is mined for sulphur and the ‘people have always assumed ownership of the resource and acted accordingly.’

On the north-eastern side of Lake Rotoiti are the Taheke Springs around the Onepu Stream on the original Taheke block. This stream joins the Kaituna River flowing to the sea. According to Mr Maxwell, when people wanted a bath they would ‘just dig a hole in the Onepu Steam and climb in.’ The water in the stream is warmed by fumaroles from below. An alum pool was used for medicinal purposes, and the hot steam bores were used for cooking. Waiairiki named Te Kuirau, Te Ponui, and Waikite were used in this area. At Te Kuirau, Mr Maxwell records that David Whata-Wickliffe remembers camping expeditions there. They ‘would arrive at Kuirau and the first thing the old people would do was to have a “tangi” for their dead and then we would set up camp.’

Environment Bay of Plenty: At Taheke, there are fumaroles, silica residue pans, sulphur deposits and solfatara, acid sulphate springs and pools, and geothermal vegetation. In Lake Rotoiti, there are gas bubbles and hot lake sediments.

Rotoma–Rotoehu–Tikorangi
The Waitangi Tribunal, in the Preliminary Te Arawa Representative Claims Report was in no doubt of the strength of the evidence demonstrating that Ngati Pikiao and other hapu of Te Arawa ‘for very many generations exercised rangatiratanga over [the principal surface manifestations within this area, including] the Waitangi Soda springs, and occupied the land overlying a substantial part of the Rotoma geothermal field.’ Some of the hapu with interests in the same region are those that have appeared before us: Ngati Tamakari, Ngati Rangiunuora, Ngati Hinekura, Ngati Rongomai, Ngati Tutaki a Koti, and Ngati Makino.

Tikorangi is the name of a large geothermal field south of Lake Rotoma which has rich sulphur deposits used traditionally for medicine. The land blocks associated with the field are Rotoma Incorporation, Matawhaura, and Rotoiti 15. Sulphur deposits are found throughout this area and were mined by the owners. There are springs and sulphur deposits on Matawhaura, Rotoiti 7, and the Tautara blocks. The Matawhaura land block takes its name from the sacred mountain in this area.
the twentieth century, with one of the claimants, David Whata-Wickliffe, being born there. The springs are held by Ngati Rangiunuora and Ngati Kawiti. Ngati Tutaki a Koti have lands in the area, as do Ngati Makino, Ngati Pikiao including Ngati Tamakari, and a number of other hapu. According to Stafford, these springs are of great significance to the people of Rotoehu and surrounding areas. There are two major geothermal springs, Ngarongoiri and Reihana; the Waiwhero Stream adds fresh water, and the combined shallow Waitangi Soda Pool flow discharges into Rotoehu. There are also the Otei Springs, which are situated south-east of the Waitangi Soda Springs.

Environment Bay of Plenty: The large geothermal field on the southern side of Lake Rotoma was called Tikorangi by its Maori owners. It is also known as the Tikorangi volcanic dome. There are warm springs at Waitangi, Rotoma eastern shores, and Otei. There are sulphur and silica residue, pans, solfatara and hydrothermally altered ground, fumaroles and geothermal vegetation. In the Rotoma Puhipuhi area there are warm springs and hydrothermally altered ground.

Maketu

We end at Maketu, where the phrase that binds Te Arawa and Tuwharetoa begins – Mai Maketu ki Tongariro (from Maketu to Tongariro), representing the spread of those who trace their descent and heritage to Te Arawa waka and the story of Ngatoroirangi. Before us a number of iwi and hapu claimed interests or are recorded as having interests in the Te Arawa ‘corridor’ to the coast, including Tapuika, Waitaha, Ngati Puheko or Pukuohakoma, Ngai Te Rangi, Ngati Makino, Ngati Whakaue, and Ngati Rangiwhewehi.

Environment Bay of Plenty: There are warm springs that merge as seeps into marshy ground.

The Tribunal’s Overall Findings: Are Geothermal Surface Features, the Fields, and the TVZ Taonga of Central North Island Maori over which they Exercised Tino Rangatiratanga?

The geothermal taonga, and all its surface and subsurface manifestations, continue to be part of the cultural and spiritual identity of the claimants and of many Central North Island Maori. On this land they continue to use the resources and practise their associated customs. The resource remains a source of spiritual, physical, and emotional sustenance. The tenacious grip the people have maintained over many of these resources across the region, as the Crown acknowledges, coupled with the extensive evidence of Maori knowledge and use, demonstrates that they consider the surface manifestations and underlying heat and energy system of the TVZ to be taonga over which they continue to exercise rangatiratanga. The evidence presented to this Tribunal – covering a more extensive area and drawing on a greater volume of scientific and customary evidence – substantiates and is in accord with the claimant evidence presented, but not fully dealt with, in the Te Arawa geothermal inquiry. We find, therefore, that the surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ are taonga protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. Geothermal activity is, for the iwi and hapu within the Central North Island, a taonga of great cultural, spiritual, and economic importance. For them, it has long been a form of energy and a source of heat that allowed them to live in what would otherwise have been harsh conditions during winter. That form of energy was central to their way of life and well-being; they harnessed it for a range of activities and in some cases regulated and manipulated it, including adjusting the temperature of adjacent pools. It is clear also that reliance on geothermal activity and the exercise of rights was, in many cases, incorporated into normal patterns of seasonal movement. In this sense, the pattern of establishment and exercise of rights to the geothermal resource was no different from the establishment and exercise of rights in any other natural resource.
We come to these findings based on the rights that Central North Island Maori can establish through Maori customary law by virtue of the creation stories and the more specific Ngatoroirangi stories. We also base it on the considerable commonality of customary and spiritual significance shown in the selection of examples discussed above. We note in this regard that geothermal activity not only gave a strong sense of identity for iwi living in the Central North Island; it was also used in many practical ways. Usage was regulated by tikanga or customary rules that protected the resource from degradation.

Reading and listening to the evidence, we could not help but be struck by the notion that there is here a continuity of Maori relationships, of shared values and use, and of law and custom and the exercise of authority over geothermal resources that has remained unbroken for hundreds of years. We cannot escape the conclusion that the mana of the tribes in the Central North Island is inextricably interwoven with the resources which they believe were provided by Papatuanuku, Ruauumoko/Ruaimoko and the other deities of creation through the gift to Ngatoroirangi. The geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ were without doubt as at 1840 possessed in accordance with Central North Island Maori customary law and tenure. Such law and tenure was based on intense associations with the resource, an extensive accumulated knowledge of its behaviour, and the varying characteristics of different surface and subsurface manifestations – as with every other aspect of Maori knowledge of the natural world with which they claimed a close relationship. It was characterised also by an emphasis on relationships, whether through the sharing with others of access to particular pools or streams – binding visitors into relationships through shared obligations – or through widespread trade in associated byproducts such as kokowai (red ochre). The development of customary law in respect of geothermal activity underlines its enormous importance to the ways of life of the majority of the iwi and hapu of the region. These iwi exercised rangatiratanga over the resources through Maori customary tenure and law, and they have a continuing responsibility to act as kaitiaki. They exercised their authority over: the various surface and subsurface features in the Central North Island; the 17 fields; and the subterranean geothermal resource (the TVZ, which largely falls within the Central North Island inquiry region). The evidence we have reviewed that considers how rangatiratanga was exercised, suggests that there were three layers of Maori rights and interests in relation to the geothermal resource; namely:

- over geothermal surface features that form part of the bundle of rights akin to those associated with land ownership;
- over the specific fields; and
- over the subterranean resource being the underlying common heat and energy system known as the TVZ.

In relation to the first and second layers of rights, the particular hapu or iwi associated with the land, geothermal surface features, and fields, are the principal holders of rights of rangatiratanga exercising authority and control over access to the resources. Within these layers, and by the operation of customary law, use rights were allocated, the complexity of which requires further research beyond the scope of this inquiry.457

In relation to the third layer of rights, they attach to the subterranean resource, the underlying common heat and energy system of the TVZ. The latter is what all the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island share because they all depend on the presence of the TVZ to sustain their fields and geothermal surface features. In addition, all the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island hold this collective right by virtue of their common history, whakapapa, and reliance on the discovery of the resources by Ngatoroirangi. As we found above, the Ngatoroirangi stories are held in common by Ngati Manawa, Te Arawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa, and those claimants before us from Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau.458

As some of the thermal areas fall into areas claimed by Ngati Raukawa, Ngai Te Rangi, Ngati Awa, Ngati Haka Patuheuheu, and Tuhoe, there are connections that require their interests also to be recognised.
We find that:

- In 1840 the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island exercised rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga responsibilities over the use and enjoyment of all their geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ.
- In accordance with the Whanganui River jurisprudence, Central North Island Maori possessed these resources as taonga over which they exercised rangatiratanga at 1840.
- In customary terms the rights to geothermal taonga were divided into three layers of rights.
- The first two layers requires that the Crown recognise the rangatiratanga of the hapu and iwi who act at the local level as kaitiaki of the different fields and surface features.
- The third layer requires some recognition of all the iwi and hapu with original interests in the subterranean geothermal resource (TVZ).
- Therefore, the Crown, from 1840, was under a Treaty duty to protect these taonga and to provide for the exercise of Maori autonomy over them, at the national, local, and regional level.

**Assertion of Crown Control and Extent of Provision for Maori Customary Rights and Treaty Interests**

**Key question:** When the Crown asserted control over geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields and the subterranean resource (TVZ), to what extent, if at all, did it recognise and provide for Central North Island Maori customary rights and treaty interests?

As European settlement proceeded in the nineteenth century, and visitor reports were published in New Zealand and abroad, the geothermal taonga of the Central North Island attracted significant tourism interest. As discussed in part IV of this report, tourism and mining of deposits such as sulphur were identified as development opportunities from an early period. Later in the twentieth century, the prospects of using geothermal energy for purposes such as heating and power generation (in the same way that Maori had used the geothermal taonga of the region for centuries, albeit now with enhanced technology) attracted considerable interest. The Crown’s authority over the TVZ and the rights to manage access to it largely took hold after the Second World War as a result of growing interest in using geothermal energy for electricity generation. We discussed that in detail in part IV. Here we turn our minds to the steps the Crown took to acknowledge and protect Central North Island Maori proprietary interests in geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ.

We have found that the geothermal resources were taonga over which iwi and hapu exercised rangatiratanga as at 1840. We turn now to consider how the Crown has dealt with Maori interests in these resources.

**The claimants’ case**

As we noted above, Mr Taylor for the claimants argued that the TVZ was a taonga. In this section we turn to his argument that:

- there is no evidence that the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island have ever knowingly and willingly alienated their underlying geothermal resource; and
- they never gave up rangatiratanga over these taonga where they sold land.

**What was granted in land sales?**

In considering what was granted in land sales, Mr Taylor submitted that, to Maori ways of thinking, there were two taonga. The first was the taonga of the surface features; the second was the taonga of the underlying geothermal resource. When Maori sold land containing a geothermal resource, they sold the taonga being the surface features.
Thus, Maori sold aspects of the resource, the geothermal manifestations on the land.

But Mr Taylor contended that they could not have sold any more than this because Ngatoroirangi’s legacy was the chain of geothermal action, the interconnected system equating to the TVZ. This was sacred to Maori and remains so today. It is, Mr Taylor submitted, ‘shallow in more senses than one to suggest that the sale of a geothermal feature, or even a number [of them], meant alienation of the underlying resource.’ This is because there was no understanding of the ability to commercially exploit the fields and the subterranean geothermal resource when land was sold. In the circumstances of most land sales in the Central North Island, this was simply not a matter Maori considered. If Maori had been asked, they would have said: you can have the land, but not the underground resource.

Did Maori ‘have any belief or understanding that they were selling part of this with the land?’ Mr Taylor submitted that they did not. Relying again on the Whanganui River Report, he argued that a willingness to share does not amount to an extinguishment. On sale, Maori were clearly granting access. But it is a leap without foundation to say that Maori were, in the same transaction, giving away the control right to the underground, interconnected resource of which they were clearly aware.

Mr Taylor noted that the reliance on the Whanganui River Report is not based on whether the geothermal resource was similar to or the same as the Whanganui River. Rather, the report ought to be considered in terms of the principles it provides, and their applicability to the current situation, rather than to ‘distinctions as to the exact nature of each of the resources’. On the basis of that report, there remains an unacknowledged Maori proprietary interest in the geothermal fields of the Central North Island.

**Retention of rangatiratanga**

Mr Taylor went on to argue that every expectation of Maori would be that when they sold land, Maori retained their rangatiratanga and ownership over the subsurface resource. The separation of authority and use is not unknown to Maori as this was inherent in their land tenure system which recognised individual use rights under the mana and authority of the hapu or iwi. Furthermore, and to use an example put to Professor Boast, a witness for the claimants, Mr Taylor considered ‘whether, hypothetically, in selling geothermally active land [near] Ohinemutu, Ngati Whakaue would have thought they were giving away the rights to others to exploit the geothermal energy to the detriment of their home resources at Ohinemutu’. Professor Boast’s answer, and Mr Taylor’s contention, was no, they would not. Similarly, the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunal held ‘that where significant surface features were retained by Maori, they had a right to expect management of the resource to protect those features.’ The only ‘logical and principled basis for those responses,’ Mr Taylor submitted, must be that ‘Maori retained rangatiratanga and possession over the underlying geothermal resource.

Today the preponderance of Maori opinion is that Maori still own their fields and the subterranean resource (the TVZ). Thus, if they were asked whether they sold these taonga, they would say ‘never’. This relates to the ‘continuing manifestation of the centrality of the resource to Maori, and their connection’ to it. Maori are saying, effectively, that ‘we did not sell the underground resource when we sold land.’

Mr Taylor considered that any ‘geothermal energy being tapped is generally well underground’. Maori ‘were aware of and treasured’ their fields and the subterranean resource. The subterranean resource is ‘removed from any individual surface feature which Maori may have sold’. This lends support to the view, that Maori would not have understood or believed they relinquished their control over their fields and the subterranean resource.

Mr Taylor did concede that there may be a point where if all land was sold, then a tribe will have no further interest in a geothermal field. But, he submitted, the fact that ‘most tribes with an original interest in the resource have continued to work hard ‘to retain at least some physical access’ to it, is a sign of their continuing rangatiratanga.’ Therefore, in accordance with the
Whanganui River jurisprudence, customary ownership of the resource remains in Treaty terms with Central North Island Maori.470

In reply to the submissions of the Crown, Mr Taylor contended that the claimants did not seek a finding of legal ownership from this Tribunal. Rather, they want the Tribunal to find that they owned the geothermal resource in accordance with the principles of the Treaty and that their ownership has not been extinguished in a Treaty-compliant manner. The claimants did not concede that legal ownership passed to the Crown or any other person, or that Maori do not retain legal ownership of the resource as customary title. If the Tribunal finds that Central North Island Maori owned the geothermal resource, and have not alienated it in accordance with the Treaty, then the Tribunal should make a recommendation that the legal title of Central North Island Maori to the geothermal resources should be confirmed by statute.471

Mr Taylor referred to the impact of any Tribunal recommendations on private land. He contended that as the geothermal resource is a water resource it cannot be owned at common law, so any findings and recommendations of the Tribunal cannot affect any private landowners and, consequentially section 6(4A) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 does not impinge on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.472 In addition, geothermal taonga are not specifically included within the definition of land under the Land Transfer Act 1952, although it does include water and water courses. He also noted that in terms of the Land Transfer Act any supposed geothermal ownership must be modified by the common law regarding water and other underground resources travelling in undefined channels. That is, the ownership of supervening land gives a right to tap those resources, but does not give a specific property right in that resource. This right to tap has already been regulated by the Crown, which receives royalties for access, a benefit that Maori should receive.473

**Alternative argument**

Mr Taylor submitted that, if the Tribunal finds that Central North Island Maori no longer possess the geothermal resource, then the Tribunal should apply the approach of the Petroleum Tribunal. It should find that where geothermal resources were contained within lands alienated because of acts or omissions of the Crown in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, then Maori retained a residual interest in those taonga.474 The Tribunal should follow the approach in the Petroleum Report and find that they continued to have a ‘Treaty interest’ in their fields and the subterranean resource (TVZ).475 An example of where this finding could be made relates to the Wairakei–Tauhara geothermal field in Taupō and the manner in which the Crown was responsible for the alienation of the associated landblock, Tauhara Middle 1.476 Mr Taylor also submitted that where there is evidence of a particularly targeted approach by the Crown to [facilitate Maori] alienating particular surface features or geothermal fields, then those resources should . . . be handed back to Maori’.477 Mr Taylor noted that the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunal had indicated ‘that there was likely to be an additional Treaty interest arising from the geothermal resources wrongfully alienated from Maori as a result of breaches of the Treaty’.478 He contended that we would be justified in finding that as a result of this remedial [or residual] interest, Maori have an interest’ that is, in the underlying common heat system, the Taupo Volcanic System, ‘which ought to be characterised as being a majority interest’.479

**Right to manage and obtain benefits from the use of the geothermal resources**

Mr Taylor essentially contended that the Crown failed to adequately recognise and provide for Central North Island Maori interests for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It failed to acknowledge their underlying title to the geothermal resources, or to direct profits to Maori accordingly.480
First, the Crown did this by assuming that, on land alienation, the Maori interest in the underground, interconnected resource went with it. But, Mr Taylor submitted, the alienation of land was not sufficient to demonstrate that they had freely alienated the resource per se. 481 What they alienated, he argued, were the taonga that were the surface manifestations. 482 Mr Taylor stressed that Maori did not sell the underlying resource – their fields or the TVZ. 483 In addition, where Maori retained significant surface features, they had a right to expect to manage the underlying resource so that they might protect those features. That is what the Tribunal found in the Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims. 484 If the ownership rests with Maori, then revenue derived from access to it can be deemed an incident of their ownership. On the other hand, if the notion of outright ownership is rejected, Mr Taylor argued that Maori nevertheless retain an interest in the resource and therefore still may claim a right to benefit financially. 485

Secondly, the Crown has passed various statutes dealing with the geothermal resources of the Central North Island which have effectively appropriated the right to use, and control access to, and to derive revenue from the resource. 486 The Geothermal Energy Act 1953 followed by the Resource Management Act 1991 have taken away ‘the most significant incidents of ownership’. This is an appropriation of the rights of use, control, and profit for the benefit of the Crown, and if that is so, then this Tribunal must find a Treaty breach. 487

Mr Taylor contended that the Treaty right to the fields and the subterranean resource may be recognised by the common law as it has never been expressly extinguished. 488 Under the common law, ‘plain and clear language’ is required to extinguish aboriginal title. The language in the various statutes passed to appropriate ‘the most significant incidents of ownership’ to the Crown – that is the rights of use and control in geothermal waters and energy, and profit from them – have not met this test for extinguishment. 489 On that basis, there remains an unacknowledged Maori proprietary interest in the fields and the subterranean resource (TVZ). He argues further that even if these statutes extinguished Maori rights in common law, that constitutes a breach of the Treaty. 490

The Tribunal should grant relief by way of a recommendation that the Crown should return the use and control of access to, and profit from, geothermal resources to Maori. 491

Mr Taylor pointed out that the most of the claimants had no knowledge of the programme for review of the allocation of geothermal energy by the Crown as announced by Crown counsel. The claimants, therefore, ‘seek a finding from the Tribunal that [Central North Island] Maori ought to be heavily involved in this review, and that their Treaty right ought to be taken into account.’ 492 At the very least they should be consulted about the review. 493

### The Crown’s case

We turn to the Crown’s response to the claimants regarding the issue of what was sold when land was alienated, or a title to the land derived from the Crown was awarded.

The Crown, as we noted in our earlier discussion, denies all claims to ownership of the TVZ by Maori whether based on the Ngatoroirangi story, the Treaty of Waitangi, or the common law doctrine of aboriginal title. That is because by the creation of a Crown grant or Crown derived title such as was gained through the Native Land Court, all common law aboriginal title over that land was extinguished. Where the geothermal resource is currently manifest on private property, the indefeasibility mechanisms of the Land Transfer Act would have operated to extinguish any common law aboriginal title to such land. In such cases, the terms of the original Crown purchase deed (or private purchase deed) would thus be irrelevant. 494 Furthermore, to the extent that the Crown became the legal owner of certain lake and riverbeds, it also gained control of the
associated geothermal fields and access to the geothermal fields and the subterranean resource via the land. That is because as the legal owner of a lake or navigable river, it controlled access to those resources (at least in the legal sense). Legislative assertions of ‘control and ownership of the lake and river beds, would not have affected or been affected by the... Water Power Act 1908 or the Geothermal Energy Act 1953. Those regimes applied irrespective of [land] ownership.\textsuperscript{495}

**What was granted in land sales?**

The Crown submitted that ‘[t]here is no evidence to suggest that [upon alienation] Maori owners believed they retained interests in the [geothermal] resource separate from rights to land’. Therefore, the claim made that Maori would not have sold ‘land adjacent to land retained’ – had they known that management of the sold land would not be retained and that other users might have a detrimental effect on the geothermal resources in the land which they themselves retained – cannot be sustained.\textsuperscript{496} In this respect, the Crown quoted Professor Boast who has recognised that generally Maori retained ownership of surface [geothermal] features and that there was evidence indicating that Maori ‘thought use rights regarding geothermal areas to be closely linked to land use rights in general’.\textsuperscript{497} Professor Boast was also unaware of any written record of complaints or contentions from Maori that they had retained interests in the geothermal resource independent of the land itself being alienated.\textsuperscript{498}

The Crown further contended that, in contrast to the facts established in the Whanganui River Report, ‘there has been no real evidence of attempts by CNI Maori to claim or retain interests in geothermal resources in land alienated by them’. Where they sold, counsel argued, Maori would have known ‘that the sale of the land containing the geothermal manifestations would, and did, result in the rights to use those manifestations and the resource being given to the purchaser’.\textsuperscript{499}

The Crown argued that ‘the Ngatoroirangi legend does not provide any basis for validly saying that Maori believed that they retained an interest in the right to control the use of the [geothermal] resource in the land alienated’. Furthermore, ‘that Maori retained some key geothermal sites, (eg, Ohinemutu, Mokoia Island, Whakarewarewa, Tikiterere, and Waihi) is a clear indication that they knew alienation would give rise to a surrender of all rights of control and/or access to and use’ of geothermal resources. ‘Maori may well have expected to retain some spiritual connection to the [subterranean] resource generally (post alienation), but that does not and cannot equate with a belief in a right to retain some degree of control over it.’\textsuperscript{500}

The Crown also challenged the view that Maori held knowledge about the ‘interconnectedness of springs within the same field’ because such knowledge was not available until ‘the necessary scientific advancements had been made’.\textsuperscript{501} In response to oral questioning by the Tribunal, Crown counsel acknowledged a degree of Maori knowledge about the interconnectedness of geothermal springs ‘at a broader level’, but maintained that having such an understanding about springs within the same field is ‘a distinct and separate matter and does require some significant understanding of the subsurface geology’.\textsuperscript{502} In any event, the Crown argued, ‘it is highly unlikely that it was within the contemplation of any of the parties’ that subsequent use would negatively impact on the geothermal resources in the lands retained by Maori.’\textsuperscript{503} The Crown noted that, to the extent that competing uses of the geothermal fields subsequent to the alienation would have impacted on any Maori rights on the lands retained in their ownership, that is a matter for a central regulatory body to deal with, namely the Crown or its delegates.

**The Crown’s response to alternative arguments**

The Crown informed us that it has rejected the findings of the Petroleum Report which contended for an ongoing Treaty interest in the petroleum resource.

The Crown also does not accept the notion of Maori having preferential development rights in relation to the geothermal resource, or to Maori having veto rights over...
use and development of the resource by non-Maori third party users.\textsuperscript{504}

We repeat the Crown’s submission that the claim made that Maori have lost access to and use of the geothermal resource through land alienation, needs to be put into perspective.\textsuperscript{505} The Crown identifies the following lands, with geothermal resources, that remain in Maori ownership: Ohinemutu; Whakarewarewa village; Mokoia Island; Rotokawa Baths; Maori land within the east Lake Rotorua Geothermal Field; Tikitere; Waitangi Soda Springs; Mokai (Tuaropaki Trust); Ohaaki; Orakei Korako; Waipahihi; Maori land at Tokaanu, and Maori land at Waihi.\textsuperscript{506} Maori shareholders in Tarawera Forests Ltd also have interests in the Rotoma geothermal field now owned by Tarawera Forests Ltd. The Crown contends that Central North Island Maori have continued to enjoy traditional use of those geothermal resources to which they can control access, by virtue of retaining land in which they are manifest.\textsuperscript{507} The point here is that Maori have not been significantly or seriously prejudiced by previous Crown actions in terms of its historical purchasing or acquiring of any other lands.

**The Crown’s position on the right to manage and obtain benefits from the use of geothermal resources**

The reason that the Crown has not asserted ownership of the geothermal resources is because it treats them as analogous to water and thus it is subject to the same legislative framework.\textsuperscript{508} We discussed that framework in chapter 19. Before the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, these were treated as water resources and were regulated accordingly. The Crown makes a distinction between water resources which are not, under common law, capable of being owned, and mineral resources, such as petroleum and gold.

The Crown claims that it has ‘retained a legitimate Article I interest’ in the geothermal resources – first, because it has ‘an interest in the allocation and management of natural resources generally’ and, secondly, because of the geothermal resources being significant energy sources. The government has a right to regulate resource use and management in the public interest. The ability to regulate property rights and other interests is a well-established element of kawanatanga.\textsuperscript{509} The Crown notes that the current Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) regime used to regulate access to and use of geothermal taonga, is not inconsistent with existing property rights as a matter of custom. Citing the chief justice in Ngati Apa v Attorney-General (2003), the Crown acknowledges that the legislation does not effect any extinguishment of such property.\textsuperscript{510}

The Crown states that ‘[g]eothermal resources have a wide range of values, including cultural, scientific, tourism, and energy related. It suggests that, for that reason, ‘[t]here is a legitimate Crown role in conserving and managing the resource.\textsuperscript{511}

In terms of the current management regime, the RMA (section 14 and part II, including sections 6, 7, and 8) expressly provides for and recognises Maori values in relation to decision-making concerning natural resources. The Crown does not think that it is necessary or desirable to amend the RMA ‘generally to provide for a greater degree of recognition or acknowledgement of Maori values. It is prepared, in principle, to make available some geothermal assets as settlement redress and/or to negotiate suitable statutory acknowledgements which provide recognition for Maori values in relation to specific geothermal sites. But:

[th]ere are substantial private third party interests in the geothermal resource [of the CNI], including use of that resource to make an important contribution towards the nation’s electricity needs. The Crown does not believe it feasible or desirable, in policy terms, to change the current regime.\textsuperscript{512}

The Crown noted that ‘[the Local Government Act 2002] and the RMA are designed to allow local bodies to implement policies that are particularly attuned to the requirements of particular districts’. The Crown submitted that the evidence from regional councils shows ‘that the Crown is not in breach of the Treaty through the current regulatory framework that is in place’.\textsuperscript{513}
While noting that the geothermal resources of the Central North Island are managed by regional councils under the RMA, the Crown submitted that the nature of the resource and the diverse range of interested parties means that central regulation is vital. It illustrates this with reference to its decision, in the 1980s, to close bores within 1.5 kilometres of the Pohutu geyser in the Whakarewarewa Valley. The Crown contended that:

[g]iven the nature of the decision and the multiple parties whom it affected ... it is an appropriate decision for [it] to take exercising its kawanatanga rights and a type of decision that only central government, or a local authority operating under delegated powers, would be capable of efficiently taking.514

Importantly, the Crown accepts that it has 'some Treaty responsibilities to protect customary use of geothermal resources by Central North Island Maori'. The Crown submits that section 14(3)(c) of the Resource Management Act 1991 'gives some expression to the Crown's Treaty responsibilities.' It also accepts that it has a responsibility to protect geothermal resources in the sense of ensuring that there is a sustainable management regime. Conversely, the Crown does not accept that it has a positive obligation to foster Central North Island Maori commercial development of geothermal resources. Rather, the Crown's view is that 'redress following a negotiated settlement will provide greater opportunity ... to commercially develop geothermal resources should [Maori] consider it appropriate.'515

The Government has embarked on a sustainable development programme of action for water. This is being coordinated by the Minister for the Environment and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. A key issue, counsel added, is to provide investment certainty for energy developers. The Crown has submitted that work is currently underway on a programme to address geothermal allocation. This is being done jointly by the Minister of Energy and the Minister for the Environment. The anticipated reporting date for that work was June 2006.516

The Tribunal's analysis on assertion of Crown control of the geothermal taonga and whether the Crown provided for Central North Island Maori rights

We have found earlier in this chapter that in 1840 the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island exercised rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga responsibilities over the use and enjoyment of all their geothermal resources. They possessed them as taonga, in accordance with the Whanganui River jurisprudence. In customary terms, the rights to geothermal taonga were divided into three layers. The first two layers of rights required that the Crown recognise the rangatiratanga of the hapu and iwi who act at the local level as kaitiaki of the different fields and surface features. The third layer required some recognition of all the iwi and hapu with original interests in the subterranean geothermal resource being the TVZ. Therefore, the Crown was under a Treaty duty to protect these taonga and to provide for the exercise of Maori autonomy over them, at the local, regional and national level. That was the Treaty standard that the Crown had to meet and we now turn to consider whether it was able to do so.

In this section, we consider how the Crown dealt with Maori interests in geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ after 1840. There are two distinct phases of Crown action that are relevant to the issue before us. The first relates to the period from 1840 to 1950, when geothermal resources were considered as water resources to be dealt with in accordance with the common law rules on land alienation and water. In our review of the evidence which follows, we consider the impact of land alienation and whether, as a result, Maori retained possession and rangatiratanga over their geothermal taonga, including the TVZ. The second phase relates to the period from 1950 to 2006 when the Crown has expressly legislated to control access to and use of geothermal taonga. We deal with these two phases below before we resolve the issue of what the Crown did and has done to provide for Maori interests in the geothermal waters or fluid, and energy, of the TVZ.
**Crown assumptions and policies affecting geothermal resources, 1840–1950**

Before we can consider whether the Crown acted consistently with the Treaty of Waitangi, we note how the Crown perceived the resource. During the early years of European settlement, the assumption was that the law recognised ‘that those who owned land on which were located geothermal springs could use them and develop them as they wished.’ Since the Crown’s policies and actions were based on that assumption, there was, in effect, uncontrolled use and development of the geothermal resources and some geothermal fields from 1840 to 1950.

Any legislation passed during this period affecting land, minerals, water, or water courses did not directly address how rights of access to geothermal resources should be allocated. Therefore, it seems that the only law in existence was the common law and we turn now to consider that law. We do so because the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi had a duty to protect Maori geothermal taonga and their exercise of authority over them. If there was no statutory law in place that did this, we must consider whether the common law did so. If it did not, we must conclude that the Crown failed to adequately provide for Maori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi.

**The common law – geothermal taonga**

As we have noted in chapter 16, by virtue of section 1 of the English Laws Act 1858, the laws of England as existing on 14 January 1840, and ‘so far as applicable to the circumstances of the colony’, were deemed to apply to New Zealand. The unique nature of geothermal taonga in New Zealand would seem to indicate that there was an opportunity to develop different rules from the general common law rules on water, or minerals. Professor Boast points out that there were and are very few geothermal resources in England and, as a consequence, there appears to be limited English case law dealing with the ownership of geothermal resources, either as a water resource or otherwise. There certainly is no case law dealing with geothermal resources that are on the same scale as those of the TVZ. That is to be compared to Maori tikanga or the customary law system, which had developed by 1840 a solid understanding of these taonga with their three layers of customary rights and interests, and regulations concerning their use. The Maori system was quite capable of being used as a management regime and as a mode for allocating rights and interests in the resources. It could have formed the basis for the common law to be applied in New Zealand. But it did not, and the Crown did not move to provide for an alternative by giving effect to such rights and interests in legislation.

That means we need to analyse whether the common law, as imported, protected Maori rights and interests. There appear to be two aspects of the common law that potentially may apply to geothermal resources:

- the common law rules relating to the taking and use of water, energy resources, and minerals; and
- the common law rules of aboriginal or customary rights.

The question here is to what extent the common law rules concerning water resources and/or native or aboriginal title applied, given that they only did so ‘in so far as they were applicable to the circumstances of the colony’.

**Common law on minerals, water, energy resources**

Professor Boast points out that geothermal resources are an energy resource analogous to petroleum and natural gas, so the common law rules applicable to such resources may apply. If that is the case, the effect of those rules on the right to use and access geothermal resources may remain the same as for water, namely, there is no ownership until it is contained. To add to this mix, geothermal fluid usually contains minerals in solution and may produce the minerals kokowai (red ochre) and sulphur. The law that may apply if geothermal resources were classified as a mineral is that ownership of minerals in land is part of the estate in land. But mineral ownership is also severable from the surface land title depending on how the land was transferred when alienated. In the *Petroleum Report*, the Tribunal summarised the law in this way:
Under common law, minerals generally belonged to the owner of the land in accordance with the maxim *cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos* (‘to whom belongs the soil it is his, even to Heaven, and to the middle of the earth’). Dating back to thirteenth-century Europe, this rule had become accepted doctrine in English law by the sixteenth century, and has been applied consistently by the New Zealand courts in determining the ownership of natural resources. Minerals as an attribute of the land likewise belonged to the landowner. When the land was conveyed so, too, were the subsurface resources unless surface and mineral rights were deliberately and explicitly separated in the instrument of conveyance. The only exceptions to this rule, until the twentieth century, were gold and silver, which, as the ‘most excellent products of the soil’, were deemed to remain subject to the ownership of the Crown as the ‘most excellent person in the realm’ – an understanding which was formalised in the Case of Mines in 1567. Since the 1930s, however, the *ad coelum et ad inferos* rule has been abrogated in New Zealand in respect of minerals deemed to be of particular importance. These include petroleum.

The doctrine of capture is also pertinent to a consideration of the ownership of petroleum under common law. Petroleum, rather than remaining in situ like metals or coal, migrates, flowing towards areas of low pressure such as drill sites. Under the common law, a landowner is unable to prevent a neighbour from draining the waters from under his or her land, providing that the means of abstraction (pumps and drills) remain within the neighbour’s property. The doctrine of capture is also pertinent to a consideration of the ownership of petroleum under common law. Petroleum, rather than remaining in situ like metals or coal, migrates, flowing towards areas of low pressure such as drill sites. Under the common law, a landowner is unable to prevent a neighbour from draining the waters from under his or her land, providing that the means of abstraction (pumps and drills) remain within the neighbour’s property.

Professor Boast and Mr Bennion have argued that the common law has never developed a body of rules to deal with property rights in geothermal taonga such as those that exist in the Central North Island. They agree that any attempts to find and rely on common law principles (outside the doctrine of aboriginal title) tend towards the view of the Crown that geothermal taonga are essentially a water resource. The common law rule relating to natural water is that no one can own it unless the water is contained, at which point a property right is created. This is referred to as the doctrine of capture, as explained by the Petroleum Tribunal. Aside from that general rule, there are a number of associated rules regarding the rights of landowners to control access to natural water within or running on their land. The question then becomes what that means in terms of geothermal taonga. Professor Boast’s view is that the rules relating to (1) surface water and (2) percolating water or ground water are the closest to draw on when looking for the applicable law.

Effectively, and as with cold water springs, the geothermal springs and other geothermal resources within a land block come under the control of the owner of the land. Any landowner can, therefore, draw off as much geothermal water or fluid or heat as he or she likes, without regard to other landowners, and without regard to whether his or her neighbour has sufficient geothermal water or fluid or heat to meet his or her needs. What does happen in such cases is that the sinking of a bore which brings water, or steam, or both, to the surface of the land creates a property right for the owner of the land or the person to whom access has been granted, regardless of whether it impacts negatively on the owners of adjoining land. As Professor Boast points out, in terms of geothermal waters or fluid, the ‘common law in its pure form gives no right of priority and no protection to existing users’.

Where the geothermal resources are running streams, and if the rules concerning water apply, landowners acquired the right to:

- the continuance of the natural flow, as regards both quantity and quality, so upstream users could not take, use, or pollute it to the extent that the natural quality and quantity of the water is impaired;
- the reasonable use of the water for ordinary or primary purposes (such as watering stock) or for the landowner’s domestic wants and the general and usual requirements of their property; and
the reasonable use of the water for extraordinary or secondary purposes, provided they are connected with or are an incident to the land.

Where geothermal surface features emerge from the bed of a lake or river, the law on lakes and rivers may apply with all the attendant issues of ownership of the bed of navigable rivers and large inland lakes. As we discussed this in chapters 17, 18, and 19, we do not propose to deal with those issues again. Where they emerge from the seabed, the law as now understood by the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 applies and settles Maori claims to the bed of the sea, but issues remain in the inquiry region regarding whether it settles their claims to the subterranean resource (tvz).

But the uncertainty about which common law rules concerning minerals and/or water applied and the extent to which they applied to the circumstances of New Zealand was not considered by the Crown during the early years of the colony. Instead it assumed that the key to access, management, and use of geothermal resources lay in land ownership and water law. But while the owners of the land could control access to geothermal surface features, that in itself could not grant them ownership of the hot water fields. We return to this theme below.

**The common law doctrine of aboriginal title**

In comparison to the uncertainty regarding the extent to which the common law rules concerning energy resources, minerals, and water apply to geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the tvz in New Zealand, the common law rules relating to aboriginal or customary title seem to us to be much more certain and would apply ‘in so far as they were applicable to the circumstances of the colony’. The common laws of aboriginal title have been considered in a number of judgments of the Court of Appeal, including *Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v Attorney-General* (1990) and *Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General* (1994). We note that this latter decision was not available to the two previous geothermal Tribunals when they reported in 1993. The decision has added to the Tribunal’s understanding of how the doctrine applies in New Zealand. The most important statement of the common law doctrine of aboriginal title comes from the decision in *Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General*, recently approved and cited by the Court of Appeal in the *Attorney-General v Ngati Apa and Others* (2003).

In *Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General* (1994), the president of the Court of Appeal, Justice Cooke, stated:

Aboriginal title is a compendious expression to cover the rights over land and water enjoyed by the indigenous or established inhabitants of a country up to the time of colonisation. On the acquisition of the territory, whether by settlement, cession or annexation, the colonising power acquires a radical or underlying title which goes with sovereignty. Where the colonising power has been the United Kingdom, that title vests in the Crown. But, at least in the absence of special circumstances displacing the principle, the radical title is subject to the existing native rights. They are usually, although not invariably, communal or collective. It has been authoritatively said that they cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent of the native occupiers, and then only to the Crown and in strict compliance with the provisions of any relevant statutes. It was so stated by Chapman J in *R v Symonds* (1847) NZPCC 387, 390, in a passage later expressly adopted by the Privy Council, in a judgment delivered by Lord Davey, in *Nireaha Tamaki v Baker* (1901) NZPCC 371, 384.

This means that the common law was capable of recognising Maori rights in land and water. The issue is whether that could extend to recognition of Maori ownership rights in geothermal resources. Although we do not have to decide the issue definitively, we do note that, in the *Attorney-General v Ngati Apa* case (2003), Chief Justice Elias recognised that ‘[t]he existence and content of customary property is determined as a matter of the custom and usage of the particular community’. Therefore, the full nature and extent of the customary rights to geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the tvz should only have been for Maori to determine according...
to their customary law and cultural preferences. But, and as always, nothing is as clear cut as it should be. We note, in this regard, that the decision of the Court of Appeal was considered in some detail by the the Foreshore and Seabed Tribunal. Although dealing with the foreshore and seabed, the Tribunal’s conclusion is worth noting. They considered submissions made by Paul McHugh who argued that it is unlikely that any common law court would be prepared to recognise the full nature and extent of Maori customary rights under the doctrine of aboriginal title. We mean in this regard that given that the common law recognises no ownership of natural water, then it is unlikely that it will recognise that Maori have an exclusive proprietary interest in the hot water fields and the TVZ. Rather it is more likely to recognise that Maori held a bundle of non-exclusive customary rights short of exclusive ownership. The Foreshore and Seabed Tribunal stated:

On the fundamental question of the common law’s ability to recognise customary rights equating to ownership, there is an internal logic to the ‘bundle of rights’ position endorsed by Dr McHugh. As well, the legal underpinnings of that position put it on a different ‘plane’ from the criticisms that were made of it by claimant counsel. In essence, the logic of the ‘bundle of rights not qualified ownership’ position is that the law cannot recognise for indigenous people what it does not recognise for the sovereign power. It is a variant of the legal maxim; you cannot give what you do not have. Against that position, the only judicial authority providing strong support for the “qualified ownership” position in connection with the foreshore and seabed is Justice Kirby’s judgment in the Yarmirr case. The statutory context for his argument is, however, significantly different from the common law context in which the New Zealand High Court would be operating. Accordingly, we are of the view that it would be a bold New Zealand High Court judge who would decline to follow the approach of the majority in Yarmirr. Further, since the issue would likely find its way to the ultimate New Zealand court – now the Supreme Court – there would need to be a majority of bold judges in that court before the conclusion contended for by the claimants could be declared part of the common law of New Zealand. Overall, we consider it unlikely that the law would be so declared. Accordingly, we consider it more likely that a ‘bundle of rights’ approach would be adopted by the High Court to conceptualise the nature of customary rights in the foreshore and seabed.

That may or may not also be the case in terms of geothermal taonga, and that would depend on whether the common law courts agreed that Maori customary rights to geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ should be constrained by narrow common-law understandings of water resources, or whether they should be conceived in accordance with Maori understandings of their taonga and the customary law associated with them.

The relevance of the common law
We consider that if the common law doctrine of aboriginal title was not capable of recognising the full nature and extent of Maori rights and interests in geothermal resources, then the Crown did nothing and has continued to do nothing about this. We consider, if that is the case, that this would be an omission that would leave the Crown in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. That is because the duty on the Crown to actively protect Maori taonga, and the exercise of rangatiratanga over that taonga, does not turn on whether the common law could recognise such matters. It turns on the Treaty of Waitangi and the Crown’s duty to actively protect taonga and the exercise of Maori authority over taonga. It seems to us that it was entirely possible during the nineteenth century – once European settlers started to move into the Central North Island – for the Crown to develop a legal framework to give full expression to Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ. In fact, under the Treaty it should have done so. As we have already found, provision should have been made for customary rights not just for land, but for taonga such as geothermal resources. In our view, such titles would have ensured the protection of these taonga. However – and as
we have shown in parts II, III, and IV of this report – that was not done. Instead, the Crown set about instituting a system that would convert Maori customary rights in land to a title derived from the Crown.

It is now well established that Maori rangatiratanga over their taonga cannot be taken away ‘by the tacit application of a presumption of English law of which they knew nothing.’ Converting customary title to land is one thing. Allowing the result of that conversion to extend to the hapu or iwi customary rights over geothermal resources, is quite another. To take such an approach is an example of the tendency to conceptualise Maori customary rights to resources in line with western concepts of property against which the Privy Council warned in Amoru Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria (1921). If, on the issue of a Native Land Court title, all the customary rights held by hapu and iwi in their geothermal taonga were converted, that would be an additional breach of the Treaty of Waitangi because the evidence of continued customary use indicates that Maori did not consent to such a result. We turn now to examine the impact of the native land title system on Maori customary rights to geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ.

The survival of customary rights in geothermal taonga

In cases where there was no alienation of customary land from 1840 to 1865, iwi and hapu of the Central North Island should have had their aboriginal title in land and their rights to geothermal taonga protected. That is what the common law should have secured to them in terms of their land as outlined in R v Symonds (1847). That is what the Treaty definitely secured to them along with the guarantee of rangatiratanga. But one of the limitations of the doctrine of aboriginal title is that such title to land may be extinguished by legislation, and by various other means such as the issue of a title derived from the Crown. So, once the Native Land Court investigated Maori customary rights to land and issued a new form of title or memorial under the Native Land Act 1873 may not have extinguished customary title to land. However, once freehold title was issued, customary rights to the land were extinguished.

As we know, nearly all customary land in the Central North Island was investigated and title eventually issued in fee simple. At that point, the exclusive rights of the hapu and iwi to control access to all the geothermal taonga within their tribal territory changed. We come to this view because of the decision in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa and the explanation by the chief justice when she stated:

From the beginning of Crown colony government, it was accepted that the entire country was owned by Maori according to their customs and that until sold land continued to belong to them (see the opinions as to the nature of native tenure collected in 1890 NZPP 1, and the authorities cited to the same effect by Stout CJ in Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General at p 341). Originally Crown purchases were required to extinguish Maori ownership and free the land for settlement under subsequent Crown grant. Subsequently, statutes provided authority for other modes of extinguishing Maori customary title.

The land became subject to the disposing power of the Crown by Crown grant only once customary ownership had been lawfully extinguished. In R v Symonds Martin CJ said at p 394 of the 1841 Ordinance [The Land Claims Ordinance 1841] that it:

... everywhere assumed that where the Native owners have fairly and freely parted with their lands the same at once vest in the Crown, and become subject wholly to the disposing power of the Crown.

Similarly, under successive Land Acts beginning with the Imperial Waste Lands Act 1842, land was able to be disposed of by the Crown only when freed from Maori proprietary interest. So too, when the New Zealand legislature was empowered in 1852 to make laws for the sale of waste lands they were defined as those lands ‘wherein the title of Natives shall be extinguished’ (s 72 of the New Zealand Constitution Act.
The Land Act 1877 defined the ‘demesne lands of the Crown’ (estates which could be granted by the Crown) as ‘all lands vested in Her Majesty wherein the title of the aboriginal inhabitants has been extinguished’ (s 5). After the establishment of the Native Land Court (effectively from 1865) the principal manner in which customary title was extinguished was through the operation of the Court in investigating ownership and granting freehold titles.

The Native Lands and Maori Lands Acts from 1862 until enactment of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act were a mechanism for converting Maori customary proprietary interests in land into fee simple title, held of the Crown. Only such land could be alienated by the Maori owners to private purchasers. The explicit policy of the legislation was ‘to encourage the extinction of such proprietary customs and to provide for the conversion of such modes of ownership into titles derived from the Crown’ (Preamble to the Native Lands Act 1865). The statement is further legislative acknowledgment that Maori customary property is a residual category of ownership not dependent upon title derived from the Crown.

We take this to mean that Maori customary property falling into a residual category of ownership can survive and coexist with title derived from the Crown. Therefore, despite the issue of a Native Land Court title for the land, it is arguable that Maori customary rights in geothermal taonga remained and coexisted in the following way:

- In relation to the first and second layer of customary rights held exclusively by hapu and iwi at the local level, their ability to control access to their geothermal taonga, including their fields, was modified once land title was issued. That is because that title was converted to a title held by individual owners of the hapu. With that title, individuals from the hapu obtained title to the land and all that runs with it. But, in our view, the grant of title to land to an individual was not a grant of title to the geothermal fields and the TVZ. That is because the claimants’ customary rights to geothermal resources were only modified to the extent that the right to control access vested in individuals of the hapu rather than the collective. The customary rights in the geothermal taonga, held at the hapu or iwi level, remained. The only difference once a Native Land Court title was issued and later registered, was that the landowner had to consent before hapu members could access their taonga where it emerged from the land. One can see in the customary evidence, outlined earlier in this chapter, that the rights of the hapu and iwi continued to be asserted, and the customs associated with the geothermal surface features forming part of the bundle of rights associated with land occupation continued and coexisted with land ownership. The evidence is that individual Maori landowners recognised that geothermal surface features on their land were taonga of the collective, to be managed in accordance with hapu and iwi customs. In some cases, the pools and other surface features are considered whanau taonga, as they were before the Native Land Court. In other cases, these taonga are used by the entire hapu or iwi as communal bathing or cooking places, even though the geothermal resources feeding these sites now emerge from the private land of individuals of the hapu. Alternatively, the Native Land Court itself, or the Maori landowners, recognising the hapu or iwi interests in these ngawha or waiariki, set aside such areas as Maori reservations held for the common benefit of the hapu or iwi, as on Mokoia Island.

- In relation to the third layer of rights, there is no effect on the collective hapu and iwi rights to the subterranean geothermal resource (TVZ). Their customary rights remain, and they continue to share those rights by virtue of their common history, or their whakapapa to Ngatoroirangi, or both.

The result is that the exclusive right to control access to geothermal resources associated with land previously vested in the local hapu or iwi, is modified, but other aspects of their customary rights and modes of ownership over these geothermal taonga remain. Consequently, where in accordance with Maori custom and tikanga access is still
being exercised, and the relationship with the taonga is extant, even though the land is owned by individuals, then we think their customary rights to those resources were not extinguished. Their customary rights and the hapu or iwi rangatiratanga continued. We come to this result because we are talking about Maori land which was previously customary land. The title the owners hold is really a legal artifice. The majority of owners of the land are, and never have stopped being, members of a hapu or iwi associated in accordance with tikanga Maori to the land previously held under the full authority and control of the hapu. The owners are the descendants of those who held the land communally and in accordance with custom.

The land is a taonga tuku iho (inherited treasure). The importance of land as a taonga tuku iho is recognised in the Preamble to the current Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. In the same way, the geothermal resources that emerge from that land are taonga. Both land and geothermal resources are therefore protected by the Treaty of Waitangi, and their retention by Maori is an expression of continuing Maori rangatiratanga and authority.

We therefore conclude that it is possible to argue that customary rights to geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ were not extinguished by the conversion of Maori customary title to Maori freehold land title capable of registration under the land transfer system.

If our view of the law is different from one that would be reached by the courts, then so be it. Such a result would mean that there is no legal protection for Maori customary rights to their geothermal taonga. That result would indicate that the Crown, by omission, has failed to protect Central North Island Maori rights, in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Crown’s obligation in terms of article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi is to provide for and protect Maori rights over all their taonga.

The significance of previous Tribunal geothermal reports
The claimants, through submission from Mr Taylor, have asked this Tribunal to decline to follow the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal on the point that Maori lost their proprietary interest in their fields upon land sales. We note first that that Tribunal had this to say about the impact of the Native Land Court process:

the simple act of awarding title and naming individual owners has generally dissolved in one stroke the rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga over the land and its resources. It has exposed individuals to the responsibilities of being both owners and trustees of the tribal heritage at the same time without, however, requiring them to be accountable to beneficiaries, and
without protecting them from their own possible prodigality and loss of their community’s means of survival.

In the present case there has been the added consequence of the owners failing to be informed of the implications of the separation in law of the springs from the underground resource, further undermining their value system and regard for their taonga . . .

Where customary land tenure had been part and parcel of tribal political organisation with chiefs and elders holding rights of administration for the tribal good, individualisation of title through the Maori Land Court gave unfettered rights to those fortunate enough to be named as owners. It would seem from the record that there was comparatively little desire to exercise rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga over land in general whenever alienation was in prospect. As against that, however, there has also been a clear intention to retain trusteeship over the springs, at least on the Parahirahi block. The intention has been steadfast over at least two generations to date and underlined by a continuous stream of petitions and protests, not over the comparatively vast acreage surrounding the springs acquired by the Crown, but certainly over the four acres of the five acre Parahirahi C block containing the springs themselves.

The sense of rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga held by the descendants in the land would appear to be further demonstrated by their acts of occupation of the Crown’s four acres (until evicted) and by their deliberate setting up of a management committee for the one acre Parahirahi C1 block instead of allowing a further diminution of trusteeship through succession to deceased owners.\(^\text{543}\)

Here, the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal is acknowledging the change or modification that occurs once a Native Land Court title is issued. That title circumscribes the ability of the hapu or iwi to control access to geothermal resources. But on our reading of its report, the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal was not saying that all aspects of rangatiratanga were diminished. The exercise of Maori rangatiratanga or right to autonomy does not depend on the ownership of land. There are political and managerial elements to rangatiratanga or autonomy that continue
despite the loss of land. Nor does the sale result in loss of rangatiratanga over the fields.

What is clear in terms of land is that there has been a modification of hapu and iwi autonomy, authority, and control over that land. Of course we would need to undertake a block-by-block analysis to know for sure, but in the circumstances of the Central North Island there has been no evidence of any significance in this stage one inquiry pointing to a desire on the part of iwi or hapu (as opposed to individual land owners) to willingly part with their springs or other surface features. There has been evidence of sharing of these taonga by some hapu or iwi, such as Ngati Whakaue, by gifting lands for the benefit of the Rotorua township. There is also a pattern of land alienation where individual Maori are selling their undivided shares in land which are then partitioned in favour of the Crown or private purchasers in order to secure the Crown or third-party interests in a thermal area. We also have examples in the evidence that often the Maori sellers did not appreciate the import of the sales of their shares. We discussed the general pattern of land alienations in part III. We cite specific examples concerning geothermal resources below. Contrary to that pattern of individual land alienations is the obvious desire on the part of Central North Island hapu or iwi – steadfast in effect – to retain their geothermal surface features and their geothermal fields, and to resist alienation of those resources. So we do not believe that our view is substantively different from that of the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal on the issue of the impact of a Native Land Court title or sale.

Fundamentally too, the facts before us are different from those before the Ngawha Tribunal. On the facts before that Tribunal, it was concerned only with the subsurface components of one geothermal field. In that situation:

The tribunal considers that once ownership of a significant part of the geothermal components, such as the surface hot springs and pools and other manifestations, are severed from that of other surface components, as has occurred in the Ngawha region, no one owner of some only of the surface components can validly claim the right to use and control the whole of the resource in and under the geothermal field. The present day owners, whether private or public, of the alienated surface of the geothermal resources, in Parahirahi B block and the Tuwhakino block must necessarily have the right to use and control at least the surface components on land owned by them (subject always to any statutory provisions affecting them). Counsel has recognised that rights ‘might have been shared.’ If he was implying that rights in the alienated surface components continued to be shared following their being vested in separate individual Maori owners, we cannot agree. Once severed and separately owned, the right to use and control the surface component no longer lay with the previous owners . . .

In so far as the Maori owners of such alienated land previously held rangatiratanga over it and the geothermal resource on and under such land they necessarily lost such rangatiratanga and the associated rights of control when they disposed of the land. This finding turns on the facts of that case where there had been significant severance of ownership over surface hot springs and pools and other manifestations. We agree that in those circumstances the local iwi or hapu rights may be diminished over surface manifestations, and ultimately a geothermal field, where all land has been sold and no further ownership of land remains. We note that, as the new landowners acquire all rights that run with land, eventually the hapu or iwi customary rights in their geothermal taonga may have diminished to such an extent that they disappear completely in relation to that one field.

But the situation is different in the Central North Island where we are talking about a multiple number of fields which, while all separate, all depend for their sustainability on one common heat system, the TVZ. We cannot, therefore, accept the Crown’s position that ‘rangatiratanga’ over the fields and the TVZ was lost on sale, alienation, or grant of a Native Land Court title in the Central North Island.

In this important respect, because the facts before us are different, we can come to a different conclusion from the
Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal and its findings on rangatiratanga over the subsurface resource. That Tribunal stated the following:

A critical question is whether the sub-surface components of the resource are capable of ownership. Our view on this topic cannot be in anyway definitive. As we have indicated, at 1840 and prior to the vesting of ownership of various parts of the field in separate owners, various hapu held rangatiratanga over the whole of the resource by virtue of their management and control of the land surface of what is now known as the geothermal field and of the hot springs and pools on the land. But since the alienation of part of the resource in the form of surface components and of the land on which they are situate, neither the hapu of Ngawha nor the trustees of the Parahirahi C1 Maori reservation have any right, or indeed power, to exercise management or control over such surface components for they no longer have rangatiratanga over them. Nor indeed do they have any right to access them.

As to the underground component of the ‘resource’ there are problems in sorting out the various elements. Is it realistic for instance to segregate out ownership of the underground geothermal fluid from all the components which go to produce it? As we have seen from the scientific evidence the geothermal system is highly complex with many inter-related components. If, however, the subsurface geothermal fluid is isolated from the remainder of the underground components of the resource for the purpose of considering the question of ownership, the tribunal considers that once ownership of the surface components has been severed there is no basis for allocating the right of ownership of or rangatiratanga over the whole of the sub-surface geothermal fluid to the owner of only one set of hot springs or pools. No one such owner or group of owners can validly claim the exclusive right to manage and control the underground fluid or, in all circumstances, to exercise a veto over its extraction and use. The question of what degree of protection should, however, be given to the highly valued taonga comprising the hot springs and pools in the care and trusteeship of the trustees of the Parahirahi C1 Maori reservation and the adjoining Crown-owned recreation reserve pools, should they be returned to Maori ownership, is considered later . . .

We note here that the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal stated that its view was not the last word on the matter of the extent to which Maori can claim ownership of subsurface geothermal fields or systems. We agree that a geothermal field is a complex system, but there can be no doubt that it is the underlying heat, energy, and water or fluid that is essential to that system, and that is what Maori in the Central North Island valued. We discussed this fully earlier in this chapter. The facts are different in the Central North Island from those that were before the Ngawha Tribunal. We refer here to the number of fields and the TVZ, the customary and continuous dependency of Central North Island Maori on the resource from ancient times to the present day, and the nature and the extent of Maori ownership of land in or around and/or over the geothermal surface resources, where they emerge from the land, rivers, or lakes.

We also note that our findings are consistent with those of the Tribunal’s Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims, which preferred to leave the issue of ownership and control of the geothermal fields (and, by implication the TVZ) unanswered until further research had been undertaken into land sales. That Tribunal comprised the same members who sat to hear the Ngawha Geothermal Resource claim.

By comparison, we have come to our findings on the basis of further research made available for the Central North Island inquiry which the earlier Tribunal did not have access to. Although detailed block history reports have not been completed for us, there is enough information available to be certain that Central North Island Maori have retained a foothold in the land sufficient to maintain their Treaty rights, including their rangatiratanga, to the underlying TVZ. That is because Central North Island Maori interests are intra- and inter-iwi in nature, are layered, are communal, and depend not just on the emergence or manifestation of the geothermal resource at one place...
in one field, but at a multitude of places across a range of fields through the tribal districts of Taupo, Rotorua and, to a degree, in Kaingaroa. This is to be compared to the situation among Nga Puhi where the resource considered by the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal was principally one field over which most of the land had been alienated and where there was not the same dependency on the surface features and the sole field.

We note further, that the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal could not, even in the situation where there had been such intense land loss, disregard the hapu interest in the subsurface resource. It found that the claimants before it, while no longer retaining an exclusive interest in the subsurface geothermal resource, necessarily retained a substantial interest in the resource.\(^{547}\) The Tribunal continued:

The preservation of their taonga, the Ngawha hot springs, necessarily depends on the preservation and continued integrity of the underlying resource which manifests itself in their hot springs and pools. It is totally unrealistic to isolate or divorce their interest in the Ngawha hot springs from the geothermal resource which finds expression in them.\(^{548}\)

Therefore, when we consider the Central North Island we are certain that in situations where hapu or iwi at the local level have lost their land through land sales or otherwise, they will have retained a substantial interest, amounting to a priority interest in their geothermal taonga if the loss of land was a result of Crown actions inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. We would go so far as to say that even where a hapu or iwi no longer have any springs or surface features under their control, if their land was lost in breach of the principles of the Treaty, they also retained their collective iwi and hapu rights in the TVZ.

In this respect our findings are only slightly different to those of the Petroleum Tribunal. Here, we recall that the Crown has not accepted the findings of the Petroleum Report. While that is a matter for the Crown, it cannot be a matter that determines the relevance of the report’s content for this Tribunal. But we note that there are differences. First the Petroleum Tribunal did not have sufficient customary evidence available to it, given that it was an urgent inquiry, to be able to make findings about petroleum being a taonga and therefore subject to article 2 rights and obligations.\(^{549}\) Instead, they treated the Maori customary interest in petroleum as an incident of land ownership and therefore subject to the equality guarantees in article 3 of the Treaty, or as a right to development, or both.\(^{550}\) In the context of the Central North Island, by contrast, we have been presented with a large body of evidence that geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ are taonga. Even so, we still find value in the Petroleum Tribunal on the issue of land loss. It noted that there had been alienation through a number of acts and omissions of the Crown inconsistent with the Treaty, including pre-Treaty transactions, pre-1865 Crown purchases, raupatu, Crown acquisition facilitated by the Native Land Court processes, takings under the public works legislation, and takings for survey liens.\(^{551}\)

The Petroleum Tribunal concluded that there were many circumstances in which the purchase of Maori title, or its acquisition by other means, breached the principles of the Treaty. The Tribunal stated:

we think it reasonable to posit that much, perhaps most, Maori land was lost in circumstances that were inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. Certainly the Tribunal’s Taranaki Report is a basis for reaching such a conclusion in respect of that district. It is on these bases that we conclude that, prior to the passing of the Petroleum Act in 1937, a significant proportion of the petroleum interests that belonged to Maori were alienated in a manner that gives rise to a Maori Treaty interest.\(^{552}\)

In the Central North Island, there is evidence of exactly the same patterns of land alienation, as we have discussed in part III of this report.

We can add to the list of the Petroleum Tribunal, the Thermal Springs Districts Act 1881 and its amendments. In part III, we considered the evidence of the targeted nature of Crown purchasing in terms of geothermal resources and the strategic use of the Native Land Court from 1881.
to 1950. In this respect, we particularly considered the impact of the thermal springs districts legislation. The 1881 Act and its amendments unambiguously reflected the policy of targeting by authorising the Governor to proclaim localities in which there were considerable numbers of ngawha, waiariki, or hot or mineral springs, lakes, rivers or waters. Once such an area was proclaimed, only the Crown could negotiate with Central North Island Maori for the purchase of lands with such features within these districts. This was a form of pre-emption. We have discussed how, as regards certain land blocks, the Crown set about acquiring as many individual interests as it could under the protection of this legislation, so as to secure its interests in a block with geothermal features, for example, the Whakarewarewa Geothermal Valley, discussed fully in part III.

We further note the response of Maori to the targeting of the resources by the Crown and the use of the Native Land Court in the partitioning process. Ngati Wahiao and Ngati Whakaue, for example, were outraged at the result of the court hearings leading to the alienation of the Whakarewarewa Geothermal Valley in favour of the Crown.

The Thermal Springs Districts Act and its amendments were followed by the Scenery Preservation Act 1903 which again targeted Maori land with geothermal features. This Act authorised the issue of proclamations over land for the purpose of scenery preservation. In such areas there could be no private sales of land. The legislation was amended several times and, depending on the state of the enactment, it could be used for the compulsory acquisition of land. We have discussed the impact on Central North Island Maori of this legislation in chapter 12 of this report.

Maori concerns about the scenic preservation legislation are recorded in a petition from Haupeta Hautehoro (of Rotorua) and about 100 others objecting to the compulsory taking of Maori land for scenic purposes. The petition stated:

The Maori lands that will be taken under this ‘Scenery Preservation Act’ are, the famous places, the lands containing thermal springs, the famous pas, the canoe landing places of former days, the sites of famous whares, the sacred shares, the bird snaring places of olden time, that is to say all such places as are understood by this Act as likely to be much frequented by the Tourists of the World who visit here ...

In our discussion in part III of this report we reviewed some of the evidence we received on targeting by the Crown of lands with geothermal features within the Central North Island and concluded that the practice of targeting, including the imposition of a form of Crown pre-emption for the purchase of land with geothermal features was in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and the Crown’s duty to act reasonably and in good faith.

The Tribunal’s findings on the impact of Crown control and Crown omissions before 1950

The geothermal resource was a taonga protected by the Treaty. Before 1950, rights to use geothermal features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ were controlled and regulated via the common law relating to water or energy resources, and statute law relating to waterways. We have discussed the impact of the common law in this chapter, and of the water statutes in chapters 17, 18, and 19. Essentially, the Crown left the regulation and control of access to geothermal resources to landowners, because the Crown linked control of access and use of geothermal resources to land and water. To the extent that it did not provide a title system to protect Maori rights in their geothermal taonga then, by omission, the Crown was in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

We find that there may be some protection to be found through the doctrine of aboriginal title. It is possible to argue that as at 1840 Central North Island Maori held customary rights to all land in the Central North Island and to all geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ. Following the issue of a Native Land Court title and its registration under the land transfer system, the customary ownership of iwi and hapu to all land within their
districts was converted to a title – but not a collective title – derived from the Crown. Their exclusive right to control access to their geothermal taonga was modified. Access became the responsibility of the individual hapu land owners. But all other aspects of the hapu or iwi customary rights over their fields and the TVZ remained. That was because Maori landowners continued to act collectively and in accordance with tikanga and custom. Access was and still is being exercised over geothermal taonga under the authority of the hapu and iwi, even though the Maori land is held by individuals of the hapu. Therefore, we find that customary rights held by Central North Island local hapu and iwi in geothermal fields and the TVZ remained, even where some of that land was sold. But where land was sold, all rights to geothermal surface features that form part of the bundle of rights of land ownership had gone. Such sales were not, however, sufficient to extinguish the hapu or iwi customary rights to the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, being the water or fluid, heat, and energy system or flow. To the extent that the application of the common law by the courts may reach a different conclusion on the law, then that points again to a failure of the Crown to provide a system of title that would protect Maori customary rights in their geothermal taonga and their exercise of authority over them.

If eventually the hapu or iwi sells or loses all their Maori land over a geothermal field, their rights in all the geothermal resources in that sole field may have largely diminished. However, even in such cases they may still have a significant interest that amounts to a priority interest in the field if the land was acquired by the Crown or others in circumstances inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Groups who fall into this category include Ngati Whaoa and other iwi who lost geothermal lands from the Paeroa and southern Rotomahana–Parekarangi areas. Geothermal sites lost include Te Kopia, Mount Kakaramea, and Waiotapu.

Although there have been land sales throughout the Central North Island, we consider that our findings mean that Maori customary rights remained intact during this period, because the iwi and hapu of the region have retained sufficient Maori land in and around the geothermal fields to establish that they have never relinquished their rangatiratanga over the TVZ. As we noted above, this is because Central North Island Maori interests in the TVZ are inter-iwi in nature, are layered, are communal, and depend on the emergence or manifestation of the geothermal resource not just at one place in one field but at a number of places across a range of fields through the tribal districts of Taupo, Rotorua, and to a lesser degree in Kaingaroa. This is in contrast to the Ngawha situation, where the resource considered was principally one field over which most of the land had been alienated.

Therefore, and despite some of the land being alienated, or despite the conversion of their customary land title by a Native Land Court title (as opposed to their customary rights to their geothermal taonga), the claimants continued to have ongoing customary and Treaty interests over their geothermal taonga, specifically their fields and the TVZ, where overlaid by or within the vicinity of Maori land.

Even if that is not correct at law, it is certainly the position in terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. Central North Island Maori possessed a taonga in 1840. That taonga was the geothermal fluid or waters and energy system, and any surface alienation of part of that taonga – including access to subsurface elements of the resource that ran with land ownership – cannot detract from that. In Treaty terms, Maori title remains and the Crown cannot and should not rely on technical common law rules relating to land and water to justify failing to acknowledge and provide for that interest. For that in itself is a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi. In finding this, we recognise that Maori rights could not interfere with the rights of a private land owner.

When the Crown asserted control of the geothermal resource in this region, to what extent, if at all, did it recognise and provide for Central North Island Maori Treaty interests? To address that question we have to refer to the Crown’s practice of targeting geothermal lands owned by the Central North Island Maori for acquisition. During
that process, it did not actively seek to provide a system that recognised Maori customary rights in their geothermal taonga. Rather, the introduction of the Native Land Court system, by converting Maori customary title to land to a title derived from the Crown, facilitated land alienation. While this had the effect of creating serious prejudice for those hapu and iwi who sold or lost thermal lands, their Treaty rights in the geothermal fields and the TVZ continued.

If the Crown had acted consistently with the Treaty, it should have recognised and provided for Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in their geothermal taonga. It did not do so. That is an omission in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Finally, we accept the submissions from Mr Taylor that under circumstances where thermal lands were acquired by the Crown in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi from 1840 to 1950, such land with geothermal resources and the geothermal fields still in Crown ownership, as opposed to private ownership, should where at all possible be the subject of negotiations between the parties for their possible return.

Crown regulation and control of geothermal energy after 1950

Before 1952, there was no state regulation of geothermal energy. New Zealand engineers had visited Italy in the 1920s and 1930s to observe the technology developed there to use geothermal energy to generate electric power, but were initially cautious and directed their attention to hydroelectric power. There was thus no degree of urgency before the end of the Second World War for the Crown to regulate. By 1945, the need to explore alternatives to water for electricity generation became urgent, due in part to concerns to avoid power shortages, in the North Island in particular. Legislation controlling the exploitation of water power (the Water-Power Act 1903) and petroleum (the Petroleum Act 1937) was already in force, but the search for alternative energy resources led officials first to uranium, which had exploded onto the scene during the war. Small amounts of uranium had been found on the West Coast of New Zealand, so in 1945 the Labour Government moved to nationalise it. When reading the parliamentary debates on the nationalisation process, one can discern a genuine political consensus around the need to develop such alternative sources of power.

Where political parties differed, it was usually over the vexed issue of the rights of landowners. On one view, it was considered that landowners should be allowed to exploit natural resources on their own land for their personal benefit. The converse view was that resources should be nationalised to be regulated by the State. For our part, either approach or a combination could have been used to meet the national interest while protecting Maori interests. But, while the Labour Government was in power, a clear state preference for nationalisation of energy resources became a policy that dominated the legislation passed from 1945 to 1949. The first major statute passed was the Atomic Energy Act 1945 dealing with uranium. The second, and more controversial, was the nationalisation of coal under the Coal Act 1948. In relation to the 1948 Act, speeches from the National Opposition focused on the State appropriating private property, or not paying adequate compensation, or both.

Debates on the possibilities of geothermal power commenced around 1947. Here, we recall Professor Boast’s evidence that in 1947, when R Semple, the Labour Minister of Works and Minister in Charge of the State Hydro-Electric Department, presented his annual report to Parliament, he began by explaining the severe difficulties the country faced in terms of adequate supplies of electricity.\(^5\)\(^5\) These difficulties were being aggravated by the impact of the war on obtaining plant and skilled labour, and were exacerbated by two very dry summers straining the resources of the existing system, it was claimed, past breaking point. In particular, this had reduced the power available from Lake Taupo. It was at this point that Semple raised the possibility
of geothermal power. As the technology for geothermal development was still in its infancy, a further visit to Italy was made, this time by officials from the State Hydro-Electric Department and the Ministry of Works, including the Commissioner of Works, to learn about the operation of the only geothermal plant operating – the Lardarello plant. After their return, and a change of Government, the first trial bores were put in place at Wairakei. By 1952, 17 bores were in existence at Wairakei. Only two of the 17 bores failed to yield steam, thereby underscoring its potential.

Rather than reverse the policy of nationalisation pursued by the Labour Government of the preceding years, in 1952 the National Minister of Works, introducing and discussing the Geothermal Steam Bill, promoted the centralisation of the right to regulate access to geothermal resources, rather than leaving control in the hands of landowners. The Minister advised Parliament that because of the potential of the Wairakei field: ‘It will be seen we are on the verge of a wonderful development in New Zealand. Its prospects are excellent.’ Professor Boast’s view is that the Geothermal Steam Bill was sold to Parliament as a result.

Nationalisation of geothermal energy as an energy resource was considered important because the National Government did not believe that anyone in the private sector had the incentive or the money needed to invest in the industry on the scale necessary to commence power generation of sufficient capacity to meet national demands. In large measure that was because geothermal technology was still in its infancy and therefore its potential in the market still lay in the future. For the Government, there had to be opportunities, it argued, for it to develop geothermal energy without restriction. But the barrier the Government confronted was the common law rights of landowners. The National Government’s dilemma was their fundamental philosophical position that such rights should not be eroded. The tension between the twin ideologies had played itself out during the passage of the Petroleum Act 1937 over which National had led a storm of protest, especially from Maori, as discussed in the Tribunal’s Petroleum Report. Similar sentiments concerning the rights of private landowners were expressed by the National Opposition in Parliament during the passage of the 1947 and 1948 legislation, though there is no specific Maori criticism to be found in the parliamentary debates.

We cannot be sure what the motive was for not vesting full ownership of geothermal energy in the Crown to obtain a state monopoly (as it did with petroleum, uranium, and coal), but what is clear is that it adopted the framework used for water – namely, aspects of the Water-Power Act 1903 – which we have discussed in chapter 18.

There is no evidence that the Crown consulted Maori in any significant way on the proposals for geothermal power generation and the use of their taonga, the geothermal resource. The traditional owners of the Wairakei–Tauhara field, for example, were not consulted regarding either the testing or the eventual extraction of geothermal energy at Wairakei. Granted they were not the legal owners of Wairakei lands by this stage, but they still had customary associations that warranted some acknowledgment. They still held some Maori land within the vicinity and they were the customary owners of the underlying geothermal heat and energy system (the TVZ). Had the Crown consulted Maori, the nature and extent of their customary interest could have been identified.

The geothermal steam and energy legislation

By section 2(1) of the Water-Power Act 1903, but subject to any rights lawfully held, the 1903 Act vested in the Crown ‘the sole right to use water in lakes, falls, rivers, or streams for the purpose of generating or storing electricity or other power’. It did not vest ownership in the Crown.

The framework used in the Geothermal Steam Act 1952 had a similar purpose to the Water-Power Act 1903. But it was different from the 1903 Act because it did not preserve any existing legal rights to generate electricity. Conversely, it did not expressly extinguish any existing ownership rights. This is very important because it means that the customary or aboriginal title of the claimants to the under-
The act gave the Crown the sole right to ‘take, use and apply geothermal energy for the purpose of generating electricity’. The power of the Crown to generate electricity was to be through the use of geothermal steam. Geothermal steam was defined in section 2 as ‘steam, water, water vapour, and every kind of gas, and any mixture of all or any of them, that has been heated by the natural heat of the earth’. Extensive powers were given to the Governor-General to take and use the resource, to set up infrastructure for taking and using geothermal energy, to enter onto private land to conduct surveys and tests, and to take any land necessary for the taking, use or application of geothermal steam for generating electricity. The Governor-General had the power to grant licences. He also had the power to proclaim geothermal steam areas, within which no person could sink a bore without the written consent of the Minister. The aim was to protect the areas which the Crown had selected for electricity generation. There was no mention of Maori rights and interests in the 1952 act. Outside the geothermal steam areas, landowners were free to sink bores wherever they liked. Within the geothermal steam areas existing bores could continue to be used unless the Minister, having regard to the public interest, directed otherwise.

The following year this Act was repealed and the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 was enacted. It seems that the reason why this Act was so quickly revisited was because it only vested in the Crown the right to use geothermal steam for the generation of electricity, whereas other industrial uses of geothermal steam and heat were being explored or contemplated. The Government was also anxious to regulate the use of steam bores, and to ensure that tourist attractions were not damaged. As a result, the Crown needed broader powers to use and regulate the use of geothermal resources. Interestingly, the reasons that may have led to a review of the legislation involved two plans to use geothermal resources on Maori land – at Kawerau for a forestry mill, and at Orakei Korako for a heavy water plant. In both cases, the Maori landowners were attempting to control access to geothermal resources on their land or within the vicinity thereof.

The Geothermal Energy Act 1953 gave the Crown the sole right to tap and use geothermal energy. When it was introduced as a Bill there were no debates or questions raised regarding Maori issues. The 1953 Act dropped the term ‘geothermal steam’ for ‘geothermal energy’, defining the latter in section 2 as:

energy derived or derivable from and produced within the earth by natural heat phenomenon; and includes all steam, water, and water vapour, and every mixture of all or any of them that has been heated by geothermal energy, and every kind of matter derived from a bore and for the time being with or in any such steam, water, water vapour, or mixture.

With this broader definition, section 3 of the Act vested in the Crown the right to take and use geothermal energy on the following terms:

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Act, or in any Crown grant or certificate of title or lease or other instrument of title in respect of any land within the territorial limits of New Zealand, the sole right to tap, take, use, and apply geothermal energy on or under the land shall vest in the Crown, whether the land has been alienated from the Crown or not.

(2) All alienations of the land from the Crown made after the commencement of this Act, whether by way of sale or lease or otherwise, shall be deemed to be made subject to the reservation of the sole right of the Crown to tap, take, use and apply geothermal energy on or under the land, and subject to the provisions of this Act.

Again, the 1953 Act did not expressly extinguish any existing rights, leaving any customary or aboriginal title of the claimants to the geothermal energy of the TVZ intact along with their Treaty rights. The Act, did, however, give extensive powers and rights to the Crown. It authorised

- the Governor-General by proclamation to set aside geothermal energy areas (section 4);
He Maunga Rongo

the Minister to issue licences and prevented anyone from sinking any bore, or tapping, taking, using or applying geothermal energy for any purpose without such licence unless exempted (section 9);

the Governor-General to take land necessary for the tapping, taking, use and application of geothermal energy under the Public Works Act 1928 (section 7);

the charging of a resource rental specified in licences (section 10); and

the Minister to close bores (section 12).

Authority was given to enter property and to drill geothermal wells (section 6). Notice had to be given of any intention to sink bores within any geothermal energy areas (section 9(1)(b)). Offences were defined and penalties laid down (section 15).

In the Ngawha Geothermal Resource Report, the Tribunal recited the following useful summary of the import of this aspect of the legislation vesting control of the right to regulate access to geothermal energy:

The purpose of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 (and its predecessor, the Geothermal Steam Act 1952[1]) was to put geothermal resources on a similar statutory footing to electricity generation from water. As noted by Boast, the legislative framework therefore links geothermal resources with water, rather than with other energy resources such as petroleum, coal or uranium. Interestingly, the legislation does not vest the ownership of the geothermal resource in the Crown – as the Petroleum Act 1937 currently does with regard to petroleum – but instead treats it as an energy resource akin to water. The fact that water itself is an energy resource highlights the conceptual difficulties of adequately categorising geothermal water (particularly in view of its mineral content).

In essence, the Act appears to be based on an assumption that the geothermal resource is analogous to groundwater, so that common law rights in respect of groundwater were of some relevance. S.3 becomes operative at the very point when the resource, considered in this sense, becomes a property right – namely at the point of abstraction. Leaving aside the limited exceptions outlined above [provided for in s9], it was necessary under the 1953 Act to obtain a licence from the Crown before abstracting geothermal fluid (and at that point obtaining property rights in the fluid). In that sense, the Act did not simply vest use and management rights in the Crown while leaving property rights unaffected. Its intent, rather, was to make the existence of private property rights in the resource dependent upon obtaining a licence from the Crown.571

In Parliament, the Crown’s right to control and license geothermal energy was justified on grounds of maximising the use of geothermal steam by siting industries within a limited area; and on grounds of the Crown’s right to recover costs, because of the ‘considerable amount’ it had spent exploring the Wairakei field.572

There were compensation provisions in section 13 of the Act for any person with land injuriously affected or who suffered any damage from the exercise of powers conferred by the Act. No compensation was payable in respect of geothermal energy unless, at the commencement of the Act, it was of actual benefit to the owners or occupiers of the surface land (section 14). The Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal thought this provision was inspired by ‘the common law’s view [that] landowners’ rights could require compensation for loss of the right to appropriate geothermal energy’.573

Issues concerning Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in the geothermal resources (waters or fluid, heat and energy) were never addressed in the legislation. Maori interests were clearly not considered by the Crown, unless it was to find ways of avoiding them, as in the Kawerau and Orakei Korako examples. There were, however, exemptions to the prohibitions against taking or using geothermal energy in section 9 of the 1953 Act. These exemptions included prior use and the right to sink bores, or tap, take, use, or apply geothermal energy for any domestic purpose whatever (including cooking, heating, washing, and bathing). The Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal thought this provision adequately recognised pre-existing use of geothermal energy by Nga Puhi for domestic purposes.574

We note that the position we adopt must be different because the situation pertaining to the customary use of
geothermal surface features and geothermal fields in the Central North Island is different. While we agree that Central North Island Maori rights to take for these domestic purposes were permitted, the extensive nature of the use of geothermal energy for cooking, heating, washing, and bathing, for horticulture and healing purposes by Maori across the Central North Island, as well as its social, cultural and spiritual significance to them – all indicates that the resource was important for much more than domestic purposes; it was a resource that people depended on to sustain their way of life. From the evidence before us, it is clear that one cannot reduce the Maori relationship with their taonga, the geothermal surface manifestations, to ‘domestic uses’.

In addition, the section 9 exemptions did not adequately recognise Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests to use their geothermal resources for customary purposes in accordance with their own tikanga and cultural preferences, as opposed to domestic purposes. As a result, the legislation did not accord an appropriate priority to these rights so as to prevent neighbouring domestic uses from impacting on their enjoyment of their taonga.

Delegation to local authorities and the management of geothermal surface resources, and geothermal fields
The first amendment to the Geothermal Energy legislation relevant for our purposes was the Geothermal Energy Amendment Act 1966. This added a new dimension by delegating to local city councils powers, under certain empowering Acts, to construct and operate any geothermal works without licences, and by authorising the Minister to delegate to councils the power to issue licences to other users, subject only to any conditions the Minister might impose in accordance with such delegation.

Under an amendment in 1969, the definition of geothermal energy was changed to exclude water at temperatures lower than 70°C. This made it possible to exploit the resource without controls and ensured that use could continue of any geothermal resources under this temperature without the need for a licence. Further provision was made for the payment and recovery of rentals as a debt due to the Crown. This latter provision was modified by the Ministry of Energy Act 1977.

The 1966 amendment to the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 was closely followed by the enactment of the Rotorua City Geothermal Energy Empowering Act 1967. The purpose of this Act was to enable the Rotorua City Council to make provision for the conducting of geothermal works, controlling the sinking of bores, tapping, use, and application of geothermal energy. The Act authorised the council to conduct such works, and to carry out inspections of these works or any private works. It provided for the council to regulate and control the sinking of new bores by the registration and issue of licences, and it provided for a charge for the supply by the council of any geothermal energy. Extensive powers to make bylaws regulating new and existing use were also granted, and many offences were created.

In 1968, the Minister – acting under section 9A of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 as amended in 1966 – delegated his power of licensing to the Rotorua City Council. That delegation was revoked on 6 October 1986. Essentially, it was revoked because the Rotorua regional geothermal field was by 1986 in a state of rapid depletion because of overuse by domestic users, and conservation measures were needed.

We received no evidence that Te Arawa was consulted about the Rotorua City Geothermal Energy Empowering Act 1967.

The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967
The next major statute affecting the geothermal resources and the geothermal fields of the Central North Island was the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. This statute nationalised all private rights in water and modified the common law regime of riparian rights. This Act, subject to a number of statutes, vested ‘the sole right to dam any river or stream or to divert or take natural water, or discharge natural water or waste into any natural water’ in
Section 2 of the 1967 Act defined natural water as ‘all forms of water including . . . geothermal steam.’ All persons wishing to take or divert or discharge into natural water were required to obtain a water right from a regional water board. An amendment in 1981 specified that water, steam, or vapour heated by geothermal energy whatever its temperature were all natural water. This confirmed the result in a judgment of the Court of Appeal where the link between the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 was considered. In Keam v Minister of Works and Development (1982), the Court of Appeal found that section 2 covered both geothermal water and steam. Therefore, the right to take and use geothermal energy became subject to the grant of a water right under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967.

The Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1981 was intended to put it beyond doubt that, where there is a conflict between the 1953 and the 1967 Acts, the 1967 Act was to prevail. Thus, applicants wishing to develop geothermal resources and the geothermal fields needed: a licence under the Geothermal Energy Act 1953; and a water right issued by the regional water board under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. This two-stage process was in practical terms then imposed by the Minister who would require applicants to acquire a licence and obtain a water permit. Furthermore, anyone diverting or discharging geothermal resources into natural water needed to obtain a water right.

But the legislation did not impose any requirement on the regional water boards to consult traditional Maori landowners. There was no direction in the legislation for joint-management options to control the use of geothermal water or fluids as defined in the 1967 Act. There was no requirement to consult with Maori regarding the management and protection of geothermal water. There was no special representation provision made for them on the boards. In this way, the Crown further appropriated the proprietary right of Maori to control the use of geothermal energy, although not expressly extinguishing their customary right. Their Treaty rights, of course, remained intact.

So, when the High Court found in Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority (1987) that Maori values could be imported into the Act’s interpretation as a matter to be considered before granting a water right, it came as a great surprise to the average local Government official. The High Court also suggested that the Treaty of Waitangi itself could be used as a guide to the interpretation of the 1967 Act. The problem with the Act was that it provided no adequate list or range of factors that the regional boards should consider when making decisions on applications for water rights. So while it was possible after 1987 to mount arguments based on Maori cultural and spiritual values in cases before consent authorities and on appeals (in relation to geothermal energy applications or in opposition to such applications), that victory was rendered nugatory because of the Labour Government’s process of local government restructuring and resource management law reform.

**The impact of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 and associated legislation**

With the passage of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, the stage was set for geothermal power to be harnessed and the building of power stations to proceed. No private landowner in New Zealand could from this point control access to geothermal energy or acquire a property right in it by capture, until the requirements under the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 were met. Nor was compensation payable for the loss of these rights. Individual Maori landowners along with all citizens of New Zealand continued to own their land but lost this feature of their property rights. They received no compensation for the loss.

The effect of the legislation on Central North Island Maori landowners was disproportionate. That is because a significant amount of land within or over geothermal fields of the region was still Maori land. Alternatively, it was Crown land or public land with geothermal resources. In such cases, and as we have discussed above, some Central North Island Maori have a significant, if not priority, interest in geothermal resources, or the geothermal fields, or both, where their land was lost because of past
Crown actions in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

The Geothermal Energy Act 1953 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 affected Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in geothermal resources and the geothermal fields in the following way:

- The legislation took away from individual Maori landowners their right to control access and their ability to receive any benefits from the control of access. Effectively, the individual Maori landowners were replaced by the Crown. As a consequence, the rights of the individual hapu members and the rights of the hapu and iwi to access their taonga were thereby diminished.

- It also took away from hapu and iwi the right to control the use of the taonga itself and, as a consequence, hapu or iwi lost the opportunity to receive any benefits from the ownership of the resource once it could be developed for geothermal power. This was done in 1953 by the Crown appropriating the right to control access thereby making the existence of private property rights in the resource dependant upon obtaining a licence from the Crown. This approach was confirmed by the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and the 1981 amendment which required regional water boards to determine water-right applications for the taking and use of geothermal resources, thereby controlling resource allocation.

Thus, the appropriation of the right of access and control to geothermal energy under the 1953 Act has had a disproportionate effect on Maori landowners, their whanau, hapu and iwi.

In addition, the section 9 exemptions did not adequately recognise Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in geothermal resources for customary purposes in accordance with their own tikanga and cultural preferences, as opposed to domestic purposes. As a result the legislation did not accord an appropriate priority to these rights so as to prevent neighbouring domestic uses from impacting on their enjoyment of their taonga.

The subsequent delegation to local authorities and regional water boards did not impose any requirement on these bodies to consult with Central North Island Maori. There was no direction in the legislation for these bodies to jointly manage, control, and use geothermal energy with local Maori. There was no requirement to consult with them regarding the management and protection of the main geothermal surface manifestations in their region.


We have found that the geothermal resources, the fields and the TVZ were taonga possessed in Treaty terms as at 1840. Maori customary rights and Treaty interests have never been expressly extinguished. The sale of land or conversion of customary title to a Crown-derived title in land has not extinguished those customary rights. Irrespective of ownership of the land, the Maori customary rights to the geothermal resource have continued. Even if the ordinary courts come to a different view of the law, the Treaty rights of the claimants have not been affected, and continue.

Historically the Crown has asserted the right to control and regulate the resource without adequately addressing the customary rights and Treaty interests of Central North Island Maori, and this has left serious present-day management and control issues still to be resolved. These issues involve the right of the claimants to maintain management oversight over the resource, to be consulted over its use, and to have access to revenue deriving from that use.

We find, therefore, that, when the Crown asserted control of geothermal resources in this region, it did nothing to recognise and provide for Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests.

We agree with the Crown that there were sound policy reasons for the Crown wishing to explore and develop alternative sources of energy – such as geothermal energy – at a time when it appeared New Zealand was facing an
electricity crisis. We also accept that the circumstances of the time were such that it was reasonable for the Crown to take the lead in the development of the geothermal industry. That is because only the Crown at this point had the expertise and the knowledge about the full potential of geothermal power and only the Crown could develop it. That is an appropriate exercise of the Crown's kawanatanga role under article 1 of the Treaty of Waitangi.

But the Crown's rights were constrained. First, its taking the lead in development of the geothermal industry was subject to discussing the matter with Maori of the Central North Island, the customary rights holders of the largest zone of geothermal activity in New Zealand. Secondly, its right to control access and manage geothermal resources, 'in the wider public interest' in the circumstances of the early 1950s, was constrained by the need to ensure that the rights and interests of Central North Island Maori in their taonga were preserved in accordance with their wishes.

Maori customary rights and their Treaty interests in geothermal taonga were fundamental rights. It is the job of this Tribunal, as stated in the Petroleum Report, 'to review Government actions, including legislative actions which may breach these fundamental rights'. The Crown, over the years 1953 to 1966, does not seem to have appreciated that the extent to which it had an obligation to protect these fundamental rights was an omission in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Crown should have known, or made a good faith attempt to find out, what the extent of the Maori rights and interests were. Its Treaty duty in a matter which was of the greatest interest and importance to Central North Island Maori was to consult. As we have demonstrated, there was an enormous amount of evidence available to it – had the Crown investigated – which established the Maori association with geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, beyond mere domestic uses. As we have noted, that association was also one known of and visible well beyond the Central North Island. Nor can the Crown be excused for its actions in 1953 on the basis that there was no protest about the legislation. That the four Maori members of Parliament did not say anything probably indicates nothing more than that they were party-aligned members, by this stage, in a Labour opposition philosophically committed to a programme of nationalisation. Maori directly affected by attempts to use their land for geothermal development did raise concerns at Kawerau and Orakei Korako. Instead of attempting to understand those concerns, the evidence which we discuss below demonstrates that the Crown simply attempted to circumvent them.

Once geothermal power was developed, another opportunity to involve Maori was available at the point when the Crown considered delegation to local authorities and regional water boards. When it did not do so, it failed to provide for the tino rangatiratanga of Central North Island Maori in environmental management. It did not include Central North Island Maori in the decision-making process, either through joint-management regimes or through special representation measures on these bodies. This also was in breach of the Crown's obligations to provide for the exercise of Maori rangatiratanga over their natural resources.

By the 1980s, the Crown had a further opportunity to address Maori issues, and did not do so. It did not take the opportunity to provide for Maori rights when it amended the Water and Soil Conservation Act in 1981 to explicitly provide for Maori Treaty interests in the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 by amendment to the Geothermal Energy Act 1953. This was a failure to acknowledge and provide for Maori customary rights and their Treaty interests in geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ. It was also a breach of the Crown's duty to actively protect Maori taonga and Maori rangatiratanga in resource management, because again there was neither an attempt to develop joint-management regimes nor to provide for special representation on these bodies.

We find that it was not reasonable in the circumstances of the time to impose the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, and statutes delegating aspects of its powers to local councils. In particular:
There was no significant consultation with Central North Island Maori before the enactment of any of the legislation relating to geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ. The Crown did not inform itself of the nature and extent of Maori interests in the geothermal resources, including the geothermal fields, and the TVZ. Although the right to generate electricity is not an aboriginal title right or a Maori Treaty right per se, the exercise of the Crown’s kawanatanga power to develop the industry was only possible by appropriation of Central North Island Maori customary and Treaty interests to control access and use. There was no provision for Maori rangatiratanga over their geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, in resource management.

If the Crown had consulted or informed itself of the Maori interest, the evidence available to us suggests that:

- The Crown would not have acted without exempting Maori landowners from the effects of the legislation.
- It would not have acted without considering a range of legislative options that would meet the public interest in developing geothermal power generation without the State needing to assume total control. There was no reason why, for example, a number of alternatives could not have been considered. One such alternative could have been a joint arrangement with Central North Island Maori, giving them management responsibility with the Crown, or a local authority, or both, and sharing the royalties and licence fees from the private and state utilisation of the geothermal fields and the TVZ.
- It would not have acted without providing for the customary rights and/or priority interest in geothermal surface features and the geothermal fields of the TVZ. This could have been done at either local or regional level through tribal trust boards and tribal committees constituted under the Maori Economic and Social Development Act which were operative in 1953 or their successors such as the district Maori councils, or any other modern expression of local and regional Central North Island Maori representation.
- It would not have acted without compensating Central North Island Maori for the appropriation of the right to regulate, manage access and use the geothermal energy of the TVZ.

The Crown’s regulatory regime is such that it did not, until the Resource Management Act 1991, expressly provide for Maori rights and interests. Consequently, we find that: under the Crown’s regime, Maori were only ever able to respond to applications for water rights under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 or licences under the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, even if they owned the land. There was nothing in the early legislation that gave them the right to obtain a water right or licence to protect their taonga. Rather, the grant of such licences or water rights was dependant on a specified end use. In this way – and although they were often the owners of land on which the geothermal heat and energy system could be accessed – they were debarred from the process of managing and protecting the resource, and they were debarred by section 14 of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 from receiving any compensation for access to the resource where it emerged from their land. They were also unable to ensure that neighbouring uses did not impact on their use and enjoyment of their taonga for customary purposes. Under the legislation, the only avenue open to Maori by which they might endeavour to protect their taonga was to object to – and if needs be appeal – the grant of water rights to others, and this legislation did not specifically recognise the Maori interests in the resource in terms of kaitiakitanga, Treaty interests, or customary rights.

We turn now to consider what happened to Maori rights and interests following the enactment of the Resource Management Act 1991 and local government reforms.

Understanding of Maori cultural and spiritual values increased as the Waitangi Tribunal heard and reported on the Motunui, Kaituna and Manukau claims and following the High Court decision in *Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority*. So, when the Crown commenced its local government and resource management reforms of the 1980s, the opportunity existed for the Crown to reconsider its approach to the regulation and control of geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ in the Central North Island by recognising and providing for Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests. We turn now to consider the statutory schemes that were introduced as a result of the reforms.

The RMA and local government statutory scheme

In 1991, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and the substantive provisions of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 were repealed and the Resource Management Act (RMA) enacted. The RMA unified and reformed dispersed legislation on land, air, and water use, and brought together the responsibilities of most central government agencies. Planning responsibility was delegated to regional and district councils. These bodies are now deemed to be body corporates pursuant to section 12 of the Local Government Act 2002.

The RMA continues the previous regime whereby water permits (previously water rights) are required from (now) regional councils for any take, diversion and/or use of geothermal fluids, steam, heat (section 14) and the discharge of such into water and, in some cases, air. In addition, the RMA introduced a new authority for regional councils to guide and regulate the taking and use of geothermal resources by way of regional policy statements and regional plans. These can contain objectives, policies, and rules relating to the taking and use of geothermal resources and the discharging of contaminants to water, air, and land. Regional plans classify the taking and use of geothermal resources into permitted, controlled, discretionary, non-complying, and prohibited activities. They also have policies which guide the allocation and use of the subterranean resource and which may touch on the role of Maori in relation to their geothermal taonga.

We turn now to analyse both the local government and RMA statutory schemes to determine to what extent if at all, the Crown recognised and provided for Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in geothermal resources, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ.

Local government legislation

The Crown acknowledges that local government legislation for most of the twentieth century did not contain provisions on how the Crown’s Treaty of Waitangi obligation to protect Maori rangatiratanga was to be implemented, so it has been unnecessary to examine various local government enactments in detail. The reforms of the late 1980s did not improve the nature of the local government legislation in this respect. In fact, according to Jane Kelsey, this was a deliberate decision taken by the then Government which had rather different preoccupations when it undertook the reorganisation of local government, in particular ‘efficiency’. Whether or not that is correct, clearly from a review of the statutory scheme, it has only been in this century that some change to this position has occurred with the enactment of the Local Government Act 2002.

The Local Government Act 2002 attempts, we were told, to address the manner in which the Crown’s Treaty obligations are to be addressed by local government. The Crown submits that in enacting this legislation it has acted in good faith by ensuring that local authorities engage with Maori, and that Maori interests and concerns form part of the decision-making process. In this way it has attempted to provide for Maori Treaty interests. We note that section 4 provides that:

In order to recognise and respect the Crown’s responsibility to take appropriate account of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and to maintain and improve opportunities for Maori to contribute to local government decision-making
processes, Parts 2 and 6 provide principles and requirements for local authorities that are intended to facilitate participation by Maori in local authority decision-making processes.

Section 14(d) provides that a local authority should provide opportunities for Maori to contribute to its decision-making processes. This measure is complemented by section 81 providing that a local authority must:

(a) establish and maintain processes to provide opportunities for Maori to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority; and
(b) consider ways in which it may foster the development of Maori capacity to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority; and
(c) provide relevant information to Maori for the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b).

There are principles governing consultation with Maori under section 82 and in section 77(c). Where local authorities are making significant decisions in relation to land or a body of water, they must take into account the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral land, water, sites, wahi tapu, valued flora and fauna, and other taonga.

The Local Government Act 2002 cannot be considered in isolation from the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori Constituency Empowering) Act 2001 and the Local Electoral Act 2001. These statutes provide for the establishment of Maori wards or regional council Maori constituencies.

According to the Crown:

local government and related resource management legislation has reflected the philosophy that it is preferable for decisions affecting the local community to be made by that community with the Crown setting the legislative parameters within which those decisions are to be made.\footnote{595}

We consider that while these new measures are an important advance on the previous local government legislation, nearly all still reflect the Crown’s preference for promulgating provisions that do not accord Maori a priority in decision-making, but rather reduce their Treaty rights to one of a number of factors that decision makers must take into account. This effectively means that – just as with the RMA on issues of central concern to Maori, such as those concerning their geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ – the Crown has not recognised and provided for their Treaty right to tino rangatiratanga or autonomy in resource management.

**The Resource Management Act 1991**

The repeal of Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and most of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 did not affect the Crown’s existing rights to control access to geothermal resources.\footnote{596} The Crown remained vested with the sole right to take, use, control, and manage water and geothermal water (which it then delegated to regional councils). This result was explained to the Ngawha Geothermal Tribunal in the following way:

The reform recognised that several iwi had lodged claims with the Waitangi Tribunal relating to the ownership of geothermal resources. The Government agreed that the Resource Management Law Reform was not the appropriate place to resolve ownership grievances, and that issues relating to Maori ownership of resources would not be dealt with in the reform. The Government also agreed to continue the vesting of the sole right to allocate the resource with the Crown until those issues were resolved. Other provisions in the Act were designed to ensure that the interests of Maori were adequately provided for.\footnote{597}

For our purposes the next relevant section of the RMA is part II, which sets up a hierarchy of matters that must be accorded priority in the interpretation and/or in the exercise of powers under the RMA. Section 5 provides that the purpose of the RMA is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. Sustainable management:

means managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which
enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while –

(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment.\(^{598}\)

Matters of national importance are listed in section 6, requiring that, to achieve the purpose of RMA set out in section 5:

all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall recognise and provide for the following matters of national importance:

(a) The preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment (including the coastal marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers and their margins, and the protection of them from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development:
(b) The protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development:
(c) The protection of areas of significant indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna:
(d) The maintenance and enhancement of public access to and along the coastal marine area, lakes, and rivers:
(e) The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga:
(f) The protection of historic heritage from inappropriate subdivision, use and development:
(g) The protection of recognised customary activities.\(^{599}\)

Decision makers exercising powers under the RMA must also have regard to a number of other matters listed in section 7. That latter section provides that ‘[i]n achieving the purpose of [the RMA] all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall have particular regard to’ a number of matters including: kaitiakitanga; the ethic of stewardship; and the protection of the habitat of trout and salmon. Finally, under section 8, and again to achieve the purpose of the RMA:

all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).

In part III of the RMA, duties and restrictions regarding the use and development of natural resources are spelt out. Directly relevant is section 14(1) which provides that no person may take, use, dam, or divert any water (other than open coastal water); or heat or energy from water (other than open coastal water); or heat or energy from the material surrounding any geothermal water, unless the taking, use, damming, or diversion is allowed by the RMA. Under section 14(2), no person may take, use, dam, or divert any open coastal water; or take or use any heat or energy from any open coastal water, ‘in a manner that contravenes a rule in a regional plan or a proposed regional plan unless expressly allowed by a resource consent or allowed by section 20A (certain existing lawful activities allowed).’ There are exceptions to these restrictions and they include under section 14(3)(c) the taking, damming, or diversion of geothermal water, where the water, heat, or energy ‘is taken or used in accordance with tikanga Maori for the communal benefit of the tangata whenua of the area and does not have an adverse effect on the environment.’\(^{600}\) Aside from the exceptions listed in section 14(3), including those in paragraph (c) described above, the management and allocation of rights to use geothermal resources and the geothermal fields are provided through two planning tools under the RMA, namely: (1) regional policy statements and plans; and (2) resource consents. Section 15 of the RMA prohibits
the discharge of contaminants into water unless permitted in a plan, resource consent, or regulations made under the RMA.

Part IV deals with the functions of regional councils and district councils. Under section 30, regional councils have responsibility for the control of the taking, use, damming, and diversion of water, and the control of the quantity, level, and flow of water in any water body, including the control of the taking or use of geothermal energy and the control of discharges of contaminants into or onto land, air, or water and discharges of water into water. Under section 33, there are provisions for a regional or district council to transfer any one or more of their functions, powers, or duties under the RMA to an iwi authority. This provision has still not been used, despite the RMA being in effect for over 15 years.

Part V contains the provisions dealing with national and regional policy and planning documents. Section 62 of the RMA sets out what the contents of such regional policy statements should be. The list includes identifying the significant resource management issues for the region and the resource management issues of significance to iwi authorities in the region. A regional plan must state the objectives for the region; the policies to implement the objectives; and the rules (if any) to implement the policies. They may also include the information that should be attached to resource consent applications. Furthermore, sections 61 and 66 require that in preparing or changing regional policy statements and plans, regional councils must take into account any relevant planning document recognised by an iwi authority and lodged with the council, to the extent that its content has a bearing on resource management issues of the region. There are provisions within the regional policy statements for both Environment Bay of Plenty (EBOP) and Environment Waikato that deal with the resource management issues of significance to iwi authorities in the region, including how they relate to geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ. We discuss these below.

Part VI of the RMA deals with resource consents. The RMA makes it clear that a resource consent is needed to do anything prohibited by sections 14 and 15 (section 87). Applications must follow the form required by the Act (section 88). There is a public notification process, a submission process, and there are special provisions dealing with regional council hearings and their decision-making powers. A number of geothermal fields in the TVZ are monitored in accordance with resource consent conditions under the RMA including Ohaki, which we discuss below, and the Mokai field. Heritage and water conservation orders are provided for under the RMA and there was a suggestion in the Ngawha Geothermal Resource Report 1993 that they could be used for the purpose of protecting significant geothermal sites. There are transitional arrangements made for licences and water rights granted under the Geothermal Energy Act and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. These previously awarded rights are deemed consents under the RMA (sections 386–387).

Regulations can be made under section 360(1)(c) prescribing the amount, methods for calculating the amount, and circumstances and manner in which holders of resource consents shall be liable to pay for the use of geothermal energy. The Resource Management (Transitional, Fees, Rents, and Royalties) Regulations 1991 (SR 1991/206) requires that these payments be made to the Crown for rent and royalties for the use of geothermal energy. These payments are made to regional councils under the RMA who then pay them to the Crown pursuant to section 359 of the RMA.

The Crown has acknowledged that the RMA, which governs the regulation of geothermal resources and the geothermal fields is not inconsistent with any existing customary property rights. Citing the chief justice in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa (2003), the Crown acknowledges that the legislation does not affect any extinguishment of such property rights. We are therefore of the view that the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, and the Resource Management Act 1991 have not extinguished Central North Island Maori
customary rights to the geothermal waters or fluid, heat, and energy within the TVZ. It has certainly not extinguished their Treaty interests.

**National management of the geothermal resource in practice under the RMA**

There is no national policy statement on geothermal resources, and the Crown has given no indication that it intends to promulgate one. Consequently, beyond the general requirement of part II of the RMA there is no national guidance from the Crown on the nature and extent of iwi and hapu interests in geothermal resources and how these should be provided for. This means that there is no clear understanding in the proposed regional policy statements and plans of how to effectively provide for and recognise iwi and hapu interests in the management of geothermal resources.\(^{604}\) The situation is aggravated by the fact that any promulgation of a national policy statement or set of guidelines now would come almost too late. We examine these documents further below, but basically the situation now is that all the RMA procedures leading to the major regional policy statements and plans becoming operative have been completed.

We note further that Mr Dickie for Environment Waikato, in answer to written questions, has identified this omission by the Crown.\(^{605}\) He has also told us that the Crown has not provided any informal guidance or guidelines to regional councils to assist with their statutory obligations to manage geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ while at the same time taking into account the rights and concerns of tangata whenua.\(^{606}\)

For a senior official from one of the most important regional councils involved in the management of geothermal resources to acknowledge this indicates that the failure to promulgate a national policy statement has been a serious omission on the part of the Crown. It is both serious and unfortunate because the Minister, under section 45 of the RMA, can have regard to anything significant in terms of section 8 (Treaty of Waitangi) of the RMA. By failing to develop a national policy statement in accordance with the procedures of the RMA within a reasonable time, the Crown has missed yet another opportunity to recognise and adequately provide for the customary rights of Central North Island Maori and their Treaty interests in the geothermal resource.

This has had a prejudicial effect for Central North Island Maori given that Environment Waikato, with 80 per cent of the nation’s geothermal resources within its region, has been delegated the responsibility to manage these resources. The regional council has already completed an intensive consultation and hearing process on its own regional policy statement and plan.\(^{607}\) The same is true for EBOP, with a large percentage of the remaining geothermal resources of the Central North Island in its region. Its planning process is also well underway with its regional policy statement now being operative and its proposed water and land plan being subject to the appeal process outlined under the RMA.

It seems that instead of opting for the national policy statement approach, the Government has embarked on a sustainable development programme of action for water. As a component of this review, we were told by Crown counsel that the Crown has commenced work on a programme to address geothermal allocation. This was being done jointly by the Minister of Energy and the Minister for the Environment. The anticipated reporting date for that work was June 2006.\(^{608}\) That became December 2006.

Reference to the Ministry for Economic Development website indicates that there is limited public information on this programme, though a Ministry of Economic development note on existing and potential geothermal resources provides some information on the use of geothermal resources and the geothermal fields for electricity generation. This information is intended to supplement the Ministry’s project to identify potential waterbodies of national importance in relation to existing and potential hydro generation, but the full report is not on the website.\(^{609}\) The importance of the TVZ in the upper North Island is identified in this note. The author(s) note that geothermal power generation accounts for approximately 7 per cent of
New Zealand’s total electricity generation. At a threshold of 230 gigawatt-hours per annum, the Wairakei, Ohaaki, and Mokai geothermal fields are considered nationally important in terms of existing electricity generation. The author(s) suggest that significant additional contribution to New Zealand’s generating capacity could be achieved by access to, and development of, further fields. The author(s) also suggest that delays and uncertainties in the resource consent process, and subsequent compliance costs act as the biggest obstacles to investment. Their table reproduced below shows a summary of potential electricity generation by geothermal field. The table is based on opportunities deemed to have a high-to-medium probability of progressing by 2025. It is derived from information collected by East Harbour Management Services in their 2002 report *Availabilities and Costs of Renewable Sources of Energy for Generating Electricity and Heat.*

At a threshold of 230 gigawatt-hours per annum, the Kawerau, Rotokawa, Wairakei, Ngatamariki, Mokai, Tauhara, Mangakino, Ngawha, and Rotoma geothermal fields are considered nationally important in terms of potential electricity generation. Note that the Wairakei field is considered nationally important in terms of both existing and potential electricity generation.

The relevance of this note and its appearance on the Ministry for Economic Development’s website is that it demonstrates that the Crown clearly understands the potential of the geothermal fields within the TVZ. Yet to date there have been no significant discussions with all the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island (with the exception of the Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu) over the nature and extent of their interests in geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, or their potential development. The Crown should know that the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island are vitally interested in the use of their geothermal taonga. We can point, for instance, to evidence from Peter Clarke for the Hikuwai Confederation demonstrating how keen they are to be involved in the development of their fields, subject of course to their conservation values:

9.1 Geothermal was always a taonga of ours and it is one that we’ve never sold. The manner in which the hot water of Onekeneke Stream was used for the purposes of the Waipahihi community is representative of how our kainga were often sited near geothermal resources to take advantage of the benefits that the resources gave.

9.2. We should have the right to exploit and develop that resource without having people tell us what we can and cannot do with it. We should also not have to pay any privilege for exploiting rights which are traditionally ours.

9.3. We understand that the Crown charges for rights to exploit geothermal, and that the use of our Tauhara geothermal is already locked up . . . through various agreement and/or policies of the Crown and local government.

9.4. There have been investigations of power generation . . . at the Tauhara field, near to Tauhara Maunga. We understand that this has taken place on Crown land, and that monitoring or test wells have been dug but capped. If it is developed under present plans we will get nothing. I attach marked ‘D’ a brief note sourced from the Ministry of Economic Development’s website which indicates that the Tauhara field has the potential to produce 550 GWh per annum, which is 5.2% of the additional potential geothermal generation nationally. This is said to be nationally significant. We believe we should be the ones developing these, our traditional resources. We look forward to a situation where we regain these rights and are able to enter joint ventures and [the like] to make real economic gain for our people.610

We consider that the failure in a national policy statement to address the full nature and extent of Maori rights and interests in geothermal resources, has been a lost opportunity to provide for such rights and interests. We turn now to consider in detail what the Crown’s failure to address this issue at the national level has meant for Central North Island Maori at the local and regional level.
Regional management of geothermal resources in practice
As we noted above, Environment Waikato and Environment Bay of Plenty manage all natural water resources of their respective regions straddled by the Central North Island inquiry district. They do so through the development of their regional policy statements and plans, and through the administration of the resource consent process. They also play the most significant roles in the coordination and monitoring of geothermal resources. Eastern Bay of Plenty Regional Council
We considered the actual management of geothermal surface features and the geothermal fields by EBOP. Here, the Tribunal was referred to EBOP’s proposed regional policy statement. EBOP classifies geothermal fields with different protection ratings. These areas are listed as follows:

- Geothermal Protection Level I
  Complete preservation of the natural, intrinsic, scenic, cultural, heritage and ecological values of the following geothermal resources:
  - Waimangu–Rotomahana–Tarawera
  - Whakaari/White Island; and
  - Moutohora Island/Whale Island.

- Geothermal Protection Level II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Geothermal field name</th>
<th>Potential additional capacity (MW)</th>
<th>Potential electricity production (GWh pa)</th>
<th>Percentage of GWh pa Nationally important at a threshold of 230GWh?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kawerau</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>26.8 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rotokawa</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2,390</td>
<td>22.8 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wairakei</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>13.6 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ngatamariki 2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>10.5 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mokai</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>7.3 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tauhara</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>5.2 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mangakino 3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>4.9 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ngawha</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4.8 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rotoma</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2.7 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tikitere-Tāheke</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.7 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Horohoro</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.7 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1332</td>
<td>10,496</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protection and rehabilitation of the natural, intrinsic, scenic, cultural, and heritage values by increasing the geothermal field pressures and the appropriate conservation management of surface features:

- Rotorua

- Geothermal Protection Level III

The use (including abstraction) of geothermal resources listed hereunder and excluding those in Geothermal Protection Levels I and II, shall not be authorised unless the adverse effects of the activity can be avoided, remedied or mitigated to comply with the principles of sustainable management as determined by a regional plan, or a resource consent application process, and there are no adverse effects on Geothermal Protection Levels I and II geothermal resources.

The resources listed include: Kawerau; Lake Rotoiti; Rotokawa/Mokoia Island; Tikitere/Ruahine; Taheke; Rotoma/Tikorangi; Rotoma/Puhipuhi; Papamoa/Maketu; Matata; Awakeri; Pukehinau; Manaohau.  

In terms of the allocation of the use of the resources, one of the EBOP regional policies is to permit the use and development of a geothermal field provided that the field’s potential, qualities, attributes and values are sustained having regard to a number of matters including the ‘iwi kaitiaki principles and taonga’ of a field. Other than through the general provisions in the regional policy statement complying with sections 6, 7, and 8, the only substantive policy recording Maori interests is included in compliance with section 62 to take into account resource management issues of concern to iwi. This is done by EBOP as follows:

Geothermal Resource

The geothermal resource is of considerable importance to the iwi and hapu of the region. The resource has a long history associated with the well-being and identity of the iwi, hapu and people of the region. It can generally be described as a taonga of the tangata whenua, having been gifted by the atua, Ruaumoko, and tohunga Ngatoroirangi of Te Arawa waka. It is considered that it was not alienated or sold even when the overlaying land was sold. Much of the resource lies beneath Maori-owned land and other parts of the resource underlie lakes also claimed as not being subject to sale or alienation.

Claims to the resource relate to rights which constitute what is commonly known as ownership of the resource. The Resource Management Act has changed the presumptions to ownership of the resource, with the rights to allocate resource consents being delegated to Environment BOP. The issues are:

- The exercise of kaitiakitanga should apply to geothermal resources, especially those whose surface features have been traditionally used by iwi and hapu.
- Recognition that Maori claims to geothermal resources include involvement in the management of those resources.
- The importance of geothermal resources for the tangata whenua that have historical association with geothermal fields has not been fully recognised.
- It is not always recognised that the tangata whenua with mana whenua over a geothermal site, exercising their rangatiratanga, determine the kaitiaki of that site.

This section of the regional policy statement merely recounts what Central North Island Maori identify is important to them without obliging the regional council to do much more than have regard to these matters in accordance with the RMA. There are passing references to geothermal resources being taonga and to kaitiakitanga, but the only other major reference to Maori are the provisions such as those in proposed change 1 complying with sections 6, 7, and 8 of the RMA. We were also referred to the iwi consultation guidelines checklist for geothermal resources.

We do not know how EBOP decides which geothermal resources are taonga and which are not. Given that all geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, are taonga a new categorisation system may be needed. The categorisation system above is evidence that regional and local officials still do not understand the
nature and extent of Maori customary and Treaty interests in these geothermal resources.

The second planning document we were referred to was the Rotorua geothermal plan. We were told it was ‘developed at the request of iwi for the primary purpose of protecting the taonga that was Whakarewarewa thermal area.’ However, in cross-examination that view was challenged by claimants.

Mr O’Shaughnessy listed the following features of the Rotorua geothermal plan designed to continue the success of bore closures that were implemented during the late 1980s to revive the resource after unsustainable extraction:

- maintaining level of permitted extraction at 1992 levels;
- compulsory reinjection of all extracted geothermal fluid so as to maintain the mass in the geothermal aquifer, which in turn maintained the hot water outflow to springs and geysers of both Whakarewarewa and other taonga area including Kuirau Park, and Government Gardens/Ngapuna;
- specific protection to be afforded to geothermal surface features which, although taonga, had historically been poorly treated;

In the plan, and after noting the findings of the Waitangi Tribunal in the Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims, EBOP identified that despite that Tribunal’s preliminary findings made to the Crown, there has been no directive from the Crown to EBOP to implement or give practical effect to the Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendations. Therefore, and in its own words EBOP considers that:

Environment BOP is obliged to operate under the Resource Management Act 1991 and could be considered to have compromised its duties if it did not exercise its function to protect what is an extremely vulnerable resource. The responsibilities and liabilities of managing the Rotorua geothermal resource currently lies with Environment BOP. Environment BOP will seek to be able to deliver the Rotorua geothermal resource to any future manager in a condition that is sustainable for future generations. Environment BOP will operate to carry out any directions from the Crown on this matter.

Notwithstanding resource ownership negotiations, and in accordance with the directions set out in the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Bay of Plenty Proposed Regional Policy Statement, Environment BOP will seek to establish a partnership of management relationship with Tangata Whenua.

But this relationship between tangata whenua and EBOP is primarily to deal with the geothermal resource and the hot pools and springs and other geothermal surface manifestations within the Whakarewarewa and Ohinemutu areas of the Rotorua field. The purpose of the partnership is to oversee any matters that tangata whenua of these villages and EBOP consider require attention, including the registration and protection of geothermal taonga, the determination of who has the right to claim geothermal use rights under section 14(3)(c) of the RMA, and the resolution of the concerns and matters of importance to tangata whenua raised at a meeting with Te Arawa representatives.

Table 20.3: Iwi Consultation Guidelines used by EBOP [extract], September 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of application</th>
<th>Consultation with iwi</th>
<th>Written approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotorua – bore</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotorua – surface feature</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other high-temperature fields</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– taonga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other high-temperature fields</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm-water fields</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm-water fields – taonga</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
held on 15 July 1993. This meeting is recorded in the second schedule to the Rotorua geothermal plan as follows:

Geothermal Meeting with Te Arawa Representatives:
15 July 1993
At this meeting staff of Environment BOP met with representatives of those Te Arawa iwi that have mana whenua, and exercise Rangatiratanga, over areas of Rotorua geothermal resource. From that meeting, the following concerns and matters of importance to Te Arawa were noted:

(a) Te Arawa supports the concept of sustaining the mauri of the Rotorua Geothermal Resource (RGR) and requires that the Rotorua Geothermal Regional Plan follows the sustainable management principles of the Resource Management Act, as those principles are in general accord with the geothermal kaitiakitanga principles of Te Arawa;
(b) Te Arawa require that the Waiariki of the geothermal field be respected. The field is to be sustained at a level that ensures the good health and protection of the mauri of the field and its features for present and future generations;
(c) Te Arawa will define what geothermal taonga are;
(d) Te Arawa will identify the respective iwi or hapu of Te Arawa that are kaitiaki to specific areas of the Rotorua geothermal field;
(e) The respective Rotorua iwi or hapu of Te Arawa that are the kaitiaki of geothermal taonga will identify and name their taonga, or not, as they wish. Te Arawa will provide Environment BOP with the location and name of taonga they wish identified;
(f) Te Arawa require that named taonga are to be respected, protected and referred to by their given Maori names throughout all planning documents;
(g) Te Arawa understands that Environment BOP has no jurisdiction to determine ownership of the field. Te Arawa acknowledge that Environment BOP is obligated by the Resource Management Act to allocate geothermal resource available for use;
(h) Te Arawa require to be involved in the administration and management of the Rotorua geothermal resource as management partners in accord with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi;
(i) Te Arawa require that the Rotorua Geothermal Regional Plan provides for the self-regulation and self-management of geothermal surface manifestations on land owned by Te Arawa iwi as they have rangatiratanga over them and are kaitiaki of them. Te Arawa are to give guidance as to whether the concerns and matters of importance noted are complete with respect to the plan.

Other than recording what Te Arawa wanted, there is little further mention of Maori interests in other geothermal resources. Te Arawa are certainly not accorded priority in the Rotorua geothermal plan. For example, according to rule 12.3.3(b)(ii), every new and existing resource consent granted to authorise the abstraction of geothermal water, heat, or energy from the Rotorua geothermal field shall be subject to restrictions where the geothermal aquifer decreases and remains low. In terms of section 14(3)(c), new bore extraction of geothermal water from the Rotorua geothermal field is deemed to have an adverse effect on the environment by virtue of rule 13.5.3(b)(iii) of the Rotorua geothermal regional plan. In such cases, the development is classified as a discretionary activity requiring that Rotorua Maori have to apply for a land-use consent. How this rule was arrived at is explained by reference to section 6(b), and is referenced to a proposition that the Rotorua field is of international importance and that it is at risk. Reference is also made to Maori issues in the following manner:

The need to respect and protect geothermal features as taonga is a matter of deep concern for Te Arawa people. For over 600 years Te Arawa iwi have been resident in the Rotorua area, in particular Ngati Wahiao/Tuhourangi and Ngati Whakaue. It is a matter of urgency that geothermal
taonga and the mauri of geothermal water be protected and respected.

In the absence of definitive information regarding which features require protection, the default suggested is to regard all geothermal features as having qualities worthy of protection until information proves otherwise. The only other mention of Maori is a repeat of the matters concerning the partnership relationship with Te Arawa that might be explored.

At the city council level, the Rotorua District Council exercises a number of related functions, such as the grant of land-use consents. The Rotorua district plan names Ohinemutu, Whakarewarewa, and Ngapuna (all geothermal areas) as papakainga of special importance, and identifies ways in which the council might work with tangata whenua to preserve their special character. One way that councils might work with tangata whenua is by the use of section 33 of the RMA, which makes provision for functions and powers to be transferred from councils to iwi. Another is to develop plans and strategies in partnership.

Consultation between the district council and Te Arawa continues, and the council – though recognising the principle of rangatiratanga – has not expressed a preference at this stage. In short, no transfer of powers to Te Arawa has occurred.

Environment Waikato

Environment Waikato is responsible for the policy and regulatory aspects of the geothermal resources in the Waikato region (including Taupo) by virtue of section 30 of the RMA. The region contains 80 per cent of New Zealand’s geothermal resources, including 15 large high-temperature systems, which are being managed and used for different purposes.

Mr Brockelsby for Environment Waikato told the Tribunal that the regional council recognises that its functions and duties as set out in section 30 of the RMA must be balanced with its duties and responsibilities specified in sections 6, 7, and 8 of the RMA. He claimed that the geothermal policy documents produced by the council aim to achieve a balance in developing resources while also protecting them for future generations. In terms of achieving this balance, emphasis is given to categorising different geothermal systems to identify the character, features, and future use of the systems. The regional council recognises that geothermal resources in the region are taonga to tangata whenua. In recognition of the status of Tangata Whenua under the RMA and its obligations under section 8 to take account of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, Environment Waikato has taken particular care to ensure that Tangata Whenua are appropriately involved in any policy or regulatory process affecting natural resources.

In considering applications for development, Environment Waikato places ‘a strong emphasis on consultation’ and is concerned to see whether an applicant has included ‘provision for a system management plan to ensure that adverse effects on the resources are mitigated.’ At the time of our hearing, its policies in relation to geothermal resources and the geothermal fields or systems were to be found in:

- the Waikato Regional Policy Statement: proposed change 1 and geothermal section (dated 12 June 2004); and
- the proposed Waikato regional plan: proposed variation 2: geothermal module (dated 12 June 2004).

Very importantly, Mr Brockelsby stated that Environment Waikato recognised that Maori in general were vitally interested in the future of geothermal resource management in the region. He told us that a full round of consultations with Maori and the public, submissions and hearings have been held in relation to the regional policy statement proposed change 1 and the proposed plan variation 2 in accordance with the requirements of the RMA. He advised that a draft of these documents was sent out to about a hundred iwi and hapu groups before public notification. In addition, Environment Waikato asked parties to indicate whether they wished to be specifically consulted, and only one group did – Ngati Karauia of Tokaanu. Written comments were provided from Ngati Kurauia, Tuaropaki.
We were provided with the documents sent by these bodies, and we note that they drew attention to their ownership of the underlying geothermal systems and the need for development where sustainable:

- Ngati Kurauia in 2000 had planned on completing a management plan, but it seems financial constraints led to a delay. Mr. Dickie stated that the potential for section 33 transfer of functions was also canvassed during these negotiations, with the hapu building capacity for the monitoring of the resource and the regional council responsible for the enforcement of consent conditions. A hapu management plan was to be developed and would be given effect by a change to the regional plan to incorporate the relevant provisions of the hapu management plan through a full first schedule RMA process. Why this did not proceed is not stated, but the evidence of George Asher indicates that Ngati Kurauia was in some financial difficulty causing a delay.

- The trustees of the Tauhara North 3B Trust wrote to Environment Waikato claiming they were the rightful owners of Lake Rotokawa and surrounding lands, currently administered by the Department of Conservation. The trust wanted to utilise its geothermal resources including sulphur deposits and the field within its lands and Lake Rotokawa. They wanted the Rotokawa system to be classified as a development system because there had been ongoing development activities for extraction of sulphur and drilling of geothermal wells.

- The Tuaropaki Trust, as representatives of the seven Mokai hapu, considers the hapu are the rightful owners of the Mokai resource, as it is a taonga (treasure), the title to which has never been legally extinguished. The trust was concerned about the ‘short timeframe’ for submissions on geothermal policy documents. It noted the additional restrictions placed on itself in terms of its use of the Mokai field, and then expressed concern about the resource consent process, citing costs of compliance.

Environment Waikato cited its attempts to work with Ngati Kurauia to develop a hapu management plan for Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua, following the hearings on the proposed regional plan. The project did not proceed, although Environment Waikato set aside a budget for it. Mr. Dickie stated that the potential for section 33 transfer of functions was also canvassed during these negotiations, with the hapu building capacity for the monitoring of the resource and the regional council responsible for the enforcement of consent conditions.

We were then referred to the proposed regional policy statement change 1 – geothermal section. This is the regional council’s attempt to allocate the geothermal resources and the geothermal fields in a way that ‘enables use and development while protecting the extent and variety of features and characteristics region-wide.’ The policy seeks to categorise certain systems for certain purposes as opposed to ‘trying to meet mutually incompatible demands within all fields.’ In this manner, a type of hierarchy is created with some systems targeted for development and others to have a more protected status. Affirming this, Mr Dickie for Environment Waikato told us:

The geothermal system is the primary management unit used, (not field). Of the 15 large hot geothermal systems of the Taupo Volcanic Zone, seven have been identified for development, two for limited development, four for protection of their outstanding surface features and two as research systems as there is uncertainty as to whether they are hydraulically connected to protected systems.
Five categories of geothermal system are identified on the basis of the system size, vulnerability of surface features to development, and existing uses. These categories are important, as different rules apply to their use and management. They are:

- **Development Systems**: systems where there are few vulnerable surface features or where existing features are significantly impaired and there is no known connection with other field types. There are seven development fields in the Environment Waikato region – including, from the Central North Island, Ohaaki, Mokai, Rotokawa, Ngatamariki, Tauhara, and Wairakei. Mr Brockelsby told us that the proposed plan variation seeks to achieve integrated management of each system by limiting extraction to a single operator. This is premised on Environment Waikato's view that multiple operators in the same geothermal system ultimately lead to competitive extraction of fluid, which is inconsistent with the sustainable management of the geothermal resource.

- **Limited Development Systems**: systems where there are significant geothermal features that would be adversely affected by large-scale development, but where smaller-scale uses are unlikely to adversely affect those features. These include Atiamuri, and Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua;

- **Protected Systems**: systems where only sustainable use can occur. They include Te Kopia, Horomatangi, Orakei Korako, Tongariro and Waikite–Waiotapu–Waimangu. These are geothermal systems that require particular care to ensure that any use of the geothermal resource is sustainable and has no discernible effect on significant natural geothermal characteristics because:
  1. The system supports a substantial number of surface features that are moderately to highly vulnerable to the extraction of fluid; or
  2. The system is largely or wholly within a national park or a world heritage area; or
  3. There is evidence of a flow of subsurface geothermal fluid to or from a system described in 2.

- **Research Systems**: systems where there is insufficient information to identify them as development, limited development or protected geothermal systems. In such a system, takes may be allowed if it can be demonstrated that they will not threaten significant geothermal features or natural characteristics. This includes geothermal systems yet to be discovered. The only example we know about is Reporoa.

- **Small Systems**: systems where there may be limited takes that do not threaten significant surface features, existing uses, and other natural and physical resources. The systems in the Central North Island are Waitetoko (Taupo), Motuoapa (Lake Taupo), Whangairorohe and Ngakuru in the Rotorua district.

The proposed regional policy statement change 1 identified five geothermal management issues and five management objectives with respective policies and methods. The proposed plan contains a rule regime for each category of geothermal system.

We were told that the council seeks to promote the sustainable management of the regional geothermal resources and the geothermal fields through this hierarchy of systems and applicable rules. With respect to development systems, the council is promoting sustainable management through a strong policy preference to reinject taken fluid back into the same system from which it was extracted. It also requires the remedy or mitigation of adverse effects on surface features. As an added precaution it demands a staged development of systems to recognise that information critical for the management of each system will be gained through exploitation and to ensure that systems are not over-exploited from the outset. We have already noted that it limits development of the fields to one operator. Environment Waikato also requires each system operator to prepare a system management plan. It also requires the establishment of an independent peer-review panel for each development system to oversee the management of the system and advise Environment Waikato in
relation to the exercise of the consent. This is a cost and management liability risk savings measure. The management of the consent is the only responsibility maintained by the regional council.654

There is only limited recognition of Maori rights in the regional policy statement. In the overview of the regional policy statement change 1, it is recorded that a number of iwi of the region – including Te Arawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Raukawa, and Ngati Tahu – regard it as critical that the ahi ka and kaitiakitanga relationship of Maori have with geothermal resources and fields be recognised and supported. Consequently, policy 1 of the regional policy statement is expressed as follows:

Ensure that the relationship of tangata whenua as Kaitiaki with characteristics of particular geothermal systems, fields and surface features is recognised and provided for, once specific resource management matters of traditional and contemporary cultural significance have been identified by tangata whenua.

Implementation Methods
1. In consultation with tangata whenua:
   i. identify the characteristics of the Regional geothermal resource significant to Maori
   ii. identify threats to these characteristics
   iii. provide strategies for avoiding, remediating, or mitigating these threats.
2. Support, and where appropriate, facilitate, the development of hapu/iwi geothermal management plans.
3. Through regional plans, district plans and the consideration of resource consent applications, ensure that the geothermal characteristics valued by tangata whenua are recognised.655

The next document we were referred to was the regional plan which notes the Ngati Raukawa world-view based on Maori cosmology, their requirement that development does not compromise their cultural and spiritual values and their demand for formal partnership arrangements with Environment Waikato.656 Ngati Tuwharetoa considers Environment Waikato has a duty to protect its taonga for as long as Tuwharetoa wish it. The active protection they demand applies to their mountains, lakes, rivers, lands and geothermal taonga.657 There does not appear to be a section on Te Arawa. Again, this section of the plan merely recounts what Central North Island Maori identify is important to them without obliging the regional council to do much more than have regard to these matters in accordance with the RMA.

The regional plan states that there is no clear process to define the relationship between tangata whenua and the natural and physical resources of the region. Environment Waikato is clearly struggling with Maori claims at this point because it then announces that this leads to uncertainty and unnecessary costs for resource consent applicants, council, tangata whenua, and the community. It also hinders, it claims, the ability of tangata whenua to give effect to kaitiakitanga.658 The plan then lists the methods the council will adopt to give effect to its responsibilities under the RMA. Most of the measures are only about consultation, information sharing, identifying important sites, supporting, and encouraging the development of iwi management plans, raising awareness and education, and facilitating involvement in RMA processes.659 The possibility of the transfer of powers under section 33 of the RMA in relation to natural resources identified as being of special value to tangata whenua is recognised.660 Such a transfer has not yet happened.

We were also referred to the regional plan proposed variation 2, known as the geothermal module. This module, in its background and explanation section, recognises that concepts of protection and development are compatible with the views of tangata whenua, who regard geothermal resources as taonga. These taonga have, the regional council acknowledges, metaphysical characteristics, and their management is based on a set of beliefs about the relationship of humans to the natural world.661 It refers to the Ngatoroirangi story.662 The only mention of Maori interests thereafter relates to the regional council's aim of encouraging and assisting tangata whenua to identify particular geothermal surface features and specific geothermal
resource management matters of traditional and contemporary cultural value. Variation 2 then sets out the rules for the taking and use of geothermal water, energy and heat, and discharges within the different systems. It lists permitted activities and discretionary activities requiring resource consents. The matters that the council considers for discretionary activities include the extent to which the cultural values of tangata whenua are recognised, including their kaitiaki role with the geothermal resource.

Clearly from this review, the regional councils and others charged with responsibilities under the RMA are providing what the legislative scheme requires in terms of meeting Maori demands for recognition of their Treaty interests in the geothermal resources. This is not a matter that regional councils can do much about. We were, in fact, impressed with the effort they have put into complying with the legislative regime, especially around its iwi consultation requirements. Conversely, we are not impressed with the consistency of the legislative regime under which they operate.

**The Tribunal’s conclusions and findings on local government, the RMA and geothermal resources**

The RMA has been in effect for some years since the geothermal Tribunals heard geothermal claims in 1993 and recommended amendment to the RMA. It is now well established that the primary purpose of the RMA under section 5 – to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources – dominates the manner in which powers and duties are exercised. Section 5 has been described as the fundamental cornerstone of the Act, and all matters listed in sections 6, 7, and 8 are considered subservient to the purpose of the RMA. Matters of national importance under section 6 are ranked higher than matters under sections 7 and 8. The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga is listed as a matter of national importance. Matters in section 7 – including kaitiakitanga – rank lower, and section 8 requires decision makers only to take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, rather than to give effect to them.

While it may be argued that mention of these limited matters and their ranking is sufficient to elevate Maori and their concerns above other sectors of the community during the RMA process, clearly that has not been the experience of the claimants before us. This is simply because the RMA does not provide for Maori self-government or the exercise of some joint-management role with the Crown or its delegates (regional councils) – or with both – over Maori natural resources. As a result, the Tribunal is still being asked to inquire into claims based on the inadequacy of the RMA to protect Maori Treaty rights and interests.

In looking at the RMA regime when it was in its infancy, the Ngawha and Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunals concluded:

> The Crown has, through the medium of the Resource Management Act, delegated the day to day administration and management of the geothermal resource, and other natural and physical resources, to local and regional authorities. The Crown has done so without first ensuring that the full interest of Maori in the geothermal resource, and the extent of its Treaty obligations to protect such interests, are first ascertained.

It is readily apparent that the Resource Management Act is a very considerable improvement on the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 in terms of its concern to ensure that consideration is given to Maori interests in geothermal resources. But we consider the Act fails adequately to ensure that Maori Treaty rights in geothermal resources are protected.

The Tribunal found in both cases that section 8 of the Resource Management Act 1991 was not Treaty compliant and should be amended. That both these Tribunals came to the same recommendations indicates to us that at least until 1993 the provisions of the RMA and how it recognised Maori rights to exercise authority over their geothermal resources was not Treaty-consistent. By 1999, the Whanganui River Tribunal was unable to come to an alternative conclusion on the RMA, stating instead:
Maori rangatiratanga is not therefore to be qualified by a balancing of interests. It is not conditional but was expressed to be protected, absolutely. It is rather that governance is qualified by the promise to protect and guarantee rangatiratanga for as long as Maori wish to retain it. We do not therefore accept that the Crown’s right or duty to control and manage resources overrides Atihaunui ownership of, and rangatiratanga over, the river. The effect of that is to negate, largely if not wholly, that guaranteed to Atihaunui.

This finding follows previous Tribunal opinion. Though it has been considered that the guarantee may be overridden in exceptional circumstances in the national interest, the national interest in conservation is not a reason for negating Maori rights of property. In similar vein, the national interest in conservation does not negate the property interests of other citizens, even without the benefit of protective Treaty covenants. Resource management may have the effect of constraining private ownership but cannot be used to deny its existence.

We disagree with Crown submissions that section 8 of the Resource Management Act provides for recognition and implementation of the Crown’s Treaty duties. It does not require those with responsibilities under the Act to give effect to Treaty principles but only to take them into account. This is less than an obligation to apply them. When ranked with the competing interests of others, this means that guaranteed Treaty rights may be diminished in the balancing exercise that the Act requires.670

By 2005, our review of the RMA has merely confirmed the findings of previous Tribunals. The Crown has still not ascertained the full nature and extent of the Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ of the Central North Island, and the extent of its Treaty obligations to protect such rights and interests. This is despite the view expressed by the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunal that, because the Crown had not done so in 1993, legislative amendment was needed because it was virtually certain that any future planning instruments would fail to adequately protect Maori Treaty interests.671 Add to this the failure to promulgate a national policy statement on geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, and the prejudice to Maori is indeed great as regional and district councils struggle to understand what the nature and extent of the Maori customary and Treaty interests are. In this circumstance, those rights may easily be eroded. The legislative scheme of the RMA is deficient without some guidance from the Crown through the development of a national policy statement recording the nature and extent of Maori rights. That is because the Act on its own does not accord Central North Island Maori sufficient protection to ensure that their customary rights and their Treaty interests and interests are provided for. If action is not taken soon, Maori may have limited ability to reclaim their rangatiratanga over geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ, as the resource is allocated to other users or it expires due to overuse.

We are much concerned by the Crown’s candid admission, firmly stated to us, that it will resist any recommendation from this Tribunal suggesting any amendment to the RMA generally.672

We note that the Mohaka ki Ahuriri Tribunal held that a failure to follow recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal is an action or omission in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi. In this case, recommendations from the Ngawha and the Te Arawa Geothermal Tribunals that section 8 of the RMA should be amended should have been followed by the Crown while it was still possible to have some impact on the planning processes of the RMA. That it has not done so, and has stated baldly that it will not do so, is a fundamental act and policy in disregard of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

In Treaty terms, more is expected of the Crown and, given the long association of Central North Island iwi and hapu with the underlying common heat and energy system within the TVZ, it is not in line with the honour of the Crown to maintain such a position.

Even if the Crown is not prepared to amend the RMA, it should intervene. There is an opportunity to do so from the
central government level by the promulgation of a national policy statement so as to influence regional planning processes under the RMA. We consider this is necessary and should be undertaken as a matter of priority. While the two regional councils in the Central North Island have completed the procedures relevant to the finalisation of their policy statements and regional plans, we do note the power of the Minister to intervene in matters of national significance. In making a decision on whether a matter is of national significance, the Minister may have regard to whether the matter is significant in terms of section 8 of the RMA. In deciding what is a matter of national significance, the Minister’s powers may relate to resource consents, preparation or change to regional plans, public works, and heritage protection orders.

The Tribunal’s Overall Findings on Crown Provision for Central North Island Maori Rights and Interests in Geothermal Resources

After our review of the evidence, we find that:

▶ In order to provide for the exercise of tino rangatiratanga in resource management, the Crown should now acknowledge the nature and extent of Central North Island Maori customary rights or their Treaty interests in the geothermal resource, or both.

▶ The Crown has failed to adequately provide for Central North Island Maori to exercise their tino rangatiratanga, control, and management over their taonga, in breach of the principles of the Treaty, including the principle of Maori rangatiratanga in resource management. It has failed to discharge its duty actively to protect Maori in possession of their taonga. This finding is made because, prior to 2001, there was no adequate provision made for the exercise of Maori autonomy in local or regional self-government. To this extent the Crown acted in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

▶ We accept that there is a clear need for a sustainable management regime in circumstances where there are significant environmental issues that relate to the use of geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ (as we discuss below). These are resources susceptible to overuse with potential environmental impacts such as subsidence. Therefore, the Crown has a legitimate article 1 interest in ensuring such a management regime is provided. But, in accordance with the principle of partnership, that management regime should include Central North Island Maori in decision-making roles, and it should accord them an appropriate priority based on Treaty principles. That can be done in a number of ways – through iwi or hapu models of autonomy, through a regional Maori body, or through joint management with regional councils. The legislation could be amended to reflect that priority.

▶ It seems to us that Central North Island Maori concern regarding the failure of the geothermal surface features and the geothermal fields at Rotorua and Wairakei and the actions that they took to bring this to the Crown’s attention in Rotorua, indicates that they were and are capable of working multilaterally with the Crown and other agencies – such as the local authorities – to ensure the protection of these resources. This adds to, rather than reduces, the force of the arguments for the claimants that they should have a real and meaningful role in the management of their taonga. If they had been delegated authority – either separately or jointly with councils – an entirely different management regime to that adopted may have evolved: one that incorporated concepts of Maori customary law and kaitiakitanga. In this respect, we note the additional restrictions that the Tuaropaki Power Station imposes on itself at Mokai. This evidence indicates that the responsibility to manage a resource such as the TVZ should not vest solely in one or two agencies such as regional councils. Our
discussion in no way suggests that they have not so far done a reasonable job, but in our view there is a need for a multilateral approach involving Central North Island Maori. The adoption of such a Treaty-based approach would, in our view, result in added protection for the geothermal resource, which would ultimately benefit all New Zealanders.

While the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori Constituency Empowering) Act 2001 and the Local Government Act of 2002 have signalled a substantial advance on the previous local government regime, this legislation does not ensure that Central North Island hapu and iwi can exercise their own form of tribal local self-government, should that be their wish. It will not prevent Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests to geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ being adversely affected by the enforcement of regional plans and resource consent applications in favour of other sectors of the community. That is because no matter how many Maori representatives there may be on the regional councils, or other consent authorities, the scheme of the RMA will remain unaffected.

The Crown will also need to amend the RMA as it does not accord Central North Island hapu and iwi sufficient recognition of their customary rights and their Treaty interests to geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ. In this way, the RMA continues to fail to accord Maori sufficient priority because local and regional authorities are not required to act in a manner consistent with the principles of the Treaty, requiring that they recognise Maori customary rights. They may do so, but they are not required to do so. The evidence before us was that delegation to regional and local authorities has been inadequate in terms of how iwi and hapu resource management issues are dealt with. Their concerns are merely being listed or selectively integrated into RMA planning documents with fleeting references to tikanga, kaitiakitanga and the identification of taonga for protection.

Central North Island Maori under the RMA are marginalised in that their position is not much stronger than that of any other interest group. In all aspects of management, Central North Island Maori rights and interests are continually weighed against the competing demands of sustainable management and access for other sectors of the community.

No regional or district council has yet transferred powers to iwi or hapu so that they may exercise their own self-governance over their resources by way of section 33 of the RMA. We do note, however, that serious attempts were considered by Environment Waikato in terms of Ngati Kuraia of Tuwharetoa, but that the hapu did not have the resources needed to proceed. In this respect it may be time for the Crown to require compulsory transfer under section 33 for certain categories of resources such as geothermal sites on Maori land or within their villages such as Tokaanu, Waipahihi, Whakarewarewa and Ohinemutu, with substantial Government assistance to fund the development of hapu management plans to enable this to happen.

The current regime under section 14 of the RMA treats geothermal water as a water resource requiring resource consent to access these resources, rather than recognising Central North Island Maori as the proprietors of the resource. There are exceptions, and section 14(c) authorises use of geothermal water, heat, or energy if it is taken or used in accordance with tikanga Maori for the communal benefit of the tangata whenua of the area and it does not have an adverse effect on the environment. This exemption is rendered meaningless if planning documents then classify uses for this purpose as having an adverse effect on the environment. It appears that the RMA
procedures cannot guarantee priority for Maori even in terms of customary use of the surface and subsurface resources on their land as regulated by Maori law and for Maori cultural purposes, where over-exploitation of the resource in an area is leading to adverse environmental effects. Instead of recognising that the burden of adverse effects on the environment should be borne by other sections of the community, the Crown told the Tribunal that Maori must shoulder that burden equally with other sectors who cannot claim the same long association with the geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ or Treaty rights protecting their interests. This result makes nonsense of the Crown’s argument that section 14(3)(c) goes in some measure towards meeting their Treaty obligations.

Any iwi or hapu or individual Maori wanting to develop their geothermal resources and fields must apply to a regional council for resource consents to take and discharge geothermal fluid, energy, steam and so forth, unless authorised by an exception in section 14, a regional plan, or regulations. They are then subjected to the public submission and hearing process whereby their Treaty rights to use and manage their own resources are balanced within a hierarchy of standards. We were given one such example from the Taupo district of the experience of a Maori land trust, Tuaropaki Trust, with the RMA. This trust owns and farms areas of land overlying and within the vicinity of the Mokai field. It applied under the RMA for a resource consent to develop its geothermal field. This consent was granted in 1994 but the trust’s evidence was that this was at great cost and significant prejudice, and irrespective of their ownership and rangatiratanga rights over the Mokai field. While we are not saying that Maori should not go through the consent process, we are saying that the process should be modified so that Maori rangatiratanga is provided for.

The RMA renders Maori rights and interests as much less than the Treaty guaranteed. It reduces those rights and interests to an identification of Maori resource management issues, with some aspects of their concerns being incorporated into the resource management process. Since the RMA was amended in 2005, there is now no requirement imposed on applicants to consult on resource consent applications. As a result of the amendment, section 36A of the RMA makes this very clear. However, Maori may still be consulted to the extent required so as to enable a consent authority to fulfil the requirements of part II of the RMA.

As we discussed in part II of this report, the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed to iwi and hapu of the Central North Island the right to autonomy and local and regional self-government. In this context, control and use of their own geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ was guaranteed. We find that the Crown should consult with Central North Island Maori and regional councils to determine in some innovative way, constructed during negotiations, how they together could manage geothermal resources. This is not conceptually or inherently inconsistent with the Crown’s article 1 responsibility to provide a sustainable management regime, which the Crown has acknowledged it must provide. That would be consistent with the Crown providing for Maori rangatiratanga in resource management whilst ensuring that they are supported with the relevant resources and expertise held by regional councils.

It seems to us that the use of rentals or profits derived by the Crown and regional councils from royalties for geothermal power generation and other uses of the resource could be shared with Central North Island Maori without violating the rights of private landowners and authorised users. Such an outcome will only impact on the current and future revenue stream currently channelled to the Crown and regional councils.
The Crown should promulgate a national policy statement and guidelines. In this process Central North Island Maori and other Maori with geothermal resources should play a central role.

The Crown should reconsider its position in respect of section 8 of the RMA and amend it so that decision makers under the RMA must give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Excluding Central North Island Maori from an effective role in management of their resource is at odds with its centrality in their everyday life. Quite simply the resource is theirs in Treaty terms, and the honour of the Crown demands that their interests be provided for.

In our view also, Maori should also be delegated decision-making regarding future access to and resulting profit from the resource as we explained in part IV.

Prejudice to Central North Island Maori

Key question: Have Central North Island Maori been prejudiced by the Crown’s failure to acknowledge and provide for their customary rights and Treaty interests in the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the subterranean resource (TVZ)?

In the previous sections of this chapter, we have found that Maori controlled, owned, and used the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ as at 1840. After 1865, their rangatiratanga, rights, and interests in the resources were modified with the change to their title sourced from Maori customary rights, to a title derived from the Crown or through the Native Land Court. That modification did not affect their customary rights and Treaty interests in the geothermal taonga. However, the customary rights of the hapu in the land, being the right to control access to the resource, were extinguished once land was sold outside the hapu. But that did not affect the hapu rights and interests in the geothermal fields and the TVZ unless all or most of the land over a field was sold. In such cases, the hapu still maintained customary rights and a Treaty interest, amounting to a substantial or priority interest in the geothermal taonga that comprise the legacy of Ngatoroirangi. In the context of the Central North Island, and despite the significantly reduced scale of Maori land ownership, much of that land rests over, or is within proximity to, all the geothermal fields in the Central North Island save for the Wairakei, Ngatamariki, Orakei Korako, Reporoa, and Paeroa areas, and the northern area of Rotorua.

In part IV, we discussed the right to development which extended to the right of Central North Island Maori to use their properties and to enlarge and develop those uses as time and circumstances dictated. We found that by certain acts and omissions the Crown has failed to provide for the Central North Island Maori right to development in relation to geothermal surface features and their fields.

We have further found that, in asserting control over the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, through the individualisation of customary rights to land by the native land laws, through Crown purchases targeting Maori resources, or through other actions inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Crown failed to provide for and protect Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in their geothermal taonga. We have also found that the Crown appropriated to itself the right to access and develop geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ through the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 and the RMA in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. We turn now to consider the impacts of the Crown’s overall actions, failures and omissions in terms of the claimants’ exercise of tino rangatiratanga, ownership, control, and use of their geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ.
The claimants’ case

In presenting the generic submissions for the claimants, Mr Taylor considered the impacts on claimants of the Crown’s failure to acknowledge their rangatiratanga and proprietary ownership of the resource. He contended that as a result of the Crown’s targeting of geothermal resources for acquisition, and of low prices and high costs of land transactions, and the Crown purchase tactics generally, the purchase of all significant geothermal features is suspect and these resources should be returned to tangata whenua.\(^6\)

In relation to the Crown’s actions after the 1940s, Mr Taylor submitted that it is clear from Crown actions and the legislation reviewed in section 2 of this chapter that the use, control, and rights to derive revenue from geothermal resources are completely controlled by the Crown. Mr Taylor submitted that the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 took away from Central North Island Maori the significant incidents of ownership.\(^6\) This appropriation of the rights of use, control, and profit to the Crown has continued under the RMA, with the Crown sharing the benefits of management with regional councils.

Mr Taylor argued that the RMA ‘is deficient to the extent that it omits any provision which ensures that persons exercising functions and powers under the Act are required to act in conformity with the principles of the Treaty’ of Waitangi. He contended that ‘[i]t is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty for the Crown to impose a system of royalties or resource rentals for its own benefit without first determining and giving appropriate effect to the interests of the Claimants.’\(^6\) The Crown has done so since the 1950s without making any provision for Maori ownership and Treaty interests in the resource. It should now pay compensation to Central North Island Maori for this use.

In concluding, Mr Taylor argued that Maori retained rangatiratanga over, and ownership in, the whole of the TVZ, because of their continued rangatiratanga over the fields and TVZ per se, and because of the flawed manner in which most Maori lands containing geothermal features were purchased.

Other counsel for the claimants detailed impacts of development on geothermal resources or specific fields. At the northern end of the Central North Island, a number of counsel for claimants submitted to us that harm has been caused by excessive draw-off and/or by the flow-on effects from other activities such as land use for tourism development, public works, and private enterprise developments. The use of Rotoitipaku and the geothermal features in the Kawerau area were particularly emphasised by Ms Sykes and Mr Pou, counsel for Ngati Tuwharetoa Te Atua Reretahi, Ngai Tamarangi.\(^6\) Counsel noted that the evidence was that most geothermal phenomena were no longer visible at this spot.\(^6\)

Other counsel have argued that harm has been occasioned either by direct Crown action or by failure to protect the geothermal resource.\(^6\) Ms Feint, after adopting the generic submissions made by Mr Taylor, argued for Ngati Tuwharetoa that Crown regulation, or lack of it, has failed to protect the geothermal resources and the geothermal fields of the region, and enormous harm has resulted. Instead of actively protecting the resource, the Crown has allowed unchecked development leading to an ‘unnecessary degradation of the resource.’\(^6\) With respect to power generation at Wairakei as an example, the Crown ‘mined’ the resource with ‘widespread destruction and significant impacts.’ This has caused the ‘mauri of the earth to suffer’ and the loss of pressure has caused subsidence of the land and collapse of puia, ngawha and waiariki.\(^6\)

In the areas surrounding Lake Taupo and geothermal areas adjacent to dams on the Waikato River, the claimants alleged that geothermal features have been destroyed and disrupted by the fluctuations in lake level brought about by hydroelectric developments.\(^6\) At Tokaanu, they alleged, bores ‘have been sunk [but] not properly capped and the [geothermal] system is being run down.’\(^6\) Ohaaki, they alleged, has been seriously affected by subsidence and much of Orakei Korako by flooding resulting from the raising of Lake Ohakuri.\(^6\)
The Crown’s case

In the Crown’s view, ‘Maori have continued to enjoy traditional use of the geothermal resources’ where they have access because they retained ownership over land where the resource is manifest. The implication is that there has been no significant impact from the Crown’s failure to provide for their customary rights and their rangatiratanga over their taonga.

The Crown further contends that it does not assert ownership over geothermal resources. Moreover the RMA is not inconsistent with existing property rights as a matter of custom; counsel contended that it does not effect any extinguishment of such property. As noted above, the Crown claims it has a legitimate article 1 interest in the geothermal resources. Crown interests in this regard are twofold: first, its ‘interest in the allocation and management of natural resources generally and, second, an interest arising from the fact that geothermal resources are significant energy sources.

In terms of commercial use, the Crown does not accept that the Treaty, including the exercise of rangatiratanga, confers a right upon Maori to generate electricity. The Crown noted that there are sectors of the community expressing significant interest in geothermal resources and that they may make an important contribution towards the nation’s electricity needs. ‘The Crown does not believe it feasible or desirable, in policy terms, to change the current [RMA] regime.’ The Crown contends that ‘Environment Waikato’s regional policy statement and regional plan provide considerable protection and conservation measures in relation to geothermal resources.

The Crown contends that, in terms of impacts from the Crown’s actions, ‘[t]here is little evidence updating the Tribunal on the issue of the extent to which the geothermal taonga in the Rotorua area, [or by implication any other field or system] have continued to suffer damage because of excessive quantities of steam being drawn off bores.’ It asserts that some redress can be provided to Maori as part of settlements that may be used to commercially develop geothermal resources and the geothermal fields ‘should they consider that appropriate.’ But the Crown will retain responsibility to protect geothermal resources in the sense of ensuring there is a sustainable management regime. It pointed to its closure of the Rotorua bores during the 1980s to protect the features of Whakarewarewa as an example of the need for it to maintain this responsibility. The Crown and Ngati Whakaue discussed the closing of the bores and reached an agreement on the issue.

In relation to Ohaaki, the Crown contended that the risk of subsidence and inundation were known to be likely consequences of the development of the field from the outset. The Crown submitted that with that in mind the trustees entered into the lease arrangement on the understanding that the Crown would accept responsibility for mitigation and remedial action, as and when subsidence and inundation occur. The only real uncertainty was when the trustees chose the development option. As is not uncommon, there appear to have been different views within Ngati Tahu as to the desirability of development. Those differences of view remain. The Crown notes that the Ngati Tahu trustees have received the sum of $1,100,000 pursuant to an agreement with Contact Energy dated 15 March 1999. This sum represented an addition to the capitalised rental paid in advance to the trustees in 1982 of $570,000. The Crown submitted that this was a situation ‘of a community electing to pursue a development opportunity through a negotiated process with the Crown and its agencies. This inevitably involved trade-offs between economic development and related opportunities’. Ngati Tahu representatives have negotiated ‘a successful assumption of responsibility by the Crown for adverse environmental consequences. These responsibilities are currently borne by Contact Energy.’ Considerable effort and investment has gone into ‘trying to find solutions acceptable to Ngati Tahu.’

In relation to Lake Rototipaku the Crown acknowledges ‘that the primary solid waste disposal site [in the lake] is now significantly contaminated.’ The lake is situated on blocks that were leased to NZ Insurance Ltd and Tasman
He Maunga Rongo

Pulp and Paper Ltd in 1971. The Crown contends that the full extent of contamination ‘had not become apparent until reasonably recently’, pointing to a report in 1995 that indicated the spring Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa was not endangered. Since that date, further research has indicated differently. The Crown acknowledges that Tasman Pulp and Paper caused the problems, but also states that the directors would not have appreciated the scale and problem that there is now in relation to the site. Impacts have been the subject of the deed of settlement of 1983. There was also a lease review in 2003 resulting in a rental of 45 per cent of the land value. The lessee (Norske Skög) has agreed ‘to undertake substantial restoration work.’ Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa is not included in the lease because it is on a neighbouring block (A8), but the lease requires the lessee to protect the spring.

The Tribunal’s Analysis on Prejudice to Central North Island Maori

We begin our analysis of the issue whether Central North Island Maori have been prejudiced by the Crown’s failure to acknowledge, and provide for Central North Island Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in their geothermal taonga by noting that the claimants’ arguments may be grouped as follows:

- impacts of diminishment of rangatiratanga and control through land alienation and targeting of geothermal resources;
- impacts of failure to protect rangatiratanga in the statutory schemes which regulate geothermal resources and the geothermal fields;
- impairment of development rights;
- loss of the financial benefits from the use of the geothermal taonga; and
- environmental degradation and loss of geothermal taonga.

We have set out the full range of claimant arguments here, for the sake of completeness. We have, however, already addressed two of them – loss of development rights, and loss of financial benefits from use of the resource – in part IV of this report, as well as the Crown’s failure to protect rangatiratanga in statutory schemes for regulation of the resource earlier in this chapter. We will do no more than summarise our conclusions on these issues here. Our main analysis in this section, therefore, will focus on diminishment of rangatiratanga, loss of taonga, and environmental degradation.

Impacts of diminishment of rangatiratanga and control through land alienation and targeting of geothermal resources

In part III, we considered the native land legislation from 1865, the creation of new forms of title, the operation of the Native Land Court, and Crown purchasing policy and Maori land administration during the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth century. We found that in terms of the Central North Island there were a number of breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi leading to land and resource alienation. We draw on some of the examples from the evidence before us to provide a snapshot of such impacts due to the Crown’s actions and omissions in targeting, and failing to recognise and provide for Maori rights to their geothermal taonga.

Early land alienations: Tauhara–Wairakei–Ohaaki

We have already referred to the Crown’s targeting of geothermal resources in its purchases of Maori land, its failure to protect Maori owners from pre-title negotiations, and its failure to provide for community titles which would better have protected hapu lands and resources from alienation to either the Crown or private purchasers. In combination, the outcomes prejudiced a number of hapu.

We note, for instance, the number of early purchases around the current township of Taupo to demonstrate the impacts of the Crown’s failure to actively protect Maori interests in geothermal resources. By 1887, the Tauhara claimants allege that thousands of acres of Tauhara land had been purchased by the Crown, despite the Maori
desire to hold onto the land as demonstrated by the leasing economy developed in the Taupo area by the 1870s. With these sales, geothermal resources and a few of the geothermal fields or taonga were lost, including surface manifestations around Mount Tauhara and on the lakefront of Lake Taupo, at Wairakei and at Rotokawa. Mr Clarke told us that he believed that rather than protect Maori interests, ‘the Crown made every effort to promote its own interests by purchasing lands it desired, regardless of the welfare of [Maori].’ This perception is not easily overcome in light of the historical record of land alienation in the Tauhara blocks which Mr Stirling has reviewed.

We mention the issues here merely to explain why Tauhara Maunga and Waipahihi, always traditionally important, became even more so for the people of Ngati Raukawa, the Hikuwai Confederation, Ngati Tuwharetoa, and Ngati Tutemohuta. It became, along with the remnants of the lands they retained within the Tauhara North and Middle blocks, the means for continuing rangatiratanga over the Tauhara–Wairakei field. It became, therefore, even more important for the Crown to protect their remaining geothermal taonga. But the evidence is that the geothermal features in and around Mount Tauhara and Waipahihi have been affected by the impacts of the Wairakei power generation station, as we discuss below.

The alienation of lands at Wairakei
We have already noted in part III the notorious passage of the Wairakei lands through the Native Land Court at the behest of Robert Graham, a prominent Auckland settler and political figure. Graham had focused on purchasing property in the vicinity of geothermal resources in Rotorua at Waiwera, Ohinemutu, and Te Kautu. In 1881, he moved to acquire 4203 acres in the Wairakei block, including the geysers there, and the Huka Falls. He did so by negotiating with a small group of five customary owners before the Native Land Court investigation into customary rights. We have pointed in our earlier discussion to Graham’s determination, the court’s haste with the case, and the intervention of the interpreter (who was in Graham’s pay) to pressure the counter-claimants to hurry through their cases, and the angry reaction of those in court when judgment was given for the five owners whose names had been handed in. Mair, we noted, wrote to the Native Affairs Minister to express his concern, and record his view that ‘numbers of natives were kept out of the certificate by unfair means,’ and that ‘a great wrong [had been done them].’ The transaction with Graham was concluded before the day was over. A rehearing was held in January 1882, when the main counter-claimants withdrew their claims – an odd outcome, which leads Mr Stirling to suspect Graham’s involvement. We have referred also to the court’s back-dating its order to the date of the original hearing in 1881, thus avoiding the restrictions on private purchasing under the Thermal Springs Districts Act 1881. In any case, by then the land had been all but sold.

Graham, having finally secured his title, set about developing Wairakei as a tourist and health resort. Consequently, from being an important customary area for fishing, for koura and kokopu, bathing in the hot springs, and gathering fern root and red ochre, Wairakei became a tourist mecca. The remaining portion of Wairakei – the 137 acres called Oruamuturangi – was later bought by the Government in 1892.

This story concerning the acquisition of Wairakei and the operation of the Native Land Court is an example of how the conversion of Maori customary collective title was effected by the operation of the native land legislation, and the consequential ease with which the land could be then alienated.

As a result of the vesting of title in a small number of owners, with whom a purchaser had already made an arrangement, and the immediate purchase of the land, most of those with rights were excluded from ownership of the block and the rights that ran with ownership, including the right to access and control access to the geothermal resources and the field of Wairakei. Maori lost the ability to control what happened to this land; yet this was not an outcome that had been agreed. The hapu did not sell their land; it was sold by a handful of individuals. This was a
direct result of the title system introduced by the Crown and its failure to protect communities of owners from such alienations. There was no protection, and subsequently there was alienation. Maori lost their immediate cultural and spiritual associations with the block over time, as we discuss below. They were prevented from exercising their rangatiratanga over the Wairakei block. They have also suffered the impacts of excessive unsustainable use of the resource owing to the extent of environmental effects at Rotokawa and Tauhara, again discussed in more detail below. These impacts have occurred because of these initial actions and omissions of the Crown in failing to institute a system of land titles and land alienation that would protect hapu rights to land and natural resources.

The land blocks associated with the Ohaaki–Broadlands, Ngatamariki, and Reporoa fields are part of the original Tahorakuri blocks. These blocks have been targeted for geothermal and hydrogeneration since the 1950s.\(^706\) The claimants before the Native Land Court seeking the title to these blocks during early title investigations were Ngati Tahu and a number of other hapu. Ngati Whaoa claim they have customary rights here as well.\(^707\)

The Tahorakuri block once comprised all the land north from Aratiatia to a point about five kilometres upstream from Orakei Korako. The title to Tahorakuri was first investigated by the Native Land Court in 1887, and the entire block was awarded to Ngati Tahu.\(^708\) During the 1880s, lands on the east bank of the Waikato River from Reporoa were purchased from Ngati Tahu. This land passed into European hands and became known as Broadlands.\(^709\)

In 1899, the remaining part of Tahorakuri block was partitioned into four sections: Waimahana, Te Ohaaki, and Kaimanawa in the east and Waikari in the south-west.\(^710\) In 1930, a new round of partitions occurred beginning with the subdivision of Tahorakuri A block into A1 and A2.\(^711\)

**Te Ohaaki o Ngatoroirangi**

Here, we consider the pressures on Ngati Tahu in respect of their geothermal resource at Ohaaki. A number of partitions affected Tahorakuri A1 during the 1930s and 1940s. A papakainga reserve at Te Ohaaki was set aside on Tahorakuri A1 in 1932.\(^712\) The order was made in favour of 210 owners for an area of 255 acres to be called Tahorakuri A1A (Ohaaki Papakainga reserve). The area was never gazetted, but comprises the present Tahorakuri A1 section 1 block.\(^713\) During the 1930s, the papakainga was the home for over 30 households.\(^714\)

In the 1950s, when the Government had committed itself to a joint venture with the British Government aimed at extracting heavy water from geothermal steam, Ohaaki was considered as a possible site. The heavy water was needed as a moderator in atomic piles equipment.\(^715\) A number of sites were proposed for the heavy water plant and Ohaaki was the first site considered, but was never used. In 1952, the DSIR advised the general manager of the State Hydro-Electric Department that:

Some enquiries have since been made as to the ownership of the land at Ohaaki. Apparently there are more than 200 owners of the small area in which the springs are situated. With such a complex ownership it is likely that much trouble would be experienced in obtaining a lease or purchase. Also, it became apparent that some pressure would be brought by the owners to prevent drilling.\(^716\)

The plant was never proceeded with. The relevance of the evidence concerning the joint venture is that where Central North Island Maori at the local level felt their geothermal resources were being threatened, or where there was a prospect that the resource might be affected, they were prepared to take direct action to protect their taonga. This example is particularly important regarding timing because this was when the Geothermal Steam Act 1952 and then the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 were enacted. So while there may not have been any national comment from Maori, there certainly was concern expressed on the ground whenever it appeared that Maori might lose control of access to their geothermal taonga.

One can see the same determination reflected in the manner in which the Maori owners sought to retain their lands at Ohaaki when they were threatened with public
works takings in the 1970s. According to Dame Evelyn, there was one household living at Ohaaki in 1970. Issues arose during the 1960s about the payment of rates on the reservation land. On application to the Maori Land Court, the main reservation status was varied, and smaller Maori reservations from Tahorakuri A1 section 1 were set aside under section 439(7) of the Maori Affairs Act 1953. These reserves cover the marae, the ngawha on the block, the urupa, and the fertility rock. The rest of the block, comprising sections 32, 34, and 35, was vested in the Maori Trustee because of outstanding rating issues with the Taupo County Council and the land was then leased to the Ministry of Works for geothermal exploration. This background is to be found in the decision of Judge Durie (later chief judge and then Justice Durie).

The land, along with several other Tahorakuri blocks, was eventually leased by the Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust constituted by Judge Durie to negotiate a lease with the Ministry of Works and Development for the Ohaaki Power Project, among other things. The lands leased were Tahorakuri A1 section 1, Tahorakuri A1 section 19, Tahorakuri A1 section 32, Tahorakuri A1 section 34, and Tahorakuri A1 section 35. The owners opposed sale to the Crown, and the only option to avoid a taking by the Crown under the Public Works Act was to lease the 400 acres of land demanded. The evidence of Dame Evelyn, contrary to the submissions of the Crown, indicates an element of coercion and lack of choice. It is not correct to characterise what happened at Ohaaki as a deliberate choice to pursue a development option. It is clear that in negotiating their lease the trustees came under constant pressure to release the Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust lands. That pressure came from the media and the officials of the Crown who claimed the land was needed to meet the public interest in power generation. Eventually, after long negotiations, the lease was signed on 28 July 1982, for a period of 50 years with two rights of renewal, to a maximum of 150 years. This is effectively a long-term alienation. The Crown’s interpretation of events at Ohaaki is incorrect when one considers the direct evidence given to this Tribunal. William Tredegar Hall advised us that he was the chairman of the Ngati Tahu Lands Trust. He did not agree to the terms of the lease that was negotiated and he was ‘told in no uncertain terms by the Crown officials that if the lease was not agreed to, the Crown would take the lands by way of the Public Works legislation.’ Hall stated he was appalled that the Crown threatened the trust in this way.

What this evidence shows is the Crown’s determination to secure the resource, by compulsory taking if necessary; and the resistance of Maori to the targeting of their resource. The evidence is that Ngati Tahu were happy to share the resource and could have taken a very active role in its development at this point. But the State was still committed, as we discussed earlier in this chapter, to the political ideology of nationalisation of natural resources to meet the public interest.

Te Kopia

The Te Kopia field is situated towards the centre of the Paeroa Range, about 29 kilometres south of Rotorua. It is on the original Rotomahana–Parekarangi 6A1 block, partitioned by the Native Land Court in 1895 in favour of the Crown as a result of its purchase of interests in [Rotomahana–Parekarangi] 6A during that year. Te Kopia reserve was gazetted in 1911 as a scenic reserve under the Scenery Preservation Act 1908. Mr McBurney states that the purpose of the reserve was to preserve some of the giant totara of the Paeroa Range. The southern portion of the reserve, however, contained ‘the powerful Te Kopia fumerole, a[s] well as associated mud pools, hot-springs and hot pools.’ We have discussed in part III the impact of Crown purchasing policies on the Ngati Whaoa claimants who, owing to actions and omissions of the Crown, were rendered all but landless by the year 1900. Ngati Whaoa claim they have customary rights over this taonga.

Waiotapu–Mount Kakaramea–Reporoa

The Waiotapu, Mount Kakaramea, and Reporoa fields fall between the Tahorakuri and Paeroa East blocks. Customary rights to the Paeroa East block were investigated for the first
time in 1881. Ngati Whaoa were the applicants, and there were several cross-claimants. After a rehearing, the claim of Ngati Whaoa to the bulk of the block was recognised.730

The main area of geothermal activity on this block is Maunga Kakaramea, Rainbow Mountain, and the Waiotapu Geothermal Valley. It was the case for Ngati Whaoa that the Crown actively targeted owners with land interests in this Paeroa East area because it wanted the forest, the geothermal resources, and water resources for itself. We were told by Mr Rika that:

By the end of 1901 however the Crown had acquired shares from 7 owners totalling 822 acres and had it partitioned out. This land took in some geothermal features and therefore competed with and undermined Whaoa's livelihood, even though they retained the main geothermal features. This was acquired at 6s/acre (LHAD). You can see that the admission of two visitors by Aporo Apiata was worth more than what the Crown paid for one acre of land. We don't think its fair that the Crown undermined and pressurised businesses that we were running. I attach marked “A” a copy of a page from the official Environment Waikato website which describes Waiotapu as the “most colourful thermal area in New Zealand” .

Hearn also talks (p150-152) about the way that the Crown targeted 4B1B, the remaining Maori block at Waiotapu, containing the best geothermal features. We wonder how the Crown can justify taking that resource for a low price, and then even taking their cultivations in spite of promises that they would not .

Attached marked ‘b’ is a copy of a second petition sent by the former owners in 1947 regarding this Block. All of the points made in that petition remain valid today. That is, we were rendered landless, and the price too low considering both the geothermal features of the land and its agricultural ability.731

Whakarewarewa Thermal Springs Reserve
A full study of the alienation of the Whakarewarewa 3 block and the resulting impacts for both Ngati Wahiao and Ngati Whakaue is provided in part III. This alienation demonstrates the use of the Native Land Court by the Crown to consolidate its own interests in a block after purchasing individual undivided shares. In summary, and in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Crown aggressively purchased shares held predominantly by Ngati Whakaue in the Whakarewarewa Thermal Valley and then applied to the Native Land Court to have its interests partitioned. Duncan Moore and Judi Boyd have outlined the operation (there is no other word for it) undertaken by the Crown’s agent, Gill, and the care with which at the outset he converted the proportionate shares of the various hapu of each block into acres, roods, and perches, then into money values per hapu, into shares (per hapu per block), and finally into share values (per share). He thus calculated how much he could offer each individual.734 The Crown assumption – as the account of Stephenson Percy Smith, the Surveyor-General, makes clear – was that the people might retain their village and cultivations in the meantime, but would soon move away, and ‘the whole of the attractive part of Whakarewarewa will fall into the hands of the Crown.’733 This turned rapidly into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In January 1896, the court granted the Crown a partition area containing all the major geysers and geothermal features of the valley. The day after the court’s orders, Gill received instructions to start buying the ‘balance of Whakarewarewa at once.’734 Despite this, both iwi have retained land in and around the Rotorua geothermal field and so continue to exercise rangatiratanga over the resource today.

Taheke Field
The Manupirua baths are waiariki that Kuiwai and Haungaroa left in their path on the way to save their brother Ngatoroirangi. The baths are on the Taheke 2 and Paehinahina–Manupirua blocks and are owned and occupied by Ngati Rongomai and Ngati Hinekura, but not without threat.735 In December 1915, the chief surveyor recommended that a proclamation be issued prohibiting any alienations for some of the Taheke and Rotoiti blocks as
the land was required for scenic purposes.736 These springs were captured by the proclamation and the block within which they were situated was eventually declared a scenic reserve on 12 April 1921. However, Mr Maxwell explains how the owners managed to find a way to keep the land. The land is now vested as a Maori reservation, but leased outside the tribe. Colleen McMurchy-Pilkington discussed the negative economic impact on Ngati Rongomai after losing control of their lands and resources:

Not having self determination over our lands and resources has had a negative economical impact on Ngati Rongomai as an iwi. Instead of being the owners and developers of our lands and resources on our rohe, many of our people are the toilers and labourers for those who lease our lands or acquired our lands through historical Acts of Parliament that encouraged individualisation of our land titles. Rotorua and surrounding environs contain strong examples from the tourist industry: many of my cousins work in the hotels and sing in the concert parties for a pittance. Once the land was ours and we should have been partners in developing those hotels. The Manupirua hot springs are another example. These are leased out to Pakeha, they employ our people to collect the entrance fees.737

The evidence on the alienations of Te Kopia, Paeroa East, Whakarewarewa, and Taheke all demonstrate the impacts of Crown purchasing and policies as effective mechanisms for acquiring Maori land and geothermal resources for tourism or scenic purposes.

**The Tribunal’s Findings on the Diminishment of Rangatiratanga and Control through Crown Policies Targeting Geothermal Resources**

As we discussed in detail in part III, there was a pattern of the Crown actively targeting Maori land for their geothermal resources, particularly where it was sought for tourism, from 1869 into the twentieth century. The above examples are but a few of those before us in the evidence and the results were often the same: loss of taonga, loss of cultural and spiritual association.

The claimants have had differing experiences, yet the impacts of their exclusion from the control of their geothermal resources, have been similar. They have been unable to protect the resources. Many geothermal features and resources have been irreparably destroyed or degraded. The impacts for the hapu of Wairakei-Tauhara in respect of their system, as Dr Severne has noted, include those on the mauri of the geothermal resource. Many sites of significance to Tauhara hapu have been affected. For example, it is believed that subsidence is affecting Te Pa o Te Waira and Kurapoto (Onekeneko). Extraction has destroyed or caused irreversible negative impacts on taonga such as puia, ngawha and waiariki and wahi tapu. An example is the collapse of Pirorirori, a wahi tapu and the source of the headwaters of Kiriohinekai Stream. The hapu consider that the mauri of their taonga has been harmed and will continue to have a significant negative impact on all the key cultural values that the hapu o Wairakei-Tauhara hold, such as kaitiakitanga, rangatiratanga, manawhenua, manaakitanga, and tikanga.738

According to Dame Evelyn, the impacts for claimants of the loss of the Wairakei and Ohaaki lands have included the loss of matauranga Maori, knowledge of puia, ngawha, and waiariki, as well as the physical loss of many of their valued taonga. Many new names have been bestowed, and Maori names lost – and with them, the history and associations that they embody. In the case of Wairakei, few of the old names were still being used by the 1930s. In some areas, customary use has been ended and the spiritual values of the claimants pertaining to geothermal sites have effectively been lost; in other places, they have been seriously eroded; and in others they continue in a much reduced form.

Maori knowledge, management practices, and respect for their taonga have been either ignored or marginalised.
under the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 and through the RMA process, despite the customary rights and Treaty interests of hapu and iwi in the geothermal resources, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ.

There has been a general failure to protect rangatiratanga in the statutory schemes which regulate the geothermal resources of the Central North Island.

The impacts of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953

We found that the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 appropriated to the Crown Maori customary rights to control access to and use of the geothermal taonga. This was done without any adequate consultation with Maori, and without adequately addressing their customary rights and Treaty interests, and was thus in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. For a long time, the State held the monopoly in power generation and development, and Maori were debarred from the process of managing and protecting these taonga. Nor could they obtain a water right or licence to protect them. The Crown also appropriated the benefits from charging users for access to the resource. As we noted earlier in this chapter, the history of the development of the Mokai field is indicative of the failure of the legislative regime in Treaty terms.

The impacts of the statutory framework of the RMA

In terms of the RMA, we have found that the Act is deficient and the environmental protection measures in regional policy statements and regional plans have not been able to protect Maori customary rights and their Treaty interests. That is because the assumptions that underpin the RMA are:

- That only the Crown has the right to set the boundaries to regulate access to the geothermal resource and to receive the benefits from, or decide who should get the benefits from, its use. That effectively bypasses Central North Island Maori common law and Treaty ownership of the resources. We have discussed all these issues earlier in this chapter. In addition, the RMA provides no formula for Maori to be accorded a priority when applying for resource consents. For example, section 8 does not require decision makers to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

- That the only recognised Maori interest in geothermal surface features, the fields, and the TVZ, is the right to access the resources on their own land for cooking and bathing and other limited uses. The provisions in sections 6, 7, and 8 of the RMA underscore that perspective, requiring that decision makers under the Act merely have regard to these forms of uses, Maori values, and kaitiakitanga.

- Maori are thus prejudiced because they do not have a right to develop their own fields to access from the benefits from the Crown's royalty system and the TVZ.

Impairment of development rights

We have discussed in detail the right of Maori to develop their geothermal assets in part IV. We have found that by failing to inform itself of Maori rights in the geothermal resource, and recognise Maori customary rights, and by passing the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, the Crown foreclosed on Maori opportunities to participate in joint-development ventures for geothermal power. The prejudice to Maori of that decision, in lost opportunities, is clear. The recent success of two joint ventures demonstrates what became possible as a result of restructuring in the 1980s, and the difficulties Central North Island Maori still faced, after years of marginalisation, in trying to develop their own resource.

The development of the Mokai and Rotokawa fields came very late in the history of geothermal power generation. As noted by Dame Evelyn, by the time development options were explored for these two fields, the rules for the geothermal power game had changed.739 The state restructuring of the 1980s shifted the focus from the State to the private sector. She states:
Ohaaki was a public work in the national interest, built to supply power for the national grid. The proposed Mokai power station was caught in the transition. At Rotokawa the aspirations of the developers were entirely commercial. In this shift to a market-oriented policy environment it appeared to Maori owners that not only had government changed the rules, but had changed the game as well. The Tuaropaki Trustees complained ‘We are the last to know what is going on.’

Among Te Arawa, Ngati Tahu and Ngati Tuwharetoa people, there has been an attitude that the geothermal resource can be shared with others. There was a feeling in the mid-1980s that Pakeha exploitation had taken over. A good deal of destruction of geothermal areas has already occurred . . .

The new policy environment opened the geothermal resource up to exploitation by private, commercial, and state-owned enterprises, which initially tried to circumvent the Maori owners of these lands.

We turn now to consider the manner in which Maori fought back to become partners in the industry.

Mokai
Exploration at the Mokai field, as we have noted, began very late in the piece as its full potential for power generation was not realised until the 1970s. According to Dame Evelyn, ‘[in] 1976 electrical resistivity surveys carried out by the [Department of Scientific and Industrial Research] geophysicists at Wairakei revealed the potential geothermal field at Mokai on Maori land farmed by the Tuaropaki Trust.’ In about 1982, the Crown entered Tuaropaki land and drilled exploratory wells. This occurred without access having been agreed to with the trust. There were moves made to attempt to lease the land, but the people resisted.

In 1985, officials from the Electricity Division, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Works Geothermal Projects met with the owners of the trust lands at Mokai. By 1984, six test wells had been drilled and one, MK 5, indicated a potential of 25 megawatts of electrical energy. Without consulting the Maori owners, the Crown in 1986 determined that Mokai was a field suitable for development. Evidently, there was a delay of some years as state restructuring took hold. The trust moved in the later 1980s to develop geothermal energy, but were blocked at the water rights and then resource consent stages by Electricorp. It was the view of the trust that the Crown actively worked against the trust developing its field. However, the trustees ‘held firmly to the view that the Mokai geothermal resource was a taonga that belonged to Maori.’

We heard evidence that the land here was amalgamated, bringing 60 different land titles into one 2700-hectare block. The first trustees that took over the land after it was returned from the hands of the Maori Affairs Department were Sir Hepi Te Heuheu, (Chairman), Taxi Kapua, Sam Andrews, Brian Jones, Clarrie Hammond, and Awhi Winiata. The Tuaropaki Trust owns most of the land overlying the Mokai field. The Crown owned one small block and it seems that when the Crown split ECNZ up, the land went to Contact Energy.

Protracted negotiations took place until 1996 when the Crown agreed to sell to Tuaropaki the information it had in relation to the wells. The trustees entered into a joint venture to construct a power station on their land in 1999. The trust entered into a joint venture with Mighty River Power (25 per cent stake) and built Mokai 1 (the first stage geothermal electricity station) producing 55 megawatts – enough electricity for around 50,000 homes. Environment Waikato’s website records:

In 2005, they completed another 40 megawatt station beside it (– Mokai 2). The trust also has a five hectare, geothermally heated glasshouse producing tomatoes and capsicums for export. This venture employs 50 people from Mokai and Mangakino, most of them previously unemployed. This has had a significant positive effect on the socio-economic well-being of the two areas.

The Trust believes that developing the Mokai geothermal system is a unique opportunity for Maori to take the initiative and create a project that allows for self-determination.
The trust is staging the development to minimise adverse environmental effects and to accommodate the needs of existing users and potential needs of future generations. They recognise that their geothermal surface manifestations, such as therapeutic and cooking pools, need protection. A key part of the development is reinjecting used geothermal fluid back into the deep geothermal aquifer to minimise the impact on existing geothermal features and natural ecosystems. The trust plans to expand the glasshouse to 20, and then 50, hectares. Further expansion of the power station is also likely once the response to the existing takes has been quantified. They told us during the hearings that the additional conservation measures they impose on their operation are designed to ensure the long-term sustainability of their taonga.

Rotokawa
We heard no evidence from the Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust regarding their involvement in power generation. We merely discuss it here to complete the story of geothermal power generation in the Central North Island. According to Dame Evelyn, who was formerly one of the trustees, two wells were drilled in the 1960s at Rotokawa. Since 1984, several more wells were drilled. Part of Rotokawa field on land not owned by Maori was subject to a mining licence held by various mining companies. Previous attempts to mine sulphur deposits under the lake failed, except for a small operation extracting sulphur for farm fertiliser. A pipeline and pump house was constructed on this land without authority. In the mid-1980s, the trust was approached to grant leaseholds to private interests and the Ministry of Works. According to Dame Evelyn, ‘the highest downhole temperature measured in New Zealand (335°C at 2450 metres) was at RK5 . . . This well is located on the Maori Land.’ Competition between the licensees over water rights applications went on to the Planning Tribunal and failed. In the 1990s, the Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust entered into a joint venture to construct a geothermal power station at Rotokawa that contributes to the national grid.

We are aware that Maori want to be developers of the resource, but in a manner that protects it for future generations. They want to manage its allocation and use within the vicinity of their specific fields. For example, we were told by Kipa Rex Morehu in giving evidence for Ngati Te Takinga that their land Mourea Paehinahina includes a geothermal field which is ‘capable of generating enough power to source the whole of Rotorua.’ Maori should not be further prejudiced by the limitations of the RMA and its assumptions.

The Tribunal’s findings on prejudice to Maori through the statutory framework of the RMA, and the impairment of development rights
The Crown has not accorded Maori an appropriate priority in the RMA process, either through an amendment to section 8 of the RMA, or through the promulgation of a national policy statement. The examples of Mokai and Rotokawa demonstrate that Maori have developed the capacity to generate geothermal electricity and can assist in meeting public demands for alternative sources of energy. But their experience suggests that Maori are marginalised during the RMA process and they have to financially struggle against competing interest groups before their customary rights and interests may be realised. In such situations where there is competition, at the least, Maori should be accorded resource consent priority over fields that they own where they seek to develop them. They have been prejudiced by the Crown’s failure to provide such an opportunity, in accordance with its duties to provide for their tino rangatiratanga, their proprietary interest, and their Treaty interests.

Loss of the financial benefits from the use of the resource
We have found that by the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 Maori customary rights in surface resources – which were developable – were appropriated by the Crown, and Maori
rights in the entire subsurface resource – also developable – were appropriated.

Maori were prejudiced by the failure of the Crown to pay a resource rental to owners of the resource. The Crown ought to have paid a royalty or rental for each of the geothermal stations to those Maori who owned the land within which the geothermal resource was contained, and the hapu or iwi who exercised tino rangatiratanga over it. It should also have paid a resource rental to any iwi or hapu who lost that ownership in breach of the Treaty.

**Impacts of Environmental Degradation and loss of Geothermal Taonga**

We turn to consider the extent to which Central North Island Maori have been prejudiced by the degradation of geothermal resources and certain of the geothermal fields. We are reminded that the TVZ is not only nationally significant, it is of considerable international significance, being one of only six major hot springs regions in the world. The others are in Iceland, Yellowstone Park (in the United States), Japan, Kamchatka (in the former Russian Federation) and Chile.754 New Zealand’s geothermal activity also appears to be scientifically unique and valuable.755 But the non-renewable nature of the geothermal resources and the fields only really became a matter of national attention after 1980. This was due in large measure to the poor management by the Crown and its statutory delegates whom the Crown preferred over any joint arrangement with Maori. As a result, many geothermal features throughout the Central North Island had already been subject to considerable damage and modification. Three of the five major geyser areas of the Central North Island had been eliminated by human activity. The poor state of the geothermal manifestations of the Central North Island was identified in the *Report of the Nature Conservation Council* (1980) in the following terms:

> Of five major New Zealand geyser fields in existence a century ago (Rotomahana, Whakarewarewa, Orakeikorako, Wairakei, Spa) only Whakarewarewa remains with any significant number of geysers active. Rotomahana was destroyed by the 1886 eruption, but Orakeikorako, Wairakei, and Spa, have been eliminated as geyser fields by human activity.756

We consider the impacts of the Crown’s actions and omissions under three headings in this section:

- impacts of the creation of hydro lakes and changes in lake levels;
- impacts of the use of geothermal fields for power generation; and
- impacts of Crown omissions in failing to adequately manage land use to protect the resources; and the utilisation of geothermal resources and the geothermal fields for residential and commercial use.

This division of tasks is to some extent arbitrary and there are some contexts – as at Tokaanu on the southern shores of Lake Taupo – where more than one environmental factor comes into play and different actions converge. We are not concerned here with making definitive findings on the current scientific status of different geothermal resources and the geothermal fields; rather we are providing a snapshot of that status taken from the evidence before us.

**Impacts of the creation of hydro lakes and changes in lake levels**

There are 12 geothermal fields or manifestations adjacent to or beneath Lake Taupo and the Waikato River. These are: Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua, Motuoapa, Horomatangi, Tauhara, Wairakei, Rotokawa, Ohaaki, Ngatamariki, Orakei Korako, Atiamuri, Ongaroto–Hikurangi (Mokai), and Mangakino.757 Mr Bromley, a research scientist and geothermal consultant with 23 years of experience in geothermal research, had this to say about the impact of water levels of a river or lake on adjacent geothermal features:
Hot springs, pools, steam-vents and thermal groundwater aquifers associated with these geothermal fields are affected to varying degrees by changes in water level of the adjacent lake or river. Often, there is a direct relationship between lake or river levels and adjacent hot spring discharge rates and temperatures. Rising levels cause rising groundwater pressures and increased spring flows. Conversely, dropping levels cause a reduction in flow rates or pool water levels. Temperatures of springs usually increase or decrease in proportion to spring flow rate because of the shallow changes in conductive cooling. Declining water levels in pools can lead to rising temperatures because of conductive heating. If the boiling point is reached, then hydrothermal steam eruptions or geysering may be triggered by either of these processes, that is, by increasing or decreasing water levels.

Submerged hot springs respond to changes in water level because of the change in outlet pressure at the vent, in relation to the underlying aquifer pressure. This will readjust slowly with time as the pressure change propagates back into the aquifer. The rate of propagation is related to the transmissivity (or permeability-thickness) of the aquifer. Submerged springs that are exposed by reducing levels will initially discharge vigorously, but flows will later reduce, as pressure equilibrium is gradually re-established.

The chemistry of discharging hot springs gives an indication of the origins of the source fluids and therefore the likelihood of shallow pressure changes, affecting flow rates. High chloride springs are more susceptible to deep pressure changes, while low chloride springs are essentially steam-heated groundwater and respond to shallow hydrological changes.

Extraction of geothermal fluids from some geothermal fields (Wairakei and Ohaaki) has caused localised subsidence. Pressure reduction in the stream zone causes local drainage of a highly compressible mudstone layer, which then gradually compacts. This has the potential of affecting river and lake levels in the vicinity.

Taking this as the basis for our analysis, we review two of the larger components in the Crown schema for hydroelectric power development that have had direct impacts on surface geothermal features adjacent to or underneath Lake Taupo and the Waikato River. The first of these was the raising of Lake Taupo in 1941 and the impacts which this had on portions of the geothermal fields adjacent to the lake and Waikato River, and on smaller geothermal areas around the lake and river margins. The second was the creation of the hydro lake known as Lake Ohakuri in 1961 and the impact which this had on the surface geothermal features in the Orakei Korako Valley.

**Lake Taupo and the Waikato River**

We have already addressed some of the injurious effects of the raising of Lake Taupo on geothermal resources bordering the lake and whether Ngati Tuwharetoa and their whanaunga received compensation for this in the decades beginning in 1940 and 1950. In this section we rehearse some of these impacts again and review additional impacts.

Dr Severne, in the course of a larger study of the Waihi-Tokaanu geothermal system in the 1990s, observed surface geothermal features and noted the impacts of changes in the lake level. She found a clear correlation and conceptualised the relationship between rises in lake level and the activity of surface geothermal features. Higher lake levels increased the activity levels, and the temperatures, of steam vents, hot springs and mud pools located close to the lake shore. Lower lake levels, conversely, decreased activity levels and temperatures. Our understanding of this evidence is that geothermal activity is relocated as lake levels change but, in sum, it is neither increased nor decreased as a result of changes to the level of Lake Taupo. The major impacts, and the major areas of potential damage from the perspective of the claimants, are those which occur when surface geothermal features adjacent to the previous lake shore are inundated or otherwise rendered inaccessible by the changes in the lake level.

A number of the claimants have provided evidence that this was the case. Paranapa Otimi, as we have seen, could describe some 13 springs ‘used for centuries to feed, heal
and sustain the tribe. All were close to the lake shore. His claim that only three of these features escaped the rising lake level is consistent with the evidence provided by Dr Severne. Rotopotakataka, Te Kiri o Pahau, Te Korua, Ngapuaauaki, Waihi Te Korua, Waihiparehopu, Te Rorohi, Te Paraki, Te Pakihi o Te Oinga, and Waihi Kahakahaoa have been lost to the tangata whenua at Waihi as a result of the increases in lake level. Only Te Tuki, Paraki Tuarua, and Whakatara survive.

Changes in lake level, triggered by Crown actions from the 1940s onwards, also impacted on low-lying areas at Tokaanu to the south of Lake Taupo. For example, Merle Ormsby described Te Mimi o Tara where she and her companions used to bathe and wash their hair. When the level of the lake rose, the land surrounding the pool became wet and soggy. Access became more difficult and the pool was abandoned sometime around 1979. The timing of the abandonment, as cited by Mrs Ormsby, suggests to us that a number of events converged to cause this result. In the wake of the raising of Lake Taupo from 1941 onwards, once the control gates were installed, came the diverting of the Tongariro River between 1966 and 1973.

In a similar manner, Dulcie Gardiner shared memories of her grandfather’s mara and thermal pool at Mahinahina. She described the spectacular geothermal eruption which took place during the construction of the Tokaanu Diversion:

The whole area by my papakainga was demolished by the building of the tailrace and the aqueduct that the Tokaanu River was diverted through. When the construction of the tailrace reached the area of the thermal mara Mahinahina a huge geyser erupted. It was spectacular to watch. We heard that the engineers were beside themselves over how to stop it. In the end they poured in tons and tons of cement and sealed it. The old people were very upset. We realised that it was the end of an era, the end of a way of life. We had lost a very valuable resource in that piece of land. But it was more than that, we had lost control of our ancestral land and our ancestral river.

We are unable to apportion damage done, and loss of amenity, between lake level rises and river diversion, both of which are actions of the Crown. What we can suggest is that it is likely that geothermal conditions below the surface of the earth at Tokaanu were changed as a result of the interplay, and that natural forces responded in a violent fashion causing the eruption.

Joycelyn Rameka and Mataara Wall have provided evidence about the loss of geothermal resources at Waipahihi Marae on the north shore of Lake Taupo, not far from Tauhara maunga. There has been a loss of amenity from the Onekeneke Stream with a decrease in water temperature and water flow important for the marae, but we are not able to determine the cause. If it is the result of lake level rise, or geothermal power development at Wairakei, the Crown is the direct agent. If it has been triggered by residential and commercial development in Taupo township, the Crown is also at fault for failing to adequately address the situation in a similar manner to the action it took in Rotorua as discussed above. We will return to geothermal development at Wairakei and residential and commercial development below.

Tereowhakotahi Charles Wall told us about Taharepa on the Taupo lakefront where a man-made pool had been carved by the owners into the bank. It was his view that the pool had been destroyed by the raising of the lake level:

Hot water would come into the pool from out of the bank into which it was cut. This was our main bathing and swimming pool. The water also had healing properties, especially when it was drunk .

Sadly this resource has been destroyed by the rising of the lake levels, which has resulted from the control gates and use of the lake for hydro storage. The hole remains, but it is now filled with sand, the whole thing is underwater. This is another instance of a resource which formed part of our everyday lives, but has now been taken away.

Emily Rameka confirmed this impact on the Taharepa Bath. She also spoke of its loss for it had been used continuously by her hapu and whanau and indeed the Taupo
community for many generations, primarily for healing and general bathing.\textsuperscript{766}

**Lake Ohakuri and the Orakei Korako Valley**

The Orakei Korako geothermal field, with its very visible surface features, was also likely to have been a prime candidate for geothermal development before the 1950s. However, this was pre-empted by hydro electric development with a series of hydroelectric dams and power stations on the Waikato River, especially once the control gates at Lake Taupo were fully in position. Ohakuri, constructed between 1956 and 1961, was part of that sequence. The large gravity dam, located downriver from Orakei Korako, would create Lake Ohakuri, the largest artificial lake in the North Island.\textsuperscript{767} This new lake would flood much of the Orakei Korako geothermal field and geothermal electric development could not proceed without putting the hydroelectric power station at risk.

Edward Lloyd, a geologist on the staff of the New Zealand Geological Survey, was assigned the task of mapping the geothermal features in the Orakei Korako Valley before the new Lake Ohakuri was filled, and monitoring the immediate and long-term effects of the changes which resulted. His observations, and his analysis, were published as part of a more comprehensive Geological Survey Bulletin in 1972.\textsuperscript{768} The results of his work are important for this field area and provide insights into the processes at work in other areas, including Lake Taupo. By the time he completed his task and published Geological Survey Bulletin 85 a substantial proportion of the Orakei Korako Valley had been submerged by the waters.\textsuperscript{769}

Lloyd, already familiar with the field area, began his surveys in October 1958 and monitored the physical and chemical changes which occurred as the lake filled between 19 January 1961, when the diversion was closed, and 8 February 1962 when the lake reached its final level. The new lake was some eight square kilometres and flooded the valley to a depth of 20 to 30 metres.\textsuperscript{770} Lloyd records two sets of effects: those changes which took place as the lake filled; and those which continued after the lake had filled and the water table stabilised at new levels. A number of spectacular changes occurred in 1961 before the new equilibrium was established. The long-term effects of increased pressure of lake water are described, mapped, and graphed in considerable detail. Lloyd recorded and mapped more than 1000 surface geothermal features (springs, vents, hot pools, warm pools, and geysers). A large proportion of these, in the order of 60 to 75 per cent, were submerged.\textsuperscript{771}

Lloyd’s report shows that increased geothermal activity took place above the new lake level, but for the most part this was not sustained.\textsuperscript{772} Some vents became, for a time, spectacular geysers: one set, known as Aorangi Geysers, erupted for a period of eight months and then collapsed; Hochstetter’s Pool became a geyser that was active for a time then declined; springs in the vicinity of the Artist’s Palette, which had previously been tranquil, became boiling and erupted at irregular intervals. The impression we gain from the scientific evidence before us is that the enhanced activity in the areas just above the new lake level is modest compared with the thermal features which are submerged. Our understanding is that most of the...
Impacts of the use of geothermal fields for power generation

**Wairakei**

In the 1940s and 1950s, the Minister of Works, Robert Semple, and the electrical engineers in the Department of Public Works were confident that natural steam, like water power, was ‘supplied by nature, and there for the taking.’ They were conscious that they were world leaders in a new field of human endeavour and stood alongside Italy, Israel, Iceland, Japan, and the United States in the application of the new technologies. There was a considerable investment in geothermal research by Government engineers and Government geologists. The intention was to identify which fields had the greatest potential for development and to generate the maximum amount of power with the greatest possible efficiency.

Wairakei was the first selected. Surface features showed clear evidence of powerful geothermal forces below and the land above the field was owned by the Crown. Robin Fry elaborates:

> Wairakei was chosen because its hot pools, fumeroles, geysers and boiling mudpools clearly indicated geothermal activity. A large fumerole known as the Karapiti blow-hole emitted super-heated steam nearby. The Waikato River could provide cooling water for the project, and there were streams in the area to provide water for drilling. Apart from the tourist hotel and the grounds and golf course, Wairakei was an unproductive wasteland. As it belonged to the Government no private interests were involved, and the location being fairly isolated meant that the development would not impinge on important scenic and tourist resources.

Test bores were drilled from 1950 onwards and electric power generation began at Wairakei in 1963. Scientific and engineering research reports appeared in the journals and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) bulletins from 1955 onwards.

This field was selected for test drilling in advance of any comprehensive survey of the sustainable long-term use of the resource. Rather, the decisions on testing were made
Table 20.4: Named hot springs at Orakei Korako.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submerged springs and geysers</th>
<th>Surviving springs and geysers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarah's Grotto</td>
<td>Bath Pool/Map of Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pudding Basin</td>
<td>Jelly Fish Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mimi Homai-o-te Rangi</td>
<td>Moss Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Te-mimi-a-Homaiterangi/Foot Bath</td>
<td>Potiki/Diamond Geyser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ngawha Tuatahi</td>
<td>Cascade Geyser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohaki/Nga Puia Paruparu</td>
<td>Hochstetter's Pool/Puia Tuhitarata</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terata/Raharahu/Tutukau</td>
<td>Dante's Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orakeikorako</td>
<td>My Lady's Lace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waikawa/Minginui</td>
<td>Dragon's Mouth/Queen Mary's Turbine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rahurahu/Terrific Geyser</td>
<td>Fred and Maggie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rameka Geyser</td>
<td>Champagne/Manganese/Fruit Salts Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waipapa Geyser</td>
<td>Petrifying Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soda Pool</td>
<td>Prince of Wales Feathers Geyser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iodine Pool</td>
<td>Witch's Cauldron/Lady Cobham's Geyser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Te Korokoro-o-te Turewa/ Taipo</td>
<td>Terrace/Dreadnought/Lord Cobham Geyser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oyster Pool</td>
<td>The Three Bears</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cardinal's Robe/Haematite Pool</td>
<td>Psyche's Bath/Rock and Roll/Gordon's Geyser</td>
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<td>Man Friday’s Foot</td>
<td>Kohuna</td>
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<td>Wine Chalice</td>
<td>The Broken Heart</td>
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<td>Map of England</td>
<td>The Perfect Heart</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Beauty Parlour</td>
<td>Bendix Washer Geyser/Kurapai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mushroom Pool</td>
<td>Kurapai</td>
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<td>Albert Geyser</td>
<td>Waiwhakaata/The Wishing Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petrifying Pool</td>
<td>Jewel Geyser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submerged springs and geysers</td>
<td>Surviving springs and geysers</td>
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<td>OK Pool</td>
<td>Palette Pool/White Pool</td>
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<td>Champagne Pool</td>
<td>Square Pool/Blue Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turtle/Opal/Earthquake/Copper Sulphate Pool</td>
<td>Twin Pools</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ace of Spades/The Swinging Rock</td>
<td>Map of South America</td>
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<td>The Shamrock/The Ace of Clubs</td>
<td>Te Wahine</td>
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<td>The Map of Australia</td>
<td>Te Tane</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kahurangi</td>
<td>Sarah’s Washing Pool</td>
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<td>Spring above bog en route to Wainui</td>
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<td>Spring below Wainui</td>
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<td>Pool below Wainui</td>
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<td>Wainui Barrier Springs</td>
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<td>Wainui Geyser</td>
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<td>Erupting Cauldron/Nghapu Geyser</td>
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<td>Coral Geyser</td>
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<td>Sea Egg Geyser</td>
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<td>Large spring, East Bank</td>
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<td>The Bird’s Nest</td>
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<td>Ruakiwi</td>
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<td>Porangi Geyser</td>
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<td>The Split</td>
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<td>White Mud Pool</td>
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<td>Red Mud Pool</td>
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on the basis of surface thermal activity. There is no evidence in the engineering or scientific literature, the annual reports to Parliament, or the published histories of the New Zealand Electricity Department, that Maori were consulted or that their environmental values were considered at the time Wairakei was selected and investigated.\textsuperscript{780}

We now turn to consider what happened to the geothermal resources, and the field at Wairakei. We do so by reference to a series of articles and reports published from 1955.

\textbf{Leslie Grange, 1955}: Leslie Grange, the director of the New Zealand Geological Survey in the 1950s, had carried out research in the Rotorua and Taupo districts in the 1930s and was a long-time advocate for the use of steam for industrial purposes. His overview \textit{Geothermal Steam for Power in New Zealand} was published as a DSIR Bulletin in 1955. It contains chapters by a number of Government scientists and engineers and gives us an important window of insight into official attitudes and expectations.\textsuperscript{781}

Wairakei, along with Orakei Korako and Waiotapu, was seen as a field offering the greatest potential for electricity generation. An expanded programme of research had been under way at Wairakei since 1950. Grange was aware that the 37-megawatt generating plant would impact on the levels of geothermal activity but was, on the basis of data already collected, unable to predict the nature or the pace of the changes which might follow. His primary concerns were with the sustainability of the field and the best locations for the productive bores.

The temperatures and the temporal dynamics of springs and geysers were carefully monitored to provide production-related data. Water chemistry was studied, partly to provide information about subsurface dynamics, and partly to minimise corrosion of drilling equipment and the power station itself. There was an awareness that surface features would change, but no recognition of Maori interests in these and no explicit consideration of the environmental impacts on these features.\textsuperscript{782}

\textbf{JH Smith and FE Studt, 1958}: JH Smith, an engineer with the Ministry of Works, and FE Studt, a scientist with the DSIR, each published papers in 1958, shortly before the power station was commissioned.\textsuperscript{783} There is recognition in the Studt paper that geothermal fields could not be exploited on a sustained basis without careful attention to the scale of production, the position of the aquifers and the dynamics of groundwater discharge. Smith shows a similar awareness when he tabulates natural heat flows for each of the geothermal fields in the region and comments that ‘the amount which can be taken off by bores cannot be determined’. Later he makes the comment, specific to Wairakei, that ‘[l]ack of inflow water could ultimately be the limitation to increase of production’, and he recognises that a case could be made for returning hot water into the ground.\textsuperscript{784} The focus for both writers is on the organisation and scale of production: there is no acknowledgement of Maori interests or potential environmental impacts on the land above the field or the river receiving the geothermal fluids once discharged. So at this stage the scientific community was aware that inflow water was relevant to the organisation and scale of production.

\textbf{RG Fisher, 1964}: Issues relating to heat flows and the sustainability of the Wairakei field were clearly in the minds of scientists and engineers monitoring impacts in 1958. R G Fisher, in a paper published in 1964, compared natural heat flows in 1952 and 1958.\textsuperscript{785} His conclusion was that the heat flow at 100,000 kilocalories per second had not changed significantly. The heat used for power generation matched the decrease in surface discharge. Fisher commented further that ‘there was a steady decline in mass discharge from natural thermal activity as seen by the decrease in the spring and geyser activity of Geyser Valley’. This time Maori are not completely invisible in the scientific report: there is a photograph of ‘Opal Pool, Geyser Valley 1949’ and a young Maori woman standing beside the pool. There is no photograph for 1958 and no mention of Maori or
Maori values in any caption or the text. At this stage the Crown should have been aware that power generation was starting to impact on the geothermal manifestations of the field.

**George Grindley, 1965**: George Grindley published in 1965 what was to become the definitive volume on the geology and exploitation of the Wairakei geothermal field. This was a comprehensive study, based on information from 150 drill holes and 15 years of field investigation. Grindley was able to answer some of the questions which were taking shape when Studt wrote in 1958. Underground heat resources had been sustained, but the geothermal fluids, which carry the heat to the surface, were found to be much less sustainable. Accelerated pressure drops in 1958 and 1959, when the station was operating to capacity, were evidence that the Waiora aquifer was being depleted of water. The reduction in pressure, Grindley notes, was apparent throughout the field, ‘even in remote parts of the aquifer little exploited by drillholes.’

The primary focus of attention in this authoritative report is on the productive capacity of the field, the ability to operate the power station at full capacity and the prospects for an additional station or stations. Environmental impacts are alluded to indirectly: if the decline in pressure continues the final result might be ‘the elimination of water flow at the surface and its replacement by steaming ground and fumeroles. Areas such as Geyser Valley, remote from the discharge region and supplied by stream water from outside’, might survive, but ‘the few discharging springs that still remain in the Waioara Valley should disappear and be replaced by fumaroles.’

Grindley had three comments to make about field management: first, monitoring was important and should continue; secondly, it was the availability of water, rather than heat, which was the controlling factor; thirdly there should be experimentation with aquifer recharge. He then raised the possibility that the life of the field might be prolonged by operating the Wairakei power station, not as a base load station, but as a peak load station. Reduction in the load factor ‘would allow areas of the field to be shut down periodically for recovery of aquifer pressures by natural or artificial recharge.’ Grindley and his colleagues were aware that there were problems at Wairakei. Energy was being used more rapidly than the aquifers could recharge. Grindley, clearly but tentatively, pointed out ways in which these problems could be addressed.

There is no recognition of Maori interests in the geothermal field and no explicit concerns about environmental damage already evident or likely to happen in this study. However, the contents of the document, and the author’s insights into field dynamics and management options, show that operations could be more sustainable and less environmentally destructive. His study suggests new operating options which should have been more fully explored, given that it was known by this time that the resource was not renewable.

**RG Allis, 1981**: RG Allis, from the Geophysics Division of the DSIR, published an overview of heat flows associated with the exploitation of the Wairakei geothermal field. As a scientist publishing his work in the *New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics*, Allis is careful not to show bias towards those who wish to maximise electricity production in the medium or long term. Nor does he take sides with those who wish to ensure that the environment is protected from damaging exploitation. His paper is substantial, technical, and important for both audiences. Allis builds on the results obtained from previous heat flow studies and when he surveys heat flows in 1978 and 1979, he provides a measure of the magnitude of heat extraction between 1952 and 1978. He estimates that 62,000 megawatt-years of heat flowed from the field. Had the field been left untouched, he estimates that the heat flow over the same period would have been 12,000 megawatt-years. Allis was also able to map areas where there had been a decline.
in heat flows and those where heat flows had increased and new surface features had emerged.\textsuperscript{795} His primary task was to develop a heat flow model and provide insights for those charged with positioning wells, considering reinjection options, and planning power generation in the future. In the course of this work, Allis provides some detailed information about areas where geothermal activity has declined and areas such as the Karapiti Thermal Area where new geothermal activity has been triggered. He makes brief and passing reference to subsidence, as much as five metres, which has taken place as hydrothermal fluids have been removed.

Allis postulates two distinctive phases in the dynamics of the volcanic field from 1952 to 1980. Between 1952 and the mid-1960s, large quantities of hot water were taken from the hydrothermal reservoirs and there was insufficient replacement of water to maintain pressure. From the mid-1960s onwards, the reservoirs have been replenished with hot water inflows from outside the production area and cold water inflows from the surface. We know from other sources, in particular Martin (1998), that major operational adjustments were made by the electricity managers in the 1960s. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the power station at Wairakei was a major source of supply for the national grid and was used as a load power station, running close to full capacity throughout the year. Peak output was achieved in 1965, but by then it was clear that the hydrothermal reservoir was running down. Since then, Martin comments (without giving precise dates or details), ‘the emphasis had shifted to managing the field to sustain existing capacity.’\textsuperscript{796} On the basis of the evidence presented above, it would appear that adjustments, along the lines suggested by Grindley, were made in the interests of maximising production, rather than the protection of the Wairakei environment.

The impacts of over 15 years of extraction at this level have had significant effects. The Wairakei geothermal field is now a geothermal field without geysers. The loss of geysers is most apparent in Geyser Valley. ‘Steam-heated pools, fumaroles and steaming ground’, writes Mr Allis, ‘have now completely replaced the springs and geysers in the valley.’\textsuperscript{797} The Allis paper, complete with maps, graphs, and mathematical models, confirms claimant evidence. The extraction of large amounts of water over a sustained period has changed the character of surface geothermal activity. Allis himself writes:

The geysers and hot springs in Geyser Valley have been replaced by steam-heated features. In the Karapiti thermal area, at the southern end of the field, there has been a spectacular increase in thermal activity, with the appearance of large fumaroles, steaming craters, and an extensive area of steaming ground . . . The Karapiti area has now replaced Geyser Valley as the major tourist attraction at Wairakei.\textsuperscript{798}

There are also impacts further afield from the production areas. Allis showed that the Tauhara geothermal field surrounding Taupo and the Wairakei geothermal field are linked and operate as a single field. The changes which result from geothermal extraction at Wairakei in the north of the field impact on Tauhara and Taupo in the south.\textsuperscript{799} This is particularly important for the Tauhara hapu and the Hikuwi Confederation whose reserves and Maori land are being affected. Geyser activity at Spa Sights, on the banks of the Waikato River below Lake Taupo, became intermittent and then ceased. Hot and cold spring activity at Spa Sights continued in the 1950s and ceased around 1960.

\textbf{Dame Evelyn Stokes, 1991:} Dame Evelyn Stokes describes impacts from development ushered in by the construction of the power station, in these words:

Waiora Valley, the place of health-giving waters, was bulldozed into Bore Valley. Another unique and distinctive landscape evolved, of pipe lines, well heads, flash plants and silencers, and plumes of steam rising from the engineering works. The geysers and hot pools died. The areas of hot and steaming ground shifted. Some ground subsided, up to 10 metres and more. A new thermal attraction appeared at Karapiti and someone gave it the name Craters of the Moon. The fumarole Karapiti has died, but there are other fumaroles and the
occasional hydrothermal eruption to titillate the tourist and entice the scientist.\textsuperscript{800}

\textbf{Dr Christopher Bromley, 1999:} Dr Christopher Bromley provided Environment Waikato with a summary overview of the environmental effects of geothermal development at Wairakei:

Deep pressure drawdown . . . during the first 20 years created extensive steam zones at about 300 m depth in both Wairakei and Tauhara fields. These changed the nature of surface thermal features. Steaming ground and fumaroles (e.g. ‘Craters of the Moon’) replaced hot springs and geysers that previously discharged about 20,000 tonnes/day of high chloride water into the Waikato River (at ‘Geyser Valley’ and ‘Spa Park’).\textsuperscript{801}

Dr Bromley is more specific than Allis about subsidence:

Over the past 40 years, subsidence . . . has gradually occurred over large parts of the Wairakei-Tauhara field. The total amount has been generally less than 2 m, although a localised subsidence “bowl” of almost 15 m is centred beneath the Wairakei Stream, forming a pond.\textsuperscript{802}

\textbf{Dr Charlotte Severne, 1999:} Dr Charlotte Severne reaches similar conclusions with respect to degradation at Wairakei. In particular, she reminds us that:

Contrary to popular opinion, geothermal energy is not a renewable resource. Through extraction of geothermal fluid, the geothermal field is progressively degraded. This leads to a loss of pressure, which causes subsidence of land and collapse of puia, ngawha and waiariki. In theory it would take many hundreds of years for the system to recover.\textsuperscript{803}

Dr Severne notes that extraction has caused subsidence throughout the Wairakei–Tauhara area for 40 years, and is predicted to continue into the future.

\textbf{Ohaaki}

Increasingly, from the 1970s it became evident to officials and to the public at large that environmental values were matters of national importance and needed to be taken into account. This change can be seen in relation to Ohaaki and proposals to use this field. The Ohaaki field posed very different technological and public policy challenges for the Ministry of Works and Development and the New Zealand Electricity Department. In the public policy context, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 were both in position.\textsuperscript{804} The first required applications for water rights which would, in the case of large projects, involve the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment Report.\textsuperscript{805} The second would require attention to land-use zoning, and recognition that the relationships between Maori culture and traditions and ancestral lands were matters of national importance.\textsuperscript{806}

Negotiations between the Crown, the iwi, the Maori owners of the land, and the Taupo County Council took place over an extended period. The site selected for the power station was in proximity to Te Ohaaki Marae, to their sacred rock and to the reserves which contained urupa and a large hot pool (figure 20.13). The negotiations culminated in July 1982 with an agreement signed between the Crown and the Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust. The Crown would lease the land for 50 years, with the right of two renewals, and would proceed with geothermal development for electricity generation. In return, it would protect the marae, the urupa, and the sacred places, and restore the hot pool and the supply of steam to the marae.\textsuperscript{807}

Ohaaki was commissioned in 1988 and began electricity generation in 1989, some 25 years after Wairakei. In the lead up to construction there had been an environmental audit by the Commission for the Environment and a determination on water rights, made by the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority.\textsuperscript{808} It would seem at first sight that the power station at Ohaaki, built with a much higher level of resource management and planning protection, and with the benefits of three decades of experience
at Wairakei, would have minimal environmental impacts. Such, however, was not the case. The evidence of Bromley, Browne, Kirkpatrick, Martin, and Dame Evelyn leads us to five conclusions: four relating to geothermal electricity development and one relating to the construction of Lake Ohakuri for hydroelectric development. Lake Ohakuri comes first in chronological sequence.

The creation of Lake Ohakuri and its impact
Historically, there were alkaline hot springs and bathing pools at Ohaaki. Before development, Ohaaki had several mud pools heated by steam; hot pools isolated from ground water by a layer of mineralised earth, also heated by steam; and hot springs producing chloride water and depositing sinter. The creation of Lake Ohakuri for electricity generating purposes, in 1961 and 1962, impacted not only on Orakei Korako farther downstream from Ohaaki, but also on portions of the Ohaaki geothermal field within the valley of the Waikato River. The waters of the lake extended upstream as far as Ohaaki and flooded the cave of Makawe, the protective taniwha of the papakainga. Other springs, bathing places, wahi taonga, and urupa were also inundated. Among them was Te Apiti, an alum hot spring, and a paruparupu place nearby which provided dark mud used for dyeing flax fibre.

Exploratory drilling and site testing, 1965–1986
The Ohaaki ngawha (boiling pool) is the dominant remaining natural feature of the system. Before the area was developed, the large Ohaaki ngawha, with its clear, pale, turquoise-blue water and extensive white sinter terrace, was once described as ‘the most handsome pool in the whole thermal area.’

Exploratory drilling from 1965 onwards, including a phase of large-scale testing between 1967 and 1972, had significant environmental impacts. In the case of the Ohaaki ngawha, close to Te Ohaaki Marae, these appear to be irreversible. Bulldozers, engaged as part of the drilling exercise, damaged a number of smaller surface features. Browne, writing for an international audience in 1986, noted that 44 deep wells had been drilled, and added that 25 of these would be used for power production and 8 for the reinjection of geothermal fluids back into the geothermal system.

When large-scale testing began in 1967 the water level in the Ohaaki ngawha fell dramatically. This caused the partial collapse of the delicate sinter edge and the white silica formations weathered to a dull dirty grey. Maria Johnston remembers that 40 truckloads of concrete were poured into the pool in an effort to block the vents, but the ngawha did not recover. The damage had been done and more recent attempts to solve the problem by reinjecting wastewater into the ngawha have not improved it. Kirkpatrick provided the Tribunal with colour photographs of the pool, the injection device, and the waste water flows, taken in January 2004. He then summed up, saying, ‘The ngawha is now wholly artificial, and concentrations of chemicals designed to keep the injection pipes clean make it impossible to utilize.’

According to Environment Waikato, the sinter terrace is now cracking and has plants growing through it. The ngawha is now fed by geothermal bore water, which they acknowledge contains chemicals added to prevent silica depositing in the bore pipes. According to Environment Waikato, most of the other flowing surface features at Ohaaki have dried up because of the extraction of geothermal fluid.

Project design and site selection
The Maori owners have suffered from inappropriate site selection. Planning for the design and location of the Ohaaki power station was carried out in the 1960s and 1970s. On the basis of evidence before us, it was done with limited consultation with Maori, with limited consideration of environmental values, and little, if any, recognition of Maori cultural and spiritual values. Given the configuration of marae reserve, ngawha reserve, wahi tapu reserve, and urupa reserve at Te Ohaaki, it was inevitable
that any adverse environmental effects would be felt primarily by Maori and most particularly by those who affiliate to Te Ohaaki Marae. In the event, there have been impacts and it is Te Ohaaki Marae which is most affected.

**Environmental impacts since 1988**

Dr Bromley, in two separate reports, has noted that geothermal ‘production since 1989 has caused a drop in surface geothermal activity’ and has presented map evidence which shows increases in ground temperatures in the vicinity of Te Ohaaki Marae. Dr Kirkpatrick has mapped and tabulated the Bromley evidence for the field as a whole and combined this with his own field visits to the Ohaaki Marae locality. A number of photographs, taken on these field visits, are reproduced in Kirkpatrick, Belshaw, and Campbell. From these sources we identify the following environmental impacts:

- the destruction of the Ohaaki ngawha, close to Te Ohaaki Marae (we have noted above that major damage had been done during the drilling programme, in advance of the lease agreement between Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust and Crown);
- a number (more than 12 in all) of warm pools have dried up;
- fumaroles near the main ngawha and sinter terraces are no longer active;
- urupa show signs of ground disturbance and, in some cases, graves have been exposed;
- vegetation changes, including the spread of wilding pines and shifts in the location of thermo-tolerant vegetation;
- noise and visual pollution, especially in the vicinity of Te Ohaaki Marae where there are 20 bores; and
- land, leased by Ngati Tahu to NZED and its successors Electircorp and Contact Energy, in the area between power station and marae, shows signs of being derelict, degenerated, and in some cases overgrown with wilding pines or littered with construction debris.

**Ground subsidence**

The most serious and problematic environmental impacts are those relating to subsidence. The engineers who planned the Ohaaki scheme, and the authorities who granted water rights and geothermal licence, were aware of two potential environmental problems. On the one hand there was the problem of ground subsidence, already evident at the Wairakei geothermal field. Alongside that were the problems of river pollution, created by the thermal and chemical discharges from the Wairakei scheme, which would be added to if the geothermal effluent from Ohaaki was also discharged into the Waikato River. The final design schemes, as incorporated into the water rights application, addressed both problems. The scheme would include a cooling tower, and a large proportion of the geothermal effluent would be injected back into the geothermal field.

The theory was attractive but the practical outcome was far from satisfactory. Significant subsidence, up to and exceeding 3 metres, is occurring on the western side of the field in the vicinity of the power station, Te Ohaaki Marae, the urupa, the sacred stone, and the Waikato River valley.
Map 20.13: Subsidence at Te Ohaaki  [Based on: Kirkpatrick et al, doc E3, figure 8.16; C Bromley, doc H34, figure 2]

Figure 20.2: Flooding at Te Ohaaki, actual and projected as at 2003, 2010, 2020  [Source: Contact Energy information as interpreted by Kirkpatrick et al, doc E3, figures 8.19, 8.20 and 8.21]
Dr Bromley has prepared a detailed contour map showing total subsidence in the Ohaaki power station area between 1979 and 2000 (see map 20.13). Bromley explained to the relevant consent authority of Environment Waikato that:

Production has also caused localised subsidence near the Ohaaki Marae at a rate of about 0.4m/year. This is having a significant effect on the nearby Waikato River bank, threatening to inundate areas of adjacent farmland during periods of high river flow.

Contact Energy, successor to NZeD and Electricorp and the current holder of the lease with its contractual obligations to Ngati Tahu, has recognised the problems created by the subsidence. It commissioned a series of projections of maximum water levels for 2003, 2010, and 2020 and presented these in the form of colour maps. The visual impact is dramatic (see figure 20.2). According to this evidence, the marae at Te Ohaaki will be surrounded by water in 2010 and inundated in 2020. The power producer has offered to fund the relocation of the marae or build a massive embankment to protect the marae and the Wahi Tapu Reserve. The large sacred rock, 130 to 230 tons in weight, would be inundated if the former option is taken up or buried under the embankment if the latter is followed.

Kirkpatrick, Belshaw, and Campbell point to evidence suggesting that the certainty of subsidence was known to Crown parties at the point when the Commission for the Environment presented an audit in 1977 and the Crown negotiated its lease agreement with Ngati Tahu in 1981 and 1982. We have not been able to refute or verify this serious claim. We are, however, in substantial agreement with the conclusion reached by the University of Waikato research team:

What the Crown hoped to be a substantial, sustainable geothermal field has proven to be anything but. There are questions about the medium-term sustainability of any geothermal field. Whatever happens, it appears that Ngati Tahu have lost a very valuable resource.

We note the Crown’s advice regarding the payment to the Ngati Tahu Tribal Trust in respect of the impacts from power generation. We trust that the Crown is fully appraised of the actual and true cost of the remedial works that must be taken in relation to the damage on this traditional papakainga land.

Kawerau

During the late 1940s, the Kaingaroa forests planted by the State during the previous three decades, had reached maturity and were ready to be cut. Government was about to join forces with private enterprise to create the wood processing facilities needed. The Tasman Pulp and Paper Company was formed to build and operate a large-scale integrated mill which would process logs and produce pulp, paper, timber, cardboard, and fibreboard.

In 1951 and 1952, DSIR scientists carried out geological and geophysical surveys to establish the geothermal energy capacity of the Kawerau geothermal field. The results confirmed the potential of the field for commercial development and were reported to the Geothermal Energy Committee. This was not the time to build a second geothermal electric power station, but another commercial option was close at hand. Geothermal energy would be used to operate the mill, dry the products which were produced, and generate power for the new town which would be built. The Tasman mill was thus located at Kawerau, on the geothermal field and between the forests at Kaingaroa and the port at Mount Maunganui. Government provided its share of the venture capital and enabled the process by designing and building the new town, constructing roads and railway, and passing legislation to ensure that production could commence with a minimum of delay. The joint-venture partners intended to run the mill on natural steam. This proposal did not fit under the rubric of the Geothermal Steam Act 1952 because that Act was confined to the use of the resource for electrical generation. We note the consternation of the Commissioner of Works in his
advice to the Minister of Works regarding the determination of the Maori owners to secure an adequate price for granting access rights to the Crown to the underlying geothermal resource, should the bores have proven successful. On 23 July 1953, the Commissioner of Works advised the Minister of Works as follows regarding the situation at Te Teko (Kawerau):

You are aware of the impasse which has arisen in regard to the acquisition of suitable areas at Te Teko for the production of geothermal steam for the proposed pulp and paper mill. The right has been secured to enter on Maori-owned property for the purpose of sinking the necessary bores but the owners have so far declined to reach any agreement as to the price of the land should the bores prove successful.

Various prices have been suggested even up to £12000 an acre. As it stands the land is worth very little, being scrub and fern covered and possibly used occasionally for grazing.

It is felt that if we enter the property and put bores down, if these prove to be successful a very heavy price will be demanded for the land.

The matter has been referred to the Solicitor-General's Office and the information we have to date indicates that the Crown has no right to acquire this land for any other purpose than the generation of electricity [this was due to the limited wording of the Geothermal Steam Act 1952] and even in this latter case the question of compensation would have to be decided by the appropriate Court. The indication from the Solicitor-General's Office is that the Court would be likely to take a liberal view of the valuation of the land . . .

Consideration should, I think, now be given to legislation extending the provisions of the Geothermal Act to give the State protection in regard to the utilisation of this steam in the national interest and on a basis wider than the utilisation of this asset for the production of electricity.

It was not long after this that the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 was enacted. The Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Enabling Act 1954 was also passed into law. Among its provisions, important in the present context, were clauses which freed the company from the restraints of the river pollution laws and allowed it to dispose of waste from the mill and the geothermal field into local rivers and lakes. The Crown was a partner in the joint venture from 1952 to 1985, when it sold its interest. The company is currently operated by Norske Skog.

Ngati Rangitihī claimants told us about the impact of the mill on the geothermal taonga within the vicinity of Kawerau. David Potter for Ngati Rangitihī says that the Onepu Springs have declined and that this has had a major impact on Ngati Rangitihī's relationship with the resource:

Bathing in the geothermal waters of the Onepu springs have long been recognised as being very therapeutic by Ngati Rangitihī. For this reason many of our tribe not only travelled there regularly, but also occupied this area on a semi-permanent basis for centuries. Our Chief Tionga had a particular love for bathing here. Many members of the Tangihia family made regular trips here up to 1953 when suddenly the geothermal activity declined, which largely reduced the attractiveness of this area. This decline in geothermal activity affected large areas where the Town of Kawerau is built today . . .

Today the Onepu Springs are spoiled and nothing like what I remembered them to be, mostly due to the reduced geothermal activity . . .

We do not have, for Kawerau, the pool of scientific evidence which is available for Wairakei and Rotorua. The observations made and reported by Mr Potter are, however, consistent with the evidence of impacts at other geothermal sites. They are also consistent with the views of Dame Evelyn, who recorded that the significant geothermal resources at Kawerau have been 'modified by the development of pulp and paper mill and geothermal steam extraction.'

Impacts of Crown omissions in failing to adequately manage land use, residential, and commercial use

The final category of impacts relates to Crown omissions in failing to adequately manage land use to protect the resources, and the utilisation of geothermal resources, and
certain fields for residential and commercial purposes. In considering this issue, we canvass some of the impacts identified by Environment Waikato.

**Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua**

At Tokaanu and Waihi–Hipaua, many of the hot pools and fumaroles continue to be used frequently by the local Maori people for bathing, cooking, medical, and ceremonial uses. There are small takes for bathing and heating for a hotel, motels, and domestic use.

According to Dr Severne, the main impacts on the geothermal resources and the field are from raised lake levels and test drilling. She advised that in 1942 four shallow bores to a maximum depth of 107 metres were drilled in Tokaanu to assess the value of the unusually high boron concentration in this field. These were the first geothermal wells drilled outside the Rotorua area. The wells were grouted in the 1960s. However, they are not stable and pose a danger. Dr Severne notes in relation to one bore: 'Healy's bore remains a concern as it has broken through and has been discharging reservoir fluids into a nearby stream for several years. This mismanagement should be remedied as it is wasteful and the system is being run down as a result.'

In other words, nothing has been done about these bores and one has been left discharging geothermal fluid. According to Environment Waikato's website this bore loses geothermal fluid at a rate equal to the sum of all other takes. As a result, Environment Waikato believes that large-scale energy extraction has the potential to exacerbate, damage, or destroy the remaining geothermal features. It may also cause heating of the ground and hydrothermal eruptions in populated areas, possibly resulting in ground subsidence and causing the settlements of Tokaanu and Waihi to become flooded by Lake Taupo.

In addition to the above problems, Dr Severne gave evidence that the presence of the Tokaanu hydroelectric power station poses difficulties for the development of the Tokaanu field for geothermal power generation. The effect of the extraction could cause the Tokaanu power station to sink and crack, making it unlikely that any proposed development would get past the resource consent process. These impacts, along with the raised lake levels and the bore spillage rate, have contributed to a situation where the tangata whenua at Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipaua are unable to fully use and develop their geothermal resources and their field. The Crown has failed to take direct action to cap or cause its successors to cap this bore.

**Rotorua, Taupo, and Kawerau**

The urban areas of Rotorua and Taupo are both built over geothermal fields. Energy from these has been used for heating homes and businesses, and hot water has been used by residents, hotels, motels, and hospitals for baths, pools, and spas. We turn now to discuss the impact of the Crown's failure to provide an adequate legislative regime to prevent excessive exploitation and use of the Rotorua Geothermal System with the resulting environmental consequences for geysers and other surface manifestations at Whakarewarewa.

**Rotorua**

The urban areas of Rotorua are built over the Rotorua and Rotorua East geothermal fields. There is no evidence to suggest that energy from these fields had not been sustainably used by Maori pre-colonisation and for most of the nineteenth century. Since colonisation, geothermal energy from these fields has been used for heating homes and businesses and hot water has been used by residents, hotels, motels, and hospitals for baths, pools, and spas. The Rotorua geothermal regional plan discusses these uses.

Allis and Lumb (1992) and Gordon, Scott and Mroczek (2005) enable us to identify four periods of domestic and commercial use at Rotorua. In the first period, from the 1880s to the 1940s, the uses were customary and sustainable and did not impact on the natural energy level of the geothermal field. In addition to customary use by Maori, private residents, tourist hotels and government agencies including hospital and gardens took advantage of the resource for heating or for pool and spa amenities. Initially
they drew on surface resources but increasingly, from the 1920s onwards, they began to drill wells.836

The extent of use increased sharply in the second period, from the 1940s to the early 1980s. Rotorua, as the urban centre for a region where agriculture, forestry, and tourism were all growing, expanded rapidly. From the 1950s onwards, the Government attempted an active role in regulating the resource. In addition to the general authority the Crown had vested in itself with the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, it also delegated powers under the Rotorua City Geothermal Empowering Act 1967 as discussed above. Many wells in Rotorua were, however, outside any controls since the regime did not apply to domestic wells which were less than 61 metres deep or which released water at temperatures less than 70ºC. The Crown promoted the use of geothermal energy as a convenient and cost-effective form of power for a wide range of uses.837 The number of wells and the quantity of heat and fluid extracted for urban uses increased rapidly in Rotorua. Gordon, Scott, and Mroczek look back on this period of Rotorua history and comment that ‘many bores were drilled and development of the field progressed in an unplanned way with no regard for the sustainability of the resource or protection of surface features.’838 In other words, this period, from 1950 to 1986, is characterised by unsustainable extraction. The Crown also took no adequate steps to protect the Rotorua geothermal resources and field from excessive residential and commercial use, or to monitor the extent and impact of such use.

By the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, there was widespread public concern, by Maori and European alike, that geothermal activity at Whakarewarewa and Ohinemutu–Tarewa was in decline. The Pohutu, Te Horu, Waikite and Papakura geysers failed and a number of hot springs, including Rachel Spring and Ororea ceased to flow, while Kuirau Lake developed an ‘erratic, very weak overflow’.839 The Government set up a monitoring programme in 1982, which confirmed that the field was being over-used and that much of the fluid being drawn off was being wasted.840

An interagency ministerial task force involving the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Works and Development, and the Ministry of Energy was set up in 1983 and the Commission for the Environment was asked to report on the management options for the geothermal field. Neither the Te Arawa Maori Trust Board nor Whakarewarewa Maori were included in the task force, and there is no reference to consultation with Maori in the report of the task force or that of the Commission for the Environment.841

The task force was unanimous in its recommendations that bores should be closed. As a result, the powers of the local council to issue licences were revoked.842 In October 1986, the Minister implemented the decisions to ensure that:

a. all wells within 1.5 kilometres of Pohutu geyser in Whakarewarewa should be closed by December 1986 with some exceptions;
b. all Government agencies in Rotorua which were users of geothermal energy from bores beyond the 1.5-kilometre radius of Pohutu geyser be required to convert to alternative fuels as soon as possible; and
c. all bores within the Rotorua metropolitan area be licensed in terms of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 by April 1987 and a royalty imposed on their use.843

Regulations were promulgated – the Geothermal Energy Regulations 1961 Amendment No 2 1987. Shallow wells 61 metres or less were not initially included, but a ministerial directive gazetted in February 1989 brought them into the schema and they too required licences.844 Thus, the third period from 1986 to 1992 of geothermal resource use in Rotorua township is marked by bore closure and recovery.

It is clear in the evidence before the Tribunal that the Crown moved late to protect the geothermal taonga at Rotorua. This failure seriously affected the ability of Rotorua Maori at Whakarewarewa, Ohinemutu, Kuirau, and Tarewa to use their resources. Our view of the situation is strengthened by reference to the decision of the High Court in 1987, which, when hearing challenges
from the Rotorua Geothermal Users Association to the Minister’s decision and the regulations closing bores in 1987, commented on the city council’s management in the following terms:

The administration of the resource by the Rotorua District Council has been a curious exercise of its statutory power. On the evidence before me it seems that they have exercised control over the sinking of bores and the issuing of permits in respect thereof, focusing largely on the engineering aspects, but have made no attempt to regulate or control the use of the resource itself by any of the normal methods of so doing. They have, it seems, issued no licences in respect of the use of energy and notwithstanding evidence of a declining resource and its consequences on the physical features of Rotorua have made no charges on an annual or any other basis for the use of the energy that was being consumed. Whilst the Court is in no final position to express any view of the course of action taken by the District Council, it is not at all surprised that its performance has been the subject of criticism. It is important to remember in this case, there was emerging over at least the last six years an overwhelming body of opinion that the draw off of energy in the Rotorua City was having a significant effect on the performance of geysers and springs in the Whakarewarewa field.

What this decision tells us is that the Crown must act quickly to protect the resource for conservation purposes. In the case of Rotorua, it did not, but rather delayed, despite Maori concerns and despite the grave consequences for Maori. Miki Raana, for example, told us that all three communal bathing places within Ohinemutu had to be closed ‘due to principally the lack of hot water which no doubt arose from the over use of the Geothermal resource within the Rotorua township.’ And Mrs Douglas (kuia of Ngati Whakaue) from Ohinemutu stated:

I can also remember the large natural hot water pools near what we call the Waikite pool was always full of hot water and that on one occasion my father fell into it and was scalded from the waist down. . . . the level and temperature of the water was deep and hot enough to scald a man. I can remember that in the late 1960’s the level of water in this pool had started to recede. . . . By the 1990’s the pool had completely dried up and there is now only manuka growing there in its place. I feel really sad that this has happened to this pool as it was one of the pools that we used to get our hot water for washing and cleaning right throughout my childhood. . . . Again it is sad to see these pools dry up. I firmly believe that as a result of the number of bores drilled to access the geothermal resource due to the tourism industry that this has had a devastating effect on the ngawha, puia and wairakiriki of Ngati Whakaue and in particular the Ohinemutu area. I cannot see how the controlled use by Ngati Whakaue of these taonga could have caused such a decline in the level and temperature of the pools. When I walk past those areas that I can remember as a child where the pools were still full I am saddened that the mauri of those pools has died, and how they used to sustain our people.

Mrs Douglas identified a tapu cave or ana (within which there was a hot pool used for acts of utu), a lime pool used as a communal pool, and other pools that had also dried up.

We note that we cannot be certain that these events occurred because of the strain on the resource, but the observations of these witnesses is consistent with what we know was then happening with the resource generally.

We should also note that the Crown did finally act. The decision it took in the 1980s to close bores within 1.5 kilometres of the Pohutu geyser, in the Whakarewarewa Valley, led to the recovery of the resource. The closure of production wells within the 1.5-kilometre exclusion zone was mandatory and a management zone was set up for the remaining portions of the urban area, designated in maps 20.14 and 20.15 as the geothermal field indicative area. Two mechanisms were used to reduce the number of wells and reduce the adverse impacts: rentals were charged for the use of geothermal energy, and rebates were given to those who conformed to a code of practice and re-injected the fluids back into the geothermal field. Closure of wells
was progressive from 1986 onwards. Primary responsibility for planning, monitoring, and implementing resource management procedures in relation to the Rotorua Geothermal Field was given in the late 1980s to the Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission as the regional water board under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. It passed to Environment Bay of Plenty when the Resource Management Act 1991 became operational. As a result of measures taken during this period, improvements were apparent by the time Cave, Lumb, and Clelland wrote their report in 1993. Pohutu geyser was active and Rachel Springs had resumed its overflows. Monitoring continues on a regular basis and the results are published annually by Environment Bay of Plenty. In their Rotorua geothermal regional plan, they note that the field is stable at the current level of extraction.

The Crown initiatives to restore the stability of the geothermal field through bore closures and reinjection, while late, were successful. The net withdrawal of geothermal fluid from the field was reduced from 29,000 tonnes per day in 1985 to 4400 tonnes per day in 1992, and as a result the aquifer levels stabilised. All this confirms that where there is a failure of delegated management, as occurred in Rotorua, then it is irrefutable, given the vulnerability of the resources and the multiple parties affected, that the Crown must make appropriate decisions such as the above leading to the closure of bores. That is consistent with its article 1 powers. It has the right to do so in terms of the Treaty. However, we do not see how this result assists the Crown’s next contention, namely that this is a type of decision that only central government, or a regional council operating under delegated powers, would be capable of efficiently taking. If it is good enough for the Crown to delegate some management responsibility as it has done to regional councils, then Maori can and should be involved.

As the claimants point out, they raised early concerns regarding the resource. They were not successful in receiving assistance and their own attempts to care for the resource were being undermined in a manner that threatened the continued use of the resource that they possessed or owned. In this respect, we note the evidence of the claimants that they clearly blame the state of their geothermal resources at Ohinemutu on previous Crown inaction. To end this section on the effects on the claimants, we refer to Miki Raana and Hamilton Pihopa Kingi. Mr Raana told us:

In 1953 the Crown used the Geothermal Energy Act to negate the private property rights of Maori. This was done without consultation with Maori or their consent. In 1967 the Rotorua Geothermal Energy Empowering Act was passed and enabled the then County Council to make provisions for the control of the tapping and use of geothermal energy in the city of Rotorua. This allowed the Council to have the sole power to allocate the use and utilisation of the geothermal resource. This in effect took the mana of Ngati Whakaue away as the custodian and kaitiaki of the natural geothermal resource in the Rotorua area. All of these Acts that have been passed by the Crown have had a detrimental effect on the Rotorua people, particularly those of Ngati Whakaue descent. As I have stated earlier I was born and bred in Ohinemutu and the effect that the Crown has had on this area has been marked. There have been a number of pools that I can remember as a young man that were once filled with hot water that have since dried up. I can only put this down to the number of bores that have been issued by the Council over the years particularly for hotels and motels and the tourism industry. The use by Ngati Whakaue of the Geothermal resource has not changed but the effects of overuse elsewhere has seen a decline in the resource available.

Mr Kingi told us:

The resource has apparently rekindled itself. The crown will no doubt say its decision from the 1980s was justified. Ngati Whakaue’s use we have always believed was based on sensible and good controlled use as our communal ways ensured this happened. Therefore in a way Ngati Whakaue’s position has been justified.

Be that as it may there is no resolution to the central argument of ownership. The geothermal in all its manifestations...
He Maunga Rongo

has always been part of our history from the time of its discovery shortly after the arrival of the Te Arawa waka until now. In the future it will always be part of our core and therefore the Crown should readdress this issue to ensure that the resource is as much ours as it is that of the wider community.

Taupo

We touched on the impacts of the Wairakei power generation extraction in terms of the Wairakei-Tauhara field closer to Taupo, which include possible subsidence near the Onekeneke Valley. We have also touched on the impacts associated with the raising of Lake Taupo. The Tauhara hapu claimants have noted impacts on the flow and temperature of the Onekeneke Stream. The stream was once used at Waipahihi as a hot water supply and for bathing, washing, and cooking. A number of witnesses spoke of the impacts as follows. Peter Clarke said:

The reserve was based around the Onekeneke Stream, which was always a very good supply of hot water, and used for bathing, washing, and even cooking. The drilling of the source by the Taupo Thermal Park (formerly De Bretts) has lowered the water flow significantly, and has made the stream just luke warm, instead of hot like it used to be. This is a real loss of one of our taonga. The people at the baths are good to us and sometimes provide sponsorship and give free entry to the trustees of our marae. However it is no kind of compensation for this loss.

Joycelyn Rameka said:

At the source of the Onekeneke stream, there are a series of black terraces, which used to be a striking visual feature. Nowadays they are blotted out from sight because of the Taupo Hot Springs development. This is a tourist facility leased by pakeha from DOC and offering spa & recreational water activities. The heat from the spring has been dissipated by the thermal development. As a result, I have learnt to be active in the protection of Taonga prior to the development of any of the Tauhara geothermal resource.

These views demonstrate the concern of the claimants regarding their taonga. The result at Waipahihi, as described by Emily Rameka, is that the Onekeneke Stream is now ‘a tepid polluted trickle’. The reasons for the degradation relate to a number of sources. We have already mentioned above the possible impacts from Wairakei power station and the possible impacts from the raising of Lake Taupo which may have impacted on the watertable, thus affecting the Tauhara field. Dr Severne also told us that when she last saw the spring source for the Onekeneke Stream in 2000 it was located within a grazed paddock, a source of pollution. Added to this, in her expert opinion, ongoing stormwater drainage into the Onekeneke Valley has had a significant impact on Onekeneke Stream. She states:

I consider that ongoing stormwater drainage into the valley has had a significant impact on Onekeneke, turning it from a silicified channel fed by seeps along its length into a valley filled with pumice from the untreated storm water where seeps no longer enter the main channel. This has resulted in the impacts spoken of in evidence by the kuia from Waipahihi: the Onekeneke Stream has significantly decreased temperatures, the flow rate has decreased, the valley is overgrown, and for the large part the water in the Onekeneke Stream is bathing water overflow from the De Bretts Thermal Resort and therefore potentially unhygienic.

I have seen part of the remnant black terraces at Onekeneke spoken of by Jocelyn [sic] Rameka. They are located downstream of De Bretts Thermal Resort (50m below a large storm water pipe). In 1998 I dug beneath the sediment that has buried the black terraces. The sedimentation is caused by untreated stormwater discharge through Taupo District Council stormwater structures.

As this illustrates, there could be a number of land use issues contributing to the decline of the Onekeneke Stream. We have much sympathy with Mr Wall when he stated:

I agree with the other witnesses as to the importance of water and geothermal resources to our people, and as to the
fact that we were the kaitiaki and owners of those resources.  . . . [T]hese interests have been eroded without any real consultation with, or agreement from ourselves.\textsuperscript{864}

This is really the point of this evidence. Maori, through various actions and omissions of the Crown, have been unable to protect their geothermal surface features and fields and the RMA legislation prevents them being able to exercise rangatiratanga over them.

\textbf{Kawerau}

At Kawerau, the focus is on land use for waste disposal and its impact on the thermal resources associated with Lake Rotoitipaku, and the geothermal spring Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa. There were impacts on Rotoitipaku, cultural and natural, beginning in the 1850s when sulphur mining took place, continuing into 1886 when Mount Tarawera erupted and deposited large quantities of pumice which found its way into rivers and lakes. There were more human interventions in the 1910s when the Crown initiated drainage and river-control schemes.\textsuperscript{865} As a result, the lake had been reasonably modified by the 1950s, but it was far from destroyed. The real Rotoitipaku story begins in the 1950s, when the Crown decided to locate the major Tasman Pulp and Paper mill at Kawerau.\textsuperscript{866} Kirkpatrick, Belshaw, and Campbell summarise:

At its outset the mill was given special dispensation to bypass the existing (and relatively weak) river pollution laws through the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Enabling Act, 1954. In the mid 1960s restrictions were placed on the mill disposing of solid waste into the Tarawera River . . .\textsuperscript{867}

The impacts of pollution were becoming important policy concern issues long before this critical period. The Crown's actions can, thereby, be measured against what was being done at the time. In 1937, the Crown set up an interdepartmental committee which examined the problems of water pollution and set these in the context of industrialisation and social organisation. A fact-finding survey was carried out after the Second World War and the committee reported in 1952.\textsuperscript{868} The Crown passed the Waters Pollution Act 1953 which set up the Pollution Advisory Council. In 1963, the council published regulations and classified coastal and inland waters according to their uses. Water quality standards were determined by the Ministry of Works, the DSIR, and the Ministry of Health. The Tarawera River, which provided water supplies for settlements downstream, had to meet higher standards than those laid down under the previous regime. In 1966, the Pollution Advisory Council, acting on the advice of the Ministry of Works, directed Tasman Pulp and Paper that it must improve the quality of waste water discharge into the Tarawera River.\textsuperscript{869} The new requirements were so stringent that Tasman Pulp and Paper turned to the Lake Rotoitipaku option. There is no evidence before us that the Crown, intent on improving the quality of water in the Tarawera River, considered the impacts that these regulations and policies would have on Lake Rotoitipaku.\textsuperscript{870}

Tasman Pulp and Paper, faced with the need to find other means of waste disposal, selected Lake Rotoitipaku and its surrounds as the best option. There is evidence that the company considered other options, including incineration at the mill site and the use of dried sludge as fuel for the mill,\textsuperscript{871} but appears to have decided against these on the basis of capital and operating costs. Documentation held by the owners of the Kawerau A9 Trust suggests that the Company began negotiations in 1967 and, in the months that followed, presented them with three options: sell the site; lease the site; or have it taken under the Public Works Act.\textsuperscript{872} It is not our intention to make a substantive finding on this topic; we simply note this as background.

In the event, a lease agreement was entered into with the Maori owners, annual rental payments were to be made over a 42 year period, and the company agreed to restore the site at the end of the lease. The environmental components of the lease were carefully negotiated and explicitly set out. Kirkpatrick, Belshaw, and Campbell summarise them as follows:
The lessee was required to fence the area and to safeguard all graves, historical and sacred places within the leased area. The lessee was able to dispose sludge, barkwood and wood-knots, and construct necessary buildings, roads and dams necessary to carry out the sludge disposal. It was also required to clarify the sludge prior to its disposal and to prevent toxic materials from entering the clarifier system, to construct and maintain an embankment to prevent seepage, to take measures to prevent and control pest outbreaks (midges, mosquitoes, algae and weeds) and remove any floating crusts that may form, employ modern measures for pollution and odour control, and take advice from geophysical experts to ensure the geothermal safety of the lands. The company also undertook to plant trees around the boundary of the proposed sludge area to screen it from adjoining lands. At the end of the lease the company was to ensure that the land would be made suitable for either forestry or agricultural purposes at the option of the lessor.\textsuperscript{873}

The Crown seems to have had a double role in these decisions as it was a commercial partner in the pulp and paper mill, and it exercised a larger responsibility for environmental protection. In relation to this latter role, the evidence is that the Crown moved to protect water quality in the Tarawera River. There is no evidence that it investigated or weighed up the impacts which the Tasman Pulp and Paper waste would have on Lake Rotoitipaku, and its surrounds. Major damage to the lake was done during the period 1968 to 1983, long before any monitoring was put in place by the Crown or by territorial authorities mandated by the Crown.

With the advent of the Resource Management Act 1991, Environment Bay of Plenty has environmental responsibilities and carries out a programme of research and monitoring of environmental quality including surface water and ground water. In this instance, the primary focus of attention is on the water quality in the Tarawera River and the nature of the discharges into that river.\textsuperscript{874} Reports by their compliance officers\textsuperscript{875} make minimal reference to Lake Rotoitipaku, and the site receives scant attention in the planning documents or the monitoring programme. Maps and photographs in the same (and other) documentation highlight the lack of interest or awareness. Land Information New Zealand, for example, has transferred
the name Lake Rotoitipaku to a body of water ponded behind the protective embankment. The map of industrial discharge to the lower river catchment in the 1995 planning document identifies locations where other forms of rubbish, including asbestos, had been dumped. The 1999 compliance report has a cryptic comment that contaminants which were not authorised by consent had been discharged at the site, then added that the mill should be discouraged from doing this without specific approval. Therefore, despite the Resource Management Act 1991, the lake has not received the attention it deserves as an important taonga of the tangata whenua. The Tribunal has in front of it very detailed evidence as to the outcomes at Rotoitipaku. The Waikato University research team and the present owners of the mill, Norske Skö og Tasman Ltd, have each commissioned or carried out investigations. Both confirm the same sad story.

In 2004, Rob Christie of Gulf Resource Management Ltd was asked to carry out a comprehensive study of environmental conditions at the Rotoitipaku waste disposal site. The project was commissioned by Norske Skö og Tasman Ltd at the request of Taumaunu Associates and involved measurements of levels of contamination, and assessment of the levels of environmental risk including the potential for further contamination. It involved a review of aerial photographs for the period from 1944 onwards; testing of soil, water, and sediment samples for contamination; and measurement of the migration of contaminated materials. Following national and international guidelines, Christie reported significant contamination within the site itself and in groundwater down gradient from the site. In the time available for his study, Christie was unable to measure the exact extent of the contamination plume, or complete a full assessment of the risks involved if embankments built by the mill owners were breached by flood or earthquake. His conclusion reads:

Elevated levels of contaminants have been found throughout the landfill in both General Mill Wastes (Upper Embankment) and primary solids. The site is in effect a landfill that contains pockets and layers of contaminated wastes generated from saw milling, pulp and paper mill, the use of Geothermal Steam and other potential industrial activities. The levels exceed certain national and international contaminated land guideline criteria for agricultural use and ecological protection. The waste is located in possibly the worst situation one could contrive for a landfill. The underlying geology consists of high permeability pumice. The landfill blocks a natural spring/waterway. The landfill is partly saturated with groundwater. The landfill site is within 100 meters of a significant waterway (Tarawera River). The site is located next to and on land with significant cultural value. The waste is situated over a major fault line and geothermally active area.

Kirkpatrick, Belshaw, and Campbell complete their review of environmental impacts by noting that the most devastating changes have occurred since 1970 when the disposal of the solid waste sludge began:

This has in effect destroyed an important taonga, together with associated geothermal and ecological resources. As well wahi tapu have been exposed to the risk of desecration by the
migration of contaminants, instability of embankments and inundation by the artificially created A8 pond.

These environmental impacts may be seen as the ‘costs of progress’. However, it seems that the costs have fallen quite disproportionately on the tangata whenua.\textsuperscript{883}

The most serious damage was done in the decades between the 1950s and the 1980s. Pollution, to an extent not fully determined, continues to the present day, and there are unanswered questions about the ability of the company to halt the pollution and restore the site. All this verifies what we were told by Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau claimants who appeared before us. Their distress at the fate of their taonga was very evident. Wayne Huia Peters remembers:

Then one day Tasman Pulp & Paper cut a road down the big flat separating Rotoitipaku and the Tarawera. At the top of this road a wooden spillway was constructed. Liquid waste was pumped to this spillway, then flowed down into Rotoitipaku. Solid waste was brought in trucks. My cousins and I went to have a look at the spillway. The sludge was slowly moving into the lake from the ngawha end. Little did we know this was the beginning of the end to our playground and foodbasket. Sadness filled our minds. Then anger took over, we knew what was happening was wrong. We lifted a big boulder from the side of the road and smashed the spillway. The workers fixed it up, and we smashed it again. In time we came to realize that Rotoitipaku was gone FOREVER.

These memories are all that are left. Through my writing I have had to stop, take time out, for the hurts are still there. The tears flow for our whenua, our lakes, our tipuna, our kaitiaki, our hapu and finally our iwi – Ngati Tuwharetoa. We do not carry the shame or accountability for this disaster, this lies with the Crown, government and borough councils.\textsuperscript{882}

To add to the pain, it would become increasingly more difficult to access the lake:

Tasman began putting roads into the area. They put pipes to the top of the hill, overlooking the bubble. They began to pump a black liquid into Rotoitipaku. Truck loads of sludge and other wastes were poured into Rotoitipaku from atop the hill. The lake began to stink and was so discoloured you couldn’t see beneath the surface. At first there were plumes of pulp floating on the surface. Then a crust began to form over the surface of the lake. Truck loads of sludge, wood and pulp waste were added to the mix till we get to where we are today. Many times I asked Uncle Bunny why they allowed these things to happen. All he would say was they could do nothing.

These things were occurring in the Rotoitipaku environs. Other things were also happening to our rights as ‘tangata whenua’. Slowly but surely our access to Rotoitipaku was being denied. Tasman used our road to access the area until they built a bridge over the Tarawera river. Then we were stopped from using the road to the lake. We had to get permission to access the area. When in the area for what ever reason, security from the mill would tell you to leave.\textsuperscript{883}

But the company could not have done what it did to Rotoitipaku without the legislative protection afforded to it by the Crown through its enactment of the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Enabling Act 1954. The Ngati Awa Tribunal records this history in the report noting that:

This area is rich in Maori history and has special significance as the ancestral home of the Tuwharetoa people. Rotoitipaku is fed by a warm spring that was used to calm the infant Tuwharetoa when he was crying for his mother’s milk. It thus became known as Te Wai U o Tuwharetoa (the mother’s milk of Tuwharetoa).

Rotoiti-paku enjoyed abundant fowl and fish life and provided the main source of food for the local people. Last century, the Tarawera River altered its course to run closer to this area. It too was a major source of food.
Today, Rotoiti-paku sits near to the Tasman Pulp and Paper mill. By the authority of the Tasman Pulp and Paper Enabling Act 1952, the mill discharged waste into the Tarawera River, killing all fish life downstream. In 1966, the Government required the mill to filter and monitor its waste-water. To this end, it built sludge ponds, which affected the lake and adjacent Maori land. The Maori evidence is that the lake and part of the land were reluctantly sold in the belief that this would enable the Tarawera River to recover. In 1971, the company built an embankment to prevent Te Wai O Tuwharetoa from draining into the lake, which had been converted to sludge ponds. The resulting pool built up, and water leached through the embankment to adjacent Maori land, threatening the urupa.

We were taken to the area. It is no longer habitable and the Maori land there is no longer an asset. We were advised that the Tarawera River remains polluted. It is, however, clear that the company has gone to considerable lengths to contain the problem.

Limitations of the RMA in respect of remedying past environmental impacts
To compound the matter of environmental degradation, there is no requirement in the RMA to remedy past environmental impacts, a matter that has serious consequences for Central North Island Maori whose geothermal taonga have been adversely affected by the historical actions of the Crown. Dr Severne completed her evidence by pointing the Tribunal to this limitation of the Resource Management Act 1991:

A further issue in relation to the resource management process is the extent to which the impact of past effects can be addressed under the Resource Management Act. The effects of early drilling and fluid withdrawal in the 1950s and 1960s on the Wairakei-Tauhara geothermal field were significant and taonga such as ngawha and puia were lost. Under the Resource Management Act 1991, an applicant for a resource consent does not need to address the impact of past effects. They need only concern themselves with ongoing effects of the activity for which they are applying.

The Tribunal’s Findings on Environmental Degradation and Loss of Geothermal Taonga

- The actions and omissions of the Crown in relation to the failure to institute environmental controls to protect the Maori customary rights and Treaty interests in geothermal resources under the Treaty of Waitangi have impacted on geothermal systems and surface geothermal features in a variety of ways.
- In respect of Crown actions in the creation of hydro lakes and the raising of lake levels, we found in chapter 18 that the raising of the level of Lake Taupo in 1941 resulted in the inundation of surface geothermal features such as springs adjacent to the lake shore, (such as at Waihi and Tokaanu) rendering them inaccessible.
- The impact of the creation of the large hydro lake Lake Ohakuri in the course of hydro development on the Waikato River resulted in the submerging of 60 to 75 per cent of the very large number of surface geothermal features of the remarkable Orakei Korako geothermal field; though some new features emerged. Thus, Orakei Korako suffered from degradation and loss of surface energy.
- At Wairakei, 40 years of extraction for geothermal power has resulted in degradation of the geothermal field: subsidence throughout the Wairakei–Tauhara area, the loss of its geysers, collapse of its puia, ngawha and waiariki, which have been replaced by fumaroles and steaming ground.
- The creation of Lake Ohakuri also impacted on portions of the Ohaaki geothermal field within the valley.
of Wairakei, flooding springs, pools, wahi taonga and urupa. The beautiful Ohaaki ngawha (close to the marae) was irreversibly damaged; and there are serious subsidence problems.

- At Kawerau, geothermal development for power generation and for timber, pulp and paper mill operations at the Kawerau mill has led to the modification and destruction of surface geothermal activity; and the taonga Rotoitipaku has been used as a waste disposal site, and destroyed;

- Impacts of Crown omissions in failing to adequately manage land use, residential and commercial use at Taupo include discharge from an uncapped bore at Tokaanu–Waihi–Hipania; and degradation of the Onekeneke Stream at Waipahihi, a taonga of the people of that marae.

- Impacts of Crown omissions in failing to adequately manage land use, residential and commercial use at Rotorua include unsustainable extraction between 1950 and 1986, where many wells were outside any controls. The Crown move to protect the geothermal taonga came late, though it was successful, and Rotorua Maori were seriously prejudiced in their ability to use their resource.

- It is clear that some of the geothermal fields of the Central North Island have been exploited with minimal consideration for environmental impacts. As a result, the geothermal resources and the affected fields are in a vulnerable state with physical and spiritual prejudice for Maori that flow from their decline.

**The Tribunal’s Overall Findings on Prejudice to Central North Island Maori as a Result of Crown Acts or Omissions**

We find that Central North Island Maori have been prejudiced by the Crown's failure to acknowledge their customary rights and Treaty interests in the geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ in a range of ways:

- By the Crown's active targeting of their land for its geothermal resources, particularly where they were sought for tourism or (later) power generation. In some cases Maori lost their taonga, cultural, and spiritual association with them, and access to development potential of the resource.

- By the Crown's failure, in the period from the 1940s to the 1980s, to explore, plan for, and work with Maori in relation to the development of their geothermal taonga; and by its foreclosing on their opportunities to participate in joint ventures for geothermal power.

- By the Crown's appropriation of their customary rights by the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 in taking control of the allocation of the right to access and use the geothermal resources, including the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, of the Central North Island; and by being debarred from the process of managing and protecting the resource.

- By the Crown's taking all the benefits of development of the resource for itself or its delegates; and its failure to pay a royalty or rental for each of the geothermal stations to those Maori who either owned the land within which the geothermal field was contained, and the hapu/iwi who exercised tino rangatiratanga over it, or who lost that ownership in breach of the Treaty.

- By the Crown's failure to take into account Maori customary values in relation to geothermal systems and surface geothermal features.

- By the operation of the RMA, which has failed to provide for the rights of Central North Island Maori to exercise rangatiratanga in resource management over geothermal surface features, the geothermal fields, and the TVZ, and failed to accord them a priority in RMA processes despite their customary rights and interests in these resources.

- By environmental degradation and loss of geothermal taonga as a result of the creation of hydro lakes,
the raising of the level of Lake Taupo, by geothermal development for power generation, and for timber, pulp and paper mill operations at Kawerau.

By the accompanying loss of matauranga Maori, knowledge of puia, ngawha, and waiariki, of customary use, and the loss or erosion of spiritual values through the destruction or decline of geothermal taonga, or loss of association with them through alienation in breach of the Treaty.

By the Crown’s failure to include provisions in the RMA for the remedy of past environmental impacts, despite the adverse impacts of past Crown actions on geothermal taonga.

Summary
The origins of Central North Island Maori customary rights to geothermal taonga

- The Central North island Maori relationship with their geothermal taonga is an ancient one, as is evident in the significance right across the region of stories of the ancestor Ngatoroirangi, specialist navigator and priest of the Te Arawa waka who, in the course of his early explorations called for fire from Hāwaiki, which was brought for him, his relatives, and his descendants.

- The stories show that Maori conceived the arrival of the geothermal waters and the heat and energy source as separate in time from the creation of the land.

- They show also the linkages between the three districts of our region (Rotorua, Taupo, Kaingaroa) converging via the ‘geothermal passage’ to Hāwaiki, binding the geothermal resource and the people through whakapapa (genealogy).

- Though these are stories which go back many generations, they should not be thought of only as artefacts of a long-gone past. Nothing was clearer to us than the central importance of these stories down to the present, in the history and world-view of the peoples of the Central North Island, and their claim to the resource. Like many key Maori traditions, they also express a deep understanding and knowledge of the natural world – in this case of the nature and extent of the TVZ.

The nature of customary rights to the geothermal taonga at 1840 and since
Extensive evidence from many who gave evidence in this inquiry, and from early European accounts, makes it clear that:

- The geothermal resource of the Central North Island is a taonga of great cultural, spiritual, and economic importance, protected by the Treaty of Waitangi.

- The hapu and iwi of the Central North Island exercised rangatiratanga over the resource through customary tenure and law, based on their deep knowledge and understanding of the resource over many generations.

- As at 1840 Central North Island Maori held customary title to all land in their region, and to all its geothermal resources.

- Their rights were at three levels: 1) to the geothermal surface features and resources (the principal holders of rights are the particular hapu or iwi associated with the land and surface features); 2) to the fields (the
principal holders of rights are the particular hapu or iwi associated with the fields); and 3) to the subterranean resource (TVZ) system itself, shared by all hapu/iwi by virtue of their common history, whakapapa and reliance on the discovery of the resource by the ancestor Ngatoroirangi.

▶ In legal and Treaty terms Maori customary rights to the fields and the TVZ were retained.
▶ Where customary ownership of land has been modified by the issue of freehold title, the exclusive right of hapu and iwi to control access to resources was modified, in that it became the responsibility of individual Maori owners; but all other aspects of their customary rights and Treaty interests remained because the Maori landowners continued to act in accordance with tikanga and custom.
▶ Moreover, Central North Island hapu/iwi have retained sufficient Maori land in and around geothermal features and resources to establish that they have never relinquished their rangatiratanga over the TVZ; even though in some cases alienation of the land has meant that the right to control access has gone.

Crown Treaty breaches

▶ The Crown failed to recognise and provide for the customary rights and Treaty interests of Central North Island Maori held in the resource and its underlying heat, energy, and water system which was clearly part of their taonga because that was, and is, its essential characteristic and the source of its value to Maori.
▶ Nor did the Crown in 1840 look to Maori law in respect of the geothermal resource as the basis for developing a management regime, despite the complexity of that law and the visibility of the Maori association with the resource. Instead, it assumed that the key to access, management, and use of the geothermal resource lay in land ownership and water law.
▶ The Crown clearly targeted geothermal lands for acquisition, and from 1840 to 1950 some were acquired by the Crown in a manner inconsistent with the Treaty.
▶ From 1950, there were sound policy reasons for the Crown to explore and develop alternative sources of energy such as geothermal energy; and it was reasonable for the Crown to take the lead in the development of the industry.
▶ But when the Crown asserted control and regulation over the geothermal resource through legislation from 1950, it breached the principles of the Treaty in a range of ways:
  ▶ It failed to inform itself of the nature and extent of Maori customary rights in the resource.
  ▶ It failed to provide for Maori customary and Treaty rights when developing geothermal energy; thus appropriating Central North Island Maori property to develop the industry.
  ▶ It failed to respond to the concerns of local hapu and iwi at Kawerau and Orakei Korako when it attempted to use Maori land for geothermal development.
▶ In effect it debarred Maori from the process of managing and protecting the geothermal resource, and from receiving any compensation for access to the resource where it emerged from their land.
The current management regime

- In respect of the current Resource Management regime, the Crown has failed to adequately provide for Central North Island Mori to exercise their tino rangatiratanga over their geothermal resource, and to control and manage it in accordance with the principles of the Treaty.
- It has failed to consult Maori with a view to promulgating a national policy statement to guide regional planning processes in respect of the geothermal resource, and no such policy has been issued.
- While the Crown has a clear interest in ensuring a sustainable management regime for the resource, such a regime should be based on the principle of partnership.

Prejudice to Central North Island Maori as a result of Crown Treaty breaches

- Central North Island Maori have been prejudiced by the Crown failure to acknowledge their Treaty rights and interests in the geothermal resource, resulting in their being excluded from the process of managing and developing the resource, despite its central importance in their everyday life.
- Many geothermal features and resources have been irreparably destroyed or degraded in the course of geothermal or hydro development; the outcome is the loss of customary knowledge; customary use and the spiritual values of the claimants relating to their resources have in some cases ended, in others been seriously eroded, and in others continue in a much reduced form.
- In some cases hapu communities lost their taonga, and their association with taonga, not because of hapu decisions to alienate the resources but because under the Crown’s introduced title system, decisions to sell blocks including geothermal resources could be made by a small number of individuals; the outcome was the loss of cultural and spiritual associations of the whole community with the resource.
- Central North Island Maori have been prejudiced by the appropriation of their proprietary rights by the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 in taking control of the allocation of the right to access and use the geothermal resources of the Central North Island, and by the Crown’s taking all the benefits of development of the resource for itself or its delegates.
- Central North Island Maori are also prejudiced by the failure of the RMA to address past environmental impacts, though some of the geothermal fields in the region have been exploited with minimal concern for such impacts.
- Central North Island Maori have been prejudiced in the impairment of their right to development of their own resource. The difficult experience of the Tuaropaki Trust in developing their Mokai field – though it became a successful joint venture with Mighty River Power – demonstrates the marginalisation of Maori owners of their own field in the RMA process.
The Crown’s Treaty Obligations

The Crown’s Treaty obligations to Central North island Maori in our view are fivefold:

- It should acknowledge the nature and extent of Central North Island Maori customary titles and Treaty interests in their geothermal resources
- It should ensure that the benefits derived by the Crown and regional councils from development and usage of the resource, in the form of royalties for geothermal power generation and other uses of the resource, accordingly accrue to or are shared with Central North island Maori
- It should acknowledge that the right of iwi and hapu of the Central North Island Maori to autonomy, and their Treaty interest in the geothermal resource, demands that they exercise a meaningful rangatiratanga role in the management of the resource; they should be consulted as to the basis on which they may wish to enter into management partnerships with regional or district councils
- It should amend s 8 of the RMA accordingly, so that all those who exercise powers and functions under the Act must give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi; and it should promulgate a national policy statement to guide regional planning processes in respect of the geothermal resource
- Where land with geothermal resources is still in Crown ownership, and was acquired in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, it should be subject to negotiations between the parties for its possible return to Maori ownership.

Notes


2. Ibid. Hochstetter stayed for five days with TS Grace and the latter may have assisted him with proper names at the point where he wrote up his journal for each day.

3. Deed of settlement with affiliate Te Arawa iwi/hapu, 29 August 2006 (paper 6.1.9), pt 1, p.137

4. Deed of settlement with affiliate Te Arawa iwi/hapu, 29 August 2006 (paper 6.1.9), pt 2, p.164

5. Deed of settlement with affiliate Te Arawa iwi/hapu, 29 August 2006 (paper 6.1.9), pt 1, p.41


7. Graham Hancox, evidence for a resource consent hearing (doc H31), paras 4.4–4.8, p.7; fig.3, p.33


10. GJ Cox and BW Hayward, The Restless Country: Volcanoes and Earthquakes of New Zealand (Auckland: Harper Collins, 1999), p.40. These authors, along with Fry, use the spelling fumerole. We have
followed other authors, and the Concise Oxford Dictionary, spelling it as fumarole.


15. Ibid, pp 32, 33, figs 2, 3 captions.


22. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p 166.


24. Ibid, p 166.


27. Ibid, p 163.

28. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Peter Andrew, and Damien Ward, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 501.

32. Ibid, p 497.


34. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p 161.

35. Ibid, pp 161–162.

36. Ibid, p 162.

37. Ibid.


40. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p 178.

41. Ibid, p 178.
43. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p. 178.
47. Ibid.
49. Ibid, p. 183.
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid, p. 185.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid, p. 186.
58. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid, p. 189.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid, p. 190.
64. Ibid.
65. Martin Taylor, Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), pp. 52–53.
68. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p. 190.
69. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p. 497.
70. Ibid, p. 498.
71. Ibid.
73. Ibid, p. 498.
75. Ibid, p. 504.
78. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p. 503.
79. Ibid, pp. 497, 509.
82. Ibid, p. 22.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid, paras 49, 50, pp. 22–23.
86. Ibid, p. 70.
92. Ferdinand von Hochstetter, *New Zealand: Its Physical Geography, Geology, and Natural History, with Special Reference to the Results of Government Expeditions in the Provinces of Auckland and Nelson* (Stuttgart: J G Cotta, 1867), p. 391; see also Evelyn Stokes, *The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources* (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), pp. 23–24. As we have noted, Dame Evelyn adds that Whakaari or Whaikari is White Island, Motou-Hora is Whale Island and Oka-karu is near Kawerau.
93. Mataara Wall, brief of evidence (English version), undated (doc D1); and (Maori) (doc D1(a)), p. 5.
108. S Ellison, brief of evidence for Te Takere o Nga Wai, 28 February 2005 (English) (doc C25(a)), p 37
112. Ibid
113. Ibid
114. Ibid, pp 56–58
Hot Lakes: Maori Use and Management of Geothermal Areas from the Evidence of European Visitors, December 1992 (doc A24), p 46


140. Huia Te Hau, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc E77), para 19, p 8


142. Ibid, p 20

143. Richard Boast, 'Maori Customary Use and Management of Geothermal Resources', November 1992 (doc A27), p 1

144. Ibid


149. Ibid, pp 90–92

150. Ibid, pp 90–91


152. Ibid, pp 8, 21, 27, 147


155. For example, Gina Rangi brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E37), p 4


157. Ibid, p 76


159. Geoffrey Rameka, brief of evidence, 9 March 2005 (doc D28)


169. Ibid, pp 3–4

170. Ivory, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc E16(a))

171. Ibid, pp 4–5


173. Fox to Premier, 'Hot Springs District of the North Island', 1 August 1874, AJHR, 1874, H-26, p 1


175. Merle Ormsby, brief of evidence, 22 July 2005 (doc I10), p 14

176. Ibid

177. Ibid, p 15


179. Ibid, pp 4–5


185. Ibid


187. Ibid, p. 129

188. Ibid, p. 73


191. ‘Taharerep Hot Spring Bath’, Report for the Tauhara RMA Committee (doc D26(2))


193. Ibid


196. Ibid


201. Ibid, p. 9


204. Ibid, p. 10

205. Ibid, p. 11


207. Ibid, pp. 12–15, 26–55

208. Ibid, p. 15

209. Ibid, p. 19


214. Ibid, p. 79


Tufas is the transliteration, and the plural, which Dieffenbach used for ngawha or hot springs.

218. Ibid, pp. 89–90

219. Ibid, p. 92

220. Ibid

221. Ibid

222. Ibid, p. 93

223. See for example Huirama Te Hiko, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D10); Brian Hauauru Jones, brief of evidence, 28 April 2005 (doc E46). The relationships are complex, some of those who came from further afield may also have held ownership rights.

224. Huirama Te Hiko, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D10), pp. 5–8, 28–30, 36

225. Ibid, pp. 36–37

226. Ibid, pp. 34–36


228. Ibid, p. 124, 125, 127

229. Ibid, pp. 119–129


236. Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000) p 95

237. Peter Clarke, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D13), p 20


244. Fox, AJHR, 1874, H-26, p 3; Evelyn Stokes, ‘Maori Issues at Orakei Korako’, November 1988 (doc A16), p 4


249. Kahurangi Te Hiko, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D11), pp 5–6


252. Ibid, p 112–116

253. Ibid, p 108

254. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: A Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 53

255. Peter Staite, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc C28)

256. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: A Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 53

257. Taupo Native Land Court minute book 12, fols 264–382; Taupo Native Land Court minute book 13, fols 1–223 (as quoted in Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: A Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 53

258. E E Vaile, Pioneering the Pumice (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1939), p 16. In his book, Vaile promoted himself as the pioneer farmer who identified and overcame problems of cobalt deficiency (‘bush sickness’) and opened the way for others to follow. His biographer, Tony Nightingale, is more realistic and points out that the research work was done by B C Aston, a soil scientist with the Department of Agriculture. Vaile, it seems, was more outstanding as an observer and writer than he was as a farmer: see Tony Nightingale, ‘Vaile, Edward Earle, 1869–1956’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 5 vols (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1990–2000), vol 3, entry V1, pp 545–546.

259. Teressa Hurihanganui, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc C30), para 29 (no page numbers)

260. Tony Mark Reihana, amended brief of evidence, 11 March 2005 (doc C15(a)), p 4


262. Ibid, p 116


265. Ibid

266. Huirama Te Hiko, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D10), p 13

267. Kim Te Tua, brief of evidence, 12 March 2005 (doc D30), pp 7, 10


273. Ibid, pp 36–37
274. Ibid
276. See for example ibid, p 373
277. Ibid, p 389
278. Ibid, pp 278–279; 388
279. Ibid, pp 278–279
280. Ibid, pp 408, 412–413
281. Peter Staite, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc c28), p 22
284. Ibid, p 373
285. Ibid, p 390
286. Ibid, pp 408–410
289. Ibid
290. Ibid
291. Ibid, pp 278–279
292. Ibid, pp 370–371
293. Teressa Hurihanganui, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc c30), paras 26–29
294. Ibid, para 28
296. Walter Rika, brief of evidence, 1 March 2005 (doc c26), p 3
298. Ibid
301. Ibid, p 390
302. Ibid, pp 408–409, 412
304. Ibid, p 63
305. Ibid
308. Ibid
309. Ibid, p 412
310. Ibid, p 423
316. Ibid
317. Ibid, p 421
318. Ibid, pp 415–416
319. Ibid, p 425
320. Reuben Perenara, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc c42), pp 6–8
321. Ibid, p 7
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323. David Potter, 'Te Manawhenua of Ngati Rangitahi', report commissioned by Te Rangatiratanga o Ngati Rangitahi Incorporated, 2004 (doc B7), p 20
325. Ibid
326. Tomairangi KL Fox, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B25), p 6
327. Ibid, p 7
329. John Henry Fox, (as quoted by Mereheeni Fox, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005, (doc B42), p 6)
331. Clem Park, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005, (doc B36), p 2
332. Ibid, p 2
334. Ibid
338. Ibid
339. Ibid, pp 23–24
340. Ibid, p 24
341. Ibid, pp 14–15
342. Ibid, p 15
343. Ibid, pp 10–11
346. Ibid
348. David Potter, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B3), p 21
353. Jonathan Mane-Wheoki, 'Ngati Wahiao and Whakarewarewa: a People, a Place, a History and a Heritage', report for Ngati Wahiao, October 1996 (doc A53), pt 1
359. Ibid, p 8
360. Ibid, p 14
362. Jonathan Mane-Wheoki, 'Ngati Wahiao and Whakarewarewa: a People, a Place, a History and a Heritage', report for Ngati Wahiao, October 1996 (doc A53), pt 1, pp 20–21
363. Mr Mane-Wheoki, drawing on a range of sources, documentary and oral, is very specific about the names of ancestors who were buried and the names of the places where the burials took place.


368. Ibid, p 3

369. Ibid, para 6, pp 3–4

370. Ibid, para 8, p 4

371. Ibid, p 5


373. Ibid, p 28


379. Ibid, p 3


381. Tuhipo Kereopa, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F51), pp 3–4


383. Lori Paul, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F75)


385. Ibid, p 3

386. Ibid
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406. Ibid
407. Ibid, p 75
409. Ibid, p 3
410. Ibid, p 2
413. Ibid, p 60
414. Ibid
415. Ibid, pp 61-64
417. Ibid, p 63
418. Ibid, pp 65-69
419. David Whata-Wickliffe, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F37)
420. H Barney Meroiti, brief of evidence, 3 June 2005 (doc F95)
422. Ibid, p 71
423. David Rangitaiura and Miharo Armstrong, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Hinekura, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.72), p 45
427. Ibid, p 39
428. Ibid
429. Ibid, p 40
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435. Ibid; David Whata-Wickliffe, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F37), p 40
439. Ibid, p 40
440. John Fenwick, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F20), p 3; John Fenwick, map (doc F20(a))
441. David Whata-Wickliffe, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F37), pp 38-41
442. Erana Waiomio, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F74), p 1
446. Ibid, p 50
447. Ibid, pp 50-52
450. Ibid, p 36
451. Ibid, pp 32-53
452. Ibid, pp 32, 35
453. Pakitai Raharuhi, brief of evidence 7 February 2005 (doc B34); p 3; David Whata-Wickliffe, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F37), pp 38-39
454. Don Stafford, Landmarks of Te Arawa, 2 vols (Auckland: Reed, 1994), vol 2, p 129
459. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions 3.3.67, pp 186-188, 195; Central North Island claimant replies: political engagement, tourism, geothermal, claimant specific, 31 October 2005 (paper 3.3.141), p 52
460. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p 186
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530. Ibid, vol 49, para 414

531. Te Runanga o Murihwenua v Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641; Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20


533. Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20, at pp 23–24

534. Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643, at p 656


537. Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399 (PC)

538. R v Symonds (1847) [1840–1932] NZPCC 387

539. Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA)


544. Ibid, pp 96–97

545. Ibid, pp 97–98

546. Ibid, p 33

547. Ibid, p 134

548. Ibid


550. Ibid, pp 43–44

551. Ibid, p 45

552. Ibid, p 56

553. Thermal Springs Districts Act 1881, s 2

554. Ibid, s 5

555. See also Stephen Quinn and David Alsop, ‘The Ngati Wahiao Tribe’s Involvement in Tourism in the Whakarewarewa Geothermal Valley’, report commissioned by the Rahui Trust in association with CFRT, 1996 (doc A40), pp 72–74

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558. Ibid, pp 56–57

559. Ibid

560. Ibid, p 59


563. Geothermal Steam Act ss 4–7

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567. Ibid


574. Ibid, p 137

575. Geothermal Energy Act 1953, s 3A (as inserted by Geothermal Energy Amendment Act 1966, s 2)

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578. Geothermal Energy Act 1953, s 10 (later substituted by Geothermal Energy Amendment Act 1966, s 4)

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581. Rotorua Geothermal Users Association v Minister of Energy unreported, 13 May 1987, Heron J, High Court, Wellington, CP 543/86, at p 4

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Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319 at p 325 (CA). The facts of Keam relate to the management of geothermal resources within the Central North Island during the period 1967 to 1991. The case concerned an application by the Minister of Works and Development under section 23 of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 for a right to take geothermal water (up to 2500 cubic metres per day, for up to a five years) for test purposes from an underground geothermal reservoir at Rerewhakaaitu, southeast of Rotorua. It was intended that, if the tests showed that geothermal energy was available, the Minister of Energy would supply it under section 11 of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 to the owner of the site, E T Ramsey Ltd, for running a timber processing plant. The National Water and Soil Conservation Authority granted the application under the 1967 Act, but Dr Keam, who had spent some time studying the Waimangu geothermal field, appealed this to the Planning Tribunal: Keam v Minister of Works and Development (1980) 7 NZPTA 11. The essence of what the Planning Tribunal found was quoted by Lord Cooke when he was in the Court of Appeal (p 320): ‘The draw-off of hydrothermal fluid could adversely affect the natural thermal activity in the Waimangu area. It is not certain that that would happen; merely a possibility. The thermal activity there has certain unique features (already mentioned) it is not as yet affected by artificial influences; and it is a tourist attraction.

‘Our conclusion from the evidence and submissions is that the benefit which may follow from the exercise of the right sought is not sufficient to justify the detriment which might be caused to the scenic and natural features of the Waimangu thermal area; that those features are of sufficient public importance that they should be preserved from the possibility of affection by the draw-off of hydrothermal fluid which would be authorised by the right sought. We do not say that the scenic and natural features of the Waimangu thermal area must be forever protected and that no rights should be granted to take hydrothermal fluid from the area. But if it is desired to explore the energy potential of the Waimangu/Waiotapu area, then we would expect that a comprehensive plan of exploration would first be prepared and that a decision to explore would not be made without full evaluation of the likely environmental consequences.’

Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319 at p 321 (CA), per Cooke J


Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188

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Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p55

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Resource Management Act 1991, s 354


Resource Management Act 1991, s 5(2)

Ibid, s 6 (as amended by the Resource Management Amendment Act 2003, s 4, Resource Management (Foreshore and Seabed) Amendment Act 2004, s 4)

Section 2 defines ‘geothermal energy’ as ‘energy derived or derivable from and produced within the earth by natural heat phenomena; and includes all geothermal water.’ ‘Geothermal water’ means water heated within the earth by natural phenomena to a temperature of 30 degrees Celsius or more; and includes all steam, water, and water vapour, and every mixture of all or any of them that has been heated by natural phenomena.

Resource Management Act 1991, s 67


Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p501; Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2005] 3 NZLR 643, para 76, at p 666

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Peter Clarke, supporting documents, 28 February 2005 (doc D13(d))

Peter Clarke, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D13), pp 19–20

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612. ‘Extracts from the Environment Bay of Plenty Regional Policy Statement, 2004’ (doc H2(i)), p 7

613. Ibid, pp 130–135

614. Ibid, p 135

615. Ibid, p 136

616. Ibid, pp 70–71

617. Ibid

618. B O’Shaughnessy, brief of evidence, 7 July 2005 (doc I21), para 6.7.0

619. Ibid, para 6.1

620. Ibid, para 6.2


622. B O’Shaughnessy, brief of evidence, 7 July 2005 (doc I21), para 6.7.0

623. Ibid, p 74

624. Ibid, p 83

625. Ibid, p 79

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628. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 6 July 2005, (doc H26), p 21

629. Ibid, pp 7, 8

630. Ibid, p 8

631. Ibid, p 19

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633. George Asher, letter to Blair Dickie, undated, in Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 29 July 2005 (doc I27)

634. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 29 July 2005 (doc I27)

635. Ibid

636. Ibid

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641. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 29 July 2005 (doc I27)


643. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 6 July 2005 (doc H26), p 21

644. Ibid, p 22


646. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 6 July 2005 (doc H26), p 22

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649. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 6 July 2005 (doc H26), p 22

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653. Mark Brockelsby, brief of evidence, 6 July 2005 (doc H26), p 23


655. Environment Waikato, ‘Waikato Regional Policy Statement: Proposed Change No 1’ (doc H2(i)), p 7

656. Mark Brockelsby, appendix to brief of evidence, 6 July 2005 (doc H26(a)), Waikato Regional Plan, pp 22–23

657. Ibid, p 31

658. Ibid, p 34

659. Ibid, pp 37–40

660. Ibid, p 40


662. Environment Waikato, ‘Proposed Waikato Regional Plan: Proposed Variation No 2’ (doc H2(j)), p 7

663. Ibid, p 25

664. Ibid, p 29


666. Ibid, p Wr-11


672. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 508


674. Ibid, ss 140–141B

675. A heritage protection order can protect any place of special interest, character, intrinsic or amenity value or visual appeal, or of
special significance to the tangata whenua for spiritual, cultural, or historical reasons. This definition could be extended to include significant geothermal sites.

677. Ibid
678. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 510
679. See Ngati Kahu Ki Whangaroa Cooperative Society v Northland RC, A095/00, vol 5 NZED at pp 720–723
680. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 2, p 510
681. Martin Taylor, generic closing submissions on political engagement, tourism, and geothermal issues, 2 September 2005 (paper 3.3.67), p 196
682. Ibid, p 193
683. Ibid, p 194
684. Annette Sykes and Jason Pou, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa Te Atua Te Reretahi and Ngai Tamarangi, 7 September 2005 (paper 3.3.93)
685. Ibid, p 21
687. Karen Feint, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 9 September 2005 (paper 3.3.106), pp 182–184
688. Ibid, p 184
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691. Ibid; Hemi Te Nahu and Maryanne Crapp, closing submissions on behalf of Ngati Tahu, 5 September 2005 (paper 3.3.88), pp 32–33
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693. Ibid, pp 500–501
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700. Peter Clarke, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D13), p 13
701. Ibid
706. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), pp 120–121
707. Peter Staite, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc C28), for example pp 15–16, 19–20
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709. Ibid
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712. Ibid, p 55
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716. Ibid, p 62
717. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 121
718. Ibid, pp 61–63
719. Ibid, p 58
720. 720. As examined in Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 58–63
721. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), pp 61–63
722. Ibid, p 63
723. Ibid, pp 72–77
724. Ibid, p 76
725. William Tredegar Hall, brief of evidence for Ngati Tahu, April 2005 (doc G10), p 2
726. Ibid, p 4
727. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 127
729. Ibid, pp 200, 199–204
730. Merata Kawharu, Ralph Johnson, Verity Smith, Robert Wiri, David Armstrong, and Vincent O’Malley, ‘Nga Mana o te Whenua o
731. Walter Rika, brief of evidence, 1 March 2005 (doc c26), pp 13–14, 16
732. Duncan Moore and Judi Boyd, 'The Alienation of Whakarewarewa: Collective Customary Possessions; Tourist and Health Resources; Geothermal Taonga; Rights of Way; Reserves,' report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 1995 (doc a30), pp 54
733. Statement of SP Smith, 13 December 1895, encl in Sheridan to Gill (as quoted in Duncan Moore and Judi Boyd, 'The Alienation of Whakarewarewa: Collective Customary Possessions; Tourist and Health Resources; Geothermal Taonga; Rights of Way; Reserves,' report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 1995 (doc a30), p 69)
734. Sheridan to Gill, NLP 1/96/39 in C2(a), MA-MLP 1 Box 49 (as quoted in Duncan Moore and Judi Boyd, 'The Alienation of Whakarewarewa: Collective Customary Possessions; Tourist and Health Resources; Geothermal Taonga; Rights of Way; Reserves,' report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 1995 (doc a30), p 75)
737. Colleen McMurchy-Pilkington, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc b40), p 7
739. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: A Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 126
740. Ibid, pp 126–127
741. Ibid, p 121
742. Gina Rangi brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc e37), p 4
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744. Gina Rangi brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc e37), p 4
745. Ibid, pp 3–4
746. Ibid, pp 4, 5
748. Ibid
749. Evelyn Stokes, Ohaaki: A Power Station on Maori Land (Hamilton: Te Matahauariki Institute, University of Waikato, 2004), p 124
750. Ibid, pp 124–125
751. Ibid, p 125
752. Ibid
753. Kipa Morehu, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc r28), p 2
755. Ibid, p 5
757. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc h34), p 2
758. Ibid, p 3
760. Ibid, pp 85–128, 238–239
761. Pananapa Otimi, brief of evidence, 27 April 2005 (doc h16(a)), pp 4–5
765. Terewhakotahi Charles Wall, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc d18), p 4
766. Emily Rameka, brief of evidence, February 2005 (doc d26), p 5
769. Ibid; see also EF Lloyd, 'Oraek Korako Geothermal Field,' New Zealand Geological Survey Bulletin, 1974
770. Bromley noted that the depth is 31 metres immediately behind the dam. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc h34), para 3.9, p 11
773. Kahurangi Te Hiko, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc d11), p 8


776. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc H34), para 2.21, p 7


781. L.I. Grange (ed), Geothermal Steam for Power in New Zealand, DSIR Bulletin no 117 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1955), includes chapters by Beck (Geological Survey), and Robertson (Geophysics Division), pp 15–20; Wilson (Dominion Laboratory), pp 27–42; and Fisher (Ministry of Works), pp 75–98

782. Environmental impacts are clearly evident in the photographs which illustrate the bulletin and in an evaluation of techniques to measure noise output and protect construction workers from injury by noise

783. J H Smith, ‘Production and Utilisation of Geothermal Steam’, New Zealand Engineering, vol 13, no 10, 1958, pp 354–374; F E Studt, ‘The Wairakei Hydrothermal Field Under Exploitation’, New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics, vol 1, 1958, pp 703–723. The papers were written by the named individuals but would, according to public service procedures, have come under careful scrutiny by senior officials before they were approved for publication (for example, Smith acknowledges the permission of CWO Turner, Engineer in Chief, Ministry of Works, p 375).


787. Ibid, p 60 and, especially, fig 51, p 75 which plots cumulative discharge against maximum aquifer pressure

788. Ibid, p 60

789. Ibid, p 77

790. Ibid, p 80

791. The technical questions posed by Grindley in 1965 were taken up by Bolton, Dawson, and Dickenson and reported at a UN Symposium on the development and utilization of geothermal power, held in Pisa Italy in 1970. Compare G W Grindley, ‘Wairakei Geothermal Field’, in Staff of New Zealand Geological Survey, Minerals of New Zealand, part D: Geothermal (Wellington, DSIR, 1974), sec 3.20


795. Ibid, p 7


798. Ibid, p 1

799. Ibid, p 3


801. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc H34), para 2.11, pp 4–5. Bromley’s evidence was provided to Environment Waikato when it was considering a consent application brought by Mighty River Power.

802. Ibid, para 2.12, p 5

When she carried out field work in the 1970s, with kaumatua interviews and field mapping, ‘it was very difficult to reconstruct the geothermal/fieldsmap/ohaaki.htm, (accessed 16 December 2007).  

When she carried out field work in the 1960s or 1970s. Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), p116, and fig 16 p 114  


When she carried out field work in the 1970s, with kaumatua interviews and field mapping, ‘it was very difficult to reconstruct the original sites.’  


Ibid  


806. Town and Country Planning Act 1977, s 3(1)(g)  


See Evelyn Stokes, The Legacy of Ngatoroirangi: Maori Customary Use of Geothermal Resources (Hamilton: University of Waikato, 2000), p 115. When she carried out field work in the 1970s, with kaumatua interviews and field mapping, ‘it was very difficult to reconstruct the original sites.’  


816. Ibid  


819. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc H34), para 2.15, p 6  


822. Christopher Bromley, evidence concerning existing geothermal fields, etc, undated (doc H34), para 2.16, p 6  


824. Ibid, p 380  


David Potter, brief of evidence for Ngati Rangitihi, pp 22–23
Charlotte Severne, brief of evidence, 15 April 2005 (doc E7), p 7
Ibid
P Cooney, Environment Bay of Plenty ‘Rotorua Geothermal Regional Plan’ 1999, (doc 122), p 34
New Zealand Gazette, 16 February 1989. Domestic wells less than 61 metres deep and those which supplied water cooler than 70°C had been outside the previous legislation.
Miki Raana, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F62), p 3
Miriam Douglas, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F63), p 3
Ibid, pp 3–4
A management plan for the field was prepared by the Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission, with the encouragement of the Crown, but challenged in the courts because it had not been authorized by statute. The plan did not become operational but the experience gained was made available to Environment Bay of Plenty after the RMA took effect.
See, for example, D A Gordon, BJ Scott, and E K Mroczek, Rotorua Geothermal Field Management Monitoring Update: 2005 (Whakatane: Environment Bay of Plenty, 2005), no 12, p 3
P Cooney, Environment Bay of Plenty ‘Rotorua Geothermal Regional Plan’ 1999, (doc 122), p 56
Miki Raana, brief of evidence, 22 April 2005 (doc F62), p 3
Ibid, p 4
Hamilton Pihopa Kingi, brief of evidence, (doc F66), p 4
Peter Clarke, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc D13), pp 16–17
Joycelyn Rameka, brief of evidence, February 2005 (doc D25), p 3
Emily Rameka, brief of evidence, February 2005 (doc D26), p 5
Charlotte Severne, brief of evidence, 15 April 2005 (doc E7), p 6
He Maunga Rongo

864. Tereowhakotahi Charles Wall, brief of evidence, 28 February 2005 (doc d18), p 4


866. See above for Murupara and the decision to use the geothermal resources at Kawerau as a source of industrial energy


871. Ibid, table 7.1, p 296, which is referenced to a February 1967 project report summarises these. We have not been able to sight the original source.


878. This is figure 26, Environment Bay of Plenty, www.envbop.govt.nz/media/pdf/TRCP_Chapter_17.pdf (accessed 24 July 2007), p 180. This has now been replaced by an operational plan. Regional Plan for the Tarawera River Catchment, 1 February 2004.


881. Ibid, p 48


883. Wayne Peters, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B38), paras 10,12

884. Clem Park, brief of evidence, 7 February 2005 (doc B36), pp 2–3

885. Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngati Awa Raupatu Report (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 1999), pp 112–113

886. Charlotte Severne, brief of evidence, 15 April 2005 (doc E7)
HE KORERO WHAKAMUTUNGA

This, then, is what the Governor intends to do, to assist the Maori in the good work of establishing law and order. These are the first things: – the Runangas, the Assessors, the Policemen, the Schools, the Doctors, the Civil Commissioners to assist the Maoris to govern themselves, to make good laws, and to protect the weak against the strong. There will be many more things to be planned and to be decided; but about such things the Runangas and the Commissioners will consult. This work will be a work of time, like the growing of a large tree – at first there is the seed, then there is one trunk, then there are branches innumerable, and very many leaves: by and by, perhaps, there will be fruit also. But the growth of the tree is slow – the branches, the leaves, and fruit did not appear all at once, when the seed was put in the ground: and so it will be with the good laws of the Runanga. This is the seed which the Governor desires to sow: – the Runangas, the Assessors, the Commissioners, and the rest. By and by, perhaps, this seed will grow into a very great tree, which will bear good fruit on all its branches. The Maoris, then, must assist in the planting of this tree, in the training of its branches, in cultivating the ground about its roots; and, as the tree grows, the children of the Maori, also, will grow to be a rich, wise, and prosperous people, like the English and those other nations which long ago began the work of making good laws and obeying them. This will be the work of peace, on which the blessing of Providence will rest, – which will make the storms to pass away from the sky, – and all things become light between the Maori and the Pakeha; and the heart of the Queen will then be glad when she hears that the two races are living quietly together, as brothers, in the good and prosperous land of New Zealand.¹

¹ Government policy statement, published in 1861

The above declaration of Government policy in 1861 illustrates the possibilities of the Treaty relationship, which is the central theme of our report He Maunga Rongo. On the face of it, the declaration charts a path to peaceful coexistence, Maori self-government, mutual benefit, and the development of both Maori and settlers in their now-shared country of New Zealand. The Governor’s path was not the only one; but the ‘work of time’ described and predicted here reflects the spirit of the Treaty relationship created in 1840 and moulded in the following decades. As Dr Ballara observes:

many [such] publicly promulgated standards were in accord with the Treaty of Waitangi, and with Lord Normanby’s instructions of 1839 to Lieutenant Governor Hobson out of which the terms of the Treaty were constructed. The problem was not that nineteenth-century standards of official behaviour were not based on the Treaty, but that these acknowledged Treaty-based standards were often knowingly breached or ignored by Crown officials.²

² As we discussed in part 11 of our report, Governor Grey did not keep to the standards and promises articulated to
Maori, and the outcome was war, and disempowerment of Central North Island Maori, rather than achievement of the Treaty relationship encapsulated in such public statements. The point, however, is that Maori should have been able to rely on the Crown's commitment to an evolving relationship. In considering that commitment, we have taken care to avoid the pitfalls of presentism, against which we were warned by the Crown. Rather, we have relied on contemporary statements and writings; and we think that twenty-first century Pakeha New Zealanders may be surprised at the range of possibilities their nineteenth-century forbears were willing to consider. The policy options debated by settler politicians were strongly influenced by Central North Island Maori leaders, who engaged with Parliament and officials, articulated a range of possibilities which governments might consider, and prompted colonial leaders to engage with them and their ideas in turn.

We have come to the conclusion that the intentions of Maori and the Crown as at 1840 are best captured in the Treaty principles of partnership, autonomy, reciprocity, active protection, equity, options, mutual benefit, and development. Our description of these principles and their application to the claims of Central North Island Maori is to be found in the opening chapters of each part of this report. We note also that the Treaty principles are in accord with international human rights standards, as seen in the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2007.

**The Peoples of the Central North Island**

Because three inquiry districts have been brought together into one regional inquiry, the number of iwi and hapu involved is large. Many of them are descended from ancestors who arrived on the Arawa canoe, but within that broad kin grouping of Te Arawa waka there are separate (though closely related) strands. The peoples of Te Arawa – including Ngati Whakaue, Ngati Pikiao, Ngati Uenukukopako, Ngati Rangiwhewehi, Ngati Rangiteaorere, Ngati Makino, Tuhourangi, Ngati Wahiao, Ngati Tarawhui, and Ngati Rangitihi – settled primarily (though not exclusively) in the inlandRotorua district, around the lakes. On the Bay of Plenty coast there are hapu and iwi such as Waitaha and Tapuika, who are also of the Te Arawa canoe. To the south, in the area between the Rotorua lakes and Taupo, Ngati Whaoa are in a similar position. Further south again, Ngati Tuwharetoa and their many hapu are also of Te Arawa waka and, although maintaining their separate identity, the links that bind them with the kin communities of the Rotorua district and of the coast are very strong.

Other peoples also have interests in the land and resources within the Central North Island inquiry region. On the western side of the region are Ngati Raukawa, of Tainui waka. Others, such as Ngati Awa to the north-east, and Ngai Te Rangi and Ngati Pukenga to the north-west, are of Mataatua waka. On the eastern side Tuhoe, too, have interests that extend into the Central North Island, along with Ngati Manawa and Ngati Whare. Also on the eastern side are Ngati Hineuru, whose interests extend from Hawke’s Bay across into Kaingaroa. To the south, Ngati Hikairo, descended in part from Ngati Tuwharetoa ancestors, also have descent lines from other iwi based outside the Central North Island inquiry region. And some peoples, like Ngati Tahu, have a number of different origin traditions and a long-established presence in the region.

Over the generations, reciprocal ties have been carefully built up amongst all these different peoples, through marriages and through social and economic interchanges, and their links with one another are complex. Likewise, their relationships with the land and resources of the region are often multilayered and closely interlinked. In our report, we found that these kin groups formed polities with their own laws and institutions, exercising authority over land and resources within their rohe in accordance with tikanga to ensure the collective well-being and security of those who depended on them. These polities governed their relations with one another through a complex network of kin ties and alliances, and through reciprocal gift-giving,
customary dispute resolution mechanisms, warfare, and peace agreements. In the period of early contact, before the Treaty, they allocated land and resources to European settlers. Most refused to sign the Treaty in 1840, some accepted it at Kohimarama in 1860, and all have since developed a Treaty-based relationship with the Crown.

**Political Engagement, Crown Governance, and Maori Autonomy**

In part II of the report, we addressed the overarching theme of Maori autonomy as guaranteed in the Treaty of Waitangi, in relation to the political engagement between the Crown and Maori polities in the Central North Island. We found that the Treaty guaranteed and protected the full authority (tino rangatiratanga) of Maori over their lands, people, natural resources, treasures, and affairs. That authority was inherent in Maori polities, not created by the Treaty. In return for the active protection of their authority, Maori ceded kawanatanga (governance) to the Crown. Neither tino rangatiratanga nor kawanatanga were absolute. Each must respect the other. Maori authority must operate inside the minimum parameters necessary for the proper functioning of the State. There were, however, matters – such as the right to determine their own land titles – over which the authority of Maori must prevail. Indigenous 'sovereignty', therefore, is not about independence from the State but rather about the proper exercise of Crown and Maori autonomy in their respective spheres, and managing, in partnership, the overlaps. The historical evidence suggests that such a partnership was always possible in the Central North Island from 1840 on.

Further, we found that article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed Maori the same rights as other British subjects, which included the right of self-government through representative institutions. That right was soon accorded to settlers through the Constitution Acts of 1846 and 1852. These Acts provided for settler and Maori local self-government (through provinces and Native Districts) and a central Parliament, but only the provinces and Parliament were created. A Maori national assembly was also contemplated in various forms, and given partial and temporary effect in the Kohimarama Conference of 1860. Although the settler Parliament voted funds for it to be reconvened, Governor Grey refused to keep the promise of his predecessor, Governor Gore Browne, to do so. Article 3, therefore, in conjunction with article 2 and the Treaty principles of autonomy and partnership, required the Crown to give effect to Maori autonomy through such bodies and mechanisms as were known and were reasonably practicable at the time. Native Districts and the Kohimarama Conference were two such mechanisms. Evidence was made available to us of models available to nineteenth-century policy-makers, including the legal pluralism in parts of the British Isles, the self-government proposals of the Irish Home Rule movement, the domestic nation arrangements of the United States in respect of indigenous polities, and many others.

Practical options for Maori self-government included:

- at the local level, their own county or borough councils or tribal committees;
- at the regional level, their own provincial assemblies or Native Districts as provided for by section 71 of the Constitution Act 1852; and
- at the national level, fair representation in the settler Parliament proportionate to their population (as they requested), and/or a national Maori assembly.

All these things were sought by Central North Island Maori, were discussed or contemplated by governors or settler parliaments, and (from time to time) were the subject of legislation or policy initiatives. None was impossible. The Crown submitted to us that it was not obliged to follow any one particular policy, but that it could justly be held to account for failing to adopt any policy that kept the Treaty.

In part II, we examined the detail of the practical options available from 1840 to 1920 for the Crown to give effect to its Treaty guarantee of Maori autonomy and self-government. We found that many options were canvassed.
at the time, all of them commanding some degree of attention from policy-makers, and many of which were pressed on the Government by Central North Island Maori. These included:

- self-governing Native Districts as provided for under the Constitution Act 1852, which could have created domestic nations similar to the United States model;
- legal powers for Maori runanga (local tribal councils) and for the Kingitanga (a pan-tribal institution established in 1858 to protect Maori lands and autonomy) – the granting of legal powers to them was a solution contemplated by both the New Zealand Government and the Colonial Office;
- the 1858 Native Districts legislation and the state runanga (New Institutions) set up under it in the 1860s – definitive proof that the Crown could give funding and legal powers of self-government to runanga;
- an increase in the number of Maori seats in the New Zealand Parliament proportionate to their population size, as sought by Central North Island Maori;
- several Government and Maori members’ Bills in the 1870s and 1880s, which would have provided powers of self-government and title determination for Maori tribal committees;
- legislation of the 1880s which did in fact provide for district and block committees;
- negotiations with the Rotorua Komiti Nui and the Rohe Potae alliance in the 1880s;
- the Kotahitanga parliaments organised on a national basis by Maori leaders, which met throughout the 1890s; and
- the agreement of 1898–1900, negotiated between the Crown and Maori leaders, which set up local Maori councils and a national forum (annual general conferences of the councils) in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Central North Island iwi and hapu established their own runanga or committees in the 1850s, some under the auspices of the Kingitanga. These institutions were renewed in various forms throughout the nineteenth century, ranging from local hapu bodies to larger intertribal komiti (committees). We were impressed by the sheer range and volume of iwi attempts to engage with the Crown and to obtain legally enforceable powers of self-government. They tried time and time again, despite constant discouragement. The Government abolished the New Institutions in the 1860s, abandoned Native Council Bills year after year in the 1870s, drew the teeth of Native Committee Bills in the 1880s, and ensured that Maori parliament Bills failed in the 1890s. But Central North Island iwi did not give up.

In particular, the hapu and iwi of our inquiry region wanted their komiti to replace the Native Land Court and decide their own titles to land and resources, and then to manage their lands and resources on a community basis. The Native Minister, John Ballance, promised them this (and more) in the 1880s. From time to time, Central North Island komiti and tribal bodies achieved sufficient political clout to win concessions from the Government. These included:

- The negotiation of the Fenton Agreement with the Komiti Nui in 1880 (representing Ngati Whakaue, Ngati Rangiwehi, Ngati Uenukukopako, and Ngati Rangiteaorere). These central Rotorua tribes agreed to the introduction of the Native Land Court to create a legal title for the Rotorua township block, in return for which they expected that their komiti would have a role in determining that title and governing the proposed township in partnership with the Crown. The potential for further such partnership agreements, and for Maori self-government under the old 1858 Acts, was enacted in the Thermal Springs Districts Act 1881. Some Te Arawa came to see this Act as their own Magna Carta.
- The negotiations with the Rohe Potae alliance in the mid-1880s (including Ngati Tuwharetoa and Ngati Raukawa), under which the Central North Island tribes believed that they had obtained reform of the Native Land Court and its restriction to rubber-
stamping an outer boundary for a vast inter-tribal district. After that, it was believed that a District Committee would decide on tribal boundaries inside the district for the new purpose of creating a title for use in the economy, followed by intratribal committees giving titles to hapu.

from the District Committees of the Native Committees Act 1883, the block committees of Ballance's 1886 legislation, and the Maori Councils and general conferences of the 1900 legislation.

But all these concessions proved either short-lived or illusory, as we explained in chapters 6 and 7, and they gave no substantive legal powers of self-government or land management to Maori bodies.

So many opportunities; all of them lost, adroitly avoided, or even actively repressed or subverted by the Crown over an 80-year period. The result, as we found in part II, was a sustained breach both of Treaty principles and of the plain meaning of the Treaty's second and third articles. Prejudicial consequences included the lack of legal powers for Maori communities to govern themselves or their resources, with flow-on effects examined in parts III, IV, and V of our report. From this fundamental Treaty breach and its prejudice, all other Treaty breaches in the Central North Island followed.

The Crown’s repression of Maori autonomy led to wars between itself and Central North Island Maori (see chapter 5). We found that these wars were avoidable in general and on the particular occasions in which the tribes were attacked. War might have been avoided:

first, had there been the political will and statecraft to negotiate a solution on the lines of Maori regional self-government advocated by the Colonial Office and believed to have been acceptable to the Kingitanga; and,

secondly, had the Crown respected the authority and rights of Central North Island Maori when it entered their territory in pursuit of leaders like Te Kooti or Kereopa.

From the beginning, therefore, the Crown’s resort to war against Central North Island Maori communities was in breach of the Treaty. The punishment/pacification that followed some of these wars in the form of confiscation of land was also in breach of the Treaty. Central North Island iwi and hapu who had lands confiscated include Ngati Makino, Waitaha, Ngati Te Pukuhakoma, Ngai Te Rangi, Ngai Tukairangi, Ngati Hineuru, and (to the extent that they have interests in the Western Bay of Plenty raupatu district) Tapuika.

War and confiscation had devastating prejudicial effects, some of them casting shadows to the present day. These included loss of life, loss of land and resources, economic harm, social disruption, divisions among kin, indirect loss of land and resources (through war-influenced absence from the Native Land Court), and stigmatisation as ‘rebels’. Ultimately, war and confiscation undermined the autonomy of all Central North Island Maori (including those who allied with the Crown), in breach of Treaty principles. In the long term, however, the Crown’s repression of Maori autonomy had its most profound effects in the Central North Island not through raupatu, but in terms of the disempowerment of Maori in respect of their lands and natural resources.

LAND

In part III, we examined the consequences of the Crown’s repression of the autonomy of Central North Island Maori communities for their ability to manage, derive benefit from, and exercise tino rangatiratanga over their lands. In respect of the nineteenth century, we were in agreement with the findings of the Tribunal in its report Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua. Maori and settlers required certainty in their dealings with one another over land, which in turn required some security of title for engaging in the new economy. The Crown, however, should not have introduced a new tenure system for Maori land, a matter so fundamental to their rangatiratanga, without their consent. It
should have provided for legal community titles: the clear and continuously expressed wish of Central North Island Maori. Its failure in these two key respects was a breach of Treaty principles with lasting prejudice for all the iwi and hapu of our inquiry region. This was so not only in the nineteenth century but, as tends to be forgotten, throughout the twentieth century as well.

After examining the evidence, we found that Central North Island Maori were not consulted on, were not informed about, and did not consent, to the creation of the Native Land Court, the individualisation of title, or the introduction of the court and its title system to their region. Rather, they fought a long and spirited rear-guard action against it, often on the political front and by dint of petitions and boycotts. They had some short-lived success, forcing the Crown to negotiate with the Komiti Nui (leading to the Fenton Agreement, which we discussed above) and the pan-iwi Rohe Potae alliance in the 1880s. Central North Island Maori constantly pressed upon the Crown their desire to decide their own land titles through their own committees and institutions, and then to manage them collectively by those institutions. Both aspirations were reasonable and could have been given effect to in the circumstances of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Maori could and should have had, as one settler politician put it, ‘an executive power over their lands through representatives chosen by themselves from among themselves; a Government, in fact, of the owners by the owners for the owners’. This was the fundamental connection between Maori self-government and the management of their lands.

Nonetheless, governments persisted with the court and individualised titles despite Maori opposition. As early as 1867, for example, the Government was aware of Maori anger at the 10-owner rule introduced by the 1865 legislation, which affected numbers of owners in the Central North Island. From time to time, there were concessions in the direction of Maori deciding their own titles, such as in 1883 and 1900, and of collective owner management of lands, such as in 1867, 1886, 1894, and 1900 (see chapters 6 to 11). Ultimately, however, the Crown succeeded in imposing the Native Land Court and its system of individualised titles on all the iwi and hapu of our inquiry region. Maori had to use the court because it was the only way for them to get a legally recognised title. In light of the persuasive evidence before us, their participation in the court process cannot be seen as an endorsement of it, or of the kind of titles it created. Their choices were, in fact, the court or nothing, with the risk of losing land to others on the one hand, or not being able to use it in the economy on the other. Participation on that basis was not an act of tino rangatiratanga, nor was it compliant with the Treaty. A state-created court presided over by settler judges, then, with the responsibility of turning Maori customary rights into exclusive and individualised titles derived from the Crown, was engaged in a process diametrically opposed to Treaty guarantees. The outcomes were necessarily in breach of the Treaty.

Further, the system of deciding title was expensive and burdensome. Its costs, especially survey fees, placed an unfair burden on communities which had no alternative but to take part in its processes. The various costs were cumulative and difficult to meet where communities had little cash flow. A frequent result of these costs was sale of lands. Even this would have been more tolerable had the outcome of the court process been a title that actually enabled Central North Island Maori communities to manage and derive benefit from their lands and resources in the new economy. Instead, communities’ tino rangatiratanga was replaced by individual interests useless for much other than piecemeal alienation. The new titles removed lands and resources from traditional community sanctions and decision-making. They failed to provide for strategic community management of land and resources, and were not adequate for raising capital, or developing retained lands.

In conjunction with introducing this flawed title system, the Crown imposed a land-purchase system on the Central North Island that foreclosed on the possibility of a viable leasing economy, despite the clear wish of Central North Island Maori to lease instead of sell their land. While
successful in subverting leasing, the purchase system was otherwise something of a false start for the Crown in the 1870s, because it did not achieve the absolute alienations desired by governments. Officials made advances before title determination, picking ‘owners’, and thereby locking whole communities into transactions without genuine consent or an agreed price. Sometimes the Crown agreed to leases instead of purchases, especially to get a foothold in the land, and then failed to sublease it to settlers or (often) to pay rent itself. Thus the transactions were used to tie up the land with little benefit for owners until outright sales could be obtained. When the Crown abandoned this system in the 1880s, admitting its many defects, it nonetheless insisted on ‘completing’ many of the defective transactions.

Most land transacted in the 1870s had been dealt with on this pre-title basis. For a few areas of our inquiry region, however, land had in fact passed the court under the deeply flawed 1865 legislation (see chapter 9). In those cases, it proved possible to purchase land from the 10 or fewer individuals granted absolute title under that legislation. Attempts were unsuccessful to make those individuals trustees rather than absolute owners, even though the Crown admitted that its 1865 ‘10-owner rule’ had dispossessed the great majority of owners in such blocks.

The Crown’s purchase system in the 1880s and 1890s relied on the Native Land Court and had more success. Officials bought up individual shares for low prices, taking advantage of debt (much of it incurred in securing titles) to obtain sales, and often relying on monopoly powers to get sales and to keep prices low. Although maximum prices were set, there was no effort to ensure that such prices were fair, or to set a minimum price. Also, many individuals (especially the first to sell) received less than others. The Government then manipulated the court process to partition out its interest, in such a way that it secured the locations it wanted from its purchase of these individual, undivided, paper shares. Hapu communities had no control, and their tino rangatiratanga was subverted. The Government was able to use the partitioning process to obtain taonga with which Maori did not wish to part, which further assisted its targeting of key geothermal and other valued resources. Having disempowered Maori from protecting their own land base for themselves, governments set up state mechanisms to protect a ‘sufficiency’ of Maori land and prevent landlessness. We found in part iii that these protections were no more than nominal in their operations and effects. All these features of the Crown’s purchase system were in breach of the Treaty.

As a result of the repression of Maori autonomy and the disempowerment of tribal committees and leaderships, the imposition of the Native Land Court and individualised titles, and the Crown’s purchase system:

- The tribes of coastal Rotorua were left with insufficient land and resources by 1900.
- The tribes of inland Rotorua retained more land, but none of it was ‘surplus’ to their needs, and they had lost possession of many of the key natural features on which to base development in tourism at that time. Only Ngati Pikiao, in the view of the Stout–Ngata commission, really had sufficient land by the first decade of the twentieth century.
- The tribes with interests in Kaingaroa had lost them either through the decisions of the Native Land Court or through alienation, leaving insufficient land and resources for Kaingaroa to form a base for their customary practices or for economic development.
- The tribes of northern Taupo may have retained insufficient land, but the evidence is not entirely clear. Many of their key geothermal features of value for tourism development in Taupo at that time had been lost.
- Some Taupo groups retained sufficient land and resources for the possibility of economic development in the twentieth century. Land sales, however, had not left them with capital for such development.

Such was the situation moving into the twentieth century and a new environment for Maori land. By this time, all lands had been clothed with a form of title which ensured that the Maori peoples of our inquiry region were deprived of their tino rangatiratanga. This situation of Treaty breach...
and prejudice persisted, despite the reorganisation of the land administration system in 1909. First, however, there was an abortive attempt at reform as a result of the successful political pressure of Maori (including Central North Island Maori) through the Kotahitanga movement. In 1900, the Crown attempted to substitute for its failure to provide legal community titles by providing for land management by regional Maori land councils. These councils were to have elected Maori members and a Maori majority, the result of a carefully negotiated agreement with Maori leaderships. At the same time, the Government suspended its purchasing in response to sustained Maori pressure, providing instead for the councils to lease the land. Five years later, without consultation or the consent of Maori leaderships, including Central North Island Maori leaders, and without a fair trial period or adequate support, the councils were replaced by land boards with only minimal Maori membership, in breach of the Treaty principles of autonomy, partnership, and active protection.

Similarly without consent, the Crown resumed purchasing in opposition to clearly expressed Maori wishes. The Stout–Ngata commission reminded the Crown in 1907 that it had a fiduciary duty to Maori, and must ensure the preservation of a tribal estate for future generations. Nonetheless, the Crown embarked on new policies to facilitate land purchase while at the same time watering down protections for retention. This was the focus of Maori land administration for the early decades of the century.

In the Native Land Act of 1909, the Crown provided for private buyers (and for itself) to deal with Maori through a new system of ‘meetings of owners’ via the land boards (which could pass good title, as Maori owners themselves could not). Though this could have been a useful mechanism, and was touted by the Government as a return to runanga management of land, it was undermined by provision for a very low quorum. Decisions to sell could legally be made by a small number of owners, resulting in the dispossession of many others without their consent. In failing to monitor these provisions and address the problems that soon became evident, the Crown breached the plain meaning of article 2 of the Treaty and the principle of active protection. Also, the Crown legislated to give itself an advantage over both Maori owners and private buyers, exempting itself from the meetings of owners’ provisions and resuming piecemeal purchase of individual shares. At the same time, governments continued to use monopolies to obtain sales.

As a result of continuing Crown and private purchases in the first half of the twentieth century:

- Further pockets of Maori land were alienated along the Bay of Plenty coast, cementing the unenviable position of the coastal Rotorua tribes, who had already had insufficient land at 1900.
- The tribes of inland Rotorua were affected by a substantial number of private purchases, especially in the 1910s and 1920s. Most land around Lake Rotorua passed out of Maori ownership by the 1950s, as had significant blocks around Lakes Tarawera, Okataina, and Rotokakahi. Owing to the failure of the Crown’s protection mechanisms, these alienations occurred despite the warning of the Stout–Ngata commission that, with the possible exception of Ngati Pikiao, inland Rotorua Maori had no surplus land.
- In the area between Rotorua and Taupo, interests that had been acquired by the Crown in the late nineteenth century were consolidated by way of applications to the Native Land Court for partition. This resulted in significant loss of land for tribes in this area.
- Tribes with interests in Kaingaroa, whose land and resources in that district were already insufficient by 1900, experienced further alienations.
- In the Taupo district, there were substantial alienations as the Crown pushed ahead with major purchases from 1918 into the 1930s. Private purchasing, though on a smaller scale, was notable in some areas. By mid-century, the Taupo Maori land base had been reduced, leaving some hapu without sufficient land and resources. Remaining land was still significant in some areas, but plagued by the constraints of the title system, which also hindered development.
Another form of obtaining Maori land was to take it compulsorily for public works, which became a principal way in which the State acquired land from Central North Island Maori in the second half of the twentieth century. In our view, the taking of land without consent, or compensation, or both, was in breach of the plain meaning of article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi. Also, from 1882 to 1974, the public works regime operated in the Central North Island in a manner that discriminated between Maori and general land, providing fewer rights and protections for the owners of the former, and thus operated in breach of the Treaty. When Maori land was acquired for public works, compulsory taking was often an early or first resort due to the legacies of the nineteenth-century title system, rather than a last resort in the national interest. Legislators and officials considered that it was just too difficult to identify, consult with, or obtain agreement from Maori owners. The land of Maori owners, unlike that of general landowners, was often taken as a matter of course, and the problem of identifying owners was left until compensation was paid (if any was due). Although the total amount of land taken by this means was not large in acreage, it affected all Central North Island iwi and hapu, and included many taonga of cultural and spiritual significance to them.

In sum, the Crown’s initial focus at the beginning of the twentieth century was on reform, but it soon switched back to acquiring land for settlement, relying on mechanisms that perpetuated the Treaty breaches of the past. Circumvention of community decision-making, manipulation of a title system designed to facilitate sales, and the increasing fractionation of titles through the court’s succession rules, all contributed to sales and to systemic barriers to developing retained farmable lands.

From the 1920s, however, the Crown did try to find solutions to title problems in the Central North Island – and thus to mitigate its Treaty breach in visiting those problems on Maori. Some solutions seemed punitive in effect, if not in design. Simplifying titles by exchanging and consolidating owners’ scattered interests, for example, proved a long and difficult process for Maori owners, the benefits of which were limited. In our inquiry region, the Crown failed to allocate sufficient resources to complete the consolidations expeditiously, to the prejudice of the owners. Similarly, two post-Second World War solutions were coercive, discriminatory, and in breach of the Treaty. These were:

- ‘conversion’ (taking small interests from those entitled to succeed to them and vesting them in the Maori Trustee, despite the fact that such interests might represent the remaining links of many successors to their ancestral lands); and
- the change of status of Maori land to ‘European’ land if it had no more than four owners.

Some of this ‘European’ land was re-converted to Maori land after 1973.

Alongside the Crown’s efforts to solve the fundamental problems its title system had created, we note the extent to which its post-war solutions were imposed without proper consultation or consent. This was so despite the efforts of the Maori leaderships of our inquiry region to engage with the Crown, as for example over the major 1953 legislation and its 1967 amendment. Also, we note the extent to which these measures were coercive. They occurred alongside compulsory takings of Maori land for public works. In neither instance – title ‘improvement’ or public works takings – did Central North Island Maori have representative bodies with the legal power to influence policy or the economic development strategies of their region. It would be a mistake, therefore, to think that the Crown’s failure to consult, failure to obtain consent, and its tendency to act coercively, were confined to the nineteenth century.

The prejudice to Central North Island Maori was lasting and cumulative. This was in part because the legal and economic climate was hostile to the kind of multiple ownership created by the native land legislation. In our view there is no greater indictment of the Crown’s title system. The Crown-derived titles bestowed upon Maori in place of their customary rights were of limited practical use even before they became overcrowded and fractionated. Owners faced serious difficulties in borrowing because the security
they could provide was not acceptable to lenders. No care was taken to ensure that all Maori owners had the protection of secure, registered title in the land transfer system. Further, the Crown considered in the mid-twentieth century that the rights of multiple owners were not worthy of legal protection in the same way that those of other owners were, and its immediate post-1945 policies were based in part on removal of owners from titles without their consent. Many of the disadvantages of the title system were exemplified in the taking of Maori land for public works, as we discussed above.

More positively, post-Second World War governments made forms of corporate title and management a more realistic option at last for those Central North Island Maori who had retained land. Trusts and incorporations, as the claimants and the Crown agreed, have been popular and effective management structures. It was not, however, until the provisions of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 that we think the Crown has finally provided a range of options for groups of owners to exercise greater control over their land. The provisions in relation to trusts are a notable example. For the first time they have also enabled Maori to adopt a process that prevents further fractionation of interests on succession. That process is the whanau trust option.

Ultimately, therefore, the Crown has accepted that collective ownership and management can work. Because of the nineteenth-century title system, however, this has meant reconstituting or empowering groups of owners identified by Native Land Court processes, or rather those owners who had, over generations, survived the structural pressures to sell their (often small) interests. They were not hapu. The loss of hapu autonomy and of tino rangatiratanga over their lands and resources in the intervening generations remains important. The loss of connection with their taonga, and the loss of responsibility for decision-making and management, persists so long as solutions are cast in terms of the past ownership regime. For some tribes, such as Ngati Whakaue, it is evident that they have been able to use their trusts and incorporations to begin the process of rebuilding a hapu base. Others remain disconnected, as they demonstrated in their evidence to us. It remains for the Crown to give effect to Treaty guarantees by empowering iwi and hapu to fully re-establish proper governance and resource bases in their rohe. We hope that such will be the outcome of negotiated Treaty settlements.

Development

For Central North Island Maori – who claimed ownership of key natural resources within the region and some of whom also retained significant blocks of land in the twentieth century – the Treaty right of development was particularly important. In many ways, development claims involve the most significant twentieth-century grievance in our inquiry. The failure to give effect to the Treaty guarantee of Maori autonomy or tino rangatiratanga was at the core of this grievance. Maori communities were denied the right to exercise authority over their natural resources, their taonga, and the manner and effect of development of those taonga. Their tribal authorities had limited powers to participate in and affect regional or national decision-making about development. They had no community titles or legal bodies (until later in the twentieth century) to make hapu decisions about development or strategies of land and resource use. Ultimately, too, they had no control over the Native Land Court and its empowering legislation, which decided what they owned in Maori custom and then granted them Crown-derived titles which were restricted to English legal definitions of land. Such titles did not recognise Maori customary interests in waterways, geothermal energy, and other taonga. In all these ways, therefore, the Crown’s failure to give effect to Maori autonomy shaped further breaches of the Treaty right of development.

In part iv of our report, we found that the Treaty-guaranteed Maori right of development includes:

- the right as property owners to develop their properties in accordance with new technology and uses, and to equal access to opportunities to develop them;
the right to develop or profit from resources in which they have (and retain) a proprietary interest under Maori custom, even where the nature of that property right is not necessarily recognised in, or has no equivalent in, English law;

- the right to positive assistance, where appropriate to the circumstances, including assistance to overcome unfair barriers to participation in development (especially barriers created by the Crown);

- the right of Maori to retain a sufficient land and resource base to develop in the new economy, and of their communities to decide how and when that base would be developed;

- the opportunity, after considering the relevant criteria, for Maori to participate in the development of Crown-owned or Crown-controlled property or resources or industries in their rohe, and to participate at all levels (such criteria include the existence of a customary right or an analogy to a customary right, the use of tribal taonga, and the need to redress past breaches or fulfil the promise of mutual benefit); and

- the right of Maori to develop as a people, in a cultural, social, economic, and political sense.

Farm land was the obvious – and at the same time, perhaps the least important – property for development in the Central North Island. By the opening of the twentieth century, the Crown’s title and purchase systems had prevented Central North Island communities from managing strategic sales and acquiring capital to develop retained land. At the same time, the Crown had withdrawn from some purchases because it was obvious that there was much poor-quality land in the region, unsuitable for farming on anything other than a large, station-based scale. That such a scale was eminently suited to hapu farming was not a consideration for the Crown, even though it was so advised by the Stout–Ngata commission. Although it was found that large areas of the Central North Island inquiry region were stubbornly resistant to farm development, some areas were considered potentially farmable with advances in knowledge and technology. The Crown therefore had an obligation to protect iwi and hapu in sufficient lands to enable them to participate meaningfully in farming as it was expected to develop at the time.

Despite the prevailing laissez faire economic philosophies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governments in New Zealand took an active role in promoting economic enterprises that were identified as important for national growth. Governments provided active assistance to sectors of the community to enable them to participate in new economic opportunities. From the beginning of colonisation, the Crown also accepted a responsibility for actively assisting Maori economic development. In the event, governments assisted settlers with loan finance to develop their land for farming from the 1890s to the 1920s, but effectively excluded Central North Island Maori from this assistance. At a time when state rural lending policies had a powerful influence on private lenders, this is likely to have contributed to the persistent prejudice of private lenders against lending on all forms of Maori land. This had long-term consequences for the peoples of our inquiry region, affecting their development prospects beyond the provision of finance for farming. Also, the Government provided training and other forms of assistance to settlers that it did not provide for Central North Island Maori, despite recommendations of the Stout–Ngata commission.

It was not until the 1930s that the Government began to provide significant assistance for Central North Island Maori to develop their land. Ngata’s schemes provided a means of sidestepping title difficulties, securing investment finance (through State loans) to develop lands for farming, and training and supervision for chosen owner-occupiers. The success of individual schemes and the benefits they provided for owners varied widely in the region, and we did not make findings on particular schemes in this inquiry. We observed, however, that the emphasis on individual farms was damaging to Maori communities and took little or no account of their preferences. State control was pervasive and made little provision for community decision-making or Maori autonomy. Not until the 1970s did owners gain a more meaningful say and participation.
in management of the schemes, and even then the Crown retained control of strategic decision-making. We think it reasonable also to suppose that, had loan finance been available earlier to Maori (and managed by them) during the key period of 1890 to 1930, the unsuitability of the small farm model for much of the land in our inquiry region would have been apparent in time to prevent some of the mistakes of the Ngata (and post-Ngata) state-controlled schemes there.

In any case, farming was not the principal development opportunity for Central North Island Maori. As we explored in detail in part iv, there were greater opportunities in the natural resources of the region, over which Maori claimed tino rangatiratanga at 1840 and after. This includes the forests, the lakes, the rivers, and the geothermal resource (the surface manifestations, fields, and the underlying heat and energy system (the Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ)). Tourism was an important opportunity, based often on possession or control of access to key natural features. Also, as new technology developed later in the century, exotic forestry on (often former) Maori land was a realistic alternative to farming. In our view, past Treaty breaches could have been mitigated and the Treaty kept in the twentieth century had the Crown:

- recognised Maori rights and interests in their natural resources (in a way sought by Maori and at least partly permitted by the common law); and
- provided the same development assistance to Central North Island Maori that it did to settlers.

In particular, the Crown’s own title system had created real barriers to Maori development that governments were obligated to assist them to resolve.

Because of the outstanding natural scenery and resources of the Central North Island, and the willingness of hapu and iwi to provide hospitality to travellers wishing to see their taonga, tourism was identified very early as a major potential economic opportunity for the region. Maori took the lead in developing a fledgling tourist industry by guiding visitors to sites of interest and providing associated services, such as transport, accommodation and entertainment. The Crown had an obligation actively to protect hapu and iwi of the region in their Treaty development right to utilise their properties and taonga in expected tourism opportunities, according to their custom and preferences. This obligation included protecting hapu and iwi in a sufficiency of those properties and resources identified at the time as likely to be important for tourism. This was particularly important because of the problems associated with farming in the region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

We found in parts iv and v that the Crown actively undermined Maori tourism opportunities by a determined campaign to purchase or otherwise acquire taonga central to the industry. These included outstanding geothermal surface manifestations like hot springs at Whakarewarewa, and angling waterways like Lake Taupo and its tributary rivers and streams. Rather than fostering Maori development, the governments of the day were determined to remove tourist attractions from Maori control. By the early twentieth century, hapu and iwi of the Kaingaroa and Taupo districts had lost most of their sites and resources identified at the time as important for tourism, although those in the Rotorua district had retained some significant taonga.

From the 1880s, hapu and iwi of the Central North Island were becoming increasingly marginalised as tourism entrepreneurs. As well as the loss of suitable sites and resources, major barriers to continued Maori participation in tourism were the title problems identified in part iii of our report, and difficulties with obtaining investment finance. These barriers were of the Crown’s own making. As part of its duty of active protection, the Crown had an obligation to assist Maori to overcome them. The various township ventures in the region offered some potential for this, and the thermal springs district legislation allowed for joint Crown–Maori partnerships in developing key tourist sites. However, the Crown failed to take advantage of such opportunities. Nor did it take steps to assist Maori when it was clear that they were effectively excluded from the major source of lending finance for their enterprises: private lenders.
By the early twentieth century, the Crown had identified some particularly outstanding sites in the region as having national value, and thus had legitimate kawanatanga responsibilities to ensure that these sites were adequately protected. Such protection did not, however, require Crown ownership of sites of great cultural and spiritual significance to Maori.

As the modern tourism industry developed later in the century, some of its activities were of course different from those contemplated in the 1840s. A significant part of modern tourism, however, remains closely linked to the outstanding natural scenery, resources, and other taonga of the Central North Island and to the hospitality and culture of the hapu and iwi associated with them.

The modern industry is therefore analogous to the tourism trade pioneered by iwi and hapu of the region. In our view, the long-established tradition of tourism for some Central North Island hapu and iwi, the close association between modern tourism and their taonga and cultural practices, and the need to redress past Treaty breaches and economic disparities, together require the Crown as a reasonable Treaty partner to provide positive assistance today for those Central North Island hapu and iwi who wish to participate in new tourism ventures.

The other key development opportunity in the first half of the twentieth century was indigenous forestry. The overwhelming imperative to clear land for farming did not obscure the commercial value of indigenous timber at the time. In its nineteenth-century land purchasing, the Crown targeted accessible good-quality timber lands and it failed to ensure that hapu and iwi were protected sufficiently for their present and future needs. The impact varied across our inquiry region. Some hapu and iwi were able to retain timber resources, while others whose timber was regarded as especially accessible and valuable for settlement purposes, had lost the opportunity to benefit from this resource. The resumption of Crown purchasing in the Taupo district in the twentieth century, and the introduction of mechanisms to enable private purchasing in theRotorua district, had a further impact on the amount of timber lands retained. A significant amount remained in Maori hands in Taupo, while in Rotorua almost half the remaining Maori timber lands were lost.

In the second half of the century, tourism remained an important development opportunity alongside new opportunities arising from technological and economic change. In particular, the Treaty right of Central North Island hapu and iwi in the Central North Island to develop their properties became relevant in the use of their taonga to generate (and profit from) electricity. As we discussed in parts IV and V, Maori retained developable property rights in the waterways and geothermal resources of the region. The battle of Taupo Maori to secure their rights with regard to hydroelectricity was waged particularly in the 1940s, but also from time to time thereafter.
The battle of Central North Island Maori to receive appropriate recognition of their interests in the generation of electricity from their geothermal subsurface resource (the geothermal fields and the TVZ) was waged from time to time in the second half of the century. In essence, Maori lost both battles with the Crown, which was in breach of their Treaty development rights, their article 2 and article 3 property rights, and also the principles of partnership and active protection. We found that Central North Island Maori are owed compensation for the past use of their taonga for electricity, from which the nation has had both great benefit and also (for the Crown and now for private enterprise) significant profit.

In considering the tribes’ Treaty development right with respect to electricity today, we found in terms of our criteria (described above) that:

- the development or activity is a legitimate outgrowth or development of a customary property right;
- the development or activity is in their rohe;
- the development or activity involves their taonga, in which (in Pakeha terms) they have a proprietary interest;
- they have had a long association or history of involvement in the development or activity;
- tribal initiatives are involved or contemplated;
- the development or activity may contribute to the redress of past Treaty breaches; and
- the development or activity may assist their cultural, social, or economic development.

The Crown should now give effect to this Treaty right of development if that is the preference and wish of Central North Island Maori.

In contrast, the record of Crown–Maori relations in our inquiry region is partly redeemed by aspects of the exotic forestry industry in the second half of the twentieth century. Our findings were preliminary (owing to lack of evidence on some points), but in our view the Crown did meet its Treaty obligation to assist the development of Maori land in the case of two large Taupo trusts, affecting many thousands of acres of retained land (the Lake Taupo and Lake Rotoaira Forest Trusts). We are not in a position, however, to comment on other forestry leases of Maori land. Significant areas of land suitable for forestry do remain undeveloped, despite their owners’ wishes. The Crown’s failure to provide appropriate development assistance to these owners was, in our preliminary finding, in breach of the Treaty.

By the mid-twentieth century, much of the land suitable for exotic forestry (in Kaingaroa, for example) had passed out of Maori ownership in circumstances which breached the Treaty. Nonetheless, we found that the Crown has met its Treaty obligation in terms of Maori development and the principle of mutual benefit in the particular case of exotic forestry on that land, fostering its growth in the Central North Island to provide employment, housing, and development for generations of Maori. Maori have paid a high price for that development, in respect of their cultural, environmental, and social interests. The price need not have been so high had the Crown met its obligation to give effect to their tino rangatiratanga (full authority), or had it assisted them to overcome known obstacles to their gaining management and business positions and experience. As a result of these failures, they were left particularly vulnerable to the restructuring of the 1980s.

In terms of late twentieth-century forestry, we found that the Crown failed to consult properly with Central North Island Maori or actively to protect their social and economic interests in its restructuring of the industry, including the provision of appropriate development assistance. This was in breach of the Treaty. The parties agree that Maori suffered significant prejudice from this Treaty breach. The relative success of exotic forestry as a Maori development opportunity has been overshadowed by the manner and effect of the Crown’s withdrawal from the industry at the end of the century.
Te Taiaro: The Environment and Natural Resources

There are key connections between the Crown’s failure to give effect to its Treaty guarantees of Maori autonomy and development, its title system, and its policies for ownership, management, control, and exploitation of natural resources. Many of the claims in our inquiry relate to these connected issues, and also to a key prejudicial effect of disempowering Maori: damage to taonga and the environment. This is not to say that had they been empowered to make or properly influence the decisions, Central North Island Maori would never have chosen to alter or modify taonga and the environment as necessary for development. What emerged in our inquiry were the cultural, social, and economic influences on what was considered necessary. As we found in respect of exotic forestry on Maori and non-Maori land, tangata whenua of the Central North Island have tended to reconcile development and modification so as to give proper weight to their culture and values wherever they are able to make or properly influence decisions. Many of the claims, therefore, relate both to the Crown’s failure to take proper account of Maori proprietary and other interests in natural resource taonga, and its modification (or permission for modification) of those taonga without sufficient consideration of Maori wishes and interests.

Of great concern here to the hapu and iwi of the Central North Island is damage to and degradation of taonga. In terms of Treaty guarantees, we found in part V of our report that water bodies such as springs, rivers, and lakes, and other natural resources such as fisheries and geothermal resources, can be taonga protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. In the particular circumstances of New Zealand, English common law should have been sufficient to recognise Maori customary or native title to these resources, given the nature of the doctrine of aboriginal title. To safeguard Maori rights, however, some formal recognition in legislation was needed to ensure their protection within the introduced legal order. That protection has not happened except in relation to their fisheries. We note that Maori customary or native rights to indigenous freshwater and sea fisheries remain legally enforceable so long as there is compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. Whether or not Maori customary or native title to natural resources has been extinguished, the claimants retain Treaty rights and interests in those resources that they consider taonga, albeit in some cases modified. One of the continuing Treaty rights held by Maori is the right to exercise rangatiratanga in the management of their natural resources or taonga (irregardless of whether they still own them) through their own forms of local or regional self-government or through joint-management regimes at local or regional level. To give effect to the Treaty, therefore, the Crown must give effect to Maori autonomy and actively protect the rights and interests of its Treaty partner. As one of the primary claimant concerns, we examined whether the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) has done so and found that it has not.

In exploring these generic issues, we looked in detail at two taonga of enormous value to Central North Island hapu and iwi: Lake Taupo and its tributaries; and the geothermal resource (the surface features, fields, and subterranean heat/energy of the TVZ). In considering Lake Taupo, we determined that the Crown now acknowledges the lake and its tributaries as taonga, although its title system still confines legal ownership to beds and banks, with no provision for a proprietary interest in water or in the waterway as an indivisible entity. This does not accord with customary law or proprietary rights guaranteed by the Treaty. Further, the Crown acquired the beds and banks – and the right to use the waters – improperly in 1926, through arrangements which breached the Treaty. It then used the taonga as a reservoir for storing water to generate electricity, raising the level of the lake in such a way as to damage the lakeshore lands and geothermal taonga of the tangata whenua, for which it has not properly compensated the affected iwi.

The Treaty-guaranteed fishing rights of Taupo Maori have in part been recognised by the arrangements of 1926 (modified in the 1990s), but without full and proper compensation for the knowing destruction of indigenous
He Maunga Rongo

fisheries before 1926. On balance, however, the Crown’s annuity in exchange for fishing rights, its agreement to a tribally based administration of that annuity, and its return of the lake and riverbeds in 1992, are positive steps in partial satisfaction of its Treaty obligations.

In terms of the geothermal resource, we found that this taonga was viewed as the creation of the sisters and taniwha of Ngatoroirangi, gifted by him to his descendants, separate from the land and waterways in which it manifests. As at 1840, the hapu and iwi of the Central North Island who whakapapa to Ngatoroirangi, and who are the keepers of the rich oral history of the geothermal taonga, possessed it in a manner akin to ownership. In the 1950s, the Crown sought to nationalise geothermal energy, partly to defeat Maori opposition to using certain sites. Had the Crown inquired at that time, it would have found that Maori possessed this taonga with three layers of rights:

- the rights of whanau, hapu, and iwi to particular surface features, inextricable from their rights to the surrounding land;
- the rights of hapu and iwi to the fields underlying their lands; and
- the rights of hapu and iwi to the subterranean heat and energy resource as a whole (the TVZ), which they inherited from Ngatoroirangi and which they have never alienated.

The Crown’s nationalisation of use of the resource in 1953, its appropriation to itself of incidents of ownership (including the right to profit from its development and use), and its failure to manage the resource with due involvement of Central North Island Maori in its allocation and conservation, were all in breach of the Treaty. Also, the Crown’s intentional stripping of Central North Island Maori of particular surface features of great value, its creation of a title system that enabled it to obtain such taonga by individual purchasing and court partitions, its refusal to recognise or protect Maori customary ownership of the fields and TVZ, and its failure to give effect to Maori development rights in respect of their geothermal taonga, are all in breach of the Treaty. The modern management of the resource through the RMA similarly fails to adequately protect the claimants’ interests or to give real effect to the Treaty. As a result, Central North Island Maori have been denied their tino rangatiratanga over the resource. As its kaitiaki, they are required to ensure its sustainable use and its conservation for future generations. The RMA does not provide properly for them to do so.

We also considered the operation of the RMA in respect of a number of other waterways and taonga raised with us by the claimants. At heart, this too is an issue of Maori autonomy. The Treaty of Waitangi envisaged that Maori would continue to exercise their autonomy by managing their own policy, resources, and affairs, within the minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the State. Overlaps in decision-making – particularly where resources have been shared with the wider community – need to be resolved in partnership. Central North Island Maori do not seek absolute control of these resources, but rather seek to negotiate their management in partnership with the Crown. After reviewing the history of many such resources in the Central North Island, we found that the Crown did not provide for Maori rangatiratanga in environmental management before 1991, and has not done so adequately since the enactment of the RMA in that year.

While the RMA is an advance on the earlier legislative regime, as is the Act’s amendment of 2005, it is still inadequate in Treaty terms. The Crown submitted in our inquiry that increased Maori representation in local government had solved the issue. We considered the initiatives that the Crown has taken in terms of enacting the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori Constituency Empowering) Act 2001 and the Local Government Act 2002, which are an improvement on the previous local government regime. However, the evidence is that Maori representation is still too limited. Central North Island iwi and hapu groups still have no direct right to attend meetings of councils or consent hearings other than as members of the public, applicants, or concerned parties. In particular, participation is not based on tribal or hapu representation, and cannot have any meaningful effect on outcomes under the RMA.
The evidence of Raewyn Bennett and Tipene Marr before us, both of whom were councillors on Environment Bay of Plenty, was that there were too few Maori on the council, and that their views were often marginalised.

In short, Maori in the Central North Island have suffered major disadvantage. Increasing the level of Maori representation in local government does not address the issue of how to ensure decisions made under the RMA are Treaty-consistent. Only a further amendment to the RMA will ensure that those exercising powers and duties under the Act should do so in a manner consistent with the Treaty. This would address past problems and ensure that present activities, carried out under resource consents, do not impinge on the Treaty rights and interests of the claimants. Our view is that an amendment is necessary to section 8 of the RMA, as we explained in detail in part V.

Finally, the Crown argued in our inquiry that the key to its kawanatanga role in managing the environment was an appropriate balancing of interests. The Treaty requires Maori interests to be given significant weight and protection but, in the Crown’s view, its ability to carry out its policies cannot reasonably be restricted to ‘extremely constrained and unusual circumstances’:

This issue may be most pressing in 20th century issues and environmental issues where a decision which directly affects one Maori group may directly or indirectly affect a number of other interested groups, Maori and non-Maori around the country. The Crown is required to balance the various interests involved in such a decision. Where issues of significant national infrastructure are included (as with electricity), such a balancing process must occur by considering the relative interests in the national context.4

We agreed that the Crown must govern in the interests of all. It is the only body with the overview and capability necessary to assess the national status of New Zealand’s environment and natural resources and provide for all communities of interests, whilst ensuring that its actions or those of its delegates are consistent with its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. In other words, the balancing of interests must be done in a manner consistent with the Treaty, and Maori rights cannot be balanced out of existence. The Crown’s right to govern was recognised in return for its guarantee of tino rangatiratanga. That guarantee included full authority over properties and taonga. Otherwise, Maori have nothing more than a limited right to be consulted – the position taken in the RMA, in breach of the Treaty. Any balancing of interests, therefore, must give due and appropriate weight to the Treaty relationship and to Treaty rights, as we outlined in chapter 17. Maori ownership of, and rangatiratanga over, their taonga should not be negated by the requirement of balancing unless it is in exceptional circumstances in the national interest. Maori also must do their part in the Treaty relationship. As we noted above, Central North Island Maori do not seek absolute control of natural resources, but rather want to negotiate their management in partnership with the Crown. The Treaty envisaged a future for all peoples in this country – sharing, developing, and protecting its natural resources for the welfare of us all and the generations to come.

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, Central North Island tribes have been deprived of their authority to manage their own affairs and their own taonga. This has resulted in economic, social, and cultural harm to all the Maori peoples of the region. First, they have been refused the right to govern themselves and their own properties and affairs, although such a right was guaranteed in the Treaty. Secondly, they have had a form of land titles imposed upon them that broke the tino rangatiratanga of their communities and led to real or virtual loss of much of their land. Thirdly, the English common law and the statute law has deprived them of authority over – and sometimes customary ownership of – the natural resources that were the key to economic development in their region. Fourthly, they have been denied their Treaty right to develop their properties and taonga, and
to develop as a people. All these factors combined to deny Central North Island Maori the mutual benefit from the new society that had been promised by the Treaty. Instead, they have suffered economic, social, cultural, and political marginalisation. They have not been able to control the environmental – and other – effects of the development that has occurred. In our view, these Treaty breaches and resultant prejudice are serious and require swift and substantial redress.

Recommendations
From time to time in our report, we have made recommendations about how the Crown could rectify particular problems and remove current or potential prejudice. These included our recommendations that the RMA be amended, that Central North Island Maori be compensated for the use of their taonga to generate electricity, and that the Crown should recognise a current Maori development right in the tourism, forestry, and electricity industries of the Central North Island. We note, too, that there are no fewer than 40 applications for remedies hearings or binding recommendations extant before the Tribunal.

Those applications affect former state forests currently held in trust – including Kaingaroa, Rotoehu, Horohoro, Whakarewarewa, Crater, Waimihia, Marotiri, Pureora, and Waituhi – with accumulated rentals of $256,946,214 as at 31 March 2007.

Broadly speaking, however, we do not wish to make formal recommendations about settlement at this stage of our inquiry. We have reported on the generic issues affecting most or all claimants in the three inquiry districts of Rotorua, Kaingaroa, and Taupo. We heard evidence and submissions from many groups. The Crown has already negotiated a settlement with a large grouping of Rotorua claimants. We understand that the Government has accepted the mandate of other groups to commence negotiations. As noted above, we think that the Central North Island claims are serious, justifying substantial redress. In our view, it would now be possible to settle the claims without further inquiry by the Tribunal. We recommend that the Crown and claimants negotiate using all best endeavours. Should negotiations prove unsuccessful, the Tribunal may reconvene – although whether it would sit to hear stage 2 of this inquiry or proceed directly into a remedies hearing remains to be decided.

Summary
- The Crown has failed to give effect to the Treaty principle of autonomy and to Maori Treaty rights of self-government in the Central North Island. It has failed to protect the tino rangatiratanga of Central North Island iwi and hapu over their affairs, lands, and resources. The principal means by which the Crown breached the Treaty was its continuing refusal to accord legal powers to Maori institutions so that the tribes could govern themselves, manage their lands collectively, and have their fair say in state decision-making on social, economic, environmental, and regional development.
- In particular, the Crown missed, refused, or actively repressed opportunities for Central North Island Maori to govern their own affairs, their lands, and their resources through representative institutions of their own devising, or of mutual devising by the Crown and Maori in partnership.
As a primary part of this breach of Treaty principles, the Crown insisted on the individualisation of customary title by a state-created court presided over by settler judges. This was entirely inconsistent with the tino rangatiratanga of Central North Island Maori, as guaranteed by the Treaty.

The resultant title system has had devastating effects on the iwi and hapu of the Central North Island. These include the destruction of community authority and control over land, the piecemeal alienation of individual interests against the wishes of hapu communities, the loss of treasured land and resources without proper consent or fair compensation, and the creation of long-term barriers to development of remaining assets. Maori held surviving blocks as multiple owners in a legal and economic climate hostile to such ownership, unable to borrow because they could not offer adequate security. From the mid-twentieth century, trusts and incorporations, providing for the corporate management of Maori land, became a realistic option for Central North Island Maori. Recent reforms (in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993) have further improved the situation for many groups of owners. Nevertheless, restoration of hapu and iwi governance and resource bases for the exercise of their tino rangatiratanga is still required. We hope that such will be the outcome of negotiated Treaty settlements.

Also, the Crown's title system did not give effect to Maori customary rights over their waterways and geothermal resources, even though such rights ought to have been protected by the common law or (in the event of that protection proving insufficient) by statute. As a result, Maori lost control over many of these resources and were marginalised from their development. The enactment of the Resource Management Act (and its amendments) has resulted in some improvement, but not enough for the Crown to keep its full Treaty obligations to Central North Island Maori. We recommend that section 8 of the RMA be amended and further improvements made.

The Crown has breached the Treaty right of development for Central North Island iwi and hapu. It has failed to give effect to that right in terms of land and resources owned or claimed by Maori. It failed to provide the same or equivalent development assistance to Central North Island Maori that it provided to settlers. It failed to assist Central North Island Maori to overcome barriers to development that had been created by its own title system. It failed to keep to its early commitment to assist Maori social and economic development, and the associated Treaty promise that both Maori and settlers would prosper (the principle of mutual benefit). The Crown still has opportunities to give effect to the Treaty right of development in tourism, the electricity industry, forestry, and any new Crown-owned or Crown-controlled resources/industries that are created in the Central North Island.

As a result of these breaches of the Treaty, Central North Island Maori were disempowered in their own rohe by the late nineteenth century. They had no legal powers to govern themselves and their affairs, or to manage their lands collectively as tribal communities. Rather, their land titles were individualised and their community authority damaged, with significant social, cultural, and economic prejudice. Further, Crown actions and inactions led to the ‘development of under-development’ for the hapu and iwi of the Central North Island. For the
first half of the twentieth century, the result was poverty and also social and cultural dislocation, as reported by welfare agencies and officials of the time.

- In the second half of the century, there was some improvement as a result of farm development schemes, provision for collective management (trusts and incorporations), and economic assistance for forestry. Farm development was limited, however, and the Crown conceded that its sector restructuring dealt a crushing blow to Maori forestry in the final decades of the twentieth century. Overall, many Central North Island Maori remain economically and socially marginalised at the beginning of the twenty-first century, partly as a result of avoidable actions on the part of the Crown and in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi.

- The Treaty breaches and resultant prejudice have been significant. In our view, generous redress is required. We recommend that the Crown and claimants negotiate.

Notes


4. Virginia Hardy, Sally McKechnie, Damen Ward, and Peter Andrew, closing submissions on behalf of the Crown, 14 October 2005 (paper 3.3.111), pt 1, p 37

The Kaingaroa 1 block is of considerable interest to claimants, and we consider it important to provide further detail about the title investigation in the Native Land Court, and the alienation of the block. We begin with an account of pre-investigation dealings in the land conducted during the period when the Native Land Court was suspended in the region (from 1873 to 1877). We give details, sourced from minute books of the Native Land Court and from reports commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, of the proceedings relating to the investigation of title of Kaingaroa 1, and the subsequent rehearing. We conclude with a brief account of the alienation of the land, and of protest by some claimants in the wake of the court rehearing, and alienation.

**Pre-investigation dealings**

As early as 1864, according to Peraniko Te Hura of Ngati Manawa, the boundaries of what would become Kaingaroa 1 were indicated to Government officers TH Smith and H’T Clarke. And by 1866, Angela Ballara tells us, Gilbert Mair had already negotiated a private lease over part of it. It is possible that this was the land ‘near Paeroa’, leased by Mair and his brother in November 1866 ‘from Ngatitahu and Ngatiwhaoa’, and that the lease was the one arranged with Ihaia Te Waru of Ngati Whaoa, for which Te Waru received £80. In 1867, Josiah Firth negotiated a lease for some land that was referred to as Kaingaroa 1, from a group of Ngati Raukawa led by Topi Te Kahuwhara. However, in the case of this particular deal, a number of factors have led both Bruce Stirling and Dr Ballara to conclude that this was not the same land that would finally become known as Kaingaroa 1. Rather, they think that the land involved was closer to Taupo and the Waikato River.

In 1873, Ngahuruhuru Perarika of Ngati Whaoa leased an area of land to the Crown which appears to have included the south-west corner of what would become Kaingaroa 1. He received £100 from the Government. He would later state:

> I received the payment to the best of my belief for the portion of the Kaingaroa No 1 shown on the map from Captain Mair[,] Crown Agent. I received payment twice[,] once before the hearing [of Kaingaroa No 1] and again afterwards from Captain Mair.

Also in 1873, the Government’s agent, Henry Mitchell, began negotiating a lease with Ngati Rangitihiri for land later given title as Kaingaroa 1, and on 1 December, at Matata, he paid £100 deposit to unnamed rangatira of the kin group. In 1874, however, Mair negotiated the lease of some Kaingaroa 1 land from Ngati Manawa. He met with them in May and they drew up the boundaries of some reserves to be set aside from the lease (as well as undertaking a census of the kin group). The area of the land leased was given as 136,000 acres, and the annual rental was to be £250, with Mair paying a deposit of £400. Mair seems to have been offered the lease by Peraniko Te Hura, as compensation...
for his having missed out on a lease on Kuhawaea, but the deal was not universally approved by Ngati Manawa. And in a newspaper article, JA Wilson, a native land purchase officer, accused Mair of bribing Ngati Rangitihi so that the boundary of the Kaingaroa 1 lease could be extended as far as Ruawahia. Mair would write in an 1878 memorandum that he later ‘gave up [his] interest in favour of the Crown’.

The transfer of the lease to the Crown, evidently promised by Mair in June 1874, was formalised on 28 January 1875, and was signed by 89 signatories for Ngati Manawa. The Crown was to pay £250 a year for the first 20 years, and £300 a year for the final 10 years. Under the terms of the lease, the money could be paid to any of the signatories. It was also written into the lease that if the surveyed area proved to be less than the estimated 136,000 acres, then the rental would be correspondingly reduced. The lease stipulated the reserves that were to be set aside for Ngati Manawa, one of which may have been for a school.

Following the signing of the lease, the Crown appears to have insisted on title investigation before paying any regular rentals – a process which of course would necessitate reinstating the Native Land Court, then suspended in the region. A payment was made to Ngati Manawa in February 1875 for Kaingaroa 1 and Heruiwi, but this seems, rather, to have been an advance to meet survey costs. In July 1875, CO Davis and Henry Mitchell reported to the Under-Secretary of the Native Department:

At Te Awa o Te Atua, numerous meetings were held with Wiremu Keapa Te Rangipuawhe [Tuhourangi/Ngati Hinewai], Te Wikiriwhi Te Tuahu [Tuhourangi], Arama Karaka [Ngati Hape/Ngati Rangitihi], and other influential chiefs, together with their people. The subjects put before the meetings were the leases of Kaingaroa and Rerewhakaitu, and it was agreed that a day should be fixed by consent of Government for the investigation of title, to insure the validity of leases.

Mr Stirling observes that these leaders came from kin groups on the western, rather than the eastern, side of Kaingaroa. Also in 1875, and after the formalisation of the Kaingaroa lease, ‘two large meetings’ (according to Mair) were held at Galatea to discuss the boundaries of the block. Henare Ngakete of Ngati Hinewai was evidently there both times and was later to comment that ‘the general boundary of this land [Kaingaroa 1] was discussed but without any result on either occasion’. Hiriwetere of Ngati Awa, Hare Matenga of Ngati Tahu, and Morihi of Ngati Hinewai (Mair’s statement of affiliations) also attended and voiced objections, but ‘their objections were not persisted in’. Mair states that the Government ‘paid [Ngati Manawa] £250 on these boundaries, £100 of which they divided amongst their visitors’. Mair’s notes indicate that Rangiheuea, and Arama Karaka of Ngati Hape and Ngati Rangitihi, attended at least one of the meetings. News of the payment clearly circulated around the district. Niheta Kaipara of Ngati Hape was later to comment: ‘I heard that Ngatimanawa received £250 on acc’t of this Block’. He further went on to observe: ‘In the time of our forefathers there was no dispute between us and Ngathinewai but since money has been paid by Government disputes have arisen.’

There is also reference to a meeting at Parawai where ‘the whole of Kaingaroa No 1 was talked about’ and where money was distributed. Sums particularly noted were the £3 given to Ngati Hinewai and £5 to Arama Karaka. Then in May 1876 Crown purchase officers attended a hui of Rangitaiki people at Te Umuika, inland from Matata, on the Tarawera River, which included around 300 people from Tuhoe, Ngati Awa, Ngati Pukeko, Te Patuwai, and Te Arawa. Crown negotiations in the Rangitaiki and Kaingaroa were apparently discussed, including matters relating to Kaingaroa 1. JC Young reported afterwards that the ‘general feeling was in favor of surveying and completing the titles to blocks which the Government have arranged to lease.’ (This may have been the meeting at ‘Umuika’ that Peraniko Te Hura later referred to in court, which Mair had apparently attended (although Peraniko himself had not), and at which boundary matters had been discussed.)

There is also reference to a hui involving ‘many tribes’ that took place at Waikarikari (elsewhere written ‘Waikaiwari’),
but we have no date for the meeting. Hiriwetere of Nga Maihi said it was one of three meetings that had been held to discuss the Kaingaroa boundaries. Ngati Haka Patuheheuhue leaders (including Mehaka Tokopounamu) were among those who attended and, during the meeting, Te Mauparaoa of Ngati Manawa disputed their claim to the northern part of Kaingaroa.26

A further hui appears to have taken place at Kokohinau, Te Teko, called by Te Rangitukehu of Ngati Awa, to which Ngati Manawa, Ngati Hamua, Ngati Whare, and Ngati Pukeko were also invited. This hui also discussed boundaries, including the boundary of Kaingaroa 1.27 Again, the evidence does not give us a date. We only know that it was before the title investigation.

**Survey**

As noted above, Ngahuruhuru Perarika of Ngati Whaoa had, in 1873, negotiated a lease with the Crown, which included the south-west corner of what would become Kaingaroa 1. He later recalled that:

> A meeting was subsequently held at Paeroa to fix boundaries of the land which I had leased to Government[,] letters were sent to Mair and Mitchell from Ngatiwhaoa and Ngatitahu inviting them to attend this meeting[,] the proceedings of that meeting were published in the Waaka Maori. The whole of the Arawa objected to Kaingaroa No 1 being surveyed. Shortly afterwards the government wished the land to be surveyed, and consequently Mitchell & I went there and camped in the evening at Paharakeke. I said to my friend let us take up our station at Wairapukau [sic] from there to Pokapoka[,] and another was between the two places[,] and another Ahiwhakamura. Mr Mitchell said let us have one station between Paharakeke and Ahiwhakamura. I said perhaps the line might be objected to by some people after us. Mr Mitchell then said[:] when will the survey between these two places take place[?] I replied[:] when the whole of the Arawa agree. Afterwards I heard of the survey having been made of the boundary between these two places. I objected to this because the Arawa chiefs had not been informed and also personally because my boundary between Wairapukau to Ahiwhakamura not being arranged.28

This may be the survey that Mr Stirling mentions as having taken place in April and May 1875, when a surveyor was sent to Paeroa to consult with Ngati Tahu and Ngati Whaoa about surveying Kaingaroa 1. Mr Stirling surmises that it related to the stretch of boundary between Kaingaroa 1 and Kaingaroa 2.29 That does not, however, fit evidence from the minute books. Wetini of Ngati Tahu said that ‘Morihia conducted the survey between K. No.1 & K. No.2’.30 And Morihia of Ngati Hinewai did indeed refer to a meeting at Paeroa, after the Galatea meetings, but said it was to decide a boundary variously spelled as ‘Putauaiki’ and ‘Putaiki’, and the boundary markers mentioned do not correspond with its being a line between Kaingaroa 1 and Kaingaroa 2. Rather they appear to designate an area to the west of Paeroa East, roughly corresponding to Rotomahana–Parekarangi.31 Peraniko Te Hura of Ngati Manawa also mentioned a meeting at Paeroa about the ‘boundary of Putauaiki’.32 On another occasion Te Hura recalled that:

> N’Tahu never had a meeting at Paeroa but the N’Whaoa [did?] to discuss the boundaries of the Kaingaroa No 1 Block. N’Tahu & N’Manawa were present by invitations of N’Whaoa. The tribes who were present at the meeting were N’Manawa, N’Tahu, N’Rangitihi, Tuhourangi, N’Tu, N’Whakaue & N’Hinewai. I was present myself and N’Whaoa supplied us with the food (Takerei). I do not know Takerei’s connection with N’Tahu. The Government Officers who were present at the meeting were Messrs JC Young, CO Davis, & Mitchell. Kaingaroa No 1 and Paeroa East was discussed at the meeting.33

He went on to report that ‘Tuhourangi laid down a boundary at the Paeroa meeting on this and other blocks’, which would accord with comments about the Putaiki being involved.34
Irrespective of any survey negotiations with western and northern Kaingaroa iwi and hapu, however, Dr Ballara notes that ‘[a]dvances were being paid to Ngati Manawa to meet survey costs as early as February 1875’.35

In 1877, Mair was instructed to assist in the erection of the trig stations that would be necessary for the surveying of the Kaingaroa (and other) blocks. However, there was opposition to this work from various kin groups in the area, including Ngati Tahu.36 Patuheuheu, too, voiced objections about a trig station on ‘Paratiemi’.37 On 14 December 1877, Mair arranged for a surveyor named Reay to make a start on the Kaingaroa survey, but the work was stopped by Ngati Manawa.38 It appears to have resumed, only to be stopped again in January 1878 – this time by Ngati Whakaue, Ngati Whaoa and Ngati Tahu – but was finally forced through.39

Afterwards, during the hearing for Kaingaroa 1, Niheta Kaipara of Ngati Hape, cross-examined by Kamareira of Ngati Tahu, said:

This block was surveyed by Ngatimanawa excepting the south west boundary line which is [the] boundary line of Kaingaroa No 2. Ngatitahu surveyed this line. It was surveyed this year [1878] (that is Kaingaroa No 1). I can't say when your survey was made. I did not agree to Wairapukau being the boundary between the Kaingaroa No 1 Block & No 2 Block. The northern & western boundaries of this Block are ancestral. I know of an ancestral boundary running North & South through the centre of the Block.40

In 1882, Kamareira would assert that ‘[his] survey of Kaingaroa No 1 [was] the first and the correct one’, and he commented that 'Captain George's lease expired before the survey of Kaingaroa No 1[,] he having died.':41

As surveyed, the Kaingaroa 1 block was over 114,000 acres.42

### Title Investigation

A block named Kaingaroa 1 first came before the Native Land Court at Oruanui, Taupo on 28 October 1867 (as did another block named Kaingaroa 2). The judge was Judge Monro and Hakiriwi Purewa was the assessor. This, however, was the land that had been leased to Josiah Firth and therefore probably not the land that would later become known as Kaingaroa 1. Judge Monro declined to issue a title, partly because many claimants were absent and partly because he anticipated problems with surveying.43

On 6 April 1868, there is again reference to Kaingaroa 1 being brought before the court at Oruanui. However, Te Kahuwhara said he wished the claim to be dismissed ‘as there was no likelihood of the land being surveyed at present’. Judge Monro obliged.44

A Kaingaroa block (without a number this time) again came before the court in 1869 but Mr Stirling thinks that this land was the same or similar to that brought in 1867. The hearing was at first adjourned in favour of another block investigation, and then abandoned because of the approach of Te Kooti and his force.45

On 9 March 1878, the title investigation of Kaingaroa 1 proper was gazetted to be heard at Galatea at an unspecified date (although wrongly described in the first instance as ‘Kaingaroa No. 2’, which had to be corrected in a later Gazette).46 Under ‘Name of Claimant’ the notice gave a long list of names beginning with Peraniko Parakiri and ending ‘and others.’47 Niheta Kaipara of Ngati Hape would later comment during hearing: ‘I was not one of the applicants for the investigation of this land. The application was written at Galatea & this is why my name did not appear in the list’. Rather, ‘Peraniko and Hare Hare made out the application for the hearing’ and ‘A Karaka, Poia & others consented to it’.48

The court in fact convened at Opotiki, on 28 June 1878, but was immediately adjourned to 12 July at Matata where it commenced by hearing other blocks. The hearing of Kaingaroa 1 commenced on 31 July 1878, immediately after the hearing of Waiohau. The case was heard by Judge Halse and the assessor was Karaka Ngatiparu.49 Taken together...
with part of the rehearing of Kaingaroa 2, and hearings of Karamuramu, Pukahunui, Heruiwi and Waiohau, the entire proceedings ran for nearly three months (from late June to the third week in September) – and this in the middle of winter.\[^50\] At more than one point, the court needed to adjourn 'to allow the people to obtain food'.\[^51\] Indeed, on 13 August 1878 the clerk recorded:

> At the general request of all the Natives the Court adjourned until next day for them to obtain food. They stated that there was hardly any to be obtained and were suffering considerable inconvenience.\[^52\]

The next day, Mauparaoa of Ngati Manawa asked the court for some relief: ‘as the Government brought them to Matata & as the food of Rangitihi (resident natives) was exhausted they should receive some assistance & would make application to the Court every day’. The court ‘admitted the force of their argument & said the District Officer would report their condition to the Government without delay’.\[^53\]

Ngati Haka Patuheuheu as such did not participate, although Mehaka Tokopounamu was present and gave evidence for Ngati Manawa (on the basis of his descent from Tangiharuru).\[^54\] According to a 1897 petition, Ngati Haka Patuheuheu said they had come to a prior agreement with Ngati Manawa whereby they would not object to the latter’s application with respect to the Kuhawaea block, on the understanding that Ngati Manawa would ensure the inclusion of Ngati Haka Patuheuheu on the resulting ownership list.\[^55\] Similar agreements are said to have been in place with respect to the Kaingaroa land.\[^56\]

Paora Pomare led the case for Ngati Manawa and called seven witnesses. Mr Stirling says that two were of Ngai Tuhoe (Makarini Waiari and Tamaikoha).\[^57\] We have, however, already noted above that a third witness (Mehaka Tokopounamu) had Ngai Tuhoe connections, being of Ngati Haka Patuheuheu as well as Ngati Manawa. Indeed, he introduced himself by saying ‘I belong to Tuhoe’.\[^58\]

In addition, there were counter-claimants present from Ngati Hape (3 names), the Pahipoto (4 names) and Tawera (3 names) hapu of Ngati Awa, Ngati Hinewai (5 names), Ngati Tahu (3 names), Ngati Whaoa (3 names), and Nga Maihi (also of Ngati Awa – 3 names). A Tuhourangi representative was likewise present but in the end resiled from making any Tuhourangi claim to the block. Although not listed on the first day of hearing, there was also a Tuwharetoa presence.\[^59\]

The minute book also notes that ‘Mr Mitchell appeared as Crown Agent to watch Crown interests’.\[^60\]

Each witness gave evidence about the basis on which his kin group claimed an interest in the land, which included take such as ancestry, conquest and marriage. In most cases the take also included resource usage. Ngati Hape, for example, mentioned a wide range of activities including fern cultivation, flax-gathering, gardens, birding areas and eeling places. Ngati Tahu and Ngati Whaoa both cited similar activities, including catching cats, birds and (later) pigs.\[^61\] There was constant reference to differences between ‘the eastern side of the block’ and ‘the western side of the block’. Niheta Kaipara, for instance, commented that ‘Ngatihape are not going on the Western side in search of food at the present time, but they occupy the eastern portion’.\[^62\] Hakopa Takapou of Ngati Rangitihi, and appearing for Ngati Hinewai, commented that ‘The Western portion is poor land’.\[^63\] A number of witnesses mentioned an old traditional boundary down the middle of the block, which they referred to as a ‘central’ or ‘middle’ boundary, and most ascribed the laying down of it to Ngatoroirangi and Maaka.\[^64\]

On 9 August, Niheta Kaipara announced that he and Arama Karaka (both of Ngati Hape) ‘withdrew all further opposition’, and Peraniko (Ngati Manawa) then stated that ‘he would admit them in Kaingaroa No 2 and also in this Block’.\[^65\]

On Wednesday 11 September, the counter-claimants began summing up their cases, followed later by the claimants. This appears to have taken the whole of that day and possibly the next two days as well, but the minute book records nothing of the information given. For the Wednesday, it merely lists the names of the speakers and the kin groups for whom
they were appearing and, in one or two cases, the length of time for which they spoke. Henare Ngakete, for example, ‘addressed the court for Ngati Hinewai (1 hour and 20 minutes)’. For the other days, there is even less information. On the Thursday the court opened at 10.00 am but no finishing time is indicated and the minute book simply records: ‘Mauparaoa (contd address)’. For the Friday, the minute book notes nothing of what went on – only that the court opened at 10.00 am and ‘Present the same’. We can assume, however, that the hearing was still related to Kaingaroa 1 since the minute book does not indicate that the court had shifted its attention to another block. Not till Saturday 14 September does it record that the court was moving on to consider Kaingaroa 2.

The judge issued his decision on Kaingaroa 1 on Tuesday 17 September 1878. He first outlined the areas claimed by the different kin groups:

- Ngati Hinewai and Ngati Tuwharetoa claimed about half the block [on the western side];
- Ngati Whaoa claimed a triangular area in the south-west;
- Ngati Tahu claimed a larger piece in the south-west; and
- Ngati Awa and Nga Maihi claimed in the northern part.

He found that Ngati Hinewai, Ngati Whaoa and Ngati Tuwharetoa had all failed to establish a claim. Ngati Tahu’s claim was said to be ‘unsupported by occupation’ so was ‘not admitted by the court’. Ngati Awa and Nga Maihi’s claims were also rejected. Title was awarded to Ngati Manawa, who had ‘fully established [their claim] to the satisfaction of the Court.’ Even assertions of occupation, though, did not necessarily guarantee success:

- Ngati Hinewai base their claim through ancestry, conquest, and occupation, but have failed to establish a claim.
- NgatiWhaoa base their claim through ancestry and occupation, but the Court does not consider that they have established their claim.

Likewise:

- Ngatihinewai base their claim through ancestry, conquest, and occupation, but have failed to establish a claim.
- Ngatituwharetoa base their claim through ancestors, also through catching birds, rats and pigs on this land. Evidence of occupation – there is none whatever. The Court does not consider that they have established their claim.

The verdict on Ngati Awa and Nga Maihi, for its part, was particularly interesting. The judge noted that they base their claim through

1st Ancestors;
2nd Subdivision of the land by ancestors;
3rd Having received money from the Government;
4th Conquest.

Not one of these claims is sustained by the evidence.

It appears that the judge did make reference to resource use in his summing up, but obviously regarded it as insufficient to establish a claim if there was not also occupation. For instance, the minute book records:

- Ngatihinewai base their claim through ancestors who obtained food consisting of rats and birds from this piece of land. The claim is unsupported by occupation and is not admitted by the Court.

Similarly:

- Ngatituwharetoa base their claim through ancestors, also through catching birds, rats and pigs on this land. Evidence of occupation – there is none whatever. The Court does not consider that they have established their claim.

We see this as having potentially disadvantaged groups claimant into the western side of the block, which has been variously described as ‘the most barren portion’ and ‘largely unfertile and unproductive and, therefore, not necessarily ideal for permanent occupation.’

Resource use rights had in many cases been described, but they seem to have been regarded as a lesser claim. We see this as having potentially disadvantaged groups claimant into the western side of the block, which has been variously described as ‘the most barren portion’ and ‘largely unfertile and unproductive and, therefore, not necessarily ideal for permanent occupation.’

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We see this as having potentially disadvantaged groups claimant into the western side of the block, which has been variously described as ‘the most barren portion’ and ‘largely unfertile and unproductive and, therefore, not necessarily ideal for permanent occupation.’
The Court's decision was ‘that the Kaingaroa No.1 Block as shewn on the plan belongs to the descendants of Tangiharuru and Apa, who are living on it, including Arama Karaka Mokonuiarangi, Niheta Kaipara, Huta Tangihia, and Poia Ririapu’ (emphasis added).71

With reference to the boundary, Judge Halse commented in his decision that, had the line continued all the way down the Ngatamawahine Stream to where it met with the Rangitaiki River, the boundary would have had the appearance of an ancestral one, ‘but as it stands the line appears to be a recent arrangement’.72 This observation tends to give credence to prior arrangements having been made about what was to be included on the title and what was not. Mehaka Tokopounamu, for example, was later to explain that the boundary of Kaingaroa 1, as drawn up, had explicitly excluded those interests of Ngati Haka Patuheuheu over which he had authority because ‘we had no desire at that time to sell the land’. However, he said, ‘N’Manawa put us into the Crown Grant of Kaingaroa No 1 of their own free will [-] we had no right on it.’73 Ngati Manawa’s Apiro Nikotedahura, for his part, said that some Ngati Haka Patuheuheu interests were not included in Kaingaroa 1 because Mehaka and Wi Patene ‘were displeased at Aperaniko and myself and they wished this piece to be left out, and also for the reason that they had already received money from the Government for it’. Ms Rose thinks Ngati Haka Patuheuheu may have wished to keep their negotiations separate from those of Ngati Manawa, so had their interests incorporated into a different block.74 Dr Ballara makes other observations. She notes that ‘Te Patuheuheu, Ngati Haka and Ngati Hamua made no overt claim to the block’ but, rather, that ‘it was left to various witnesses from other hapu to state their interests, and their own chief, Mehaka Tokopounamu, supported the Ngati Manawa claim’. Less than a month after the judgment, she notes, Peraniko Te Hura and Mauparaoa Manuka telegraphed to Mitchell asking for a £100 advance on the block, the request being made in the name of Ngati Manawa, Ngati Whare, Ngati Apa, Te Patuheuheu and Ngati Hineuru. Dr Ballara concludes from this that these other hapu had merged their claims with those of Ngati Manawa.75

However, for Dr Ballara, ‘perhaps the oddest thing’ about the judgment was that:

the principal claimant, Peraniko Te Hura of Ngati Manawa, admitted the interests of Ngati Rangitihi’s principal chief and gave testimony about his distribution of moneys to Ngati Rangitihi, Ngati Hinewai and others, but that the testimony of the principal claimant was ignored by the judge.76 [Emphasis added.]

Ownership List

The ownership list took some time to finalise. Ngati Manawa presented a list of over 300 people, and Niheta Kaipara of Ngati Hape sought to include 103 further names.77 The length of Ngati Manawa’s list supports the contention that they tried to include people from other kin groups, since Gilbert Mair’s census of 1874 had returned a population of only 123 people for Ngati Manawa, and a 1878 census suggested an even lower total of 61.78

On 30 May 1879, a hui was held at Karatia (Galatea) to try and resolve the issue of the lists. It was called by Ngati Manawa and attended by Ngati Apa, Warahoe, Ngati Hineuru, Ngati Whare, Patuheuheu, and Hamua to ‘consider an arrangement for the Native Lands Court’ with respect to Kaingaroa 1 and 2.79 None of these kin groups had been specifically represented at the hearing of either block, which again suggests that Ngati Manawa’s original list for Kaingaroa 1 was intended to cover more than just themselves.80

Further evidence that Ngati Manawa’s claim was on behalf of others as well is provided by their request for an advance on the purchase payment for the block. Immediately after the 1878 hearing, they asked for a £100 advance on behalf of themselves, Ngati Whare, Ngati Apa, Te Patuheuheu, and Ngati Hineuru. This suggests that the
other kin groups also had interests in the land – as well as confirming that they saw alienation to the Crown as a foregone conclusion. Mr Stirling suggests that one reason for the other groups not wanting to participate in the Native Land Court hearing was their support for Te Whitu Tekau (although he adds that Te Whitu Tekau also opposed land sales, implying that that should theoretically have militated against those groups’ acceptance of any proceeds from alienation).81

By mid-July 1879, Ngati Hineuru’s position on the alienation had become less clear. On the one hand, they wrote letters to the Premier and the Native Minister protesting against the sale of Kaingaroa 1 (and more particularly 2), while on the other, according to Mitchell, they had, on exactly the same day, signed a document assenting to the sale of the number 1 block.82 Either way, however, they clearly regarded themselves as having ownership rights in the block.

On 24 September 1879, a list of names was finally ‘acceded to by Ngatimanawa and accepted by the Court’. However, the court minute book records that two lists were read out: ‘List of names read as well as the list of names leased by the Government’.83 In a later (1926) inquiry held as a result of a petition over Kaingaroa 1, William Bird, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would assert:

Read – one list contained 360 & one 31 names . . . Order only showed 31 names – names on o’ list 360 not shown.
List of 360 in handwriting of Natives – 31 list in Capt. Mair’s handwriting.84

Harehare Atarea was also at the 1926 inquiry, and was by then the only surviving grantee of the block. His statement corroborated the evidence of Bird: he maintained that ‘[i]t was “Tawa” (Capt. Mair) who handed in [the] list of 31 owners, and he added that the list was ’not completed by elders of N’Manawa’.85 The judge, however, later ruled that the assertion about the list being in Mair’s handwriting was erroneous.86 (Mair himself commented disapprovingly in his diary at the time about the attempt of Niheta Kaipara of Ngati Hape to add further names; he ‘tried to insert 103 of his own people’.)87

At the same inquiry, Mr Darby, for the Crown, admitted that blocks were ‘often . . . investigated for [the] purpose of sale’ and that ‘to facilitate such sale numbers put into [the] title were kept to a minimum – representatives only being included’. He asserted that ‘[p]ersons in M/O are N’Manawa only’ and ‘[m]oney paid to N’Manawa only’.88 Analysis suggests that in fact a number of those named did have links to groups other than Ngati Manawa, but the associations were not made explicit on the list as recorded by the court at the time. None of those named, though, appears to have had a close connection with any kin groups from the west such as Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Tahu, or Ngati Whaoa.89 Rather, the connections were almost exclusively with kin groups associated with the eastern sides of the block. Three of those listed, for example, had appeared in court on behalf of Ngati Hape. Niheta Kaipara, who gave evidence for the Ngati Hape claim, identified with both Ngati Rangitihi and Ngati Manawa. (For the Ngati Hape take, see evidence of Niheta Kaipara (their ‘counsel’), and his cross-examination, Opotiki minute book 1, pp 118–134.) Mr Stirling attributes the withdrawal of their claim, during proceedings, to their having come to an agreement with Ngati Manawa about being included on the list and, as we have noted above, this understanding was in fact subsequently recorded in court.90 Also listed were two Ngati Haka Patuheuheu chiefs, Mehaka Tokopounamu and Wi Patene Tarahanga. As earlier noted, the former had identified himself in court as being of Tuhoe, but had given evidence for Ngati Manawa.91 And at least two (Hamiora Potakurua and Hapurona Kohi) were of Ngati Whare.92 Perarika Ngahuruhuru of Ngati Whaoa would later state: ‘My name was not put in the Certificate for Kaingaroa No 1 by my own wish[,] being arranged with Peraniko Te Peretini.’93
Rehearing

Most of the counter-claimants at the original hearing soon requested a rehearing. Applications were lodged by Ngati Hinewai, Ngati Whaoa, Ngati Awa ‘and all the tribes of the Arawas’; and Ngati Hinewai, Ngati Awa, Ngati Whaoa, and Ngati Tahu combined. Ngati Manawa asked that the rehearing take place at Galatea.

Among the complaints were the court’s failure to make clear the basis of its decision on Ngati Hinewai’s claim, and the role of Gilbert Mair who, it seems, had been present ‘at all times’ during the hearing. Ngati Hinewai objected to the judge’s decision on the grounds that:

With reference to the ancestors, it is not clear – With reference to the Ancient permanent boundaries, it was not clear – With reference to the directions of the Ancestors in pointing out the land it was not clear – The cultivation of and occupation of the land was not considered.

As to Mair’s role, they clearly felt that the nature of his involvement had been highly questionable:

The District Officer backed up the claim of the people in whose favour the decision was given; we and some of the other opposing tribes strongly urged upon the Court to disallow the partiality shewn by that District Officer Captain Mair, but the Judge Mr Halse did not consent to Captain Mair’s removal but retained him to assist him with respect to some of the evidence adduced in that case.

Ngati Awa, for their part, indicated they had simply been unable to get to the court in time for the hearing of their case.

The applications were used by Government officials as an opportunity to have fresh surveys carried out, extending these into adjacent lands where surveys had previously been resisted. Included in the work were additional surveys of the land on the western side of Kaingaroa.

To facilitate the surveying, Mitchell set out to meet with some of the tribes to urge that boundary issues be brought to the court for resolution rather than disputed on the ground:

On the 4th of January last [1879] we . . . started on a mission amongst the tribes of Matata, Te Teko, Kokohinau, Te Waiohau & Galatea, announcing His Excellency’s assent to the Re-hearing of the Kaingaroa No.1 Block (to take place before September 1879) and the advisability of taking the opportunity they now had of bringing their various claims before the Court with maps derived from actual survey shewing their ancestral boundaries, kaingas, cultivations, & burial places &c. Kepa [Te Rangipuawhe] explained that each hapu in agreeing to have their boundaries surveyed should allow any other hapus lines to be surveyed even altho overlapping into each other – and to leave all disputings over boundary lines to be settled in and by the Court instead of obstructing and fighting with each other on the ground.

Also in 1879, Ngati Manawa telegraphed the Native Minister, John Sheehan, about the location of the rehearing:

Your word to us at Wellington was that Karatia [Galatea] was to be the place where the court for Kaingaroa No.1 & Kaingaroa No.2 should sit. Now Mr Mitchell says that Matata is the place where the Court will sit for Kaingaroa No.1 & Kaingaroa No.2. We told him that from you was the word to us. Allow these courts to be held at Karatia. We have food for the tribes. We also have houses for any number of persons.

Mitchell, however, advised the Minister there was no suitable building at Galatea, it was too far from the telegraph, and it cost too much to get supplies there.

The rehearing opened in Matata on 22 October 1880, but was immediately adjourned to Whakatane on 25 October, owing to a lack of suitable accommodation for the judge and court officers. Hardly any Maori appeared at Whakatane on 25 and 26 October and it was reported that some of the witnesses were ill. On 27 October a further adjournment was requested, this time by the claimants,
until February 1881. Apart from illness, this may have been because there was apparently very little food for the claimants at Whakatane (unlike Matata, where food, they said, was plentiful). The judge (Symonds) declined the request. Further, he decided that ‘the eastern part [of Kaingaroa 1] not being disputed, the evidence must be confined to the western part’. Mr Stirling points out that this ignored a Ngati Awa claim in the north-east of the block.103

Present at the hearing, in addition to Ngati Manawa, were representatives from Ngati Hinewai, Ngati Tahu, and Ngati Awa. However, the Ngati Awa witness, Penetito Hawea, said that ‘his tribe would not oppose the claim of Ngatimanawa at this hearing’. On the Ngati Hinewai side, one of their main witnesses, Keepa Te Rangipuawhe, had not arrived when the hearing opened. Mair, who was evidently present in court, stated that ‘he had sent both telegram and letter to Keepa Te Rangipuawhe, so that he could not plead ignorance as an excuse for not being present’. The court decided nevertheless to proceed with the hearing and the judge indicated that ‘Hakopa must conduct the case of Ngatihinewai until the arrival of Kepa’.104 By Saturday 30 October, Te Rangipuawhe had still not appeared.105

The re-hearing lasted only a few days, and Mr Stirling notes that Te Rangipuawhe (who was of Tuhourangi as well as Ngati Hinewai) was reported ill and did not recover in time to attend.106

Many tribes argued that Ngati Manawa did not have mana in the western part of the block, but Peraniko Te Hura, for Ngati Manawa, was adamant that they did. He conceded, however, that the area contained no permanent kainga as it was ‘unfit for cultivation’ and was occupied only by wild pigs and horses ‘belonging to all tribes’.107

In delivering his decision, the judge reiterated his view that there was no dispute about the eastern portion of the block: ‘The portion of this block on the East of the boundary set by Ngatihinewai belongs unquestionably to Ngatimanawa’. However, he went on to say: ‘The evidence regarding the Western part is very perplexing and contradictory, yet the preponderance of that testimony is in favor of Ngatimanawa’. Nevertheless, he did rule that a portion in the south-west of the block should be excluded from the award to Ngati Manawa:

The Southwest portion, claimed by Ngatitahu, cannot in the opinion of the Court be arranged until Paeroa East is heard. Therefore the Court awards this Block [Kaingaroa 1] to Ngatimanawa, reserving that portion claimed by Ngatitahu to be settled hereafter.108

The latter area – a triangular portion of around 10,000 acres – was later heard along with Paeroa East, and became designated Kaingaroa 1A.

The block as finally awarded was surveyed at 104,479 acres 3 roods 38 perches, the portion claimed by Ngati Tahu having been adjourned.109

New Ownership List

Again there was disagreement over the list of names. Ngati Manawa tried to use the opportunity to expand the list to 120 names. Instead, the number of those named in the Memorial of Ownership, dated 4 November 1880, was further reduced to just 28 owners. Among those dropped were Hamiora Potakurua and Hapurona Kohi of Ngati Whare.110 The list of 28 names ‘in the re hearing order’ was in Gilbert Mair’s handwriting, with the exception of one name.111

Dr Ballara comments that ‘Henry Mitchell must have been relieved; the list of grantees included all those to whom he had been advancing money on the block’.112 Her analysis indicates that of those on the list ‘a large number’ were Ngati Manawa. Of the rest, she says:

those that can be identified included Wi Patene Tarahanga and Mehaka Tokopounamu of Te Patuheuheu/Ngati Haka, Hemi Te Whatanui of Ngati Hamua, Meihana Te Hiakai of Ngati Hineuru, Arawa Karaka Mokonuiarangi, Niheta Kaipara, Poia Te Ririapu and Huta Tangihia of Ngati Rangitihi/Ngati
Hinewai/Ngati Hape, and Rihara Kaimanawa, and Waretini Ngapapa (also of Ngati Rangitihi) and Nikora Te Tuhi of Ngati Hape.\textsuperscript{113}

When Arama Mokonuiarangi later complained about the size of his payout on the sale of the block, Mair wrote:

Ngatimanawa . . . explained that had they adhered to their first intention of putting 120 names in the Memorial Roll Arama's share would have been small indeed, that they reduced the list to 28 to enable govt. to obtain a title more easily.\textsuperscript{114}

The wording implies prime agency on the part of Ngati Manawa with respect to restricting the ownership list. However, as we have seen, the Crown freely admitted in later years that blocks were ‘often . . . investigated for [the] purpose of sale’ and that ‘to facilitate such sale numbers put into [the] title were kept to a minimum – representatives only being included.’\textsuperscript{115} Given Mair’s own close interest in the case, it seems most unlikely that the decision to limit the list was only, or even primarily, Ngati Manawa’s. In fact Mair noted in his diary that he had great difficulty keeping the number down to 28; and in a letter to Brabant he wrote that he reduced the Ngati Manawa list ‘to enable Govt. to obtain title more easily.’\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{Alienation}

The Crown’s interest in purchasing Kaingaroa 1 seems to have been apparent by 1877.\textsuperscript{117} At some point before the title investigation of 1878, Mitchell had already paid over some money to one of the owners. A witness at the title investigation recalled that Keeqa Te Rangipuawhe had received from Mitchell ‘£80 on account of the Western portion’, which had subsequently been distributed amongst Ngati Hinewai. The witness went on to state that ‘The money was a deposit on the western portion of this Block’. ‘Keeqa claimed land’, he said, ‘and Govt paid him for his claim.’\textsuperscript{118}

According to an annual return of native lands purchased, leased, or under negotiation by the Crown, the official commencement of negotiations for Kaingaroa 1 was notified in the \textit{Gazette} of 14 March 1878. The return includes reference to the purchase of 110,000 acres in the block, negotiated by Henry Mitchell. The amount paid on account is given as £700 6s 8d, with an additional sum of £255 17s 7d recorded as ‘Incidental.’\textsuperscript{119} In short, steps were being taken to convert the Crown lease to a purchase some months before the court commenced sitting in relation to the original title determination for the block.

By January 1879 (after the original hearing but before the first ownership list was finalised), Mitchell was already sending a request to the Paymaster General for ‘a fifth instalment’ of £150 to be paid on Kaingaroa 1. When the Auditor General’s Office queried whether consent had been obtained to buy, Mitchell responded that it had. An initialled minute in the Auditor General’s files queries both the legality and wisdom of that situation:

\begin{quote}
Such a purchase as this can hardly be legal and certainly could not be enforced. It contains elements not only of uncertainty in law but of dispute and discord with the native owners.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Following the rehearing, as we have seen, the list of owners stood at 28 names. The signatures of all 28 were obtained by the Crown between 4 December and 8 December 1880. The total purchase price was £7754 9s 7d, and the area alienated was 103,392 acres 3 roods 37 perches, which excluded Oruatewehi Bush, Rangipo 1 and Rangipo. The purchase was confirmed by the trust commissioner, T’M Haultain, on 26 April 1881, which thus became the official date of purchase.\textsuperscript{121}

Of the total purchase price, only £5650 was calculated as still owing at the time of alienation, since £2104 was reckoned as already consumed by advances. In the distribution of the cash Mair once again became involved, saying afterwards:‘I did all in my power to see a fair division made of the money, rather annoying the natives by my
interference’. His formula appears to have been based on tracing back to particular tupuna, with an emphasis being placed on male lines of descent. This resulted in some men with ‘five or six of the sixteen ancestors’ getting a large share, while others received considerably less.

**Subsequent protest**

In 1881, and despite the block having already been acquired by the Crown, Wi Keepa Te Rangipuawhe of Tuhourangi and Ngati Hinewai, who had missed the rehearing through illness, petitioned Parliament for a further rehearing. The Native Affairs Committee requested the view of Chief Judge Fenton. Although claiming to be speaking in a private capacity, Fenton agreed that Te Rangipuawhe’s allegations were ‘in the main correct’ and he told the committee:

> I remember hearing a great deal of talk with the Natives all about the country and the general opinion is the matter has not been heard in a satisfactory manner. My mind was never very comfortable about the case and I always hoped a day would come when a satisfactory hearing could take place.\(^{122}\)

When asked whether he recommended a rehearing ‘under proper conditions’, he responded: ‘I should be very glad to see Parliament take steps in that direction, no other authority can do so.’ (His latter comment referred to the fact that only Parliament could order a second rehearing, and it usually required special legislation.)\(^{123}\)

Despite Fenton’s endorsement, no rehearing was granted. The Native Department did propose a commission of inquiry, but the idea was quashed by the Native Minister, John Bryce. A further petition from Te Rangipuawhe in 1882 was also set aside.\(^{124}\)

In 1926, there was, however, an inquiry into Kaingaroa 1 following a petition lodged in 1924 by Wharehuia Heta of Ngati Manawa, and 38 others. The petitioners’ concerns related to the omission of a number of people from the ownership list at the time of the title determination, and that the block had been purchased by the Crown before the time allowed for filing applications for a rehearing had expired. They also claimed that the amount paid for the land did not represent fair value, and that certain reserves promised to Ngati Manawa had instead been retained by the Crown.\(^{125}\) The judge found against the petitioners on all points apart from the issue of Motumako reserve, which he considered should have been set aside for Ngati Manawa.\(^{126}\)

**Summary and Comment**

The 1878 hearing of Kaingaroa 1 was held in winter, far from the homes of the claimants and most of the counterclaimants, and the food supply was tenuous. Distance was also a problem for many at the 1879 rehearing, and again there were issues over food.

In the determination of title, Maori in the west of the block were disadvantaged because the court appeared to place an overriding emphasis on occupation. Maori in the east of the block (other than Ngati Manawa) were disadvantaged because the court failed to take account of out-of-court agreements.

Mair’s role in the proceedings was questionable, as was Mitchell’s. Large sums of money were being paid out before the title determination was completed and the list of owners finalised. In the Auditor General’s own words:

> Such a purchase as this can hardly be legal and certainly could not be enforced. It contains elements not only of uncertainty in law but of dispute and discord with the native owners.\(^ {127}\)

In Dr Ballara’s damning estimation:

> Kaingaroa No.1 demonstrates many of the aspects of the Land Court and land purchasing process that mark them as unsatisfactory, improper, even fraudulent processes which damaged the customary interests, the economic base, the livelihood, and the social cohesion of all the hapu involved.\(^ {128}\)

We cannot help but concur.
Notes
3. Whakatane minute book 1, p 7
6. Whakatane minute book 2, p 110
9. Ibid, p 160
11. Ibid, p 179
15. Ibid, p 167
16. Ibid, pp 160–1, 167
17. Ibid, p 169
19. C. O Davis and Henry Mitchell to Under Secretary, Native Department, 10 July 1875; AJHR, 1875, C-44a, p 4
22. Opotiki minute book 1, pp 124, 130. As will be recalled from chapter 2, Ngati Hinewai are associated with Ngati Rangitihi. However, they also have a strong link with Ngati Whaoa in that their eponymous ancestor Hinewai was the mother of Whaoa. Ngati Hape have strong links to both Ngati Rangitihi and Ngati Manawa.
23. Opotiki minute book 1, p 140
25. Opotiki minute book 1, p 200
30. Whakatane minute book 1, p 8
31. Opotiki minute book 1, p 150
32. Whakatane minute book 1, p 5
33. Whakatane minute book 2, p 51
34. Ibid, p 52
38. Ibid, p 172
40. Opotiki minute book 1, p 133
41. Whakatane minute book 2, p 47
44. Taupo minute book 1, p 15
47. New Zealand Gazette 1878, no 20, p 281
48. Opotiki minute book 1, p 127
49. Kaingaroa 1 Block History, LHAD Data (CD), 2005 (doc 144), p 2; Peter McBurney, ‘Ngati Manawa and the Crown 1840–1927’, report commissioned by CFRT on behalf of the claimants, March 2004 (doc A37), p 199; Opotiki minute book 1, p 70.
51. Ibid, p 139
52. Ibid, p 141
53. Ibid, p 142
58. Ibid, p 28
60. Opotiki minute book 1, p 116
62. Opotiki minute book 1, p 130
63. Ibid, p 138
64. See, for example, ibid, pp 137, 139, 141, 145, 149, 150, 181, 187
65. Ibid, pp 134–135
66. Ibid, pp 203–205
67. Bruce Stirling, ‘Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa’, report commissioned by CFRT, April 2005 (doc G17), p 29 Details of the various claims, as summarised by the Court, may be found in Opotiki minute book 1, p 207
68. Ibid, pp 29–30; Opotiki minute book 1, p 208
71. Opotiki minute book 1, p 208
74. Ibid
75. Angela Ballara, ‘Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts’, report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 730
76. Ibid, p 730
82. Angela Ballara, ‘Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts’, report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), pp 734–735
83. Opotiki minute book 1, p 249
84. Rotorua minute book 77, p 144
85. Ibid, p 150
89. Bruce Stirling, ‘Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa’, report commissioned by CFRT, April 2005 (doc G17), p 33


92. Bruce Stirling, 'Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa', report commissioned by CFRT, April 2005 (doc G17), p 42; see also pp 32–33. We note that Mr McBurney has made suggestions as to tribal affiliations of those named in the memorial of ownership, variously Ngati Manawa (ten), Ngati Rangitīhia/Ngati Hape (four), Ngati Whare (four, possibly five), Patuheuheu/Ngati Haka (three), Tuhoe (one); his suggested affiliations thus relate to 22 of the 31 people named in the memorial of ownership. Peter McBurney, 'Ngati Manawa and the Crown 1840–1927', report commissioned by CFRT, March 2004 (doc A37), pp 214–215. Mr Stirling expresses some caution about assigning affiliations, given that those claiming rights in a block might rely on descent lines particular to the origins of those rights. As always, a range of considerations were important to those claiming rights in various lands.

93. Whakatane minute book 2, p 111


95. Bruce Stirling, 'Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa', report commissioned by CFRT, April 2005 (doc G17), p 34

96. Angela Ballara, 'Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 731; Bruce Stirling, 'Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 731; Bruce Stirling, 'Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 731; Rotorua minute book 77, p 145

97. Angela Ballara, 'Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 731


100. Angela Ballara, 'Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), pp 732–733


102. Angela Ballara, 'Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 592


104. Whakatane minute book 1, p 3

105. Ibid, p 18

106. Bruce Stirling, 'Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa', report commissioned by CFRT, April 2005 (doc G17), pp 34, 44


108. Bruce Stirling, 'Nineteenth Century Land Interests in Kaingaroa', report commissioned by CFRT, April 2005 (doc G17), pp 40–41; Whakatane minute book 1 p 26


111. Peter McBurney, 'Ngati Manawa and the Crown 1840–1927', report commissioned by CFRT on behalf of the claimants, March 2004 (doc A37), p 480

112. Angela Ballara, 'Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 738

113. Ibid, p 739

114. Ibid, p 741

115. Rotorua minute book 77, p 154; Peter McBurney, 'Ngati Manawa and the Crown 1840–1927', report commissioned by CFRT on behalf of the claimants, March 2004 (doc A37), 472


118. Opotiki minute book 1, pp 138–139

119. AJHR, 1879, c-4, p 13

120. Angela Ballara, 'Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts', report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 734

121. Kaingaroa 1 Block History, LHAD Data (CD), 29 July 2005 (doc 144), p 14.
124. Ibid, p 45
126. Ibid, p 483
127. Auditor General, 28 April 1879, Minutes on voucher for fifth payment on account of Kaingaroa No 1, MA 1, 1892/1219, Archives New Zealand, Wellington, cited in Angela Ballara, ‘Tribal Landscape Overview, c1800–c1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National Park Inquiry Districts’, report commissioned by CFRT, September 2004 (doc A65), p 734