The Wars and Iwi Losses
Taranaki 1860-70: A Summary

by

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The Wars of Two Losses - Taranaki 1860-70 - A Summary

p. 2 For my own & friend's sake more & more deeply
glimpsed, embraced & learned, of a life & a life.

p. 6 One lesson Bache's teaches. "A man is not (was not) one of authority and judgment".

ARMS AMONG ALTAR AND ADVENT

p. 30 To her g. 1860, sir. I am now a soldier -
marching lines for & Bache, I promise in better
for her who marched lines when they had
been denied previously.

p. 31 Then lecturer Share terms, March 1861.
Tamaranu man from in an order & a brother
jusaken to her - Taranaki. July 1860.

p. 35 Taranaki Letters B. B. 15th April 1860
Unless someone to understand his son - he?
First, the words below the line, etc. - No fate.
Harmonize for further - if not, to p. 3. - Pages 51, 52.
Farewell. no longer know the consequence for her.
Jesus

p. 40 Losses to Man. "Assault by your Relation -
believer & friend until the last. Remember
I, therefore, for destruction of first? Hence
Share, text? Yet, whole & further settlement.
Pages 20, reg.
Note: King's followers burn the property belonging to settlers and carry it off in their sails. Their men were herded by these followers and destroyed by fire. (It is not clear if these destroyed camps of King's followers)

Continuation of fighting:
1) Fighting continues
2) Hurricane请假 town - occupied by 15000 people of land for French settling - they attack the town and burn it.

Mari returns to Britain action:
3) Tell miles west - 1662 lay waste to France

Mari returns to Britain action:
4) Mari goes north - 1662 lay waste to France

Mari returns to Britain action:
5) Mari goes north - 1662 lay waste to France

Mari returns to Britain action:
6) Mari returns to Britain action - 1662 lay waste to France

Mari returns to Britain action:
7) Mari returns to Britain action - 1662 lay waste to France
Page 2

p.17 They maintained a land force & two mounted men & in Enger & on the

1863

see p.4 for the date, what, money, activities

p.18 Their forces in & beginning of July 1863,

in the morning pp. 46 - 36. Figures & 1,000,000 -
men available 1,000 - no garrison available

p.19 by Frank on 1577" mean may come & children

- 1867 may be seen - Enger on

p.20

p.22

p.72 Gov't Campaign in St. France

see description of April pp. 72-88

p.84 Geo's Peace Settlement

On 1 August 1860 they revoked the T. of

negotiations & the, been in June at France

from 13 - 1860:

1861 they move to Peter, etc.


p.85 All began as British were ready

89 The best time was the not too bo or in aw,

not be preserved for the few - establish

& allegiance & these nations - various countries.

the above tables ends consideration - France

a great deal of the role needed in their minds &

protection of the laws. To others of land They

value to employ who was certified one for the

(L to 5 pages, 24-65)

p.90 1866: Perry United States

NB 19th: the power of fighting vessels & destruction of

were extinguished from 1866. November 28, 1866
The text on this page appears to be a mixture of handwriting and printed text. The handwriting is in English, and the content seems to be discussing historical events, possibly related to a military campaign. The printed text at the bottom suggests references to a book or a document, possibly "Living and Loving." The specific details are not entirely clear due to the handwriting style.
p106 became interesting aff') - means & strams
of many foreign vehicles
also return to the land
p109 the enemy declared a "pact" with the
host of the Russian army
affirming that "God was
p113 South Germans" 1867
p115 later in 1846-63 express the distinct hope
of land & the show some
the administration's "war crimes" against
the people, with quite a few
perhaps because the war thus far gone.
only 3 months. They accepted them on the
basis of saving themselves to the loss of a
limited currency. But one has the long path of
running "at war". The Germans always find
this such a war to serve only one land. Always
well. This is increased & justified by
p115 1867 the Germans fought to serve
the head of the empire & the
p116 Togliardo's Resistance
features to face that attack of allies
was a long battle of "I know the other
people ultimately have to win the
people only now as our strength.
these ideas now exist to a degree of
Togliardo's campaign
Vince Fett vs. Hoff, Hastings & others High Ern.
12. The losses continue

Telegraph's force was 5,000 - 80k
and by 1865, 12,000. Some casualties shown by


1865. Casualties by regiment. Some 8000

13. The fall of the Southern States

December 1865. Surrender of all forces by

13.1 The loss of the Southern States' Armies

December 1861. Surrender of all forces by

13.2 The fall of the Southern States' Armies

December 1865. Surrender of all forces by
p139 2 Decmbr 1869 It is very well except

lack of light & Negro supply. He neither has

any to live or remain for an hour

but 15 mins. We have gone to London

18th December 1869 the report of Mr. Paschke's & Mr.

expenses & transportation to Egypt. He

will return with some plans etc on a later

day. Raffee the mustard on 6 Nov 1869

p140 more details of the war of Khedive &

Egypt's declaration of war.

p141 From April 1869 Dumas were in

one magazine on 1 hand Cotton & 500

ashes, were still counted dangerous

attempts to break back by attack. The war

in 1869 was very serious because he

was between 2 sides & Egyhpian

army between 2 sides & Khedive's

Army (IOC. 276-7)

p140 Army of Khedive & Egyhpian

As of 9 Nov 1869 (1869-3)

p140 Lieutenant G. K. Paschke's Report.

NB 2 g Kloth plates & 2 plates having

been damaged & others returned -

the commander to supply depot & receive

the following for its service - 22 each 6 yrs. 3 yrs

for life service - 16 in 1869

6 Nov 1869

20th December 1869 & 21st December

12 were returned (close to 20) return to 20, 3 by then
for which reason wandered written in
esquisses hastened over a bridge as soon
arm drawn i Ladies air Ladies 3 keen drawn
there do, he go forward his hand was a Spanish
but doing much he force a Spanish people
into Ladies air Ladies (He gentle from
old ladies p. 147)
The Invasion of Taranaki and Iwi Losses

Previous papers presented on behalf of Nga Iwi have discussed the origins of the Wars in Taranaki. This paper, which sits alongside evidence presented by kaumatua, has four aims:

1. To outline the course of the wars in Taranaki between 1860 and 1870.
2. To give some idea of the losses sustained by the claimants during the wars.
3. To show the impact of the New Zealand Settlements Act\(^1\) and the proclamations issued under its authority upon the wars.
4. To state the grievances of Nga Iwi o Taranaki in respect of the Pakeha wars of the 1860s.

At this stage note that any reference to the Pakakohi and Tangahoe people makes no judgement as to their status as iwi or hapu, it refers to those known by these names in the 1860s.

The Course of the Wars in Taranaki

Introduction

For Nga Iwi o Taranaki the wars themselves were a devastating experience; combined with the passing of the New Zealand Settlements Act they signalled the end of a way of life. The Taranaki War of March 1860 to March 1861, was fought to the north of New Plymouth, in the Waitara area, and to the south, around Omata. Te Ati Awa, Ngati Mutunga, Ngati Ruanui, Taranaki, Nga Rauru, and Ngaruahine defended themselves from the British and Colonial troop incursions. They were aided in the north by

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\(^1\) The New Zealand Settlements Act will be discussed in detail in a paper to be prepared by Dr Ann Parsonson. It is not proposed to discuss the act in great depth in this paper. The name of the Act has been used in preference here to the words sometimes used “the muru and the raupatu.” Some iwi expressed concern that the use of these terms, important and valid terms in traditional society, made it sound as though the actions of the Government were justified, or sanctioned under Maori values. There also seems to some variation in the meanings taken by some iwi, and by the Waitangi Tribunal itself.
various taua from the Waikato region - some Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Raukawa, Ngati Haua and Waikato. Peace terms were formulated by the Governor for Te Ati Awa, and for Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui. The latter two iwi were condemned for their defence of their mana whenua and their mana Maori, judged as having no quarrel with the Government. The terms ordered the iwi to submit to the Queen's authority and Law, and not to raise arms against Her Majesty again.

Although the actual fighting in Taranaki stopped in 1870 the Government's continued invasion of Maori land and sovereignty led Te Whiti O Rongomai and his people to take a stand at Parihaka. The Government finished off its military incursions into Taranaki as it had started, with the invasion and ransacking of Maori people defending their right to their land, and to make their own decisions concerning the way they lived upon it.

Taking the land was one of the surest means to force the Maori to submit to Government authority. The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, although allegedly to ensure the peace and security of the disturbed districts, was a concerted effort to take Maori land by any means possible, and control where and how Maori lived their lives. It provided for the ultimate confiscation of vast tracts of territory, leaving those affected to apply for compensation, should their claims be accepted by the Compensation Court set up under the Act. As a result whole iwi were left practically landless, and others confined to agriculturally marginal land, taking the most fertile land for British settlers. The wars in South Taranaki saw attempts by the iwi to defend themselves from the Government's "scorched earth" policy - destruction of settlements, cultivations and the pursuit of those fleeing for their lives. In this context the teachings of Te Ua Haumene developed, giving those who followed his thinking strength and faith to continue to fight.

Nigel Prickett summed up the aims of the British expansion in the campaigns in Waikato as well as Northern and Southern Taranaki. These campaigns represented:

a deliberate expansion by Europeans from districts of earlier settlement to gain possession of land previously denied to them by Maori. At the time, and indeed subsequently, prosecution of the wars has been described in terms of military movements and engagements, but it was in fact systematic possession of the land
which secured victory. Defined military objectives followed passage of the New Zealand Settlements Act of 1863 which allowed confiscation of land from "rebel" tribes. Thus the campaigns in Taranaki, Waikato and Wanganui-Patea may be seen as bringing about much desired and deliberate expansion of early settlements of New Plymouth, Auckland and Wanganui. The political objective was more land; the military objective was a tenable frontier.2

The seven years from 1863 to 1870 saw an almost continual campaign against the southern people. Many were exiled far from their homes, only to return to find their land taken. The New Zealand Settlements Act was applied to the area in the context of the attacks, the taking of the land and the plan to establish military settlers in Taranaki. Titokowaru's attempts to peacefully deal with the Colonial Government's encroachment on the land were abandoned with reluctance. His war with the Government was a strong and gallant attack against the actions of the Crown.

The Taranaki War 1860-1

Te Ati Awa initially faced an aggressive British force which marched out from New Plymouth to occupy land at Waitara. Initially the fighting was centred around the Waitara area, but as Southern Taranaki iwi joined in the defence, the fighting shifted south of New Plymouth, with expeditions down to Tataraimaka. The Taranaki iwi were aided by various taua from the Waikato, who fought in the northern part of the conflict. The British settlers retreated to New Plymouth where they admonished the Imperial forces for their failure to subdue the iwi who defended their land.

The British forces concentrated on trying to beat the Maori warriors on the battlefield, first through attacking pa openly, and destroying villages, and later when that failed to win the troops a quick victory, by sapping. They aimed at forcing the Maori to submit to the authority of the Government and the Queen, not solely at holding onto the disputed land at Waitara.

The actual fighting was a defeat for the British - they failed to make any decisive gains, and were taken by surprise by the strength and ability of the Maori warriors. For the Maori, the war was one of survival, an attempt to

maintain control over their lives, and they fought hard to do it. It was their homes and ancestral lands that were assaulted and which they were defending. By the time of the peace negotiations it was clear that neither side was going to gain a conclusive military victory and gain decisive control. The Government turned its sights to the Waikato to try and force the Maori into submission, while the Taranaki iwi kept their eyes on the Crown and the settlers, and continued to respond to further encroachments by the Pakeha.

Recent Historical Writing

James Belich's *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* represents the main attempt to address the imbalances of the history written about the wars of last century. In his work Belich has shown that the strategic planning, co-ordination and combination of iwi forces in defence of their rights and their land have been consistently denied in accounts of the fighting. Such accounts, he writes, make a "travesty of one of the most efficient and effective resistance efforts ever mounted by a tribal people against European expansion", and the result disguises the reality of New Zealand history, the achievements of the Maori, and the nature of race relations in New Zealand.

Belich argues that outside the main immigration points British annexation of New Zealand did not alter the Maori dominated racial relationship - the boundaries of the two spheres being the areas where Maori had "sold" land. In the context of the expansion of British settlement, to oppose land sales was to defend Maori autonomy. The Maori who signed the Treaty thought they were getting a flow of valuable Pakeha in return for ceding a vague "suzerainty". The British thought they were signing for full and real sovereignty. Belich makes a distinction between nominal and substantive sovereignty; nominal being the theoretical domain of a sovereign, one who reigns but does not govern; and substantive being the actual dominion of a controlling power, which exercises a decisive influence over the whole of the country.


"suzerainty: state in which there is an overall government, but where there is internal autonomy."
The British thought that they were entitled to govern the Maori "in fact as well as name", while Maori resented British interference in local matters, except when they, themselves, invited it for a particular purpose. Belich argues that the British had tacitly accepted Maori independence for twenty years. His argument comes to the conclusion that land was not the main military objective of the British.4

In the context of a Maori determination to defend their sovereignty, and a British attempt to establish real control, the Waitara purchase took on an additional urgency. Governor Gore Browne felt that to back down from acceptance of Te Teira's offer was to acknowledge Kingi's authority. British sovereignty was to be asserted by denying the chiefly right of Kingi, even if the result was war - "I must either have purchased this land or recognised a right which would have made William King virtual sovereign of this part of New Zealand."5 "The wide range of British opinion that supported the war did so less to expand the farms of a few hundred New Plymouth settlers, than to bring the reality of Maori control of the hinterland into conformity with the expectation of substantive British sovereignty." According to Belich, the Kingitanga fought less to secure Kingi the peaceful enjoyment of the Waitara, than to prevent British intrusion into tacitly agreed to boundaries of control, and so to protect Maori independence. The main issue was one of "authority and jurisdiction."6

In Taranaki, as in the Waikato and on the East Coast, the British fought to enforce their perception of sovereignty. They occupied the disputed land at Waitara, but their campaign continued. The land alone was not enough. In sum, Belich suggests that the British sought first to check, and then to cripple, Maori independence. This was reflected in persistent efforts to defeat Maori forces in decisive battle7, and to destroy their lives and their livelihood. The substantive sovereignty "would allow the relatively easy purchase of Maori land, and the imposition of British administration, law, and civilisation on the Maoris."8

4 Belich, Wars, p.21.
5 Browne to Newcastle, 22 March 1860, Parliamentary Papers 1861 (2798) XLI, p.17.; Cited by Belich in Wars, p.11.
6 Belich, Wars, pp.79-80.
7 Belich, Wars, pp.78-80.
8 Belich, Wars, p.78.
Belich has suggested that the Taranaki War of 1860-1 is best divided into four phases. He describes the first, March-April 1860, as a period in which Governor Gore Browne failed to secure a rapid and "cheap" (in terms of the investment of British money and military personnel) assertion of sovereignty through a quick victory. The second stage saw the intervention of Kingitanga taua in the period from May to July of 1860 - with the main military action being the British attack on Puketakauere. Belich identifies stage three as encompassing the full development of the Maori war strategy in response to the continuing British attacks. The effective defence put the British in the position of having to modify their own techniques. The final stage, December 1860 through until March of the following year, represented continuing development of the British sapping technique and the defence of pa by the iwi involved in the fighting.

The Maori adapted to the overwhelming British numbers and modern weaponry by developing a new and efficient mode of fighting designed both to minimise the effect of British artillery attacks and to maximise the damage which could be inflicted on British troops. Belich calls the fortifications they developed the "modern pa." Tactically these amounted to trench warfare - fortified with anti-artillery bunkers, and carefully sited firing positions. They constructed false targets, as at Puketakauere, drawing British long range fire, and the troops themselves, to fortifications where there were few warriors. These pa represented an innovative adaption of traditional strategies. These positions, which could be built and abandoned with relative ease, were mainly defensive, with only Titokowaru using them consistently with strategic initiative. 9

The feat of adapting to the conditions of war with a strong Imperial power allowed Maori in some measure to fight on ground of their own choosing. 10 The tactics adopted by Maori were very effective, keeping the British from gaining the quick military victory that they desired. The Maori achieved more success in the first Taranaki war 1860-1, and in South Taranaki in 1868-9, than in the campaigns of annihilation by the British in the mid 1860s - although ultimately the disguised force of legislation took what military force alone had been unable to - vast tracts of land.

10 Belich, Wars, pp.294-7.
Throughout this report the main sources are the official reports of Imperial and Colonial soldiers. According to Belich they overestimated both the number of Maori warriors and the number of Maori killed or wounded in the fighting to explain the losses. British reports are always those of hostile outsiders looking at their enemy. Hence their words do little to show the reality of the wars from a Maori viewpoint. Correspondingly this report can only give a bare outline of what happened in Taranaki from the written material available. It in no way attempts to tell the stories of the iwi, telling rather the story of what the British and Colonial troops did, and how they justified their actions.

The Forces Involved in the Wars

The number of Maori involved in the fighting was substantially smaller than that of the British troops. Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake's Te Ati Awa force did not exceed 300 men, and was probably closer to 200. Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui had between 400 and 500 warriors. The intervention of the Kingitanga barely doubled the Maori numbers.

A sense of the movements of Waikato during the 1860-1 fighting can be ascertained. Various parties from Waikato arrived in July 1860. By August there were probably around 500 warriors in Taranaki. Most went home to do their planting at the end of August, for example Epiha Tokohihi, a Ngati Maniapoto chief, and his men left Taranaki in August, and returned in December. Reinforcements arrived soon after the battle at Puketakauere. By mid October more parties were arriving. By the beginning of November their numbers were probably around 600. There were more arrivals in December, and by January there were probably around 800. The number of Waikato probably did not drop below 400.

There were Maori who fought alongside the British in the 1860-1 war, but information about them is patchy. Governor Gore Browne did not wish to upset the balance of peace by using outside iwi in Taranaki, stating that the "employment of friendlies" had often been suggested to him, but that "nothing short of extreme necessity will induce me to throw the torch of discord between those tribes who are now at peace with each other." He
feared for example, that the use of Ngapuhi with the Imperial and Colonial forces would unite the Waikato in opposition to the Government.\(^{11}\)

It appears, therefore, that those Maori who fought alongside the Imperial forces in Taranaki in 1860-1 were locals. These people fought with the Crown not necessarily because they were wholeheartedly behind the Government's cause, but because long standing differences meant they could not side with Wiremu Kingi. Thus Te Teira and Ihaia Te Kirikumara were both identified as "friendlies." Gore Browne's instructions to General Pratt in July 1860 made it clear that he was aware that the "friendlies" risked their lives siding with the Government. He hoped that Pratt would continue the

> protection and kindness for the friendly natives, more particularly the chiefs Mahau, Aperhama [sic], Ihaia, and Teira, and their men; they have proved themselves faithful allies, and their lives would be instantly sacrificed if they were deprived of our protection.\(^{12}\)

The Maori who aided the Government performed various roles, including actual fighting. They served as guides, and passed information to the Imperial forces, although it is clear that the British realised that the sharing of intelligence went two ways with the followers of "loyal" chiefs passing information to Kingi.\(^{13}\)

Governor Gore Browne attempted to organise a Maori force soon after his arrival in New Plymouth. In March 1860 he wrote that he "prepared to enrol the few natives who can be depended on into an irregular company, under the charge of Mr Richard Brown, a gentleman resident in New Plymouth."\(^{14}\) Colonel Gold in June 1860 acknowledged various payments for services made out of Her Majesty's Commissariat chest, including money to the "native force" under the now Captain Richard Brown.

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\(^{11}\) Governor to Duke of Newcastle, 20 May 1860, British Parliamentary Papers, Irish University Press (hereafter BPP/UP) v12 1861, p.64. At times the BPP duplicate material held in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHRs).

\(^{12}\) Governor Gore Browne to General Pratt, 27 July 1860, Encl. in No.35, BPP/UP, v12, 1861, p.91.

\(^{13}\) Governor Gore Browne to General Pratt, 27 July 1860, Encl. in No.35, BPP/UP, v12, 1861, p.91.

\(^{14}\) Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 12 March 1860, No.5, BPP/UP, v12 1861, p.13.
It is difficult to find specific mention of the "native force's" participation in particular battles. Major General Pratt did note the use of 150 "friendly natives" under the command of Robert Parris, in an attack on pa in the Okato district in October 1860. No mention was made of payment to that force, although a memorandum of matters agreed to by the Governor for the use of General Pratt, stated that friendly natives were to be paid. A chief "Mahan" (Mahau) did receive £50 for his support for the Imperial forces.\^{15}

The British began the war with 800 imperial troops. Shortly after the war began the garrison of New Plymouth and its outposts numbered about 1200 men, of whom the 65th Regiment made up about half. By June 1860 the force amounted to 2000. By early 1861 they had 3500 men. The Taranaki Rifle Volunteer Company, formed at the end of 1858, was made up of one hundred men. Marsland Hill (ancient pa site of Pukaka) was the headquarters.\^{16} Colonel Gold arrived in New Plymouth at the end of February 1860, and took over the Taranaki command until Major-General Pratt arrived at the beginning of August. The garrison was reinforced by three companies of the 65th. The HMS "Niger" under the command of Captain Cracroft, was ordered to Taranaki on 29 February 1860, arriving the following day.

Phase One of the Fighting: March-April 1860

On 1 March 1860 Governor Gore Browne arrived in New Plymouth aboard the "Airedale", which also carried 448 troops to the town. New Plymouth itself was still a fledgling settlement - Gore Browne noted that "what is delineated in the New Zealand Company's plan as squares and streets is in reality wild land, much tormented....Isolated cottages are dotted about at intervals, the town being confined to little more than a single street on the shore." There were "numerous native pah in every direction."\^{17}  

\^{15} Colonel Gold to Governor Gore Browne, 4 June 1860, No.7, BPP/IUP v12, 1861, p.137. Also Sub Encl No.1 in No.48 Deputy Adjutant General Lieutenant Colonel H.Cany and Donald McLean, 3 Sept 1860, ibid, p.144.; General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 12 September 1860, Encl.12 in No 48, ibid, p.144.; Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 16 October 1860, Encl.1 in No.53, ibid, p.165.  
\^{17} Governor Gore Browne to the Duke of Newcastle, 13 March 1860, No.6, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.14.
The Governor instructed Colonel Gold to enforce the survey at Waitara although cautioning the Colonel to take "every possible care to avoid a collision, unless it is forced upon him."18 Ironically while ordering what amounted to an invasion of the Pekapeka Block, the Governor informed all forces of the "necessity of treating the natives with the utmost civility. They are unlikely to have intercourse with any but men who are disposed to be most friendly and of great use to us, and quarrels between individuals of the two races may be attended with the worst possible result." Severe punishment would befall anyone who breached these orders.19

Gore Browne reported that Wiremu Kingi had "retreated" far back into the bush, and that it was difficult for the Government to gain access. The Governor thought that Kingi's position allowed him to command "many straggling settlements recently occupied by Europeans, most of whom have taken refuge in the town."20

On 5 March Colonel Gold marched to Waitara with a force of 400 men of the 65th Regiment and occupied the disputed land. Camp Waitara, a large redoubt built on the site of Pukekohe pa, became the British base for their invasion of the Waitara area over the next twelve months.

On 17 March Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake and Hapurona Pukerimu, with seventy to eighty warriors, built Te Kohia (L-pa) in response to the British invasion of the Waitara. Colonel Gold sent Parris with a summons requesting Kingi to surrender. Gold wrote

misguided people, your pa is invested. Surrender at once, or I commence to fire upon you. Though your offence is great, the Governor will be merciful if you surrender. If I fire upon you your fate is sealed.

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18 Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 2 March 1861. BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.11.
19 Governor Gore Browne to Colonel Gould, 3 March 1860, Encl.2 In No.5, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.13.
20 Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 2 March 1861. BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.11.
Kingi refused to either receive or read the demands and refused to surrender the pa. The British opened fire.21 Te Ati Awa faced a determined attempt by the Imperial forces to defeat them. Although there was no such defeat Te Kohia was evacuated on the night of 18 March. Te Kohia, reported by Gore Browne to be “extraordinarily well designed”, was destroyed after much labour.22 Te Kohia was a “modern pa” of the type described earlier in this report.

“Friendly Natives” were reported to have informed the Governor that other iwi were likely to join Kingi - and the rumours were treated with great alarm. The colonists on the Tataraimaka block were advised to come into New Plymouth. Two block houses were erected by the troops - one about four miles to the north of the town, and the other five miles to the south, with the aim of commanding the main roads. The pa in New Plymouth itself was closed, and Maori admitted by passes given only to those who would sign a declaration of allegiance to the Queen.23

Within a week of the British commencing hostilities two small taua of Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui arrived at Waireka, to the south of New Plymouth. The abandoned farms of the settlers were plundered, and some twelve colonists were killed in following weeks. Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui became the focus of the British military force. Colonel Gold had mounted three movements against them by the end of April.24 To the north of New Plymouth the Te Ati Awa taua had a respite from the military attention of the British as Colonel Gold’s attacks on the southern iwi absorbed his forces.

On 27 March and 28 March 1860 when the bodies of five Pakeha were found, including two boys, having been shot and tomahawked, the military authorities mounted an expedition to Omata to escort the Rev. Brown and

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22 Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.166.
24 Cowan identifies the iwi and hapu involved as: Taranaki: Ngamahanga, Patukai, Ngati Haumia, Ngarangi and others, under Kingi Parengarenga who was killed at Sentry Hill, Hor1 Kingi, Wiremu Kingi te Matakaatea and Arama Karaka; Ngati Ruanui: chiefly Ngaruhine under Te Hanatau., Cowan, NZ Wars, I, pp.171-2.
family and other settlers from their farms. The Ngati Ruanui and Taranaki chiefs had proclaimed that Brown, and other settlers who were not British subjects, would be protected. Their war was with the British.

On 28 March some 200 Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui faced the British troops in what became known as "The Battle of Waireka." The British force under Lieutenant Colonel G.F. Murray, numbering 276 men, reinforced to 360, marched south on the road to Omata for the purpose of bringing settlers into New Plymouth. According to Belich military overestimates at the time recorded the number of Maori involved as 460-600. Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui were reported to have a fortified position on the road between New Plymouth and Omata. The position on the road, supposedly at "Whaler's Gate" did not in fact exist. The road was clear, with "no trace of natives anywhere near." The settlers thought themselves under attack, exchanged long range fire, and then retired to a farm house. Murray sent attachments down to the settlers, but withdrew them before dark and retreated to New Plymouth in the late afternoon.

The contemporary British version states that the militia, in trouble, outnumbered and under attack, unable to retire, were rescued by a small naval brigade of 60 men from HMS "Niger" who marched up from New Plymouth, assaulted and took the pa at Waireka, killing anything up to 150 Maori. Waireka was seen as a great British victory. What actually happened when Waireka was attacked is not clear. Belich questions whether there was actually a military crisis for the Imperial and Colonial forces. He considered that there were probably two Maori killed. The militia had one man hit before they went to ground at the farmhouse. Their total casualties were six wounded and one dead. Belich wrote that the attack was more likely to have involved lots of noise and little harm, and that the pa was probably more like a camp, and it had probably been abandoned.

Ngati Ruanui and Taranaki were usually portrayed by the Government as taking part in the 1860-1 war for the joy of blood letting, not for any

25 See p.8. above.
27 Belich, Wars, pp.68-6.
grievance. There were dissenters from that view, both Maori and Pakeha. The missionary J.F.Riemenschneider stated that war had been forced on the Ngati Ruanui and the Taranaki. He wrote that the "Southern tribes" felt themselves to be included in the hostilities, and that they could not travel without government passes. Riemenschneider argued that the pronouncement of martial law written in Maori amounted to a declaration of war, with the name of Taranaki iwi included in the proclamation. He wrote that they, Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui had had little opportunity afforded them to see any "true and genuine" design on the part of the Government to recognise their rights as guaranteed under the Treaty and as British subjects, particularly as the Governor had never visited either Taranaki or Ngati Ruanui.

Governor Grey, however, did note a past Vice Regal visit to the Taranaki iwi. In a despatch to the Duke of Newcastle, responding to the comments made by Riemenschneider, he stated that Governor Gore Browne had visited these people in 1859. They had apparently sent a message to him assuring him that in raising the flag to the Kingitanga they meant no disloyalty to Her Majesty's Government - "on the contrary, they simply meant to maintain peace and order amongst themselves on the one part and the Government and the settlers on the other part." Governor Grey wrote that his predecessor had thought the subject of the Kingitanga "beneath the dignity of Her Majesty's representative to take notice of." In response to their assurances the Taranaki iwi were informed that it was not their place to ask questions of, and demand answers from the Governor.

Riemenschneider argued that the Government had not adequately allowed for Maori representation or concerns. He saw the Constitution Act (1852) as providing Pakeha with the power to govern themselves, manage their own

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28 See for example Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 30 March 1860, No.9, BPP/116/1861, p.24.
29 In response to Riemenschneider's comments Grey provided the Duke of Newcastle with information regarding movement restrictions placed on those Maori who lived to the South of New Plymouth. For the passports and instructions regarding them see C.W.Richmond to Mr Atkinson, 9 March 1860, Encl. 2 in No.10; C.W.Richmond to the Officer Commanding the Garrison, 10 March 1860, Encl.3 In No.10, "Memorandum as to the Issue of Passes to Natives entering Town from the Southwards." A Register of holders was to be kept in blockhouses. E-2, AJHR 1862, pp.28-30. [RDB v15 pp.5419-5427.]
30 Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 23 November 1861, No.10, E-1, AJHR 1862, p.22. [RDB v15 p. 5419.]
interests and affairs, and make laws for the land. He asked whether there was “anything of some similar kind of provision made for the Maori, with a view to unite and bring them also and likewise together for deliberation, and for consulting and being consulted about all such matters as might especially relate to their rights, claims, their wants, and wishes of a common interest.” Maori had the right to participate in the affairs of the nation, and their rights and status should be recognised.

Those involved in the Kingitanga hesitated to pass judgement on Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui. A meeting at Ngaruawahia on 11 April 1860, with several leading chiefs, and Potatau, the King, refused to separate Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake’s struggle for the land and the involvement of these iwi. With regard to the “killing of unarmed settlers” the chiefs stated that although the incident could “properly be called murder, though in itself a crime regarded in the light of Christianity”,

...it remained to be seen where the blame of having brought about the state of affairs which led to its commission ought to be laid; that such acts were incident to a state of war as carried on by natives, and as such were in great measure chargeable on those who caused war; that under any circumstances they regarded the proceedings of the Governor as hasty, and should have thought he would have tried other means of inducing William King to give up his opposition before sending soldiers to take possession of the land.

The Southern iwi who had fought at Waireka continued to resist the British assault as it continued in April - the principal incursion coming from a 460 strong British and Colonial expedition along the coast southward as far as Warea. Gore Browne stated that the expedition was undertaken with the view to “inflict a severe chastisement on the two tribes who committed the murders on 27th March, and attacked our troops the following day.” Colonel Gold expressed the desire to teach these iwi “a wholesome lesson, and cause them for the future to have a wholesome dread of condign punishment, should they venture to injure the property or persons of the European inhabitants.”

32 Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 27 April 1860, Encl. 1 in No.14, BPP/UP, v 12 1861, p.35.
33 Colonel Gold to Governor Gore Browne, 28 April 1860, Encl. A in No.17, BPP/UP, v 12 1861, p.46.
Gold noted that the pa between Tataraimaka and the Hangatahua River had white flags flying, although "with few exceptions, the natives usually in them had joined the rebels in arms against us." He professed to treat the "friendlies" differently - "no molestation was offered them." The settlement of "Turne"(??) was evacuated as the force under Gold advanced. The village was destroyed, the Colonel taking the view that

as these people were directly concerned in the murders of settlers which have been recently committed, I caused the houses to be pulled down, the machinery of a water-mill situated about a mile inland to be destroyed, and the wheat and grain, of which there was a considerable quantity, to be thrown out into the fern.

On 27 April the people at Warea, who had earlier been shelled by the "Niger", faced another British expedition. They fired on the advanced guard of the British, and then evacuated the pa. Gold ordered that the pa and all the property in it, including waka, were to be destroyed. The church at the settlement, and the house of the missionary Riemenschneider were not burnt. Gold hoped that the "distinction between my mode of dealing with places where active opposition was experienced, and those which were abandoned on our approach" would be noted. He expected the people to abandon their homes without opposition to the invading force, or be punished as aggressors.\footnote{Colonel Gold to Governor Gore Browne, 30 April 1860, Encl.1 in No.20, \textit{BPP//UP}, v12 1861, p.S8.}

The Tataraimaka Block was occupied with 200 soldiers as an advanced outpost for the British settlements.

On 24 April, being satisfied with the security of New Plymouth Governor Gore Browne returned to Auckland aboard the "Niger."

\textbf{Phase Two of the Fighting: May-July 1860}

In late April through until mid June the Kingitanga movement was vocal in its intention to join the fighting in defence of the Taranaki iwi.\footnote{Reverend J.Morgan to Governor, 8 May 1860, Encl.2 in No.22, \textit{BPP//UP}, v12 1861, p.64; Donald McLean, 21 May 1861, Encl.3 in No.22, ibid, p.65.} On his return to Auckland the Governor sent agents to Waikato to provide information regarding the war in Taranaki. He was anxious to prevent the Kingitanga from growing in its desire for union and a separate Maori
nationality, writing to the Duke of Newcastle that under these circumstances the events in Taranaki "sink into insignificance." He wrote:

It is quite true that this sovereignty, as relating to the Maoris, has always been more nominal than real; but it is now evident that the Maoris desire a separate nationality and union that they may exert a real sovereignty, the existence of which would be incompatible even with that very mild and imperfect exercise of authority which has been hitherto maintained and could not fail to bring collision between the races.

It was indeed fortunate, the Governor thought, that hostilities had broken out in Taranaki because it caused "a disclosure of the real state of feeling entertained by the Maoris towards us. If the emissaries of the King had been able to consolidate their party without attracting attention by any overt act, we should have felt their power unexpectedly...." He was of the opinion that Wiremu Kingi would not have begun hostilities without the backing of the Kingitanga.36

The possibility of Kingitanga intervention forced Governor Gore Browne to temporarily suspend his attack on Te Ati Awa, and to try to get the Kingitanga supporters on the side of the Government. He was still hopeful that old animosities might divide the various iwi, and planned his military tactics accordingly. In addition he wanted it to appear that Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake was the one to provoke further hostilities, rather than have the Imperial troops be the obvious aggressors. The Governor wrote that

[un]der these circumstances a successful attack by our forces upon W.King (who is residing on his own land), without further provocation on his part, would at once reconcile all these differences, and unite a large part of the southern tribes against us. For this reason I have requested Colonel Gold to refrain from attacking W.King again, unless that chief commences hostilities....37

The Governor was anxious that operations continue to the south of New Plymouth. Colonel Gold, however, thought that conditions in the field,

36 Governor Gore Browne to the Duke of Newcastle, 27 April 1860, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, pp.31-3; Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 26 May 1860, ibid, v12 1861, pp.63-4.
37 Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 26 May 1860, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, pp.63-4.
particularly the inclement weather, would prevent him from fulfilling Gore Browne's desire. He wrote with frustration that

[to take up guns without roads, dragged by bullocks eight to a team, and which on fair roads go on average but two miles an hour, and a supply of ammunition, tents, stores, and provisions for even a few days, where the drays will carry only 10 cwt. each, entails a train, or rather incubus, of lumbering impediments which requires in an enemy's country your whole force to protect with scattered guards.

He wrote that little else could be done in the South, and felt sure that "the destruction of the mill and crops, corn, houses, canoes and ploughs at the different stations we went to will severely cripple the resources of the Taranaki natives this winter."38

Gold concentrated on fortifications to the north of New Plymouth. He placed one hundred men at "Northcroft", at the inland boundary of the Bell Block, close to the track that was used by Kingi and the iwi south of New Plymouth for communication. The Colonel planned to gradually clear towards the track, "keeping on our land."39

In early June Te Ati Awa were joined by Ngati Maniapoto taua under Epiha Tokohihi. They built defences at Puketakauere and Onukukaitara, both situated about a mile from the British base at Camp Waitara, and half a mile south east of Te Kohia. Puketakauere was a challenge and a threat to the British camp restricting movement, supplies and security. On 23 June the Te Ati Awa and Ngati Maniapoto defenders of the pa fired on a British unit attempting to investigate the fortifications.

Belich writes that it was possible the incident was manufactured by the British as "further provocation", the prerequisite for action against Te Ati Awa. Indeed the Governor wrote again to the Duke of Newcastle that he had instructed Colonel Gold not to attack Kingi until he had given some "new and indisputable provocation" so as to avoid uniting the whole of the Maori population against the Government.40

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38 Colonel Gold to Governor, 4 May 1860, Enc12 in No.20, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.59.
39 Colonel Gold to Governor, 4 May 1860, Enc12 in No.20, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.59.
40 Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 25 June 1860, No.25, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.68.
on the morning of 23 June a fire was observed in the fern to the south east of the Imperial camp. He wrote: "I have reason to believe that they were aggressing on Her Majesty's land", and ordered the reconnaissance party to go to the raupo swamp where Maori collected material for their whare, again saying that he suspected that they were on Crown land. Three shots were fired at the soldiers from an old pa. 41 Certainly from the evidence at hand it is clear that the British were anxious to resume action against Kingi, and they succeeded in provoking a response from him.

Major Thomas Nelson sent for reinforcements, and on 26 June Colonel Gold sent 180 men and gave his permission for an attack.

Early in the morning of the following day Major Nelson attacked Puketakauere with 350 men and two howitzers. During this important engagement in the Taranaki war of 1860-1 the estimated 200 defenders of the pa defeated the British and Colonial forces. Part of Epiha Tokohihi's taura was present, but many Te Ati Awa were inland at the Mataitawa cultivations with Kingi himself. 42

The pa was a very effective defence, and succeeded in dividing the British attack into two distinct combats: Major Nelson's operation in front of Onukukaitara, and Captain Messenger's assault against Puketakauere. In effect, the British were ambushed during their advance on what they wrongly assumed to be the key - Onukukaitara. When more Maori warriors moved in through the bush Major Nelson was forced to retreat, picking up Captain Bowdler's men on the way back to camp after they, too had been overwhelmed. Captain Messenger's division was completely shattered. Ngati Maniapoto figured prominently in the battle.

The British had trouble admitting that they had been routed. Belich states that the Imperial command tried to soften the blow by referring to overwhelming Maori casualties, overwhelming numbers of Maori combatants and faulty British leadership. The British leaders of the campaign were used as scapegoats for the defeat. Colonel Gold, in particular,

41 Major Nelson to Major of Brigade, 23 June 1860, Encl.1a in No.28, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.80.
42 General command seems to have been held by Hapurona. (Cowan lists the iwi involved as: Te Ati Awa, Taranaki, Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Raukawa, Ngarauru, (Patea and Waingongoro), and Whanganui, some Waikato men had come with Ngati Maniapoto.)
was criticised. The British quoted 130-150 Maori casualties, but five independent Maori sources, two actually listing those that died, state that an estimated five Maori were killed.43

According to Belich, Maori tactics and engineering techniques were the real cause of the British defeat. He states that the defenders of Onukukaitara and Puketakauere utilised the modern pa, which could be readily abandoned, but with an emphasis on deception and concealment. Hapurona Pukerimu's skill led to the fragmentation of the British forces, forcing the British to fight two battles, while the Maori fought one.44

The Maori success at Puketakauere threw the British onto the defensive. Governor Gore Browne was concerned that the Maori victory would result in a general uprising among Maori at a time when all the troops were concentrated in Taranaki. He feared that evident dissatisfaction with the Government, given the boost of the victory at Puketakauere, would lead to more active protest by Maori in areas such as the Waikato, with a potential attack on Auckland. He appealed for reinforcements from Britain and Australia.

Governor Gore Browne still believed that the best way to prevent escalation was a quick victory in Taranaki and this aim took on a new urgency. Victory for the Crown meant the submission of the Taranaki people to British rule and the destruction of Maori autonomy, not merely the occupation of the land at Waitara. It was with the assertion of sovereignty in mind that the Imperial and Colonial forces continued their attack on the iwi of Taranaki, still focused in the area to the north of New Plymouth. The British intentions and urgency were evident in the fact that General Pratt, who took over from Colonel Gold, arriving in Taranaki on 3 August, was told by the Governor that every day of delay increased the enemy's confidence and strength, and that another reverse would be disastrous for the British settlement of the country.45

The Governor was further alarmed by the death of Potatau, reported in a despatch on 6 July 1860. He viewed Potatau as a leader who had "always

43 Belich, Wars, p.95, footnote 35 (p.349). See also Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.188.
44 Belich, Wars, pp.89-98.
45 Major General Pratt to Governor, 29 September 1860, Encl. 4 in No.48, BPP/UP, vol.12 1861; See also Belich, Wars, p.100.
used his influence in favour of peace and friendly relations with the Europeans”, and was concerned that the King’s death could destabilise the situation. Gore Browne stated that he was “prepared to take advantage of any opportunity which may offer to meet the views and wishes of the Waikato tribes if they can be persuaded to give up this dangerous agitation.” He called a meeting of chiefs from all over the country to discuss the issues. Excluded from the meeting were those “in arms” against the Queen and some of the “most violent agitators and supporters” of the Kingitanga.

The hui, held at Kohimarama, lasted for over a month with 120 chiefs in attendance. The most fully represented areas were the Bay of Islands, Kaipara, Auckland, Bay of Plenty, Wairarapa and the West Coast from Whanganui to Wellington. Thames/Waikato, Taupo, Upper Whanganui and Taranaki were the least represented, as they were unwilling to leave their districts.

The Governor in his speech, referred to the duties of both the Government and the Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi, and warned those present that they had to prove themselves loyal in return for the protection of the Crown. He stated that New Zealand was the only country that gave the Maori status as British subjects, and this status made it impossible for them to be “unjustly possessed of their lands or property.”

After wide ranging discussion the meeting passed a number of resolutions - condemning the Kingitanga as inconsistent with the sovereignty of the Queen, and the murder of unarmed settlers in Taranaki, and resolving that Kingi had provoked the quarrel with the Government. There was, however, confusion about whether these resolutions had been adopted, and the actual amount of dissent from them. After the reporting of the resolutions by the Governor the Reverend Robert Burrows, a Pakeha observer at the hui, expressed his disagreement at the picture of unanimity portrayed by the Governor.46

46 Governor to Duke of Newcastle, 28 August 1860, No.39, BPP/IUP, v.12 1861, p.96.; T.H.Smith, Report on the Native Conference at Kohimarama, 27 August 1860, Encl. 1 in No.39, ibid, p.97.; Resolutions of the Conference, Encl. 6 in No.39, ibid, p.120.; Dissension over the resolutions see Copy of a letter from Rev.Robert Burrows to the editor of the New Zealander, Encl 1 in No.45, and H.T.Clarke (Resident Magistrate of the Bay of Plenty) to the New Zealander, ibid, pp.128-9.
In her analysis of the hui Claudia Orange has stated that there were allegations that the meeting was stacked, and that "although the charge was officially denied, it was undoubtedly substantially true, for the government intended to use the conference as a means of confirming allegiance to the Crown of as many Maori tribes as possible, thereby isolating the Taranaki 'rebels' and the King Movement." She also argues that the Governor was threatening "a withdrawal of Crown obligations under the treaty, by making that agreement [the Treaty] conditional on a continuing Maori acceptance of Government authority."

Donald McLean, in his position as Native Secretary, had an important role at the hui, attempting to ratify the Treaty in essentially British terms of reference - as the resolutions of the Conference showed. Orange suspects McLean of what she calls "deliberate linguistic manipulation in an attempt to guide his audience towards the attainment of his own purposes", couching his language in a way to get the most appeal. He wished British sovereignty to be confirmed "to obtain Maori assent without appearing to trespass on Maori rights, or mana, particularly those relating to land...", even though implicit in the British understanding of sovereignty was the erosion of Maori rights through the acquisition of territory by the British. Instead the protection of Maori by the Crown was emphasised.47

In July and August 1860, the Maori maintained their threat to the township of New Plymouth. Belich stated that although the town was never attacked, the possibility was a constant worry to the British. As well as maintaining a cordon around New Plymouth and its surrounds, Maori continued their raids on the property of settlers. The Maori respected the churches in the abandoned settlements. The churches at Henui, Bell Block and Omata were found to be untouched at the end of the war.48 An expedition on 19 September found that twenty six settlers' homes had been burned on the Tataraimaka Block, and about 100 in the Omata and Waireka districts. Colonists were said to have lost stock amounting to 2000-3000 sheep, 100 cattle and many horses.49

48 Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.190.
49 Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.192.
There was no mention of what Maori lost in terms of their kainga, livestock or cultivations.

The Governor urged Pratt to insist "gently but firmly" on the removal of the Pakeha women and children from New Plymouth. He had urged evacuation since late March when he had placed the steamer "Airedale" at the disposal of the Superintendent of the Province. The Major General did attempt a full evacuation, but failed to convince the women and children to go to Nelson. Only 112 women and 282 children were shipped, no more would leave.\(^5\)

Gore Browne instructed Major General Pratt to strengthen the garrison in New Plymouth and to renew the attack to the north. He wrote that "every day's delay will give increased confidence and add to the strength of the enemy, who are constantly receiving reinforcements." At Waitara Major Nelson led a force to destroy Te Ati Awa villages: Manukorihi, Tikorangi, Ninia and Tima were demolished.\(^5\) The road between the Bell Block and the Waitara was cleared. Information supplied by "Friendly natives" revealed that the "Pukutotura" (Puketotara) pa had been demolished by the British troops. Donald McLean recommended that £50 be paid to the chief "Mahan" (Mahau) for his "general zeal and fidelity as an ally of the English, and in recognition of his services...in taking possession of the Puketotara pa."\(^5\) Pa on the north bank of the Waitara ("Kirihí" and "Sikirangi" (Tikorangi?)) were also destroyed - both supposedly being deserted.\(^5\)

Around 29 August a party of thirty Waikato under Anatipa left Kingi for their home. Wiremu Kingi was thought to be at either Kairoa or Karaka, both inland settlements. The Maori from Taranaki continued to maintain a threat around New Plymouth, and a presence to the north and south. McLean estimated that there were forty Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui at "Burton's farm" and Puketotara, kainga inland from New Plymouth. At Tataraimaka 200 Maori from the southern iwi occupied several small pa.

\(^5\) Governor Gore Browne to the Duke of Newcastle, 27 August 1860, No.38, BPP/UP, v12 1861, p.94.; Major General Pratt to Governor, 29 September 1860, Encl.4 in No.48, ibid, v12 1861, p.146. 
\(^5\) Cowan, NZ Wars, p.190-1.
\(^5\) Donald McLean, 3 September 1860, Subencl In Encl.1 in No.48, BPP/UP v12 1861.
\(^5\) General Pratt to Governor Grey, 8 September 1860, Encl.1 in No.48, BPP/UP v12 1861.
McLean wrote about them in hostile terms as "secretly murdering every stray European they can lay hold of...."

Towards the end of August there was a decrease in pressure as many Maori returned to their homes, abandoning their most advanced positions, including Puketakauere which had served its purpose. The Governor, as Commander in Chief of the Forces, thought that the lull would be a good time to launch further invasions against the Maori around New Plymouth. He stated that

...a system of sudden, secret, and constant attack, when and where they least expect it, conducted by energetic officers, confident of support at appointed places, acting with enough of personal responsibility to excite ambition, will so distress the natives...that when their allies return both parties will be disheartened and glad to end their troubles by submission.

In addition, these "guerilla tactics" - foreshadowing that to be used in the mid 1860s - should involve establishing a hold on the nearby territory. "Native" and settler labour should be used to clear the land around the area to be occupied.\textsuperscript{54} Pratt considered such tactics to be impossible as it was not likely that the Imperial troops would be able to keep the element of surprise that they needed.\textsuperscript{55}

Puketakauere was occupied by the Imperial forces. The British forces destroyed a number of Maori settlements. Ratapihipihi was burned.\textsuperscript{56} On the 11 September, troops under the command of General Pratt destroyed Huirangi, a settlement near Te Arai on the Waitara River about eight kilometres inland. Four more entrenched villages were burned and many horses and cattle were looted. A group of Te Ati Awa warriors ambushed the British troops, succeeding in making them withdraw and halt their destruction.\textsuperscript{57} The efforts to defend their settlements continued on 29

\textsuperscript{54} Governor Gore Browne to Major General Pratt, 18 September 1860, \textit{BPP/IUP}, v12 1861, p.145.
\textsuperscript{55} Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 29 September 1860, Encl.4 in No.48, \textit{BPP/IUP}, v12 1861, p.147.
\textsuperscript{57} General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 12 September 1860, Encl.2 in No.48, \textit{BPP/IUP}, v12 1861, pp.144-5. The pa are identified as "Ngataparirua", "Kairau"/"Kerum"; See also Cowan, \textit{NZ Wars}, I, p.191.
September when 500 Troops under Colonel Leslie were ambushed by 100 Maori.

Maori settlements to the south of New Plymouth suffered as well. In addition to an outbreak of influenza, which added to the misery of the war, there was still pressure from the Imperial forces. Maori entrenched close to the British camp at Waireka retired under fire on 29 August - with three casualties.58

At the end of September Pratt reported the damage done to the iwi around New Plymouth by the recent campaigns. He wrote that troops under his command had, over the previous few weeks

destroyed between twenty and thirty pahs many of them very recently built, and provided with rifle pits and other defences constructed with the most careful and elaborate manner. The rebels did not venture to defend any of these places, but deserted them all on the approach of the troops, in some cases in such haste that on our entry we found meat half-cooked on their fires. We have also destroyed a great number of "whares" or native habitations, and a considerable quantity of provisions.59

South of New Plymouth the attacks on Taranaki iwi continued. On 9 October Orongomairangi, Pukekakariki and Mataiaio on the Kaihihi River, around eighteen miles from New Plymouth, were advanced upon by the Imperial troops, led by Pratt and Colonel Mould of the Royal Engineers, and 150 Maori under Parris. They waited as the forces under British command began to sap up towards the pa. On 12 October the Taranaki people evacuated their pa. General Pratt noted in his report that these pa were very strongly fortified, and had they been defended the British would have suffered heavily. He was of the opinion that the flax covering the pa would have made them impervious to musket fire, and even heavier artillery would have had difficulty penetrating the fortifications.60

58 Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 31 August 1860, BPP/IUP, v 12 1861, p.126.; Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.192.
59 Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 29 September 1860, Encl.4 in No.48, BPP/IUP, v 12 1861, p.147.
60 Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 16 October 1860, Encl. 1 in No.53, BPP/IUP, v 12 1861, p.165.
By mid October the number of Waikato, Ngati Haua and Ngati Maniapoto warriors in Taranaki was reaching a peak. Despite this strength there were problems for the defenders. On 6 November a party of Ngati Haua began entrenching an old pa site at Mahoetahi. The group, part of a larger force yet to arrive, was numbered around 160. General Pratt had planned to take over the pa on that day with a force of one thousand men. The Ngati Haua party was routed - with heavy casualties. Cowan estimated that there were 50 killed and another 50 or more wounded, out of the 150 Ngati Haua engaged.61 From the number of dead and buried General Pratt gave a different estimate, 80-100 of the Ngati Haua party were killed and wounded.

Official despatches at the time stated that amongst those killed are three "influential chiefs." General Pratt wrote that one was a leading chief in the Kingitanga and that the other two were of lesser importance - although no names were given. The soldiers took the bodies of the three principal chiefs to town for what was termed, "proper interment". The other Maori killed were buried on the battlefield by the Imperial troops. Six prisoners were taken.62

On 29 December the British attacked Matarikoriko downstream from Huirangi and Te Areti, which Parris thought was occupied by a large party of Waikato. The Maori evacuated it on 30 December. In the attack an estimated six Maori were killed. It is possible that Maori casualties were greater than the number estimated above. Major General Pratt thought that the casualties were probably great since they forced the people at Matarikoriko to abandon their pa and their strongly fortified position. He wrote that at least five chiefs were killed, including Te Ahitana of "Ngatiawa" and Karira of Ngati Maniapoto.63 However, in line with the general Maori strategy of relying on purpose built modern pa which could be abandoned quickly and easily, Pratt's argument does not necessarily hold.

61 Different sources give different estimates of the size of the Ngati Haua force. Cowan states that there were between 50 and 150, while Pratt states "confidently" that there were 150. It was rumoured that there were 1000 warriors in the party, but Pratt dismisses this number as an exaggeration. Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, p.198.; Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 23 October 1860, Enc.2 in No.53, BPP/IUP, v12 1861, p.166.
62 Despatch Major-General Pratt to Governor Gore-Browne, 6 November 1860, No. 1, AJHR 1861, E-1a, pp.7-8. [RDB v14 pp.5211-2.]
63 Despatch Major-General Pratt to Governor Gore-Browne, 31 December 1860, No. 2, AJHR 1861, E-1a, pp.8-9. [RDB v14 pp.5212-3.]
In the New Year the Government continued to negotiate with the Waikato over the war in Taranaki, and the involvement of these iwi, and the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement. In a discussion with Thomas H. Smith at Mangere, Tamati Ngapora noted obstacles in the way of a peaceful settlement.

First was the Government requirement that the men involved in the murders at Omata should be given up. The second issue identified by Ngapora was the impression that compensation would "be demanded for the losses of the Taranaki settlers, and that the land would be taken." He thought that it was improbable that Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui would give up the men because although called murder it was in line with the Maori customs of war. Moreover, Paratere Te Kopara, who was killed at Waireka, was solely responsible for the act of his party. Even if peace was made with Te Ati Awa and Waikato, Ngapora stated that the former would be bound in honour to aid the Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui iwi, they having supported Te Ati Awa.

When Smith identified the Kingitanga as a barrier to peace Ngapora disagreed with him. Ngapora stated that he did not see the Kingitanga as a ground for quarrel, and said that "if this was the Governor's intention, it should be made known, that they might know what to prepare for." If the Government closed the door on Maori independence and the Kingitanga, then they were closing the door to peace.

The interviews with various chiefs over peace continued on 2-5 February. The chiefs proposed that the piece of land at Waitara be left aside or set apart to "be afterwards arranged or settled by a court or wakawakanga." Their second demand was that the Governor was not to "hold or bear in remembrance the causes of evil, whether as regards men, the land, or murder or property, let these be all unloosened, all forgiven, now at the present time."

In reply to their solutions to the hostilities Governor Gore Browne stated that he saw nothing he wanted: "not a word about the future recognition of British law in cases where individuals of the two races were concerned, nor

64 T.H. Smith, Notes of a Conversation with Tamati Ngapora and Patara at Mangere, on 2nd of January 1861, Encl. in No. 4, BPP/IUP, v13 1862–4, p.27.
about compensation for the devastation that had been committed at Taranaki, nor about the murders of the boys at Omata in March 1860." He also said that he was unwilling to accept the armistice proposed by them because he argued that there were no guarantees that the fighting would end, and that in the break in the hostilities the Maori might be able to harvest the crops they had planted in the region of Huirangi.

The chiefs stated that the proper course was to make peace and settle the differences afterwards. The Governor replied that such a course was out of the question. The Maori continued that all their chiefs agreed with these terms. The Native Secretary, Donald McLean, said that the course proposed by the chiefs was inadmissible. Ngapora argued that in the end it was up to Kingi and the Governor to make peace and stop the fighting, but the Governor still said that there was nothing in the terms that would prevent the Waikato from resuming the bloodshed. So the fighting continued.

**Facing the Sap: January - March 1861**

The Maori had been successful in battle. In order to limit his losses, and in response to the strength of the pa, General Pratt changed his strategy to sapping. The Imperial forces constructed Redoubts along the line of operations to consolidate the advance made by the sap, and to provide bases, and close range cannon fire when attacking the Maori.

To facilitate the sapping method of attack, the British embarked on a spree of redoubt building. On 15 January the 670 troops marched to the redoubt at Kairau (Kairoa?) for this purpose, hoping to build another in advance of it. The Maori in the vicinity fired on the advancing troops. Four days later a detachment of 133 men from the 65th Regiment arrived from Wellington and Napier, and were sent straight to Kairoa. Two redoubts were constructed, and another was being erected five hundred yards in advance of the second.66

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66 Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 15 January 1861, Encl.2 in No.3, *BPP/IUP, v13 1862-4*, p.21.; Major General Pratt to Governor, 19 January 1861, Encl.3 in No.3, *ibid.*
On 22 January the pa at Huirangi was attacked again. The Maori evacuated the pa a week later on 1 February.

On 23 January, against the more established pattern of waiting for the British to attack, one hundred and forty Ngati Haua, Waikato and Te Ati Awa men attacked the third the series of British redoubts near Kairoa, following the slow British advance on their position over the previous fortnight. The losses to the Maori were heavy, and the attack was unsuccessful. The British counted thirty four of the various iwi killed. They held two mortally wounded men, and four prisoners wounded from the party defending their land.67 Cowan states that 50 Maori were killed, including chiefs Te Retimana, Paora Te Uata (Ngati Raukawa) and Ratima Te Paewaka of Waikato.68 Paora Te Uata and Wiremu Hoete Kumete were interred in New Plymouth. Others were buried by the soldiers at the site. The wounded were brought to the Hospital for treatment.69 In his despatch to the Deputy Adjutant General, Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie wrote with satisfaction that the "enemy completely routed retired in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded.70

On 2 February the British troops took possession of Huirangi and the entrenchments surrounding the pa, which had been destroyed in September. A redoubt for four hundred men was built on the site. The

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67 Lt-Col Leslie to Deputy Adjutant General, Enclosure 1 in No.3, 23 January 1861, AJHR 1861, E-1a, p.12 [RDB v14 p.5216.]
68 Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.21.
69 Despatch Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, No.3, 23 January 1861, AJHR 1861, E-1a, pp.10-11. [RDB v14 p.5214-5.] List of those Maori killed on the battlefield was Enclosure 4 in No. 3. [Ibid, p.13. [RDB v15 p.5217.] Paora Te Uata, Raniera and Te Te Whireinui all Ngatiukorehe, from Patatere; Hohai Te Hama, Te Hama, and his son Wiremu, Patata and Te Hata, all from Patetere [sic]; Tungou Heremakimiki, Wiremu Hoete, Matauharua and three not recognised by name all Ngati Hawa, Hema Te Hui, Wanakere and Werahiko all Ngati Haua, Wiremu Horete Kumete and Kiwi of Ngati Maniapoto; Horia, son of Wiremu Kingi Ngawaka of Te Atiawa; Hemi Kuka; Te Retimana Riwi of Ngatiraukawa. Fifteen not recognised because they were disfigured by wounds. Prisoners wounded mortally were: Totere, nephew to Paora Te Uata of Ngatiukorehe; Mahi Nkatiahuru [sic] of Hamaria and Inuhaere, a Waikato mokai of Te Atiawa, Dangerously wounded were Kirikona Rewiti of Ngatikoroko and Marakai of Ngatiraukawa. That was a total of thirty six killed and five wounded.
70 Lt-Col Leslie to Deputy Adjutant General, Enclosure 1 in No.3, 23 January 1861, AJHR 1861, E-1a, pp.11-12. [RDB v14 pp.5215-6.]
"enemy" was reported to have retired further inland to another line of defence.\textsuperscript{71}

In a further sapping operation on 10 February the British attacked Te Arei - a purpose built modern pa on the north west front of the old pa of Pukerangiora. Maori were reported to have had only one man wounded. In total the Maori lost thirty men killed and wounded in the sapping operations. The British troops took possession of twenty five acres of maize and potato cultivations.\textsuperscript{72}

The war of 1860-1, while in no way a victory in military terms for the British, represented a foothold for them into Taranaki lands where they had been denied land previously. Prickett states that the successive military campaigns of this period saw the "almost complete expansion of European settlement throughout Taranaki at the expense of the Maori population." It is clear that there was a new military landscape replacing that familiar to the Maori. Old pa sites were erased as British fortifications were built on top of them, for Wharepapa pa was replaced by Fort Niger; Pukekohe pa by Camp Waitara, and Rungapiko pa by Fort Murray. The at least twenty redoubts, stockades and blockhouses built in the area around New Plymouth and the Waitara were military holds on land, some of which were not abandoned until the 1880s, by which time the land was held by Pakeha settlers.\textsuperscript{73} The

\textsuperscript{71} Major General Pratt to Governor, 6 February 1861, Encl.1 in No.9, BPP/IUP, v13 1862-4, p.36-7.

\textsuperscript{72} Major General Pratt to Governor, 14 February 1861, Encl.5 in No.9, BPP/IUP, v13 1862-4, p.37.

\textsuperscript{73} Prickett gives the histories of the following military buildings constructed during the first war. These formed a basis for the later military expansion in following wars, finally forming part of a military frontier that stretched from Pukearuhe in the north to Whanganui in the South: Mt Elliot (hill mouth of Huatoki stream 1840s, fortified 1860-1; Marsland Hill, 1855-1880; Fort Stapp, near Mount Bryan Domain; Henui Blockhouse, overlooking Henui Stream; Fort Niger, formerly Wharepapa pa; Fort Cameron, Fort Herbert, Carrington Road Blockhouse – all situated on the edge of high ground behind the town of New Plymouth; Fort Murray, between the Mangoatuku Stream and the sea, formerly Rungapiko pa; Bell Block Stockade – the only position held north of New Plymouth until February 1864 when the Mahoetahi redoubt was recaptured and a new one built at Sentry Hill; Omata Stockade 1860; Ohukalaitara Stockade; A stockade built on site of Ngapuketura, near Mahoetahi; Camp Waitara, used through out the war and then again on the re-occupation of Waitara in 1865, still used 1869; Tataraimaka had Pakeha fortifications in 1860; Puketakauere Stockade, destroyed at the opening of the second war; Waireka Camp, redoubt on hill at Omata, abandoned but reused in 1863; Camp Parawha and Orongomairangi sap 1860, reused 1863, abandoned 1865; Mahoetahi Stockade, pa site, between Waiongana and Mangaoraka Stream, held and used at least until 1865; Matarikoriko Stockade, 1860, given to the care
military buildings formed the base around which the Government planned military settlements, which in turn created an area of expansion for Pakeha farming. First the military settlements and then the farms steadily took land from the Maori people, particularly with the passing of the New Zealand Settlements Act. As the military frontier stretched out so did the Pakeha farms.

Peace Talks and Peace Terms, March 1861

Dr Ann Parsonson, in her report "The Waitara Purchase and War in Taranaki" writes in detail on the peace terms and negotiations. It is proposed here only to summarise what she has written. For full detail refer to the aforementioned paper.

In March 1861 Wiremu Tamihana Te Waharoa arrived in Taranaki to discuss peace terms. Parsonson states that he talked to Wiremu Kingi Te Rangiatake, and then proposed to the Native Commissioner, G.Drummond Hay, that the Waikato return home, that the British troops withdraw to Waitaki (Waitaha?), and the Waitara land remain undisturbed until some final decision was made. On 12 March Pratt rejected the terms of this truce, stating that he would retain possession of Pukerangi and Te Arei. Tamihana held further negotiations with Donald McLean, the Native Secretary, hoping that the issue of the Waitara which had led to the present war, be settled. Tamihana then returned to Waikato.

On 27 March 1861 Governor Gore Browne himself came to Taranaki, accompanied by two Waikato chiefs who opened the negotiations, the Attorney General and the Minister of Native Affairs. Wiremu Kingi and the Governor did not meet as neither would go to the other's camp. The Governor did meet some Te Ati Awa representatives, including Hapurona Pukerimu. Kingi did not sign the peace terms that were negotiated, although he wrote to the Governor that he had consented to peace.

The terms offered by the Governor to the "Waitara Insurgents" stated that all land in possession of Her Majesty's forces was to be disposed of by the

of Hapurona still in occupation when the second war began.; Huirangi Redoubt 1860 occupied on and off until 1869.
Governor as he saw fit, and that all plunder taken by Maori was to be returned. The title of the Waitara land was to be investigated, and the survey completed without further interference. The land around the Blockhouses and redoubts was to be kept by the Crown, and roads were to be made through the Waitara district. Once the "insurgents" had agreed to the terms then they would get full protection of the law. No mention was made of the restitution of Te Ati Awa property. Hapuroa Pukerimu signed the terms on 8 April, speaking for himself and sixty four others whose names were listed.

Governor Gore Browne dictated Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui harsher terms, with only a few days to reply. The Governor required their "entire submission to the Queen and the law", all plunder returned and compensation paid. People, goods and mail were to be permitted to flow freely through their territory. Those who had killed 'unarmed settlers and children" (referring to the killings at Omata in March 1860) were to be apprehended and tried for their crimes.

The Taranaki people did send an envoy to accept the peace terms. Ngati Ruanui made no similar move; they did not make verbal submission, let alone written, to British authority - although the Governor did mention in a despatch that he was aware of a meeting to be held between the Taranaki, Ngati Ruanui in consultation with Waikato, to decide what course of action to take. They wanted adequate time for this process.\(^5\) Formally no plunder and no "murderers" were given up, and no compensation was given. The Southern tribes added 1 000 cattle to their herds after the cease-fire. In addition they banned the passage of travellers and mail through their territory. Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui seized the 4,000 acre Tataraimaka block, as hostage for the 500 acres at Waitara.

Towards the end of April Donald McLean sent Hohepa Tamahehangia (Tamahehangia?) of the Ngatitou (Ngati Toa?) and Ropiha of Ngati Ruanui to convey the terms of peace to the southern iwi. The Taranaki iwi deputed Komene to come up and talk to McLean. Komene said that his people wished to accept the terms, to gain the protection of the Governor, and to renounce their alliance with Waikato. McLean reported that the only

\(^5\) Governor Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 12 April 1861, No.17, BPP/IUP, v13 1862-4, p.53.
opposition to this plan was from "a small tribe at Warea (Putukahi) who still cling to and avow their allegiance to the King." He wrote that the "whole of the Taranaki people evince a desire to submit to the terms, and from their close propinquity to New Plymouth their doing so will prevent any war parties from coming through their territory towards that settlement." Ngati Ruanui were still talked of in harsh terms. McLean reported that their conduct "during the suspension of hostilities, having destroyed some settlers' houses before retreating to their country, fully indicates that they require further chastisement before they yield submission to English rule and authority."

In line with the on-going consultation and admonishment directed at the Waikato throughout the 1860-1 conflict, meetings were held with these tribes during the peace-making, warning them about the consequences of their involvement. At a meeting at Ngaruwahia in May 1861, the Governor put forward his demand that there be compensation for plunder by Maori. Echoing earlier statements made by Ngapora, Wiremu Tamehana Te Waharoa replied thus:

Mo nga taonga tenei wahi. Ko nga taonga i kia mai e koutou kia whakahokia atu nga mea e takoto nei. E kore ano tika ena i ahu. Kia rongo mai koutou i tuku tikanga mo ena. Na te Kawana te take o ena. Ka whawahaitia a Wi Kingi ka ona atu i tona pa, ko te pa ka tahuna ki te ahi, ko te whare karakia ka tubuna, me te pouaka Kawenata; pau katoa i te ahi nga taonga kakahu, paraikete, hate, tarau, kaone; pau katoa. Nga kau, kainga iho e nga hoia; nga hoia 100, maketetia iho e nga hoia. Ko te tino mea tenei i manukanukatia e te ngakau o Wi Kingi, ko tona hahi i tahuna ki te ahi. Me i puta he kupu ma te Kawana kia kaua e tahuna tona hahi, kia waiho marie ona taonga me ano karehe, kua puta hoki tona whakaaro ki te tohu i nga taonga o nga Pakeha. Koia tenei te take o nga taonga o nga Pakeha i ngaro ai, no te noho-tahangatanga o Wiremu Kingi i runga i te mahi o te Kawana; e ki an ia, na te Kawana katoa te take o enei mahi, nana i timata tera huaraahi, he haere kau tana i runga.

That I also do not consider right. Hearken to what I propose with respect to that. The Governor was the cause of that. War was made on Wiremu Kingi, and he fled his Pa. The Pa was burnt with fire; the place of worship was burnt; and a box containing testaments: all was consumed in the fire; good, clothes, blankets, shirts, trowsers [sic],

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76 Report by Donald McLean, Native Secretary, 1 May 1861, Encl.2 In No.19, BPP/IUP, v13 1862-4, p.45.
gowns, all were consumed. The cattle were eaten by soldiers and the
horses, one hundred in number, were sold by auction by the soldiers.
It was this that disquieted the heart of Wiremu Kingi - his church
being burnt with fire. Had the Governor given word not to burn his
church and to leave his goods and animals alone, he would have
though also to spare the property of the Pakeha. This was the cause of
the Pakeha’s property being lost (destroyed). When Wiremu Kingi
was reduced to nakedness through the work of the Governor, he said
that the Governor was the cause of all these doings. He first
commenced that road, and he (Wiremu Kingi) merely followed it.77

Ngapora viewed the war in Taranaki as a war of sovereignty, for the
“mana” of New Zealand. He stated that the Maori King wanted a friendly
alliance with the Queen, but wanted supreme authority in his own
territory. If it was the Governor’s intention to demand the submission of
the flag of the Maori King, then he should state so.78

Meanwhile in Taranaki, the Government made continued attempts to
subdivide the land at Waitara in accordance with the terms of peace put
forward by the Governor - amongst its “former owners” with reserves made
for blockhouses and redoubts, including a small piece of land surrounding
each one. Hapurona Pukerimu stated that it was the wrong time to pursue
such a course - the wounds of the people were not healed.

Rogan, the newly appointed commissioner to Taranaki, thought Hapurona
Pukerimu stood on his own, and that the people of Huirangi and Mataitawa
had “nearly all deserted him on account (they say) of his abandoning the
Waitara cause, the Maori King and New Zealand." However, when the
Commissioner met the Huirangi and Pukerangiora people at Te Arei, he hit
a wall of opposition to the Government actions on the land. Wereta said
"Hapurona has given over Onukukaitara to the Governor, which we all
assented to, and beyond that place we will not allow any interference.”
Aperahama agreed on this point, saying that Onukukaitara had been given
for the wrong done to the Pakeha. All other land, including redoubts,

77 Letter in Maori of Wiremu Tamehana Te Waharoa, No.18; Translation of the
Reply of Wiremu Tamehana Te Waharoa to the declaration addressed by his
Excellency the Governor to the Natives Assembled at Ngaruawahia., No.19, 21 May
1861, AJHR 1861, E-10, pp.16-17. [RDB v14 pp.5242-43.]
78 T. H. Smith to the Secretary of State, “Notes of a Conversation with Tamati
Ngapora and Patera at Mangere, on the 23 January 1861.”, No.5, AJHR 1862, E-1
s1, p.11. [RDB v15 p.5379.]
belonged to Maori and was not to be interfered with - “if you should come hereafter with your chain to measure, that is a path to death.”

**The Issue of Compensation**

The Maori had entered the conflict in defence of their land and autonomy. However, the predominant Pakeha view of the war for many decades afterwards has been that the "net result of the war was the enormous destruction of settlers' property at comparatively small cost to the Taranaki Maoris. More than three-fourths of the farmhouses at Omata, Bell Block, Tataraimaka, and the settlements nearer the town had been destroyed...The total value of homes and stock lost was estimated at £200 000. The blunder of the Waitara purchase set the province back well-nigh twenty years." Government concern about the settlers at the time was reflected in their attempts to provide at least some financial compensation for loss of both life and property.

On 29 August 1860 a Select Committee was appointed to consider the state of affairs of the Taranaki settlers, and how to remedy their situation. The Committee was made up of Messrs Weld, J.C.Richmond, Williamson, Moorhouse, Fitzgerald, Gillies, Domett and Sewell. Sewell stated that it was an injustice to keep the settlers in Taranaki in doubt as to whether they would be compensated for the losses they had sustained in the war. Their losses should be ascertained and set right. He said that "[i]t was an ugly fact" that there had been great loss to property, and that compensation was "a simple matter of right and justice." The settlers should be re-established as quickly as possible. "The war was provoked by no act of theirs: it was made promising by the British Government, and the natives were induced to direct avenge the injuries done by the settlers."  

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79 Mr. Rogan to Native Secretary, 28 June 1861, Enclosure I in No.9, AJHR 1862, E-1-s2, pp.20-1. [RDB v15 pp.3417-8.]  
80 Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.219.  
81 Frederick Weld was a Member of the Executive Council, MHR for Wairau, and became the Minister of Native Affairs in November 1860. James Richmond was a member of a prominent Taranaki settler family, his brother C.W.Richmond being Minister of Native Affairs 1858-60. J.C.Richmond was Member of the House of Representatives for Omata - a Taranaki seat, and a member of the Taranaki Provincial Council. His wife had been evacuated to Nelson with other families in March 1860. James Fitzgerald was MHR for Ellesmere in Christchurch; Thomas Gillies was a member of the Otago Provincial Council and the MHR for Dunedin County District; Alfred Domett was MHR for Nelson City. He was to be Premier 1862-3; Henry Sewell was MHR for Christchurch. Source: Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, v1, 1990.  
82 John Williamson was MHR for the Pensioner Settlements of Onehunga, Franklin and Raglan.  
83 D.S.Moorhouse was MHR for Akaroa.
necessary for political reasons and they were fighting the battle of the colony. J.C.Richmond, while acknowledging a personal interest in the matter of compensation, argued that the Taranaki settlers were entitled to the support of the colony in what was a national war to uphold the authority of the Queen.

Members of Parliament showed great concern about the suffering of Pakeha settlers, who were portrayed as innocent bystanders in the midst of a politically inspired war. J.C.Richmond suggested a number of provisions for compensation. Men disabled in the war, widows and orphans should be adequately maintained. The local men should be allowed to leave the militia as the civilian force could "no longer be said to be defending their homes, as their homes are gone." Their families were a burden to the colony, and it made economic sense for the men to be permitted to return to their families. The situation in Taranaki was one where "property to the value of a hundred or two hundred thousand pounds has been destroyed, where probably the burnt homes might now be reckoned by the hundred, much and heavy distress must exist, setting aside that from death and wounds." In addition there was a shortage of food, clothing and shelter.

The Government had paid out substantial amounts of money for the evacuation and maintenance of the families of Taranaki settlers. The exact sum is difficult to ascertain, but there are a number of mentions of payments made for this purpose. In October 1861 Governor Grey noted that the cost of removing women and children from Taranaki amounted to £29,000. He estimated the losses of the settlers to have been around £150,000, but thought that the total losses were much greater. Grey stated that

As rulers of this country, we must weigh the miseries and losses of all classes of the population, whether European or Native, who are alike subjects of the Queen and have equal claim on Her Majesty's care. If, then, the losses which the Natives must sustain in any general war is considered as well as those I have already brought under review, [the losses of the Pakeha settlers] they will add a very large amount to those already estimated for.

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82 Mr Sewell, August 29 1860, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hereafter NZPD) 1860, p.397.
83 J.C.Richmond, August 29 1860, NZPD 1860, p.397.
84 Governor Grey to Secretary of State, 25 October 1861, No.4, AJHR 1862, E-1 s2, p.6. [ROB v 15 p. 5403.]
The Select Committee resolved that the expense of maintaining the refugee families from Taranaki was to rest with the Colony. Any money paid out by Provincial Governments was to be refunded. In the name of economy, the Committee agreed that the militia men should be released from service.

Taranaki settlers were to be permitted to leave the Province, temporarily or permanently, should they wish to do so. The Government wished to afford "every person desirous of leaving Taranaki" the opportunity to do so, and the "full benefit of his labour and outlay during such residence[outside the Province of Taranaki]." Those who took up the offer were entitled to an order for land of a specific value, estimated according to the land laws of the particular province. A crown grant would be issued after five years of occupation and use, or earlier if the land was paid for by the occupier. Those militia and volunteers who accepted the offer of land would be given an allowance in lieu of three months' rations in order to settle their families. Land allowances were to be charged against the amount of compensation that might later be granted.85

In its final report, the Committee agreed that there were strong moral grounds for compensation in the case of the Taranaki settlers. Taranaki was a province under the Constitution Act, and the settlers had therefore been guaranteed enjoyment of the protection of law. The origin of the war was not traced to actions by any of the settlers, it was rather the "result of a course of policy sanctioned by the General Government of the colony.", [emphasis added] The losses consequent upon the war should, therefore, be carried by the Government.

The Select Committee further considered that the "losses sustained by the destruction of homesteads are partly attributable to the abandonment of their homes by the outsettlers, in obedience to orders from the military and civil authorities - many outsettlers leaving to do military duty." Those outsettlers who had requested that they be able to stay and defend their property had not been permitted to do so, and their homes had been lost. Losses were to be determined at the end of the war, and total compensation was not to exceed £25 000. Mr Gillies (MHR for Dunedin County) expressed reservations, arguing that the Imperial Government, whose soldiers had

85 Resolutions of the Select Committee to Consider the State of Taranaki Settlers, September 1860, NZPD 1860, p.519.
fought the war, should bear the cost of compensation. On 9 October 1860 the report of the Select Committee was adopted by the Committee of Supply, and the Taranaki Settlers' Relief Act passed.\(^{86}\)

The Act itself was to provide relief for "Settlers and others who have sustained injuries in the Taranaki War" - it being "just and expedient", according to the Preamble, that they receive some aid. Application was to be made in writing subject to a number of conditions. Application had to be made before January 1862, accompanied by a declaration to a Justice of the Peace, on the correct form. The applicant had to have been a resident in Taranaki on 5 April 1860. The Government would issue an order entitling "such applicant to select from the wastelands of the Crown within the Province specified in such Declaration, Land of the value of Forty pounds, estimated at the fixed or upset price of Lands in such Province."\(^{87}\) Land had to be selected within six months of the issue of the order.

In October 1860 £25,000 was allocated by the Committee of Supply, to the "relief of the settlers" on the express understanding that the "sum has been computed so finally and conclusively to dispose of the question of money relief, or compensation from the funds of the Colony."\(^{88}\) Despite this hope that there would be no further money allocated for the purpose of relief, money continued to be paid out. Under the New Zealand Loan Bill 1860 £5,000 was applied out of the war loan of £150,000 towards refunding payments and advances made by Provincial Governments for the relief of the Taranaki Settlers.\(^{89}\)

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\(^{87}\) New Zealand Statutes.


\(^{89}\) Committee of Supply, 2 November 1860, JHR 1860, p.237. There were mentions of specific amounts paid out for particular purposes from the war loan, but it is difficult to assess the total actually spent. See, for example, Return of the Amount Expended out of the War Loan of £150,000 from 1st October 1860 to 12th June 1861, A/JHR 1861, B-5, p.5. The balance sheet notes money paid for passages for refugees, money to the Provincial Treasurer in Nelson and smaller amounts spent refunding goods, Provinces Separate Accounts, A/JHR 1862, B-1, p.42 and p.44. - payments to Nelson and Taranaki. There are mentions of payments to individuals. W.Grey in Nelson received over £6,000 for the relief of the refugees in Taranaki. Advances to Officers of Government and others, A/JHR 1864, B-1, pp.30-1. Not all these amounts represent compensation to those who suffered losses in the war. Most seem to be maintenance payments for those who left their homes.
Henry Sewell was commissioned to ascertain the losses of the Taranaki settlers.\(^90\) The total value of the claims put in under the Taranaki Relief Fund for the actual losses of property sustained by settlers he put down as £181,693. At the time of writing, October 1861, he was engaged in the actual settlement of claims, and thought that he could reduce the amount to be paid by around £25,000. He believed that the amount fairly claimable did exceed £150,000 - exclusive of deterioration in the value of property or non-occupation of land, and from general depreciation.\(^91\) Sewell did apparently set the amount for the value of stock lost by the settlers in 1860-1 as £35,732, but at this point the rest of his awards are unknown.\(^92\) In October 1863 it was reported in the financial accounts of the colony that £22,771 had been paid out by the sub-commissioners for the relief of the "inhabitants of Taranaki", a total of £23,191 being paid up to this date.\(^93\)

The on-going finance for the relief and reinstatement scheme for the Taranaki settlers was to funded out of a loan by the Colonial Government - under the Loan Act 1862. The main object of the Loan Act was to provide the means to pay the Imperial Government the amount they claimed from the Colony for expenses incurred in the Taranaki war. The Act also provided the sum of £200,000 for the reinstatement of settlement in Taranaki (separate from the £25,000 Taranaki Settlers Relief Fund). The proposal relied on the Imperial guarantee of the loan.\(^94\)

In later discussions it was stated that the sum was to be used for the "reinstatement of the settlers and inhabitants of Taranaki" - and there was concern that the settlers did not know how the money was to be applied to "liquidate the losses of the settlers during the war" and the reinstatement of settlers now that the Tataraimaka block was reoccupied, and there appeared to be no further barriers to settlement. The Governor thought that it was impossible for the Government to define exactly what measures were necessary for the security of the area. He expressed concern about "driblets"

\(^90\) The New Zealand Gazette does not have a copy of Henry Sewell's commission.
\(^91\) Henry Sewell, Commissioner, Estimates of Losses of Settlers at Taranaki from the Late War., 15 October 1861, Enc1.5 in No.4, AJHR 1862, E-1, pp.10-11. [RDB v15 pp.5407-8]
\(^92\) F.D.Bell to Domett, 1 May 1863, Encl. in No.2, AJHR 1863, E-2, Papers Relative to the Waitara, p.18. [RDB v16 p.5806.]
\(^93\) Finance Accounts of the General Government of New Zealand, 1 October-30 September 1862, AJHR 1863, B-1, p.25.
of money being paid to the settlers, causing a large sum of money to be “frittered away in rations of other eleemosynary [charitable] relief.” He decided that £120,000 of the £200,000 should be allocated for the settlers’ losses, and arrangements should be made for the payment of £90,000, being the balance between the sum of £200,000 and the £30,000 already paid. Grey recognised that the money would not pay the losses in full, but thought that it would benefit the province, and the individual settlers who had lost property.95

The Governor thought that some further plan should be adopted because the losses could not be met solely out of the £200,000. He proposed that settlers receive, partly in cash and partly in an acknowledgement bearing interest, the full amount allowed by Mr Sewell. Grey invited the Provincial authorities to assist in the scheme. The Provincial Council was to pass an ordinance whereby the Province would be charged with the difference between the amount allowed by Mr Sewell, and the sum of £140,000, including the £25,000 paid in 1860, which would have been granted by the colony to the settlers of Taranaki. The Province of Taranaki was to pass an ordinance96 authorising the issue of debentures to the value of £50,000 redeemable after ten years, with the Government guaranteeing the interest for the first five years, taking the money from the reinstatement fund. The scheme still depended on the sanction of the Imperial Government to the Loan Act 1862.97

There was opposition from the Imperial Government over the proposed three million pound war loan. The Secretary of State, Cardwell, advised the Colonial Government to reapply for the smaller sum of £500,000 which had been submitted and then withdrawn at the end of the last parliamentary session, bringing the guaranteed loan to a total of one million pounds. The offer was made only with the conviction that “the recent successes of the Queen’s forces and of the Colonial militia and volunteers will have placed in the Governor’s hands the power of securing a just and permanent

96 Loan Ordinance 1863, Encl. to No.8, 26 March 1863, AJHR 1863, A-3, pp.6-7.
peace", and that Grey and his colleagues give an assurance of their desire to co-operate in this just and temperate policy towards the native race.\footnote{F.Rogers (on behalf of the Secretary of State) to Grey, 26 May 1864, AJHR 1864, D-3, pp.6-9.; [RDB v17 pp.826-6-5.]}  

There was conflict within the Government over whether the Reinstatement fund could legally used for compensation. Domett, in his position as Colonial Secretary, asked Attorney-General Frederick Whittaker whether the Government was authorised under the terms of the 1862 Loan Act, to pay the Taranaki settlers the £171,000 claimed by them as compensation for their losses, and wanted advice as to what the Governor and the Executive Council could authorise. Whitaker noted that the £200,000 was to be used for the "permanent reinstatement of Taranaki", and that the Governor and the Executive Council had discretion with regard to these matters, but was of the opinion that "no part of the money can be legally applied in giving compensation for past losses." The Ministers wrote a memorandum stating that such a use of the money was a misappropriation of the fund.\footnote{Memorandum by Colonial Secretary for the Attorney General, 17 March 1863, No.4, AJHR 1863, A-3, p.3.; Opinion of Attorney General, 19 March 1863, Ibid, p.3.; Memorandum by Ministers in Auckland (signed by Reader Wood and Thomas Russell of the Treasury) 19 May 1863, No.12, Ibid 1863, A-3, p.9.}

Governor Grey was unhappy with the opinion given by Whitaker and the attitude of his ministers. Grey believed that until the Taranaki settlers were compensated for their losses, the Government would have to continue to support them using some form of "charitable aid." Doling out this kind of money he considered to be demoralising for the population, and it was cruel to keep the settlers in doubt as to what they would receive. The lack of progress with regard to compensation meant that no future plans could be made for the settlement. The Governor felt that the administration was "honour bound" to provide some sort of compensation.\footnote{Memorandum by the Governor, 21 March 1863, No.5, AJHR 1863, A-3, p.3.}

The proposed compensation did not necessarily involve expenditure on the farms of the settlers. Grey stated that he "knew that his duty was to strive to re-establish the settlement of Taranaki, not to reproduce it in its former form. He believes this last operation to be simply impossible." He wrote that the settlers had been driven from their farms for three years - those had been farmers were now merchants, shop-keepers or had gone into other
totally new pursuits. The former settlement could not be reproduced, and reoccupation was not compensation in the mind of the Governor. He wanted the issue dealt with quickly, particularly in light of the "dreadful murders" the "Natives" recently committed. [at Oakura] 101

The final form of the scheme was still not set. In June 1863, the proposal was reassessed when the fighting broke out in Taranaki again. Domett stated that due to these altered circumstances the Government was unable to carry out the arrangement of £90,000. He proposed instead to pay interest at 8% per annum on the £90,000, to the persons whose losses had been ascertained by Sewell. The sum paid would be charged against the Reinstatement Fund. 102

The problems continued over the amounts awarded by commissioner Sewell. In May 1864 Thomas Beckham was commissioned to investigate Sewell's awards. There was concern about the supposedly "exorbitant amounts" recognised in these awards - arising from the fact that equally exorbitant claims had been made. Beckham's commission required him to select five or six cases and assess the compensation awarded. 103 His selection encompassed two of the largest awards, two claims that were fully recognised, and three which had been much reduced by Sewell in the original awards. He found little to dispute in the judgements of Sewell, and thought that it was unwise to re-open the claims. 104

Beckham's commission was continued in November 1864. He was required to investigate the supplementary and military claims, in addition to those reported on by Mr Sewell. He wrote to the Colonial Secretary in the middle of that month, that only twelve supplementary claims were lodged with the sub-commissioners, but that 300 wished to lodge claims, amounting to £20,000, with him. 105

101 Memorandum by the Governor, 16 May 1863, No.10, AJHR 1863, p.8.
102 Colonial Secretary to Superintendent of Taranaki, 19 June 1863, No.15, AJHR 1863, A-3, p.10.
103 Colonial Secretary to Superintendent of Taranaki, 19 December 1863, AJHR 1864, A-3, p.3; Colonial Secretary (William Fox) to T. Beckham, 17 May 1864, AJHR 1864, A-3, p.3.
105 For full list of claimants and awards see National Archives: TP 9/1 Reports from Commissioners.
There was only one mention of a Maori person in connection with applications for compensation. Sewell made judgement as to the claims of a "rebel native for rent." He stated that a "rebel native who has been instrumental in ousting a Tenant from the occupation of his land will not be entitled to recover rent from such Tenant - unless therefore the Tenant has actually paid rent in such cases; he should not be treated as entitled to participate in the Fund on account of his supposed hostility." It is interesting to note that in other districts, notably Waikato, there were numerous claims for compensation for war damages from Maori, enough to fill a large ledger book. No such claims are to be found for Taranaki, where no Maori seems to have received any compensation for losses during the war.

Originally £150,000 had been allocated for the purpose of reinstating settlement in Taranaki. Reader Wood, the Colonial Treasurer, reported in 1863 that £51,569 had been spent towards that end. From this fund payment was made for the Taranaki Relief Commissioners (£37,934), passages for refugees, expenses of the Governor (£800), expenses connected with a scheme to introduce German immigrants to Taranaki (around £300) the cost of military buildings at Tataraimaka and militia pay (around £12,000).

The measures undertaken by the Government left the settlers dissatisfied because not all their claims were paid out in full. While Members of Parliament repeatedly defended the innocence of the settlers, drawn into a war based on a Government policy, the iwi who had been pulled into the fight for their lands were punished as rebels - the wording of the peace terms leaving no doubt as to their guilt in the wars. Despite the recognition that Maori would have suffered considerable losses in the fighting, there is no discussion on directing the compensation towards them.

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106 Some appear to relate to Compensation Court awards, and others to applications for compensation for losses sustained in the wars. See National Archives MA Series 61/4, Schedule of European and Maori claims reinvestigated in 1867-8, and MA 61/8 List of grants of land awarded to particular persons, 1867-1872.
1860-1: Losses to Maori, and Attempts to gain Redress

Governor Grey, in an 1863 despatch to Newcastle, noted that the iwi who had seen British troops march out onto their lands, and saw no alternative but to mount a defence against them. "The iwi believed that a great crime has been committed against them. That through all future generations it will be told that their lands have been forcibly and unlawfully taken from them by officers appointed to them by the Queen of England", and that her laws have failed to rectify the wrongs.108

Adding to the injustice felt by the iwi were the material losses they suffered because of the British invasion. This report can in no way even attempt to show the reality of the losses to the iwi, in terms of life, land or disruption to way of living. What follows provides a glimpse into what mainly Pakeha observers and participants in the war noted at the time.

In March and April 1860, south of New Plymouth, Wareatea, Mokotura, Warea and other settlements were entered with the aim destroying the flour mills in the area; several pa were destroyed, wheat stacks were burned, a flour mill rendered useless, cattle and horses looted. The Warea area was well known for its productivity. Probably the first Maori owned flour mill in the country had been established there on the banks of the Kaikoura Stream in 1847, and was in full production by 1848.109 The settlements were shelled by the HMS Niger on 30 March, suffering heavy damage. Komene's mill, on the Werekino Stream, just south of the Hangatahua River was destroyed in early April.

In retaliation for the destruction of villages and other property, Taranaki Maori had devastated the whole of the abandoned Pakeha settlements - burning nearly every house outside New Plymouth. Riemenschnieder commented to John Whiteley that the Warea Maori argued that they were

108 Despatch Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 24 April 1863, No. 1, AJHR 1863, E-2, pp.1-2. (ROB v 16 - p.5789-90.) Grey's comments were not without political motivation, especially so when trying to smooth the path for the abandonment of the Waitara purchase without losing face, but in writing this despatch, given his motivation he was able to pen a most telling view of the war.
109 Kelvin Day, Warea School and District Centennial 1884-1984, pp.18-22, p.29. The mill appears to have been abandoned by 1860. Other mills were destroyed by the British troops.
defenceless against the shelling by the "Niger" and were "justified by example in falling upon defenceless persons or property by land."\textsuperscript{110}

Francis Dillon Bell, the Minister of Native Affairs, felt that it was unjust to ask Maori to return plunder and let colonists keep what they had taken. In a letter to Domett, he enclosed evidence of losses to Maori - recorded by Parris. His letters show that there were expeditions by civilian settlers to take property from Maori settlements, when the opportunity presented itself. Parris noted that "a number of cattle and horses" were brought back by parties of mounted civilians who had accompanied the expedition to Warea. He wrote that such groups took advantage of the movement of any force "to capture cattle and horses which are afterwards sold or slaughtered for private benefit." In some cases claims to these beasts were made by "friendly natives" or other settlers.\textsuperscript{111}

There are examples of Maori attempting to gain redress for such actions by appealing to the Pakeha Courts. In May 1861, Haripa preferred a charge against soldiers and militia stationed at the Bell Block for unlawfully taking his pigs from Maori land beyond the Block. A cart had been hired on three different occasions, and twenty pigs taken.\textsuperscript{112} In another case Matene Tupoki claimed a horse that was in the possession of a commissariat officer - Mr Neill. The officer refused to give up the horse. Tupoki got a summons, and the case was heard by the Resident Magistrate. In the eyes of the court Tupoki failed to prove the horse was his, despite its distinctive branding, and the horse was returned to Mr Neill.\textsuperscript{113}

Parris was concerned that Pakeha possession of Maori goods would lead to trouble. In one case, the Mataitawa people had returned the property of Europeans that they had taken. Parris was concerned that because Pakeha were still riding horses belonging to Maori. He feared that this would lead to further "unpleasantness."\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{110} Cowan, NZ Wars, I, pp.181-2; Riemenschneider cited by Kelvin Day, op cit, p.30.
\textsuperscript{111} F.D.Bell to A.Domett, 1 May 1863, Encl In No.2, AJHR 1863, E-2, pp.17-18. [RDB v16 p.5805-6.]
\textsuperscript{112} Extracts from the letters of Parris, AJHR 1863, E-2, pp.18-19. [RDB v16 pp.5805-7.]
\textsuperscript{113} Parris to Native Minister 26 March 1862, AJHR 1863, E-2, p.19. [RDB v16 p.5807.]
\textsuperscript{114} Extracts from the letters of Parris, AJHR 1863, E-2, pp.18-19. [RDB v16 p.5805-7.]
So-called "Friendly Natives" were in no way exempt from loss. On 7 April Parris received a delegation from a group of four Maori from the Kawau pa in New Plymouth (near the beach close to the Huatoki River). They came to complain about the excavations through their pa carried out by the militia as part of the road building schemes aimed at establishing settler presence and military access in Taranaki. The excavations aimed to open Currie Street to the beach. Parris wrote that the "commencement of this work before the land has been acquired by the Government from the Native owners appears to me rather injudicious." The workings passed through the Kawau reserve made in 1844.

The people from Kawau had been induced to leave their pa at the beginning of the Taranaki War "in order that the Town may be free of Natives by night" - the Government being unsure of the extent of loyalty of their supposed allies, and unable to identify friend from foe. They were given assurances that Kawau would be returned to them in its entirety, as they had left it. On these conditions they agreed, and were put to the trouble of building a new pa at Puketotara, two miles from town.

In April 1861 without consulting the owners, the land was valued so that it could be offered for sale. At the time of the valuation Parris felt obliged to point out that the sale of Kawau would deprive the Ngamotu people "of all their sea frontage, and the landing-place of their canoes for fishing - a deprivation which will be severely felt by them." He wrote that it was possible that land could be allotted to the Kawau people near the mouth of the Henui River. Halse advised Parris that the Kawau land was to be purchased as soon as possible, and that land near the mouth of the Henui should be allotted.

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115 See Charles Brown (Superintendent of Taranaki) to Provincial Council: Message 96, Encl. 1 in No.1, 20 May 1862, AJHR 1862, A-6e, Further Papers Relative to Military Road Parties at Taranaki, pp.3-4. See also section on the military settlements, and the importance of road building in that scheme.

116 Parris (Assistant Native Secretary) to Native Minister, 16 April 1862, No.18, AJHR 1863, E-4, pp.63-4. [ROB v16 pp.5990-1.] Puketotara was destroyed.

117 Parris (Assistant Native Secretary) to Native Minister, 16 April 1862, No.18, AJHR 1863, E-4, pp.63-4. Halse, Acting Native Secretary, to Assistant Native Secretary, 9 May 1862, ibid. [ROB v16 pp.5990-1.]
Lieutenant Bate's report to the Governor concerning the Pekapeka Block and its resources, gives a picture of destruction. Te Kuhikuhi, Kingi's home, and Wheroihia were:

burnt by natives in the Queen's pay assisted by marines and sailors...The extensive cultivations around these pas were likewise destroyed by the troops, friendly natives, and others, and an inland cultivation belonging to Tamati Teito and other natives, some of whom were friendly (and which cultivation was situated at a "kainga" or settlement on the Waiongona [sic] called Poata) was also destroyed together with the native houses standing near it.

An attached map showed that a blockhouse was built on the site on Te Kuhikuhi. Bates noted that the destruction of the pa and cultivations led to retaliation by Kingi and his followers who burnt "an exactly corresponding number of settlers' houses, no settlers' houses having been previously burnt or destroyed by them." The pa of Te Teira and his followers, Te Huriarapa, between Te Kuhikuhi and Wheroihia, continued to be occupied by his people.118

Te Kuhikuhi and Wheroihia were abandoned in haste, and a "considerable amount of property destroyed". The soldiers who burnt the pa reported finding the remains of furniture, cooking stoves and even money melted into a lump. There were also boxes, chests, and boots. The remains of the iron cooking stove were taken and used by the soldiers.119

Other pa were destroyed: "Pukutotarei" (Puketotara?) on the Waiwakaiho River - on 2 September 1860, and two pa between the Bell Block and Waitara, Te Puki(Nga Pake?) and Te Turia (Te Tima?). Ngatiparirua and Hairau were both destroyed and burnt.120

In September 1860 Pratt reported that in the past few weeks troops had destroyed between twenty and thirty fortified pa, many recently built. He did not specify whether these pa were to the north or south of New Plymouth. They were abandoned in great haste, leaving half cooked food. He stated

118 Report of Lieutenant Bates to Governor Grey, 10 April 1863, Encl. 2 in No.1, AJHR 1863, E-2, p.4. [RDB v16 p.5792.]
119 Statement of E.Houltham, AJHR 1863, E-2, p.11. [RDB v16 p.5799.]
120 Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 8 September 1860, No.3, AJHR 1860, E-3c, p.15. and ibid, No.32, p.16.
that "we have also destroyed a great number of "whares" or native habitations and a considerable quantity of provisions."

Pratt noted that the life of the Maori living through the conflict was not healthy: "During the whole of this period the enemy have been suffering very severely from sickness caused by privation and exposure", although he gave no specific evidence for these statements.\(^{121}\) Added to the uprooted existence of those dispossessed of their homes, were the wounds suffered in the fighting.

There were also British expeditions further south. Pratt reported one to the Tataraimaka Block aimed at destroying three pa: Puketakariki, Orongomahunguai [Orongomairangi] and Mataiau [Mataiaio] belonging to the Taranaki people. These three were abandoned as the force advanced. Large quantities of potatoes were found at the pa, and taken by the soldiers. The pa were heavily fortified - and possibly recently built, one was built on an older pa site.\(^{122}\)

McLean noted that further south, Ngati Ruanui had "almost entirely abandoned their pas and villages on the coast, resorting to them only occasionally in the summer to fish. Their settlements and cultivations are chiefly along the margin of the forest, in places not easily accessible during the winter months."\(^{123}\)

The Continuation of the Fighting

Military Settlement

With the trouble for the Crown supposedly over in Taranaki, the Government hoped to be able to reoccupy the Omata and Tataraimaka Blocks without further interruption. The Government planned to pay out further instalments of the Taranaki Reinstatement fund to encourage

\(^{121}\) Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 29 September 1860, No.34, AJHR 1860, E-3c, p.18.

\(^{122}\) Major General Pratt to Governor Gore Browne, 16 October 1860, No.37, AJHR 1860, E-3c, p.20.

\(^{123}\) Memorandum By the Native Secretary D.McLean to the Secretary of State, c.13 April, Enclosure 4 in No.8, AJHR 1862, E-1, p.19. [RDB v15 p.5387.]
The Under Secretary of the Colonial Office stated that these settlements would be founded on the "Waste Lands of the Crown" in Taranaki. In December, Domett wrote that the Government was prepared for the introduction of German immigrants. In a letter to Godeffroy's, he put forward the settlement scheme - with the proposed town and rural sections of villages, and the twenty acres to be granted to the immigrants who performed militia duties for the colony, after seven years of occupation. The immigrants were to arrive not later than September 1863.

With regard to the settlers' relationships with Maori, Domett thought it improbable that they would have any collision, but recognised the possibility. He thought the best safeguard against any problems was the military character of the settlements and the state of readiness in the towns. He wrote that the settlers would be on "lands which have long been in the possession of Government, and never been disputed by the Natives in the immediate neighbourhood."

The superintendent of Taranaki had a different view of the scheme. He thought that Pikipara, the site chosen for the settlement, was unsuitable. The authorities had, in his opinion, wrongly identified the stronghold of the Maori as the bush, and located the settlement there. Superintendent Brown stated that it was the open fern land where the majority of pa had been located: Tukupera, Ratapihipii and Huirangi were all on the edge of the bushline with roads to them, not deep in the bush. Brown stated that he was not "aware of their habitual presence anywhere further inland than six miles from the sea."

Pikipara was apparently ten miles from the coast, with three difficult mountain streams to cross between it and the nearest road. Brown wrote that it was too far inland to interfere with the Maori, and not eastward enough to "threaten" Ngati Maru, or to interrupt the communications between Ngati Ruanui and Waitara. If the settlement was located at Pikipara it would be isolated and in need of support from the British positions and New Plymouth.

127 W.Glsborne to Mr Kelling, 6 December 1862, No.3, AJHR 1863, D-5, p.2.
128 Alfred Domett to Messrs Godeffroy, 23 December 1862, No.9 and Enclosure, AJHR 1863, D-5, pp.4-7.
129 Alfred Domett to Mr Kelling, 6 January 1863, No.10, AJHR 1863, D-5, pp.8-9.
Brown was aware of the difficulties that acquiring land presented to the Government. He thought that if the Government could not hold onto lands under Crown grant it might be worth acquiring more from both Maori and Pakeha. He stated that there were "Maori reserves and private property that could be acquired without injustice to Maori." In addition he recommended that the "lands of friendly Maoris might be obtained by purchase, that of Rebel Maoris (as at Ratapihipi) by forfeiture." 130

In the end the proposed scheme did not go ahead. The German Government and Godeffroys rejected the terms offered by the New Zealand Government as too harsh for the immigrants to accept. They thought the land was too expensive (at two pounds an acre - higher than other colonies), and that not enough of it was offered. The immigrants should be free settlers and not contracted labourers. In the end the final decision came as the delicate situation in Taranaki descended into war once again, and the Government put the arrangements on hold. 131

The extension of control through military settlements required land. Arthur Domett, the Premier, stated in his October memorandum, that land would come from "the property of friendly natives, which must be bought in the usual way." Foreshadowing the New Zealand Settlements Act passed December 1863 which gave the statutory means for confiscation, the source of the funds used to pay for the "settlers" was an "Increase to the Land Revenue" - produced "by the sale of lands forfeited by the Natives at war against us." 132

Before sale, land was to be deducted for the Maori to meet their requirements, and for free grants to military settlers. Initially in Taranaki military settlers were to be stationed between the Tataraimaka and Omata Blocks, in time the settlement was to extend along the West Coast. From its instigation the scheme was intended to take the land with the best agricultural potential for the Pakeha settlers:

130 Superintendent of Taranaki to Colonial Secretary, 3 March 1863, No.17, AJHR 1863, D-5, pp.13–4.
131 Colonial Secretary to Mr Kelling, 9 May 1863, No.19, AJHR 1863, D-5, p.15.; Mr Kelling to Colonial Secretary, 20 April 1863, No.21, ibid, p.16.; Messrs Godeffroy to Kelling, 20 April 1863, Enc1. to 21, ibid, pp.17–18.
[RDB v16 p.5727.]
Now it would certainly be only just and reasonable that all the lands of the Waikato and Taranaki tribes that are best adapted for European settlement should be taken for that purpose, leaving them the valleys and plains further up in the interior. These tribes have wantonly and altogether without provocation murdered our soldiers and settlers, including old men and boys. They have literally declared a war of extermination against us.133

Domett wrote that to avoid driving Maori to desperation and into the mountains, no attempt at "full redress" was to be made. Out of a total of 500,000 acres in Taranaki, 100,000 was to be deducted for the Maori - for a population estimated at 704 males over 14 years resident on the land, 200,000 for the settlers, leaving 200,000 to be sold at a planned £2 an acre - for the best land, and one pound an acre for the second best land. Land for the Maori and military settlers was to be taken equally from both categories.134

Alongside the establishment of military settlements came the building of roads, a task that Domett identified as an integral part of the scheme. He stated that the

most obvious material guarantees for the prevention of future wars are the making of roads that could be used by the military everywhere throughout the country; and the introduction of such an amount of armed population, formed into defensive settlements, as would overawe the Native Tribes. or if not overawe them, at least be always ready and able to check or punish their incursions and depredations.

The roads and the settlements were to be made through and about the frontiers of the present settlements.

We take as the sites of our settlements either the plains and valleys, however far stretching into the interior, still connected with and continuous from those already settled, and thus capable of being included with them within one ring of defence; or the open along the coasts, avoiding the narrow inland gullies or isolated plains of the more central parts of the country.

133 Alfred Domett, Memorandum on Roads and Military Settlements in the Northern Island of New Zealand, 5 October 1863, AJHR 1863, A-8a, pp.7-8. [ROB v16 pp.5753-4.]
134 Domett, Memorandum on Roads and Military Settlements in the Northern Island of New Zealand, 5 October 1863, AJHR 1863, A-8a, pp.7-8. [ROB v16 pp.5753-4.]
The roads were to form an extensive network for both civilian and military purposes - both aiming to extend the hold of the Government and colonists over the land and its Maori inhabitants. One thousand miles of road were to go through the Upper North Island; the roads were to cut through the Waikato country, from Auckland to Taupo, from Taupo to Napier, Raglan to Otawhao, Otawhao to Tauranga, and Otawhao to Waipa. Roads were to be built through the Manawatu, the Hawkes Bay and Wairarapa. Domett was keen that immediately following the establishment of military settlements in Waikato, that a similar plan be carried out “with the rebellious tribes of Taranaki” as an “effectual warning to all other tribes...that a like offence will entail a like punishment.”

In the Taranaki region the network of control was to go from Pukearuhe to New Plymouth, from New Plymouth to Whanganui, from Waitara by the way of Mount Taranaki to the sea coast at Waimate, and from Whanganui a road was to be built linking the town with Wellington.

The military settlers were to hold fifty acre farms on military tenure, first having performed military duties for the colony. The land for these farms was to be taken from the “tribes now in arms against the government” - Taranaki and Waikato. The Government used the justification that the “punishment” was to deter “other tribes from hereafter forming and attempting to carry out designs of a similar nature.” The military settlements meant locating large bodies of British settlers who were strong enough to defend themselves, with an aim of commanding the provinces that were in a state of disruption.

A rough map enclosed in Domett’s memorandum showed sixty five planned military settlements in Taranaki from the Whanganui River to the Mokau River. The Government calculated on four thousand military settlers along the coast between Omata and Waitotara, (a thousand from New Plymouth to the Waimate path, one thousand on Ngati Ruanui land and two thousand on the coastal belt.) The settlers would be distributed in

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135 Domett, 31 May 1863, AJHR 1863 A-8, p.3. [RDB v16 p.5729.]
136 Domett, Memorandum on Roads and Military Settlements in the Northern Island of New Zealand, AJHR 1863, A-8a, pp.2-3. [RDB v16 p.5747-8.]
137 Despatch Grey to Newcastle, 29 August 1863, No.1, AJHR 1863, A-8a, p.1. [RDB v16 p.5746.]
around forty settlements of around one hundred men. A total of 190,000 to 200,000 acres of land were required for the Taranaki military settlers.138

The armed settlements required armed settlers. Domett wanted 20,000 men. Two thousand had already been introduced from Australia and Otago, who would serve as militia and as labourers on the roads when required. He planned to introduce fieldworkers of good character from England and elsewhere. These immigrants could also work on both the roads and the land granted to them. The introduction of these groups depended on peace in the localities where they were to be introduced.139

The passage of the New Zealand Settlements Act in November 1863, with its retrospective clauses validated the earlier plans put forward to take huge areas of land from Maori. Prickett writes that the act "brought military strategy into line with political objectives. To win the war the Maoris were to be systematically dispossessed of their land." In the long term, in both North and South Taranaki, the extension of military control allowed a "general expansion of the farming frontier."140

The Maori Response to British Actions

Since the replacement of Governor Gore Browne by Sir George Grey in May 1861, the Government's policy had been directed towards trying to negotiate with the Waikato people, and bringing the Southern Taranaki iwi under Government control. Belich wrote that when Grey replaced Gore Browne in September 1861 he suspended Gore Browne's invasion plans, and peace seemed possible for the next year. Grey's peace plans were, according to Belich combined with the "new institutions" - the official runangas which were to be set up. Belich described the new institutions as a blind to disguise Grey's preparations for war, and a means of drawing support away from the Kingitanga.141

138 Domett, Memorandum on Roads and Military Settlements in the Northern Island of New Zealand, 5 October 1863, AJHR 1863, A-8a, p.3. [RDB v16 p.5748.]
139 Domett, Memorandum on Roads and Military Settlements in the Northern Island of New Zealand, 5 October 1863, AJHR 1863, A-8a, p.5. [RDB v16 p.5749.]
140 Prickett, "The Archaeology of a Military Frontier.", v1, p.15. and p.153.
141 Belich, Wars, p.120.
The Government Ministers provided a summary of the position of the Colony at the time Grey arrived:

Ngatiruanui and Taranaki Natives remain in a state of passive insurrectionary sullenness - refuse submission to the terms proposed - retain possession of large quantities of the settlers, [sic] stock carried off during the war - have stopped the mail though carried by natives - and threaten death to all Europeans who venture beyond certain lines, so that no one dare travel beyond a few miles from the town of New Plymouth, on the one side, and Wanganui on the other.

The Tataraimaka block was "practically in the possession of the insurgents" who "boast" that they hold it under conquest. The Ministers continued to discuss Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui in demeaning terms:

The case of the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki Natives is one which presents the fewest grounds of sympathy with other Natives. They engaged in the quarrel without provocation, and were guilty of gross outrages.

They thought that the present attitude of these iwi "demand on our part active measures against them, and retribution for the wrongs done...." If these operations were done in combination of opening up the area by road there would be some success in bringing these iwi into submission.142

The iwi of Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui were trying their best to deal with the constant pressure and hostility from the Government. They erected a toll gate the great house of Te-Ika-Roa-a-Maui under the name of the King, Matutaera Potatau. The largest charges were reserved for Pakeha policemen and newspaper mail. Letters that "badly tempted the tribe" were to be seized, and the bearer made to pay £55. The notice, outlining the charges dated 8 July 1862 was later shifted to Puketehe, just beyond Tataraimaka. The British troops removed it in June 1863. The toll was one way of trying to keep elements hostile to the iwi out, maintaining a front against the Government, Pakeha and "Queen's Natives" who were seen to undermine the efforts of Maori to maintain their independence, and stop the loss of land. Parris identified the toll as extending into "Ngatiruanui country."

142 Minute by Ministers on the Position of the Colony at the date of the Arrival of Sir George Grey: Chiefly in relation to the Native Insurreccion, 8 October 1861, AJHR 1862, E-2, p.6. [ROB v15 p.5496.]
Governor Grey described the toll as a "foolish and vexatious proceeding" and a "plot against the Government."\footnote{K. Day, *Warea School and District Centennial 1894-1984: A History,* c1984?, pp.32-3.}

Governor Grey feared that if war was made with the Taranaki people then there would be an outbreak of wider hostilities, and possibly an attack on Auckland. He concentrated on securing the safety of Auckland, including building a military road through the Waikato area. He did, however, want to take measures "for the security of the settlers in Taranaki." Grey's despatch reveals that he wanted to pave the way for Pakeha settlement with the least possible resistance from Maori, and avoiding war where possible. He was not, however, willing to go as far as recognising Maori rights to land, such as the Tataraimaka and Omata blocks, which they claimed by conquest, ridiculing such a "pretension" on their part.\footnote{Governor Grey to Ouke of Newcastle, 6 April 1863, No.44, *BPP/IUP,* v13 1862-4, p.258.}

In later years when the Governor was forced to defend the re-occupation of the Tataraimaka block, he justified it on several grounds. Firstly, he believed that the purchase was valid, and had never been questioned by the Maori. There had been extensive planting by the settlers who had been "driven off" by Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui "to whom we had never done any wrong." Secondly, he stated that to have admitted that a chosen spot, twelve miles from the town of New Plymouth, had been conquered from the English, would have terrified the wavering and prevented allies from risking their territories by helping a people that could not hold their own; and would have encouraged barbarians to attempt the conquest of new homesteads, the capture of more booty.\footnote{Governor to Secretary of State, 7 April 1865, No.31, *AJHR* 1865, A-S, p.20. [RDB v18 p.7017.]} Grey realised that Maori commitment to fighting alongside the British was made on Maori terms. If the British could not appear to be in a position to offer some advantage to Maori who "came over" then he considered there would be fewer Maori "allies" to the British cause. He would not give his
Maori adversaries the additional impetus by admitting that the Tataraimaka and Omata Blocks had been conquered.

Grey was criticised by J.E. FitzGerald (MHR for Christchurch) for his dealings with both the Waitara purchase and the occupation of the Tataraimaka block. FitzGerald wrote that he had

not the slightest doubt that, had the Waitara question been honestly grappled with at once, the restitution of the Tataraimaka would have followed...William Thompson and the chiefs of Waikato offered to go down to Taranaki and effect the restitution of Tataraimaka by peaceful means, and the Governor deliberately refused their offer.146

Belich states that there were signs that Grey, as part of his strategy of reducing the number of Maori hostile to the Government so as to allow for a military focus on the Waikato, made arrangements with some local Taranaki Maori to "trade Waitara for Tataraimaka." He delayed the action trying to persuade the Colonial Ministry to take joint responsibility, consequently some Maori felt that he had gone back on his deal and mounted the Oakura ambush. Grey returned Waitara any way, although his profession that "the Natives are in the main right in their allegations regarding the Waitara purchase" sound hollow in the context of the British actions in holding the Tataraimaka and Omata Blocks. The British garrison was reduced to 700 men. Grey's peace policy was in fact in preparation for war in Waikato.147

It was also Grey's tactic, Belich argues, to use his monopoly on information flow to the Colonial Office to create a "picture of a tense situation in which Maori aggression was possible at any time." He used the Oakura ambush, and the alleged but unlikely (according to his General Commanding the Forces - Cameron) threat of a Maori attack on Auckland to justify increasing troop numbers.148

The Governor went to New Plymouth on 4 March 1863. On 12 March Lieutenant General Cameron marched for Omata, with a force under

146 J.E. FitzGerald to Cardwell, 15 April 1865, Encl.1 to No.40, AJHR 1865 E-2, p.38. [RDB v16 p.7035.]
147 Belich, Wars., pp.119-122.; Grey to Newcastle (Secretary of State), 24 April 1863, AJHR 1863 E-2, p.2. [RDB v16 p.5790.]
148 Belich, Wars., p.124.
Colonel Warre of the 57th Regiment. The Omata block was occupied, Grey wrote, "not only without any opposition from the Natives, but with signs of goodwill on the part of many of them." The Imperial troops constructed a redoubt at Poutoko to house two hundred men. The Governor wished a road to be constructed from Poutoko to New Plymouth. He ordered reinforcements for the re-occupation of Tataraimaka, and on 28 March Lieutenant General Cameron arrived with a cavalry force of one hundred men, and an additional two hundred infantry under Captain Mercer.\footnote{Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 6 April 1863, No.44, BPP/IP, v.13 1862-4, p.258.}

On 4 April the combined forces marched for Tataraimaka. Again Grey reported some signs of welcome, and no opposition from the local people. "We not only met with no opposition from the Natives, but some chiefs who had been hostile to us came to our boundary on this side of the block, and received us with loud cries of welcome." A redoubt was built on the block on 6 April. Grey reported that "formerly hostile natives" brought potatoes to the camp to sell.\footnote{Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 6 April 1863, No.44, BPP/IP, v.13 1862-4, p.258.}

Information from Māori involved in the fighting revealed a different underlying reaction. Cowan, who spoke to Hori Teira, writes that the re-occupation was accepted as an act of war. Taranaki sent out appeals for assistance to Ngati Ruanui and Nga Rauru, and to Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato. A letter appealing for support was sent to Wiremu Kingi at Kihikihi.\footnote{Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.222.} According to Lt Bates Ihaia Te Kirikumara said that the Mataiwawa people had informed the Kingitanga of the re-occupation of the Tataraimaka Block and asked for instruction, and were advised to strike the troops while their numbers were small.\footnote{Report by Lieutenant Bates, Interpreter to the Forces, 8 May 1863, No.6A, AJHR 1863 E-2, pp.23-25. [RDB v16 pp.5811-3.]}.

On 4 May 1863, thirty Ngati Ruanui and Taranaki ambushed and killed nine soldiers at Oakura, near Tataraimaka. Ihaia Te Kirikumara, interviewed by Governor Grey on 7 May, stated that he did not consider the killings to be the work of Taranaki alone, but rather it was "the deed of the whole island, on account of the holding of Waitara."
Cowan writes that the New Plymouth authorities had been warned by Maori fighting with the British that ambush was likely, and indeed Frey enclosed a letter from a runanga sitting in Taranaki, dated December 1862 which warned that “...if Waireka and Tataraimaka are forcibly taken possession of by the Governor’s orders, an attack will at once be made on the Pakehas.” There was also evidence that prior to the Oakura attack ambushes had been placed on the road to Tataraimaka, in clear opposition to Government intentions in the area. 153

The immediate reaction from Grey and two of his Ministers was to call for the confiscation of the land of those involved in the ambush - a call still preceding the passing of the New Zealand Settlements Act. They thought that the land between Omata and Tataraimaka belonging to Parengarenga Kingi and those involved in the fighting should be forfeited. In addition disguising their threat and drawing attention away from Tataraimaka, they decided that there should be a meeting held to appease the Te Ati Awa people, to state that it was no longer advisable for the Government to “complete the purchase” of the Pekapeka block.

Arthur Domett advised the Governor to meet with Te Ati Awa, renounce the purchase and warn the people against any association with Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui. He stated that they should be told that if they “refused to comply with this condition and any assistance of any kind whatever is given by them to the Southern tribes, the whole of their own land at Waitara will be declared forfeited in like manner as the territory between Omata and Tataraimaka. Domett recommended that a proclamation be issued to Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui stating that “it is the Governor’s determination if the murderers are not given up within a month from this date to hold those tribes responsible as accessories to and participators in the crime. In a strategically timed action the purchase of the Pekapeka block was renounced on 11 May, and the troops withdrawn on 13 May. 154

153 Cowan, NZ Wars; I, pp.223-4. The author had talked to Hori Teira sentenced to life imprisonment because he was identified as taking part in the Oakura ambush, who after the war, having his sentence cut to 4 years, farmed near Parihaka; Letter from runanga of Taranaki, 8 December 1862, Encl. in No.9, AJHR 1863 E-2a, pp.11-2. [ROB v16 p.5867-8.]; Grey to Newcastle, 5 May 1863, No.14, ibid, E-3, p.25. [ROB v16, p.5881.]

154 Dr Ann Parsonson, “The Waitara Purchase and War in Taranaki,” pp.89-91.; Minute recording the steps proposed for abandoning Waitara and in regard to reinforcements, Domett to Grey, No.4, AJHR 1863 E-2, pp.20-1. [ROB v16
The Imperial and Colonial troops followed through Domett's threat when on 4 June 1863, twenty eight Maori were killed defending their pa at Katikara, on the Tataraimaka Block, south of New Plymouth. There were fifty Maori in the party - reported by Cameron to be from Taranaki, Ngati Ruanui, Nga Rauru and Whanganui. They retreated, faced with the advance of the new British commander, Lieutenant-General Duncan Cameron, with 870 troops and accompanied by bombardment from the "Eclipse". The British burnt the whare in the pa, and destroyed potato and maize cultivations outside the settlement. The Imperial troops buried the Maori dead in one pit down the Tataraimaka near St George's Redoubt on the Katikara River.

Belich writes that the war in Taranaki demonstrated that the Government did not have the ability to enforce substantive authority over the Maori while the Kingitanga continued to defend their boundaries of control. In order to do so the Government decided that the power of Kingitanga had to be destroyed. The leaders of the Kingitanga refused to submit to British control and on 11 July 1863, Grey ordered the invasion of the Waikato. Grey alleged that the Oakura ambush was an "assassination" by order of some of the "upper Waikato" chiefs. He believed that the Maori King knew the orders had been issued, or that he was powerless to interfere.

Throughout the 1860-1 fighting in Taranaki the numbers and strategic position of Waikato appeared such a threat to the Government that it was forced to consider them when undertaking military action. According to B.J. Dalton, writing in *War and Politics in New Zealand*, the war in Waikato was one of calculated aggression on the part of Governor Grey and the Government. It was designed and conducted in such a way as to drive the Waikato from their territory and occupy it in readiness for settlement by colonists. The prime object of the war was clearing and holding onto a great tract of land - which was to be "forfeited" by those in arms against the Government. Prickett writes that the continuing war in Taranaki, as with

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155 Lieutenant General Cameron to the Governor, 9 June 1863, No.1, AJHR 1863, E-5, pp.2-3. [ROB v16 pp.6002-3]
156 Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 6 January 1864, No.1, BPP/IUP v13, 1862-4, p.291.
the war in Waikato, "the instrument of a deliberate policy of expansion of European settlement made legal by the New Zealand Settlements Act." 157

In Taranaki, the Southern iwi continued to face sporadic operations by the Imperial troops. On 15 September a party of around thirty Maori were ambushed by the Imperial troops near Wairau Stream. Three Maori were killed - including one chief, whose taiaha was taken by the troops. Three others were wounded and ran. The following party were driven back to a swamp. When another group was seen coming from Ahuahu the troops drove them back. Two were seen shot, and another fell from a cliff. 158 On 24 September the Imperial troops attacked the Kaipakopako pa, near Mataitawa, north of New Plymouth. The Maori were driven across two rivers and into the bush leading to Mataitawa. Three or four Maori were wounded. There were no British casualties. 159

On 2 October 1863, the Maori retaliated with an unsuccessful attack on the British position at Poutoko. The British estimated there to be between 600-800 Maori. The Maori forces were driven back. The British troops had command of the area from Waireka Hill to the redoubt at Poutoko. Major Butler estimated that there was one Maori killed and several wounded. The British had one killed and eight wounded. 160

The Pai Marire or Hauhau Faith 161

Lyndsey Head, who has studied the writings of Te Ua Haumene for many years, has produced the most recent work on the Hauhau faith. She prefers

158 Captain Russell to Colonel Warre, 15 September 1863, Encl. in 30, AJHR 1863, E-5, p.36. [RDB v16 p.6037.]
159 Colonel Warre to Assistant Military Secretary, 26 September 1863, Enc1 to 31, AJHR 1863, E-5, p.37. [RDB v16 p.6038.]
160 Colonel Warre to Assistant Military Secretary, 6 October 1863, Enclosure to 33, AJHR 1863, E-5, pp.40-43. [RDB v16 pp.6041-3.]
161 Head writes that the name Hauhau "has been rejected in recent work on the grounds that it is a perjorative term coined by Pakeha in the 1860s. This is not the case; the word was used by Te Ua to describe his followers...The term signified to believers their communication with God through the gifts of the spirit." L. Head, The Gospel of Te Ua Haumene, "Journal of Polynesian Society", v101 March 1992, p.14; Head "Te Ua and the Hauhau Faith in the light of the Ua Gospel Notebook." M.A.Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1983, p.88.
the term Hauhau to the rather better known one Pai Marire because Te Ua used the word Hauhau to refer to his following. She argues that in the three years between the formation of the church in 1862 and 1865 when Te Ua Haumene\textsuperscript{162} was captured by the Government forces in September of that year, Te Ua made a statement of mana motuhake, which had a profound influence on the course of Maori Christianity. The basis of the religion was strongly in the spirituality and ethics of the Bible. The Bible, Head writes, gave

authority and shape to the values which needed to be re-expressed in order to encompass social change. Foremost amongst these was autonomy. The value placed on autonomy stemmed from the organisation of traditional society into numerous small units whose independence was expressed in competition, ultimately in warfare. When changes caused by European influences meant that warfare no longer functioned positively in society, the Bible offered a way to redefine the autonomy of the \textit{hapu} in terms of the will of a god who required peace.

Head wrote that before the wars of the 1860s the chief benefit of Christianity named by Maori was peace.

As the pace of change continued, including a demography in which the number of Pakeha in the country drew level with, and then outstripped Maori population, autonomy was increasingly redefined in racial terms. Competition was between Maori and Pakeha.

Head wrote that in the 1860s the "pursuit of justice brought the values of peace and autonomy into sharp conflict." She notes that the motives for joining the conflict were complex, but that many Christian Maori, committed to autonomy felt they had no choice. In the context of change and war prophetic movements were born, with Hauhauism being the one of the first associated with the war.

\textsuperscript{162} Te Ua Haumene was born in Taranaki in the mid 1820s. He was captured with his mother in a Waikato raid when he was around three years old, spending his youth at Kawhia. He was baptised into the Christian faith by John Whiteley. Before he became a prophet Te Ua signed himself by his baptismal name Horopapera Te Ua. At a time between late 1862 and mid 1864 he took the spiritual name Haumene. Head explains that Hau is the spirit of God in the image of the wind, and Mene (man) is a transliteration.
Te Ua’s faith grew out of this political ferment in Taranaki. After working as a Wesleyan monitor and as an independent Christian teacher, he joined the Kingitanga in response to the ‘destruction of Maori tikanga represented by the sale of the Waitara block.’ He fought at Waitara, and led a Kingitanga runanga which policed the autaki. According to Head the early military successes led to high hopes in Taranaki for an independent Maori kingdom, and there were reports that supernatural support was required for this goal.

The Hauhau faith was developed in the months following the wreck of the Lord Worsley at Te Namu, in South Taranaki. Te Ua’s gospel was written during this time, predating the public career of the faith. The events of 1865-6, however, made the Hauhau church a byword for “anarchic barbarism for a century.” The actions of settlers, and of the Government were governed by their perception of the faith as savage and violent.

Head writes that the attempts to label the faith as either warlike or pacific need to be looked at in the context of Taranaki in the 1860s. A consistently strong desire for peace was expressed by Te Ua, however his concepts of peace were strongly tied to the concept of justice. Head writes

\[\text{because the Pakehas chose to fight, the choice available to anti-government Maoris was whether to submit to injustice, and lose their land, or fight, and have the land confiscated for 'rebellion.' In this impossible situation Te Ua's political position was cautious and reasoned. He pursued a policy of defensive warfare behind boundaries which guarded the integrity of tribal land. He asserted an identity based on the Maoris' right to own the land and oversee their own affairs...} \]

Te Ua gave many Maoris the will to resist fighting when there was a chance of peace, and the strength to fight when the price of peace was disinheritance.163

Te Ua preached peace at the same time as he called for the angel Gabriel to vanquish the unrighteous. Head writes that it was because “[p]akeha actions over Waitara and in the Waikato were seen as manifestly unjust that Maoris who were not warlike nevertheless took up arms.” Head writes that Te Ua

guarded the heads of slain Pakeha enemies, and sent them around the North Island as tokens of spiritual victory. Inevitably, most

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people perceived them in the traditional way, as *tiwha*, an invitation to join the fight, or as symbols of victory, and the message of deliverance could not be contained within the spiritual boundaries of Te Ua’s vision.\(^{164}\)

As a result the missionary Carl Volkner was ritually killed in March 1865. The Pakeha community was outraged by the killing. Head writes that this was "the single event which defined the character of Te Ua and his faith for 100 years." She states that the killing outraged the cultural assumptions of the Pakehas. They were strangers in a strange land, and they needed a special certainty that their values were sacred as a bulwark against loss of identity. Missionaries were a primary symbol of the Pakehas’ values, which were bitterly mocked in the manner of Volkner’s killing...The emotional context of that image meant that the Pakeha opinion of the Hauhau hardened into loathing.

According to Head, the killing played into the hands of the Government by lending a kind of moral authority to the punitive treatment of “rebellion”. In much of the commentary on the war those fighting against the Government were automatically identified as Hauhau, with the image of Volkner’s death strongly associated with the religion, and this was used as a justification to continue the war against the Maori in Taranaki.\(^{165}\)

**The Attempted Destruction of the Southern Taranaki Iwi**

By the end of 1863 there were already signs that the Government’s campaigns against the iwi south of New Plymouth were disrupting the lives of these people. There were a number of reports of groups from this area being short of food.


Major Logan, reporting on the movement of Maori people in South Taranaki in late 1863, stated that there were no Maori in position in the area other than those occupying the pa at Kaitaki. The "Waitotara people", that is Nga Rauru, had all returned to their homes, with the exception of a couple of chiefs - one, Hare Tipene, had been wounded in earlier fighting.

Logan reported the effects of the war in disrupting the agricultural base of some Taranaki Maori. He wrote of "...the extreme scarcity of food amongst them; for some weeks past the Wanganui and Ngati Ruanui tribes have chiefly subsisted on nikau, the inner part of the fern tree." The result of the food shortage was that these people had had to split into smaller groups, now residing mainly around Witora and Warea. A group of young men from Topine Te Mamaku's tribe had returned from the head of the Waitotara River, also short of food.\textsuperscript{166}

Up until this time the Southern Taranaki people had not experienced the full force of British military operations in their country, but in the period 1864-70 they were to fall victim to the Government's campaign of annihilation - where their settlements and cultivations were destroyed, and the inhabitants pursued as they scattered into the bush. The Government effectively crippled the economic heart of the Southern Taranaki Maori. They were driven away from their homes into the rugged inland bush country, forced to live as fugitives on their own land.

Worse was to come as the Government unleashed full military force on the Maori of Taranaki. From 1864 to late 1869 the Government, initially using both Imperial and Colonial forces, attempted to destroy the Maori settlements in Southern Taranaki. Belich writes that the campaigns in Southern Taranaki, which laid waste the Maori settlements on the coastal land and many in the bush, were undertaken somewhat reluctantly by Cameron as commanded by Grey and the colonial Government. Belich states that since they could not persuade the General to "mount a further campaign in Waikato, they wished to crush a secondary bastion of Maori independence - the South Taranaki tribes", an argument with which Richard Hill in \textit{The Colonial Frontier Tamed} agrees. Both writers argue that British sovereignty was nominal in these areas, and that at various

\textsuperscript{166} Major Logan to Assistant Military Secretary, 2 November 1863, Encl.1 in No.1, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.3. [RDB v18 p.6752.]
points the British and Colonial forces attempted to aggressively assert their rule by force.167

In 1865-6 the campaigns were led by the British forces, who mounted three campaigns in South Taranaki. In January-March 1865 Nga Rauru, Pakakohi and Tangahoe - those the Government saw as Ngati Ruanui people, faced the Imperial army under General Duncan Cameron as the force laid waste to their coastal territory. In the words of James Belich, Cameron's invasion "ripped open South Taranaki like a tin opener, leaving it vulnerable to the tender mercies of his ruthless successors."168

Governor Grey issued a proclamation, in both Maori and English, under the New Zealand Settlements Act on 7 April 1865. He called on all Maori who had been fighting against the Queen since 1 January 1863 to give themselves up. Those who had "comforted", "aided", or "assisted" those fighting had also to surrender, as did people who had induced others to join the conflict. If they came in and took the oath of allegiance and surrendered, land could be granted to them on which to settle, allocated by the Government.169

On 22 April 1865 the Governor issued a proclamation, in both Maori and English, condemning Pai Marire, and appealing for assistance to suppress the religion. The English version stated

whereas a fanatical sect, commonly called Paimarire, or Hau Hau, has been for some time, and is now, engaged in practices subversive of all order and morality; and whereas the rites and practices of such a fanatical sect, consisting, as they partly do, in murder, in the public parade of the cooked heads of their victims, in cannibalism, and in other revolting acts, are repugnant to all humanity; and whereas Her Majesty the Queen has commanded her successive Governors in the Colony of New Zealand not to tolerate, under any pretext whatever of religious or superstitious belief customs subversive of order and morality and repugnant to humanity:

...I will...resist and suppress, by the force of arms if necessary and by every other means in my power, fanatical doctrines, rites and practices of the aforesaid character; and I will cause to be punished all

168 James Belich, I Shall Not Die: Titokowaru's War, New Zealand 1868–9, Wellington, 1989, p.7 (hereafter Titokowaru)
169 New Zealand Gazette, 7 April 1865, p.67. [RDB v11 p.4000.]
persons, whenever they may be apprehended, who may be convicted of instigating, or participating in, said atrocities and crimes; and in Her Majesty's name, I call on all well-disposed persons, whether Native or European, to aid and assist me herein to the best of their ability.\textsuperscript{170}

Grey proclaimed that all the land from the Stoney to the Waitotara River to be confiscated during 1865. Some of the land was to be sold to pay for the war, and some was to be allocated to military settlers who had been recruited to fight the war. On the basis of the proclamation Ngati Ruanui and Nga Rauru returning to their coastal lands in 1867 were "squatting" on Crown land. Maori treated the confiscation as meaningless, as did the Government in practice. It did not have the resources to implement the confiscation wholesale. Surveying and occupation depended on short term and pragmatic concerns: the need for land for a particular purpose - a farm for a military settler, the availability of money for surveying costs and the extent to which Maori could be pushed off their land before they resisted. Confiscation was, in the words of James Belich, "sporadic, piecemeal, and unpredictable; an insidious, seeping, nibbling process, a slow cancer."\textsuperscript{171}

There were two ways that Maori could try and ease the spread of confiscation - although the injustice of it could never be eased at all. Then they could negotiate with the government for some places to live, through the establishment of so-called Native Reserves. The alternative was passive resistance, peaceful protest at the confiscation of their land. The strength of the iwi to defend themselves was weakened through the devastation wrought by the Imperial and Colonial forces.

In January and February of 1866 the Southern Iwi faced further brutal treatment from the Government forces. Imperial General Trevor Chute mounted a campaign further inland with a force of Imperials, Colonials and Whanganui kupapa. He destroyed a number of Ngati Ruanui settlements. Both fortified and unfortified villages were burned, those of "friend" and "foe" alike. Chute's strategy known as "bush scouring", involved "sudden attacks on soft targets, even deep in the bush". These "soft targets" were people's homes - unfortified villages, papakainga. Over large areas, and affecting many people, Chute's campaign ravaged the bush settlements.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{New Zealand Gazette}, 29 April 1865, p.129. [RDB v11 p.4013.]
\textsuperscript{171} Belich, \textit{Titokowaru}, p.10.
including those of iwi who were already reeling from Cameron's earlier destruction. Chute's campaign was taken over by Major Thomas McDonnell from August-November 1866, beginning with the treacherous attack on the village of Pokaikai. He killed and burned over a large area, less than Chute only because he had fewer resources.

Bush scouring entailed a few hundred men, without a large supply train, who hunted down Maori in the bush, and forced them to fight by attacking their villages and cultivations. The Imperial, and later the Colonial forces alone, used weaponry suited for such tactics, and made use of settler-frontiersmen in the "irregular" forces, rather than the strict conventional forces. They were recruited from military settlers who occupied the land in Taranaki and elsewhere. Most units were in effect regular troops: for example the Patau and Wanganui Rangers, and the Forest Rangers. In 1867 these groups were consolidated into the "Armed Constabulary."

The British Forces in the Invasion of Southern Taranaki

The tension heightened in Taranaki as the Pakeha continued to encroach on Maori land. Richard Hill writes that the Colonial Defence Force, initially envisaged as some sort of military police for the internal defence of the Colony, and "for the protection or resistance of any District of the Colony in which there may have been or may be a state of war or insurrection", became in effect a sort of standing army, used to supplement the regular imperial troops, and the colonial forces created specially for the war. In Taranaki the Colonial Defence Force was used as a surveillance body, backing up the military threat. Hill writes that their work included "surveillance of "friendly" tribes so as to prevent the possibility of their holding communication with the tribes now in rebellion against Her Majesty."

Towards the end of 1864, the Weld Ministry began its move towards a "self reliance" policy. One of the main components was phasing out of the Imperial troops, a body considered to be too expensive to maintain, and not totally reliable in that if required in some other country they could be withdrawn. Most significantly for the self reliance policy, the presence of the troops meant that the British continued to hold certain controls over the
exercise of state power, and the withdrawal of the Imperial force would mean, in the words of Richard Hill, "a free rein for the colonial state's desire for the rapid subjugation and dispossession of the indigenous race." 172

There was a comparative lull in the military incursions into south Taranaki prior to 1865 as the strategy of the forces were worked out by the Government. For a time the emphasis remained on surveillance, and the building of transport and communication links, particularly between Wanganui and New Plymouth. While not strictly militarily aggressive, these actions represented an extension of Pakeha control and an erosion of Maori rights, continuing to cause aggravation among the Taranaki Maori whose lands were taken under the New Zealand Settlements Act. The temporary shift from warfare to a campaign aimed at the "suppression" and then "civilisation" of those Maori who were defending their rights, was another "mode of turning nominal into substantive sovereignty." 173

The lull was temporary. By 1865 war was again on the agenda of the Government. Hill writes that the settler Government feared a link between the Kingitanga and Pai Marire. General Duncan Cameron, the commander of the Imperial Forces, was "...now instructed by Grey to recommence campaigning north of Wanganui." The soldiers were to crush the Maori who still worked to defend their land, and take the land by force. 174

Up until the withdrawal of Imperial troops in May 1867, the invasion of southern Taranaki was undertaken with both British and Colonial forces, stationed at Whanganui and New Plymouth. In February 1865 there was a regular force of 2,956 men and officers stationed at Whanganui, and 1,541 at New Plymouth - amounting close to five thousand soldiers. Six hundred men from the Waikato Regiment were employed in the Transport Corps and a further eight hundred military settlers were available for service. From 1 February 1865, eighty irregular settlers at Taranaki were available, as well as one hundred Bushrangers under Major Von Tempsky. Together these forces amounted to six thousand men. The Taranaki and Whanganui militia could be called upon to defend their own settlements. In addition

172 Hill, The Frontier Tamed, p.5.
173 Hill, The Frontier Tamed, p.5.
174 Hill, The Frontier Tamed, p.5.
there were some Maori who looked to maintain their own survival by fighting alongside the Government.

The number of Maori defending their land and their livelihood was small. Grey estimated that the combined Imperial and Colonial forces were attacking 1500 Maori men, women and children.

There was on-going conflict between Governor Grey and Lieutenant General Cameron, beginning after the Oakura ambush, over the deployment of troops. Cameron had stepped around Grey's manipulation of correspondence to the Imperial Government, and sent his memorandum doubting the reality of a Maori invasion of Auckland, which Grey had suppressed, to the Colonial Office. Their conflict over the leadership of the war was to continue through the mid 1860's.

In May 1865 the first order from the Imperial Government for the removal of five regiments was received. From July of that year the Colony attempted to rely more on Colonial forces, and its own financial resources, to aid in the removal of the troops. The small permanent colonial force was maintained for the "defence of threatened or unprotected districts." The system of transport and supply, previously in Imperial hands was reorganised. In the twelve months following the order all the five regiments ordered to leave had done so. The twelve months following May 1866 saw the removal of a further four, with one still in New Zealand in November 1867.

The proposed removal of the Imperial troops caused significant conflict and argument within and between the Colonial and Imperial Governments. The Secretary of State in England complained about the lack of action taken to facilitate their removal, and a lack of information from Governor Grey with regard to relevant plans. In December 1866, the Earl of Carnarvon was...

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175 Return Showing the Present Effective State of the Colonial Forces, 6 July 1866, AJHR 1866, A-5.
176 Governor Grey to Secretary of State, 27 April 1865, No.35, AJHR 1865, A-5, p.23. [RDB v18 p.7020.]
177 Belich, Wars, pp.124-5.
178 Memorandum by Stafford, 21 November 1867, AJHR 1868, A-1, p.19. [RDB v21 p.7960.] The ease of the process described by Stafford is misleading. He was trying to make a political point. The Imperial Government was unhappy about the lack of progress in removing the forces. See also Hill, The Frontier Tamed, p.6.
complaining that he had heard nothing. He had seen correspondence showing that Major General Chute had tried to lessen the involvement of one battalion as early as April, but that Grey had neglected replying until mid August, leaving Chute in a powerless position.

Cardwell had instructed Grey not to leave the Imperial troops in isolated outposts. Again the Secretary of State was outraged to find that the Governor rejected Chute's proposals to withdraw the troops from Southern Taranaki. The Secretary of State reacted to the delays by placing the troops under the undivided authority of Major General Chute. He stated to Grey "You will accordingly understand that...you are not at liberty to exercise any control over the movements or disposition of Her Majesty's troops." Chute was to concentrate on getting the troops ready for embarkation. Carnarvon renewed his command that

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\text{troops must not be placed in distant and isolated parts, or employed virtually as a Frontier or Native Police. They must be concentrated in places of easy access where adequate barrack accommodation exists...}^{179}
\]

For his part Grey had been complaining about obstruction from Major General Chute. With regard to the Imperial troops he justified his lack of action on the grounds that the situation in the country was constantly changing, making the continual repositioning of troops necessary. Chute complained about actions being undertaken with the Imperial forces without reference to him first. Grey argued that in times of peril there was no time to consult with an Auckland-based General who refused to move closer either to the seat of Government, which had shifted to Wellington, or closer to Taranaki.\(^{180}\)

Taranaki was one of the regions where troops were being used basically as frontier police. Their use was contrary to the orders from the War Office. The continued confusion over their use made it more difficult for the troops to be used effectively, with some confusion from officers over what they were permitted to do. Ultimately the forces were withdrawn, and the

\(^{179}\) Secretary of State to Grey, 1 December 1866, No.15, AJHR 1867, A-1, p.10. [RDB v20 p.7530.]

\(^{180}\) Grey to Secretary of State, 3 November 1866, No.8, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.7; Grey to Secretary of State, 19 February 1867, No.29, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.41. [RDB v20 p.7586. and p.7620.]
course of the wars in Taranaki in the mid 1860's is marked by a decreasing involvement of Imperial troops.

The forces in the mid and late 1860's differed from the earlier war in Taranaki because of the involvement of kupapa who participated in the fighting. There were a variety of motives for the involvement of kupapa, and a varying commitment to the British cause - all those who fought on the Government side had in common the fact that they did not share British aims, rather they had their own. In a period of great upheaval the kupapa fighters were trying to look after their best interests and their survival in the peace that would follow the war.181

Government Campaigns in South Taranaki

On 25 March 1864 the Taranaki people at Kaitake faced the British at their pa on the Oakura River. It had been built by Patara Raukatauri of Taranaki, one of the messengers of Pai Marire. Lieutenant General Cameron justified the attack as protecting New Plymouth. He thought that the town "could not be safe from the incursions of hostile natives so long as the rebels remained at Kaitake." He aimed to try and get the Maori out of their position at Kaitake, or, failing that, cut communication off with the south by establishing posts on the Timaru River.182

The pa was taken by a British force of 420. After the Maori evacuated it a redoubt was built on the site. There were differing accounts of casualties. Cowan writes that forty Maori were killed and three British.183 There are similar differences in accounts of the number of Maori defending the pa. A prisoner taken said that the pa was defended by 200 Maori,184 while Major Hassard wrote that Parengarenga Kingi had about eighty men with him at

181 Belich, Wars, pp.211-2.
182 Col.H.J.Warre to Deputy Quarter Master General, 26 March 1864, Sub. Encl. in No.33, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.43. [RDB v18 p.6792.]
184 Colonel Warre, 26 March 1864, Encl. in 33, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.44. [RDB v18 p.6793.]
Kaitake. There was no dispute about the destruction - on 18 July two Ngati Raukawa chiefs stated that the pa at Kaitake had been "knocked to pieces by the Armstrong guns, the houses totally blown away."

Colonel Warre, commanding the forces in Taranaki, did not stop at the destruction of the pa. He aimed to "destroy their crops and cultivations, whereby I hope to place a large tract of country between their habitable pas and New Plymouth." In four days, working with a Flying Column, the troops destroyed "every acre of cultivation within 20 miles south of the settlement" of New Plymouth. Warre wrote that in a few days the troops "succeeded" in "driving the whole of the rebel Maories from the several positions they have occupied since March, 1863, on the Patua Ranges; and by the successful attack on Kaitake yesterday have left the rebels no place of refuge on this side of the Katikara River."

Tutu pa, occupied by women and children, was also attacked in March 1864. Colonel Warre had led expeditions in the area aiming to cut communication with the South. He wanted to drive Maori from positions that they had held since March of the previous year. The occupants ran when the soldiers appeared. "The stockade was pulled down and burnt, so also were several whares, not only near the pah, but at some distance from it. Some cattle were taken and driven in, and many acres of cultivation were destroyed."

At Te Ahuahu, near Oakura, on 6 April a small Taranaki party attacked and routed a British patrol on open ground. The British force had been destroying crops in the area of the Patua Range. The group, led by Captain Lloyd, was ambushed. Seven soldiers were killed and twelve wounded. No Maori were killed. The bodies of Lloyd and his men were left naked and decapitated.

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185 Major W. Hassard to Assistant Military Secretary, 18 July 1863, Encl. 1 in No. 2, AJHR 1863, E-3a, p.2. [RDB v16 p.5932.]
186 Colonel Warre to Deputy-Quartermaster-General, 23 April 1864, Encl. 1 in No. 43, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.71. [RDB v18 p.6820.]
187 Col.H.J.Warre to Deputy Quarter Master General, 26 March 1864, Sub. Encl. in No.33, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.43. [RDB v18 p.6792.]
188 Col.H.J.Warre to Deputy Quarter Master General, 26 March 1864, Sub. Encl. in No.33, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.43. [RDB v18 p.6792.]
189 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.16-17.
The British reaction to the killing of Captain Lloyd, was one of outrage. Colonel Warre wrote that the Regular and Militia forces engaged in the fighting, were

animated with one desire, viz., to punish the savage perpetrators of the cruel mutilations on the remains of Captain Lloyd and his unfortunate comrades, upon whom the rebel natives appear to have practised all their ancient and most barbarous rites...the remains...bearing unmistakeable evidence of acts of cannibalism too atrocious to record.190

Such acts were part of traditional warfare and their practice in the course of war is not so surprising. The British, however, for their own cultural reasons had a particular horror of cannibalism, and now drew on it to justify great retribution.

Belich writes that the British force was routed at Te Ahuahu. However, the picture in the official accounts is somewhat different. Warre stated that the pa was taken, and with it a lot of plunder - "great quantities of vegetable produce of every description, all of which, including several acres of growing crops of Indian corn, tobacco, tara [taro], &c were destroyed, after filling two empty carts which I had brought with the column for the purpose." Having "burnt and destroyed" everything they could, the column returned to Oakura.191

Another such expedition in the vicinity of Kaihihi and Hangatahua Rivers on 19 April 1864, destroyed kainga and cultivations. Puketawa pa, found to be deserted, was burnt. The soldiers captured eleven horses. At Paiakamahoe pa the British forces were fired upon, but still managed to destroy cultivations, whare and the pa itself. The force proceeded towards Te Ahuahu where more crops were ruined.192

The next major attack by the Taranaki tribes was on 30 April, when a larger force attacked a British redoubt at Sentry Hill, north of New Plymouth. The redoubt, built at the end of 1863, was on a hill called Te Morere - an ancient

190 Colonel Warre to Deputy Quarter Master General, 23 April 1864, Encl.1 in No.43, AJHR 1864, E-3, p.71. [RDB v18 p.6820.]
191 Colonel Warre, 26 March 1864, Encl. in 33, AJHR 1864, E-3, pp.43-4. [RDB v18 pp.6792-3.]
192 Major Butler to Colonel Warre, 22 April 1864, Sub. Encl. 1 in No.43, AJHR 1864, E-3, pp.71-2. [RDB v18 pp.6820-1.]
pa site. It was near the right bank of the Waiongana River, close to Manutahi. The redoubt was regarded as a challenge by Te Ati Awa - it was on their land.\textsuperscript{193}

Cowan estimates that 200 warriors under the command of Hepanaia Kapewhiti, were involved in the attack. Members of Taranaki, Te Ati Awa, Ngati Ruanui and Nga Rauru were in the taua. Cowan got his account of the fighting from Te Kahupukoro of Otakeho - of Ngaruahine, closely related to Titokowaru, alongside whom he would fight in 1868-9. The casualties were heavy. Te Kahupukoro lost his father and his uncle. Hepanaia was killed. Kingi Parengarenga was killed. Titokowaru lost the sight in one eye at this battle. Cowan put the casualties at fifty Maori killed and another sixty wounded, and one British soldier killed.\textsuperscript{194} The Maori dead were buried outside the redoubt by the Imperial troops.

Following the battle at Te Morere Whitaker wrote that it was vital that an "effective blow should be struck at Taranaki and Wanganui as soon as possible", while the "rebels in arms have not time and opportunity afforded them of recovering from the moral effect of their defeats operating upon the minds of those who have hitherto sided or sympathised with them in the southern districts." He proposed that small blockhouses be erected at convenient distances along the coast to facilitate the movement of the troops, and that supplies could be landed along the coast at Patea, Waimate and Te Namu.\textsuperscript{195}

In September the British continued to assault the area to the north of New Plymouth. The abandoned pa at Manutahi was taken by the British on 8 September. In a similar situation the pa at Te Arei was taken on 11 September. There the British built a redoubt.

The planned British operations in Taranaki in the area from New Plymouth to Whanganui, were delayed in late 1864 because of the escape

\textsuperscript{193} Colonel Warre to Deputy Quarter Master General, 1 May 1864, Encl.2 in No.43, \textit{AJHR} 1864, E-3, pp.72-3. [RDB v18 pp.6821-2.]; There was mention in other despatches. See Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 30 May 1864, No.10, \textit{BPP/IUP}, v14 1865-8, p.46. He mentions "fanatics" were killed at Sentry Hill.

\textsuperscript{194} Cowan, \textit{NZ Wars}, II, pp.22-28. for an account of the battle. His casualty figures are from the Appendices, p.550.

\textsuperscript{195} Memorandum to Grey, F.Whitaker, 27 June 1864, \textit{AJHR} 1864 E-2, pp.69-70. [RDB v17 pp.6624-5.]
from Kaua of prisoners taken by the British in the Waikato on 10 September. The Governor was concerned that the safety of Auckland could be at risk, and therefore wanted to maintain a strong military presence there, and avoid an action that could increase the number of troops needed in other parts of the country.196

1865: Renewed British Invasion

1865 began with the Southern Taranaki people facing a renewed campaign by the British troops. The offensive began in January, with the force eventually numbering more than three thousand. Grey and the Colonial Government, continued their attack on Maori independence.

At the beginning of 1865 the Imperial government made their views of the aims of the wars in New Zealand known. Cardwell, the Secretary of State, wrote about the objects which Her Majesty's government desired to effect for the colonists in this way:

They have wished to carry on the war till the rebels had been unequivocally defeated. This has been accomplished in the Waikato and Tauranga districts, and less completely at Taranaki also. They have wished to inflict upon the rebel tribes, or some of them, an exemplary punishment in the way of forfeiture of lands, which shall deter them from any wanton aggression in the future...Finally, they wish to restore a peace which shall enable Europeans and Maoris to cultivate their lands and pursue their own interests in such security as the nature of the case admits of, and shall remove any occasion for quarrel.197

The Secretary of State, did not, however, approve any aggressive operations by the Imperial forces in New Zealand. He wrote that

If you [Grey] undertake an aggressive war...[to] once and for all subjugate the Natives, you would be involved in an undertaking of greater difficulty than ever with the aid of the whole force now in New Zealand you could reasonably hope to accomplish. The Natives if they did not divide themselves into predatory parties would remain on the defensive, constructing pahs on the strong positions which command the few lines by which it is possible to penetrate the

196 Governor Grey to Secretary of State, 6 July 1865, No.52, AJHR 1865, A-5, p.53. [RDB v18 p.7050.]
forests of the interior. You would be involved in a succession of sieges tedious, expensive, and affording no opportunity of striking any decisive blow, but on the contrary calculated to alarm tribes hitherto neutral or even friendly, - and to draw to the side of the insurgents increasing numbers of allies. This policy Her Majesty's Government instruct you to avoid. They observe with pleasure that in your Proclamation you have said "The Governor will make no further attack on those who remain quiet." 198

The Secretary of State wrote that if it was consistent with the above policy to "chastise into submission the rebel natives of the Taranaki and the Wanganui" then it could be viewed as just with reference to the past, and politic with reference to the future. 199

Despite the concerns expressed by the Imperial Government, aggressive actions were planned for Taranaki. The area was of particular concern to Grey and his officers - as a source of unrest affecting other areas of the North Island. Colonel Greer, commanding the troops in the Tauranga district, stated that "the eyes of all Maoridom are on Taranaki - there is the head quarters of their "Atua" or "God"; and if he cannot drive the Pakeha into the sea there, I think they will give up, on a bad bargain, all over this side of the island." 200

Grey's instructions to Lieutenant General Cameron were that two Regiments were to be employed in either Taranaki or Whanganui, with the object of the Government being

1. The military occupation of sufficient country to gain possession of the Patea River from the sea to the forest, and of the country between that river and the Wanganui, so that the Waitotara road may be carried on.

2. Such occupation of the country from Tataraimaka southwards as will secure for settlement a block of land between Tataraimaka and the Stoney River.

198 Cardwell to Grey, 27 March 1865, No.21, AJHR 1865, A-6, p.17. [RDB v18 p.7083.]
199 Cardwell to Grey, 26 July 1865, No.28, AJHR 1865, A-6, pp.25-7. [RDB v18 p.7091-3.]
200 Governor to the Secretary of State, 6 February 1865, No.12, AJHR 1865, A-5, p.4. [RDB v18 p.7002.]; Col. Greer to Deputy Quarter Master General, 29 January 1865, Encl. to 12, ibid, p.5.; Colonel Greer to Deputy Quarter Master General, 7 February 1865, Encl.1 to No.23, ibid, p.9.
The ultimate object of the Government in undertaking these operations, was the construction of a thoroughfare between Taranaki and Whanganui, and the establishment of military settlements at convenient points.201

The Government ministers endorsed the need for a road through these districts. In a Memorandum they described such measures as "indispensable" to the permanent safety of Taranaki. They wanted the road building to be completed as soon as possible. In addition they wanted New Plymouth and Whanganui strengthened by the extension of settlement to the north and south of both towns "by the location of settlers on the land continuous with the present settled blocks." They thought that a strong post should be established at Patea, and others between Patea and New Plymouth in order to keep the road open.

The Maori in Taranaki were still labelled as "dangerous." The memorandum stated that the

large majority of the natives in this district are, and always have been, amongst the most lawless and turbulent of the native population. They have committed the worst and most unprovoked outrages on the settlers, and are now in a state of open armed rebellion against Her Majesty's authority. There can be no permanent peace until these natives are reduced to submission and their country opened.

The Ministers did not want any policy that would delay the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from the country. They thought that the country was unable to provide any great expenditure on the military operations.202 The Ministers proposed to raise a Colonial Force of 1500 men as soon as the state of New Zealand made it possible, to enable the Government to dispense with services of the Imperial troops.203

Cameron thought that if Colonel Warre occupied the line of the Hangatahua River, then he would have a moveable force to meet any attack made on him.

201 Grey to Cameron, 16 December 1864, No.1, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.1. [RDB v18 p.6923.]
202 Memorandum by Ministers, 6 January 1865, Encl. to No.5, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.2. [RDB v18 p.6924.]
203 Governor to Cameron, 7 January 1865, No.8, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.3. [RDB v18 p.6925.]
In late January the British began their invasion into Southern Taranaki. On 24 January a 1200 strong British force, under the command of Cameron and General Waddy, advanced from the edge of Whanganui to Nukumaru. On 24-25 January 400-600 South Taranaki warriors, supported by some from Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto, attacked the British force from the bush. Their attacks were repelled, with at least twenty three Maori killed, and fourteen British. Cowan's accounts of the fighting were from Te Kahupukoro and from Tupatea te Rongo, a thirteen year old in his first battle at Nukumaru. Tupatea said that the chiefs involved from Pakakohi were his father Haumatao, Tumahuki Rongonui, Paraone Tutere and Kahukuranui. Te Ua Haumene was the head of the group, but they fought under Patohe - a chief of Ngati Hine and Tangahoe, elder brother of Hone Pihama. Taranaki chiefs who fought at Nukumaru were Te Wharepouri and Tohu Kakahi.

Lieutenant General Cameron proposed to cross the Waitotara River and advance toward Patea. He wanted to establish a military post there. Colonel Warre planned to advance from Patea to the Hangatahua River, although Cameron was not optimistic that such a move would be possible as there was unease amongst the Southern people. Cameron wrote that "if we do not look sharp, they ["the rebels"] will soon begin murdering and plundering our own settlers, and I am going to establish a line of forts for their protection along the Kai-iwi." He did not want to cross the Waitotara River until the settlement at Kai-iwi was fortified.

By late January the long running bickering between Lieutenant General Cameron and Governor Grey was coming to a head. Cameron was increasingly critical of the war, partly because of his animosity towards Grey, but he did make raise some important questions. In one despatch, in a state of bitterness he described the war as "miserable", and claimed it was being pursued for the "profit and gratification of the colony." He called the Waitotara purchase a "more iniquitous job that that of the Waitara", and

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204 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, pp.48-9, for Tupatea's account of the battle. Appendices, p.550. for casualties.
205 Cameron to Grey, 28 January 1865, No.19, AJHR 1865, A-4, pp.6-7. [RDB v18 p.6928-9.]
206 Cameron to Grey, 21 January 1865, No.16, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.5. [RDB v18 p.6927.]
was not surprised that the local people opposed the road building in the area. Finally he claimed that

Our proceedings are something like those of a man who, living in a glass house, is constantly throwing stones at the blackguards about him. All the well-to-do settlers are I believe aware of the folly of this cruise, and deplore the war, but the shopkeepers and settlers, greedy of land, of course delight in its continuance.\textsuperscript{207}

On 7 February Lieutenant General Cameron sent his resignation to the War Office, although he did not leave the colony until August 1865.

After Nukumaru the Maori forces attempted to enter the conflict on their own terms. They were concentrated in a newly built pa at Weraroa, and invited Cameron to attack. Cameron did not oblige. Instead he covered Weraroa with a sizeable force and, after building several redoubts - on a cliff at the left bank of the Waitotara River, on the left bank of the Patea River, and another in the area of the present town of Patea, moved north.

Cameron's forces crossed the Waitotara River on 5 February in preparation for advancing on Patea, leaving half the force to hold position at Nukumaru. On 11 February he reported not having "seen a native since we left the Waitotara; the country in the neighbourhood of our camp is entirely deserted." Two Pakeha had been killed in the vicinity. One was a settler who lived on the frontier near Pai-uri, and another a soldier who had gone out contrary to orders, to plunder a Maori village. The settlers panicked and demanded reinforcements. On 16 February a post was established at Patea, and Colonel Weare's forces moved to Waitotara.\textsuperscript{208}

On 6 March a white flag was seen at Weraroa pa. The interpreter to the forces, Charles Broughton, was sent to negotiate with them. The Maori at the pa stated their demands directed to Cameron:

\textsuperscript{207} Cameron to Grey, 28 January 1865, No.19, AJHR 1865, A-4, pp.6-7. [RDB v18 p.6928-9.]
\textsuperscript{208} Cameron to Grey, 8 February 1865, No.26, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.9. [RDB v18 p.6931.]; Cameron to Grey, 11 February 1865, No.27, \textit{ibid}; Cameron to Grey, 17 February 1865, \textit{ibid}, p.10.
You must go back peaceably, you and you soldiers to the other side of
the Kai-iwi, there to watch the doing of that word, the making of
peace and to look out also for the ceasing of the evil. 209

On 13 March around 200 Ngati Ruanui opposed Cameron at Te Ngaio. They
were heavily defeated. Cowan, based on the account of Tupatea of Taumaha,
estimated that eighty Maori were killed, one British soldier killed and three
wounded. Tupatea stated that there were 200 Maori involved, including five
women who were urging the warriors on. One, Tutaki's wife, was killed.
The principal chiefs were Patohe, Haumatao, Te Wakataparuru, Paraone
Tutere and Te Mahuki. Those iwi Cowan identified as taking part in the
fighting were mainly Ngati Hine, Pakakohi and Ngati Ruanui. 210 Two
Maori prisoners were taken. One wounded man asked by General Cameron
why they resisted the advance when they were outnumbered replied: "What
would you have us do? This is our village; these are our plantations. Men
are not fit to live if they are not brave enough to defend their own
homes." 211

In a footnote Cowan comments on the various estimates of casualties. One
Dr. Grace had stated that very few Maori were killed in the battle at Te
Ngaio. The report of Colonel T.R. Mould, of the Royal Engineers, gave
twenty three as the number killed, which Cowan thought to be under the
mark. In Gudgeon's work the number given was fifty six, also thought to be
too low. Cowan states: "It was natural that the Maori losses should have
been underestimated in the official reports of this and other engagements,
as most of the dead were usually carried off the field. It is clear now from
the narratives given me by Tu-Patea and other natives that the Hauhaus
lost eighty killed at Te Ngaio besides having many wounded." 212

Those Pakeha commanders in charge of the soldiers in the field had no
doubt that the Maori suffered more casualties than the colonial troops were
able to ascertain. After the attack on Te Ngaio where casualties were known

209 The runanga of Ngarauru, Ngatiruanui, from Waikato, 1000 men at Te Weraroa
to Cameron, 31 February 1865, Encl. to No. 37, AJHR 1865, A-4, p. 13. [ROB v18
p. 6935.]

210 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p. 47. and p. 54. Cowan's source of information was Tu
Patea Te Rongo of Taumaha, a Pakakohe chief who was also to fight with
Titokowaru in 1868-9. Also on the battle see Cameron to Grey, 14 March 1865,
No. 45, AJHR 1865, A-4, p. 16. [ROB v18 p. 6935.]

211 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p. 54.

212 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, footnote, p. 54.
to be heavy Cameron stated that there were "no doubt still many bodies about the fern and in the swamp, which we had not the time to find." As with the earlier fighting in Northern Taranaki, Maori took their dead and wounded with them where they could, which makes it difficult to ascertain the numbers killed.213

After the battle at Te Ngaio Governor Grey noted the number and composition of the troops available to Lieutenant General Cameron. Cameron had thirty two irregular cavalry, and fifty men led by Captain Percy. Bushrangers were to be sent to his aid, numbering one hundred men. The bushrangers were to act in the country between Whanganui and Waitotara. A Volunteer cavalry under Captain Cameron was to used from Whanganui. Two hundred military settlers were ready to occupy Patea.214

The British continued to extend their hold in South Taranaki. Redoubts were constructed at the village of Kakaramea which had been captured, and at Manutahi (close to Manawapou) on 15-16 March.215 Lieutenant General Cameron reached the Waingongoro River and set up camp, halting his advance. A force of 750 men was left at Patea for the winter. Colonel Warre, the officer left in charge during Cameron's absence, extended the outposts - establishing a strong redoubt at Pukearuhe, one at Warea and another at Opunake. These redoubts brought the length of the Taranaki coastline occupied by Imperial or Colonial troops, to eighty five miles, with forts commanding the country within their rifle range.216

In mid March 1865, Manutahi had the appearance of having been recently occupied. Cameron noted that "There is a good deal of cultivation about it, which we shall consume or destroy before we leave it." Cameron was surprised at the amount of food found at the kainga. "This is the third day

213 See for example: Major Von Tempsky to Brigadier-General Waddy, 14 May 1865, Encl.2 to No.154, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.63. [RDB v18 p.6985.] and Major General Chute to Governor Grey, 8 January 1866, Encl.6 in No.25, AJHR 1865, A-1, p.58. [RDB v19 p.7329.]
214 Grey to Cameron, 13 March 1865, No.42, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.15. [RDB v18 p.6937.]
215 Cameron to Grey, 14 March 1865, No.45, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.16.; Cameron to Grey, 15 March 1865, No.46, ibid, pp.16-7. [RDB v18 pp.6938-9.]
216 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.55.
we have been digging potatoes and cutting maize, and we have not yet finished."\(^{217}\)

On 7 April in compliance with orders from the Governor, Cameron advanced along the coast as far as the Waingongoro River. Adding to the posts at Patea and Waitotara, others were established at Kakaramea, Manawapou and Waingongoro. Cameron felt it unwise for his forces to stretch themselves any further. Two days later the Imperial troops reconnoitred the country between "Kututamie" and "Ketemetea." Cameron noted that "these and the other native settlements between them are either in the bush or so close to it as to afford the inhabitants an immediate retreat. Indeed, they have already abandoned them, and keep only a few scouts in them." He did not destroy the villages because he felt that such an action could bring retaliation, and would gain little.\(^{218}\)

The 7 and 22 April saw the two proclamations from the Governor mentioned earlier. The first under the New Zealand Settlements Act called for the surrender of those involved in the fighting, and promised land on which to settle for those who took the oath of allegiance. The people continued to resist the confiscation of their territory. The second called for aid in suppressing Pai Marire, and promised punishment to anyone judged to be involved in the "atrocities and crimes" which Grey judged to be part of the faith.

The iwi around Patea continued to retreat into the bush as Cameron's forces reconnoitred the area. The Lieutenant General reported on 21 April that all the villages they had scouted were abandoned on approach, with just a few scouts remaining. Cameron wanted to establish a line of posts along the edge of the bush, to keep them in it or drive them further into it, if it be desirable to carry on a guerilla war of this description with them. There are no crops now in the ground, and all the food is probably stored and concealed a good distance inside the bush, and all we should gain by attempting to follow them would probably be a few broken heads.\(^{219}\)

\(^{217}\) Cameron to Grey, 15 March 1865, No.46, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.17. and ibid, No.50, p.18. [RDB v18 pp.6939-40.]
\(^{218}\) Cameron to Grey, 7 April 1865, No.65, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.23.; Cameron to Grey, 9 April 1865, No.68, ibid. [RDB v18 p.6945.]
\(^{219}\) Cameron to Grey, 21 April 1865, No.71, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.26. [RDB v18 p.6948.]
Toward the end of April Colonel Warre occupied a position at Te Namu, close to Opunake. The area offered a relatively safe landing place, as an alternative to the one at Waingongoro, which had claimed the lives of a number of soldiers. 220

At the same time, the Government forces occupied land to the north of Waitara, near Paraninihi (White Cliffs). Paraninihi was occupied with 250 militia and "loyal" Maori. The Governor also wanted to establish military settlements at Tikorangi - with 120 men. Two settlements of "loyal natives" were to be made at Mimi and Urenui. The Government wanted to assert its presence in the area, and to keep an eye on "rebel William King" at Kaipikari. 221

Cameron left Patea on 29 April to visit the Governor and discuss future operations. The communication between the two of them was deteriorating rapidly at this time - with exchanges over the deployment of troops, the questionable Waitotara purchase, and personal animosity. 222 Cameron gave instructions from Auckland for the next three months. He did not return to Taranaki before he left the colony in August 1865.

The bush villages of the Maori inland from Patea were threatened by expeditions by Major Von Tempsky's Bushrangers on 13 May. His force, and soldiers of the Waikato Militia had been scouting the area for four days. They had found a track inland, where streams had been bridged, and where there were some cultivations. On 12 May the troops went up the Patea River, where more signs of settlement were found - eel weirs, and a place for steeping corn. When they stumbled on a village an estimated sixty

220 Cameron to Grey, 3 May 1865, No.87, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.32.; See for casualties from failed landings at Waingongoro, Grey to Cameron, 26 April 1865, No.80, ibid, pp.29-30. [RDB v18 pp.6951-2. and p.6954.]
221 Cameron to Grey, 3 May 1865, No.87, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.32.; Grey to Cameron, 13 May 1865, No.103, ibid, p.38.; Major H. Atkinson (Minister of Defence) to Col. Warre, 30 May 1865, Enc1.2 to No.36, ibid, p.55.; Warre to Atkinson, 30 May 1865, Encl.3 to No.36, ibid, p.55. [RDB v18 p.6954., p.6960. and p.6977.]
222 See for example Grey to Cameron, 15 May 1865, No.105, p.38.; Cameron to Grey, 18 May 1865, No.107, p.39.; Cameron to Grey, 1 June 1865, No.128, p.52.; Cameron to Secretary of State for War, 7 July 1865, No.2, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.5.; Governor's Private Secretary to Assistant Military Secretary, 2 June 1865, No.129, p.52. The Governor did not feel that he should answer correspondence written in such a manner. All AJHR 1865, A-4. [See RDB v18]
Maori defended their homes from the attack. Von Tempsky's troops withdrew under heavy fire, fearing that the Maori had reinforcements.223

After some initial skirmishing at Whatino, near Opunake, when six Maori attacked a military escort resulting in three Maori and one soldier being killed, the Taranaki iwi again faced an attack by the troops. On 13 June Colonel Warre, with three divisions, attacked the Taranaki iwi at their villages inland of Warea. The villages of Ngakumikumi, Okeanui, Nekea (an old fortified position) and Te Puru were destroyed. A "quantity of plunder" from the wrecked steamer "Lord Worsley" was found in the villages.224

The Maori between New Plymouth and Whanganui now faced the advance of more soldiers when the Government continued their aim of opening the country these two centres as a thoroughfare. The 5 June saw Warre and the Bushrangers ship from New Plymouth to Opunake. Captain Mace and the Mounted Cavalry went overland to the same position. Their ship signalled Colonel Weare at Waingongoro to move north. On 8 June Colonel Warre and Colonel Weare (50th Regiment) "advanced from their respective posts and formed a junction on the same day, without opposition thus opening the whole distance between Taranaki and Wanganui."

During the advance from Waingongoro one of Weare's soldiers fell off his horse and was left behind. The man followed his horse inland and was captured by the people from Te Kauae. A messenger from Parris was there, and asked that the soldier be returned. The man was released.

The people at Te Kauae requested that Parris meet with them to discuss peace. On 12 June Parris met with Te Ua Haumene, and listened to speeches from three chiefs from the Waikato area - Tikaokao, Manuka and Haurua. In his report of the meeting Parris wrote that the "tenor of their speeches was most peaceful; in fact I had never witnessed a stronger desire for peace since the war began." Parris stated that Te Ua repudiated the Kingitanga,

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223 Major Von Tempsky to Brig-Gen Waddy, 14 May 1865, Encl.2 to No.154, AJHR 1865, A-4, pp.63-4. [RDB v18 pp.6985-6.]
224 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.57. The "Lord Worsley" was wrecked at Te Namu on 1 September 1862. The ship was carrying passengers, mail and gold from Nelson to New Plymouth and Auckland. Wiremu Kingi Te Matakaatea and Te Whiti looked after the sixty passengers and permitted them to go overland with their baggage, making them pay a toll on the way. Cowan, NZ Wars, I, p.221.
saying "the people of the district, were an independent tribe, and should settle their affairs without reference to Waikato." One man, Ritimana, stated that when the troops were withdrawn, peace would be effected.

On the following day Hone Pihama Te Rei Hanataua brought a cart-load of potatoes, kumara, pumpkins and tobacco as a present to troops at Waingongoro. Groups at Wereweri and Ketemarae followed suit, producing six cart-loads and some pigs.225

The presence of the Imperial and Colonial troops was taking its toll on the people in south Taranaki. Colonel Warre, writing from New Plymouth, reported the arrival of Ranuka, a "rebel native" and his wife and child. They had come to Te Arei by way of the inland track behind the mountain, and surrendered to Captain Saltemarshe. Tikaokao and eighty of his followers offered to surrender to Parris and to return to their own district, in the vicinity of Mokau. Warre stated that "It appears that the Ngatiruanuis are very tired of war, and are very seriously alarmed at the return of the troops to Nukumaru."226

Grey estimated the "total force" the Maori could have collected between New Plymouth and Whanganui, as less than eight hundred men, "including their allies and chiefs, and males of all ages who could have held a gun."227

On 13 July, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, Governor Grey outlined his plans regarding his next moves in the war. He stated that due to the possible reduction of the number of Imperial troops in the country:

...the course that ought to be taken in the present condition of the Colony was 'that a sufficient force should be collected with the least delay practicable to take the Weraroa pa, in such a manner as, of possible, to secure a marked and decided success on our part. That the local Government should then, occupying as it would an

225 Parris (Assistant Native Secretary) to Native Minister, 21 June 1865, Encl.2 to No.54, AJHR 1865, A-5, pp.55-6. [RDB v18 pp.7052-3.]
226 Warre to Assistant Military Secretary, 23 June 1865, Encl.5 in No.58, AJHR 1865, A-5, p.66. [RDB v18 p.7063.]
227 Grey to Secretary of State, 10 July 1865, No.57, AJHR 1865, A-5, p.59. [RDB v18 p.7056.] The Governor was trying to justify his refusal to call for reinforcements at this time, in response to criticism by Lieutenant General Cameron. It is possible his estimates could have been affected by this need.
advantageous position, attempt to come to terms with the leading rebel chiefs, which I believe it could speedily do, and that then, as a consequence naturally and properly following this pacification of the country, the proposed reductions of the troops should be promptly carried out.

The Colony could then make its own arrangements in terms of raising additional troops from within the colony.228

On 20 July 1865 Governor Grey, without Cameron's knowledge, personally directed a small force to Weraroa, near the Waitotara River. The pa was evacuated the next day, many warriors having already left. Grey and others publicised this as a great victory, and as a demonstration of the superiority of the Colonial forces over Imperial troops. When questioned later about the building of the pa Ihaia Tataraimaka stated that it had been built to defend the area around the pa, and to stop the road making that had been started.229

Cowan states that at around the same time Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell and the kupapa forces captured the village of Areiahi. Sixty warriors were taken prisoner, including some from the Ngati Pukeko tribe from Whakatane. The prisoners were kept in a stockade, some were shipped to Wellington. There they were kept aboard a prison hulk, the "Manukau", moored off Kaiwharawhara. Most escaped, with their chief Tataraimaka, by swimming ashore. Several were drowned in the attempt.230 J.E. Alexander was critical of the conditions on board the hulk. In Bush Fighting, wrote that the vessel did not seem to be in a very fit state for the reception of prisoners; the deck was lumbered with miscellaneous articles, as pieces of iron, marling spikes, &c., some of which were thrown into the hold where the prisoners were located, immediately over a quantity of stone ballast.231

228 Grey to Secretary of State, 13 July 1865, No.58, AJHR 1865, A-5, p.64. [RDB v18 p.7061.]
229 Statement by Natives on Board the Hulk regarding the Weraroa, Encl.6 in No.10, BPP/IUP v14 1865-8, p.615.
230 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.52.
231 J.E. Alexander, Bush Fighting, Illustrated by remarkable actions and incidents of the Maori War in New Zealand, 1873, pp.317-8. Alexander does not give the source for his information. He writes that a Court of Inquiry was held, not into the conditions aboard the hulk, but about how the escape was able to happen. As yet I have found no further information on the fate of the prisoners.
It has been difficult to assess how prisoners were treated. From the limited evidence it is clear that they suffered much physical hardship, as well as the pain of being taken from their own lands. It is not clear whether the government made preparations for the detention of any prisoners it might have expected as the campaigns devastated Taranaki; but I have been unable to find who would have been responsible for their care.

In late July, Maori from the Warea district continued to make their presence felt to the Government forces in the area, killing two soldiers who were gathering firewood close to their redoubt. On the following day the Taranaki tribe faced a force of 300 soldiers from New Plymouth. The fighting continued on 2-3 August when the Taranaki Maori inland from Warea once again faced some 400 Imperial troops. Eleven Maori were bayoneted when one company rushed a village, killing and wounding others. The Maori attacked the division from the rear. Another group of five Maori were killed by Captain Colville, who returned to the scene the next day and burned the whare that were there. Cowan listed sixteen Maori as killed. British casualties amounted to four killed and six wounded.

The invasion southward from New Plymouth as far as Hangatahua River (Stoney River) was to form the somewhat tenuous frontier of British control for the fifteen years up until the destruction of Parihaka in 1880-1. The posts established at Warea and Opunake in 1865, were further south, but were essentially isolated and controlled territory only in their immediate vicinity.

Grey's Peace Proclamation

On 1 August 1865, the Governor revoked the proclamation of Martial Law that had been in force in Taranaki from 25 January 1860. As mentioned earlier, Hill writes that at this time there was a temporary shift of emphasis from aggressive warfare to a policy based on the consolidation of the areas already partly under Government control. He writes that the official policy

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232 For further information of the capture and deportation of the Pakakohe people see later section entitled Maori Prisoners.
234 Prickett, "The Archaeology of a Military Frontier.", v1 p.173.
was "...to see British law enforced upon all 'those living inside the boundaries of substantive sovereignty." Such a trend would go some way to explain why Grey chose to announce peace proclamations at this time.\textsuperscript{235}  

In September Grey issued a peace proclamation, dated the second of that month. He proclaimed that the war that had begun at Oakura had ended, and justified that actions of the Government, writing that the Governor took up arms to protect the European settlements from destruction, and to punish those who refused to settle by peaceful means the difficulties which had arisen, but resorted to violence and plunged the country into war.

Upon these tribes sufficient punishment has been inflicted. Their war parties have been beaten; their strongholds captured; and so much of their lands confiscated as was thought necessary to deter them from again appealing to arms.

The Governor continued that all those who had been in arms, would not be prosecuted for their part in the hostilities, with the exception of those involved in various murders. He would restore lands confiscated in Taranaki and Waikato, to those who wished to live under the protection of the law. The boundaries of land they wished to occupy would be marked out for them.\textsuperscript{236}

There was some confusion amongst the Imperial forces following the peace proclamation. At the end of September, Brigadier-General Waddy, commanding the forces at Whanganui, unsure about what he was able to do, wrote for instructions to the Major General in command of the forces for instructions. Waddy supposed that

our relations with the rebel Maories are altered since the proclamation of peace, I wish to be informed if I am able to undertake any operation against them if they do not (within a short time) come in and make submission. There are several villages in the bush all the way from Weraroa to Waimate occupied by Maoris, but not in any considerable numbers at each place; in as far as I can ascertain at present they are not inclined to accept peace. In the event of any envoy being attacked or our mounted orderlies fired at, does the Major General think it advisable I should endeavour to punish the

\textsuperscript{235} Hill, \textit{Frontier Tamed}, p.7.  
\textsuperscript{236} Grey to Secretary of State, 2 September 1865, Encl. to No.3, \textit{AJHR} 1866, A-1, p.4. [RDB v19 p.7275.]
rebels by attacking their villages near the place at which they might attack a convoy or orderlies, or are we to remain on the defensive in the posts now occupied between this [Whanganui] and Waingongoro and up the Wanganui River.237

Waddy's letter was written at the same time as Charles Broughton, the interpreter to the forces, and a "native policeman" Kereti Te Ahuru, were killed at Kakaramea while attempting peace negotiations with Maori at Nukumaru. The Brigadier General felt himself paralysed until further instructions were received on the matter. Governor Grey was outraged that such a "barbarous and treacherous murder" was allowed to pass without immediate action. He furiously demanded that Waddy explain why he had not taken such action. Major General Chute defended Waddy, writing that the Brigadier General did not want to undertake any action that would bring about uncertain results, given that the Imperial troops were to be withdrawn. Chute stated that "no officer would be more ready to undertake aggressive operations against the disaffected tribes by whom these atrocities have been committed", but that Waddy had felt that he had no authority under the peace proclamation. On 13 October Waddy wrote that he was about to commence operations against Maori at Kakaramea, and Waitotara, although he does not state the reason for his change of heart.238

1866: Facing Chute's Campaign

Plans to locate military settlers on the land around Patea were prominent in the minds of the Government. H.R.Richmond had come to the conclusion that

before any settlers (whether called Military or Agricultural) are located on lands at points intermediate between Patea and Stony River, it will be necessary either to reduce the Natives of that District to submission and to acquiescence in the confiscation of the land, or to inflict so severe a chastisement on them that they practically abandon the contest.

237 Waddy to Deputy Quarter Master General, 30 September 1865, AJHR 1865, A-4a, p.2.
238 Grey to Chute, 11 October 1865, No.6, AJHR 1865, A-4a, p.3.; Chute to Grey, 11 October 1865, No.8, ibid, p.3.; Grey to Chute, 17 October 1865, No.9, ibid, p.3.; Chute to Grey, 15 October 1865, No.11, ibid, p.4.; Waddy to Deputy Quarter Master General, 13 October 1865, Encl. to No.11, ibid, p.4.
I feel confident that one or other of these results would be effected by a very short series of operations if conducted by Colonial Forces, aided by Friendly Natives, and carried on with the promptitude and vigour which has been displayed on the East Coast...239

The lull in the fighting at the end of 1865, was but a temporary respite. At the beginning of 1866, in the month from 3 January through until 6 February, Cameron's replacement as Commander of the forces, Major General W.C.T.Chute, devastated the territory of the South Taranaki tribes between the Waitotara River and Mount Taranaki. The small local forces of the Maori people were driven out of unfortified villages and traditional pa by the campaign of destruction. Chute's tactics involved bush scouring - ransacking the settlements and cultivations of the people who had already fled their coastal residences, and who were now forced even further into the bush.

The toll on the people was great, with Chute ravaging a huge area of Southern Taranaki. Most of the settlements in the area were destroyed. The list is long, as are the memories of the descendants of those who survived the onslaught.

On 4 January Chute's forces of around 620 men, the Imperial forces - Royal Artillery and the 14th Regiment, Native Contingent and kupapa volunteers under McDonnell, burned Okotuku - a village inland of Wairoa. It was intended to destroy the large plantations of potatoes and maize that were there. The combined force, under heavy fire, destroyed the defences of the pa and the whare in the village. Six Maori were killed, six of the fixed colonial and Imperial forces were wounded and one killed.240

The 7 January saw the people at Te Putahi, above the Whenuakura River, defending themselves from Chute's soldiers. Fifteen Maori were killed. Two troops were killed and twelve wounded, including Major McDonnell. The Te Putahi people, labelled by Chute as "two hundred rebels of the worst character", were driven inland.241

239 H.R.Richmond to Stafford, 28 March 1866, No.15, AJHR 1866, A-2a, p.11. [RDB v19 p.7455.]
240 Chute to Grey, 8 January 1866, Encl. in No.25, AJHR 1866, A-1, pp.58-9.[RDB v19 pp.7329-30.]
241 Chute to Grey, 15 January 1866, Encl.1 in No.33, ibid, p.87. [RDB v19 p.7358.]
Major Hassard's force patrolled from Manawapou. He reported that he saw "no rebels" in the area. Several settlements were destroyed as the force moved past Waihi. The Government troops crossed to northern bank of the Waingongoro River and seven Maori were killed attempting to defend the village of Mawhitihiti - a principle kainga of Ngaruahine. Seven villages of the Ngaruahine and Ngati Ruanui people were destroyed including, Ketemarae, Weriweri, Te Whenuku, Keteonetea and Puketi.

On 8 January 1866 the cultivations around Putahi were destroyed. The "unoccupied but extensive settlement" of Oika was also burnt. On the 10th in the area around Kakaramea two deserted villages were destroyed. No "rebels" were seen but traces of their presence was noted, thought to be "fugitives from Putahi." Similarly on the 12th "Ketemitia" was raided, but under heavy fire the troops retired. As they patrolled around Manawapou villages were destroyed, but no Maori were seen.

The loss did not end at the destruction of the kainga on the coastal belt or in the bush. Once these were destroyed the people from them were pursued. Warre, for example, was instructed to "clear his district of rebels", particularly in the vicinity of the southern outposts, and prevent their retreat to Mataitawa - a settlement/retreat inland from Waitara. There were also expeditions to try and apprehend the people retreating from Okotuku. Chute reported that "all the principal villages and positions of the enemy up to and within reach of this camp (Putahi) have been destroyed, and the rebels scattered."

Otapawa, defended by Ngati Ruanui people, was attacked on 14 January. Two of the principal fighting chiefs were Tautahi Ariki and Tukino. Cowan estimated that thirty Maori were killed and many wounded, with the eleven British killed and twenty wounded. Defences, whare and cultivations were destroyed. In all the cases where kainga were wrecked,

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242 Chute to Grey, 15 January 1866, Encl.1 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.87. [RDB v19 p.7358.]
243 Chute to Grey, 15 January 1866, Encl.1 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.86.[RDB v19 p.7357.]
244 Chute to Grey, 8 January 1866, Encl.6 in No.25, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.59.; Chute to Grey, 15 January 1866, Encl.1 in No.33, ibid, A-1, p.88. [RDB v19 p.7359.]
the destructive effect was wider than the loss of life. In the case of Otapawa, Cowan estimated that 350 people were displaced.245

Not content just to destroy settlements, the Government troops pursued those whose residences had been destroyed. On 14 January the Forest Rangers and the Native Contingent searched the bush for several hours for "fugitives." They came upon several parties of Maori, twenty one of whom were reported to have been killed. The villages: Te Whenuka, Te Moro, Kanihi, Mawhitiwhiti, Te Paki, Okutere, Aotearoa and probably Ahipaipa were destroyed. Ketemitia (Keteonetea) and Puketi were also destroyed.246

Ahipaipa was a large settlement. H.Butler in his diary of operations made observations about what was present before the village was razed: "A well furnished strong European house was erected close to the mill or flagstaff; it was destroyed in common with everything to be found, including cultivations" On the way to Ketemarae a clearing under careful cultivation was found "amongst the rest about two acres of wheat, much India corn and tobacco, and a number of fruit trees" - all destroyed. Another party making a similar discovery brought what vegetables they could into camp.247

Chute then marched a mixed Imperial, Colonial, and Kupapa force through the bush inland of Mt. Taranaki to New Plymouth, along the way cutting off the retreat of "fugitive rebels."248 This was the last of any importance involving Imperial troops. He was praised for his bravery by colonists and Grey for the march around Mt Taranaki. (Although according to Belich the expedition was a near disaster as Chute got lost and his force had to eat its own pack horses to stay alive.)249

The instructions to the forces from Major General Chute made it clear that the campaign of pursuing and destroying the Maori was to continue. Brevet Major H.R.Russell reported the garrison orders for the various military outposts in Taranaki. Those in command of the posts were

246 Chute to Grey, 15 January 1866, Encl.1 in No.33, *AJHR* 1866, A-1, p.87. [RDB v19 p.7358.]
247 H.Butler to Deputy Quartermaster General, 4 February 1866, Subenc1.2 to No.33 *AJHR* 1866, A-1, p.91. [RDB v19 p.7362.]
to clearly understand that no restrictions are placed upon their
harassing and attacking the enemy whenever and wherever they may
be able to do so.

Officers commanding at Warea and Opunake especially are instructed
to lose no opportunity in attacking the rebel Natives, and by constant
patrols and reconnoitring to harass and annoy them as much as
possible.250

Although the Garrison orders are dated the middle of February, it is clear
that the forces in Taranaki were operating under these orders prior to that
time. Major H.Butler wrote from Camp Waingongoro at the beginning of
February that he hoped that the measures he had carried out under order to
harass the enemy and destroy cultivations met with the approval of his
commanders. He had been part of the force of Imperial, Colonial and
kupapa soldiers, that ravaged Ngati Ruanui country between 17 January and
3 February 1866.251

After the march around the Mountain, the destruction continued. On 18
January the pa and cultivations at Tirotiromoana were destroyed by a force
under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Butler. Another expedition by
Butler on 20 January to Ahipaipa, found the settlement abandoned, and
destroyed any remaining whare and cultivations. Another village was
attacked by a force under Sir Robert Douglas. The village, unnamed in
Cowan, and identified in the official report as "the headquarters of the
fanatics in the neighbourhood", and its nearby cultivations were
destroyed.252

The people of Taranaki tuturu continued to face the onslaught of the
Colonial forces. On 1 February a Force under General Chute assaulted
Waikoko [Waikoukou?] pa, inland from the road between Opunake and
Warea. Cowan put the Maori casualties at four, and the British lost one
soldier and four were wounded. The whare and cultivation were reported
to be "unusually extensive." Three days later Warea pa was destroyed. On 5

250 Brevet Major Russell, Garrison orders, 17 February 1866, Subenc1.1 to Encl.2
in No.38, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.93. [RDB v20 p.7672.]  
251 Brevet Major Russell, Garrison orders, 17 February 1866, Subenc1.1 to Encl.2
in No.38, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.93. [RDB v20 p.7672.]  
252 Chute to Grey, 12 February 1866, Encl.2 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.90. [RDB
v19 p.7361.]
February a pa at Meremere was destroyed, including a "considerable extent" of cultivation.253

In total, Chute's five week campaign had captured and destroyed seven fortified pa and twenty one open villages.254

From June to November, consistent with the opinion of Richmond, noted earlier, Major Thomas McDonnell with Colonists and Kupapa continued the destruction in the area of Warea and Opunake. Villages and cultivations were attacked. Belich has written that when their occupiers attempted to defend them, they usually did so without outside help and from an unprepared position. Under the ruthless pressure of Major McDonnell local people were weakened and intimidated.

The invasion and destruction wrought by the Imperial and Colonial forces appear to have put the iwi involved in a defensive position at this time. They managed to put up sporadic resistance to the constant onslaught of the soldiers, but the iwi were scattered from their coastal homes and retreated to the bush, Chute's campaign then attempted to prevent them from establishing any sort of even tenuous existence there. His expeditions appeared to uproot the precarious living that people attempted to make in their bush homes.

The Attack on Pokaikai

There were a number of occasions when the conduct of the troops was questioned by the Government, the public and even by people within the military command. The best known was the attack on the village of Pokaikai. The village was attacked in the middle of the night after negotiations for peace were in process.

On 24 July 1866, Te Ua Haumene had visited Pokaikai on a mission of peace, and was satisfied that the Waitotara people wished hostilities to end.

253 Chute to Grey, 12 February 1866, Encl.2 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.90. [RDB v19 p.7361.]
254 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.70.; Chute to Governor, 12 February 1866, Return showing the Pas and villages taken and destroyed by the Field Force under the command of Major General Chute, during operations commencing 30 December 1865, and terminating 9 February 1866., Encl.2 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.90. [RDB v19 p.7361.]
On 27 July a messenger from Major Thomas McDonnell brought the people a percussion cap, a bottle of rum, a white handkerchief with the words "Rongo pai" written on it, and a cartridge - asking them which emblem they would accept. The people at Pokaikai decided that the cartridge and the percussion cap meant death, and that the rum was also bad. They kept the white handkerchief and sent the other items back - believing that the gesture was a sign of peace. They prepared a gift of potatoes for the nearby military camp. Before they could be delivered, the village was attacked by McDonnell with a force of two hundred men.255

Maata Moerewarewa "Martha", Natanahira Ngahina's wife, reported that the villagers had been asleep when the attack occurred - "[t]he sleep was the sleep of fools, for the words of the Government through Te Ua, had lulled us." Maata's parents were killed, and her ear ring was cut from her ear.256 Maata confronted McDonnell and demanded that he wrap her parents' bodies before burial. He agreed, but she later found the dogs had scratched up and consumed a portion of the body of her father which was naked.257 Two men and one woman were killed - Aperahama Te Runganui, Haira Nga Karaka and Hera Hine [last name unreadable in the photocopy]. Another woman was wounded. Thirteen were taken prisoner. James Belich reports that several colonists raped a wounded woman. Most of the inhabitants of the village managed to escape. One of McDonnell's men was killed. The village was burned.

After the attack on Pokaikai there were negotiations with Tangahoe and a section of Pakakohi. Some of these groups surrendered and declared their allegiance. The greater part of Ngati Ruanui remained aloof. Titokowaru thought that the attack should not be avenged because it was made in a time of peace - he sent a letter, produced by Parris as evidence, saying that "We should have revenged the murders at Pokaikai, but for Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnell's promise to give us back the whole of our land."258 In Titokowaru's view the war had finished after General Chute's campaign, after Otapawa had been taken. Natanahira Ngahina stated that "the word of the whole of the Tangahoe and Pakakohi hapus was that the weapon of war should be laid down, and that I should be sent among the Europeans. No

257 Belich, Titokowaru, p.40.
258 Evidence of Robert Parris, 18 March 1868, AJHR 1868, A-3, p.4.
hostile act was committed by them [the Tangahoe and Pakakohi people] after the 27 July 1866,... and not even after the attack upon Pokai...The firearms were hung up, and the women and children were on the ground.259

The Government held a Commission of Inquiry into the attack, following reports to the Colonial Office of brutalities committed by the troops in Taranaki. The commissioners, appointed on 11 September 1867, were to "inquire into the circumstances of the attack on Pokai by the colonial forces under Lieutenant Colonel McDonell." They were given a fortnight to investigate the accusations, which proved to be an unrealistic goal given the number of witnesses called and the distances to be travelled. The commissioners included two Taranaki members - A.S. Atkinson (Omata), the brother of Harry Atkinson, both of whom served in the Taranaki Volunteers, and James Richmond (Grey and Bell, Commissioner of Customs).260 There were no Maori commissioners.

The Report adopted by the Government cleared Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell of any misconduct and stated that no "wanton outrage was committed" by an enroled member of the force. The tone of the report was such that it seemed that it was the people of Pokai who betrayed the trust and efforts of McDonell in his "quest" for peace. The findings of Commissioners were of the sentiment that the end justified the means. The Commissioners stated that the results of the attack "were the almost immediate surrender of the Tangahoe and Pakakohe [sic] hapus of the Ngatiruanui tribe, and the subsequent peace and order which prevailed for almost two years...."261 The voice of acceptance was not unanimous.

The dissenter, George Graham262, protested officially at the adoption of the report.263 He submitted his own report to his fellow commissioners which

259 Evidence of Tito Hunataua (?Hanataua), 19 March 1868, AJHR 1868, A-3, p.7. See also evidence of Natanahira Ngahina, ibid, p.8.
260 The other commissioners were E. Baigent (Walmea), A. Clark (Auckland City East), G. Graham (Newton), A. Ludlam (Hutt), McLean, McNeill (Wallace), Paterson (Dunedin City), and Tancred (Ashley). JHR 1867, p.xxii.; ibid, p.229.
262 George Graham, 1812-1901, (MHR Newton 1861-9) was English born. He emigrated to New South Wales in 1836, and arrived in New Zealand in 1840. He worked on public works, road building and fortifications. He was involved in fortifying Auckland during the invasion of Waikato. He farmed in Mangere after the fighting. Scholefield writes that Graham was known as an advocate of Maori
they did not adopt. Following this rejection he sent it on to Governor Bowen. Graham noted that the emblem of peace had been adopted by the Maori, but that McDonnell was anxious to "push forward the surrender of the Natives as rapidly as possible", despite the fact that the Tangahoe people wished to have time to "secure the co-operation and advice of relatives and friends of the Tribe living at a distance" before formally concluding the peace. Graham was in no doubt about the sincerity of the move towards peace, and felt that insufficient time had been given to them for this purpose. Graham also noted that rather than negotiating solely with McDonnell, Natanahira Ngahina had proceeded to New Plymouth to meet with Civil Commissioner Parris with the purpose of proceeding to Wellington to make peace. Natanahira Ngahina had sent messengers to McDonnell informing him of this course.

Graham stated that "Lt Colonel McDonnell for reasons not sufficiently explained to us immediately conceived an opinion that the Natives were deceiving him, and made up his mind to treat them still as rebels, and that he then took the steps...for lulling them into a feeling of security prior to the contemplated attack." Extracts from McDonnell's letters confirm this opinion. McDonnell wrote that he determined to attack Pokaikai, having ascertained that the Hauhau were "dwelling in fancied security." He waited until the kainga was asleep before attacking.264 In Graham's opinion:

the attack on Pokaikai was unnecessary, was determined upon by Lt Colonel McDonnell hastily, and without sufficient examination of the reasons for Natanahina's absence from Waingongoro at the appointed meeting and that the course taken...for lulling the Natives into a feeling of security while contemplating an attack upon them, and whilst they still retained the emblem of peace held out by himself was - improper and unjust and calculated to lead to serious complication in our relations with the Tribe in question.265

After the attack on Pokaikai, McDonnell warned the people at Otapawa that if "they did not immediately submit I will carry fire and sword through

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264 Extracts from Lt Colonel McDonnell's letter to the Minister for Colonial Defence, 4 August 1866, IA 1, 1868/2424. [A-15 RDB v133, pp.51376-7.]
265 George Graham to Sir George Bowen, 22 July 1868, IA 1, 1868/2424. [A-15 RDB v133, pp.51370-3.]
their country and give them no rest by day or night." In the context of the attack on the village, these intimidatory remarks were a warning to the other iwi that they might suffer a similar fate. The death and destruction were to continue until peace was made on terms that suited the Government.

The Continued Invasion

The Government aggression in Southern Taranaki continued after August 1866, the main headquarters of the Colonial force shifting to Waihi, a redoubt being built there in September.

There remained a substantial presence of Imperial troops in Taranaki at the beginning of September - with battalions of the 14th, 18th and the 50th regiments in the area. There were posts at Whanganui, Alexander's Farm, Weraroa, Waitotara, Patea Camp and on the left bank of the river, Kakaramea, Manawapou - both banks, Waingongoro and Parikino. These military bases had a total of 1170 troops south of the Waingongoro River. To the north an additional 568 troops were stationed at New Plymouth, Hangatahua River (Stoney River), Warea and Opunake. In line with the Imperial policy of removing its troops from New Zealand, Chute proposed that the 14th Regiment be withdrawn from the area, meaning the abandonment of posts at Manawapou, Waingongoro, Kakaramea and Parikino. Chute also suggested to Grey that the 50th abandon their posts at Warea and Opunake. The Governor was unimpressed with these suggestions and demanded that the posts at Manawapou, Waingongoro, Opunake and Warea be retained. Instead he suggested that garrisons were not necessary at New Plymouth, Whanganui or Napier.267

266 Extracts from Lt Colonel McDonnell's letter to the Minister for Colonial Defence, 4 August 1866, IA 1, 1868/2424. [A-15 RDB v133, pp.51376-7.]
267 Chute to Grey, 20 August 1866, BPP/IUP, v14, pp.836-7.; Grey to Chute, ibid, p.837.
On 23 September a party of twenty Ngati Tupaea and other Ngati Ruanui exacted utu for the attack on Pokaikai. They ambushed a cart convoy halfway between Waihi and Hawera, killing one soldier.

The next major incursion by the Colonial forces was on 2 October at the village of Te Pungarehu on the western side of the Waingongoro. The village was peopled by Ngaruahine families. Te Pungarehu, which was reported by McDonnell to have some fortifications, was attacked with a force of around 110 men. In his report McDonnell stated that many of the Ngaruahine people were located in the bush between the Waingongoro and Inaha Rivers. He had no idea of their exact position, "but trusted to drop upon them somewhere." The force came upon the village - in a clearing intersected by several strong cattle fences and containing several large whare. People came from Te Ngutu o te Manu to aid those at Te Pungarehu. They succeeded in driving off the main body of the British force. Thirty people, mainly Ngaruahine were killed, and nine were taken to Waihi as prisoners at Te Whenuku. Three of the colonial force were killed, and four wounded.268

The Imperial Government was not altogether happy with the nature of the Colonial Government's campaign that was ravaging Southern Taranaki, and was unimpressed at Grey's lack of progress at withdrawing the Imperial troops. The Earl of Carnarvon, Secretary of State, expressed his concern about the campaigns against villages, and wrote in harsh terms to Governor Grey about the attack on what Grey assumed to be Pungarehu:

I must observe that while you thus appear to cling to the expectation of continued assistance from this country, your own reports, or rather the absence of reports from you show how little you recognize any continued responsibility to the Imperial Government for the conduct of war. While in your despatch of 15th October, you inform me that a Trooper of the Colonial forces had been killed by some hostile Natives, you leave me to learn... that a Native village on the West Coast after being summoned to surrender was attacked by a Colonial force, and, escape being cut off, about thirty or forty persons were killed. In the account before me this last transaction is described as 'the most brilliant affair of this Guerilla war.' I need hardly observe that if it at any time were alleged in this country that these affairs described by the Colonial Press as brilliant successes, were in fact

268 Report by Major McDonnell, 4 October 1866, Encl. 1 in Subencl. in No.11, AJHR 1867, A-1a, pp.16-18. [RDB v20 p.7595-7.]
unwarranted and merciless attacks on unoffending persons, I have no authentic means of reply afforded by your despatches.269

Grey responded, in rather offended terms, that in his view the attack on the village was one in which the colonial forces were in acute danger, and that it was warranted as the people "contained amongst their number some of the worst and most desperate characters in New Zealand." He thought it was one of the largest villages he had seen, and that it had been attacked with a small force.270 However, the small casualty list of the troops, with only three killed, suggests that the situation was not as desperate for the Colonists as Grey painted it.

Some government ministers were similarly galled by the remarks from Carnarvon. E.W. Stafford, the Colonial Secretary, stated that Lord Carnarvon's statement could be sufficiently answered by any reference to the previous six years on the West Coast: "The West Coast in the neighbourhood of Patea, has long been the scene of Native Insurrections and of atrocious murders."271

In mid October the people at Te Popoia defended their village from two attacks. The first, on the 18th was fired upon and withdrew. Four days later the village was destroyed in another assault, and two defenders killed. The final incursion for the year, made by the British, was on 5 November. McDonnell took a force inland, making a second attack on the Ngati Tupaea village of Tirotiromoana. The Ngati Tupaea people had evacuated the settlement, and the Colonial troops returned to Waihi.

At this time Major J.H. Rocke of the 18th Regiment considered that the Imperial forces had the area of south Taranaki under control. He wrote that the Patea district south to Whanganui was ready for military settlement, only a small section of Maori remaining in arms against the troops. The people at Tirotiromoana, Meremere and Manutahi had surrendered. Rocke

269 Carnarvon to Governor Grey, 28 December 1866, No.16, AJHR 1867, A-1, p.15.[RDB v20 p.7535.] It is clear that this statement is trying to make a political point to Grey, given the conflict over the troops, but even considering this the criticisms made by the Secretary of State remain valid.
270 Grey to Carnarvon, 4 March 1867, No.22, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.45. [RDB v20 p.7623.]
271 Memorandum by Mr Stafford, 17 April 1867, Encl. in No.30, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.64. [RDB v20 p.7643.]
reported that on 27 October Reihana and his followers surrendered at Waingongoro. Only Tamati O Raukawa remained "outside", and he had abandoned villages at Mawhitiwhiti, retreating to Warea.\textsuperscript{272}

With Tamati O Raukawa (also known as Tamati One) now the only chief in arms on the western side of the Waingongoro, Grey wrote that it was desirable to "crush him at once." The Governor noted that there remained only Ahitana and his party to deal with. The neighbouring villages of Pungarehu and Te Maru o te Whenua had both recently been destroyed. Inland from Tapua was uninhabited, except for a few "temporarily favourite localities." The people from Te Maru o te Whenua fled inland, some joining Ahitana at Tirotiromoana, and some retreating towards Warea. Grey planned to advance towards Tirotiromoana from Te Whenuku, to crush the remaining defenders on the south side of the Waingongoro. Tirotiromoana was defended from attack by the Colonial forces, successfully on 3 November, finally succumbing to the renewed invasion on 10 November, when the village was destroyed.\textsuperscript{273}

Titokowaru's Peace

War was not the first path to be chosen by the Southern Taranaki people. Despite the destruction wrought by the troops Titokowaru began a campaign of peace and reconciliation. He rebuilt his village - Te Ngutu o te Manu - which had been burnt to the ground in McDonnell's campaign. It became a focus of peace. It was the headquarters of Ngaruhine, a large kainga of fifty eight whare, a large marae, and a great meeting house - Wharekura. Te Ngutu o te Manu was the scene of a number of tribal and intertribal meetings which were the basis of Titokowaru's peace campaign - held 1867 and early 1868. In January 1867 he hosted a delegation from the Kingitanga, led by More who acted as the ambassador to Taranaki. Titokowaru had hosted hui discussing peace to which different hapu of Ngati Ruanui, Taranaki and Upper Whanganui people were invited. With a group of supporters he had travelled through Taranaki, the Upper Waitara, the Upper Whanganui, down that river and home to Te Ngutu o te Manu via
the coast. James Booth described him as "untiring in his efforts to bring other tribes to make peace."\textsuperscript{274} When war broke out at the beginning of June 1868, it was only after it became obvious that force was the only way to try to hold on to the land.

In January 1867 the messages of peace continued. Parris reported a part of Waikato in Taranaki. The group had visited Kirikiringa in the Ngati Maru rohe, talked to Pukerimu Hapurona and Wiremu Kingi of Te Ati Awa and the Ngati Ruanui at Waikoukou. Of their meeting with Ngati Ruanui, in the words of Reweti and Pumipe, the Waikato emissaries stated that the weapon of war was "broken and ended.\textsuperscript{275}

For the next one and a half years, an uneasy peace prevailed on the West Coast. During this time areas totalling 50,000 acres of mostly open land, south of the Waingongoro, were laid out in military settlements - the townships were Kakaramea, Mokoia, and Ohawe. Many military settlers took up the occupation of the sections to which the Government had given them entitlement, but the majority in the end disposed of their grants and left the district. When the decision was made to occupy the confiscated lands between the Waingongoro and the Waitotara, the Patea Field Force serving at Opotiki was recalled, arriving at Patea in June. The body from Opotiki was joined by kupapa from Whanganui. McDonnell shifted the camp to Manawapou in order to cover the work of the surveyors under S.Percy Smith.\textsuperscript{276}

As the surveyors began their work Ngati Ruanui made it clear that they intended to resist the confiscations. On 20 March 1867, Ngaruahine held a hui at Te Ngutu o te Manu, while Pakakohi met at Whakamara. According to Belich both groups were decided on peace, but supported pacific resistance against the extension of confiscation. Pakakohi took the full force of the forced alienation of land, because the term of two companies of military settlers had just expired, and the government decided to settle them around Manutahi, the economic base of Pakakohi territory. The Pakakohi people

\textsuperscript{274} James Booth to Hon. C.W.Richmond, 30 November 1867, No.75, AJHR 1868, A-8, pp.41-2., [RDB, v21, pp.8072-3.]

\textsuperscript{275} Parris to Native Minister, 24 January 1867, Encl.1 in No.18, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.31.; Tamati Kawena to Parris, (English translation) Sub. Encl.1 to Encl.1 in No.18, ibid. [RDB v20 p.7610.]

\textsuperscript{276} Cowan, \textit{NZ Wars}, II, p.143.
interrupted the surveys obstructing an attempt to survey the Whenuakura block.\textsuperscript{277}

On 15 May two leading chiefs, Te Wharematangi and Ngawakataurua, met James Booth, the Resident Magistrate, at Hukatere. They stated their intention to prevent the survey of the land. Booth said that their land had been confiscated. The chiefs asked why the land had not been taken until after peace had been made. The chiefs said that they would continue to oppose the surveys, but that they would not strike the first blow. Booth called the survey off for the time being. According to Belich Te Wharematangi thought that it was only a matter of time before the government called his bluff, and began to think in terms of military resistance.\textsuperscript{278}

That the patience of the Southern Taranaki people was being pushed was evidenced by the sentiments expressed at a further hui was held at Te Ngutu o te Manu on 25 May. Te Wharematangi proposed armed resistance. Titokowaru was opposed to this. He managed to convince Te Wharematangi to continue with a peaceful campaign. With these convictions in mind, Titokowaru set off on a hikoi, a march of peace and reconciliation, accompanied by most of his following - amounting to fifty to sixty men, eighty women and children. The Hikoi arrived at Camp Waihi on 10 June. Titokowaru and his group showed their respect for the Queen. The ceremony was repeated the next day at Turuturumokai, the next colonist post. On 19 June Titokowaru met McDonnell at Manutahi, the officer having missed the earlier meetings. The Hikoi continued to Patea with McDonnell. At the Patea meeting there was tension over Maori prayers referring to the Kingitanga which had embraced peace. McDonnell took the prayers as an affront and walked out of the meeting.\textsuperscript{279}

While the iwi in South Taranaki worked to maintain the peace, the government continued to wrangle with the difficulties over Imperial forces. The British War Office had commanded that the Imperial troops be withdrawn from isolated positions. In line with this instruction small local
forces were sent out to "punish offenders who had been committing murderous outrages close to the Imperial Camps." Colonel Haultain, the Minister for Defence, complained that Major General Chute remained in Auckland when the seat of Government had shifted to Wellington, and when the operations were centred two hundred miles away from him.

Haultain lamented what he saw as the lack of decisive military success on the West Coast:

the results were not such as might have been expected: the rebel natives returned to their settlements in the the bush, and committed aggressions from time to time with comparative impunity. The communications between Patea and Taranaki were never open, large parties only could pass from post to post with safety, and notwithstanding the assertions that small escorts were sufficient from Patea as far as Waingongoro, the occurrence of murderous outrages and ambuscades...suffices to prove the offenders remaining yet unpunished. It is true that armed parties were sent to follow them to the edge of the bush, into which the rebels returned, only more likely to be emboldened still further to harass and annoy their opponents, by finding that they could always make good their retreat to positions which they could not be followed.280

At the same time that Haultain was lamenting the lack of lasting military success for the government, Parris was noting the difficulty of fulfilling claims under the Compensation Courts. He wrote to James Richmond that there was a shortage of land for "loyal natives" in Ngatiawa, Waitara South, Oakura and Ngatiruanui Coast blocks.281

The cumulative effect of accusations of atrocities by the Imperial troops, the disputes with Major General Chute over the Imperial forces and the added problem about paying for the costs of the war came to a head when on 18 June Grey was notified that his successor to the Governorship would be appointed. On 22 August 1867 George Frederick Bowen, the Governor of Queensland, was named as successor. Bowen arrived in the Colony at the beginning of 1868.282

280 Memorandum by Colonel T.M.Haultain, 18 June 1867, Encl. in No.38, AJHR 1867, A-1a, p.92. [RDB v20 p.7671.]
281 Parris to J.C.Richmond, Return of Reserves for Friendly Natives and Returned Rebels., 11 June 1867, No.5, AJHR 1867, A-18, p.7. [RDB v20 p.7779.]
282 Duke of Buckinghamshire and Chandos to Governor Grey, 18 June 1867, No.4, BPP/UP, v15 1868-9, p.408.
There were various ways in which the iwi of Southern Taranaki dealt with the continued threat from the Government. According to an account by Belich, the Nga Rauru people of Waitotara gave the impression that they accepted the current losses of land in return for peace, at a hui in Okotuku on 23 June 1867. Other groups, such as the Pakakohi people were silent as to their thoughts on the matter. McDonnell was concerned about their silence on the subject of the surveys. Titokowaru advised him to give them time.\textsuperscript{283}

The message of reconciliation was taken to North Taranaki and Whanganui. Te Wharematangi and Tito Hanataua took the message north, while Titokowaru went to Whanganui - which he reached on 4 July. He met with kupapa chiefs, and with the Kingitanga minority. He advised them not to fight. Ngati Tupaea, who had suffered at Pokaikai, remained what the Government termed "outsiders", refusing to follow the advice of Titokowaru. On 13 November, however, Ngati Tupaea formally sent a message of peace to McDonnell.\textsuperscript{284}

The surveys continued. On 16 July McDonnell decided to resume the survey of the Whenuakura Block. The surveyors under Charles Wray began near Oika, a small village near the Whenuakura River. The brother of Te Wharematangi, Te One Kura, came to Oika to support the local chief - Rurangi. A small party was sent out to tell Wray stop the work. Wray obeyed, noting 100 Pakakohi people assembled at Oika. He sent word of the incident to McDonnell at Patea.\textsuperscript{285}

The next day, while Oika slept, McDonnell mustered 100 men and crossed the Whenuakura. He distributed his force to command the village. McDonnell woke the leading men and asked why they had stopped the survey party. They speakers told him that no survey would be permitted from the south bank of the Patea River to the Waitotara River. McDonnell planned to call in his troops, but discovered that Titokowaru was camped across the river. Booth was left in Oika while McDonnell went to talk to Titokowaru. Titokowaru said that he had advised the Pakakohi to let the

\textsuperscript{283} Belich, Titokowaru, p.19.
\textsuperscript{284} Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell to Captain Holt, 18 July 1867, No.1, AJHR 1867, A-22, pp.3-4. [RDB v20 pp.7855-6.]
\textsuperscript{285} Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell to Captain Holt, 18 July 1867, No.1, AJHR 1867, A-22, p.3. [RDB v20 p.7855.]
survey proceed. He told McDonnell to note that the Pakakohi sent the surveyors back during the day, and did not hurt anyone. McDonnell returned across the river where the Pakakohi continued to oppose the survey. The next day Rurangi gave up the resistance, saying that although they continued to oppose it, they would not prevent the surveyors from doing their work.286

The land between Patea and the Waingongoro River was being settled by a variety of people, in an obviously volatile situations. One hundred and fifty four officers and men were garrisoned in the district. A further one hundred and thirteen men were liable for militia service, from these were organised Volunteer Corps. Land was allotted to the Native Contingent on condition of military service - fifty were in actual occupation of land. Twenty six military settlers were stationed at Warea. Arms had been issued to Arama Karaka and Wiremu Kingi Matakatea. A Resident Magistrate was placed in the district.287

**Living the Wars.**

The British campaigns in South Taranaki relied on bush scouring. Colonial forces entered the bush and destroyed crops, villages and the lives of those people living in the villages. Major General Chute's instructions to the Commanders of the Outposts were: "to lose no opportunity in attacking the rebel natives, and, by constant patrols and reconnoitring parties, to harass and annoy them as much as possible."288 Maori who did not fight suffered loss in economic terms, as well as despair because of the destruction of their kainga and other taonga. As Belich stated "[a]cross half the North Island, this new kind of war spread like a lethal blight, leaving violent death, starvation, and misery in its wake."289 The fertile Maori lands were laid waste. The effect can be judged by the statement by Premier Fox in 1869 that

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286 Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell to Captain Holt, 18 July 1867, No.1, AJHR 1867, A-22, pp.3-4. [RDB v20 p.7855-6.]
287 Return of the Quantity of Land Confiscated by the Government in the district of Waitotara and New Plymouth with the Boundaries of the Same, August 1867, AJHR 1867, A-16 [RDB v20 p.7759.]
288 Despatch from Secretary of State to Governor Grey, 1 March 1867, No.30, AJHR 1867, A-1, p.33. See also Lieutenant Colonel Hamley to the Assistant Adjutant-General, 19 November 1866, Encl In No.23, AJHR 1867, A-1, p.23. [RDB v20 p.7543. and p.7553.]
the "entire destruction of the pas, cultivation, and stock, for a distance of 60 to 70 miles inland has been effected." 290

The effect of the campaign was such that by 1865 Cameron stated that the "country between this coast and the bush is perfectly open, and deserted by the Natives, who have either established themselves in the bush, or occupy villages on its border; and, on the approach of a military force, are ready...to retire into the bush." 291 The people of the area were pushed into a fugitive existence in their own land. The scarcity of people is shocking considering that this was part of the area on Domett's map where the Maori population in coastal Taranaki was estimated at 3300 - all in areas below the bushline. 292

When Cameron reconnoitred the area around Patea in 1865, he noted that the villages were abandoned, and that there were no new crops in the ground. The people from the villages had retreated to the bush, and probably stored and concealed their food a good distance from open land. 293

In camp at Ketemarae, Chute noted in January 1866 that "all principal villages and positions of the enemy up to and within reach of this camp [have] been destroyed, and the rebels scattered with heavy loss." 294 Colonel Weare in a letter to his brother dated 13 January 1866, recognised the dire circumstances of the Southern Taranaki people. He wrote that "the Natives will be very badly off for the next six months, for they have no open land open to them now, and they must fall back into the bush, make clearings, and cultivate, which will take them six months at least." 295

There was a continued shortage of resources for those who had suffered through the conflicts of 1864 onwards. At Te Ngutu o te Manu this was

290 Belich, Titokowaru, p.280.
291 Cameron to Grey, 7 April 1865, No.65, AJHR 1865, A-4, pp.23-4. [RDB v18 pp.6945-6.]
292 Colonial Secretary to F.Mace, 7 July 1863, No.9, AJHR 1863, A-8, p.11. [RDB v16 p.5745.] The roughly drawn map did not cover South Taranaki alone so the population estimate does not entirely fit. The estimate did not, however, give any population for the bush areas, and has to be taken as low of the whole region of Taranaki.
293 Cameron to Grey, 21 April 1865, No.71, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.26. [RDB v18 p.6948.]
294 Chute to Grey, 15 January 1866, Enc1.1 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.88. [RDB v19 p.7359.]
295 Extracts from a letter from Colonel Weare to Rev.T.W.Weare, 13 January 1866, Subencl. to Encl in No.4, AJHR 1867, A-1b, p.4. [RDB v20 p.7715.]
evidenced by the inability to provide sufficient food for hui. James Booth, who attended a meeting there in November 1867 noted that "with the exception of the flour and sugar before mentioned [presented to Titokowaru by Kemp, Aperaniko and the rest of the Native Contingent], the Natives had not been able to provide anything beyond a few kits of potatoes and some eels. They do not seem to possess either cattle or pigs." 296

The campaigns into the bush, led by the likes of Major Von Tempsky, disrupted the lives of those who had retreated in the face of the onslaught, and who were trying to live under the constant threat of further destruction. Von Tempsky stumbled upon settlements and cultivations in the bush after traversing very rough country that had been recently occupied. 297 These, like those on the plains, were destroyed, leaving the people to pick up their dead and wounded, and the threads of their lives.

The on-going destruction and fugitive existence took its toll on the Southern Taranaki Maori. Expression of the exhaustion took various forms. Some surrendered to the British forces - whole families, or whole parties. There were quarrels amongst hapu. In June 1865 Warre noted that the Ngati Ruanui were tired of war, and alarmed about the return of the troops to Nukumaru. He wrote that the Maori occupying Weraroa pa had argued over how, and whether to continue to defend their homes: "some of the hapus of the Ngatiruanuis are almost entirely destroyed, and all are anxious to make terms with His Excellency." 298 The conflict over the course of action to be taken at Weraroa continued up until the time of its abandonment and "capture". Aperahama and Pehimana, two of the principal chiefs gave themselves up, while other such as Hare Tipene and Ruka refused to do so. 299

Maori who fought on the side of the Government in the conflict were not free from bad treatment and strife. Parris expressed official concern about the way that a party of Ngamahanga people, who had decided to abandon

296 James Booth to Hon. C.W. Richmond, 30 November 1867, No. 75, AJHR 1868, A-8, p. 41., [RDB, v21, p. 8072.]
297 Major Von Tempsky to Brigadier-General Waddy, 14 May 1865, Encl. 2 to No. 154, AJHR 1865, A-4, p. 63. [RDB v18 p.6985.]
298 Colonel Warre to Assistant Military Secretary, 23 June 1865, Encl. 5 to No. 58, AJHR 1865, A-5, p. 66. [RDB v19 p. 7063.]
299 Memorandum by the Governor, 18 July 1865, Encl. 7 in No. 1, AJHR 1865, A-7, pp. 3-4.
hostilities in January 1865, were treated by Chute's troops. At the time of their surrender they had been living at Tukitukipapa, near Tataraimaka. In September of the same year Parris found land for them between Warea and the Hangatahua River - noting that "these poor Natives have been in great distress for want of food, not having commenced planting before December."

In February 1866, he received a complaint from Wiremu Kingi Te Matakatea and Te Ua Haumene, that two officers of the 43rd Regiment had come to the settlement of the Ngamahanga people and threatened to burn the place down, under the authority of their commander. Indeed more than once did the forces of the 43rd attack and burn the places of Matakatea, using the justification that Matakatea had "gone over to the rebels." In addition, Parris was concerned that horses were being brought in, over which the so-called Friendly natives had claim. Captain Mace and his men refused to give up the horses - claiming authorisation from General Chute.300

Parris was not the only official expressing concern. Carrington was also worried - shedding light on what was happening in the district around Hangatahua River. On 7 February three Maori had come to the Stoney River Camp to sell their peaches. Captain Horan sent for the old men to tell them through Carrington, acting as interpreter, that he wanted them as guides to point out an inland track. He told Carrington to say "that if they did not go willingly, he would confine them and make them go by force; that the General had given him orders to destroy all the rebel places, and that he was to make use of the friendly Natives as he liked." Horan stated that the men would receive neither pay nor rations, but that he would let one of them go back to their village to get food for them all. One of the men told Carrington "that one of the officers from Warea had been to their place and said to them, if they did not find guides to show them all the tracks and cultivation, they (the soldiers) would burn all their places down."

Carrington persuaded Horan to let all three men return to their homes for the night, on the condition that they return in the morning. When Porana, Rewete and Te Rei returned the following day Horan said that they would

not be marching until three o'clock the following morning, and that his "guides" were to stay in the camp until that time. There had been no food at the kainga for them to bring. Horan continued to refuse them rations. They were given a few broken biscuits, but nothing more. Carrington managed to get them some sugar, and gave them all the tobacco he had. He told Horan that he considered "he (Horan) had no more right to force those Natives to work without pay or rations than he had to take any labouring man on the Omata Block." These men were British subjects, and deserved to be treated as such.301

Parris continued to express concern. The horses were still being offered for sale. After complaint from Parris, the auctioneer withdrew them from sale, but they were not returned to the Maori who claimed them. Maori at the sale were threatened with violence by the soldiers. Parris was of the opinion that a great number of horses were being removed to the bush farms, some clandestinely stowed away. Captains Corbett, Mace and their men were, Parris thought, "seizing the property of individuals, which they refuse to give up, and have written to Major-General Chute for authority to do so." Parris was concerned about how far the authority of the Major General stretched with regard to people who were under the protection of the Government.

Parris was clearly worried about the effect that this kind of behaviour would have on his relationship with those Maori who fought alongside the Government or who remained refused to fight with either side. The Ngamahanga people would think that he had betrayed them. He saw similar difficulties in the situation with Te Ua Haumene. Parris had been authorised by Colonel Haultain to bring Te Ua into Matakaha, Te Ua's own place. There he lived with Arama Karaka, a "friendly chief" and Hone Pihama Te Rei Hanataua - close to the Opunake redoubt. Matakaha had been attacked by Chute's forces, and Te Ua taken to Wellington. Parris lamented that "I could have induced him to go to Wellington or any other place without subjecting him to the disagreeables of being paraded as a prisoner from his place to Wanganui." Parris wanted Te Ua back in the district to aid the peacemaking process.302

301 Statement by Mr Carrington, 13 February 1866, Encl. 5 in No.2, AJHR 1866, A-8, pp.2-3.
Parris felt that the aggression toward Te Ua would alarm Matakatea. In accordance with this belief he sent Ropata Ngarongomate to try and talk to Matakatea. Ngarongomate and his followers were given passes to enable them to make the trip; but they were prevented from talking to Matakatea. Instead they were compelled by Captain Horan "to go in advance of troops to attack him. They protested and were told they would be made prisoners if they did not do as they were told." They were "arbitrarily compelled to go in front of the troops, without a gun in their hands wherewith to defend themselves, to the attack of a near relative, with whom they had always been...."303

Ropata Ngarongomate expressed his anger at the treatment of those who had fought on the side of the Government and suffered because of it - in terms of material loss as well as lives lost:

As to the extent of our cultivation, I call the attentions of the Court [the Compensation Court] to our pigs, horses, and cows,... I demand that our compensation shall be within the block [Oakura]; The blood of my relatives is on my mind. You must remember my services during the war. My cattle, my sheep, my pigs, and all my property went in the war, my wheat, my cultivation, and I never received anything for them, though the Pakehas have all been compensated. What I did was without renumeration, I was never paid, and now let the court fulfil its promises.304

The Taranaki Herald expressed public concern about the treatment of "friendly Natives" and the effect that this had on their allegiance; writing about the "going over to the enemy" of Wiremu Kingi, Te Matakatea and Heremaia. The writer was very specific about the terms in which the situation was discussed: "we speak of this act of theirs in these terms, instead of calling it by its technical name of treason, because we believe they were fairly frightened into doing it."

Matakatea had fought on the side of Wiremu Kingi in the war of 1860-1, but towards the end had withdrawn and termed himself neutral. His neutrality had been preserved from that time up until the occupation of Opunake -

303 Parris to Russell, 27 July 1866, No.11, AJHR 1866, A-8, p.9.
304 Ropata Ngarongomate’s evidence to the Compensation Court, No.1, AJHR 1866, A-13, p.5. [RDB v19 p.7475.]
suffering considerable hostility from the "rebels" on account of his stance. He and Heremaia had been on good terms with the troops. Indeed their people had moved from inland of Ngaariki to Opunake to get out of the way of Chute's operations. They had been assured that if they packed all their things into one whare, their belongings would be protected. Two days later the place had been burnt by a party from the 43rd after the expedition to Waikoukou. All the things to be kept safe were destroyed. The destruction "looked like an act of treachery or deliberate breach of faith."  

On the same day as their settlement was destroyed, an officer took Heremaia to Opunake from Umuroa "under a threat of shooting him" - with a pistol against his back the whole way. Heremaia was not the only person to receive this type of treatment. The Herald reported that when General Chute arrived in Opunake he sent soldiers to Matakaha to bring Adam Clark (Te Ua) and about thirty others, including some Poutoko Maori, to the camp. The paper reported "they were brought to camp with a very unnecessary display of force, in the shape of bayonets", and were shut in tents. Arama Karaka and thirty three of the others were kept prisoner overnight. The group was under the impression that they were to be executed. All but Te Ua were liberated in the morning. The writer continued acidly that Chute's campaign "left us with more enemies than we found here when we came."  

South Taranaki in 1867

By the end of 1866, South Taranaki had been disembowelled. The surviving Ngati Ruanui and Ngarauru had fled the coastal lowland for their ancient fastnesses in the mountainous inland forest. But the notion that Maori could easily pluck a living from the bush was always nonsense: These refuges could not feed them for long, and soon some had to trickle back to the arable areas, under the shadow of British redoubts. This was the classic lever by which Maori groups were prised into some sort of submission: concede, become 'insiders' and lose some of your best land, or remain 'outsiders', independent in your bush fastnesses, and lose the lot...The mere cessation of violence was not enough to allow [the] process of reconstruction. The tensions between tribe and subtribe, born of desperate and sometimes selfish
resistance and collaboration, had yet to be repaired. There were still more than 1000 troops in the district, Imperial, colonial, and kupapa, and the situation was always ready to explode like an unstable bomb.307

When in 1864 and 1865 the Government had declared huge areas of land on the East and West coasts to be confiscated, the area already occupied and surveyed by Pakeha was quite small. Local Maori probably believed that these boundaries were final. According to Belich "[t]hey accepted peace on this basis, reconciling themselves to the loss of a limited acreage." The government was limited by financial concerns, and other considerations, from immediately extending the confiscations. Because of this fact, local peace was maintained. Once resources allowed for it the government started to survey and occupy more land. Maori saw this as aggression and fought back.

In Southern Taranaki Pakeha were expanding their settlements. Wanganui, founded by the New Zealand Company in 1841 with a steady population of about two hundred, had by 1868 just over two thousand inhabitants, with another two thousand Europeans in surrounding districts. The zone of influence of the town was spreading. It was technically part of the Wellington region, but had a population as big as the New Plymouth district which was a province in itself. The Pakeha settlers of South Taranaki looked to Wanganui rather than New Plymouth as their centre. The military presence was an important element of the population. From 1847 until October 1867 the town had been a garrison for Imperial troops. In 1865 Cameron's troops arrived, boosting the population by a few thousand.

The Kai Iwi district, from up to the mouth of the Kai Iwi Stream had been worked by Pakeha for twenty years by 1867. It was settled with substantial farms - wheat, oats, cattle and sheep. The districts across the Kai Iwi Stream remained largely frontiers in terms of contact between Maori and Pakeha. There was conflict over the Waitotara Block, as the Government considered that it had bought the land, rather than confiscated it. The Block was sold off in large estates, not given over to military settlers as was land to the north - partners called Moore and Curry had buildings on the Waitotara Block worth £3000 and wealthy Wellingtonian, Robert Pharazyn, had an absentee holding of 5000 acres at Lake Marahau. There was also a military outpost and

307 Belich, Titokowaru, p.9.
a Pakeha settlement of around 200 at Wairoa. Surveyors used the town as a base as they marked out the Okotuku Block.

Patea township was the port and military centre of the Southern Taranaki district. The Imperial troops had been stationed there in 1866-7. In 1867 the military settler units were disbanded. The men either left the area or took up farms as military settlers. Some joined the regular army (known as a police force - the Armed Constabulary - 5 divisions 70 strong). Thomas McDonnell retained command of the 2 divisions stationed in the district.

Hawera was one of the last three foci of military settlement. The others were at Ohawe, and Ketemarae, inland of Camp Waihi. Ohawe marked the farthest point of Cameron's advance.

For the Nga Rauru people, led by Hare Tipene, Pahimana and Aperahama Tamaiparea, the main centres of population had been rebuilt since the campaigns of Cameron. Perekama and a number of other villages around Weraroa, together with Papatupu across the Waitotara, formed the agricultural heart of the iwi.

By late 1867 the Southern Taranaki people were beginning to resume their lives after the ravages of the Government campaigns. Cultivations were re-established at Oika and Putahi, and at gardens close to the Patea River. Land on the north bank of the Patea River was, however, granted to military settlers based at Patea town and Kakaramea. Former cultivations in the Manutahi area, including the villages of Manutahi, Manawapou and Mokoia, had also been alienated in this way.

Taiporohenui, Ohangai, Pokaikai, Te Ruaki, Matangarara, Whareroa, and Otapawa had been destroyed by Imperial and Colonial forces. The people, who had fled further inland to Tirotiromoana and Turangarere, and to the Te Ngaere Swamp, returned to their district uneasily. The Ngati Tupaea hapu lived at Keteonetea and Tirotiromoana under their chief Ahitana.

The Ngaruahine people, living with the threat of Camp Waihi, had also suffered heavily from the Government campaigns of the mid sixties. Many kainga remained in ruins: Weriweri, Katautara, Ahipaipa, Te Pungarehu
and Mawhitiwhiti. These fringe villages formed a transition zone between the coastal lowland and the inland forest. 308

The iwi in Taranaki were treated differently by the Government according to their perceived attitude to the Crown, particularly on the question of land alienation. Evidence of these divisions comes from Governor Bowen who, in 1868 gave estimates of the population, including the "allegiance" of the various iwi. The Te Ati Awa people (including Ngati Tama, and those in Wellington) were described as "mostly friendly", but with a "considerable number of professed Hauhaus". Some of their leaders were also mentioned according to allegiance. Honiana Te Puni was described as "a firm and faithful friend of the Pakeha from the first." Ngati Ruanui were labelled as "Partly friendly", again with "a considerable number of professed Hauhaus." Nga Rauru were termed as "mostly returned rebels." 309

Titokowaru's Resistance

In 1865-6, the British had confiscated and occupied some land in South Taranaki, and subsequently the local Maoris had brought themselves to accept this. But the area theoretically confiscated was much greater. The colonists seemed to believe that when Maoris reluctantly acquiesced in confiscations, they meant the land marked on maps in Wellington, rather than that actually occupied. Accordingly, in early 1868, they proceeded to survey and settle more Ngati Ruanui land. This placed the hapu in a very difficult position. The campaigns of 1866, when Chute and McDonnell had destroyed many villages and cultivations, had damaged their economies to the point that they could not afford to lose more land. But these campaigns had involved enough defeats to make resistance seem no longer viable. Some hapu, including Titokowaru's Ngaruahine, were thus faced with the options of starving or fighting an apparently hopeless war. 310

308 Belich, Titokowaru, pp.22-45.
309 Ngati Mutunga and Ngati Maru are not mentioned separately. It is possible that both were included in the "Ngatiawa" figures. Similarly in the south Ngaruahine, Pakakohe and Tangahoe are presumably included under the heading of Ngatiruanui. The Government typically ignores the divisions unless it suits them to recognise the people separately. List of Maori Tribes and Chiefs, Encl. 2 in No. 36, AJHR 1868, A-1, p.59. [RDB v21 p.8000.]
310 Belich, Wars, p.236.
Despite the efforts of Titokowaru and the concessions made by Maori, the confiscation continued to creep. Toi stated to Booth at Te Ngutu o te Manu that the Pakeha were doing a great wrong to the Ngaruahine "so great that you do not see it." According to Belich at the Te Ngutu meeting toward the end of March, Ngati Ruanui decided to try passive resistance once again, with added extras. They decided to apply the traditional law of muru to the disputed farms. No one expected Pakeha to be reasonable, but it was hoped that if muru was exacted with caution then there was a chance that the settlers might be harassed off their land. The wave of muru, which appeared to the British as petty thefts, extended as far south as Nga Rauru country.

Settlers at Wairoa were harassed, as were those at Oika, when Pakakohi took up the tactic. Toi stated, with reference to the muru, that the land between the Waingongoro and Kapuni was "[t]he flesh, blood and bones for the Ngaruahine" - all the land that had been taken on north side of the Waitotara River. When the Europeans went back south of the Waitotara River, plunder would be returned.

The meetings of peace continued. When outlining the social and political state of the Maori in various districts for the new Governor, Parris described a hui held at Te Ngutu o te Manu at the end of March 1868. Six hundred Maori from all over Taranaki had attended. Titokowaru, speaking to the assembled people, referred to the great houses built to protect the land - Taiporohenui and Kumeamai, the two built for the Kingitanga - Aotearoa and Rangiatea, noting that none were standing. He called attention to the new house built for the "King of Peace" - Wharekura.

There was a long build up in the tension that would ultimately lead to the war of the Taranaki people continuing once again at full strength. The campaign of death and destruction that the Government waged against the people, and the confiscation of their lands amounted to huge provocation.

The incidents prior to the start of Titokowaru's campaign will be dealt with in this section. Bayly, a settler close to Kakaramea, was ejected from the land.
he was working by Pakakohi people on 8 April. On 10 April 1868 two farmers, Henderson and Luxford, began to work on the land which they had bought from military settlers at Matakara, close to Whakamara. They were turned back by some Pakakohi people - who said that their land was being stolen from them in a time of peace, and demanded that the Pakeha return back past the Patea River. James Booth described the Pakakohi as having shown a "somewhat sulky spirit of resistance, but on the exhibition by Mr Booth, the resident magistrate, and Mr Parris, civil commissioner of the West Coast, they had always given way." He told the Pakakohi people that their land had been confiscated and that ample reserves had been made for them. Booth asked Lieutenant Hunter to call out the militia and fifteen militia were called out and stationed at Mokoia. Three days later Henderson and Luxford were turned back again.314

Booth organised a night expedition for 20 April. After reinforcing the blockhouse at Mokoia, he, Hunter and thirty militia and constabulary marched secretly to Matakara and took Tokorangi and Paraone Tutere of Manutahi as "hostages." Te Wharematangi, fearing for the safety of the pair, came up from Putahi and promised that the obstruction would end. The hostages were released, Te Wharematangi kept his word, and Booth withdrew the troops. Pakakohi held a hui and promised no further aggression.315

In the north the muru, which began in late March, was more persistent, particularly around Turuturumokai and south west of Mokoia. It was led by the Titokowaru's active lieutenants: Toi and Haowhenua. On 7 April Katene Tuwhakaruru broke into a house and stole goods worth £14. Booth tried him and sentenced him to six months prison with hard labour. A few days later Waru broke into a settler's (Lennon's) house and stole four mirrors. On 11 April another Ketemarae settler, lost all his household

314 Civil Commissioner Robert Parris, Reports on the Social and Political State of the Natives in various Districts at the time of the Arrival of Sir G.F.Bowen, 1 April 1868, No.12, BPP/IUP v15 1868-9, p.187.; Booth to J.C.Richmond, 11 April 1868, No.1, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.3. [RDB v21 p.8034.] Booth to J.C.Richmond, 8 April 1868, No.3, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.4. [RDB v21 p.8035.] Memorandum to His Excellency the Governor, explanatory of the Disturbances on the West Coast and the Settlement on the Feud at Hokianga, 4 July 1868, Encl. to No.49., BPP/IUP v15 1868-9, p.158.
315 Booth to J.C.Richmond, 28 April 1868, No.7, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.6. [RDB v21 p.8037.]
goods. Gordon Gilfillan, farming near Turuturumokai, had a revolver stolen.316

Booth had heard that Warea people attending the hui at Te Ngutu o Te Manu were responsible for the thefts. Te Ngutu was in the bush beyond Pakeha control. Booth wrote and demanded the return of the goods. In late April the muru was extended beyond the Ketemarae district to Ohawe. At Ohawe a settler called Smith had two horses taken, together with one belonging to his neighbour Edward McDonnell. One of the horses had been looted from Kokiri, a lieutenant of Titokowaru's, in 1866. A week later, Smith received information that the three horses were at Te Ngutu. He rode to Patea on 3 May and told Booth.317

The following day Booth rode to Te Ngutu with an escort of three constables. As Titokowaru was ill, Booth was met by Toi Whakataka. Booth demanded the return of the horses and other goods. Toi said that the goods would not be handed over. Booth asked why the attitude of the people had changed, the Maori had not been molested, yet they committed great wrongs. Toi replied that when the Pakeha retreated, and the land was restored then goods would be restored. Booth returned to Patea, and there issued McDonnell with a warrant for the arrest of Toi, Haowhenua and other Ngaruahine residing at Te Ngutu.318

McDonnell set out on 11 May to execute the warrant. He took with him 110 men. McDonnell went to Mawhitiwhiti, where he had been told that Toi was staying. Toi had left earlier. McDonnell seized two leading villagers, Wairau and Hakopa Te Matauawa, as hostages. McDonnell intended to surround Te Ngutu, then demand the return of the property and the thieves. As they got close to the village Hakopa broke free and warned Te Ngutu. Toi and Haowhenua were able to flee. Tauke Te Hapimana came out alone to meet McDonnell and asked him to bring his men in. The

316 Memorandum to His Excellency the Governor, explanatory of the Disturbances on the West Coast and the Settlement on the Feud at Hokianga, 4 July 1868, Encl. to No.49, BPP/IUP v15 1868-9, p.158.; Booth to Rolleston, 13 April 1868, No.4, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.5. [RDB v21 p.8036.]
317 Booth to J.C.Richmond, 14 April 1868, No.5, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.5. [RDB v21 p.8036.] Booth to J.C.Richmond, 5 May 1868, No.8, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.7. [RDB v21 p.8038.]
318 Booth to J.C.Richmond, 5 May 1868, No.8, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.7. [RDB v21 p.8038.]
entered and slept in Wharekura till daylight. Tauke and Kokiri spoke on behalf of Titokowaru who was still sick. McDonnell threatened to take the whole village hostage unless Tauke and Kokiri returned with him. Tauke agreed to go as a hostage. The force returned to Waihi. 319

Booth continued his demands the next day. He sent Natanahira Ngahina to Te Ngutu with a final demand. Ngaruhaine sent the three horses back to him - realising they could go only so far in the hope that they could out bluff the Pakeha. When the bluff failed they did not immediately begin hostilities, but rather made a minimum concession to avert war. 320 Natanahira Ngahina arrived back at Waihi with the horses and found Booth outraged. The thieves had not been caught, and other horses had been stolen. Booth stormed angrily to Te Ngutu, despite attempts by McDonnell to stop him. He allowed Tauke to accompany him, but did not give him a horse. McDonnell following behind with a small force caught up with Tauke and gave him a horse so he could get to Te Ngutu and avert trouble. Booth took three prisoners and two horses, in a very volatile situation. Booth released two of his prisoners after examining his case, but held Ihaka for a week waiting for more evidence. Ihaka remained in prison when the week was up. On 7 June he escaped from Waihi gaol and returned to Te Ngutu.

The Forces involved.

Titokowaru's force was very small. According to Belich Tangahoe and Pakakohi did not participate in his first campaign. Until mid-September 1868 Ngaruhaine fought virtually alone with a force of around eighty men. The warriors who joined Titokowaru were few, and often very young or very old: some Ngaruhaine people joined up immediately - Wairau, Hakopa and Kaake, with his Araukuku warriors. There were individuals such as Rupe of Tangahoe, with Bent and Kane the renegades, and Tihirua a young priest from Ngati Maru, who joined the struggle. The chiefs, Haowhenua, Toi Whakataka, and Katene Tuwhakaruru, were able men. Even with this support the first campaign was fought at odds of around twelve to one. 321

319 Booth to J.C. Richmond, 15 May 1868, No.9, AJHR 1868, A-8, pp.7-8. [RDB v21 pp.8038-9.]
320 Belich, Titokowaru, pp.50-1.
321 Belich, Titokowaru, p.55.
The lack of participation reflected the past experiences of the iwi in the district. Having survived the ravages of Chute and Cameron, the people may have been unwilling to run the risk of unleashing further military action against them. They were aware of the need to tread very carefully with the Government. The Ngaruahine of Kauae, Mawhitiwhiti and Hatepe fought no more. Nor did Pakakohi, Tangahoe and Nga Rauru. Hone Pihama Te Rei Hanataua wrote in June of 1868 that "[o]ur tribe, the Taranaki, laugh at the actions of Titokowaru. They are peacefully disposed. The Tangahoe and the Pakakohi are also living quietly."322 These iwi remembered the campaigns of 1865-6 and were not anxious for a repeat.323 Their distance from Titokowaru was conditional on how the Taranaki people identified his cause. Wiremu Manaia Hukanui talked to the Taranaki people who said that if it became clear that Titokowaru's struggles were based on land grievances then the iwi would consider helping him. If however, it was a fight solely based on horse stealing, then they were determined to remain aloof. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Pakakohi.324 Clearly, these people were being very cautious.

There was an identifiable feeling of tiredness among many of the Southern iwi. Ngati Tupaea had returned from Waikoukou, near Warea, and had settled inland of Keteonetea. They sent a message to McDonnell stating that it was their intention to live at peace in the future, and hoped that McDonnell's people would not interfere with them. McDonnell believed that Ngati Tupaea would not offer any further opposition to Pakeha occupation of land in their neighbourhood.325

Other Maori, known to the Pakeha as "friendlies" kept out of the conflict. Hone Pihama was described in an official memorandum as a "very trustworthy man, once an active foe, but for three years past an invaluable friend of the Government." Ropata Ngarongomate reported that the Taranaki iwi "have no sympathy with the perpetrators of these crimes."326

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323 Belich, Titokowaru, p.55.
325 Colonel McDonnell to Captain Holt, 3 October 1867, No.19, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.17, and ibid, 14 November 1867, No.21, p.18. [RDB v21 pp.8048-9.]
326 Memorandum, Encl. to No.49, BPP/IUP, v15 1868-9, p.159.
Such remarks point to the leaders' concern that their people suffer no more in the wars.

The European forces were much larger. In late August 1868 the Patea Field Force consisted of 770 Europeans, and 150 Wanganui kupapa. The hard core of this force was the Armed Constabulary. There were some discipline problems with the Armed Constabulary, but they were very good soldiers. They were equipped for bush fighting. They made up about a third of the Field Force's Europeans. The remainder were Wellington Rifles or Wellington Rangers, and other newly recruited volunteer units from Nelson, New Plymouth and Whanganui.

The kupapa made up part of the Field Force, totalling 150 men in August 1868. It increased to 457 in early November. This force included 110 experienced Whanganui warriors under Kepa te Rangihiwini (Major Kemp).

The Start of Fighting.

According to Belich Titokowaru adopted a strategy of "controlled provocation." He responded to the price on his head by writing a letter to unaligned Maori (the letter was found by Mawhitiwhiti people in a cleft stick on a path)\(^\text{327}\), that passed through the hands of colonists, putting a price on the head of the Governor (two shillings and sixpence, when his own head was worth £1,000.) He flaunted his location at Te Ngutu, and challenged them to come and get him. He instituted an intentional campaign of raid and ambush, which led the settlers to abandon their homes. The settlers' property was plundered after they left. The delay in government action led to pressure from the settlers for military action. They feared that the longer he was left unmolested, the more likely other hapu would join him. There was also pressure because of Te Kooti's war on the East Coast. Action was needed to justify the presence of troops in Taranaki.

Indeed this strategy attracted the attention that Titokowaru desired. James Booth, Resident Magistrate, did not trust the Pakakohi professions of peace, writing that

[i]n the meantime we take care to appear to have unbounded faith in the Pakakohi. If a blow sudden and effective is struck at the root of the evil [Te Ngutu-o-te-Manu], the Pakakohi will remain friendly; but if the murderers [those at Te Ngutu] gain the slightest perceptible advantage over us, I am afraid that other hapus, with the hopes of getting back their land, will be induced to join.

Booth continued trying to secure the friendship of Maori, while also attempting to deal "swift punishment to Titokowaru and this cannibal tribe."^328

William Hunter, Inspector in the Armed Constabulary, instructed the Officers to patrol their areas carefully, and to apprehend any Maori who opposed the settlers in their occupation of the land. They were, however, to be careful not to offend "Maori living in the area of the Camps, but with a thinly veiled threat accompanying the civility: "They are to be civilly treated and spoken to, but at the same time made aware that the detachment has been sent there to carry out the intentions of the Government, and that the settlers who wish to occupy their land will be protected, and those who oppose them will be punished." The detachment were to act as "peace officers", but could use arms under the direction of Head Quarters.^329

On 9 June 1868, Haowhenua and Katene, along with several other men, attacked three military settlers on the Te Rauna block (a portion of the confiscated land near the east side of the Waingongoro and near Mawhitihiti) who were felling timber on land that the Ngaruahine people considered to be theirs. Warnings to quit the land had been disregarded by settlers. McDonnell obtained the consent of the Defence Minister to enlist 400 men immediately, including 100 Whanganui Maori, for three months service. Following the killing of Cahill and the two other settlers, McDonnell was instructed by T.M.Haultain that there should be severe

^328 James Booth to J.C.Richmond, 1 July 1868, No.17, AJHR 1868, A-8, pp.15-6. [RDB v21 pp.8045-6.]
^329 Instructions for the Guidance of the Officer Commanding Detachment Armed Constabulary, Kakaramea and Wairoa, 29 March 1868, Encl. in No.23, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.19. [RDB v21 p.8050.]
punishment for murderers, but the force should be restrained "from unnecessary bloodshedding", and should make an effort to spare women and children, and to spare life once resistance ceased.330

The next day fifteen armed Ngaruahine men went to the house of Cahill's neighbour, Hiscox, which he had left in the care of an old employee named Griffiths. The Maori asked Griffiths if he held any land at Ketemarae. He replied that he did not, and that he was a poor man and had no land. Ngaruahine replied "You are the same as the Maoris, they are poor men too and have no land." They told Griffith to warn Hiscox to stay away, and to leave himself. They did not harm him.331

The Southern Taranaki chiefs continued to try and talk peace with Booth. On 10 June Natanahira Ngahina, Ngawakataurua, Te Wharematangi, Paraone Tutere and Rangihaeata visited the Resident Magistrate in his office at Patea. Booth had informed them by letter of the murder of Cahill, and wished to secure their allegiance. He reported that they "one and all, on behalf of themselves and their followers proffered allegiance to the Government, and volunteered to take the responsibility of giving protection to the wives and children of all the settlers in the district." On the request of the chiefs Booth posted a notice stating that the Pakakohi people were shocked by the killing, and were not connected with it. The Nga Rauru people also offered to protect Pakeha, as did people at Te Kauae - led by Wiremu Manaia Hukanui. The Tangahoe people made a similar offer.332

A member of the Armed Constabulary was killed and mutilated close to the Waihi redoubt on the 12 June. When the body of Trooper Smith was found the legs were lying on the ground, but the upper half of the body was carried to Te Ngutu where it was cooked and eaten. The deed was intended to strike

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330 Instructions for Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell from T.M.Haultain, 16 June 1868, No.49, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.31. [RDB, v21, p.8062.]
331 Belich, Titokowaru, pp.55-6.
terror into the hearts of Pakeha. It was followed by a letter from Titokowaru saying that his band had eaten the flesh of the white man.333

Titokowaru warned "Puano and the rest" (Puano was reported to be a "friendly" chief) to keep off the roads around Camp Waihi:

...Cease travelling on the roads; stop for ever going on the roads which lead to Mangamanga (Camp Waihi), lest you be left on the roads as food for the birds of the air and for the beasts of the field, or for me, because I have eaten the European (Smith, trooper), as (a piece of) beef, he was cooked in a pot: the women and children partook of the food. I have begun to eat human flesh, and my throat is constantly open for the flesh of man.

I shall not die; I shall not die. When death itself shall be dead I shall be alive.

That is the word for you extending to Matangarara. That is a light (clear) word to you extending to all your boundaries.334

Support for the actions of Titokowaru was still divided. Wiremu Manaia Hukanui reported a meeting with the Taranaki people. He said that if the murders were committed for land then there was some sympathy with Titokowaru, but if it was only horse stealing then there was no support for his actions. Belich states that the Taranaki iwi believed Titokowaru had broken the absolute commitment to peace made at the March meeting. He said that if those present at the July meeting supported Titokowaru they would not be allowed back.335

Initially the Upper Whanganui chiefs did not intend to fight. Titokowaru hoped that a decision in his favour by the Kingitanga would influence those who did not support him. But he appeared not to have Kingitanga support.336

334 Translation of a letter from Titokowaru to Puano, 25 June, 1868, Enc1.2 in No.17, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.16. [RDB v21 p.8047.]
Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell prepared to put military operations on a larger scale, but wanted confirmation from the Government before he began. He wrote that it was perfectly clear...that the Government must now lose no time in putting our coercive machinery upon a more comprehensive footing....A dangerous crisis is evidently at hand, requiring in the first instance, great caution in the choice of "which end of the stick to get hold of;" but there can be no doubt as to the immediate necessity of an enlargement of our field of operation.

McDonnell was advised by Katene to take Pakakohi and other chiefs prisoners, but Haultain disagreed with this course because he was unwilling to increase the hostility towards the Government. He could offer no further reinforcements.337

On 7 July Major Von Tempsky went to the Ngaruahine village of Mawhitihiti, Te Kauae and Araukuku on McDonnell's command, bearing letters ordering them into Camp Waihi so none could tell Titokowaru where the troops were going to fight. McDonnell suspected the Mawhitihiti people of being involved in 9 June killings. Katene Tuwhakaruru, who with Te Katu had gone over to Titokowaru, visited the camp and persuaded the Mawhitihiti people to join him. Virtually the whole population of around fifty went to Te Ngutu. McDonnell was still considering what action to take against the Pakakohi. He wanted to establish posts on the road to Te Kauae and at the entrance to the Pungarehu bush in order to provoke the first engagement. The fight would then, in his eyes, be an attempt to hold the Waingongoro River.338

Ngaruahine, under Haowhenua's and Tautahi Ariki's (Tautai) operational command, made their first major move against the Colonial forces on the 12 July, attacking a small redoubt at Turuturumokai (three miles from the main colonist camp at Waihi.) Titokowaru had planned the attack. The main aim was to damage the garrison without losing any warriors.339 Ngaruahine killed ten and wounded six soldiers (out of twenty) without

338 McDonnell to Haultain, 7 July 1868, No.66, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.38. [RDB v21 p.8069.]
entering the redoubt. According to Cowan the hearts of the first two soldiers killed were cut out as offerings to Tu and Uenuku (Whangai Hau). The Maori lost 6 killed, when a group went against Titokowaru's orders and attacked the front gate. Due to Turuturumokai's proximity to Waihi the rout was a major embarrassment to the colonists. McDonnell wanted to attack Te Ngutu as soon as possible (as Titokowaru wanted - fighting on ground of his own choosing). 340

Following the attack on Turuturumokai there was hostility towards Maori not involved in the fighting. Hone Pihama Te Rei Hanataua reported to Parris that his messenger was turned on by Pakeha. They accused the people at Matangarara of being the attackers of the redoubt. Pihama feared that "those of my tribe who have surrendered to the Government will be liable to another Pokaikai attack." Pihama stated to Parris that

if it ever occurs I am determined to leave you and go to the bush, and you will see that every friendly native in the district will follow me. I would rather die fighting with my race than subject any more of my people to such treatment as that was. 341

Following the hostility directed at Pihama's people, the Minister of Native Affairs authorised notices to be printed and circulated calling on soldiers to "abstain from any acts or words tending to drive well disposed men into the arms of the enemy." Hone Pihama was to be paid a salary of £50 per annum commencing on 1 June 1868. 342

The Government conveniently found further justification to attack the people in South Taranaki. On 17 June the Under Secretary for Colonial Defence wrote to McDonnell, reporting that one of the people involved in the killing of Rio Haraterangi [sic], named Pairama - a Waikato man, was living at Kaipo, a reserve at Waitotara. Others involved in the killing were supposed to be living at Patea. In addition those involved in the killing of the native policeman Kereti were said to be residing at Okotuku.

340 Von Tempsky to McDonnell, 12 July 1868, Encl. In No.1, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.37. [RDB v21 p.8068 and supplement pp.8068-9.]; R.T.Blake to G.Blake, 13 July 1868, Encl. In No.91, ibid, p.47. [RDB v21 p.8078] The writer was the son of Mr Blake, whose mother was Maori. 341 Parris to J.C.Richmond, 17 July 1868, No.89, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.46. [RDB v21 p.8077.]

342 G.S.Cooper (Acting Secretary of Native Affairs) to Parris, 24 July 1868, No.90, AJHR 1868, A-8, p.46. [RDB v21 p.8077.]
McDonnell was instructed by the Defence Minister to take the steps necessary to capture these "murderers."\textsuperscript{343}

McDonnell was concerned about the intentions of Pakakohi, who he met with at Manutahi on 17 July. He reported their attitude as "pleasing" and "satisfactory." The next day officials from Whanganui met Nga Rauru at Weraroa. The tribe expressed their loyalty to the Queen and their desire to protect the Pakeha. Both groups wanted to allay Pakeha suspicions. A week later Pakakohi and Nga Rauru met at Waitotara. While outwardly the speakers disapproved of Titokowaru's proceedings, and stated that they wished to remain neutral, the real attitude of these people was more complicated. They remembered Pokaikai and wanted to protect themselves. But there was sympathy for Titokowaru. Te Wharematangi wrote to Titokowaru with information and support. Nga Rauru denied to the settlers that they had any knowledge of what Titokowaru planned to do, but they were in fact communicating with him. Nga Rauru are known to have visited Te Ngutu with gifts of gunpowder, as did Te Ati Awa. An Upper Whanganui chief, Te Kere, sent Titokowaru a white horse named Niu Tireni.\textsuperscript{344}

After McDonnell's first expedition to Te Ngutu on 21-22 August was abandoned because of bad guides, and bad weather, a second went ahead on the twenty first of that month. Te Ngutu was not a fighting pa and was unfortified. Titokowaru concentrated his engineering efforts on Te Maru, about a mile south east, on the track that an attacking force would use. If the colonists did make it to Te Ngutu Titokowaru had allowed for that contingency by reducing its economic importance as the centre for Ngaruahine, by increasing cultivations elsewhere and not planting Te Ngutu that year. Ngaruahine shifted their reserve supplies, equipment and livestock to a clearing, Ruaruru, nearby.\textsuperscript{345}

On the day of the attack Ngaruahine were gathering food. The colonists managed to burn some of the village, including Wharekura the meeting

\textsuperscript{343} Francis Stevens (for the Under Secretary of Colonial Defence) to McDonnell, 17 July 1868, No.68, \textit{AJHR} 1868, A-8, p.39. [RDB v21 p.8070.]

\textsuperscript{344} Belich, \textit{Titokowaru}, pp.76-8.

house, before being beaten back by the inhabitants. Ngaruahine lost two men. Four of the Colonial force were killed, and nine wounded.

It was not until 7 September 1868, that there was a full scale battle at Te Ngutu.346 The Patea Field Force in three groups in the command of Hunter, Von Tempsky and Kepa, under the formal command of McDonnell, planned to attack Te Ngutu through the neighbouring clearing of Te Ruaruru. They missed the village and approached Te Ngutu from the north. The Pakeha force was spotted by some villagers who raised the alarm.

During 7 September attack on Te Ngutu o te Manu the kupapa scouts came across a clearing where there was a hospital. In the clearing were two sick children, tended by a man and a woman. The man was probably the chief Paramena of Mawhitiwhiti. The woman was standing outside the huts when the kupapa entered the clearing. She was pursued by the kupapa. Ngaruahine believe she was caught and killed. Paramena was shot down by the scouts as he tried to defend the children. Although Belich states that the troops who found the children left the sick girl alone, in The Adventures of Kimble Bent, Cowan writes that the girl was slain cruelly - "by throwing her up into the air and spitting her on a bayonet as she fell".347 The boy, Katene's son, would not keep quiet, and a kupapa seized him and "dashed out his brains." Von Tempsky did not stop the killings. Another child, Omahura, son of Te Karere, was found and taken to the clearing. He was taken back to Camp Waihi, and later adopted by William Fox and trained as a lawyer.348 In the official account of the fighting McDonnell states that the adults were killed and the children taken with the soldiers.349

Titokowaru had been warned about the expedition: the women and children had been evacuated safely to positions prepared in case of attack. The warriors at Te Ngutu o te Manu rained heavy fire upon the whole colonist, causing heavy casualties. The Colonists retreated, but they were still under fire from all directions, and were pursued all the way to the

348 Belich, Titokowaru, p.118.
349 McDonnell to Under Secretary of Colonial Defence, 9 September 1868, No.94, AJHR 1868, A-6, pp.51-2. [RDB V21 pp.8082-3.]
Waingongoro. The people at Te Ngutu lost no more than three men in the battle - one was the Araukuku chief Kaake, another a young chief, Reweti. Fifty Europeans were listed as killed and wounded. The total casualties were probably greater, as the belief that no kupapa were killed is likely to be false.

After the battle the dead soldiers were burnt on a funeral pyre. One was cooked and eaten. Te Ngutu was abandoned after the fight and a new site for a fighting pa found.

The military was in shock at the massive defeat. Hundreds of men deserted the Patea Field Force or refused to re-enlist. The kupapa, impressed with the mana of Titokowaru, went home. Von Tempsky's constabulary unit mutinied. Six out of eight European units involved in the defeat, ceased to exist. The Government was forced to abandon its main base at Waihi, together with lesser posts (Turuturumokai, Hawera, Manutahi, Mokoia and Manawapou), and retreat to Patea. McDonnell was "encouraged to leave his command". When McDonnell's replacement, Colonel Whitmore, arrived he had trouble with the forces. They had, according to their new commander "melted away" and were, except for the Armed Constabulary "utterly useless for any purpose whatever."

During September, according to Belich, most of the Matangarara people - the main section of Tangahoe, some Nga Rauru and some individuals from other tribes joined Titokowaru. Sections of Tangahoe at Oeo and Keteonata under Pihama and Ahitana remained neutral. Natanahira Ngahina and Maata also refused to join Titokowaru.

In mid September Titokowaru resumed his tactic of goading the Colonial forces. He started by harassing Camp Waihi using haka and long range volleys. On 13 September Titokowaru and his people crossed the
Waingongoro and camped at Taiporohenui - a politically significant choice. It was in full sight and sound of the colonist garrison at Turuturumokai.\textsuperscript{354}

Again Titokowaru's tactics worked. On 20 September McDonnell attempted an attack on Taiporohenui, but abandoned it when he realised that there were hidden fortifications - another trap. Two days later the kupapa left for home, claiming that they had to attend the tangi of Hori Kingi. It is possible that they may have wanted to avoid further collision with Titokowaru.

Early October found Titokowaru on the move. He and his people marched to Otoia (north east of Patea) and built a pa there. For nearly two months after Te Ngutu he made no offensive moves - "no attempt to exploit his victory by destroying colonist forces." The people needed time to recuperate - repair weapons, collect food, plant crops, after fighting for four months. His followers still numbered less than the colonial forces - probably around 150. The Government forces were around 632 Europeans and 457 kupapa. Many of these were ineffective after the rout at Te Ngutu. Many kupapa wavered about serving.\textsuperscript{355}

On 14 October Defence Minister Haultain relieved McDonnell of his command at Patea. The pressure of the loss at Te Ngutu and the resulting public criticism was finally taking its toll.

Titokowaru still faced the problem of having to get the colonists to attack him on a location of his choosing. He raided around Patea, to try and get the colonists to attack Otoia. As a further challenge he shifted his base to Moturoa at the beginning of November.\textsuperscript{356}

The tactics worked. Colonel Whitmore prepared to attack Okotuku, the new pa at Moturoa, with reinforcements of 100 Constabulary newly arrived from Auckland. On 7 November Whitmore marched from Wairoa to attack Moturoa (Papatihaehake) with over 600 men. Of these, 200 Wanganui

\textsuperscript{354} Belich, \textit{Titokowaru}, p.141,  
\textsuperscript{355} Whitmore to Haultain, 2 November 1868, No.2, \textit{AJHR} 1869, A-3, pp.4-5. [RDB v21 pp.8221-2]  
\textsuperscript{356} Lt Col Gorton to Whitmore, 1 November 1868, Encl. in No.2, \textit{AJHR} 1869, A-3, p.5. [RDB v21 p.8222.] Sub-Inspector C.McDonnell to Gorton, nd, Sub Encl. to Encl. in No.2, \textit{ibid}. 
kupapa refused to go into the bush. The plan was to outflank the pa and attack its open rear, in a surprise attack.

Again they were outsmarted. Titokowaru's people knew of the attack and were well prepared. The colonists never got into position, retreated and were pursued back to Wairoa. They lost between fifty and sixty killed and wounded. The defenders lost one dead and a few wounded. Again the defeat was blamed on large Maori numbers, incompetence of the soldiers and the behaviour of some of the kupapa. Actually it was the fact that, in Belich's words, "Whitmore was unfortunate enough to be a good general matched against an excellent one." Okotuku was abandoned after the battle.357

A few days after the victory Titokowaru advanced to Papatupu on the Waitotara River. He began negotiations with the remaining Nga Rauru, whose chiefs were still reluctant to join him. Pehimana and Hare Tipene went to their up-river refuge of Piraunui. Aperahama Tamaiparea stayed at Titokowaru's camp for some days but refused to see him. Aperahama then went to his Whanganui relatives at Putiki and reported all this information to James Booth. Apart from the aforementioned group, all Nga Rauru joined, adding probably seventy or eighty warriors to Titokowaru's supporters. Recruits also came from Te Ati Awa, Taranaki and Ngati Maru.

The chiefs of Te Atiawa, including Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake and Hapurona Pukerimu confirmed their desire for peace at a meeting later in November, but they could not prevent small groups from going south, and may not have wished to stop them. Te Whiti O Rongomai and Tohu Kakahi remained committed to peace. Titokowaru's followers soon grew to nearly 1000 people, including 400 warriors. Belich states that around half were Ngati Ruanui, a quarter Nga Rauru, and a quarter Ngati Maru, Taranaki, Te Ati Awa and individuals from other tribes such as Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato.358

Titokowaru again persisted with his tactics of harassment. On 12-13 November the Tekau-ma-Rua (Titokowaru's chosen warriors) burned a


358 Belich, Titokowaru, pp.180-1.
half finished blockhouse outside the Weraroa redoubt, slaughtered some stock and harassed the garrison. The following day Titokowaru's whole force arrived at Nukumaru, burned local farm houses and started building Tauranga-Ika, fifteen miles north of Whanganui. Parties raided the township.

On 27 November the Government forces committed some of the most atrocious actions of the campaign, when a small body of troops attacked a group of young children exploring the Handley's farm, close to Tauranga-Ika. The oldest was probably around ten, the youngest about six. Kingi Takatua was the oldest and tallest. With him were Ihaka Takarangi Akuhata Herewini, Hoani Tamou, Tonu and Wi Taria, Pehira Toheriri and Poharama Ngarutahi. None had weapons.

The boys were fired on by a column of Colonists led by Newland and fled back toward the pa. The cavalry had a fair view of their targets and realised that they were children. As the children ran Handley and George Maxwell pursued them. The "Kai Iwi cavalry ran for their horses, mounted, and charged in for the kill, not despite the fact that their quarry were unarmed children, but because of it." Maxwell and Wicks teed caught the trailing boys up and fired on them.

Akuhata was hit in the back. Ihaka was hit in the thigh. As he tried to protect himself Maxwell slashed him about the hands and head - severing one of his fingers and cutting deeply, but not fatally into the boy's head. Kingi was hit in the back and stomach when Wicksteed fired on him. Maxwell split the child's skull in half with his sabre. The officers following their men were struggling to regain control of them, realising that Tauranga-Ika was very close, and that angry warriors would be upon them quickly. Maxwell then slashed Akuhata on his head and shoulder as he lay bleeding from his bullet wound.

George Campbell and Maxwell chased the remaining boys. Campbell fired on Poharama Ngarutahi ripping a wound across his chest. Either Arthur Wright or George Peake cut Hoani Tamou on the back of the head. Wi Taria was also wounded and Tonu was hit by a bullet on the sole of his foot. Bryce finally managed to catch up to them as they were preparing to take on Titokowaru's army on their own, and comparing scores. After some further
difficulty he managed to get them to retire. Bryce and his men rejoined the cavalry. Newland falsified the report: multiplying the number killed from two to eight, and failed to mention that the victims were children. The "gallantry of Maxwell" was said to be extreme - sabring two and shooting one of the enemy.359

Whitmore planned to march out on 30 November with his whole field force, hoping to resupply and reorganise the Patea and Wairoa garrisons before leaving for Poverty Bay. He also hoped that Titokowaru might be forced into battle on open ground. On the same day Titokowaru advanced most of his warriors and appeared before Woodall's redoubt where they threw up slight fortifications. He sent a detachment south of Kai Iwi where they looted and burned a couple of farmhouses.360 Whitmore ignored his provocation.

The Colonial Panic of 1868.

Before Titokowaru began his fight against the threat to Maori land in the South Taranaki area, it had seemed to the Government and the settlers as if the fighting was over. The colonists had been expecting to get on to the lands confiscated from Taranaki Maori, and to enter a period of "progress." Instead the wars on both the West and East Coasts continued, draining the financial resources of the Colony, and threatening British dominance - with Titokowaru now controlling the area between Mt Taranaki and Wanganui, except for the fortified settlements of Patea and Wairoa.

Titokowaru's success in battle led to appeals for Imperial help. Settlers from north of Wanganui abandoned their farms, some leaving the colony. The Government advised settlers to withdraw to centres of population, and to fortify these areas. The militias of Rangitikei, Manawatu, Wellington and the Hutt Valley were placed on active service.

360 Whitmore to Haultain, 2 December 1868, No.9, AJHR 1869, A-12, pp.13-4. [RDB v21 pp.8230-1.]
Te Kooti's Poverty Bay raids added a touch of terror to those already in crisis. The Poverty Bay actions increased the problems of the Government, and increased the sense of crisis throughout the colony. Colonists felt that British control of the North Island was threatened.

In late 1868 settlers and soldiers in Wanganui believed that a full scale attack on the town was imminent. To make matters more desperate, the Imperial forces that had been available during the Taranaki Wars were not accessible. British control of the West Coast between New Plymouth and Wanganui was genuinely threatened by Titokowaru.

The Imperial Government was sick of the whole affair. They were still wrangling about the costs of the indecisive Waikato Wars. The threat of an attack on a town was not enough them to justify the expense, and they refused to become involved. On top of all this settlers believed that there was a chance of a Kingitanga offensive. Indeed there was increasing sympathy for Titokowaru from some Kingitanga supporters. The settlers now had to deal with the possibility of defeat in the wars that they had always believed it was impossible for them to lose.

According to Belich, the historical treatment of this very real crisis has been to ignore it. It has disappeared from the historical record. "As a result, the military crisis of which he [Titokowaru] was the principal architect - perhaps the greatest threat to European dominance in the history of New Zealand - has all but disappeared from the received version.[history]"

The End of Titokowaru's Armed Resistance.

From 2 December 1868 until 16 January 1869, Titokowaru devastated the hinterland in the vicinity of Whanganui, burning farms and abandoned military posts - seeking to force the colonists to attack him in a position of his choosing. Colonel Whitmore was absent from the West Coast, and during this six week period the colonial forces in Wanganui were built up to about 2 000 men. The Government, however, attempted no major invasion until Whitmore returned.

361 Belich, Titokowaru, p.220.
362 Belich, Wars, pp.252-257.
On 4 December Titokowaru sent a letter to Whitmore stating that New Zealand was made for the Maori, and England for the Pakeha. He asked that the Pakeha "Move off from my places to your own places in the midst of the sea. Move away from the town to those other places." Titokowaru's two emissaries - Rimitiriu of Nga Rauru, and Ngaruahine Rameka were seized and imprisoned. 363 Rameka was till in prison in January.

Manutahi, and other small villages were ravaged by the Wanganui Cavalry on 14 December. The settlement was inhabited by an old Pakakohi couple were keeping the fires burning for their people. According to Livingston (who Belich identifies as a reliable source) they murdered the old couple, burnt their bodies and "did other atrocities which if done by the Maoris on us would create a great sensation." Belich states that the atrocities included some form of sexual mutilation, it is likely that the man's genitals were severed and placed in his mouth. Acting on information from Livingston and Ginger, Booth complained about the "brutality and mutilation of a Hauhau man and woman." The incident was investigated and the volunteers exonerated. Booth's complaints were described as totally unfit for publication. Finnimore and his men went on to burn Mokoia and two other villages. They took thirty horses. Titokowaru sent his mounted men after them but it was too late. 364

Colonial forces patrolled around the area of Ketemarae. The kainga at Taiporohenui was burnt. The force travelled through Mokoia and Manutahi. Lieutenant Colonel Lyon noted that "not a Native, or any indications of Natives were seen." On returning to camp the force was fired on. Lyon ignored the fire, his aim was to return to base, not engage the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell's force reconnoitred around Te Ngutu. He destroyed the pa, which he estimated to have been unoccupied for about a fortnight. He burnt Otoia, an unfortified village of around eight whare. 365

In mid January 1869 Colonel Whitmore returned to Whanganui, setting up headquarters at Kai Iwi. His field forces numbered 1,753 men, including 405

363 Belich, Titokowaru, p.207.
364 Belich, Titokowaru, pp.209-10.
kupapa. On 21 January the Colonial army began a methodical advance
towards Tauranga-ika. They cut a road and sent reconnaissance parties as
they went. The defenders at Tauranga-Ika had to wait until 2 February until
the Colonists arrived at the pa. The next day Tauranga-Ika was abandoned
without a fight. 366

Many of Titokowaru's warriors left him. The areas that he had conquered
were reoccupied by colonists. Although it was not obvious to the Colonial
force for some six weeks, the abandonment of the pa was the beginning of
the end of Titokowaru's armed resistance. Titokowaru's supporters did
continue to ambush and bother the Colonial forces, but the Colonists
continued to pursue them. 367

In the pursuit Whitmore attempted to persuade soldiers to enter the bush,
something they were understandably reluctant to do. He offered various
incentives. One was any women captured by the force, as happened on the
East Coast when the Government forces gave the Arawa of No. 8 division
custody of some of the women with Te Kooti captured at Ngatapa,
including some of Te Kooti's own wives. These women were brought to
Whanganui in January. Whitmore promised that if any of Titokowaru's
women were captured he would give them to the Arawa. Some women
were captured. It seems probable that these women were raped. Belich
writes that the treatment of these women "... amounted to government
authorised slavery."

In addition Whitmore offered a bounty on enemies that were brought in-dead or alive. In at least four cases his offer of a price on the head was taken
up literally. A kupapa and Tom Adamson dumped four heads in front of
Whitmore, who was apparently shocked because he had apparently
intended that they only bring the ears. 368 In The Adventures of Kimble
Bent, Cowan describes the head hunting of the government troops. Every
man killed in the pursuit was decapitated. The first was a rangatira-
Matangi-o-Rupe of Ngati Manuhiakai (Titokowaru's own hapu). A group

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367 Whitmore to Haultain, 3 February 1869, No.17, ibid, pp.22-3.
368 Belich, Titokowaru, p.252.
of Maori travelling with children, who were slow in escaping were captured. The man was decapitated, and the woman and her children were taken to Rotorua with the kupapa Arawa after the campaign. Three other men were decapitated by Whanganui kupapa. Both Maori and Pakeha hunted the Titokowaru's retreating group.369

The Government and the settlers were outraged, when on 13 February fifteen Ngati Maniapoto warriors attacked the Pukearuhe redoubt at Whitecliffs - the northern-most British outpost in Taranaki, built on an old pa site. The settlers had been warned that there was a likelihood of an attack in the area, but the decision whether to stay or go was left up to them. They stayed. One woman, four children and the missionary J. Whiteley were killed in addition to three military settlers. Belich writes that the raid was possibly sanctioned by the Kingitanga leadership, but King Tawhiao disapproved of the killing of women and children. The settlers saw it as a declaration of war. New Plymouth was put on a war footing. The colonial forces were marched to New Plymouth. There was fear that the Kingitanga would combine with Titokowaru.

In Southern Taranaki Titokowaru's people still managed to successfully attack their pursuers. On 18 February a group retreating from Tauranga-Ika ambushed a party of soldiers who were cutting a track in pursuit of Titokowaru. The attack, known as the "Peach Grove Ambush", saw seven of the men of the Colonial force dead, and one wounded.370 Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell resigned over the incident.

Titokowaru's remaining group was attacked as they retreated inland. On 13 March a Colonial force came upon Titokowaru with his Ngaruahine warriors and women and children at Otautu, an unfortified camp. The government moved to attack, but were held back by Maori defenders. The non-combatants escaped, then Titokowaru and his men did the same. Titokowaru's group lost three people who were slow in escaping, and were caught and killed. A number of women were taken prisoner. The government lost six men killed, and twelve wounded.371

370 McDonnell to Whitmore, 19 February 1869, Encl.1 in No.21, AJHR 1869, A-12, p.26. [RDB v21 p.8243.]
371 Whitmore to Haultain, 14 March 1869, No.25, AJHR 1869, A-12, pp.29-30. [RDB v21 pp.8246-7.]
The Ngaruahine ran still further inland. On 24 March Titokowaru narrowly escaped capture at Te Ngaere swamp. He made his way to Totara, and to Kawau pa on the upper Waitara River. Whitmore gave up the pursuit.

Not all of those who had supported Titokowaru fled with him to the upper Waitara River region. Some of the Pakakohi and Nga Rauru people had taken shelter up the Patea, Whenuakura and Waitotara Rivers. In June Major Noake, accompanied by around 200 men imprisoned the old chief Ngawakataurua and many of the Pakakohi people who chose to surrender in order to survive. Pakakohi had sent a peace envoy to negotiate with the Colonial forces, and had surrendered on the condition that they would not be harmed. The warriors surrendered their arms and were taken to Patea. Gradually other sections of the tribe were brought in from the Patea and the Whenuakura Rivers until practically all the warriors were captured (over one hundred), besides most of the women and children - a total of 233 people. The men were transported to Otago and were not released until peace was established on the West Coast. Belich states that "had the Pakakohe [sic] anticipated the imprisonment it is extremely unlikely that they would have surrendered as they did."372

The Pakakohi were first imprisoned at Patea, but secret preparations were made to ship them to Otago. In December ninety four men were shipped to Wellington and tried. Despite pleas from the Whanganui and other government allies, seventy four, including very old and young men, were sentenced to three to seven years hard labour in Dunedin prison. For many it was the equivalent of the death sentence. They were shipped to Dunedin on 6 November 1869.373

From April onwards, although the pursuit of Titokowaru was given up, the military hold on South Taranaki continued. For another eight months Colonial troops garrisoned and patrolled the area. Titokowaru's allies fled to refuges high up the rivers. Garrisons were stationed in Patea and Weraroa, Nukumaru, Wairoa and Manawapou. Camp Waihi was reoccupied in October. In April the South Taranaki force exceeded 1,000

372 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.311.
373 Belich, Titokowaru, p.278. The treatment of the Pakakohe prisoners will be covered in more detail below.
men. The number diminished as units were laid off and reinforcements sent to the East Coast. Later in the year Lyon and Noake still had 700 men, including a number of kupapa.

The people who took refuge up-river were pursued and harassed. Between April and November 1869, the Colonial forces made expeditions inland. Nga Rauru in their Upper Waitotara refuges were the target of the first at the end of March. A Kai Iwi cavalry patrol found a Nga Rauru man, woman and child hidden in the bush at Pakaraka. The man, an ancient warrior Te Kerira, was spared on the condition that he became a guide. At the beginning of May an old woman was found at the village of Piraunui. She was killed. Noake's men carried off, burned or destroyed everything in a dozen villages and cultivations. Nga Rauru were left destitute and fled to the Whanganui people, putting themselves under their protection. Two Pakakohi who attempted to surrender, and a woman, were shot by a Ngati Porou kupapa force.374

From April 1869 onwards there was no more fighting on the West Coast. Whitmore shifted his force to the East once again. But Titokowaru was still considered dangerous and willing to fight back if attacked. Throughout the 1870's his armed presence helped protect the area between the Warea and Waingongoro as a bastion of Maori independence.375

The 27 October saw the last deaths of Titokowaru's War. Lucy Takiora who acted as an informer to the Government, paid directly by McLean and rewarded with £400 of confiscated property, heard that some old Ngaruahine people had returned to their homes near Araukuku. She gave the information to Richard Blake, who was in command at Waihi, making him promise to capture, not kill them. Blake and Piniamino led out a patrol with Takiora as guide. When three of the old people were found, the two men, Wikiriwhi and Hami, were shot dead. Only the woman was taken alive.376

374 Belich, Titokowaru, p.276-7.
375 Belich, War, pp.257-70.
376 Belich, Titokowaru, p.280.
Maori Prisoners of War

Maori imprisoned for their defence of the land and their mana fell into two main groups. The first were a group of Pakakohi men who were transported and exiled first to Wellington and then to Dunedin. The second were the people from Parihaka exiled for their actions in challenging the Government's right to confiscate the land in Taranaki. Alongside these main groups Taranaki Maori involved in the fighting were captured by British and Colonial forces and held as prisoners of war. This last group is difficult to trace and little is known about what happened to them, and their experiences. Jane Reeves wrote that "Maori never accepted the "justice" imposed on them and active resistance to the confiscations continued throughout the 1860's, 1870's and 1880's."

The Treatment of Prisoners

There were rumours of harsh treatment of prisoners by the Colonial forces. In a private letter to his brother Colonel Weare wrote of an incident following the capture of Putahi pa:

On the 7th, the day the General took the Pa of Putahi, I was ordered to lay an ambush with fifty men, to cut off fugitives. A party of five fell into it, - one was badly wounded and got away with three others, as the bush was so dense. One man was taken alive, unhurt - a Piperiki [sic] Chief. The General received me very coldly on his arrival at Patea, for taking this man alive, after his intimation of 'no prisoners.' However I told him I could not order my men to kill a man after he had thrown down his arms and surrendered. This prisoner was taken to Kakaramea, where the General encamped on the 9th, and kept there till the 11th, on which morning the General left at 3a.m.; and at 8, under the instructions from the General, this prisoner was taken down to a gully, tied hand and foot, and then cruelly shot to death by some of the Fiftieth....I have written officially to the General to know if Captain Young had due authority and orders for this act, as otherwise we consider he has cast a stain on the name of the regiment.

Since the leaving of Sir Duncan, the true sentiments of the Governor and his Government have come out towards the Maoris, in their urging General Chute on to all these atrocities of killing and no prisoners. And they cannot get out of it, for Dr Featherston, the superintendent of the Province, and a Government man, is moving about with the General's camp.
The kupapa forces also rated mention in Colonel Weare's letter. He reported that they had taken two men, one who was a chief. They were said to have cut his ears off, dried them, and presented them to their chief.377

Other atrocities were mentioned in Weare's letter, but not reprinted in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives. Grey's response to Cardwell, the Secretary of State mentions such atrocities as partially disembowelling prisoners, and roasting them while still alive - whether done by the troops, or with their knowledge. Grey would not deign to reply to such accusations. Weare, shocked at the use that a personal communication of his had been put to, withdrew it and denied that there was any substance to what he had reported. It is hardly surprising that he did so. He was severely reprimanded for the expression of these views and indeed withdrew the letter, but it represents, nonetheless, a candid depiction of concerns by one who was intimately involved in the war.378

In response to the accusations by Weare, Chute denied the charges of misconduct on the part of the troops. He stated that the Officers serving on the West Coast "could not have received a semi-official notification, or any notification at all to the effect that I did not wish any prisoners to be taken for I never authorised any such instructions." He continued that "having received the best confirmation that the country in which I was about to operate was infected with the very worst characters in New Zealand, and as the operations themselves became necessary only in consequence of the messengers of peace having been murdered under circumstances of the basest treachery, it is true that I myself [had] conversations with some officers gave it to be understood that in a rebellion marked by such atrocities it was necessary to inflict [summary?] punishment on the rebels in the several assaults on their strongholds, and it was with this view that I made use of any [impressions] about wishing for prisoners - but I never either said or intended to convey that rebels were to be killed in cold blood, or that question should be referred to wounded or to prisoners of taken, and I cannot admit that anything I may have said of the above nature had any

377 Extracts from a letter from Colonel Weare to Rev.T.W.Weare, 13 January 1866, Subencl. to Encl in No.4, AJHR 1867, A-1b, p.4. The Secretary of State enclosed this letter in a despatch to Grey on the 26 April 1866. It was marked confidential.
378 Governor Grey to Cardwell, No.6, 30 June 1866, AJHR 1867, A-1b. pp.5-6.
connection with the two deeds of violence committed by the Native Contingent, whose revengeful feelings towards the enemy, after an engagement, it was most difficult to control."

Prisoners were taken during campaigns. It is difficult to trace what happened to them, for how long they were held, and under what authority they were kept. There are many references to their capture - for example on the 20 April 1865 at Kakaramea, 2 prisoners taken,379 on the 18 July 1865 at the capture of Weraroa pa 57 prisoners were taken.380 In some cases more information was given. Sixty warriors from the village of Areiahi which was destroyed on the 20 July 1865, were taken prisoner, including some from the Ngati Pukeko tribe from Whakatane. Some of these prisoners were kept in a stockade, while others were shipped to Wellington. In Wellington they were kept aboard a prison hulk moored off Kaiwharawhara. Most escaped, with their chief Tataraimaka, by swimming ashore. Several were drowned in the attempt.381

There is evidence of harsh and intimidatory treatment of Taranaki Maori taken into custody by the invading forces. The treatment of Te Ua Haumene was an example of implied threat and brutal denial of information. On 2 February 1866 Te Ua was taken prisoner on by a Colonial expedition near Opunake which destroyed his settlement at Matakaha. The Taranaki Herald reported that General Chute sent soldiers to Matakaha to bring Te Ua Haumene and about thirty others, including some Poutoko Maori, to the camp. The paper reported "they were brought to camp with a very unnecessary display of force, in the shape of bayonets", and were shut in tents. Arama Karaka and thirty three of the others were kept prisoner overnight. The group was under the impression that they were to be executed. All but Te Ua, who was sent to Wellington382, were liberated in the morning. The writer continued acidly that Chute's campaign "left us

379 Cameron to Governor, 20 April 1865, No.70, AJHR 1865, A-4, p.25.
380 In the early despatches it is stated that fifty prisoners were taken. Grey later identifies the number as fifty seven. Memorandum by the Governor, 18 July 1865, Encl.17 in No.1, AJHR 1865, A-7, pp.3-4, and Governor Grey to Secretary of State, No.19, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.26. [RDB v19 p.7297.]
381 Cowan, NZ Wars, II, p.52.
382 Major General Chute to Grey, 12 February 1866, Encl. 2 in No.33, AJHR 1866, A-1, p.89. [RDB v19 p.7360.]
with more enemies than we found here when we came. 383 On the same
day as Matakaha was destroyed, an officer took Heremaia to Opunake from
Umuroa "under a threat of shooting him" - with a pistol against his back
the whole way.

The Imprisonment of the Pakakohi People

The land in South Taranaki had not been immediately occupied by the
Pakeha, and Maori continued to live in their ancestral areas. In early 1868
colonists began to survey and settle the confiscated land. Ngati Ruanui were
in the position of "having to fight for the land, or to leave it and starve."
The destruction of the economic base and the devastation of the
Government campaigns of the mid 1860s had left many of the people in the
area in an impossible situation, in which any further loss would leave them
landless. The Pakakohi were in a difficult position because the Government
had decided to locate military settlers around Manutahi in the economic
heart of their land. Te Wharematangi and Ngawakataurua were determined
to resist the survey. 384

In June 1869 around 233 Pakakohi men, women and children surrendered
to the troops on the promises that they would not be harmed. Despite the
assurances ninety six men were taken on "The Stitch" to Wellington on
charges of treason, or levying war against the Queen, as it was described in
the Taranaki list. They were held for a month in Wellington while awaiting
sentence. During this time they were housed on a Hulk in Wellington
Harbour. Oral sources say that two men died during this time. Seventy
four, including Ngawakataurua, were sent to Dunedin Gaol. Originally the
death sentence was imposed, but sentences were commuted to varying
lengths of penal servitude for all prisoners. Twelve men received seven
years, and sixty two received three years for high treason. The prisoners
arrived in Dunedin on 6 November 1869.

There was to be no leniency for the Pakakohi people. They were to be
punished harshly for their involvement in the struggle for their land.
William Fox stated that "Had this been the first offence of these men their

383 Extract from the Taranaki Herald of 17 March 1866, No.10, AJHR 1866, A-8,
384 Jane Reeves, "Maori Prisoners in Dunedin 1869-1872 and 1879-1881: Exiled
sin might possibly be forgiven, but this their second offence, and if they are not punished, how can the dignity of the law be sustained? - and evil doers will not fear it." The prisoners portrayed as evil and sinful had been attempting to protect their own lives, and their land from the destruction of the Colonial campaigns, and confiscation under the New Zealand Settlements Act. Newspaper reporting of the time was similarly harsh. The Grey River Argus wrote

with regard to Tito and his mob, our advice will be short and concise - Extermination. Desperate causes require desperate remedies and if we have no wish to see this native feud extending further we must crush it out - crush every spark out of it - or we may find when we least expect it that it has broken out in a fresh place causing us more loss of blood and treasure to subdue.385

The prisoners were aged from 18 and to over sixty.386 The loss of labour and of knowledge to the Pakakohi was substantial. Once in custody in Dunedin they formed part of the prison labour force that was used around that city in the 1860's, 1870's and 1880's - a time when Dunedin was going through rapid economic growth, and extensive development. The prisoners were used to build the infrastructure of that growth - the roads around the city. They also worked on quarrying, excavation of Bell Hill, road maintenance, reclamation of land and the formation of the Botanical Gardens. The Maori prisoners worked on the Gardens and the grounds of a High School. The Pakakohi men worked on so-called Maori Road, and on the Andersons Bay Causeway. These tasks involved heavy and back-breaking stonework, often in abysmal conditions. Caves around the Causeway were probably used to house the prisoners for short periods - appalling accommodation in the cold and dampness of Otago. Oral sources recall the lack of ventilation - taking turns to breath fresh air through a pipe under the door of the cave. There are no references to the hardships of the exile and imprisonment in the written sources of the time.387

The harshness of the conditions and the cold climate of the South took its tolls on the Pakakohi. In the first year eight prisoners died, four within the first four months. In the period from December 1869 through till September

385 Grey River Argus, 15 October 1868, p.3., clm 3. quoted in Reeves, p.8.
386 Reeves, p.9.
387 Reeves, pp.13-4.
1870 the *Otago Witness* reported eight deaths: Waati Tumeorangi, Iraia Tumahuki, Taituha, Waititi, Rangireru, Reupena te Rangi i Reunga, Haropapero Hopu, and Ruka Taiamua. The Dunedin Register of Deaths reports only from mid 1871: Hakarai Te Ngohi, Rapana Atonia, Takiwirangi, Tamati Te Pouwhakawiu, Hiriwetere, Rangiwhakarangona and Wiremu Tupito. Around twenty Pakakohi men died in Dunedin gaol. The gaoler reported ill health among those imprisoned, especially the elder ones. The trauma of exile and imprisonment, the sudden change of climate, the exposure to diseases such as tuberculosis, and isolation from whanau contributed to the high death rate.

On 12 March 1872 the Defence Minister announced that the Government would free the Pakakohi prisoners. The group finally left Dunedin on the 20 March. Oral sources state that the prisoners were asked to pledge to end their resistance to land confiscations. Their actions after they were returned to Taranaki was consistent with such a pledge.388

On return to their lands, the Pakakohi men found that their land had been occupied by Pakeha settlement. The men were finally to be settled on reserves south of the Waingongoro River - harshly punished for their cause with exile, imprisonment and loss of land. As a gesture of peace the returned men established a number of churches. At Nga Rauru an interdenominational church called Tutahi, at Hukatere "Te Kapenga" ("dethroning of hatred between Maori and Pakeha), and a marae where the house was called Te Takere O Aotea. In memory of those who had died in prison, and in gratitude to those who had cared for them in Dunedin, a hapu was renamed Ngati Otakou.389

**Conclusion**

The various campaigns from Waitara in 1860 to Parihaka in 1880-1, saw the establishment of over seventy military fortifications in Taranaki. The fortifications used were not just for the defence of the field forces. The redoubts, stockades and blockhouses were used so that "small bodies of men could be distributed economically to control large tracts of land."390 With

388 Reeves, pp.14-6.
389 Reeves, pp.16-7.
the added power of statute and regulations means, used throughout the
wars in Taranaki, including the Parihaka campaign, the land could be taken
and held, and those who lived on it dispossessed.

The invasion of Taranaki caused loss of life, and massive destruction of
homes and cultivations. Lives were disrupted as the Maori fled from their
largely coastal homes to refuges in the bush. When the immediate danger
had passed, many returned to find that they had no land, no homes to
return to. Or particularly in the area south of New Plymouth, they returned
cautiously to re-establish settlements only to find later that the government
would claim it as confiscated land.

The Government actions in Taranaki resulted in extended hostilities over a
decade as Maori were driven to the defence of their lives and their homes.
Above all, the confiscation of the land was a brutal act, doing much to force
the Taranaki people into defence of their lives. This was recognised at the
time. Colonel Weare felt that the campaign in Southern Taranaki had been
very harsh, and that the confiscations were harmful to the peace:

This wholesale confiscation should be inquired into, as there is not
an inch of open land left them in the line from Mt Egmont to
Parakeno [sic]. If you want peace you must give your enemy a chance
of living, and means of procuring food; at present they have none left
to them. I hope the degrading and brutalizing manner in which this
war is now conducted may be known in England and the troops no
longer be allowed to be demoralized by the colonists for their sole
selfishness.391

Accompanying the soldiers and entrenching the Pakeha settlement, were
the roads and the military settlers. The roads were the means of enclosing
large tracts of confiscated land, and securing land for settlement. The
military settlements were to a "large extent the mechanism by which the
ambition of older Taranaki settlers for the expansion for their settlement
was translated into effect."392

The military expansion and presence in Taranaki was maintained until
after the destruction of Parihaka in 1880-1. "The Armed Constabulary and

391 Extracts from a letter from Colonel Weare to Rev. T. W. Weare, 13 January
1866, Subencl. to Encl in No. 4, AJHR 1867, A-1b, p. 4. [RDB v20 p.4.]
392 Prickett, The Archaeology of a Military Frontier.". v1, p. 341.
road builders advanced over the Stoney River Frontier to dispossess the Maoris of land which had been confiscated under the act of 1863 but which the Pakeha had until then lacked the resources to effectively occupy." The success of the British and the colonists was "to be found not in the dramatic events of the war but in the steady expansion of the geographical distribution of military fortifications. It is these posts after all which secured the land." By 1886 when the Armed Constabulary was disbanded, there had been a military presence in Taranaki for thirty years. The people continued to resist up until that time. Parihaka was the centre for continuing the fight to hold the land.

With these Hearings the efforts of those in the past are remembered, and continue.

Note on Sources

This paper represents primarily a Pakeha picture of the war in Taranaki as it affected the iwi. An iwi perspective would have produced a different picture and needs to be given utmost consideration when assessing the war in Taranaki. No attempt has been made to exhaustively research this topic, such an approach was beyond the scope of this paper.

Primary Sources

The major source for this paper were the official reports of various agents of the Government published in the *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR s)*. It is not intended to reproduce them here, they have been photocopied in the Raupatu Document Bank, and are accessible in many libraries. Extracts of the *New Zealand Gazette* are also reproduced in the Raupatu Document Bank.

Some information has been taken from the *British Parliamentary Papers*, Irish University Press edition. These too are reasonably accessible, and will not be copied. They often duplicate material found in the *AJHR s*.

It is important to note that the sources on which I have based my work are almost entirely Pakeha. This paper represents an assessment of Government actions as they impacted on the iwi of Taranaki, not an iwi expression of what happened. The reports of Maori meetings, and the translation of Maori letters both rely on a Pakeha mediator, as not many Maori were fluent in English. Many Maori letters or the reports on hui appear to have been translated in a literal sense, not necessarily as Maori would have expressed themselves. It is not possible from these works to gain a true sense of the wars in Taranaki from an iwi perspective. This report should be read with that fact in mind.

Other written sources could have been consulted to possibly provide a fuller picture of the situation in Taranaki, but in the interests of space and time they were left out. No attempt has been made to consult newspapers, which would have given a further insight into the attitudes, particularly of settlers, towards the war and the Maori people. This aspect will gain some attention.
on a later paper to be presented on the "labelling of the iwi" by Pakeha. Other sources that could have been utilised were the diaries of soldiers involved in the campaigns.

The Taranaki Province Series [TP 9/1], held at National Archives in Wellington, provide material on the sittings of the commissioners examining compensation for settlers following the 1860-1 fighting. This has not been copied, for although there is some relevant material, the large body of files do little to illuminate the experience of the Iwi of Taranaki. For similar commissions outside Taranaki such files could provide valuable information, because claims were accepted from Maori. These are held at National Archives, Wellington MA Series, for example MA 61/4, 61/8.

Secondary Sources.

Published.
A variety of contemporary and recent published material is available on the wars in general, with some specific coverage of the experiences in Taranaki.

The Major works consulted were:


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The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period, 2v, Wellington, 1922-3.

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Muru me te Raupatu

Backup Notes to H.Bauchop's Report: Nga Rauru Losses

by Vanessa Sturmey

According to C.L.Loveridge, in his "Military History of Waverley" (1969) "...the strategic aim of Military Policy was to prevent the enemy penetrating within striking distance of surveyed land. To achieve this, destruction of villages, cultivations, livestock and canoes, depriving the Hau Hau of the means of waging war were the objectives of the forces commanded by Major Noake, March-April 1869...."

Unfortunately, no attempt was made to differentiate between "Hau-hau" and "Loyal" natives, the end result of course, being that every Maori resource was devastated in the "scorched earth" policy that followed. Noake stated in a report to Col. Whitmore on 27 March 1869 that "...I have warned the natives at Putiki and sent up the Whanganui River notices that any native found in the Waitotara district will risk being shot and that all well disposed must keep away or they will be treated as rebels...." In other words, every Nga Rauru person was branded a rebel, and were forced to either leave their ancestral homes to the tender mercies of the Military, or risk being shot.

Whitmore's forces withdrew from the District on 5 April, leaving the task of rounding up the remaining Hau Hau to Noake and the local forces. The Wairoa Rifles joined the force of Major Noake and his diary, compiled for the Government, details the sacking of the Waitotara River. Noake intended to take or destroy everything he found in his path, as he felt that although the possibility of a large scale attack against the local Military Posts was now unlikely "...there were still sufficient numbers of Maoris about to be of nuisance value."

The Waitotara River expedition took place between 1 April - 10 April 1869. Noake's diary reports that:
1 April: We arrived at Te Auroa... the settlement is on both banks of the river with considerable cultivations.

These cultivations were destroyed by Captain Hawes of the Wairoa Rifles.

April 3: ...I then sent Captain Kells with 24 of his men and the guide in two canoes to reconnoitre up the river....He not only found a settlement with large cultivations (Te Rakea) but two more canoes which he sent down to me with those he took up.

Te Rakea met the same fate as Te Auroa.

April 5: ...We soon found ourselves at Te Erangi [NOTE: Correct name, Te Iringa] where we expected to find some of those we were seeking. We approached the place with every caution but found everything but the men themselves...large cultivations, corn, cattle, sheep, poultry and property of every description....

Te Iringa was sacked on 6 April and everything which could not be carried away was destroyed.

...We arrived at Pa palisades [Piraunui] and found a small white flag flying and a decrepit old woman left to receive us. She was the same venerable personage who had been left at Okutuku or some other place to receive Sir Trevor Chute in somewhat similar circumstances....

Noake's diary does not mention this old woman further, but some Nga Rauru sources say the Old Woman was killed by his forces when they left Piraunui. Noake's diary continues:

April 6: ...Captain Kells...came across another kainga, one of the prettiest and most comfortable he had ever seen. The place he destroyed, also another still further up. We remained at Piraunui the night.

After travelling ten miles up river from Piraunui, one of the principle Nga Rauru settlements, the force returned down the river, destroying Piraunui as they passed.

...Everything was destroyed...settlements, cultivations, eel weirs and any stock we could not eat. The same was done at Te Iringa. We encamped at Whare Kowhite....
April 7...We destroyed this place [Whare Kowhite] and cultivations along the river. Arrived at Paki Kai....

April 8: ...Cpt Gilling took up a position at Te Rua Pounainui where they found more cultivations...."

April 9: Sixty men with loot horses under Lt Kenah left for Weraroa by track from the right bank of the river, Captain Hawes party with canoes and loot and Captain Kells and I joined Gillings party at Te Rua Pounainui and encamped....

April 10 ... With the remainder of the force left at Te Rua Pounainui I left for Weraroa and arrived about eleven. The sale of loot began immediately....

The destruction of cultivations and all that could not be removed was a crippling blow to the Nga Rauru economy, and left them facing virtual starvation if they remained in the area. Although a number of writers blithely state that "...a Maori could scratch up a feed where a European would starve..." this was an impossible task while being hounded from place to place as fugitives. A despatch written by Captain Hawes on 29 July 1870 states that Nga Rauru were still being harried and were unable to return to their homeland:

"If you find any natives they are not to be allowed to remain..."