NGATI TOA AND THE COLONIAL STATE

A REPORT TO THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

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Preface

The present author's qualifications and experience are as set out in my first report written for this claim, *Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region* (June 1997). The main focus of this report is on the military campaigns of 1846, although some attention is given to a further analysis of Ngati Toa's general position in the Wellington region as at circa 1840. The events of 1846 are an important chapter in the history of Maori land alienation in the Wellington region, however broadly or narrowly the Wellington geographical region is understood.

I would like to thank Andrea Tolley and Reuben Waaka for assistance with the research and to Matiu Rei, Greg White, and Keith Pickens for comments on the draft.

Richard Boast
21 June 1998
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1. Introduction

1.1. **Summary of the 1997 Report:** This report is designed to be read in conjunction with my earlier report, *Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region* (June 1997). That report was partly a response to Neville Gilmore's *The Myth of the Overlords: tenure in Whanganui-a-Tara*. Although some documentary and archival sources were used in my 1997 report, in the main it was an attempt to reconstruct Ngati Toa history using the richest and most complex original sources, the minute books of the Native Land Court. The objective was to base the evidence on as comprehensive a range of Land Court testimony as possible, favouring the testimony of eyewitneses such as Matene Te Whiwhi, and relying on long narrative texts (transcribed and typed in vol. 2 of the report) rather than on single isolated statements. I attempted to draw evidence from as wide a range of minute book material as possible, utilising not only the Wellington minute books, but also the the Otaki, Chatham Islands, Waikato and Nelson Minute Books (shortage of time prevented a consideration of the Wairarapa Minute Books, a comprehensive study of which would probably help to fill in a number of the missing pieces of the jigsaw.) Based on this material I advanced a number of contentions. These included the fluidity of "tribal" relationships (most key individuals had links to two or even three "tribes"), the inevitable contestability of the traditional history, and the role of missionaries in modifying customary practice. Ngati Toa history's in the Wellington region was covered fully. I found that my understanding of the battle of Waiorua differed from Mr Gilmore's. I also raised some doubts about the supposed "panui" by which some authorities claim that Ngati Mutunga ceded the whole of Wellington Harbour to Te Ati Awa before the former's departure to the Chatham Islands.

My 1997 Report, however, in accordance with the Tribunal's directions, did not focus only on the traditional history of Ngati Toa, but also considered Ngati Toa's relations with the emerging colonial state. Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata were formidable adversaries, if provoked, as the Wairau incident of 17 June 1843. There was, however, no single "Ngati Toa" response to the colonial state, and it is clear that the policies followed by Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata were quite different. Nevertheless Governor Grey thought it necessary for the Ngati Toa polity based at Porirua to be crushed. This was achieved in a sequence of steps in 1846-7. In early 1846 Grey arrived at Wellington with a detachment of troops, his plan being to drive Maori out of the Hutt Valley. In July 1846 Te Rauparaha was
captured by Grey at Taupo pa, and while he was in the custody of the Crown Grey pushed through two major transactions by which Ngati Toa lost most of their lands, these being the Wairau deed of 18 March 1847 and the Porirua purchase of 1 April 1847. In early 1848 Te Rauparaha was released. These events were covered somewhat sketchily in my first report, and one objective of the present report is to cover the events of the years 1846-7 in more detail, paying particularly close attention to the fighting in the Hutt Valley.

The history of the interaction between the Crown and the tribes, between Maori and Pakeha, in the Wellington region in the 1840s has proved to be a complex affair. The various reports submitted in evidence to date have each taken a particular angle or emphasis. In this report the particular emphasis, one that has not really been given its due so far, is on military coercion by the Crown. Looked at in this light, the key event was Grey's arrival in early 1846 accompanied by substantial armed forces. When other events are juxtaposed with this the importance of this new, coercive presence, becomes apparent. For example Ngati Tama agreed to move out of the Hutt Valley within a few weeks of Grey's arrival, and it seems clear that the main reason they left was military intimidation.

1.2. Geographical focus: During the course of writing and researching my two reports I have been confronted with the rather intractable problem that while Ngati Toa's concerns were mainly centred on Porirua, the West Coast, and their lands in the South Island, the Tribunal's main focus of interest and attention seems to have been on the lands comprised within the boundaries of the 1839 Port Nicholson deed. Even if in the course of this inquiry it has become apparent that the Port Nicholson deed boundaries became irrelevant, still it seems clear that the Porirua deed of 1847 has been put in a different category and that, whatever story it may be said to belong to, it is not part of the "Wellington" or "Wellington Tenths" story. I have endeavoured to suggest that to focus only on Wellington and the Hutt Valley is somewhat a-historical, and is itself dictated by changes brought about by colonisation of the region by the New Zealand Company rather than by any boundaries which were meaningful to local Maori. The boundaries of the Port Nicholson transaction, if that is indeed any longer the focus of this claim, seem from the perspective of Ngati Toa to be something of a Procrustean bed into which to force an assessment of the impact of Crown policies on local Maori. The fact was that the main concentrations of Maori population in what may be loosely called the
"Wellington" region were actually found on the West Coast; and this goes for Te Ati Awa\(^1\) (or perhaps more accurately, North Taranaki, descent groups) as much as it does for Ngati Toa. The main North Taranaki settlements were around Waikanae. I endeavoured to develop this general point a little further in pointing out that the New Zealand Company representatives themselves also did not conceive of the Wellington deed in isolation, as the later Kapiti deed (18 October 1839) concluded with the Ngati Toa chiefs covered a vast area which included the area covered by the Port Nicholson deed. Wakefield himself did not think that the purchase of Port Nicholson could have been valid "unless it had been confirmed by the Kawia tribe"\(^2\) [Ngati Toa]. It is not my contention that Ngati Toa had sole rights to dispose of lands around Wellington harbour; but it cannot be maintained, I believe, that they had no rights. There is now evidence that as late as the 1860s at least some Ngati Toa chiefs were working to protect Ngati Toa interests in the reserve lands at Wellington. I am not sure if any of the parties to what has by now become a very complex investigation go so far as to maintain that what happened around Wellington was no business of Ngati Toa's; judging by the discussion at the last hearing at which I gave evidence the real questions, rather, seem to be the difficult ones of deciding the precise nature of Ngati Toa rights, and then of considering whether such rights can be said to have been comprehensively and justly extinguished by the Crown.

Since presenting my first report, Duncan Moore has filed further evidence with the Tribunal which displaces the centrality of the Port Nicholson deed in a rather different way. If I understand Mr Moore correctly, his point is that while the process of title extinguishment around

\(^1\) There seems to be a great deal of confusion over quite who is meant by "Te Ati Awa" or "Ngati Awa". Present day usage, as far as I can tell, is to avoid using the term "Ngati Awa", perhaps to avoid the risk of confusion with Ngati Awa of the Bay of Plenty. The term invariably used in the Minute Books is "Ngati Awa", which is usually used to mean the North Taranaki descent groups of the Waitara-Ngamotu area (the Te Atiawa of today). Sometimes "Ngati Awa" is seen as distinct from, but closely connected with, Ngati Mutunga immediately to the North, but there are also some situations when "Ngati Mutunga" are deemed to be included within "Ngati Awa". I have not seen the term "Te Ati Awa" used in the 19th-century Minute Books or in ethnographic sources: the term used is always "Ngati Awa". The present writer's understanding is that in fact, whatever contemporary usage may be, "Ngati Awa" is the correct name for the Waitara-Ngamotu descent groups; and that Te Ati Awa, properly speaking, refers to a much broader grouping which includes Ngati Mutunga. In this report I have decided to stay with the older nineteenth-century usage and use the term "Ngati Awa" or sometimes "North Taranaki descent groups", doing my best to make clear whether I mean to include Ngati Mutunga within the discussion or not.

\(^2\) Evidence of Wakefield in cox by Spain, OLC 1/907 (CAs 374a), transcript of evidence, 9 June 1842.
Wellington harbour certainly began with the Port Nicholson deed, as time went on, that transaction became ever more an irrelevance. Title to land at Wellington was not extinguished by the 1839 deed and its aftermath, but rather by a sequence of later arrangements and separate transactions which had only a tangential connexion with it. The boundaries of Spain’s 1845 Award and then of the 1848 Crown grant to the New Zealand Company were quite different from each other and both differed considerably from the boundaries of the 1839 deed.³ In Moore's words:

> It should be stressed that, in a sense, the later Port Nicholson purchase boundaries did not adjust but actually replaced this first "version" [i.e. the 1839 deed boundary]. By January 1843, the Company was no longer pressing any claim to this originally submitted area, and the Company was no longer inquiring into the nature or status of titles to it.

Once it is conceded, as it has to be, that the process of extinguishing title to Maori lands in the Wellington region is not anchored to the boundaries of the 1839 deed, the impossibility of insisting that the only relevant Ngati Toa interests for the purposes of this claim are those demonstrably within the 1839 boundaries is even more apparent.

The alienation of lands at Wellington and at Porirua were in any event not distinct processes but interconnected aspects of the same process. As Moore points out, one category of reserves outside the boundaries of the 1845 award arose at Porirua, originating from Company surveys in 1841-42 conducted to enable the Company to select its 110,000 acre "Port Nicholson neighbourhood" under the terms of the company’s 1841 Charter.⁴ The Company, that is, surveyed sections and allotted reserves at Porirua. Of course with Ngati Toa securely based at Porirua these sections, seen by the Company as part of their entitlement, could not generally be enforced. The situation was further complicated when Spain, after investigations at Port Nicholson in June 1842 and at Otaki in April 1843 decided ultimately that the Porirua deed could not stand that the Company was not entitled to a Crown grant for any of its lands at Porirua.⁵ A principal reason why Grey nevertheless felt it essential that the Porirua area be forcibly acquired by the

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³ See the maps in Duncan Moore, Questions Regarding the Port Nicholson Purchase: Surplus Lands, Purchase Consideration, and Title to Maori Reserves, Wai 145 Doc#17, p. 4.
⁴ Moore op.cit., 39.
⁵ See Spain's report, GBPP 1846/203, 94 (Doc#A32,98) and the discussion in Boast, Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region, 124-8.
Crown was because the New Zealand Company had already sold sections in the area. But to obtain Porirua Ngati Toa had to be coerced militarily, which was not achieved until mid-1846. Finally in 1847, with Te Rauparaha illegally detained and Te Rangihiaetata driven north to the lands of his Ngati Huia kin at Poroutawhao, the chiefs of Ngati Toa sold the Porirua block to the Crown, which, says Grey, "included the whole of the sections the New Zealand Company claimed, with the exception of about sixteen". Grey had sought Lieut-Col's McCleverty's advice as to the amount of compensation to be paid by the Crown to Ngati Toa for the loss of Porirua; McCleverty named a figure of £2000, which was the amount paid. McCleverty's involvement also demonstrates the unity of the Porirua deed with the whole history of events at Wellington from 1839 onwards. New reserves were set aside in the Porirua block, these being the Whitireia and Aotea blocks and the large area north from Porirua harbour to the northern boundary of the block subsequently surveyed into a number of separate blocks investigated by the Native Land Court. The alienation of Porirua is inextricably tied together with the process of title investigation at Wellington; it is indeed part of the same process. I remain convinced that any investigation of the extinguishment of Maori title which ignores or marginalises the Porirua deed of 1847 simply makes no sense. The distinguishing feature of the alienation of Porirua, however, is that it could only be brought about at the barrel of a gun. It is not contended, however, that Grey went to the lengths he did against Ngati Toa only for the benefit of the settlers who had bought Porirua lands from the New Zealand Company. He also wanted to break Ngati Toa power in the region as a whole.

1.3. Interpretation of events in the 1840s: It is not easy, in the circumstances of this case, to form a clear perception of the events of the 1840s. This is partly because of the way in which this case has evolved. It presumably began as what would have seemed to be a reasonably straightforward enquiry into the Wellington Tenths lands, administered successively by the Public Trustee, the Maori Trustee, and the Wellington Tenths Trust. The Tribunal's starting point, therefore, was not a particular region or tribal grouping, as in the Muriwhenua claim, but simply a particular class of Maori reserved land which, because of the origins of this particular category of reserves, seemed at first sight to be restricted to the boundaries of the Port Nicholson deed of 1839. (As noted above, however,

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Duncan Moore sees the Port Nicholson deed as just a prologue to the main arrangements which were finalised considerably later.) As the case has developed, comprehensive research on the background to the settlement of Wellington and of the interactions between the New Zealand Company, the Crown and the Maori descent groups of the region has obviously become necessary, and much of the discussion has ranged, in a geographical sense, far beyond the limits of Wellington Harbour and the Hutt Valley. However the Tribunal has not broadened the claim into a general enquiry into the effects of colonisation on the tribes of the Wellington region, and remains focused on the Wellington Tenths reserved lands.

This focus makes it difficult for a historian to prepare evidence on tribal history for this claim, for as soon as one begins to do so it becomes only too obvious that a focus only on Wellington and the Hutt Valley had no real relevance for the tribes of the region - and, arguably, still does not. As at 1840, it seems clear, there were three main descent groups (Ngati Toa, Ngati Awa-Ngati Mutunga and Ngati Raukawa) present in the region and one somewhat smaller one, Ngati Tama, and one other group, Ngati Rangatahi, whose size and autonomy still has not been completely clarified. These descent groups were very closely interconnected, and shaded into one other; Ngati Toa merged very closely with Ngati Mutunga and Ngati Tama in particular; Ngati Tama and Ngati Mutunga were practically "one people", and the Ngati Awa (or Te Ati Awa connexions) with all the other groups were also very strong. As well as there being close interconnectedness, there was also fighting and dispute; and the main focus of conflict, and the main places of residence, were on the West Coast, where Ngati Toa, Ngati Awa and Ngati Raukawa all lived in close proximity, all wanting to benefit from the trade and commerce with the Pakeha. This trade was focused on the Kapiti roadstead, readily accessible to the South Island, and one of the few safe anchorages on the West Coast, and the trade had had a considerable impact on the material base of Maori society in the area long before the New Zealand Company made an appearance in the region. Ngati Toa lived at Kapiti, at Mana, around the arms of the Porirua and Pauatahanui harbours, and in the Wairau Valley and the Marlborough Sounds. The North Taranaki descent groups ("Ngati Awa") had basically the same residence pattern as Ngati Toa; most lived on the West Coast, at Kenakena and the other villages at Waikanae; others lived in the Marlborough Sounds. North Taranaki descent groups also lived, of course, around Wellington harbour. Whether the North Taranaki people ("Ngati Awa") who lived at Kenakena, Waikanae, Arapawa and Wellington should be seen as basically one
grouping, or a number of unconnected separate ones (those who lived around Wellington were later arrivals) is an interesting question. As far as I am aware this important point has not really been clarified in the course of these hearings. The Ngati Awa based at Waikanae and the Ngati Awa - 'Ngamotu', more correctly - living around Wellington were distinct groups. The Ngamotu at Wellington did not arrive there until the mid-1830s: I suggest in my first report that there is no reason to believe that relations between the two waves of Ngati Awa settlers based at Waikanae and at Port Nicholson must have been cosily firendly.

Ngati Raukawa, the other principal group in the region, lived around Otaki. In terms of population they may have been the largest of all the groups in the area. Many Ngati Raukawa hapu came south, and, of course, still remain in the Horowhenua-Manawatu region. Unlike "Ngati Awa" at Waikanae and Ngati Toa these descent groups had no South Island lands, having arrived in the region after the campaigns in the South Island led by Te Rauparaha with the assistance of Rere Tawhangawhanga of Ngati Awa and other chiefs. (The invasion of the South Island took place after the conquest of Wellington harbour by Ngati Mutunga.7) At 1840 the dominant political fact in the region was the tension between the hapu of Ngati Raukawa and "Ngati Awa", which had resulted in the major battles at Haowhenua, usually dated to 1834,8 and Kuititanga, or Kuhititanga, a "fierce and bloody contest"9 which was fought only a few days before the Tory arrived in 1839. The fighting took place, significantly on the West Coast, and reflected Ngati Raukawa's jealousy of the more strategic location of Ngati Awa further south and closer to the centre of the trade at Kapiti.10

Ngati Tama, who were closely connected to Ngati Toa, seem to have been in a somewhat ambiguous and difficult situation in 1840. Ngati Tama had fought alongside Ngati Toa and Ngati Awa in the South Island campaigns, and there were some Ngati Tama settlements there. In 1835 some sections of Ngati Tama migrated to the Chatham Islands with Ngati Mutunga, the Kekerewai, and Ngati Haumia. Other sections of the tribe lived in villages around Wellington Harbour. Ngati Tama do not seem to

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7 See R.P. Boast, Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region. 56.
9 Wakefield, Adventure in New Zealand, (1845), 1, 111.
10 This at least was Diffienbach's opinion, which seems to me to be very plausible: see Ernest Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand, vol. 1, 104.
have succeeded in establishing a core zone of dominance and settlement in the way that Ngati Toa, Ngati Awa and Ngati Raukawa had managed to do.

Into this somewhat intricate and contestable mosaic came the New Zealand Company and the Crown, with all the legal and administrative infrastructure that entailed, armed also with a different vision of the landscape, seen not in terms of difficult relations between kin groups scattered in space, but rather in terms of maps, Crown grants, surveys and boundary lines. This alternative vision was superimposed on the landscape, and is now an integral aspect of how we perceive it ourselves, but I would argue that it is important to try to make the mental effort to stand outside the new British legal geography of the area and try to see it through Maori eyes.

Even in the 1840s, and despite the new reality of survey plans and boundary maps, any realistic appreciation of the geopolitics of the region, as seen by an astute governor such as Grey, had to take account of the dominant political fact of the time, the continuing power and influence of the leadership of Ngati Toa. This Grey was determined to shatter, and did. There were three prongs to Grey's strategy. The first was military containment, including the construction of the Paremata Barracks and other blockhouses on the Porirua-Wellington route, and the road built across the Wellington Peninsula from Port Nicholson to Porirua. The second was his illegal kidnapping and detention of Te Rauparaha (July 1846) and the expulsion of Te Rangihaeata, Ngati Toa's principal military leader, from out of the area to Poroutawhao where he remained defiant and hostile to the government, but unable to influence events (August 1846). The third was the pressure he placed on Ngati Toa to sell their lands, leading to the Wairau deed of 18 March 1847, and the Porirua deed of 1 April. From a Ngati Toa perspective, the dominant event of "Wellington" history in the 1840s was the sequence of disaster and division which befell them in 1846 and 1847, of which the loss of such rights as they may have possessed in Wellington and the Hutt Valley were but a part (although not something that Ngati Toa willingly acquiesced in, as this report will argue).

1.4. Ngati Toa's economic and other interests: The Direction Commissioning Research of 19 December 1997 has requested information on Ngati Toa's "economic and other interests" particularly at Te Whanganui-a-Tara, Heretaunga, Oteranga/Oterongo and Ohariu" after 1840. This issue will be discussed in this section. However, in some respects this is a question mal posee. The implication seems to be that if it can be shown,
for example, that there were no specifically "Ngati Toa" cultivations in the Hutt Valley, then there is no "Ngati Toa" grievance in respect of the valley. Ngati Toa's stance in this claim has been to struggle against any perception that the Wellington region, considered in its broadest sense, was a neat checkerboard of long-established tribal territories. Rather, there was a network of deeply entangled groups who were all affected by the Crown's actions in the critical years of 1840-47. We have also struggled against the perception that "tribes" were simple and uncomplicated entities: in fact deciding exactly where Ngati Toa, Ngati Mutunga, Ngati Tama and Ngati Awa begin and end is far from easy and is even faintly ludicrous (Ngati Raukawa are clearly much more separate, although one Raukawa hapu were very close kin of a powerful section of the Ngati Toa leadership). Chiefs often stated that they belonged to more than one group,\(^{11}\) which they could do readily as "tribes" were descent groups: Ngati Toa are the descendants of Toarangatira. Furthermore, as we have already sought to demonstrate, the whole region had been in a state of continual flux during the 1830s. The Ngati Awa and Ngati Tama presence around the harbour was very recent. At 1840 the Crown did not come across a tidy and settled schema but one which was still developing, deriving from comparatively recent migrations, and which was contestable in every way. In this confusing and untidy situation Ngati Toa had, it seems beyond denial, a key position of some kind, although defining precisely the nature of this position is far from easy. The tensions between the more recent Ngati Awa groups and Ngati Raukawa, in particular, were far from resolved, and in fact were in some respects to flare again during the fighting in 1846.

(a) Lands occupied or cultivated by Ngati Toa:

(i) Wellington: This report does not seek to suggest that Ngati Toa had their major cultivations around Wellington. Their core areas by 1840 were at Porirua, Mana, Kapiti, Pukerua and the Wairau and parts of the Marlborough Sounds. However this is not all there is to it. Wellington was regarded by Te Rauparaha as a place he had conquered with, as he told Spain, "with my own hands"\(^{12}\) (as explained in my first report, it seems that that Ngati Mutunga were deputed by Te Rauparaha with the task of subjugating the Wellington district.) There seems to have been some Ngati

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11 See Boast, *Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region*, pp 9-10 for examples.
12 Edward Meurant, Diary and Letters, ATL MS 1635, typescript, unpaginated, 3 July 1844.
Toa residence at Port Nicholson, before and after 1840. There is a Ngati Toa tradition that the chief Te Hiko lived at Wellington, and as he lived there he must have cultivated there. A recording made by Ramari Wi Neera and held by the Porirua Museum Oral History Archive states that:13

Te Hiko: Mostly lived with Te Ati Awa at Waikanae and Wellington.

All of this property (Takapuwahia) belonged to Te Hiko...but he mostly lived in Wellington.

Te Hiko was the chief of Mana Island...lived mostly at Wellington.

After 1840, according to Saxton's diary, two of Te Rauparaha's sons lived at Wellington, at least some of the time:14

He said Raupero [Te Rauparaha] had two sons residing in Wellington to transmit him intelligence and they might be seen every morning riding in white trousers and blue surtouts and hats like gentlemen.

Hohepa Tamaihengia also lived at Wellington and was involved in business activities activities there. He was one of the owners of the Three Brothers, a trading vessel built and operated by Hori and Tametame (Thomas) Thoms, themselves grandsons of Nohorua.15

Although evidence adduced in this claim so far lays primary stress on a Ngati Awa claim to Port Nicholson by means of a panui from Ngati Mutunga, there is also evidence that in fact the main source of Ngati Awa title to the harbour in fact came by means of purchase. Richard Barrett claimed that in 1835 he and his associate Jacky Love purchased land at Port Nicholson, Kapiti and in the South Island, Barrett himself buying a large tract of land on the waterfront. Barrett and Love, although based in Taranaki, knew the Cook Strait region well, having travelled south on many occasions from 1831-35. The interesting question, of course, is who did Barrett buy land at Port Nicholson from? It is perhaps conceivable that he may have bought it from Ngati Mutunga, but as he refers to the lands in the

13 Porirua Museum Oral History Archive, Ramari Wi Neera (Molly), typescript of tape held by Porirua Museum.
14 Saxton Diary, qMS-1759, typescript, ATL, Wellington, 126. Perhaps the two gentlemen referred to are Tamihana Te Rauparaha and Matene Te Whiwhi.
15 My thanks to Matiu Rei for this point.
south as "depopulated" by that "inhuman and scoundrelly beast" Te Rauparaha, the more natural assumption is that he bought the land from Te Rauparaha himself. After making his purchase Barrett then returned to Ngamotu (New Plymouth) and told the local people of his new purchases in central New Zealand; it was then decided to journey southwards "with as many natives as desired to go". Barrett went to Port Nicholson with the Ngamotu people where he engaged some of them to cut timber and build a warehouse. The full passage is as follows:

From 1831 to 1835 Love and myself had made many trips to southern tribes, in this period the trading ships were becoming quite numerous, we had many ships call in this period which enabled us to quit all our flax, taros and bacon, also the HMS Zebra had called to see if the European traders were still intact. In the latter part of 1835, Love and myself had decided on purchasing land at Port Nicholson. I secured a tract of land on the waterfront and Love purchased land at Port Nicholson, Kapiti and the South Island. This land had been depopulated by the most inhuman and scoundrelly beast in the colony, Te Rauparaha. On our return to Ngamotu we acquainted [sic] the natives of our new purchases and after discussing the idea of migrating it was eventually agreed to go south with as many natives who desired to go. Packing our pikau each adult had carried about 40 lbs including the women, we took a quantity of guns and ammunition. We made way by the Te Whakaahurangi Track. much hard work was entailed in cutting our way, but favoured with good summer weather we made fair progress but was compelled to rest a good deal on account of the children becoming foot sore. On reaching Whanganui we found ourselves involved in a serious battle with northern tribes, our guns were the deciding factor after three days battle, in which we lost a few men. Continuing our journey we reached Port Nicholson after three months of hardship, the party numbered about 2000 all told. Little did we think that Te Wherowhero on hearing of our migration would return and take Ngamotu by conquest which he did.

We now find ourselves settling down in our new land. Having received tools for felling and cutting timber our first job was to provide shelter which we built with Pongas and rapu, this accomplished Keenan and his followers settled in an area by

17 Richard Barrett, Journal, MS-Papers-1736, ATL, typescript p. 8-19. This evidence of early commercial activity at Wellington is not, it seems, very well known. It is not mentioned in the entry on Barrett in the DNZB: see Julie Bremner, "Barrett, Richard", DNZB vol. 1, 19-20. Nor has it been mentioned, as far as I am aware, in any of the evidence so far produced to the Tribunal in this claim, although Barrett's Journals would seem to be a fairly obvious source. The possibility that Ngati Awa title at Wellington might be based on a purchase from Te Rauparaha is intriguing to say the least.
themselves their whare-kura being sacred and reserved for people who believed in God. I then engaged a large number of Maoris to cut and prepare timber, and Williams the ships carpenter was charged with the job of erecting a large warehouse...Having erected the largest building in the settlement, I now commenced buying from all tribes who had anything to offer.

(ii) **The Hutt Valley:** Ngati Toa did have land in the Hutt Valley. On 5 June 1846 the Wellington settler F Bradley noted in his diary a conversation he had with Samuel Ironsides, a Wesleyan Minister:18

I saw Mr Ironsides this evening & he told me that Rangihata [sic] and his tribe had never sold their land at the Hutt.

This only raises the question as to who "Te Rangihaeata's tribe" might have been. This could have meant Ngati Toa, or Ngati Rangatahi, or even Ngati Raukawa, or a mixture of two or all three of these. Elsdon Best states that after the battle of the Wairau a number of Ngati Toa went to live in the Hutt Valley "in order to annoy the settlers"; he says further that *most* (i.e. not all) of the Ngati Awa objected to this Ngati Toa settlement in the Hutt Valley.19 Captain Collinson R.E. wrote that Ngati Toa and Whanganui (i.e. Ngati Rangatahi) cultivated in the Hutt Valley from 1843 to 1846:20

Parties of Natives belonging to the Ngatitoa tribe, and to Whanganui, acting with the open support of Te Rangihaeata, and the secret support of Te Rauparaha, located themselves in the Hutt Valley, and occupied and planted patches which the Company's settlers were just beginning to cultivate, by way of preserving what they considered their title to those particular patches of land.

This accords with Taringa Kuri's cutting a massive boundary line through the forest at Rotokakahi in March 1844 at Te Rauparaha's instructions after the discussions between Ngati Toa and Spain over compensation for Wellington and the Hutt had broken down.21 South of the line the settlers could live. North of it was for the Maori - presumably Ngati Rangatahi,

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18 F Bradley, diary, 5 June 1846, Ms 63, ATL.
19 Best, *Porirua and they who settled it*, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p. 58.
21 Forsaith to Richmond, 21 March 1844, OLC 910-911, NA Wellington.
Ngati Toa and indeed Ngati Tama. Although Grey managed to intimidate Ngati Tama into leaving the Hutt in February 1846, Ngati Rangatahi certainly remained and continued cultivating land in the Hutt, and I suppose the issue here is to attempt to decide whether Te Rangihaeata saw himself as protecting Ngati Rangatahi's independent rights, or whether, on the contrary, he saw them as Ngati Toa clients living on Ngati Toa lands. Wellington newspaper comment gives the overwhelming impression that the principal antagonist was Te Rangihaeata, not Ngati Rangatahi as such, and that Ngati Rangatahi had been settled on lands in the Hutt under Te Rangihaeata's direction.\(^{22}\) (This is discussed further heading the heading of "tino rangatiratanga" below). In any case, as noted, there is evidence that Ngati Toa themselves were cultivating in the valley.

(b) **Usufructuary rights:** I am not certain whether it is meaningful in terms of Maori customary law to separate rights of ownership and cultivation from rights of usufruct. If Ngati Toa held lands in the Hutt then this would naturally include rights to harvest crops and to gather wild plants and hunt on the land as well.

(c) **Other rights:** The same comments can be made as for (b).

(d) **Wellington harbour and the coast:** Ngati Toa certainly were based at Ohariu (Makara), as well as Ngati Tama. In the Wellington Tenths case in 1888 Kere Ngataierua said:\(^{23}\)

> Rauparaha's hapu were living at Ohariu, Porirua.

I have not located any evidence which demonstrates a particular Ngati Toa interest in Wellington harbour or the Wellington South Coast. The coastline from Titahi Bay round to Wellington harbour is a substantial area and it is very likely that Ngati Toa and other tribes may have had fishing camps at various times around the coast, but I have seen no direct evidence of this. It does seem clear that Ngati Toa regarded "Ohariu" (Makara) as part of their ordinary domain. This is demonstrated by the constant anxiety the settlers at Wellington and (especially) Karori felt about an attack from the direction of Ohariu. In 1846 some of Ngati Rangatahi were living at Ohariu.

\(^{22}\) Best, *Porirua and they who settled it*, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p. 56.

\(^{23}\) (1888) 2 Wellington MB 100.
presumably by direction of Te Rangihaeata; eight of this group joined Te Rangihaeata's force.\textsuperscript{24}

Ngati Toa did trade with the settler community at Wellington and sent produce round to Wellington by sea. In 1846, at the time of Te Rauparaha's arrest, a boat belonging to him was seized at Wellington:\textsuperscript{25}

Mrs McDonald said that when she was in Wellington a boat of Raupero [Te Rauparaha] had been seized, for a time under suspicious circumstances, and had caused much distrust and alarm. It was laden with potatoes and eels.

\textbf{(e) Tracks and inland waters:} In the early 1840s, before Grey's road-building programme began in 1846, there were two main routes: the cart road to the Hutt Valley, and a very rough bridle track to Porirua from Wellington, now occupied by the main road.\textsuperscript{26} These two routes aside, the whole region was criss-crossed by Maori trails and paths. One important track ran from Porirua via Pauatahanui to the Hutt Valley. Scot refers to this as "the mountain road."\textsuperscript{27} Captain Collinson of the Royal Engineers refers to this route as the Pareraho track.\textsuperscript{28}

The Natives coming from Porirua used the Pareraho track from the head of Porirua harbour, coming out near Boulcott's.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{New Zealand Spectator}, May 23 1846: "In consequence of the recent events, eight of the intruding natives belonging to the Wanganui tribes who were staying at Ohariu, have joined Rangihaeata".
\item \textsuperscript{25} Saxton Diary, qMS-1759, typescript, ATL, 219.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Collinson, The Shadow of War: Native Disturbances at the Hutt and Porirua', Papers of the Corps of Engineers, 1855, reprinted in Best, \textit{Porirua and they who settled it}, typescript, n.d., copy in Porirua Museum Library, p. 95: "The New Zealand Company had made a cart road from Wellington, extending into the Hutt Valley for a few miles, but it was necessarily difficult of passage even for the rough carts of the settlers, and there was a bridle path to Porirua (following nearly the line of the present road), and thence on to the northwest coast by Pukerua, but it was almost impracticable even these exceptions [sic], the only way of crossing the country was by the narrow footpaths of the Natives, and beyond these paths it was dangerous and indeed nearly impossible to stray into the thick forest, the underwood of which is choked with creepers thickly interwoven...Settlers had been lost in the forest ravines within a mile or two of Wellington."
\item \textsuperscript{27} Scot, \textit{Narrative of a campaign against Rangihaeata}, MS 88-102-2/15, ATL, entry for 31 July 1846.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Collinson, The Shadow of War: Native Disturbances at the Hutt and Porirua', Papers of the Corps of Engineers, 1855, reprinted in Best, \textit{Porirua and they who settled it}, typescript, n.d., copy in Porirua Museum Library, p. 96. Pareraho, or Pariraho, may in fact just be alternative versions of Porirua: see Scot, ibid.
\end{itemize}
This was the route used by the Crown forces in July 1846 to cross from the Hutt Valley to Pauatahanui in an attempt to trap Te Rangihaeata in a pincer movement. Grey refers to this track as "a mountain pathway which Rangihaeata believes to be impracticable for any European force".\(^{29}\) It is also described by Cowan, who discussed this route with old Hutt Valley settlers; at one time fortifications were still visible along the old path:\(^{30}\)

Mr Peter Speedy, of Belmont, Lower Hutt, who was born in Wellington in 1842, informs me that the Belmont Creek, which runs out through his property, was an old war-track of the Maoris between the Heretaunga and the Porirua districts. The trail led up the rocky bed of the creek for about half a mile to a place where the stream forked; thence there was an ascent up a steep and narrow forested spur. The natives had cleared a part of this ridge, which was only a few yards wide, and when Speedy was bushfelling there many years after the war he found the remains of huts which had been roofed with totara bark, also stones used in the earth-ovens, a rusted bayonet, a musket-barrel, and other relics of 1846. The lofty ridge was an excellent position for defence, and it had evidently been used as a temporary pa in the war-days. The ground falls precipitously away for several hundreds of feet on either side into the canyon-like valleys. It was no doubt by this route that the war-party descended on Boulcott's Farm in May, 1846; and it was this track also that the Militia and the friendly natives took in the march to Paua-taha-nui....The Maori name of the range in rear of Belmont is Te Raha-o-te-Kapowai.

This path must have been the main route used by Ngati Toa and Ngati Rangatahi to move back and forth between the West Coast and the Hutt Valley. It is shown on the Lands and Survey Department plan reproduced at p. 222 of Wards' *Shadow of the Land* as the "old road to Pauatahanui", with its starting point in the Hutt Valley at a ford in the river just north of the Taita stockade. The same map shows another "old track to Porirua" beginning near Fort Richmond (on the Hutt River near present-day Lower Hutt City centre). This track is presumably the same one described by Cowan as "another Porirua war-track" which ascended the hills not far from the current site of Melling station which "trended across the hills on the northern side of the peak called Pokai-mangumangu".\(^{31}\)

\(^{29}\) Grey to Gladstone, 29 July 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 498.
\(^{30}\) Cowan, *NZ Wars*, I, 111.
\(^{31}\) Cowan, *NZ Wars*, I, 111.
A Lands & Survey Department map 'compiled from old records' and reproduced facing p. 213 of Wards' *Shadow of the Land* shows the main track from Porirua to Port Nicholson. This did not follow the current route of S.H. 1 up the steep gorge at Nga Uranga, but rather ran from a point near Pito-One village to the junction of the Takapu and Kenepuru streams and then followed the Kenepuru north to the southern arm of the Porirua harbour. There were thus at least three routes between the two arms of the Porirua Harbour and the Hutt Valley, coming out at Petone, Lower Hutt and Taita respectively. The middle and upper reaches of the Hutt Valley were quite accessible from the Pauatahanui arm of the Porirua harbour. When in mid 1846 Crown forces attacked Pauatahanui from the Hutt, the main force left the Hutt River at 12 pm and was in Pauatahanui by the following morning; lightly encumbered Maori could have made the crossing even more quickly.

This network of tracks converging on the Porirua area was one of the main reasons why Grey decided that it was essential that the Crown acquire Porirua, for (in Grey's words) "it was only by the occupation of the Porirua District that the various tracks leading across the woody mountains which lie between Porirua and Wellington could be effectually closed against an enemy".32

(f) **"Overlordship":** The question for consideration is framed in the Tribunal commission in an interesting way:

> A discussion of whether, and if so, the extent to which Te Rauparaha and other Ngati Toa leaders had 'overlordship' over other groups in the district during the period in question. This is to include the meaning in customary terms of such an 'overlordship' - especially in terms of 'tino rangatiratanga'.

While the other questions focus on "Ngati Toa", this focuses, quite correctly, on "Te Rauparaha and other Ngati Toa leaders". As I have stated elsewhere, I claim no expertise in anthropology or "Maori studies", and thus it is difficult for me to attempt to explain a concept of overlordship in terms of Maori custom. Whether 'tino rangatiratanga' is a term which necessarily well describes Maori custom is, perhaps, debatable. Outside the text of the Treaty of Waitangi, one of the few references I have in fact seen of the term 'tino rangatiratanga' refers specifically to Te Rauparaha as head of the

coalition. The term was used by Paka Herewine Ngapiko (Ngati Rarua/Ngati Tama) in the Nelson Tenths case in 1892 when describing the allocation of the conquered South Island territories by Te Rauparaha:  

Rauparaha was the tino Rangatira who led the people to Kapiti, but I don't admit that he was the Rangatira who was paramount over the affairs of the hapus who conquered the district. The reason that Te Rauparaha divided the land amongst the hapus was as a reward for their bravery. He was the leader and that was why it devolved on him to divide the land amongst the people. The reason why Te Rauparaha was elected the leader was because he was the person who was instrumental in forming the expedition to Kapiti.

In the same case Paka Herewine Ngapiko described in detail how Te Rauparaha divided up the land following the landing at Te Awaiti and the various campaigns:  

They landed at Te Awaiti [ ] [ ] Ngatiturangapeke and Ngati Pare te ata [ ] [ ]. Ngati Rarua proceeded to Motueka from Te Awaiti. They found the land at Motueka in the possession of Ngatitumatakokiri who they then killed and enslaved. They then proceeded to West Whanganui and from there to Karamea. Te Iti, Pikiwhara, Pukekohatu and Te Arama were the leaders of the party. These people belonged to Ngati Rarua. They fought with the Ngatitumatakokiri at Karamea. Niho and others afterwards settled at West Whanganui (Taitapu).

The war party returned to Te Awaiti, and the land was divided amongst the hapus by Te Rauparaha. Arapawa was given to Te Manutoheroa, Rere Tawhangawhanga, Hiwi Whenua, and Tamati Ngarewa. [174] Hiwi Whenua belonged to [Ngati Rahoi?], Rere Tawhangawhanga belonged to Ngati Awa, Tamati Ngarewa to Ngati Henetiu, Toheroa belonged to Puketapu. These people went with Te Rauparaha to Te Awaiti. Ngati Toa got the Wairau and the Pelorus District but I cannot describe the boundaries. Ngati Koata got Rangitoto (D'Urville Island.)

Te Rauparaha divided the land amongst the people. Ngati Rarua got the land from Hourirangi to Takaka, including Wakatu, Waimea, Motueka, Riwaka, Kaiteriteri, Marahau, Whenuakura, Potihitanga, Awaroa, Te Matau (Separation Point), Taupo, Tata, and Takaka. Taupo and Takapau belonged to Ngati Tama. Wharerangi was the principal man of that party. Te Pou Whero was the rangatira at Te Takapau. Te Iti owned the land at Takaka. I don't know who the land to the west

33 (1892) 2 Nelson MB 177.
34 (1892) 2 Nelson MB 92-93.
of the Takaka river belonged to. That section belonged to another section of the Ngati Rarua. My father Ngapiko died at Motueka. The land at Motueka belonged to Ngati Rarua. Ngapiko lived at a pa called Hiu Te Rangiura near Riwaka. He was living there when Captain Wakefield arrived.

In this rangatira's view, then, the most important aspect of Te Rauparaha's status as 'tino rangatira' was the allocation of land.

An early and very clear statement of the relative positions of Ngati Toa and the other tribes is in a report by Donald McLean made in 1856: 35

10. The conflicting claims of different tribes, residing on both sides of Cook's Straits, to the unpurchased lands in the Nelson Province, occasioned considerable difficulty. For instance, the Ngatitoa tribe of Porirua (with whom the first treaty was concluded) had unquestionably, as the earliest invaders, a prior right to the disposal of the district. This they had never relinquished, although after the conquest their leading chiefs partitioned out the subordinate branches of their own tribe, as well as the Ngatiatoa,36 a few of which took part with them in the conquest, the lands which they now occupy in Nelson Province.

11. The latter parties did not assume to themselves a power of sale, except over the lands they actually occupied, yet some of them, when not confronted by the leading Ngati Toa chiefs, professed to have independent and exclusive rights, while the majority and even the parties making such assertions (when closely examined), always acknowledged that the general right of alienation vested in the Ngatitoa chiefs of the northern island. In fact their relative rights through intermarriage, the declining influence of the chiefs, and other causes, had become so entangled, that without the concurrence of both these occupants, and of the remnants of the conquered Rangitane and Ngaitahu tribes, no valid title could have been secured.

To McLean, Ngati Toa had a kind of prior right of land allocation and land alienation as the original conquerors. The other tribes did claim separate and independent rights of alienation, but not, in McLean's view, in the face of prolonged scrutiny or Ngati Toa opposition. No other tribes are regarded by McLean as having a 'prior right' of this kind: this belongs solely and uniquely to Ngati Toa. However by 1856 the situation was becoming confused: intermarriage and the declining power of the chiefs are two factors that McLean particularly emphasises. Everything had become very difficult.

36 Sic. Ngati Awa?
to disentangle. Had Wellington itself been unsold as at 1856 probably McLean would have proceeded in the same way as he did in the upper South Island, concluding separate and independent deeds with Ngati Toa (who received the largest share of the money, and who then redistributed it), other tribes of the coalition, and the remnant sections of the original tribes. It is certainly hard to see why, on the face of things, Wellington should be seen in a different position vis a vis Ngati Toa as say Nelson or Golden Bay.

That Te Rauparaha and (to some degree) the rest of the Ngati Toa leadership were responsible for distribution of land is easy to document. As noted, after the conquest of the upper South Island by Ngati Toa (including Ngati Toa proper, Ngati Rarua and Ngati Koata), Ngati Awa and Ngati Tama "the land was divided amongst the hapus by Te Rauparaha...Te Rauparaha divided the land amongst the people".37 When Ngati Raukawa moved to the Kapiti region from the south Waikato in three separate migrations from 1827-9 Te Rauparaha allocated them a substantial tract of land from Otaki north to Whangaehu. Ngati Awa living at Otaki were obliged to move south to make way for them; and Te Rauparaha was evidently able to exercise his generosity to Ngati Raukawa despite a considerable degree of resentment within Ngati Toa itself. This emerges in the account of Tatana Whataupiko in the Ngakororo 3B hearing in 1891:38

Rauparaha reached Kapiti and crossed to the other island. He obtained possession of the land and the Ngati Toa subdivided it. After they had been here some time an advance guard from Ngati Raukawa arrived (one cartridge). Rangiorehua among them, and Te Ahu Karamu. All were chiefs. They had an interview with Te Rauparaha. The latter and his sister, Waitohi, felt sorry for the Ngati Raukawa and told them they had better come and occupy this land. The Ngati Toa did not feel pleased at this. He [Te Rauparaha] was partly a Ngati Raukawa. This prevented Ngati Toa giving effect to their anger.

The evidence seems, therefore, almost overwhelming that Te Rauparaha had a clear sense that it was up to him to decide how the land should be allocated amongst the various tribes of the coalition, and there seems to have been general acquiescence in this. Obviously there were tensions, the worst being those between Ngati Awa and Ngati Raukawa,

38 (1891) 16 Otaki MB 346.
which Te Rauparaha could not easily control due in part to divisions within Ngati Toa itself. There is also evidence that Te Rauparaha objected to Ngati Awa settlement at Wellington. Taringa Kuri (Te Kaeaea) of Ngati Tama believed that Ngati Awa basically sold the land at Port Nicholson as insurance against impending attack by Te Rauparaha and Te Whatanui. To put it simply, on this view the Ngati Awa (Ngamotu) people of Wellington were afraid of Ngati Toa attack. If Taringa Kuri is correct, Wellington could have become the scene of another round of the long-standing struggle between Ngati Raukawa (Te Whatanui, along with Te Ahu Karamu, was the leading chief of Raukawa) and Ngati Awa, with Te Rauparaha’s involvement as a chief of Ngati Raukawa in his own right, as the general head of the coalition, and as the leader of the Ngati Raukawa-leaning section of Ngati Toa. This is the same conflict that had already flared at Haowhenua and Kuititanga, and which, in a rather different context, resurfaced in 1846. In Taringa Kuri’s opinion, therefore, Wellington was sold as an insurance against Te Rauparaha and Te Whatanui.

There is other evidence of continuing tension between Ngati Awa and Ngati Toa in the early 1840s. In September 1844 Edward Meurant (who worked as an interpreter for Commissioner Spain) noted in his diary that a group of Ngati Awa had come into Wellington to buy supplies of powder to defend themselves against Ngati Toa attack in the following summer:

I spoke to some Maoris (Ngateawas) from Queen Charlotte’s Sound who informed me that Terauparaha intend to attack them in the ensuing summer, and that was the cause of there visit (the Ngatiawa) here to purchase Powder and Muskets for there defence and intended to return home directly.

Later, Ngati Awa reaffirmed their alliance or coalition with the Crown by offering military assistance to Grey in his campaign against Te Rangihaeata in 1846. (It should be noted, too, that Te Puni’s people were reluctant to serve as guides for Grey against Ngati Rangatahi: "they declined, saying they were friendly to both sides and so did not wish to quarrel with either"). Finally, with respect to Wellington itself, it should be reiterated that in the Wellington Tenths case in 1888, Judge Mackay stated that the only

39 As cited in the New Zealand Spectator, 28 Feb 1846.
41 Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, ATL pp 343-4 of manuscript.
other group who could have successfully maintained a claim to Wellington would have been Ngati Toa: 42

The only hapus who would have been justified in making a claim to the territory sold by the Ngati Awa in 1839 were the Ngati Toa, but the only part of the [ ] [ ] they preferred a claim to was the Porirua district...

With respect to the Hutt Valley the Ngati Toa leadership similarly claimed the right to place groups on the land, although the principal decision-maker seems not to have been Te Rauparaha but Te Rangihaeata. These two chiefs seemed to have had separate and distinct authority and networks of support. J.W. Barnicoat, noticed this when he met both chiefs at the Wairau in June 1843: 43

On going back Rangiharta [sic] sent for me. He encamped quite separately from Rauparo and seemed to have a separate Court and establishment altogether.

Te Rangihaeata placed a group of Upper Wanganui people (the same group, presumably, who are usually known as Ngati Rangatahi) on the banks of the Hutt River after the battle of the Wairau. According to Elsdon Best: 44

Among these malcontents, or patriots, according to the reader’s point of view, was a party of Natives from the Upper Whanganui District, already mentioned, under Te Mamaku. These folk had for some time been living with Ngati Toa of Porirua, and a number of them had taken part in the Wairau massacre. They were there under the leadership of the above-named chief, an Upper Whanganui Native, and of Kakahere; the latter died at Porirua, apparently in 1844. Shortly after the Wairau massacre these folk settled on the banks of the Hutt River, at the instigations of Te Rangihaeata, and were most prominent in harassing the white settlers.

The New Zealand Spectator also asserted that Ngati Rangatahi were also placed in the Hutt Valley by Te Rangihaeata: 45

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43 J.W. Barnicoat, Journal, June 3 1843, qMS 0139, ATL.
44 Best; Porirua and they who settled it, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p.
58.
45 New Zealand Spectator, 28 February 1846.
These last [Ngati Rangatahi] came originally from the upper part of the Wanganui river to Porerua. The head men amongst them were Kaparatehau, commonly called E Pare, E Horo, Te Kohera, Te Arihi, Papa Ahuapa, Kore, Te Atuta, and Kakaharea. They were all present at and took part in the sale of this district to the New Zealand Company in 1839. They were also at the Wairau massacre, where the two first were the most active and ferocious, and where Atuta was killed. Kakaherea died at Porirua in 1844, and the rest immediately after the Wairau massacre usurped land on the banks of the Hutt under Rangihaeata's sanction, and have continued ever since to molest and despoil the settlers up to the time of their expulsion by the troops on Wednesday last.

The settler press at Wellington was in no doubt that Te Rangihaeata was pulling the strings behind the scene of Ngati Rangatahi's defiance in the Hutt. Independent evidence supports this. In December 1844 Edward Meurant, the interpreter, visited Ngati Rangatahi: 46

We rode to the pa where we found the Maoris assembled discussing disputes of their own. I spoke to the chief (Kapara Tehau) respecting the report in town. He said it was true and they were determined not to leave the place till they were drove off. As some Maoris had appeared from Porirua last night with instructions from Rangihaeata saying they were not [to] leave on any account.

Similarly in 1846, Richard Taylor wrote in his diary that although Ngati Rangatahi had reluctantly agreed to leave the Hutt Valley, they were ordered by Te Rangihaeata to return: 47

I called upon the Governor to tell him that I feared Rangihaeata had compelled the Hutt natives to return.

Te Rauparaha himself claimed a position of pre-eminence and predominance over all the tribes of the coalition. An example of his stance is the debate at Otaki that took place shortly after the Wairau affair in 1843 between Te Ahu Karamu of Ngati Raukawa and Te Rauparaha. William B. White had been prevented by Ngati Toa from driving his cattle south along the coast, and a meeting was called at Otaki to discuss this and other matters: 48

46 Meurant diary, Ms 1635, ATL, entry for Saturday 28 Feb 1844.
47 Highlights in the life of William B. White, typescript, Ms 4542, ATL, 15.
All the people of Otaki were there, there were large numbers of whalers present too and there was great difficulty in restraining Edward Jerningham Wakefield who had sworn he would shoot Rangiata [Te Rangihaeata] who had killed his uncle, Captain Wakefield and other gentlemen at Wairau. At the meeting Eahu [Te Ahu] made a most solemn and impassioned speech, a protest against Rauparaha acting the course he had in regard to me. He said, "He had conquered Munoha and had a right to have his pakeha there if he chose and he reminded Rauparaha of his services on their expedition from Waikato and that from Maungatapu to Otaki, how when they were besieged at Taranaki he got through the enemies ranks went back to Maungatapu, collected his people, burnt their houses, took a little child on his back (a metaphorical way of saying he took all his people with him) and relieved Rauparaha from the siege and many other deeds of daring he had performed. Rauparaha in reply acknowledged all Eahu's services but reminded him that he was only one of his, Rauparaha's generals that he, Rauparaha was their chief, their general, their king, that they could not act independently of him and that they had no right to bring Europeans to endanger his position if the Europeans made war on him. There was a great deal said on both sides. It ended in Rauparaha's having his way.

Contemporary observers stressed the pre-eminence of Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata in the region as a whole. Captain Collinson of the Royal Engineers, in a memoir dating from 1855, wrote:

...The chiefs Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata do not appear to have been treated by the New Zealand Company's agent on his first arrival with the consideration due to their influence in the country. They both almost immediately repudiated the sort of bargain they had made with the agent for the sale of the Hutt, Porirua and Wairau districts; now, considering their powerful influence and the existence of doubt about their claims, it would, doubtless, have been better that the company's agent should have come to terms with them, which at that time he could have done at one fourth of the cost at which it was finally obliged to be concluded in about 1848.

In my first report I raise the issue as to whether Te Rauparaha was building a new kind of imperial polity in the Kapiti region, and thus should be seen

as similar to Kamehameha in Hawai‘i or to George Tupou in Tonga. This is in my view certainly a possibility and does appeal to some historians (including Belich); others are more inclined to see him as an old-fashioned, if especially successful, Maori rangatira of the old school. In either case, it seems impossible to deny that he and Ngati Toa generally had a unique status in the Wellington region.

1.5 Military coercion: This report will lay particular stress on military factors and the fighting that took place in the Hutt Valley and at Porirua. The Tribunal now has before it a great deal of material which explores the process of land transactions and the administrations of the Wellington Reserves (although not the Porirua reserves) in minute detail. This is obviously important. But it is only half the story. The Crown did not assert itself at Wellington only through deeds, deals, payments and negotiations. It also asserted itself coercively and militarily. To neglect the military dimension is to consider only a part of the story. Until 1846 Wellington was a civilian settlement, remote from the centre of power, and protected basically by civilian militias and a handful of British soldiers. In February 1846 the situation was decisively transformed once the Crown was able to deploy at Wellington military forces formerly occupied with Hone Heke’s war in the North. This new accession of military strength was ultimately deployed to eliminate Ngati Toa as an independent Maori polity, able up to that time to intimidate the Wellington settlements. Ngati Toa rangatiratanga was to be brought to an end.

In exploring the history of this military intervention in the region’s affairs after 1846 the impossibility of neatly disentangling events at Port Nicholson, the Hutt Valley, Porirua and the Kapiti region is once again only too apparent. Grey’s military intervention in the area began by sending army units into the Hutt Valley. But well before the fighting in the Hutt Valley was over, Grey had decided that it was essential to neutralise Porirua, which to him was “the point at which those natives who were inclined to be troublesome to the settlers and to commit depredations have assembled”.51 Maori who had plundered settlers in the Hutt were assured of a "friendly reception" at Porirua. Strategically the mouth of the Porirua harbour was a critical point on the tracks leading from the north to Wellington; Ngati Toa controlled the ferry and had "in the most vexatious manner" refused to

51 Grey, Memorandum to Officer in Charge, Paremata fort, 8 April 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 462.
ferry cattle across the harbour entrance. The answer was a permanent fort, and it is surely significant that the Crown's most sustained and elaborate attempt to create a military base in the region was the barracks at Paremata, where as early as April 1846 Grey was planning to establish a permanent force of 220 men and a unit of artillery. One objective of this was to cut off any line of retreat from the Crown's military opponents in the Hutt. 

Coercion was not confined merely to military attack and armed policing, but included public execution and transportation as well. The capture, court martial and public execution of Matini Ruta, captured at Pauatahanui, is described in the text. Other Maori who opposed the Crown militarily in the campaigns in the Wellington region in 1846 were transported to the penal colony of Van Diemen's Land. Te Rauparaha was kidnapped and detained on Grey's orders on doubtful grounds and in legally questionable circumstances, to say the least.

1.6. "In Satan's Time": Christianity and the modification of customary law. One final general point I feel it is necessary to reiterate are the changes to Maori customary practice brought about by the introduction of Christianity. By the mid-1840s the three tribes of the Wellington West Coast, Ngati Toa, Ngati Awa and Ngati Raukawa, had been deeply affected by Anglican Christianity. It is very important to take account of this if the question of "tribal" territories and boundaries is to be clearly grasped. Maori custom was not fixed, but was in a state of dynamic evolution under the influence of the Gospel and the Church Missionary Society. In 1868 Nopera Te Ngiha, a leading rangatira of Ngati Toa, gave evidence in the Native Land Court concerning the Himatangi Block near Otaki. During cross-examination he admitted that before the advent of Christianity Maori had kept slaves, but stressed that this was "in Satan’s time" before the coming of the Gospel: 52

In Satan's time there were slaves, of the three hapus, at Kapiti. Satan's time was up to Mr Williams. I can't tell about 'mana' in the time of Satan.

Such a sharp repudiation of Maori customary practice probably was not necessarily typical, and was certainly not always expressed with such fervour. Yet it does indicate that under missionary tutelage at least some

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52 Evidence of Nopera Te Ngiha, Himatangi case, (1868) 1 C Otaki MB 165.
Maori had come to equate pre-Christian customary practice quite literally with the government of Satan.

In considering the role of the missionaries in transforming Maori custom and practice one faces the immediate difficulty that there is remarkably little literature on the 19th century missionaries in New Zealand of any real sophistication and depth. Biographies of individual missionaries are plentiful enough, but with some obvious exceptions (Binney on Thomas Kendall for example\textsuperscript{53}) most are poorly referenced hagiographies which tell us little or nothing about the intellectual and political background to the missions, and even less about their interrelationship with British imperial expansion in first half of the nineteenth century. In a brilliant recent history of South Africa Timothy Keegan has analysed closely the links between the British evangelical missionary effort, anti-slavery and the ideology of free trade, lines of inquiry which might profitably be applied to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{54} Certainly in New Zealand missionaries were closely connected with the local representatives of empire, even if they at the same time self-consciously stood apart from some aspects of imperial policy. Octavius Hadfield, for example, the CMS minister at Otaki, was often consulted by Grey in regard to local Maori issues.\textsuperscript{55} Richard Taylor, based at Wanganui, preached sermons exhorting his flock that one main aspect of Christian teaching was obedience to the Queen's governor. This shown by the following entry in Richard Taylor's diary:\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{quote}
I saw a letter this morning from the Governor to the different chiefs exhorting them to peace and give up the land at the Hutt quietly all in the pa agree that the letter was a very good one. I preached from 1 Tim. 2 chap. on the duty of yielding obedience to Governors and rulers. The Natives appeared to pay deep attention to what I had said.
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{55} Letter of Octavius Hadfield to Mrs Hadfield (i.e. his mother), 1 August 1846, qMS 0898, WTL, vol. 2: "He [Grey] has been in this part of the country for the last month, and he comes to me almost every day that he is in Wellington to ask for my advice in some matter concerning the natives, and as he almost invariably acts upon advice I give him, I feel a degree of responsibility which is rather too much for my state of health."
\textsuperscript{56} Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, pp 343-4 of manuscript.
\end{flushright}
As will be seen, on a key occasion in 1846 Taylor played an important role in persuading the Christian chiefs of Ngati Raukawa to withhold support from Te Rangihaeata's military defiance of the Crown. Missionary stance on the relationship between Church and Crown varied, of course, between denominations and also from individual to individual: Hadfield, for example, seems to have been much more circumspect in lending support to Crown policies than Richard Taylor or Samuel Williams.

The CMS first came to the Wellington West Coast region in 1839. This followed from the initiative of Tamihana Te Rauparaha, Te Rauparaha's son, and Matene Te Whiwhi, who was Te Rauparaha's son-in-law, and who became a well-known and influential Maori leader of the 1850s. Both, like Te Rauparaha himself, belonged to the Ngati Huia hapu of Ngati Raukawa and both also counted as leaders of Ngati Toa. These two young chiefs decided "to get a missionary of the Church of England to come and reside in the midst of Ngati Raukawa" and travelled north to the Bay of Islands to ask Henry Williams to send them one, even though their people were fearful "that Ngapuhi might do them some harm for some early acts of Ngati Raukawa against Ngapuhi". These fears proved groundless, and in 1839 Octavius Hadfield arrived from Paihia and set up his mission at Waikanae and Otaki. To what extent Christianity had spread in the region before Hadfield's arrival is hard to say: obviously Matene Te Whiwhi and Tamihana Te Rauparaha were already keenly interested in Christianity and there is no reason to suppose they were the only ones interested in learning about the new faith. What is certainly clear is that by the mid-1840s key sections of Ngati Toa, Te Ati Awa and Ngati Raukawa were committed Anglicans.

There also evidence that political allegiance and commitment to Christianity closely interlocked, at least for a few years. In February 1846 when Governor Grey came to Wellington for the first time, accompanied by a very substantial military force, the West Coast chiefs met at Taupo, Te Rauparaha's main village near Porirua, and then collectively sent a letter to Grey inquiring as to his intentions, and requesting the assistance of a neutral adviser to replace their "friend and guide" Octavius Hadfield. They wanted an adviser to explain to them the "laws of the Queen" for "we have already ministers of God teaching us the laws of God". The assumption

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58 Heni Te Whiwhi (Matene's son), at 1905 AJHR G-5, p. 8.
59 Te Rauparaha and others to Grey, 19 January 1846, PP 1846/48, BPP (NZ), vol. 5, 416-17.
seems to be that those who followed God's law ought also to follow the Queen's law. This assumption was made explicit in a letter sent by Wiremu Kingi and the Ngati Awa of Waikanae to Grey, announcing their decision "that the natives of the faith should hearken fully to the law of the Queen" so that all "will hearken to the truth, to the Queen, to the Governor, and to the minister".60 The Queen's law meant peace and the teachings of Christianity.

This assumption that the Queen's law was in some way connected with the teachings of the Gospel may well have played a direct part in some of the key earlier land transactions. In 1846 Grey struck decisive blows against the leadership of Ngati Toa by capturing and detaining Te Rauparaha for nearly eighteen months, and by driving Te Rangihaeata out of the region by military action in a winter campaign in which army and police units were supported by Ngati Awa. Grey was also, significantly, supported by a section of Ngati Toa itself, led by Rawiri Puaha, one of the Christian chiefs. (This campaign is described in detail in the main section of this report). Subsequently Rawiri Puaha, along with Matene Te Whiwhi and Tamihana Te Rauparaha put their signatures - and theirs alone - to a deed by which the all-important Wairau block in the South Island, one of Ngati Toa's most prized possessions, was alienated to the Crown.61 Although Grey held the trump hand of Te Rauparaha's detention, it is possible too that the younger Ngati Toa chiefs were activated by a sense that Christian teaching mandated placing their lands under the mana of the Crown.

It is possible that there was something of a spirit of generosity in the air and a willingness to abandon land claims based on take raupatu in the late 1840s. In 1848 Te Rauparaha was released from custody and was taken home by three of the leading chiefs of the country, Te Wherowhero (Waikato: later King Potatau), Taraia (of Hauraki) and Te Horeta (from the East Coast). When he was returned Te Wherowhero invited the southern tribes to return to their ancestral lands in Taranaki and the Waikato coast, abandoned under Waikato pressure in the 1820s and 1830s. The occasion was described by Matene Te Whiwhi of Ngati Toa/Ngati Raukawa:62

60 Wiremu Kingi and others to Grey, 21 February 1846, PP 1846/38, BPP (NZ), 5, 20. Again the point must be made that the Ngati Awa at Waikanae led by Wiremu Kingi were distinct from the Ngati Awa (Ngamotu) people of Port Nicholson. Wiremu Kingi was the son of Rere Tawhangawhanga who had accompanied Te Rauparaha in the campaigns in the South Island.

61 A copy of the Wairau deed of 1847 can be found in Alexander Mackay, A compendium of official documents relative to Native affairs in the South Island, 1873, vol. 1, 204.

62 Puahue case, (1868) 2 Waikato MB 78.
When Te Rauparaha was returned, Potatau, Taraia and Te Horeta went to Kapiti. They came to Otaki. All the tribes were gathered together to mihi over Potatau and Tamati Waka over Te Rauparaha being returned. All the southern tribes were gathered together: Ngati Raukawa, Ngati Toa and Ngati Awa. Potatau stood up and said, Ngati Awa go back to Waitara, to your own lands. Waikato must not keep them. He said the same thing to the other tribes, that is to Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa...I don't know if this was the sentiment of the whole of the Waikato tribes but Potatau was the chief of Waikato. After this the word of Potatau was remembered by all the tribes.

Te Wherowhero’s generosity may well have stemmed from the fact that under the new Christian dispensation retaining lands based on a title founded on recent conquest was no longer acceptable. Ngati Awa, of course, did indeed return to Taranaki. By 1850 their settlements around Waikanae had been abandoned, and the large decorated church at Kenakena built under Octavius Hadfield’s direction in 1843 lay in ruins.63

Much more direct evidence of the impact of Christianity on land-selling is available for blocks in the Horowhenua-Manawatu region. Missionary influence was, for example, critical in the decision of the younger chiefs of Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa to acquiesce in Ngati Apa, a conquered tribe, selling the Rangitikei block to the government in 1849. This sale was negotiated by the young Donald McLean, then fresh from his first big success at Wanganui in 1848 and at the beginning of his career as a the Crown’s chief land purchase officer. Ngati Apa’s rights to sell were the cause of major discussion within Ngati Raukawa and Ngati Toa. To older conservatives such as Te Rauparaha (by this time released from captivity), Ngati Apa were a “slave tribe” and McLean should not have been negotiating with them. Other older chiefs took the stance that they had signed the Treaty of Waitangi on the assumption that the Crown had agreed to protect their titles to land based on take raupatu.64 But the younger Christian chiefs were of a different opinion. The lines of debate were explained by Rawiri Te Whanui (Ngati Raukawa) to the Native Land Court in 1868:65

64 See e.g. evidence of Henare Te Herekau (Ngati Raukawa), 1 C Otaki MB 207.
65 Evidence of Rawiri Te Whanui, Himatangi case, (1868) 1 C Otaki MB 231-2.
Mr McLean spoke of his having been to Ngati Apa to hear about the sale of land from the other side of Rangitikei to Manawatu. Rauparaha was annoyed with McLean. "What did you go to those slaves to talk about a sale?" - meaning Ngati Apa. He said they were people whom he had spared and they had no voice in such a matter. Ngati Raukawa agreed.

McLean, always careful never to rush matters, left Ngati Raukawa to talk the proposed sale over at a number of hui. It was agreed that Ngati Apa should be allowed to sell some land, but much dispute as to exactly how much.

Opinion was divided. Some said at Whangaehu, some Turakina. Rauparaha said let it be at Whangaehu - he and other chiefs. The point was not decided. [There was] another meeting afterward and discussion about the boundary, Whangaehu or Turakina. The young men, such as myself, Hakaraia and Matene Te Whiwhi, wished to follow advice of missionary [sic] and take the boundary to Turakina, and, after, to Rangitikei. [It was] proposed to fix Rangitikei as the boundary of Ngati Apa's sale - old men still urged that [sic] - Matene and Hakaraia pressed their point and it was at last agreed to.

The principal adviser of Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa Anglican rangatira such as Matene Te Whiwhi at this time was Samuel Williams, who officiated at Rangiatea church, Otaki, from 1849-53. Williams later testified that McLean had asked him to assist in obtaining Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa assent to Ngati Apa’s sale of the Rangitikei block:66

I advised Te Rauparaha to show consideration to the conquered tribes living on the land and that they should consent to a sale of the portion of the country.

Williams’ involvement seems a lot like simple missionary meddling, but Williams himself had no qualms about admitting his involvement and nor did the “Mihanere” chiefs see anything wrong with seeking missionary advice. To a man like Samuel Williams, the notion of a “slave tribe” was as obnoxious as slavery itself, and this is probably sufficient in itself to explain his willingness to assist McLean.

Not everyone was happy about missionary involvement in land selling. Rangatira complained that under missionary influence some tribes became 'whakahî' (cheeky), questioning the accepted scheme of things.

Parakaia Te Pouepa, who was the main claimant in the Himatangi case, told the Native Land Court in 1868:67

Ngati Raukawa were kind to Ngati Apa. If Whatanui had not saved them they would not have been spared. They were not ‘whakahi’ to Ngati Raukawa or they would not have been spared. Began to be ‘whakahi’ after the missionaries came - about 1842 - they began to be cheeky... Missionaries were here before 1840. Their preaching and the purchase of land from them by the Government about 1847 caused them to say the land was theirs.

Henare Te Herekau, also of Ngati Raukawa, said much the same:68

Though the Christianity and the notice of government has raised these people out of their degraded position, if they had shown themselves before my hands were tied by the Gospel, I should have killed them or sent them off to some other Island.

Clearly the effects of Christian teaching on land rights were the cause of considerable dissension and debate. In the particular instance of the Rangitikei block Te Rangihaeata of Ngati Toa did everything he could to block the sale by Ngati Apa up to the time when the deed was finally signed at Wanganui by McLean and 200 people of Ngati Apa in May 1849.69

This climate of opinion of the 1840s is relevant, perhaps, to Ngati Toa’s stance over Wellington. If some sections of the tribe were willing to alienate even the prized Wairau block to the Crown, and to acquiesce in Ngati Apa selling lands in the Rangitikei district, then it equally should not be assumed that decisions by sections of Ngati Toa not to intervene at Wellington reflect any lack of a traditional right to do so according to pre-Treaty Maori practice. Furthermore, the Waitangi Tribunal cannot, any more than could the Spain Commission or the Native Land Court, escape from the problem of what weight ought to be accorded to pre-Treaty titles to land based on take raupatu.

67 Evidence of Parakaia Te Pouepa (Ngati Raukawa), Himatangi case, (1868) 1C Otaki MB 203.
68 Evidence of Henare Te Herekau, (Ngati Raukawa), Himatangi case, (1869) 1 C Otaki MB 207.
69 McLean to Principal Agent, NZ Co, Wellington, 12 April 1849, in NZ Co 3/10, NA, Wellington.
2. The establishment of the colonial state and Ngati Toa's response:

A. Ngati Toa and the New Zealand Company

2.1. Introduction: It is not intended to repeat here material covered already in earlier reports. In this study, the main focus, as required by the Waitangi Tribunal's commission, will be on the events of 1845 and 1846. It is my argument that the main protagonists in the events of those years were the government and Ngati Toa. To see the events in the Hutt Valley as merely a conflict between Ngati Rangatahi and the Crown is to ignore the all-important wider context of conflict with Ngati Toa. The conflict began originally as a struggle between the New Zealand Company and Ngati Toa, while the Crown, in the person of Governor Fitzroy, attempted to act as peacemaker and mediator. Governor Grey, however, who had far more military resources at his disposal than Fitzroy, embarked on a specific programme of breaking Ngati Toa power. In this he was remarkably successful. To both Fitzroy and Grey Ngati Toa were a threat to the New Zealand Company settlers at Wellington. Ngati Toa themselves, still largely immersed in the pre-1840 world of internecine Maori rivalries, were in fact divided in their aims and sympathies. There is no evidence that Te Rauparaha ever considered an attack on Wellington in any case; this would have obviously been risky, especially once Grey and substantial military forces had arrived in the region in early 1846.

In 1843 an armed posse of New Zealand Company officials and settlers had set out from Nelson while the Spain inquiries were still proceeding, resolved to arrest Te Rauparaha for "trespassing" at Wairau. Te Rauparaha certainly did not want conflict. The whole affair was a tragedy and miscalculation on both sides. The actions of the Nelson settlers were absurd and unjustifiable and they were no match at all for the well-drilled and experienced Ngati Toa warriors, who were only too experienced in the use of firearms. It could be said, too, that Te Rangihaeata's decision to exact utu on the captives, however justifiable according to the norms of Maori customary practice, and Te Rauparaha's acquiescence, were also unwise actions, opening up a breach with the settlers at Nelson and Wellington which could never be repaired.

2.2 Fitzroy's policy towards Ngati Toa: While the point need not be laboured here unnecessarily, it needs to be stressed that relationships
between colonial governors and settlers, especially the New Zealand Company settlers, were far from friendly. Many of the settlers were Whig or Liberal in their political sympathies and had a deep-seated distrust of governors, especially those from military backgrounds, and of military forces in general. Much of the friction between the New Zealand Company settlers and Governor Fitzroy arose from the Wairau incident. Fitzroy's decision to take no action against Ngati Toa incensed the Wakefield family and many other people. Fitzroy's manner, in which he lectured settlers in (in Mark Francis' words) "as if they were midshipmen" made a bad impression, and Domett published abusive verse about the governor lampooning him as the "King of the Cannibal Islands":71

Thus we see in your method to civilize savages
By giving them licence to murder and thieve,
And then hanging all who resist their wild ravages,
A scheme which it needed your brain to conceive.

Fitzroy was constantly pilloried in the colonial press: settlers liked him about as much as they did the Native protectorate and "Exeter Hall", that revealing term used to stigmatise what were seen as busybody evangelical missionaries.72 Fitzroy's attitude towards Ngati Toa was dictated in part by idealism, but also in part because he had a far more realistic grasp of the balance of power in the Wellington region than the settlers did. Wellington, like Nelson, was highly vulnerable to Ngati Toa attack, and Fitzroy was in no doubt that Ngati Toa were militarily formidable, dominant in the region, and unwise to provoke. The situation is acutely summarised by Mark Francis:73

There was no room for compromise between Fitzroy and the settlers. He saw himself as the protector of the Maori against his countrymen, whose giant appetite for land did not match their puny martial abilities. His prognosis of the situation was that,

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70 Mark Francis, Governors and Settlers, Canterbury University Press, 1992.
71 See Francis, op.cit., 219.
72 See e.g. The New Zealand Spectator, 28 February 1846, reprinting the comments of the Auckland Times on Protector Forsaith's (in fact innocuous) letter suggesting that Maori chiefs write testimonials for Governor Fitzroy on his departure: "See how the created pests of Exeter Hall, salaried however in the colony, gratuitously go about teaching to the hitherto quiet and contented maories, the doctrine of European debt to them, and promising, most monstrous! that the "good Governor" shall be more useful to them in England than here" etc.
without fortifications at either Nelson or Wellington, fewer than 400 serviceable muskets, and little ammunition, a military response to the Wairau conflict in 1844 would have resulted in the total destruction of these settlements under circumstances of the most cruel description.

Fitzroy was trying to be magnanimous. His policies only alienated the settlers; and the Ngati Toa leadership, who were expecting some retaliation for the deaths at the Wairau, seem to have found Fitzroy's decision to take no action rather puzzling.

2.3. **Fortifications at Wellington:** The settlers at Port Nicholson were confronted with the uncomfortable reality that while the government at Auckland was very far away Ngati Toa and its allies were only too close. With no military force available to protect them the New Zealand Company settlers somehow had to defend themselves. Following the Wairau engagement in 1843 the 18-pound guns, originally placed by the Company on Somes Island, were moved to new forts at the northern and southern ends of the town. One fort was at Thorndon, and the other at Clay Point, Clay Hill, or Flagstaff Hill, the "abrupt terminal" of a ridge right by the sea at the point where Willis Street and Lambton Quay now meet; following Wairau the townspeople formed a working party and dragged the guns up to the top of the hill. In 1845 the Hutt Valley settlers also built a fort; as at Wellington this was a settler, rather than a military initiative. This fort, Fort Richmond, was close to the present site of the Lower Hutt bridge. Drawings of the fort show it to rather resemble a Canadian stockade; adjacent to it was a bridge across the river connecting with the track to Wellington. The settlers of the other main Wellington out-settlement, Karori, also built a fort, "in order to guard against an attaxk from Ohariu" [i.e. Makara], says Cowan, situated near Lancaster Street. Karori at this time was a very isolated settlement: basically just a few homes in clearings cut out of the very dense forest. The Karori fort was built by the Karori militia, assisted by sailors from H.M.S. *Calliope* and armed police from Wellington commanded by A.C. Strode. As in the Hutt, the fort was garrisoned by local militia, not by regular army units. Such military forces as were available in the country at this time were committed to the Northern war in the Bay of Islands. Cowan writes:

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74 Cowan, *NZ Wars*, I, 93.
75 See ibid, 97.
76 Ibid, 96.
77 Cowan, *NZ Wars*, I, 98.
The post was designed chiefly as a protection against possible attack from the natives at Ohariu Bay and the mouth of the Makara Stream, and in nights of alarm a good lookout was kept in that direction. Some of the settlers worked on their holdings with cartridge-belts over their shoulders and a "Brown Bess" lying close by. However most of the Ohariu Maoris left by canoe for Porirua and places higher up the coast. There was greater danger from kokiris, or small raiding-parties, of Rangihaeata's force. The armed settlers formed sections each of eight or nine men for garrison duty, and these detachments in turn occupied the stockade-house at night.

It can be pointed out here that it has been suggested in these hearings that Ohariu was an entirely Ngati Tama settlement, beyond the control of the Ngati Toa leadership living around the Porirua basin, and that Ngati Toa had no effective presence there. If this is true, then it is hard to see why the Karori settlers could have been nervous about an attack from the direction of Makara. In fact they were highly apprehensive about an attack from that direction and felt vulnerable enough to go to the trouble of building and garrisoning a stockade.

The other fort was built at Johnsonville. This was a wooden stockade with slits for musket fire, built on Johnson's section (No 11/181), and overlooking the track to Porirua.

The fortifications certainly do demonstrate how apprehensive the Wellington settlers were after Wairau, and that the main source of apprehension was Ngati Toa (the victors of Wairau, after all); but all the same it needs to be stressed that there is no evidence of the Ngati Toa leadership at any time contemplating an attack on Wellington. The zone of military confrontation was in the middle reaches of the Hutt Valley in early 1846. It seems that while Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata were willing to accept compensation for Ngati Toa interests and Port Nicholson, and may have indeed valued the presence of the settler community there for trade (Te Rauparaha himself shipped trade goods to Wellington) the Hutt Valley was a quite different proposition.

2.4. **Ngati Toa and the Spain Commission:** The direction commissioning research of dated 19 December 1997 has required an an account of:
- a consideration of the rights of Ngati Toa, as explained by Ngati Toa and other witnesses to the Spain commission;
- a consideration of the implications for Ngati Toa of Commissioner Spain's arbitration activities and decision with regard to the Port Nicholson deed;
- details of any protests made by Ngati Toa at the time of the arbitration and decision.

These points (all of which have already been considered in my first report) will be considered in order:

(a) **Ngati Toa's rights as explained in evidence to the Spain commission:**

Abundant evidence was put to the Spain commission regarding Ngati Toa's particular status in the region. Wakefield himself gave evidence that in his view the Port Nicholson deed could have had no validity without Ngati Toa approval. The Kapiti deed included the whole area of the Port Nicholson deed, and one of the main reasons for the former was to secure Ngati Toa acquiescence to the latter (frustrated by Spain's complete disallowance of the Kapiti deed). As I pointed out in my first report, Wakefield believed that Ngati Toa had title to the harbour by conquest, that Te Atiawa were only "allowed" to live there by the permission of the "Kawhia chiefs", and that the "Ngatiawa tribe" could not sell land there unless this was "confirmed" by the "Kawhia tribe":

Q: Do you know what Title Rauparaha, or any of the Chiefs who have signed this deed [i.e. the Kapiti deed] claim Port Nicholson?
A: The Title of former conquest, and the extermination of the former inhabitants.
Q: Do you know how long it is since that conquest took place?
A: No, I do not.
Q: Do you not know that it has been several years an undisturbed possession of the Ngatiawa tribe?
A: I always understood that the Kawia Chiefs allowed a portion of the Ngatiawa Tribe to reside there.
Q: Do you consider that the Ngatiawa Tribe had a right to sell to the Land at Port Nicholson.
A: I do not think any purchase would have been a valid one unless it had been confirmed by the Kawia tribe.

78 OLC 1/907 (Case 374a), NA Wellington, transcript of evidence, 9 June 1842.
Wakefield's view is supported by no less an authority than Ian Wards, who is in no doubt that the transaction was fatally flawed without Ngati Toa consent:79

The Ngatiawa chiefs, perhaps with what could well have seemed an inevitable final struggle with Ngati Toa in mind, were anxious to get guns... [T]he Ngatiawa, of themselves, had no right to sell any land without Ngati Toa consent - a view from which the great fighting chief Te Rangihaeata never departed, and with which the Ngatiawa chiefs themselves would no doubt have agreed had they the least understanding that they were being asked to permanently alienate their whole territory, losing their bird forests and eel streams, placing themselves at the mercy of the company's inadequate native reserves scheme.

Taringa Kuri told the commission that, far from acquiescing in Ngati Awa's rights around the harbour, Te Rauparaha was planning to attack them: *this was the main reason for the sale.*80

Were any of the natives from Porirua present [at the sale of Port Nicholson]? Yes, the Ngati Rangatahi tribe.

Who are the principal chiefs of that tribe, and were they present at that meeting? Te Kohera, Te Arihi, Papa Ahupa, Kore, Te Atuta, Kakaherea: they were all there: I invited them.

Are those the natives who lately took possession of some land on the Hutt? Yes.

Was the land they so took possession of, included in the land sold to Colonel Wakefield? Yes.

On what ground did they cede that land to Colonel Wakefield? Lest Rauparaha and Watanui should come and fight with us.

What reason had you for fearing they would do so? Rauperaha was offended because the land was taken up by the Ngatiawa tribe.

In his evidence in the Kapiti case Wakefield stressed Ngati Toa's general rights by conquest:81

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80 As cited in the *New Zealand Spectator*, 28 Feb 1846.
81 Evidence of William Wakefield, 9 June 1842, OLC 1/907 (Case 374a), NA, Wellington,
At several interviews with Rauparaha, and Hiko who were the acknowledged principal Chiefs of the Kawia Tribe they described to me the properties of the tribe in Cooks Straits; they stated that they had come many years since with Tepehi from Kawia and Mokao and taken possession by conquest, and the extermination of the ancient Tribes of both sides of Cooks Straits within the boundaries named in the deed...

(b) A consideration of the implications for Ngati Toa of Commissioner Spain's arbitration activities and and decision with regard to the Port Nicholson deed:

Ngati Toa did receive payment for Wellington: that is, it was accepted by Spain and Clarke that Ngati Toa had compensable interests at Port Nicholson. If part of the compensation for the extinguishment of Native title at Wellington was the reserved lands it presumably follows that Ngati Toa have an interest in them too, as Judge Mackay accepted in the Native Land Court decision on title to the Wellington Tenths blocks. 82 On 3 February 1844 Te Rauparaha and Te Rangiheata wrote to Clarke, Spain and Fitzroy complaining that the compensation money for Port Nicholson was being paid to the wrong persons and asking that it be paid to them. 83 Clarke advised that some money would certainly be paid to them, and a meeting of 8 March was organised at which the amount of the compensation for Ngati Toa could be fixed. However the meeting foundered over the question of the Hutt Valley: Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata had assumed that the matter to be decided was compensation for Wellington only, whereas Spain insisted that the compensation was for Ngati Toa's rights in the Hutt Valley as well (all this is covered in detail in my first report84). This meeting seems to have been a hopelessly confused affair, not helped by a somewhat lofty and detached attitude on the part of Commissioner Spain, who would not budge from his position that the boundaries of the area subject to the compensation agreement had already been settled in earlier discussions between the Ngati Toa chiefs and Clarke. There was a simple conflict of evidence on the point: Clarke said that "he had spoken of his [Te Rauparaha's claim] under the general term of Port Nicholson; but that the

82 (1888) 2 Wellington MB 99. See Boast, Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region, 161.
83 Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata to Spain, 3 Feb 1844, OLC 910-911, [Re conference with Te Rauparaha]. See Boast, Ngati Toa in Wgtn. Region, 1, 132.
84 Ibid., 133-36).
Hutt was clearly understood to have been included". Te Rauparaha, however, was adamant:

I understood I was to have a payment for Port Nicholson, and I am now ready to receive it - I had no idea you meant to include the Hutt Valley...

The mix-up was in all likelihood over what was meant by "Port Nicholson" and the "Hutt Valley". Te Rauparaha and the Ngati Toa chiefs were quite willing to accept that a certain amount of the lower part of the Hutt Valley was a part of "Port Nicholson", and this may have been responsible for the confusion in Clarke's mind. In Te Rauparaha's words (at the same meeting):

I consider Port Nicholson to mean all the land seaward of Rotokakahi, but that beyond Rotokakahi would be retained by the Natives.

The importance of this confusion can hardly be exaggerated, as Te Rangihaeata continued to take the same basic stance in 1846: the lower part of the Hutt, that which could fairly be regarded as being part of Port Nicholson, was a place where the immigrants were welcome to settle; but the middle and upper sections of the valley was never alienated and was accordingly not available for settlement. It was over this issue that armed conflict broke out in the valley in 1846. Ngati Toa and Ngati Rangatahi wished to remain in the valley. The settler community, at least as reflected by such mouthpieces of settler opinion as the New Zealand Spectator, wished to see the valley cleared of any Maori presence and made wholly available for British settlement. In addition, as noted above, the Company had sold lands at Porirua itself. Governor Grey did not share the colonists' hunger for land, but he did want to coerce Ngati Toa into submission for military and strategic reasons, and thus in the crucial year of 1846 the Crown's aims and those of the settler community were to coincide.

The key place name is Rotokakahi, where Te Rauparaha thought "Port Nicholson" ended and the "Hutt Valley" began. Plate 32 of the New Zealand Historical Atlas identifies "Rotokakahi" with the place known to the settlers as Fort Richmond, the site of the militia stockade built in 1845.

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85 This and the following references are all taken from the minutes of the discussions at Porirua on March 1 1844, on OLC 910-911, NA Wellington.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
and subsequently occupied by British army units: it is reasonable to assume that Maori living in the Hutt would have seen the fort as a boundary point. It was at this point in 1844 that Taringa Kuri, acting under instructions from Te Rauparaha, cut a boundary line in March 1844, "on the North Eastern bank of the river some thirty or forty yards broad, and extending nearly a mile in length." This spot is more or less on the Hutt River near to the current Lower Hutt city centre, and obviously a substantial section of the valley lay beyond in Maori hands, as the map in the Atlas makes very clear. As this report will show, it is clear that by 1846 Te Rangihaeata was unwavering in his view that the settlers had no right to occupy land in the middle and upper sections of the valley: nothing that happened between 1844 and 1846 had made him change his mind.

(c) Protest

Protest came, as noted, immediately after the failure of the March 1844 discussions when Taringa Kuri cut the line at Rotokakahi. But the main protest did not come until 1846, at which time Ngati Tama, Ngati Rangatahi and Ngati Toa were still in the Hutt Valley. It was only in 1846 that the Crown was in a position to impose a coercive military solution to the continuing 'problem' of Maori settlement in the Hutt. The inclusion of the whole valley of the Hutt in the Crown grant was simply ignored by the Maori communities living there and the point was not enforced by due process of law but by British regiments, armed police and their Maori allies in a fairly major military conflict from May-September 1846. In effect the same is true of the sections sold by the New Zealand Company at Porirua. The settlers and the Crown wanted the Maori communities in the Hutt gone. Ngati Tama left after military intimidation. Ngati Rangatahi and sections of Ngati Toa resisted militarily. This resistance is the main subject of this report.

2.5. Ngati Toa and Te Rauparaha in late 1845: Although forts were built at Wellington and the settler community remained apprehensive about Te Rauparaha's intentions, there was no overt hostility shown towards the

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88 Taringa Kuri told Forsaith and Spain that he was "cutting a line according to the directions of Rauparaha to divide between the Lands of the Europeans and our own": see Forsaith to Richmond, 21 March 1844, OLC 910-911, NA Wellington.
89 Forsaith to Superintendent of Southern Division (Richmond), 21 March 1844, OLC 910-911.
Pakeha settlers by Te Rauparaha and travellers freely travelled through Otaki and Porirua on their way to Wellington. William Williams passed through the area in November 1845 and his journal entries give a picture of tranquility. Te Rauparaha was living at Otaki at this time, which is where Williams met him on 6 November:90

The natives here [Otaki] have a very civilised appearance having it in their power to maintain many good clothes which they much value. There are many here also who have embraced Christianity and they shew in their conduct that a blessing has attended Mr. Hadfields instructions among them. Old Rauparaha soon came in to see me. He will be remembered as one of the principals in the sad affair at Wairau. Since that event he has been an attendant upon Mr Hadfields ministrations and certainly apart from that circumstance he is a very fine specimen of the native chief.

Te Rauparaha courteously invited Williams to stay for a few extra days. Williams did so, and the next day Te Rauparaha came over to see him, bringing with him Tamihana te Rauparaha and some other people.

He [Te Rauparaha] says he has had experience of evil in every shape among the natives of battle sieges and murders, but that now he wishes to know something about Christianity.

Williams was invited to visit Tamihana's house, which "is neat with 4 glass windows and is intended to be divided into four rooms". Williams was also impressed by the large congregations who came to hear him preach at Otaki and Waikanae. On November 11 he travelled across the Wellington peninsula via Porirua; by this time there were settlers living on their selections not far from Porirua. No settlers were to be found at this time until about six miles from the southern end of the Porirua harbour.

Pulled up the Porirua river in a canoe until we came to the beginning of a road which has been cut through the wood to Wellington. At a distance of about six miles we came upon some of the settlers houses which continue at intervals for the distance of another six miles. They are in a romantic district very wild and rugged, and the labour which has been spent in clearing the timber and cultivating the soil is immense.

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Williams paints a peaceful scene, but there is other evidence to show that relations between the West Coast tribes (Ngati Toa, Ngati Awa and Ngati Raukawa) and the settler community at Wellington continued to be tense. The fortifications described in the previous paragraph is one example. It also appears that Te Rauparaha and other chiefs feared for their physical safety at Wellington and preferred not to go there. When Grey sent H.T. Kemp across to Porirua in early 1846 with his reply to a letter sent to him by Te Rauparaha and other chiefs (see below), he found that the chiefs were only willing to visit Grey on condition that their personal safety was guaranteed.\(^9\) Later in 1846 in the midst of the fighting in the Hutt Valley Te Rauparaha offered to visit Wellington but Major Last thought "that there is such a hostile feeling against him by all the people that I think it would not be advisable."\(^2\)

**B. February 1846: the situation transformed**

2.6. **Militarisation:** As noted above, the various forts and stockades around Wellington were erected and garrisoned by the New Zealand Company settlers, who feared an attack on the town after the battle of the Wairau. In 1845 the government was forced to commit such military forces as it had to the Northern War, and had few resources to spare at Wellington. In the course of the year, however, a few regular detachments were moved into the area. In April, following rumours of a planned attack on Fort Richmond (Lower Hutt) Major Richmond ordered 50 men of the 58th regiment to the fort; they were taken to the Hutt from Port Nicholson on the brig *Bee*, and marched up to the fort from Petone Beach, relieving the militia garrison on April 21. Two of the Company's 18-pounder guns were also sent across the harbour and installed in the fort. But it was not until the end of the Northern war in early 1846 that the government was able to move larger military forces into the Hutt Valley. Or rather, the Northern war had led to a build-up of military force which Grey now had at his disposal to employ at Wellington.\(^3\) An over-emphasis on the various negotiations following the aftermath of the Spain commission at

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91 Grey to Stanley, 17 February 1846, PP 1846/44, BPP(NZ) 5, 415.
92 Major Last to Governor Grey, BPP(NZ) 5, 488.
93 See Hill, *Policing the Colonial Frontier*, 1, 230: "The northern insurrection had led to a large increase in the number of soldiers in the country, 800 by 1 June 1845, and after George Grey replaced FitzRoy in November he secured huge increases in military strength. Following the cessation of hostilities after the occupation of Kawiti's Ruapekapeka pa, Grey arrived in Wellington in February 1846 with more than 500 troops to crush resistance in the south...".
Wellington should not obscure the fact that the principal factor dominating the government’s reaction to Maori resistance in the Hutt was military: nothing really could be done until forces could be shipped down from Auckland in 1846. Once the government's hands were no longer tied by the war in the north, it was able to act coercively in the Hutt and at Porirua.  

The military buildup at Wellington began in February 1846. A flotilla of ships, including the naval steamer H.M.S. Driver - the first steamer ever to be seen in Wellington harbour - appeared at Wellington, bringing substantial military forces to the area and immediately shifting the balance of power at Wellington away from Ngati Toa and its allies. This sudden militarisation is described by Cowan.

As soon as it was possible to withdraw troops from the Bay of Islands preparations were made for a transfer of the military forces to Wellington, and on the 3rd February, 1846, a body of nearly six hundred men under Lieut-Colonel Hulme embarked at Auckland for the south. The fleet which transported them consisted of the British frigates "Castor" and "Calliope," the war-steamer "Driver" - which had just arrived from the China Station - the Government brig "Victoria," and the barque "Slains Castle." Inclusive of a detachment of the 99th Regiment, lately arrived from Sydney in the barque "Lloyds," the following was the detail of the force: 58th Regiment - one field officer, two captains, six subalterns, and 202 non-commissioned officers and privates; 99th Regiment - one field officer, tow captains, six subalterns, and 250 non-commissioned officers and privates; also a detachment of Royal Artillery.

The excitement created by the opportune arrival of so large a body of British soldiers, bringing the total force of redcoats in Wellington up to nearly eight hundred men, was heightened by the novel spectacle of a steam-vessel. H.M.S. "Driver" was the first steamship to visit the port; she was a wonderful craft to many a colonist, and amazing to the Maoris, who congregated to watch the strange pakeha ship driven by fires in her interior, moving easily and rapidly against wind and tide.

94 The details in this paragraph are mainly based on the narrative in Cowan, NZ Wars I, 98-99.
96 Cowan, op.cit., 99-100. A number of historians have emphasised the importance of Grey's ability to divert troops southward after the conclusion of the Northern war: see Miller, Early Victorian New Zealand, 94; Burns, Te Rauparaha, 268. According to Burns: Grey brought with him 500 regular troops and a detachment of artillery. Both he and Richmond hoped that a display of force might suffice to convince the Maoris that they could only lose against British might.
In the circumstances of colonial New Zealand, this was an impressive flexing of imperial muscle, and it is impossible to imagine that the implications of the new situation were not lost on someone as astute as Te Rauparaha. Governor Grey himself in no doubt that the arrival of military forces on such a large scale had decisively transformed the situation at Wellington. Grey contrasted the situation which had prevailed until 1846, "when the British authority was neither recognised nor could be enforced at the distance of only a few miles from the town" with that after his - and the military's - arrival:97

If we now consider how far the arrival of Her Majesty's naval and military forces in the southern portions of New Zealand has altered this state of things, we find that British authority has been so far enforced that the intruding natives have been expelled from the Hutt, and that the coast-road in the direction of New Plymouth has been opened by the establishment of a post at Porirua, which post also enables the Government in some degree to protect the rear of the Port Nicholson settlements. So large a force is now assembled in this part of the country that the Government may, when proper police regulations have been established, enforce its laws and its authority throughout a considerable tract of country, and thus give confidence to the well-disposed natives who may naturally hitherto have distrusted the ability of the Government to protect them.

Clearly firepower and manpower on this scale was more than was necessary to chase small groups of Maori cultivators out of the Hutt Valley. The community at Wellington until 1846 was essentially a civilian community of settlers. Now there was a formidable Crown military presence. There was also another factor: a young and determined governor determined to eliminate Ngati Toa as a political and military force.

2.7. Grey's programme: Grey arrived in New Zealand on 14 November 1845, but did not come to Wellington until early February 1846. He is, of course, a controversial figure.98 There are different assessments of him by historians. Ian Wards, while noting Grey's "unquestionably great gifts" sees

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97 Grey to Stanley, 22 April 1846, enclosure No 3, BPP (NZ) 5, 465-7.
98 Although Grey is central to this report, it is not (fortunately) necessary to delve into the historiography relating to Grey, except perhaps to deplore the absence of a modern biography of such a key figure in the country's history. The most interesting recent reassessment is in Mark Francis, Governors and Settlers, Canterbury University Press, 1992, 221-9. Francis' discussion, although illuminating, is too brief to allow a full consideration of Grey's native policy.
him as a liar, and while this may be rather harsh, such a verdict by such an able historian must at the very least mean that Grey's official despatches should be read with a certain amount of caution. Octavius Hadfield got to know Grey well (Grey often consulted him about Maori affairs in the Wellington region); Hadfield thought Grey "clever" but "not very talented", a major misjudgement. To the settler community at Wellington the arrival of the Governor and his wife and the Crown's military forces were at first very welcome. The beleaguered Wellington settlers, who had loathed with passion the gloomy and censorious Governor Fitzroy, regarded by them as too partial by far to Maoris and missionaries, responded with enthusiasm to Grey, a young and decisive governor seemingly determined to put Maori in their place. (They were eventually to become disillusioned with Grey in his turn.) On Thursday 19 February a Ball was given at the Assembly Rooms at Barrett's Hotel. Grey, his wife, and his entourage of military and naval officers were invited. It seems to have been a jolly occasion. The New Zealand Spectator describes the scene:

His Excellency and Mrs Grey arrived about ten o'clock, when dancing immediately commenced, and was kept up until one, when the supper room was thrown open. After supper the dancing was resumed with great spirit, and the party did not break up until nearly six o'clock in the morning.

One of Grey's early actions was to abolish the Native Protectorate, which had played such an important role in Spain's investigations. Most settlers had little time for the Protectorate: some had long hoped that "this protectorate department will be abolished as a public nuisance." Grey granted their wish. Clarke was eventually dismissed on 1 July 1846. In July 1843 Clarke had proposed a system of Native Courts which would pave the way for the gradual introduction of British law amongst the Maori; Swainson, the Attorney-General, had instead favoured confining the

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99 See Wards, Shadow, 391.
100 Hadfield letter (to his brother), 13 April 1846, typescript WATL:
I have seen good deal of our new Governor Captain Grey. He is a very clever man but not a very talented man. He is very honest, unprejudiced, and desirous of doing good, but not possessing very much decision of character or much judgment. His intellect is rather acute than comprehensive, and more prone to see analogies than differences in things, and rather too ready to jump at conclusions; still, I have a very high opinion of him, and much admire the high moral tone that he assumes which is important in these colonies, where people generally retrograde on that point.

101 Auckland Times. cited in New Zealand Spectator, 28 February 1846.
jurisdiction of the legal system only to areas of European settlement. But Grey rejected both Clarke's and Swainson's ideas, and instead favoured Maori becoming immediately subject to British law. He proceeded, in Wake's words, with

... the imposition of British institutions on the whole country. With increased finances and a reinforced army Grey was able to crush the Maori rebellion, repeal the Native Exemption Ordinance, and re-establish the principle that Maoris were amenable to the ordinary courts of the country.

On 16 February 1846 Grey wrote to Te Rauparaha, telling him that "Maori and Europeans shall be equally protected, and live under equal laws", the laws being, however, as Burns notes, "entirely those of the Europeans". Legal and political pluralism was definitely not part of Grey's vision.

In respect specifically to Wellington, Grey had quite specific plans and a specific timetable. It is not clear exactly when Grey formulated this, but it was certainly in place by April 1846. The first, and immediate, step was to secure "military possession of the country round Port Nicholson, included by a line drawn from Porirua to the upper Hutt". This then had to be followed up with the establishment of an armed police force. (The boundaries of the Wellington deed, it must be stressed, meant nothing to Grey: his programme was not one of resolving the complexities of land titles and reserves but of actively extending the Crown's power outwards from Wellington.) Grey believed that "Porirua is the key to the Wellington district, being the point through which the roads from all the other settlements pass to that place." In the winter of 1846, Grey believed, the Crown should "confine itself to holding possession of Porirua and the upper Hutt, as its extreme military posts". Meanwhile it was essential that a road be built from Wellington to Porirua, if not further: "every exertion" must be made "to construct a good line of road from Wellington to Porirua, and, if possible, as far along the coast as far as Wai-nui" [Paraparaumu].

103 For a full discussion of these competing policies, see C.H. Wake, "George Clarke and the government of the Maoris", *Historical studies: Australia and New Zealand*, vol 10, 339, 353-55.
104 Grey to Te Rauparaha, 16 Feb 1846, IA 46/799, NA, Wellington; also BPP (NZ) 5, 417.
106 Grey to Stanley, 22 April 1846, enclosure No 3, BPP (NZ) 5, 465-7.
108 Grey to Stanley, 7 April 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 450.
following summer the Crown forces could break out of the Wellington-Hutt-Porirua area into the Horowhenua region and beyond:

Efforts must at the same time be made to enforce British authority within the same limits; to strengthen our alliances along the coast in the direction of New Plymouth; to accustom the natives to, and to inspire them with a respect for, British laws and usages; to choose proper sites along the coast for military and police stations: so that when at the commencement of the next summer we break out into the open country beyond Wai-nui, we may be able at once to afford an efficient protection to the settlers inhabiting that tract of country...

As well as being committed to subjecting Maori to British law, Grey favoured a universal reduction of the whole of the country to the authority of the Crown. In Grey's view, "it is not sufficient that the Government should merely conquer, and remain in possession of certain portions of it [New Zealand]."109 The army could not be relied on to control the country permanently. Military action had to be followed up by policing.

It also seems that Grey had quite specific plans to obtain Ngati Toa land at Porirua for the purposes of settlement. It appears that by April he had discussed this with Colonel Wakefield and had promised Wakefield he would obtain land at Porirua for the New Zealand Company. The diary of F. Bradley, small farmer and bootmaker, contains the following entry for May 4 1846:110

I met in with Colnl Wakefield & he told me that the governor has promised to get them Porirua but he said he believed all the land would be got very shortly as the new commissioner was coming out & I said Mr Spain (our late commissioner) had acted the Part of a very bad man and he said he had.

In a report made to Earl Grey in 1847 Grey explained that it had been essential to obtain the Porirua area in order to satisfy the claims of New Zealand Company settlers to land there, and also in order to make the Wellington settlement secure:111

110 Bradley diary, Ms 63, ATL, 4 May 1846.
The land claims which appeared, in the circumstances of the Colony, to require immediate adjustment were those advanced by the New Zealand Company: - Firstly, to the district of country, including Porirua, and lying between that place and Wairau [sic - Wainui?]. Secondly, to the district of Wairau...In both of these districts the Company had actually disposed of land to European settlers, whom, of course, it was desirable to place in possession of the sections they had purchased; and moreover, in a military point of view, the possession of a great part of the Porirua District, and its occupation by British subjects, were necessary to secure the town of Wellington and its vicinity from evil-disposed Natives, as it was only by occupation of the Porirua District that the various tracks leading across the woody mountains which lie between Porirua and Wellington could be effectually closed against an enemy.

2.8. Armed Police: In his magisterial Policing the Colonial Frontier Richard Hill has emphasised Grey's commitment to an Irish-style armed police force as a key part of his coercive programme in the Wellington region. Grey had spent six years' army service in Ireland, and although he had certainly been shocked by the poverty and inequalities of Ireland he also, in Hill's words, "had been impressed by the efficacy of a militarised police in imposing unpopular rule upon large, turbulent sectors of a subject population". Grey had instituted an Irish-style armed police force in South Australia during his tenure as Governor and strongly favoured the establishment of an armed police force in New Zealand. Grey was especially dismayed by the absence of any effective policing at Wellington:

The Governor required, besides fighting bodies, a specialist police to complement his military forces, a force raised on his authority alone. Only an armed police-force of professional soldier-policemen could fulfil in the short and medium terms the several functions which he had in mind. The existing Police Magistracy system's inability to cope with these functions was revealed in February 1846 when Grey arrived in Wellington with 500 troops to present that show of force against the Maoris for which Superintendent Richmond had been pressing. The regional police, he found, consisted of seven constables to 'watch a tract of forest country without roads, more than a hundred miles in length, and to control about five thousand Europeans, and many thousand Savages', and at most British authority was enforceable only a 'few miles from the town'. The Governor was to change this citation.

112 Keith Sinclair, "Grey, George", DNZB, I, 160
113 Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier, I, 235.
114 Hill, op.cit., 240.
The most important document relating to Grey's plans for an armed police is the secret memorandum he sent to Lord Stanley on April 22 1846. Here Grey argued that although his military show of force had already expanded the zone of effective British authority around Wellington, it was nevertheless necessary for military pressure to be followed up by an armed police force under civil authority. The main purpose of this new force was essentially to supplement the military units; the armed police would have the functions of "obtaining information, of exploring and opening up lines of communication throughout the country, and of transporting military stores and supplies." In stressing the lawlessness of the countryside around Wellington, Grey may have been over-colouring the situation. As seen, an unarmed traveller like Williams was easily able to walk from Otaki to Wellington in late 1845, noting only Te Rauparaha's growing interest in Christianity, the large congregations in the Maori churches at Otaki and Waikanae (Kenakena) and the settlers' houses on the Porirua track, apparently tranquil and unmolested in the dense forest. Grey wanted to proceed to coercively impose British law through military action and armed policing because this was a model of colonial government he was committed to, not because it was actually necessary.

To head his new armed police force at Wellington Grey chose William Durie, a New Zealand Company settler with a military background, close friend of William Wakefield, and an active promoter of the volunteer corps after the Wairau incident and other 'Maori scares'. In 1845 Durie became captain of militia at Wellington. Grey enticed him into working for the Crown, and on 9 April 1846 Durie became Inspector of Police for the Southern District of New Ulster. Durie got busy with recruiting and drilling his men, some of whom were Maori. Durie and his constables were later to play an important part in the capture of Te Rauparaha. Grey formulated his plans for policing the Wellington region in the wake of military conquest. Hill analyses Grey's policing strategy as follows:

The first of the blue-jacketed Armed Police Forces established, Grey now declared his strategy for initiating an 'unvarnished policy of conquest'. Over winter the focus would be to secure and enforce British authority throughout that 'considerable tract of country' south of a line drawn between Upper Hutt and a new military barracks

115 Grey to Stanley, 22 April 1846, enclosure No 3, BPP (NZ) 5, 465-7.
116 Ibid.
117 Hill. op.cit., 243.
established at Paremata on Porirua Harbour. A total of 65 armed police would operate from 'civil establishments' on the border and southwards from it, their task being to 'to acquire information, to become acquainted with the Natives, their habits, cultivations, and roads, and more especially to watch over and provide for the safety of the Settlers in the neighbourhood of the Troops.'

2.9. **Ngati Tama leave the Hutt Valley (February 1846):** Grey's immediate objective was, by means of a show of force, to intimidate those Maori remaining in the Hutt Valley into leaving. In a letter written to Lord Stanley on 12 February Grey explained that "the strength of the force at my disposal, and the intelligence of the events which have recently occurred in the northern part of this island, will induce the natives to abandon the valley of the Hutt without offering any further action". In the case of Ngati Tama, at least, the strategy certainly worked. Taringa Kuri went to see Grey on 14 February and promised to withdraw from the Valley within a few days. The timing makes it clear that Ngati Tama left because of military intimidation, and not for any other reason. Grey reported to Stanley immediately:

> ...Taringa-kure [sic], one of the principal chiefs of those natives who have intruded into the valley of the Hutt, has just been with me, as a kind of deputation from the other chiefs of that district, and that upon my requiring him to name a specific day upon which the valley shall be evacuated by the natives; he has assured me that all those over whom he has any influence shall quit the land belonging to Europeans upon Tuesday or Wednesday next.

Taringa Kuri then asked Grey for compensation for the "crops, houses & c. which they must leave upon the land"; but Grey told him they were trespassers and declined to make any promises. As a concession he told Taringa Kuri that once the the land had been abandoned "I would receive any deputation of the chiefs, and hear any representations, which they might make to me". Taringa Kuri had to be happy with that, and Ngati Tama duly pulled out of the Valley as agreed, leaving behind them 300 acres of potatoes. By February 17 they had gone. To Grey it seemed that his strategy of intimidation had worked. Grey reported to Stanley that:

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118 Grey to Stanley, 12 February 1846, PP 1846/48, BPP(NZ) 5, 413.
119 Grey to Stanley, 14 February 1846, PP 1846/48, BPP (NZ) 5, 415.

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...although the question of the occupation of the valley of the Hutt by the natives has not been definitely concluded, it has, however, advanced so far that the whole of the fighting me, who were estimated at 300 in number, have, with the exception of about 20, abandoned the disputed land, and removed their families and properties from it; and as the great majority of the natives in this part of the island are decidedly opposed to any of the intruding natives continuing, as they have hitherto done, to set the laws at defiance, I have every hope that by to-morrow evening this troublesome and exciting question will have been set permanently at rest. Your Lordship may rely upon my omitting no measure of precaution which may suggest itself to me for the purpose of adjusting without bloodshed, a question which, from the most trifling beginning, has been allowed to grow into one of the last importance for the interests of these islands, and I certainly have very strong grounds for hoping that the affair can now be satisfactorily and finally adjusted, without the employment of force...

Perhaps the real significance of these events was that Taringa Kuri and Ngati Tama had reached a separate agreement with the Crown (separate, that is, from Te Rangihaeata and Kaparatehau).121 The Wellington settlers were delighted with Grey's apparent success. The New Zealand Spectator exulted:122

At length the intruding natives have left the district of the Hutt. They were peremptorily told to go away or they would be driven off, and being fully informed of the recent reverses of Heki [sic] and Kawiti, seeing also that resistance to the force brought against them was hopeless, and being convinced that the Government is now in earnest, they have abandoned the district without an effort and, as we are informed, have expressed their readiness to submit their claims to the arbitration of the Governor.

"No time should be lost", the Spectator opined, "in pulling down their Pa, so as to leave them no excuse for returning". The Spectator took this opportunity to contrast Grey's "decided course" with the weakness and vacillation of the Fitzroy regime. The Spectator also hit out at the

121 Ballara, "Te Rangihaeata", DNZB 1, 490; "Te Kaeaea", op.cit., 456: "By May 1846 Grey had successfully detached Te Kaeaea and Ngati Tama from Ngati Rangatahi. Their immediate needs were met with 300 acres at Kaiwharawhara and with monetary compensation for their crops. Te Kaeaea was got out of the way by sending him on a visit to Auckland."

122 New Zealand Spectator, Feb. 21 1846.
Wellington local government headed by Major Richmond, who was stigmatised as indecisive and much too pro-Maori.\(^{123}\)

2.10. **The West Coast chiefs write to Grey:** Meanwhile the West Coast chiefs had been trying to find out what Grey was up to. There must have been a meeting of all the chiefs at Ngati Toa’s Taupo pa, as it was from there that a letter was sent to Grey, signed by (amongst others) Te Rauparaha, Nohorua, Rawiri Puaha, Matene Te Whiwhi, and Tamihana Te Rauparaha of Ngati Toa, Wiremu Kingi and Riawai Te Ahu of Ngati Awa and Te Whatanui of Ngati Raukawa. (Te Rangihaeata, significantly, did not sign it.) The translation reads:\(^{124}\)

> Friend, the Governor,
>
> We salute you. We are now living in considerable uncertainty; we are living in considerable anxiety in reference to your intentions, as to what they really are; this was not the case formerly when our friend and guide Mr Hadfield was dwelling in the midst of us; we used to hear what your (the Government’s) intentions really were; then our minds were free from anxiety, and however frequently it may have been said to us by white persons, ”Your land will be forced from you, you will be destroyed,” or expressions of like character have been used, Mr Hadfield used at once to say, ”Regard not these expressions.” whereupon our irritable feelings became calmed. Therefore, our request to you now is, that you may be pleased to provide for us some friendly adviser who shall be able to understand both our customs and those of the white people, that he may constantly explain to us the laws of the Queen; we are anxious that the laws of the Queen should be firmly and permanently established among us; that by that means we may be raised to a more enlightened state, for we have already ministers of God teaching us the laws of God.

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\(^{123}\) See ibid. The *Spectator*, which can probably be taken to be fairly representative of settler opinion at Wellington, also complained incessantly about the allegedly favourable treatment Maori received from the government (some things never change, it seems); see ibid: "No time should be lost in bringing under the notice of His Excellency the great absurdity of some of the exceptional laws in favor of the natives. A glaring instance of it exists in our town...The Police Magistrate is strictly enforcing the provisions of the Raupo Ordinance, and a poor man, whose cottage is not merely detached, but at some distance from other buildings, is compelled, under a yearly penalty of £20, to expend money in altering his roof from thatch to shingle...but the native warres [sic], composed wholly of tohi tohi, reed, and other inflammable materials in the pahs of Pipitea, Kumu Toto and Te-aro, surrounded by our largest buildings and stores in three different parts of the town, are allowed to remain in their original state of filth and danger."

\(^{124}\) Te Rauparaha and others to Grey, 19 January 1846, PP 1846/48, BPP (NZ) 5. 416-17.
Grey advised Lord Stanley that the chiefs were in accord with his own strategy of universal application of British law, although his own report does suggest that Grey himself wondered whether he was only being told what he wanted to hear.\textsuperscript{125} This cannot now be determined. That the chiefs wanted to know what Grey's plans were, however, is not surprising. The arrival of the new governor with a massive military force would only naturally have given them reason for concern. The main thrust of the letter is in fact a request for an independent adviser to replace Hadfield, who had won Ngati Toa and Ngati Awa's trust as an independent and reliable counsellor.\textsuperscript{126}

2.11. God's laws and the law of the governor: Grey brought to his governorship a deep conviction that Maori and Pakeha should be ruled by the same law - British law. The chiefs of the three tribes seem, however, to have made the mistake of assuming that the law Grey was talking about, in Maori, "te Ture" (the Torah) was God's law, the law of the new Christian dispensation. Grey favoured a unitary state under secular British law; he may have been a committed Christian, but his vision for New Zealand was not directly linked with propagating the Gospel. But this seems to have been how the chiefs read his message: "we are anxious that the laws of the Queen should be firmly... established among us; that...we may be raised to a more enlightened state, for we have already ministers of God teaching us the laws of God." The link is made explicit in a subsequent letter sent by Wiremu Kingi and the Ngati Awa on 21 February. Here the assumption that the Queen's law and God's law were the same is manifest:\textsuperscript{127}

This is our deliberation. We have decided that the natives of the faith should hearken fully to the law of the Queen, which proceed from your mouth, from the Governor. Leave us below under the regulations of the Queen and yourself. Let a good regulation be commenced, that the faith may grow among us; that we may not profess faith in God, while we are reverting to error, because there is no one to use the scourge; that our race, the native people, may grow; and that we may forsake our evil customs,

\textsuperscript{125} Grey wrote to Stanley (Grey to Stanley, 17 February 1846, PP 1846/38, BPP (NZ), 5, 416) that "I have quite satisfied myself that this letter is entirely their own production, and that the idea of addressing it to me originated with themselves, and that it was written at a distant native village, where they were not in communication with Europeans. It, however, accorded so entirely with my own known and recorded views, that I entertained in the first instance some suspicion, that it might have been an artful piece of flattery, written with some ulterior object. Subsequent events, however, convinced me, that it was written in complete sincerity."

\textsuperscript{126} Hadfield was ill in Wellington at this time.

\textsuperscript{127} Wiremu Kingi et al to Grey, 21 February 1846, PP 1846/38, BPP (NZ), 5, 20.
great quarrels and little quarrels, such as taking away land, removing land-marks, robbery, murder, and very many other of our customs among ourselves. Now this is our consideration; it is for your good customs to beat down our evil customs, with the help of God, that the work left for us may be the cultivation of provisions for the life of the body, and the faith of Christ for the life of the soul. It is for you, and the ministers of God, to make these evil people grow (in good), that they may grow; then they will hearken to the truth, to the Queen, to the Governor, and to the minister.

The connexion between the law of God and the Crown's law could not be more explicit: "evil customs" are to be given up so that there may be cultivations for "the life of the body" and the Christian faith "for the life of the soul". The letter specifically equates "the truth, the Queen, the Governor, and the minister". Grey certainly wondered whether the chiefs were dissumulating and telling him what they knew he wanted to hear, but it is more likely, judging by the texts of the letters, that he and they were talking about different things. The chiefs had in mind enlightenment and an end to internecine discord through accepting the truths of Christianity; Grey was speaking the language of political and legal subjugation, to the sovereignty of the Crown and the universal application and enforcement of British law. This confusion of ideas and language seems to have persisted for some time, and may have been a factor in persuading younger Mihänere (Christian) chiefs such as Rawiri Puaha that selling land to the Crown contributed in some way to the establishment of peace and the furtherance of the Gospel. To the leaders of the tribes, Grey's language of the Law and his obviously coercive behaviour in the Hutt Valley must have seemed bewildering, a puzzling set of attitudes very difficult to decode (no wonder Te Rauparaha and the other chiefs felt they needed an independent adviser). It was Te Rangihaeata who saw through the rhetoric to the coercive assertion of sovereignty which lay behind it, and who determined to resist. It was Ngati Toa's tragedy to be divided at this critical moment.

2.12. Crown forces move into the Hutt Valley (February 1846): After Taringa Kuri and Ngati Tama had pulled out of the Hutt Valley, some of the settlers tried to move back to their farms, but found that they were opposed by Kaparatehau and others of Ngati Rangatahi. The Wellington Spectator described Ngati Rangatahi as originating from the Upper Wanganui, and named their leaders as Kaparatehau, "commonly called E Pare", E Horo, Te
Kohera, Te Arihi, Papa Ahuapa, Kore, Te Atuta, and Kakahereaa. They came, said The Spectator, from the upper Wanganui to Porirua, and were present with Ngati Toa at the battle of the Wairau. After the battle they "usurped land on the banks of the Hutt under Rangihaeata's sanction". The Spectator always saw Ngati Rangatahi as acting under the direction of Te Rangihaeata. The Ngati Rangatahi opposing the settlers were then joined by Taringa Kuri. On Monday February 23 Grey ordered St Hill, the Police Magistrate, to go to the Hutt Valley:

On Monday, Mr St. Hill, the Police Magistrate, went over to the Hutt district in obedience to the instructions of His Excellency, to put the settlers in possession of the land, but they were immediately driven back by the natives, and it was evident that an armed demonstration, and perhaps the employment of force would be absolutely necessary to compel these natives to submission.

Grey now quickly moved military forces into the Hutt Valley. According to Crawford, a British officer who wrote an interesting diary of his adventures:

Feby. 24th. The intruding natives refused to leave the Hutt. I walked up there. The Governor went up and had a parley they still refused to move. He returned to the stockade and ordered the troops to move up. They marched and occupied a potato ground. The artillery and a gun from the Castor was ordered up.

On 24 February Richard Taylor went to see Ngati Rangatahi and Kaparatehau, and managed to persuade them to leave the valley. They began to reluctantly do so. He describes the discussions as follows:

I found the soldiers in a large potato ground filled with stumps of trees and fallen timber. The place was surrounded by dense forest. I proceeded to the Natives the same

128 New Zealand Spectator, 28 February, 1846.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid: "a message was sent to Kaparatehau, the chief who has been acting under the directions of Rangihaeata"; there "can be little doubt that these natives are still acting at the secret instigation of Rangihaeata, who is artfully directing their operations, and while he keeps at a distance from the scene of action, is the prime mover and promoter of these disturbances".
131 Ibid.
132 Crawford Diaries, ATL Ms 1001: 5, 24 Feb 1846.
133 Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, p 351 of manuscript.
evening although it was late. I found from sixty to seventy in the forest about 1/4 of a mile in it. They had their sentinels as well as the soldiers and all had guns with them. The two principal chiefs were absent. I spoke to them for some time. They appeared very attentive and were much pleased with my going to see them, but said they claimed the land and would not leave without a compensation both for it and their crops which are considerable. It was pitch dark when I left. I promised to visit them in the morning and tell Paratehau and Te Oro to meet me there.

The next morning Taylor returned and met Kaparatehau:

This morning we left to return to the natives. We were with them before eight. Paratehau and Te Oro arrived. They were very attentive and again affirmed they had no desire to fight and if paid for their crops would leave. When I went to them Col. Hulme bid me say if they wanted food they should be allowed to come within the lines and dig up potatoes provided they came unarmed. They appeared to hesitate. I told them I would accompany them, when about twenty men, women and boys jumped up and followed me. On going out of the wood I met Te Karamu and another native. They were also going to make peace if possible. They had just come from the Governor who had arrived on the ground. I spoke to him. He said he would not give them anything until they had left, that if they left quietly abandoned the place he would take their case into consideration and would not suffer them to be losers. I returned bearing the message. They again stated, let a remuneration be given for their crops and they would immediately get up and leave. Tahana, Te Karamu and another earnestly exhorted them to go.

Grey, speaking through Taylor, then in effect threatened violence. A huge crowd of settlers also gathered. Taylor implored Ngati Rangatahi to leave, and, intimidated and isolated, they finally agreed to do so:

I went again to the Governor who said he had no new word but that they should have until noon given them to consider and then if they did not agree he would commence hostilities. Two guns had been got up during the night and a great number of all classes of the settlers had congregated. The Natives at my earnest solicitation at last agreed to go, and they rose up and left. I felt much rejoiced at their doing so and so did the Governor and officers, who knowing the difficulties of native warfare and the blood that must of necessity be shed, were glad to think such would be obviated by their peaceable departure.
As Ngati Rangatahi were leaving the soldiers and settlers then openly plundered the abandoned Maori homes and cultivations. Crawford found the soldiers at the Hutt "bivouacked in a potato field" and "men roasting potatoes in all directions". As the troops came up Taringa Kuri withdrew:

The Maoris immediately retired before the troops, and their numbers were rapidly thinned by the desertion of Taringa Kuri, and others who had no intention of offering any serious opposition, but who desired to try if the Government were in earnest.

Taylor was distressed to see Maori homes and plantations plundered and vandalised by some of the "low Europeans":

I was grieved as I and my native companions went along to notice the low Europeans plundering the native houses of everything they thought worth taking as well as their plantations. I also noticed with sorrow and shame that some of the worthless miscreants had been into the native chapel and overthrown the pulpit and violated even the sanctuary of the House of God.

The situation in late February-early March is described by Cowan:

On the 27th February some of the troops marched to the principal village occupied by the Maoris on the Hutt banks and destroyed it. The natives had abandoned their homes on the advance of the soldiers, and were camped in the forest above Makahinuku.

The behaviour of the British forces as they moved into the Hutt Valley in late February and by the soldier's and settlers during Ngati Rangatahi's partial withdrawal have been highlighted by Wards, who has based his account on Richard Taylor's diary, on the Wellington Spectator, and on correspondence between R.D. Hanson, the Crown Prosecutor, and Fitzroy. Significantly there is no mention of these events in the official correspondence reprinted in the British Parliamentary Papers. Wards describes what happened as follows:

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134 Crawford diary, Ms 1001:5, 26 Feb 1846.
135 Ibid.
136 Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, pp 350-51 of manuscript.
137 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 109.
138 Wards, Shadow, 245.
On 27 February, and as Grey kept such a tight rein on the actions of his military officers it can be presumed according to his instructions, the troops ransacked and burned the deserted Maori pas, a conflagration from which the looted chapel and the stake fences round the graves of the Maori dead did not escape. Apart from any other consideration, and there were many, the burial grounds of the Maoris had been specifically exempted from European occupation by Spain's award and Fitzroy's grant. In view of Kapratehau's promise, made verbally to Grey himself, to accept compensation, and his actual removal, this hasty and ill-considered act put Grey irrevocably in the wrong.

Ngati Rangatahi's departure, however, then seems to have been countermanded by Te Rangihaeata. On the evening of 26th February Taylor heard a rumour that "Rangihaeata had compelled the natives who had left the Hutt to return". Taylor reported this to Grey, who now saw no option but war - but who also felt sickened by what he now had to do:

I called upon the Governor to tell him that I feared Rangihaeata had compelled the Hutt natives to return. He appears very unwilling to shed blood although fearful it must be done and also disgusted with the position he is placed in with the settlers here. He remarked he was more like a bailiff turning the poor Natives from off their pretty little cultivations than a British Governor. He has written to Rangihaeata and so has Mr Hadfield. I am in hopes that restless and wicked chief will listen to them. May it please the Lord to constrain him to live in peace.

C. March-April 1846

2.13. Maori retaliation (lat Feb-March 1846): In late February-early March 1846 Maori forces made a counter-move against the Crown by plundering in turn a number of settler homes. In Grey's words:

One body of the natives who, in spite of the remonstrances of the Government, continued to occupy the Valley of the Hutt, came down from the wooded hills, and passing the troops in such a manner as to escape detection, suddenly plundered sixteen or seventeen houses of the settlers, and then suddenly again retreated to their fastnesses.

139 Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, ATL, pp 351 of manuscript.
140 Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, ATL, p 352 of manuscript.
141 Grey to Stanley, 8 March 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 457.
Significantly, in his official report of this affair to Lord Stanley, Grey gives no indication as to why "the natives" took this step, representing it as the action of "insurgents", but there can be no doubt that this plundering was in retaliation for the actions of the British forces and settlers at the end of February. The houses themselves were left undamaged, but the settlers were stripped of all their possessions, including stock. Nobody was killed or hurt severely (the *New Zealand Spectator* did claim that the plunderers had "in some cases committed acts of personal violence", but no details are given\(^\text{142}\)). The Hutt settlers then (in Cowan's words) "temporarily without means of livelihood, trudged into Wellington" where they had to be fed out of the public rations.\(^\text{143}\). The Reverend Richard Taylor again went to see Kaparatehau of Ngati Rangatahi on March 1, who had no qualms about admitting that he had indeed plundered the settlers and that he would continue doing so due to the injuries he had received at the hands of the Governor:\(^\text{144}\)

I met a number of persons driving away their pigs and carrying their poultry. On enquiry I found the natives had plundered nine families on the Waiwatu (Waiwhetu) and stripped their houses of everything. Soon after I met some of the parties who were in very low spirits and said they had lived peaceably amongst the natives for the last six years and it was only since the soldiers came that it had been the contrary...I proceeded to the bush where the Natives were encamped. Their advanced posts immediately they saw me ran to the main body crying out my name. I was received very kindly by them. I reproved Kaparatehau for his false dealing. He said he had not promised to go, the others had and then broken their word. I then told them of their having profaned the Sabbath in plundering houses. They denied having done so...They told me they had plundered and should continue to do so for the Governor had taken their lands, their crops, their pigs and poultry, that he had plundered their houses and then burnt them and to crown all had burned their church and the fences round the graves of their dead, that he was determined there should be no wakapono amongst them and he took me to the spot where they had reinterred them. They said the soldiers might fight with their dead if they liked (this is a Native custom in war). I told them the soldiers only fought with the living. I reasoned with them but although very civil they were determined not to resign their

\(^{142}\) *New Zealand Spectator*, Saturday, 7 March 1846.
\(^{143}\) Cowan, *NZ Wars*, 1, 102. Full details of those plundered are given in the *New Zealand Spectator*, ibid.
\(^{144}\) Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, ATL, p. 353-4 of manuscript (March 1 1846).
lands without a struggle. I told them my last words were to listen to the Governor and leave.

It certainly does seem that as far as Te Rangihaeata was concerned there was a fundamental issue at stake. He did not support Kaparatehau’s acts of plunder and in fact wrote "an angry letter" to him telling him to give the stolen items back.145 But, he said, in a "very civil" discussion he had with Richard Taylor, if the Governor declined to give some of the land in the Hutt to Ngati Rangatahi, all the tribes "as far as Taupo" would rise against the Crown.146 What was this fundamental issue? It may have had something to do with the plundering and destruction of Maori property, as Wards suggests, but it does seem that the real issue to Te Rangihaeata was the provision of land for Ngati Rangatahi. They were, of course, his and Ngati Toa’s clients, and he was obliged to support them, but that would not of itself explain why all the tribes "as far as Taupo" would feel obliged to take action. It seems most likely that the issue was forcible expulsion from cultivated land. If the Crown was allowed to get away with it in the Hutt there was no telling whose lands and cultivations might be next. That other tribes would become involved was not an empty threat. The Reverend Richard Taylor visited the Ngati Raukawa at Otaki and Ohau in early March. Crossing the Otaki River on 4 March he encountered a party of Maori on their way south to join Te Rangihaeata.147 He met a number of other such groups as he travelled north. While preaching near Ohau on 6th March Taylor was annoyed to "hear a large party of the young men singing one of their hakas or war dances"; they turned out to be a "party from Taupo on their way to Rangihaeata".148

2.14: Grey and Ngati Toa (March 1846): Grey thought it too dangerous to counterattack, and tried diplomacy instead. To block off the line of retreat of the Hutt "insurgents" Grey needed the support of at least some of the Ngati Toa chiefs at Porirua, and contacted Rawiri Puaha, a "Mihanere" chief living at Takapuwahia who seems to have been quite willing to help Grey. Grey explained his strategy to Lord Stanley as follows:

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145 Taylor, Journal, 2 March 1846, MS 254/04, ATL.
146 Ibid. See Appendix 1 for a full transcription.
147 Taylor, Journal, 4 March 1846, MS 254/04, ATL.
148 Ibid, 6 March 1846.
As only one line of retreat was left open to the insurgent natives, which was by a native path, leading through the wooded ranges until it debouched at the head of the harbour of Porirua, distant about eighteen miles from this place, I determined to adopt the plan of threatening to cut off their line of communication with their rear, at the same time that I prevented them from obtaining any supplies of food from the Hutt. I, therefore, at once put myself in communication with one of the friendly chiefs at Porirua, who entered fully into my plans, and upon receiving my communications on the subject addressed me the enclosed letter.

The letter Grey refers to, from Rawiri Puaha, deserves very careful analysis as an important Ngati Toa text dating from this crucial time, albeit one which has survived only in English translation.\footnote{Rawiri Puaha to Grey, 3rd March 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 457-8. Rawiri Puaha was subsequently instrumental in the sale of the Porirua and the Wairau blocks to the Crown in 1847. The Te Kanae manuscript states specifically that Grey "asked Rawiri Puaha and his people to sell Porirua to the Queen" and that subsequently "Sir George Grey asked Rawiri Puaha and his people to give over Wairau, the place where Wakefield and his comrades died, to the queen in compensation for her dead." (Te Kanae ms., Graham trans., typescript AILM, 17, 18). Along with Matene Te Whiwhi and Tamihana Te Rauparaha, Rawiri Puaha was one of the three signatories to the Wairau deed of 18 March 1847. Rawiri Puaha may be a classic example of a Mihanere chief who felt that the Governor's laws were the laws of Christianity and that there was a moral duty to sell land to the government. Puaha also led a Ngati Toa contingent to fight on the Crown's side in the campaign against Te Rangihaeata in July-August 1846 (see below).} (Grey's letters to Rawiri have not survived.) Rawiri Puaha's letter begins as follows:

Salutations to you - great is my regard for you. Friend, here is my arrangement with you. If we see the arrival of the property about which you wrote, it is right - we shall catch it; but as for this, perhaps we shall not see it - if we see it, we shall bruise them, Sir, and because they are causing evil upon the land, in order that you may turn upon us while they run away, that they may leave the suffering upon a different tribe.

"The property", it is safe to assume, is the plundered property taken as utu from the settlers' homes in the Hutt. Grey appears to have asked Rawiri Puaha to look out for the plundered property and attack the plundersers (but "perhaps we shall not see it", Rawiri sensibly points out). The rest of the sentence is garbled in the translation, but appears to mean that Rawiri Puaha will do his best to "bruise them" in order to prevent Grey from taking revenge against Ngati Toa: the plundersers have "caused evil" which could lead to Grey's turning "upon us [Ngati Toa] while they run away". This seems like, in fact, the response to a threat: to prove their loyalty, and escape
retaliation, Ngati Toa had to catch the plunderers and return the confiscated property: the alternative was an attack.

Rawiri Puaha went on to disavow any connections between Ngati Toa and the Hutt Valley insurgents:

Sir, be upon your guard with that people, the Wanganui; do not suppose we are one people (with them). No, they are our enemies - therefore I consider, What is to be done? What is to be done? But we will watch the entrance of the road - for there is no road over the mountains - no other egress - that they may be extinct.

It seems likely that Rawiri Puaha felt it necessary to disavow a connexion between the plunderers in the Hutt Valley and Ngati Toa because Grey had suggested, or implied, that there was a connexion. Rawiri continues:

Friend the Governor, there are two tribes, the Wanganui and the Ngatimaniapoto. They are all our enemies - the cause of their coming near this place is the faith, or rather on account of you, the Europeans; before, they would not have come down - they are a different people - we devoured them - they devoured us.

Rawiri's suggestion is that Ngati Maniapoto's [Ngati Rangatahi's] presence in the Hutt is in some way connected with the European presence at Wellington and with the Christian faith, a statement which is not easy to grasp. Contemporary testimony should not, however, be discarded just because it fails to fit easily into current preconceptions. Perhaps Rawiri means that the presence of Wellington drew the Wanganui-Maniapoto groups south so that they could trade with the new settlements and receive the benefits of the Gospel. Having expectantly moved into the Hutt Valley, well away from the territories of the three tribes, they then found themselves treated as belligerent interlopers to be driven out of the Valley by force.
3. War: the Hutt Valley and Porirua March-August 1846

3.1. Grey proclaims martial law (3rd March 1846): In early March Grey decided to place the whole of the Wellington district under martial law. The area placed under martial law included the whole area south of a line drawn across the island from Wainui (Paraparaumu) to Castlepoint.\(^{150}\) It seems likely that Grey did this because of doubts over the legality of driving Maori out of the Hutt Valley. However by his proclamation Grey also put Ngati Toa's villages on the West Coast under martial law as well, perhaps an indication of what his main target was. Cowan writes:\(^{151}\)

The troops remained inactive on the day of the principal raid (1st March), greatly to the indignation of the civilians. Then it became known that the Governor was undecided whether or not to proceed with hostile measures against the natives. He had been advised by the Crown law authority that he was acting illegally in evicting the Maoris, inasmuch as the grants issued by Governor Fitzroy after the purchase of the valley had excepted all native cultivations and homes. The legal adviser, further, was of the opinion that the natives were justified in resisting such eviction by force of arms.

Captain Grey, however, was not long influenced by this opinion. He quickly made up his mind to protect the settlers at all hazards, and on the 3rd March he issued a proclamation declaring the establishment of martial law in the Wellington District, bounded on the north by a line drawn from Wainui (near Pae-kakariki) on the west coast to Castle Point on the east.

The 'legal adviser' was Hanson, the Crown Prosecutor, who pointed out to Grey that martial law was illegal as the original grant had specifically excepted cultivations in the Hutt Valley. The Reverend Richard Taylor heard from a Mr Nixon that Wellington was in "great confusion",\(^{152}\) with several boatloads of outsettlers coming into town from the Hutt Valley, and that the Crown Solicitor, Mr Hanson

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\(^{150}\) Cowan, *NZ Wars*, 1, 102. The text of the proclamation is printed in the *New Zealand Spectator*, 7 March, 1846. One wonders whether the proclamation was translated into Maori and read to Ngati Toa. If so, then Ngati Toa may well have understood the proclamation as a declaration of war in much the same way as the Taranaki martial law proclamation of 1860 was so understood (my thanks to Greg White for this point.)

\(^{151}\) Cowan, *NZ Wars*, 1, 102.

\(^{152}\) Taylor, diary, Ms 254/04, ATL, 3 March 1846.
had just sent in a Protest declaring Martial law to be illegal up the Hutt that according to the grant made to the Company the very land in question was granted to the Natives. Strange to say none of the authorities had remembered the terms of the deed.

The same day (March 3) shots were fired in the Hutt Valley. A Maori group fired from the trees at a company of the 96th regiment at Boulcott's farm, two miles north of Fort Richmond. Te Rangihaeata could not have been present, as it is known that on March 3 he had a long conversation with Rev. Richard Taylor. He asked Taylor to write to Grey asking that if only some of the land in the Hutt Valley was set aside for Kaparatehau all would be well: this Taylor agreed to do. Taylor described this interview as follows:153

I had another long talk with Rangihaeata. He again wished me to write to the Governor that if he would give up a piece of the land to Kaparatehau all would be well as they did not wish to fight. I therefore did as he wished me. He called us a murdering people. I said ironically Yes his was the good Tribe. He retorted I was a murderer. I answered he was the good man, that we know the good tree by its fruit. I told him God would judge the murderer. He put out his tongue in blasphemous defiance. He said what did he care for God, that he was one himself, that the reason Kawiti was not conquered was that he was a God. This is a general belief, that great Chiefs are Gods, or rather demons. At last I left him.

Clearly Te Rangihaeata was well informed about the fighting in the North and did not accept the Crown's claims of military success at face value.

The firing at Boulcoutt's was returned, and when Grey heard of it more soldiers were moved from Wellington to Petone and the Hutt Valley. Te Rauparaha also took action, and sent instructions to the coastal tribes to meet him at Porirua.154 A few days later Te Rangihaeata and Te Rauparaha spoke to Grey's interpreters, although at whose initiative these discussions took place is not clear. They apparently informed Grey that "the enemy had entirely quitted their position upon the hills in the neighbourhood of the Hutt, and had retreated to the to the interior, with the intention of wholly abandoning the disputed lands."155 Grey went out to the Hutt Valley to look things over for himself. All was, as the Ngati Toa chiefs had said, "perfect

153 Ibid.
154 Taylor, Journal, MS 254/04, ATL, 6 March 1846 (see Appendix 1).
155 Grey to Stanley, March 11 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 458.
quiet”. By now the settler community at Wellington, initially enthusiastic about the new governor, had started to become disenchanted. Grey was stung by criticisms from some of the settler community for his indecision, and he was relieved to find, not far from the army positions, a massive (but abandoned) fortification big enough for a force of 300-400 men:156

Upon examining this position and the path through the forest which led to it, I felt much gratified that I had not uselessly thrown away the lives of those brave men who have already seen such hard service in this country, by directing that an attack should be made upon the enemy in this position, from which they certainly could not have been dislodged, whilst the loss upon our side must have been very great.

Why it had been abandoned is not clear. Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata seem to have been correct in their statement that Maori forces had withdrawn from the Hutt: they were clearly well-informed as to what was happening. Matters seem to have remained quiet for the rest of March. In late March and early April some settlers began to return.

3.2. The Gillespie murders and Ngati Toa (April 1846): Matters then took a much more serious turn on 2 April 1846 when a Lower Hutt settler named Andrew Gillespie and his young son were killed by a raiding-party led by Te Pau of Ngati Rangatahi.157 Gillespie was the first settler placed on the land from which Maori had been evicted in March,158 and his killing was clearly intended as a warning. The Gillespie murders were a decisive event, a turning-point, as Richard Taylor recognised when writing to Donald McLean on April 24:159

You will have heard of a man named Gillespie and his son having been murdered by some person connected with Mamaku, this has apparently brought things to a crisis. Rangiata [sic] has and party declared his intention of supporting the Hutt natives and has retired with them to some pa 4 miles inland from Porirua. Rawiri Puaha, the Otaki and Waikanae Natives have declared for the Governor and so things remain, no decided step has since been taken by either party...

156 Ibid.
157 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 102. Te Pau was later found dead in a fortification abandoned by Te Rangihaeata in the Horokiwi Valley: see Crawford diary, MS 1001:5, WATL: “Aug 24th. Heard of further retreat of Rangihiaiata [sic] and that Epau the murderer of Gillespie had been found dead in the evacuated pa.”
158 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 102.
159 Taylor to McLean, 24 April 1846, Ms-copy-Micro 535, ATL.
The Gillespie murders increased the level of tension in the area and led, perhaps not surprisingly, to increased ill-will towards Maori on the part of the Wellington settlers.\textsuperscript{160} Cowan says that the tragedy made Grey take immediate action, but, in fact, the person to take immediate action was Te Rauparaha. As soon as he learned of the Gillespie tragedy (the next day), Te Rauparaha, doing his best to minimise the risk of a collision with the Crown,\textsuperscript{161} wrote to Grey to tell him he had detained the murderers at Porirua and invited Grey to send a police unit to Porirua to take custody of them:\textsuperscript{162}

I have just heard - the bell has tolled. I have heard the Pakeha is killed - murdered clandestinely by a Wanganui native. I heard of it this evening, and chased him to catch him and tie him up - him the man who slew. The people are keeping guard lest he should run away. Friend, let the constables come to tie them, and carry them away there. Let not the Europeans be alarmed - let them come on without hesitation - here we are at Takapuahia waiting...

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\setcounter{enumi}{159}
\item As demonstrated in a letter of Octavius Hadfield, April 13 1846 (typecript, ATL):
Down here affairs are far from settled. Two whites were murdered by two natives here about ten days ago. The murderers are known but cannot be obtained as yet by the government from the party who refuse to surrender them. About 200 are now in arms, but as the government has a strong force here, and nine-tenths of the natives, with Te Rauparaha at their head are in favour of Government, I hope the question will soon be settled, though from want of a proper systematic way of proceeding the Government sadly confuse questions. A native was lately tried for robbery and sentenced to ten years transportation. Subsequently I discovered he was innocent and memorialised the Governor on the subject, and though the matter is not quite settled, I have no doubt...he...will be set at liberty. Six white witnesses swore positively to him and yet he has proved a clear alibi. You may easily imagine the state of feeling existing between the two races which could lead to such prejudice and blindness.

Diaries kept by the settlers show that the Gillespie murders and Te Rauparaha's offer to hand the murderers over to the government were well known. See e.g. Bradley diary (Bradley was a farmer and bootmaker), Ms 63, ATL, 4 April 1846:
A man named Gillispie [sic] & his son were found murdered with there faces very much cut out with a Tomahawke it is suspected by the natives the murder was committed Thursday evening. This morning the chief Te Rauphara [sic] sent a note to the governor stating that he had caught the two murderers & he was to send somebody for them but not soldiers accordingly about a dozen civilians went.

\item See Wards, \textit{Shadow}, 249: "Te Rauparaha repeated many times that the offenders were Wanganui natives, and was clearly anxious that the incident should not have local repercussions."

\item Te Rauparaha to Grey, 3rd April 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 461-2. In writing this letter Te Rauparaha, like Rawiri Puaha, stressed to Grey that the Whanganui people in the Hutt Valley were distinct from Ngati Toa: "Wanganui is one river - Kawhia another river; they are different people from ourselves." Te Rauparaha also took the opportunity to warn Grey about Taringa Kuri: "Sir, watch Taringa Kuri; let the soldiers watch him.
\end{enumerate}
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Te Rauparaha completed his letter with a warning about Taringa Kuri: "Sir, watch Taringa Kuri; let the soldiers watch him." Te Rauparaha's letter was taken to Grey by a settler. Grey then sent a party to Porirua to pick up the prisoners, led by Symonds and Servantes. When they arrived, however, they found that Te Pau and the other prisoners were no longer available for collection. In Grey's words:

On their arrival at Porirua they found that the party to which the murderers belonged had refused to allow these men to be given up to justice, and had retired towards the interior, with the intention of doing further mischief to the out-settlers; they also ascertained that Rangihaeata, the principal chief at Porirua, appeared determined to support all those who would rob and murder the Europeans; and although he had yet committed no overt act of hostility beyond refusing to permit cattle of any kind to be driven along the road which passes his village, his language and his demeanour are such as to cause just ground for apprehension.

There is no evidence that Te Rangihaeata ordered the Gillespie murders. But he was certainly not prepared to acquiesce in handing the Ngati Rangatahi perpetrators over to the Crown. Rangihaeata met the detachment himself, surrounded by armed men; and the encounter was far from friendly. Rangihaeata "exultingly pointed to one man, not only as the leader of the robbers, [i.e. of those who had plundered settler homes in the Hutt Valley in February] but as a man who had, a few weeks before, violated a European female there; and had then tauntingly asked, why they were not arrested." Grey was informed as to what had occurred.

Grey then decided to invade Porirua. A detachment of 300 men were sent round to Porirua by sea, and Grey himself went there on the Driver. Ngati Toa thus suddenly found themselves with three warships, including a steamer, 300 soldiers and Governor Grey in their midst. Not surprisingly there was, writes Grey, much "alarm of my taking an indiscriminate

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163 Grey to Stanley, 7 April 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 459.
164 Ibid. Again, Grey drapes what is purportedly a straightforward narrative description with highly tendentious phraseology: "the murderers"; "doing mischief to the out-settlers"; "all those who would rob and murder". There is no evidence that Te Rangihaeata countenanced the Gillespie murders.
165 This remark of Grey's aside, there is no evidence that prior to the Gillespie murders any physical harm was done to any of the Hutt Valley settlers. It would be interesting to what the Maori word was for the conduct rendered by Grey as "violated".
166 Ibid.
revenge for the murders". By the time Grey arrived Te Rangihaeata and his supporters had gone. Te Rauparaha went on board the ship to discuss the situation with Grey. He told Grey that about 180 men were determined to support "the murderers" but that the rest of the coastal tribes wanted to see them handed over to the Crown and had taken steps to prevent their escape. Te Rangihaeata himself had left a (presumably sarcastic) message for the Governor "that I could, if I chose, take his defences and his houses, as he had left them for me". Te Rauparaha also suggested that Grey write to Te Rangihaeata to reassure him that while the two murderers had to be handed over to the Crown forces, "I had no intention of injuring those who conducted themselves properly". Grey wrote the letters as suggested, and Te Rauparaha undertook to deliver them to Te Rangihaeata (indicating, if nothing else, that Te Rauparaha must have known where Te Rangihaeata and his force was).

3.3. Ngati Toa's stance: Interpreting Te Rauparaha's stance, Te Rangihaeata's, and the position of Ngati Toa as a whole are obviously key questions, but it is very difficult to be certain. Certainly Mihanere chiefs like Rawiri Puaha tried to distance Ngati Toa from the events in the Hutt Valley. Some sections of the Ngati Toa leadership close to Te Rauparaha were keen to develop their links with the Anglican Church and take advantage of the educational opportunities it offered. In February 1846 Tamihana Te Rauparaha, Te Rauparaha's son, and Matene Te Whiwhi, his son-in-law, with their wives and children, left Wellington for Auckland to be educated at the Bishop's School, an arrangement which may have been mediated to some extent by Grey. In this, both Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata acquiesced. Te Rauparaha's behaviour generally seems consistent with a genuine desire to prevent the situation from escalating. Octavius Hadfield thought that "nine-tenths of the natives, with Te Rauparaha at their head, are in favour of Government". Most historians tend to see Te Rauparaha as a force for moderation - which is not quite the same thing as being "in

167 Ibid.
168 According to Ballara, Te Rangihaeata left because "he had heard rumours that the governor was coming to hang him for the Wairau affair": see Ballara, "Te Rangihaeata", *DNZB* 1, 490.
169 Ibid.
170 See *The New Zealand Spectator*, 21 February 1846: "Thompson (Rauparaha's son) and his wife, and Martin, his wife (Rauparaha's daughter), and three children, proceed to Auckland by the *Victoria*, to be educated in the Bishop's school. Rauparaha and Rangihaeata, it is said, are peaceably disposed."
171 Hadfield letter, 13 April 1846, typescript ATL.
favour of Government”. Burns is convinced that Te Rauparaha was genuinely trying to be helpful. 172 Wards sees a consistency in Te Rauparaha’s stance: he preferred peace, but did not want an open breach with Te Rangihaeata: 173

Te Rauparaha was following a line that was consistent with his behaviour during the protracted negotiations of the previous year, that his preference was for all to live in peace, that he would use the influence he had to this end, but that the final solution lay with Te Rangihaeata whom he would not encourage, but whom he would not himself directly oppose.

Grey, however, did not trust Te Rauparaha at all. He was annoyed to find out that some of Te Rauparaha’s party who came on board the Driver were the same men who were pointed out by Te Rangihaeata as the "plunderers" of the Hutt (which could well mean that some of them were Ngati Toa). It seems certain that Ngati Toa were split, and that something had caused Te Rangihaeata to throw caution to the winds and to oppose the Crown militarily; Te Rauparaha was trying to seek some accommodation and to prevent the situation from escalating. He was nevertheless certainly anxious about and exasperated by the colonial regime's apparently insatiable appetite for land, as shown in a speech he made at Otaki in a meeting with Spain in July 1844: 174

Te Rauparaha then spoke, saying yes Mr Spain that may be your disposition toward us, but Government may look at it in another light if so send me word like a gentleman that I may prepare I'll not run away lets have a battle for it. If you beat us you shall have the country and we will be your Servints but don't think you will get it without a struggle, you got Port Nicholson, Nelson (Wakatu), Blind Bay (Taitapu), Q.C. Sound (Arapaowa), Wairarapa, Mana, Porirua, Kapiti and many other places that I conquered with my own hands. Wairau I wanted to keep for myself. You are still pursuing me. What do I see, the Queens Vessle bringing men with guns and chains to take me. Shooting my children and Brother and for what, because I have burnt some wood and grass that was my own and you are not satisfied you still pursue me...If Government persists in pursuing me let me know and I will go with a thousand men and meet you at Port Nicholson.

172 Burns, Te Rauparaha, 269.
173 Wards, Shadow, 251.
174 Edward Meurant, Diary and Letters, ATL MS 1635, typescript, unpaginated, 3 July 1844.
There were, as noted, younger, missionary chiefs at Porirua who saw the Governor as representing the truths of the Christian faith, and Ngati Toa may have split into a conservative, anti-government party led by Te Rangihaeata, and a radical, pro-government party led by the Christian chiefs, with Te Rauparaha somewhere in the middle. This division may have been on kin group lines as well. It is certainly possible that Te Rauparaha was dissimulating, as Grey thought likely, or that Te Rangihaeata and Te Rauparaha had agreed that the safest course was to simultaneously go along with the governor's wishes, or at least try to mollify him, while also preserving some military force in reserve. Te Rangihaeata may also have feared that Grey was coming to arrest him for his role in the aftermath of the Wairau in 1843.175 Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata faced an unprecedented situation - a new and unpredictable governor, and a massive display of military force on a scale not seen before. The northern war had resulted in victory for the Crown, as everyone knew; and caution was necessary.

Te Rangihaeata, as already noted, seems to have been regarded as having particular interests in the Hutt Valley. He was quite willing to share the valley with the settlers. According to the *New Zealand Spectator* :176

We are informed from very good authority that Rangihaeata is still at Porirua, and is in communication with the intruders at the Hutt. He says that he is not desirous of fighting, and wants to have peace, but he considers that a division should be made of the land, and the boundaries distinctly marked, and if the maories trespass in the future, that they should be punished. He threatens that if hostilities commence in the Hutt, he will immediately join the intruding natives. Rauparaha is at Otaki, and disavows any part in these proceedings, and has sent to Rangihaeata informing him that if he does join these natives in their opposition to the Governor's authority, he does so at his own peril. but Rangihaeata has treated the message with contempt.

The Te Kanae manuscript, the most important Ngati Toa written analysis of these events,177 written about 40 years later, takes the stance that

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175 Ballara, "Te Rangihaeata", *DNZB* 1, 490.
176 *New Zealand Spectator* (Wellington), 28 February 1846.
177 This manuscript was written in 1888 in Maori by Wiremu Neera Te Kanae of Ngati Toa for Hane Te Rau (Jane Brown), one of Te Rau o te Rangi's daughters and Sir Maui Pomare's aunt. In this report the translation relied on is the typescript translation made by George Graham dated 20 April 1948 held in the AML.
Ngati Toa as such were not involved in the events in the Hutt Valley, and that only Te Rangihaeata "remained alert" because of "his killing the Europeans at Wairau".178 (This Ngati Toa source thus strengthens the possibility that a main reason for Te Rangihaeata's refusal to meet Grey at Porirua was because he was worried Grey planned to arrest him in retaliation for the Wairau.) This action set him apart, as it were; he went to live at Pauatahanui and was then chosen by the Hutt Valley tribes as their leader. Rawiri Puaha and Te Rauparaha, as seen, themselves wrote to Grey disavowing any involvement in the events in the Hutt Valley. Against this, however, there is other evidence which points to a much more substantial involvement than merely providing an able leader in the form of Te Rangihaeata. For example, Grey himself was far from certain as to Ngati Toa's stance:179

When, after the departure of Rauperaha from the vessel, I was made aware of these circumstances, I felt compelled either to doubt the sincerity of Rauperaha and his followers, or to conclude that those natives inhabiting Porirua (Rauperaha's own place is Otaki, about 35 miles to the north of Porirua), who were well disposed towards the Government, were so weak in numbers as to be held virtually under the control of Rangihaeata and his party.

As Grey saw things, either he was being misled by Te Rauparaha or, in fact, Rangihaeata was supported by a substantial "party" at Porirua. Grey also was convinced that the "plunderers" in the Hutt Valley had substantial backing at Porirua and always had the option of retreating there. The New Zealand Spectator claimed in March 1846 that "settlers who have recently visited Porirua have recognized among the natives there, some of the rebels who

178 Ibid, 17. The relevant passage is as follows: "In 1845, there broke out a dispute between the Maori and the Europeans at Heretaunga, at Port Nicholson. The Maori tribes concerned in that conflict were Whanganui and Ngati Rangatahi. Ngati Toa did not interfere in this trouble. Te Rauperaha and his tribe quietly remained here at Porirua. One of the chiefs of Ngati Toa remained alert in those days, this was Te Rangihaeata alone. The reason why he continued on guard was because of his killing the Europeans at Wairau. He remained aloof among the Ngati Toa. They and some other people went to Pauatahanui. When the people who were engaged in fighting at Heretaunga knew that Te Rangihaeata was living isolated at Pauatahanui, those tribes came to him as their leader." But there are difficulties with accepting this at face value. As noted in the text, Grey was convinced that the "troublemakers" in the Hutt received ample support and assistance from Porirua. As also noted, it seems very unlikely that Ngati Rangatahi could have issued a military challenge to the Crown on the scale of the forces employed at Boulcott on their own. It is also clear that when Te Rangihaeata withdrew from Porirua to Motukaraka and then to Pauatahanui he did so with the support of a substantial section of Ngati Toa.

179 Grey to Stanley, 7 April 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 459.
have recently been driven from the Hutt". Elsdon Best believed that Te Rangihaeata sent parties from Porirua to "harass the settlers" in the Hutt. It was primarily for this reason that he decided to neutralise what he saw as the threat from Porirua by building a fort there and establishing a permanent military garrison. Nor was Grey the only one who was uncertain as to Te Rauparaha's stance. Richard Taylor, writing in his journal in early March, "thought that there can be little doubt that crafty chief is playing false with the Europeans." But as noted above, to convince Grey and Taylor that he was not "playing false" would probably have acquired active military aid against Te Rangihaeata and thus a civil war within Ngati Toa. This was to ask too much.

Ngati Toa seem to have split on very traditional lines, the same divisions that had occurred at the time of Haowhenua and Kuititanga, reflecting Ngati Toa's deep-seated structural ambivalence with many being most closely linked to Ngati Mutunga, Ngati Awa and Ngati Tama but with a key faction of the leadership with very close kin links to Ngati Raukawa. Those of Ngati Toa with kin linkages to Ngati Awa and Ngati Mutunga tended to lean towards the government, perceived, perhaps, by some as a kind of tribal ally of Ngati Awa. Although the transforming effect of the Crown's military escalation of early 1846 is critical to grasping the events of this time, older patterns of fissure and conflict continued to be relevant. The tribes of the region were deeply divided (indeed Elsdon Best believed that had they been able to combine they could easily "have wiped Wellington off the map, and left but the smoking ruins thereof" but there is no evidence that either Te Rauparaha or Te Rangihaeata had any such intention.) In some respects the campaigns of 1846 were a revival of the Ngati Toa-Ngati Awa-Ngati Raukawa conflicts of the 1830. Te Rangihaeata received considerable support not only from the Wanganui and Taupo tribes, who were kin of Ngati Rangatahi, but from his own Ngati Raukawa kin at Otaki and Ohau. He also, according to Best, sent for aid to Tiakatai, a leading rangatira in the Hawke's Bay region, but this was unsuccessful. By March Te Rangihaeata had been joined by "several Natives from D'Urville's

180 New Zealand Spectator, March 21 1846.
181 Best, Porirua and they who settled it, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p.
182 Best, Porirua and they who settled it, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p.
183 Taylor, diary, MS 254/04, WATL, 6 March 1846 (see Appendix 1).
184 Best, Porirua and they who settled it, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p.
Island, Queen Charlotte's Sound, and other parts of the straits".  Those from D'Urville (Rangitoto) would have been Ngati Koata, one of the three main divisions of Ngati Toa. The settler community at Wellington was quite aware of the tensions between the tribes and although Ngati Awa's offer of military assistance was certainly welcome there was some concern that it would lead to Ngati Raukawa involvement on the side of Te Rangihaeata. The *New Zealand Spectator* noted on June 3:

> [T]he very alliance now formed with the friendly tribes of the Ngatiawas, however much we approve of it on principle may be turned to our disadvantage; for the emissaries of Rangihaeata will not fail to profit by the time lost by present delay, to revive the old jealousies and feuds existing between these tribes and the Ngatiraukawas, so as to obtain the active assistance of the latter tribes; and if those who have the conduct of affairs profess themselves unable with the force at their command unable to quell the rebellion when there are only two hundred men opposed to them, what will be their position if Rangihaeata should succeed in obtaining a reinforcement from these tribes of from six to eight hundred men?

While it certainly does seem as if there was some kind of split or division in Ngati Toa, it also is important not to over-emphasise it. The leader of the pro-government party was Rawiri Puaha, who led a section of Ngati Toa against Te Rangihaeata at Pauatahanui and Horokiwi in 1846. Puaha was nevertheless very careful not to kill kinsmen on the opposite side, and a number of Crown officers - as well as Ngati Awa - were far from certain exactly whose side Rawiri Puaha was on.  

Ngati Raukawa were, like Ngati Toa, themselves divided into pro- and anti-government groups, the former connected with the Anglican chiefs. At Ohau Richard Taylor, who had met a number of Raukawa parties heading south to join Rangihaeata in March, heard while staying at Ohau that a large Raukawa party intended to join Rangihaeata, and he worked closely with Christian chiefs trying to prevent them from doing so. Taylor took part in a substantial debate between the war and peace parties, which he describes in his diary:

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185 *New Zealand Spectator*, March 21 1846.
186 See the discussion in Wards, *Shadow*, 284-5.
187 Taylor diary, 9 March 1846, Ms 254/04, ATL. Taylor described the same event in a letter to Donald McLean on April 3: see Taylor to McLean, 3 April 1846, MS-Copy-Micro 535 WATL: "I held a large meeting at Manawatu on my Return from Wellington which was attended by all the chiefs of that river, the occasion of its being held was that one of their chiefs was going to join Rangihaeata with 30 of his followers, and after a great many
Immediately after Prayers this morning we held a Council with all the Natives on the subject of the present war with the Europeans. The principal chiefs made some long and excellent speeches. One old man named Paora said if they went they must leave their books behind and give up their Ministers and return to their former evil courses, but said we have forsaken them because we know them to be bad, therefore now having turned to the living God we must remain firm in his service. One chief named Puke made a very long and excellent speech in a very droll and sarcastic tone he alluded to all the reasons urged by the advocates for War and refuted them.... Ihakara a teacher and chief made a very good speech after I had addressed them. He said don't forget this meeting and the day it was held the 9th of March. It is a great meeting and must not be forgotten. He was afraid many had double hearts though they all asserted that there was a Judas amongst them as there was a Judas amongst the Apostles. One only of the opposite party briefly addressed the meeting. He seemed afraid to avow his desire of War. I was much pleased with this meeting as I cannot but think it will have a very beneficial effect on the Natives of this part. They will say as Christians it was their duty to listen to their Ministers and they were determined to do so. I shook hands with some of the speakers and especially with Puke and told him his speech was a very good one, another said and was not mine a good one, and so on with them all. It appears now that my being not able to administer the sacrament service was ordered by a higher power for good. Had it been administered the week before as was my intention then this week's meeting would not have been held and many would have gone to the seat of War. I have also noticed that whenever the holy sacraments have been administered they are attended with a perceptible benefit to the recipients in confirming their faith and strengthening their good resolutions.

One sees again the readiness of Christian chiefs to accept that the Governor was on the side of Christianity and the Gospel; that those who took up arms in support of Te Rangihaeata would have to leave "their books (Bibles) and their Ministers behind". This is an impression that Taylor certainly took no steps to dispel. Taylor was perhaps too ready to assume that the "Christian" party had carried the day. By early June the New Zealand Spectator was reporting that the "rebels" in the Hutt Valley had "received a considerable accession to their numbers from the heathen natives of the Ngatiraukawas dwelling at Otaki".188

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188 New Zealand Spectator, 3 June 1846.
To make sense of it all is no easy matter. My impression is that there was an actively Christian and pro-Governor party within Ngati Toa led by Rawiri Te Puaha, and another section which adhered to the broad anti-Government coalition that Te Rangihaeata was trying to establish. Te Rauparaha was sympathetic to both camps. Te Rangihaeata did not, however, wish to wipe Wellington off the map or drive the settlers into the sea; he was in fact quite willing to share the Hutt Valley. Although a few settlers were killed (and there is no evidence that Te Rangihaeata was involved in these killings, or approved of them), the level of violence was in fact quite minimal and seems to have been carefully controlled. Both Te Rangihaeata and Te Rauparaha were capable of great ruthlessness on occasion, but the campaigns were not waged ruthlessly. There were no attacks on Wellington itself. Precisely three settlers were killed, perhaps with the object of serving as a warning. The main attack at Boulcott was on an advanced army post far up the Hutt Valley and well to the north of the disputed boundary line at Rotokakahi. Elsdon Best, writing in the early twentieth century, was surprised by the strangely low-key and restricted Maori response but typically explained the limited level of violence as due to Maori lack of energy, an explanation which is not very plausible.\textsuperscript{189}

3.4. Te Rangihaeata moves from Taupo: It seems that immediately before Grey's arrival Te Rangihaeata and his supporters moved from Taupo pa, first to a new fortified place at Motukaraka on the northern side of the Pauatahanui arm of the harbour, and then to Pauatahanui itself. The fortifications built at Motukaraka were still visible in the early twentieth century. Others remained behind at Taupo. Elsdon Best describes the situation, based on Ngati Toa testimony, as follows:\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{189} Best, \textit{Porirua and they who settled it}, typescript, copy at Porirua museum library, p. 56: "Considering the bitter hatred that this man [Te Rangihaeata] entertained towards the Europeans, it is astonishing that he did not do more damage. Had he and his hostiles been more energetic they could have stayed the settlement of the Hutt and the Old Porirua Road for some time, nor was there, apparently, anything to prevent them making a night raid on Wellington and practically desolating the district. The country was covered with forest at the time, a forest in which the Imperial troops would have been helpless, but an ordinary thoroughfare to Natives. We may may be thankful that these hostiles made so few attacks none of which were followed up, and that so few of our settlers were murdered, for some of the out settlers at the Hutt seemed to have displayed much want of caution, more so than those of the vicinity of Johnson's clearing on the Porirua road." Best's explanation of "lack of energy" is simply not credible. Although Te Rangihaeata is repeatedly seen in very negative terms by settlers and officials (one of the few who seem to have friendly and amicable discussions with him was Richard Taylor) the actual level of violence was fairly controlled and moderate.

\textsuperscript{190} Best, \textit{Porirua and they who settled it}, n.d., copy in Porirua museum library, p. 54.
An old Native of the Ngati-Toa tribe explained to the writer that when the Natives under Te Rangihaeata resolved to make a stand against the whites, they evacuated the Taupo pa at Plimmerton and moved to Motukaraka, on the northern shore of the north-east arm of the harbour, where they erected a fortified place...All of the Taupo folk did not so move, some remained at Taupo; apparently Rawiri Te Puaha's party did so. In after days the irreconcilables of Motukaraka came to the conclusion that the position was an undesirable one, hence they deserted it, and moved up the Pauatahanui stream, where they built a pa on the spur near, and just above, the bridge, which was named Matai-taua, a most appropriate name for any fortified position.

The elaborate fortification of Motukaraka and then of Pauatahanui show decisively that Te Rangihaeata was not at all merely an isolated Ngati Toa leader at the head of a group of Ngati Rangatahi. The fortifications built in 1846 point to large-scale resistance in which a substantial section of Ngati Toa living formerly at Taupo were involved. Major Last inspected the fortifications at Pauatahanui on 2 August, and was impressed with what he saw (although he also observed that the place could have been attacked by artillery placed on a nearby hill):191

On examining the pah, I found it to be built on a very strong position, having a double row of timber palisades, with trenches and traverses across; about 80 paces long and 85 broad; in the shape of a parallelogram, with flanking defences... There was also a bank of earth thrown upon the scarp side of the trenches, which, owing to the heavy rain, were full of water. The position altogether is a very strong one, and would have been almost impregnable without artillery; but a hill, about 500 yard distant, opposite the front face, commanded it completely. Therefore, had the enemy remained, we might soon have dislodged them with our guns...

3.5. Grey decides on confiscation and military occupation: Grey's letters to Te Rangihaeata and the anti-government chiefs were an embarrassing failure:192

This morning about eight o'clock Rauperaha returned on board, bringing messages from the chiefs, who had been using their influence to protect the murderers, that they

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191 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501.
192 Ibid.
would not interfere to have them taken up; in fact, their replies were simple evasions. Rauperaha at the same time stated, that no hope whatever existed of surprising these men by a sudden movement, unless a very large force was brought together in order to surround them, and that at present it was quite useless to make such an attempt, as he had no knowledge where the main body was.

Grey then announced to Te Rauparaha his plan to confiscate the land of the "rebels":\(^{193}\)

I then stated to Rauperaha my intention of taking possession of all those portions of the Porirua district which belonged to, or were claimed by, the disaffected natives; and I further informed him that I should hold the most important point in this district by a military force.

(In fact, of course, there was no "confiscation" as such, as Grey's arrest of Te Rauparaha and the Porirua deed of 1847 made confiscation unnecessary.) As Grey is referring to land at Porirua, it is clear that by this time he had formed the clear impression that a substantial number of Ngati Toa were "rebels" who merited punishment by confiscation. It is possible that there is a connection between Grey's outburst on this occasion and the sale of the Porirua block to the Crown the following year when Te Rauparaha was in custody.

3.6. The Porirua Road and the Parema Barracks: Grey wanted a permanent military base near Porirua. Te Rauparaha showed him the most strategically suitable site for a fort, on the northern side of the Pauatahanui arm of the Porirua harbour.\(^{194}\) Grey believed, or claimed to believe, that not only Te Rauparaha himself, "but the other natives at the point where we landed, expressed their satisfaction at my determination to occupy the district of Porirua".\(^{195}\) What the other communities of the area thought about it is not known, and perhaps the implications of a British army base near Porirua were not completely clear to all local Maori. On 8 April Grey directed Lt-Col Hulme, in command of the British forces in New Zealand, to establish a permanent base of 220 men with "a small detachment of artillery" to be based north of Porirua. Grey also prepared a separate memorandum for the benefit of the officer commanding the base. Here Grey

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193 Ibid.
194 The ruins of the fort can, of course, still be seen in the Ngatitoa Domain at Mana.
195 Grey to Stanley, 7 April 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 459.
makes it clear that in his view the focal point for Maori resistance to the Crown in the Wellington region had been at Porirua: 196

The boat-harbour of Porirua has, for some years past, been the point at which those natives who were inclined to be troublesome to the settlers and to commit depredations have assembled. It afforded a harbour for their canoes, and a point from which they could penetrate to the rear of the settlements at Port Nicholson and on the Hutt. Lately it has been the point to which all those natives who have been concerned in the murder and robbery of the Europeans have retreated, and where they have met with a friendly reception from the natives inhabiting that vicinity.

Then there was the strategic importance of the harbour crossing:

Porirua is also the point by which all the persons coming from the northern settlements to Port Nicholson must pass, in order to cross the ferry over that river. The natives have recently, in the most vexatious manner, refused to permit either Europeans or natives to pass cattle of any kind over the ferry.

Grey also took steps to construct a road across the Wellington isthmus from Port Nicholson to Porirua. On April 21 he wrote to Lieut-Col. Hulme to require military assistance in constructing the road; this was a military project, and the construction was to be supervised by Captain Russell of the 58th regiment. 197 The next day Grey, just before he left for Auckland, wrote to Te Rauparaha about the planned road: 198

My friend Te Rauparaha, I am about to proceed in the Steamer to Auckland, as I have much to do there, but I shall return here again as soon as I can. In order that those Natives who have separated themselves from those men who have committed murders and crimes of so disgraceful a character may feel the advantages of their good conduct I have directed that twenty of them should be offered employment under the Government in examining and making roads. Will you recommend to Major Richmond twenty deserving young men, they shall be paid well for their services. I have left a large force here, and will send more men if they are required. I will be very kind to your children in Auckland, I will make them write to you and send you some present. Do you hold fast to the good part which you have taken up, and let your

196 Grey, Memorandum, 8 April 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 462.
197 Grey to Hulme, 21 April 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 465.
198 Grey to Te Rauparaha. 22 April 1846, Grey's letterbook, NZMS 227, APL (copy in Burns papers, ATL).
character now stand forth in its true light. Let all men see that the New Zealanders are good men and incapable of approving such horrible crimes as have been committed in defiance of the laws of God and Man. Do you still strive to make your countrymen redeem their character by giving up voluntarily those Murderers instead of by protecting them, implicating them in themselves in their crimes and in the dreadful punishment which will certainly at last overtake them.

Grey's letter, threatening "dreadful punishment" for those continuing to protect the Hutt Valley "murderers" was probably largely directed at Te Rangihaeata. Having thus, as he thought, settled matters at Wellington for the time being, Grey left Wellington for Auckland on April 22nd, arriving at Government House on the 26th. Taringa Kuri went to Auckland with him.199

Russell, working through Servantes, then contacted Te Rauparaha and sought volunteers for the road construction work. There was no shortage of volunteers, and a number of men of the Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa tribes, most of them either relatives or slaves of Te Rauparaha himself, were soon working on the road on the government payroll. Russell placed Hoani Te Akoro, Te Rauparaha's nephew, in charge of the group of Maori labourers. In a report to Grey sent in mid 1846 Russell wrote favourably of their skills and commitment, especially in bush clearing, and stressed too their value in giving an added sense of security: "the presence of Rauparaha's men working in conjunction with our own is of itself security against interruption".200 When, however, Russell asked these men to build a stockade at Porirua itself, Te Rauparaha intervened and warned that Te Rangihaeata might revenge himself on their families: "Rauparaha objected on the ground that Rangihaeata would attack and kill their wives". The men stopped work for a few hours to consider this, but then resumed building the stockade; the next day Te Rauparaha withdrew his opposition.

3.7. Boulcott Farm (16 May 1846): Grey had hoped that he left affairs at Wellington more or less settled, but this was not the case. For a few weeks everything seemed tranquil enough. On May 10 Grey reported to Stanley that he had received letters from the civil and military authorities at Wellington "reporting that all is going on there in a very satisfactory manner."201 Although there is nothing in the official records to indicate

199 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 105.
200 Russell to Grey, 8 June 1846, BPP(NZ), 485-6.
201 Grey to Stanley, 10 May 1846, BPP (NZ), 468. On the period between Grey's leaving
that an attack in the Hutt was suspected, it nevertheless appears that such an attack was widely feared by the settlers as there had been a number of warnings, including one by Te Rauparaha himself. A naval party near Te Rangihiaeta's pa at Pauatahanui had also been fired on, demonstrating once again the interconnections between events in the Hutt Valley and the West Coast. Then, just a few days before the actual attack (according to a story told by Tungia of Ngati Toa to Dr Maui Pomare), Te Rangihiaeta or Te Mamaku sent a scout to the Tinakori range overlooking the town: here he lit a large fire. This gave the impression that the town was about to be attacked, and some of the forces from the Hutt Valley were brought back into Wellington, which is where many of them were when the main attack in the Hutt came on May 16.

The attack was made against a British regular army force of fifty men of the 58th regiment commanded by Lieutenant G.H. Page stationed at Boulcott's farm in the Hutt Valley. This was the most advanced post of the regular forces, although there was a small force of the Hutt militia further up the valley at Taita. The attackers were led by Topine Te Mamaku of Ngati-Haua-te-Rangi (Upper Wanganui) and (possibly) by Te Puni's warning and offers of help were disregarded, and even a word of caution from Rauparaha did not seem to stir the Superintendent from his indifference. The Governor was now absent at Auckland (the troublesome Taringa Kuri had gone with him in the "Driver"). Rauparaha, in a letter received in Wellington some days before the attack, stated that when Major Richmond and Major Last were at Porirua during the previous week he said to them, in bidding them to be on their guard against a sudden attack, "Kei Heretaunga te hui ki ai; kia mohio; huhiuia atu nga Pakeha" ("At Heretaunga the assault will be made. Be wary; concentrate the white men").

for Auckland and the fight at Boulcott's farm on 16 May see Wards, Shadow, 168. Wards notes here that while the Spectator printed a number of stories about warnings - including a warning from Te Rauparaha himself - of an imminent Maori attack on British forces in the Hutt Valley "there is nothing in the official sources to support these reports". Cowan, however, believes that the possibility of an attack was well-known (NZ Wars, 1, 104-5).

See Cowan, ibid:
During the week preceding this attack a general opinion was entertained at the Hutt that some sudden movement was contemplated by Rangihiaeta. A naval reconnoitring-party had been fired upon by the hostiles at Paua-taha-nui, and the failure of the authorities to retaliate had, as it proved, emboldened Rangihiaeta and his fellow-warriors to launch one of those lightning blows in which the Maori bush fighter delighted. Te Puni's warning and offers of help were disregarded, and even a word of caution from Rauparaha did not seem to stir the Superintendent from his indifference. The Governor was now absent at Auckland (the troublesome Taringa Kuri had gone with him in the "Driver"). Rauparaha, in a letter received in Wellington some days before the attack, stated that when Major Richmond and Major Last were at Porirua during the previous week he said to them, in bidding them to be on their guard against a sudden attack, "Kei Heretaunga te hui ki ai; kia mohio; huhiuia atu nga Pakeha" ("At Heretaunga the assault will be made. Be wary; concentrate the white men").

Cowan is in no doubt that Te Rangihiaeta commanded the attack along with Te Mamaku. He gives no sources for this. Wards, however, is not at all sure whether Te Rangihiaeta was present at Boulcott's farm and notes, quite correctly as far as I can judge, (Shadow, 167) that "there is no direct evidence" that Te Rangihiaeta was there at all. The main piece of evidence is the famous bugle belonging to William Allen, killed in the attack; the bugle was later found with Te Rangihiaeta's men at Horokiwi. hardly compelling proof of Te Rangihiaeta's personal presence at the battle. Ballara is sure that Te Rangihiaeta was
Rangihaeata. (Elsdon Best says the attack was led by Te Mamaku and Kaparatehau.\textsuperscript{206}) There were, thought Page, about 200 men in the attacking force, judging from those he saw fighting and those seen later doing a haka after the battle.\textsuperscript{207} It will be recalled that when at the end of February Richard Taylor went to see Ngati Rangatahi he found about 60-70 people "in the forest":\textsuperscript{208} it is very unlikely that by themselves they could have fielded a force of 200. It seems clear that Te Rangihaeata had moved a considerable number of fighting men into the Hutt some time after February. Wards believes that it would not have been possible to field an attacking force of 200 warriors without Ngati Toa participation.\textsuperscript{209}

The attack came early in the morning of Saturday May 16. The British were at first taken by surprise and four soldiers of an outlying picket were killed. According to Cowan's narrative the shots fired by the soldiers of the picket nevertheless warned Page's main force, who successfully counterattacked with the aid of some men of the Hutt militia.\textsuperscript{210} The battle, or skirmish rather, lasted about an hour and a half. Page lost six men and four wounded. It is not certain how many Maori died, "for all who fell were carried off, but two were seen shot dead, and ten or more were wounded, some of them severely."\textsuperscript{211} Major Last, in command of the British forces at Wellington, quickly brought reinforcements up to Boulcott's farm himself, and found that Maori forces were still firing at the British "from the thick scrub on the opposite side of the river":\textsuperscript{212}

At this time Captain Hardy came up and several volunteers, when I immediately advanced with my whole force (as far as was practicable) in extended order, and directed a heavy fire of musketry, which drove the enemy back and silenced them.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{206} Best, \textit{Porirua and they who settled it}, n.d., copy in Porirua museum library, p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Page to Last, BPP (NZ), 5, 483.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Taylor diary, typescript, qMS 1987, ATL, pp 343-4 of manuscript.
\item \textsuperscript{209} Wards, \textit{Shadow}, 267.
\item \textsuperscript{210} See Cowan, \textit{NZ Wars}, 1, ch. 11. pp 104-11.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Cowan op.cit., 109.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Major Last to Richmond, 18 May 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 482.
\end{itemize}
Alarmed settlers at Wellington heard that "the natives" had come down upon the soldiers in the Hutt Valley "& killed five of them & one civilian (Mr Boulcots servant)" and that "Bolcut got up the chimney & hid himself & so saved his life". The battle and its aftermath are described by Crawford, who notes the general atmosphere of panic that followed at Wellington:

This morning rather before daybreak the troops encamped on the Hutt were attacked by the rebel natives with great vigour. They succeeded in driving off the Maories but sustained a loss of 6 killed and 5 wounded out of a force of about 45 men. Great alarm was felt in all quarters. Many families abandoned the Hutt; the militia were called out and patrols appointed to perambulate the town at night. The officer in command of the party attacked (Page) had a very narrow escape, having been fired at when forcing a passage out of his house. Wellington was in a state of great excitement for a considerable time after this attack and a strong party of militia and volunteers patrolled the town every morning before daylight. Despatches were sent to the Governor by the [Mule?] 1 am direct and by the Cecilia to Kaipara. The former vessel was lost at Hawke's Bay and the despatches by the latter were long in coming. In the meantime the Government Brig returned with Lieut Symonds from Wanganui having failed in settling the land claims in that place, the refractory natives there having become impracticable in their demands when they heard of the [supineness?] of the troops at Wellington and the success of Rangihaeata. The brig sailed soon after her arrival here for Auckland.

Following the battle military reinforcements were sent into the valley, and the Wellington magistrates decided to finally accept the offer of military assistance from Te Puni and Wi Tako. 100 muskets were issued to their men from New Zealand Company stocks. Major Richmond, the superintendent at Wellington, had been reluctant to issue arms to the Ngati Awa in view of Grey's "apprehension of rousing former animosities among the tribes"; but now he was convinced that "the late attack has proved too clearly how necessary it is, both for security and to enable our troops to act with any success in so difficult a country". Despite this and other

213 Diary of F. Bradley, Ms 63, WATL, Saturday May 16 1846.
214 Wards, Shadow, 268.
215 Richmond to Grey, 19 May 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 482. Richmond thought that "by this determination of Epuni [Te Puni] to unite with us in suppressing the rebellious natives, we secure the alliance of the whole of the Ngatiawa tribe, which being the most powerful in this part of the country will prove of the greatest service to the Government."
reinforcements and the general panic at Wellington nothing further happened. The Maori forces in the Hutt withdrew. It seems unlikely that there ever was a plan to attack Wellington. The area at issue was, after all, the Hutt Valley.

Richmond then suggested to the Ngati Awa chiefs a joint attack on Te Rangihaeata's main base at Pauatahanui. Richmond thought that British forces could attack Pauatahanui from the front while Ngati Awa could cross the ranges and attack it from the rear. Te Puni and the others were opposed to the plan:216

They considered both the European and native force (not yet 200) too weak to enter upon such an expedition.

Grey opposed the planned attack as soon as he got to hear of it. It would, he thought, have led only to Ngati Awa's certain defeat:217

The defect of this proposed plan of operations appears to His Excellency to have been, that the force under the command of Epuni, would, judging from Lieutenant Page's account, have been inferior in number to that of the rebels, whilst Epuni's men would certainly have been far inferior to them in practical experience of native warfare and knowledge of the country. His Excellency thinks, therefore, that the probability is, that so far would the rebels have been from allowing Epuni to have shut them in from this movement on their rear, that they, receiving intelligence of his approach, would have abandoned their pah, would have advanced to meet him in the densely wooded country in which he would have been involved, where he could have received no possible assistance from us, and that he would, in all probability, have received a signal defeat.

However, the plan proposed by Richmond was very similar to that ultimately adopted later in 1846.

3.8. Grey's reaction: Grey, of course, was in Auckland in May and June of 1846, and he may not have learned of the outbreak of fighting in the Hutt for some weeks. Lord Stanley had been replaced at the Colonial Office in late 1845 by no less a figure than W.E. Gladstone, and it was to Gladstone that

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216 Richmond to Grey, 2 June 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 483-4
217 Andrew Sinclair (Col. Sec) to Richmond, 20 June 1846, BPP (NZ), 484
Grey on 20 June 1846 reported the news of the skirmish at Boulcott. (It is unlikely that neither Gladstone nor anyone else in the British government would have given much attention to New Zealand affairs in the midst of the great political crisis of the repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846.) Grey's main reaction was to ask for more troops to be sent from New South Wales. He was not very enthusiastic about the decision taken at Wellington to supply the "friendly natives" with firearms. As seen, he poured cold water on Richmond's plan for a joint attack on Te Rangihaeata at Pauatahanui. But in general Grey did not believe that the fighting at Boulcott showed any need to change his general policy of a military holding operation at Wellington and Porirua, road construction, armed policing, and military expansion beyond the region postponed to the following summer:

The circumstances which have recently transpired amount to this, that the natives have attacked one of the outposts stationed for the protection of that district of country which they were intended to cover, and have been beaten off. There appears, therefore, no reason why I should either depart from or vary that plan of operations which I adopted after the most mature consideration, and which still appears to me to be in every respect adapted to the state of affairs prevailing throughout these islands.

3.9. Further skirmishing in the Hutt Valley (June 1846): In early June there was another gun battle at Boulcott between British and Maori forces. On 2nd June "the natives" appeared on the opposite side of the Hutt River from the British base. They burned down one of the houses abandoned by the settlers. The British soldiers opened fire; the Maori fired back across the river, burned another abandoned house, and then disappeared. Last reinforced the garrison at Boulcott, so that it now had 180 men as well as "our native allies", Ngati Awa from Wellington led by Te Puni - although Last was dubious about the value of Ngati Awa support. A few days later some of Te Puni's men went out to dig potatoes (presumably on Ngati

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218 Grey to Gladstone. 20 June 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 480.
219 On Gladstone's short tenure of the Colonial Office see Roy Jenkins, Gladstone, 84-5.
220 See Grey to Gladstone, 20 June 1846, at 481.
221 Last to Grey, 8 June 1846, BPP (NZ), 5,487.
222 Ibid: "...our native allies, who I find are remaining with us, more from mercenary views than friendly, as they are wanting pay, rations &c., and seem little inclined to pursue the object we want them for, which is to take to the bush and follow up the rebels. E Puni put us off by saying that when the Governor came he would do something."
Rangatahi's old potato grounds) and were fired on; the Crown forces counterattacked and the "rebels" withdrew once again.223

There was another, more substantial, engagement on 16 June. Captain Reed of the 99th regiment, in command of 40 men, with "a small party of the friendly Maoris" were attacked by about 70 or 80 "rebels" in a bush clearing near Taita. The Crown forces, in open ground, were fired at from behind felled timber at the edge of the clearing. Reed and his men took cover in the bush and fired back, but then were caught in a cross fire and had to retreat back to Boulcott's. On the retreat he was joined by Lieutenant Page who come up with more men, but the combined force then continued to retreat.224 Crawford described the engagement in his diary:225

Captain Reid of the 99th went out from the upper stockade with a party of forty soldiers and 15 natives, Lt Herbert of 50th and and Mr [Polkinghorne?] of Calliope as volunteers, and proceeded towards the Taita to reconnoitre. Suddenly a Maori who was leading discovered the rebels and gave the alarm by firing his musket and throwing himself on the ground. The rebels then fired a volley but without effect, when a skirmish commenced which ended in the rapid retreat of the military with a loss of 4 wounded and 2 missing. Lt. Herbert being wounded through the arm and in the finger found himself abandoned and by good luck managed to secrete himself from the observation of the enemy and was afterwards discovered by the friendly natives and brought into camp. The militia about 12 under Lt White stationed at Taita hearing the fire hastened down to the assistance of the troops (who however had disappeared before their arrival) and engaged the rebels for an hour and a half driving them across the river.

W.B. White, a lieutenant of the militia and in command of the outpost at Taita, heard the sound of the guns and went to see what was happening with 11 volunteers, but found the soldiers had already retreated; his little party then fought "a very lively skirmish" but retreated when about 100 Maori warriors "came up the road at the double, trailing their arms". They turned out, luckily, to be "friendlies", accompanied by Scott, the interpreter.226 Grey was not impressed with Reed's conduct and was worried

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223 See Last's report, 9 June 1846, BPP (NZ) 5,488.
224 Reed to Last, 16 June 1846, BPP (NZ) 5,491.
225 Crawford, diary, June 17 1846, Ms 1001, ATL.
226 Highlights in 'the life of William B. White, typescript, Ms 4542, ATL, 20.
that the British retreat on this occasion would cause some uncommitted Maori to join forces with Te Rangihaeata.  

In another incident, on 15 June a settler named Rush was killed in the Hutt Valley. F. Bradley noted in his diary:

I heard that the natives have come to the Hutt today & been firing upon the soldiers & there was a man of the name of Rush a carter went out in the morning to look for his horse but the natives got hold of him split his head with a tomahawk & then told our People were [sic] to find him.

3.10. Grey becomes suspicious of Te Rauparaha's intentions, June-July 1846: In early June Major Last, the officer commanding at Wellington, noted Te Rauparaha's apparent continued friendliness and helpfulness, but was nevertheless unsure about his stance. No real attempt was made to assess the difficulties of Te Rauparaha's position. The difficulty was that neutrality and peace-making on Te Rauparaha's part was not enough for officers such as Last: he wanted Te Rauparaha to actively aid in suppressing the "rebels". To be seen as loyal to the Crown Te Rauparaha was expected to attack his own kin and forces commanded by his own nephew. Te Rauparaha offered to come in to Wellington with Major Arney, but Last did not think this was a good idea: "there is such a hostile feeling against him by all the people that I think it would not be advisable".

Nevertheless Te Rauparaha came across to Wellington from Porirua in late June and stayed for a few days, presumably to talk things over with Richmond (Grey was en route from Auckland and did not arrive until after Te Rauparaha had returned to Porirua). A vivid, if prejudiced, account of

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227 See Grey to Gladstone, 2 July 1846, BPP (NZ) 5,490 ("I apprehend that this affair will have a very bad effect upon the natives; that it will give them confidence in themselves; will lead them unjustly to undervalue the British power; it will induce many to join Rangihaeta...") Grey to Gladstone, 20 July 1846, BPP (NZ) 495, referring to Maori "contempt for us since Captain Reed's unfortunate affair". Grey may have been unfair: Last himself thought that Reed and "those under his command acted with great steadiness and bravery on the occasion": Last to Richmond, 17 June 1846, BPP (NZ) 5, 491.

228 Bradley diary, 15 June 1846, Ms 63, WATL.

229 See Last to Grey, 8 June 1846, BPP(NZ) 32: "Rauparaha still continues his friendly intercourse, and even proposed to come into town with Major Arney. He is gone for a few days to Otaki. I feel a little suspicious of this chief, notwithstanding his professions, as his reluctance to assist in putting down the disturbances is inconsistent with his promises of alliances, &c.: time, however, will show."

230 Ibid.
this visit - which is not mentioned in the standard works by Burns and Wards - is found in Crawford's diary:231

Te Rauparaha came over from Porirua accompanied by Major Arney, 232 Lt Peddar and escorted by a party of soldiers. He was lodged in [Rev?] Mr Douglas' house. The old rascal was made much of during his stay although the Maories would have nothing to say to him. His appearance is not particularly remarkable. He is rather bent by age, moderately tall and his expression of countenance but little more sagacious than that of other Maories. A large bunch of feathers decorates his ear. His dress changed day by day - sometimes a [ ], sometimes European clothes. He was accompanied by his two wives one of whom is young and handsome.

On June 29 Te Rauparaha returned to Porirua.

Richmond, Last and others had been urging Grey to return from Auckland with reinforcements. Grey embarked on HMS Driver on 25 June, taking with him some men of the 58th regiment and party of artillery, and was in Wellington by the evening of 1 July, and remained in the area for a number of months, having "frequent consultations" with Major Last, the officer commanding.233 He also, according to Cowan, had discussions with Te Puni and the other Ngati Awa chiefs of Wellington.234 Whether as a result of these conversations, or independently, Grey now began to himself develop a firm mistrust of Te Rauparaha. By 9 June he had come to the conclusion that if the British attacked Te Rangihaeata at Pauatahanui they were at risk of being attacked in the rear by Te Rauparaha and other sections of Ngati Toa. For that reason, as Grey explained in a minute to Gladstone, he did not feel confident about attacking Te Rangihaeata "until I can assemble a force sufficiently large to enable me to hold Te Rauparaha in check at the same time that Rangihaeata is attacked."235 But Te Rauparaha kept Grey guessing. Grey found out, or at least believed, that Te Rauparaha had been lying to him about his involvement in closing the coast road to the Manawatu. Grey struggled to understand and describe Te Rauparaha's stance in his reports to Gladstone. It seems likely that the real difficulty was his own limited understanding. Like Last, Grey could only be happy with Te Rauparaha's active military help: for Te Rauparaha to continue to act as a

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231 Crawford diary, 26 June 1846, Ms 1001:5, ATL.
232 Major Arney was the commander of the force stationed at the Paremata barracks.
233 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 500.
234 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 112.
235 Grey to Gladstone, 9 July 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 492.
kind of broker or go-between - the most natural interpretation of Te Rauparaha's actions at this time - was simply "treachery".236 Grey's attitude to Te Rangiheata was even more blinkered: he saw him as a rebel, a criminal and a murderer (although there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Te Rangihaeata was involved in any of the murders in the Hutt Valley).

What clinched matters for Grey were two letters sent in May and July. The first was a letter to the chiefs of Wanganui sent by Te Mamaku (who was himself, of course, from Wanganui) from Porirua on May 25. One of the Wanganui chiefs to whom it was addressed sent it on to Grey, who presumably did not see it until early July. In this letter Te Mamaku claimed to have gained the victory at Boulcott's and had asked that the leading chiefs of Wanganui "allow Ngapara, Maketu, Amarama, and Te Kawana, those who do not profess Christianity" to come and see Te Rangihaeata and Te Mamaku and "hear the particulars of the war".237 Te Rauparaha is mentioned briefly: "the coast, or road, is open and Te Rauparaha has given his consent". The other letter was from the Wanganui chief Maketu, announcing that he and his followers were on their way to Wellington.238 This letter had been intercepted somehow239 and sent on to Major Richmond. To Grey it all added up to a lack of good faith on Te Rauparaha's part, although as it happens the letter from Maketu seems mainly to be aimed at reassuring Te Rauparaha that Maketu's party was not coming south with hostile intentions.240 On the other hand the Ngati Awa chiefs at Waikanae, Wiremu Kingi, Te Heke, and Tuairane Hingarere, were convinced that the Wanganui detachment was hostile, and that other

236 Grey to Gladstone, 20 July 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 494: "The fact indisputably is that Te Rauparaha and some of the chiefs of the Ngatitoa tribe are secretly assisting Rangihaeata, whilst they are professing the warmest friendship for us; to what extent their treachery may yet have proceeded I am not prepared to speak...".

237 Te Mamaku to Hori Kingi, Te Tahana et.al, 25 May 1846, GBPP (NZ) 5, 496. Only the English translation is reprinted in the official papers.

238 Maketu to Te Rauparaha. 9 July 1846. GBPP (NZ), 5, 494

239 There is an implausible tale in Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 116 that this letter to Te Rauparaha was entrusted to Richard Deighton, a young Wanganui settler bearing a despatch to Grey by Maketu himself. Deighton, if the story can be believed, travelled south from Wanganui with Maketu's party, all the time bearing a confidential despatch for Grey sewn into the collar of his coat by "one of Deighton's sisters" and Maketu "confidingly" gave to Deighton a letter from himself to Te Rauparaha. Deighton, naturally, took Makehu's letter straight to Grey. The strangest aspect of the story is that a Pakeha settler was able to stroll down the coast from Wanganui in company with a Maori invasion force, if that is in fact what it was. However we are in a realm of hopeless conjecture here.

240 The letter reads (in part): "Te Rauparaha; salutations to you...Don't inquire or be suspicious of this coming (down of people). It is not for hostile purposes. It is a visit to see Mokau and Mamaku."

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parties would follow, all seeking to join Te Rangihaeata in order to kill not only the Europeans but also the Maori Christians. To counter this the Ngati Awa at Waikanae wrote to Grey asking the government to supply them with arms and ammunition. They also told Grey that "now the Ngatitoa are aiding or strengthening Te Rangihaeata". But how objective the Ngati Awa chiefs were is itself uncertain, and there always the possibility that Ngati Awa sought to prejudice Grey against Te Rauparaha for their own reasons.

241 Wiremu Kingi et al to Grey, 15 July 1846, GBPP (NZ) 5, 496.

242 It seems very likely that Grey was strongly influenced by the Ngati Awa chiefs in coming to the conclusion that Te Rauparaha was playing the Crown false. As noted, shortly after Grey arrived at Port Nicholson he had discussions with Major Last, Te Puni, and the other Ati Awa chiefs. Then there is the letter already described sent by Wiremu Kingi and the other Ati Awa chiefs of Waikanae on 15 July claiming that Ngati Toa was actively aiding Te Rangihaeata - which may have been true, or have been just mischief-making: who knows? Then, just before capturing Te Rauparaha, Grey himself paid a visit to Waikanae. The circumstances are described in Grey's report to Gladstone of 23 July 1846 (GBPP (NZ), 5, 497). Here Grey describes how the plan to land troops to intercept the party coming south from Wanganui were foiled because of the winds and heavy surf on the beach. He had previously collected together a number of Ngati Awa and Ngati Raukawa chiefs. Being unable to land the troops, the Driver and the Calliope landed the Ngati Raukawa chiefs at Otaki and returned to Waikanae. Grey then adds:

The whole of the chiefs with whom I had interviews declared that these disturbances were to be entirely attributed to the intrigues of Te Rauparaha, and some of the chiefs of the Pah of Taupo at Porirua.

The discussions at Waikanae are also described by Cowan: see NZ Wars, 1, 116:

Grey acted quickly after assuring himself of Rauparaha's duplicity. He ordered a force of troops and armed police aboard the warship "Driver," with some bluejackets from the "Calliope". The "Driver" next morning anchored off Waikanae, in the strait between Kapiti Island and the long beach where the Waikanae River issues from its sand dunes. Here Captain Grey went ashore and visited the Ngati-Awa Tribe; they were gathered in their pa, under Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitaake, who afterwards fought the British troops in the Taranaki War. To Wiremu Kingi and his chief men the Governor explained the danger which existed of a coalition between the Wanganui war-party and Rangihaeata's force, and requested the assistance of the Waikanae people in preventing a junction. Kingi promised that if Maketu brought his taua along the beach through Ngati-Awa territory they would intercept and attack him, but told Grey that they could not take the tribe into the bush if the expedition left the coast route and travelled through the ranges to the head of Paua-taha-nui or the Hutt. With this attitude the Governor was satisfied; he satisfied himself also, from what he heard at Waikanae, that Rauparaha was playing the Government false.

This adds up to a fairly substantial Ngati Awa influence on Grey's decision-making. If they were right in their views about Te Rauparaha then there is no issue; but it in fact seems more natural to see Te Rauparaha as attempting to mediate between Grey and Te Rangihaeata. Ngati Awa were old enemies not of Ngati Toa as such, but certainly of Te Rauparaha, Te Rangihaeata, and their Ngati Huia kin connexion with Ngati Raukawa, Ngati Awa's enemies. Thus they may have had their own reasons for wanting to influence Grey into taking action against Te Rauparaha.
Grey decided he had to act. He now felt sure that Te Rauparaha and much of Ngati Toa at Porirua were hostile and would support Te Rangihaeata in the event of a Crown attack. On 18 July Grey made a further proclamation of martial law, extending the proclaimed area northward from Wainui to Wanganui. The main military base on the west coast, at the Paremata barracks, was placed between Te Rangihaeata and Te Rauparaha and was, Grey thought, vulnerable, especially if an attack was made on Pauatahanui. Grey's plan had two prongs. First, it was necessary to intercept Maketu's force. Secondly, Te Rauparaha had to be nullified, which Grey intended to do by kidnapping him. This rather risky plan is first mentioned in Grey's report to Gladstone of 21 July. Provided that on his visit to the West Coast Grey found "fresh cause to confirm my suspicions" he intended, he told Gladstone, to "attempt to seize Te Rauparaha and these chiefs, and disarm the disaffected portion of the tribe". What Gladstone might have thought of this plan to illegally kidnap a leading Maori chief whose worst offence had been reluctance to attack his own kinsmen is unknown; in any case it would be months before Gladstone would see the correspondence.

In a report to Grey dated 4 August, Last summed up the agreed strategy that he and Grey had developed in the preceding weeks. This reveals that one of the main purposes of arresting Te Rauparaha was to prevent him from coming to the aid of Te Rangihaeata once the latter was attacked at Pauatahanui. Whether or not Te Rauparaha was dissimulating (both Last and Grey were convinced that he was), he could hardly be expected to stand aside in the event of an all-out attack on Te Rangihaeata and the "rebels".

After frequent consultations with your Excellency, since your arrival from Auckland, relative to the movements of the force under my command, particularly after the receipt of intelligence by the Government that a number of disaffected natives had left Wanganui, and were moving down the coast with a view of forming a junction with Rangihaeata and the rebels, at his pah of Pauhatanui [sic], in the northern branch of the Porirua river; and that this movement was being made with the sanction and connivance of Te Rauparaha, and some disaffected chiefs of the Ngatitoa tribe, residing in the immediate neighbourhood of our position; it was determined that an effort should be made to destroy this party, or to induce the

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243 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 115.
244 Grey to Gladstone, 21 July 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 497.
245 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 500.
friendly natives on the coast to prevent their progress; also that an attempt should be made to arrest Te Rauparaha and the disaffected chiefs with him, in the event of obtaining further evidence against them; and should these movements be attended with success, it would enable us to make an attack on Rangihiaeta and his followers, without the apprehension of Te Rauparaha, or any evil-disposed Ngatitoas aiding him; and then the pa at Pauhatanui could be regularly invested, and the rebels destroyed.

3.11. The Hutt Valley after the campaigns: The fighting in the early part of 1846 caused much gloom and despondency among the settlers, and some, including Joseph and Almon Boulcott, contemplated either leaving for Nelson or returning to England.246 The fighting took its toll on the Hutt Valley. William Swainson described its appearance in October 1846.247

The Hutt looks wretchedly - houses empty, fences broken down, roads over fields and through crops and all the traces of military despotism i.e. Martial Law. I am now the only "gentleman settler" for the Riddifords have gone, Stillings is going and most of the other settlers above me had gone to other districts.

246 Joseph Boulcott to John B. Boulcott, 27 May 1846, MS 73-008, ATL: "Almon [Boulcott] is safe though he had a very narrow escape. Here everything is in a state of alarm, every one armed and all the out settlers returning to town, so that for this season the whole of our agricultural operations are suspended and how the poor people are to be supported I am quite at a loss to guess, until the government will come forward and ration them. Almon has also left the Hutt as the military occupy his farm and what he is to do I cannot say. He has not yet made up his mind, he sometimes talks of going to Nelson and sometimes of returning home.

4. Conquest and retribution

4.1. Introduction: In late July Grey's coercive programme against Ngati Toa began in earnest. It began with the capture of Te Rauparaha in a secret operation at Taupo pa on 24 July. This was followed by a two-pronged attack on Te Rangihaeata's base at Pauatahanui; Te Rangihaeata and his supporters, barely escaping in time, were then pursued up the Horokiwi Valley. Te Rangihaeata eventually had to take refuge amongst his Ngati Raukawa kin. This was then followed by the coercive imposition of the law: Grey had one of the 'rebel' chiefs publicly hanged at Porirua, and others were transported to Van Diemen's Land. The final stage was the acquisition of Ngati Toa's lands at Porirua and in the South Island by deeds drawn up in 1847 and the confining of the tribe to reserves.

4.2. Te Rauparaha's capture (23 July 1846): On 23 July 1846 Grey struck his first major blow against Ngati Toa by making a surprise attack on Taupo pa on Porirua harbour and capturing and detaining Te Rauparaha and four other Ngati Toa chiefs. A candid contemporary account of the capture of Te Rauparaha by McKillop and Durie on Grey's orders and the events which followed at Porirua is given in a letter from W.J. Swainson to John Parkes written in September 1846:

Rauparaha lives at Porirua close to the stockade where the soldiers are stationed. H.M.S. "Driver" was therefore sent round with more troops who with the sailors landed in the night and and having surrounded his village, secured Rauparaha and many of his principal men and and conveyed them on board the "Calliope" where they still remain. The Governor then returned to Wellington and ordered the Natives and Hutt Militia to march over the hills which divide this valley from Porirua, by doing which they would get in the rear of the rebel pa. I therefore accompanied the expedition, the natives being under Mr Scott's and my command and the Militia under the command of Mr McDonogh.

Another contemporary account is from Crawford's diary:

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249 Crawford diary, 24 July 1846, Ms 1001:5, WATL.
July 24th. Heard of the steamer's proceedings. She had first proceeded up the coast to Waikanae and having lulled suspicion returned under cloud of night to Te Rauparaha's pa at Taupo on the Porirua harbour. The boats were manned and rowed and the pah surrounded at daybreak, when Te Rauparaha and 4 of his chiefs were taken prisoner and conveyed on board the steamer the Governor having full proof of the treachery of the former.

A detailed narrative was written by William B. White, of the Wellington militia, who in July 1846 was ordered "to join Major Durey's force of Armed Constabulary to proceed in HMS Driver on a secret expedition". White went on board the Driver to find it full of troops: "most of us had to lie on the cabin floor for the night". The force reached Porirua at daybreak. White describes what happened next:

In the morning at daybreak we reached Porirua and here disembarked a little above Rauparaha's pa. Major Durey and I with the force under our command were ordered to enter the Pa and capture the six natives who were known to us. Mackillop with twelve sailors was ordered to go direct to Rauparaha's hut, seize him and take him on board. We marched along the beach for about one hundred yards crossing a little stream where there were a number of geese that made a tremendous noise, we entered the Pa taking the natives completely by surprise and had no difficulty in capturing our men.

Those arrested also included Wiremu Te Kanae and Hohepa Tamaihengia, both of Ngati Toa.

McKillop's own narrative is as follows:

I took Mr Dighton (Deighton) with me to act as interpreter, and four of our own men unarmed, giving them directions to seize upon the old chief as soon as he was made aware of the charge preferred against him, and to hurry him down to the boat before he could raise his people, the principal object being to secure him. We landed at break of day; and while they were forming the troops on the beach, I with my small party ran on, as it was then light, fearing that conscious guilt might sharpen their ears and frustrate our plans. When we reached the pa not a soul was stirring, but our heavy steps soon brought some of the sleepers to the doors of their huts, knowing we were not

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250 Highlights in the life of William B. White, Ms 4542, ATL.
251 Ibid.
of the bare-footed tribe. We could not wait to give any explanation, but pushed on to the hut which contained the object of our search, whose quick ears had detected strange footsteps; never having liked me, he did not look at all easy on perceiving who the intruder was, though his wife showed no alarm, and received me with her usual salutation. Upon informing him that he was my prisoner, he immediately threw himself (being in a sitting posture) back into the hut, and seized a tomahawk, with which he made a blow at his wife's head, thinking she had betrayed him. I warded the blow with my pistol, and seized him by the throat; my four men immediately rushing in on him, securing him by his arms and legs, started off as fast as his violent struggles would allow of, which for a man of his age (upwards of seventy), were almost super-human. He roared most lustily - "Ngati Toa! Ngati Toa!", the name of his tribe, endeavouring to bring them to the rescue; and in a few seconds every man was on his legs, and came rushing over to see what was the matter with their chief; but the troops and bluejackets coming up at the same time, and surrounding the pa, prevented any attempt at a rescue as he was already in the boat.

Te Rauparaha was told he would be shot if he attempted to escape.

Grey and Major Last then came ashore and supervised the destruction of Ngati Toa's stocks of arms and ammunition. 32 muskets were seized, along with a "small iron gun and carriage", axes and casks of powder. This must itself have been a heavy blow against Ngati Toa. A large party of Te Rangihaeata's supporters came towards Taupo to rescue Te Rauparaha as the ships were leaving with their prisoners. McKillop, described by William Swainson as "a mad harebrained fellow, delighting in everything plucky and reckless", took the gunboat towards the head of the harbour to intercept them and fired round shot at them, "which only had the effect of producing a straggling fire of musketry, at far too great a range to do any execution". Grey's prisoners were locked into the engine room of the Driver and the ship steamed back to Wellington during the
night. At one point something went wrong with the engines and Te Rauparaha and his fellow prisoners were nearly asphyxiated by the hot escaping steam. At Wellington Te Rauparaha was placed on HMS Calliope and was then taken to Auckland "and put under Te Wherowhero's care in a hut in the domain at the place where the Chinamen's garden was afterwards situated."\textsuperscript{257}

4.3. Consequences of Te Rauparaha's capture: According to the Te Kanae manuscript Ngati Toa were bewildered by Grey's capture of Te Rauparaha:\textsuperscript{258}

In 1846, Te Rauparaha and his people were still residing at Porirua in their pa at Taupo. Their occupation was cultivating food. One day in June, Te Rauparaha and his people went to Kapiti to fish. When finished their fishing they returned to Porirua to their pa at Taupo. When the Europeans knew that Te Rauparaha and his people had returned there came the armed party of Sir George Grey, Governor of New Zealand, to arrest Te Rauparaha and his nephew aboard the ship "Calliope". Ngati Toa did not know the reason why Te Rauparaha and others were then arrested, even so until this day.

It is possible that Te Rauparaha's capture led to some of Ngati Toa taking up arms against Te Mamaku on the basis that his actions had led to the capture of their chief. This is suggested by Richard Taylor:\textsuperscript{259}

Te Rauparaha's capture had an immediate political impact, as no doubt Grey had intended. W. Tyrone Power, an army officer who published his journals of his experiences in New Zealand, believed that the capture of Te Rauparaha had the effect of ensuring that uncommitted chiefs would keep out of the conflict, leaving Te Rangihaeata isolated. His capture also

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Te Kanae manuscript, Graham translation, typescript, AIML, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{259} Taylor, Journal, qMS 1987 WATL, typescript p. 90 (4 August 1846).
meant that some sections of Ngati Toa joined forces with the Crown and Ngati Awa, although not, thought Power, with much enthusiasm.  

The capture of Rauperaha, and the suddenness and energy with which it was done, paralysed the efforts of our enemies in the south, who all feared some similar surprise for themselves, and made the best of their way home, leaving Mamaku, Rangihaeta, and those who had openly committed themselves, to get out of the scrape as they best could. With such a hostage in our hands, we could command the neutrality, at any rate, of many of the tribes; while his own people, the Ngatitoas, to show their fidelity, volunteered to assist in attacking Rangihaeta. They actually did take the field, as it was safer to take them with us than to leave them behind; though it is a matter of great doubt which side received the most benefit from their services.

**4.4. The campaign against Te Rangihaeata:** The campaign that followed was essentially a campaign by the government and its Maori allies against a section of Ngati Toa led by Te Rangihaeata. Having learnt - or so he says - that Te Rangihaeata and his people had abandoned his fortress at Pauatahanui Grey gave instructions for a two-pronged attack. One force, made up of militia and Ngati Awa was to cross the ranges from the Hutt Valley; the other, made up of regulars, was to move from the Parematatui barracks under the command of Major Last. No regular forces ("not being suitable troops for bush-work") were included in the force of 226 men crossing the ranges from the Hutt. The militia were commandeered Captain

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261 This is how it is seen by Wards: *Shadow*, 183.
262 Grey's avowed intention was not so much as to capture Pauatahanui as to forestall another possible attack on the Hutt: see Grey to Gladstone, 29 July, 1846, BPP (NZ), 5, 498: "Intelligence has just reached me that Rangihaeata, alarmed at the movements which are now going on, has moved from his pah at Pauatahanui, accompanied by a considerable number of his followers. Some of the rebels are supposed still to occupy the pah, but I have failed in obtaining any information as to the direction in which the main body have gone. This movement on the part of Rangihaeata will necessarily occasion corresponding modifications in the plan of operations which I had laid down. I have therefore just issued orders for the movement of a body of militia and police, accompanied by 240 of the Port Nicholson natives, from the Hutt, upon Pah Pauhatanui. by a mountain pathway which Rangihaeata believes to be impracticable for any European force. If the rebels have again ventured in this direction, they will once more be driven back on their pah by this movement..." It is, however, by no means certain what Grey's sources for this intelligence were (he does not say) and it may have suited Grey's convenience to represent as a defensive measure what was in fact an aggressive attack on Te Rangihaeata and his forces. One certainly gains the impression from Scot's detailed narrative that the objective was the capture of Pauatahanui. He gives no indication that his force was meant to be on the lookout for Te Rangihaeata's men moving in the direction of the Hutt Valley; rather the objective was a surprise attack on Pauatahanui.
263 Cowan, *NZ Wars*, 1, 125.
McDonogh and Lieutenant White; Sub Inspector Chetham Strode commanded a detachment of the new Wellington military police, and "the native friendlies were under the charge of Mr. D. Scott".264

Lieutenant White of the militia, in command of a party of volunteers, has left a valuable account of the campaign, describing the arduous struggle across the mountains from the Hutt Valley to Pauatahanui, a "terrible march, three days in the rain through the bush".265 On the morning of 1 August the force came to the hills overlooking the head of the Porirua Valley and were within sight of Pauatahanui. Scouts were sent forward, and then White heard "a clear distant voice" shouting "Ka mau, ka mau, ka mau" (I am taken). White moved forward to witness an extraordinary sight:266

I started at the double with about fifty men and the sight I beheld on reaching our party I shall never forget. The Maoris, our allies, were all on one knee, the butts of their guns on the ground, the right hand gripping the barrel, each man's head bowed on his left hand in prayer. Macdonogh and Middleton with their swords drawn stood beside the prisoner who lay on the beach, tied hand and foot. This was the unhappy man who had shouted "Ka mau".

This man was Matini Ruta, (Martin Luther). He was subsequently tried by court martial and hanged at Porirua as a rebel.

The force moved into Te Rangihaeata's pa at Pauatahanui, but Te Rangihaeata and his people managed to escape into the bush, leaving the place empty. The planned pincer attack was foiled by bad weather in Cook Strait which delayed the Calliope and prevented the main force from arriving in time to prevent Rangihaeata's escape. 267 The fortress, known as

264 Ibid. A detailed breakdown of the Hutt Valley force is given by Scott (or Scot): D. Scot, Narrative of a campaign against Rangihaeata, (hereafter Scot, Narrative ), MS 88-103-2/15, WATL, entry for Friday 31 July: "Left the camp on the River Hutt this morning at 12 am our party consisting of the following forces - 50 Hutt Militia, 140 Wellington Natives, 16 Police, and formed in the following order on the opposite side of the river, 6 Natives proceeding as scouts under Kararu, 50 Natives, forming the advance guard under the chiefs Motoroa of Wairarapa and Porotu of Pipitea, 50 Militiamen under Captain McDonogh and Lieut. White, 16 Wellington Police under Sub. Inspector E.C. Strode, 104 Natives in the rear under the chiefs Pakuahi of Te Aro, and E. Tako [i.e. Wi Takoj] of Kumutoto, in all about 226, and proceeded on the mountain road towards Porirua."

265 Highlights in the life of William B. White, typescript, Ms 4542, ATL, 21. White is exaggerating here. In fact the force left the main camp on the Hutt River on August 31 and was at Pauatahanui the following day.

266 Ibid.

267 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501; McKillop, Remiscences, 209.
Matai-taua, is now occupied by St Alban's Church at Pauatahanui. The Crown forces fired on retreating Ngati Toa, and this caused McKillop to start firing on the pa from his gunboat in the harbour on the assumption that the fortress was resisting an attack. Rangihaeata was taken by surprise, and later in the day he called a challenge across the harbour: "What people are in my pa?". He was told: "The Governor's people and the Maoris of Port Nicholson." Later in the day part of the main force, including Grey and Rawiri Puaha's Ngati Toa, arrived at Pauatahanui.268 Rawiri Puaha and his people were received "in a friendly manner" by the Ngati Awa.269 Majors Last and Arney and the main body of troops arrived at dawn the next morning (Sunday 2 August) in the Calliope's boats: 7 officers and 160 men of the 58th, 65th and 99th regiments, to find the pa at Pauatahanui "occupied by the militia, armed police and native allies", and Te Rangihaeata gone.270 The abandoned pa was subsequently converted into a British military post.271

The pursuit began the next day, August 3. The whole force, regulars, sailors, military police, militia, Ngati Awa and Puaha's Ngati Toa, under the general command of Major Last, moved up the Horokiwi Valley from Pauatahanui (roughly the line of the current Paekakariki Hill road). Major Last describes the pursuing force under his command as 6 officers and 120 men of the 58th, 65th and 99th regiments, 30 militia, 150 Maori allies, which was accompanied by a separate force of 4 officers and 100 men of the Royal Artillery, 58th and 65th regiments with 80 Maori allies commanded by Major Arney.272 On the first day the pursuers advanced about four miles into the forest. The force was led by Rawiri Puaha and the Ngati Toa, which the Ngati Awa were not altogether pleased about:273

Our natives were often disappointed at the Militia not being allowed to accompany them, as they were rather distrustful of their new allies, the Ngatitoa tribe.

268 Highlights in the life of William B. White, typescript, Ms 4542, ATL, 22. See too Scott, "Narrative", entry for 1 August.
269 Scott, "Narrative", ibid.
270 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501.
271 Cowan, NZ Wars, 1, 125: "The next stage in the history of Paua-taha-nui pa was its conversion into an Imperial military post. It was garrisoned by detachments of Regular regiments, and for a considerable period after hostilities had ceased it was occupied as an advanced post covering the construction of the main road northward to Paekakariki and Waikanae by a company of the 65th."
272 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501.
273 Scott, "Narrative", entry for Monday 3 August.
The advance was difficult: McKillop wrote that the path "lay through the most dense wood it has ever been my fate to tread, being frequently crossed by small rivers, and fallen trees of such a size as to make it necessary to change the direction of the road to avoid them."274 The next stages of the campaign, in which the pursuit was mostly left to Ngati Awa and Rawiri Puaha's section of Ngati Toa is conveniently described in Crawford's diary:275

Aug 4th. Arrived HMS Castor from Sydney in 18 days and from Auckland in five. The troops had now pushed Rangihaeata into the hills and he had taken up a position on a steep and difficult ridge above the Horokiwi valley. The force against him consisted of several hundred soldiers, about 200 Natives and a strong party of militia and police. On the ...... an unsuccessful attack was made in which Ensign Blackbird (99th) two soldiers and two seamen were killed.

On the 17th HMS Castor returned to Port with the Governor on board Captain Graham having ordered all the blue jackets to return to their ships and by his interference broken up the attack.

Aug, 19th. HMS Castor sailed with the Governor for Auckland. When the troops evacuated the position before Rangihaeata at Horokiwi they left the friendly natives to build a fence around Rangi's position and thereby to put him in a pound but Rangi did not choose to wait for this but proceeded up the coast. The Ngati Awa with the friendly (soi disant) Ngati Toa under Puaha promised to pursue Rangi and did follow him and on one occasion lost three men in an ambush but they nevertheless did not show any great anxiety to come to close quarters. The supineness of the troops at this time is too disgraceful to believe. There they remained in quarters at Porirua when a little exertion would have enabled them to attack and take Rangi and his party and thereby put an end to the war.

Aug 24th. Heard of further retreat of Rangihaeata and that Epau the murderer of Gillespie had been found dead in the evacuated pa.

Crawford's belief that the Ngati Toa fighting on the side of the Crown were reluctant allies and unwilling to kill their own kin is also essentially Power's view, cited in the preceding paragraph.

274 McKillop, Reminiscences, 213.
275 MS 1001:5, ATL.
The main engagement at Horokiwi took place on 6th August. At daylight Rawiri Puaha met with Te Rangihaeata. The discussions are described by McKillop:

[H]e [Te Rangihaeata expressed his regret at a portion of his own tribe being in arms against him, and begged them to return to their pah or join him. Puaha, however, told him that he had already suffered from the misconduct of that portion of the tribe who were now with Rangy, and begged him to give up the murderers, which would at once have put an end to the proceedings. This, however, was declined, and the interview ended by the two chiefs rubbing noses, Rangy expressing his regret at being at variance with his children.

Following the discussions, Ngati Awa and Rawiri Puaha's Ngati Toa assembled for a haka, in which apparently a number of the British soldiers joined in, "much to the delight of our maori friends". The force then climbed the steep hill, or mountain rather, to attack Te Rangihaeata who was ensconced at the top. This is the place now known as Battle Hill, not far from the present road between Pauatahanui and Paekakariki. In Last's words:

At about nine o'clock, A.M., we ascended the hill, preceded by an officer and a party of men with tools to cut away the wood to facilitate our getting up. After ascending with great difficulty about a mile, we suddenly discovered that the enemy had established himself in a stockade on the spur of a hill, which was not only excessively steep and precipitous upon each side, but so narrow in places that only a few men could proceed abreast.

Some of Te Rangihaeata's men appeared in front of the stockade, at which point "a heavy fire was opened on both sides"; Te Rangihaeata's force made "repeated efforts to turn our left flank, but were driven back with great loss to their position."

Casualties were heavy on both sides. The firing lasted all day. A further engagement took place on the 8th, also with inconclusive

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276 For a detailed contemporary account see Scott, "Narrative", entry for 6 August.
277 McKillop, Reminiscences, 217.
278 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501.
279 Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501. McKillop writes (Reminiscences, 220) that "we sheltered ourselves behind the trees as we best could, and carried on an irregular fire for some hours, our people throwing away several thousand rounds of ball-cartridge. The rebels were more successful, and picked off several of our men."
results. The Crown forces and Te Rangihiaeta's people continued to confront each other on the high ridge above the Horokiwi Valley.

The Crown blinked first. Last, short of supplies, decided to give up the attempt to dislodge Te Rangihiaeta and his supporters from his very strong position at Horokiwi, where he had blocked the line of the ridge up which the troops were advancing by a breastwork of trees and rubble. Major Last could see no point in an all-out attack. On the 10th of August the troops were withdrawn from the ridge at Horokiwi and returned to Pauatahanui and Paremata. The Ngati Awa under Te Puni and Wi Tako and the section of Ngati Toa commanded by Rawiri Puaha remained in position, but they were very disappointed by the withdrawal of the main force. The Ngati Awa were in fact rather suspicious of Rawiri Puaha's Ngati Toa:

[There] may have been a lack of confidence of the Ngatiawa in the Ngati Toa, but perhaps a diary entry of an early settler indicates the real situation - it states that judged by the number of bullets on the ground the "friendlies" had extracted them and fired blanks. To some extent this is confirmed by Mamaku, who after it was over said that while he would still like to fight the Ngatiawa, the Ngati Toa (Puaha's) were friends, and at night gave them ball cartridges and food.

On the morning of 13 August, however, Te Rangihiaeta abandoned his position at Horokiwi. In Scott's words:

A few shots were fired from the rebel's Pa early this morning and at about 7 am our natives observed their Porirua allies proceeding up to their Pa, when they also hastily followed in the same direction, and on arriving at, which to their great surprise and disappointment, found it had been abandoned by the rebels that morning, only an hour previously. The natives all being assembled in the Pa, discussed their

\[280\] Last to Grey, 4 August 1846, GBPP (NZ), 5, 501: "The enemy kept up a fire upon us during the whole time. His position having been thus felt and ascertained to be defended by strong entrenchments thrown across the steep and narrow ridge of a lofty and densely wooded hill, the rebels being in retreat, there was every reason to believe that their intention was to pour a few destructive volleys into our men as they advanced, crowded as they must have been into so narrow a space along the steep ridge, and then to fly in the woods in the rear, thus abandoning without loss a position which, from the want of supplies, it was impossible for them to retain for more than a few days. It did not appear expedient to incur so large a sacrifice of life to attain a post useless in itself, and which must soon have been ours without any loss...."

\[281\] Cowan, op.cit., 130.

\[282\] Scott, "Narrative", 10 August 1846.

\[283\] Wards, Shadow, 284.

\[284\] Scott, "Narrative", 13 August 1846.
future proceedings, and notwithstanding the obvious propriety of an instant pursuit, 
they decided in waiting the arrival of the Waikanae party, who they fully expected 
in the course of the day, nor could I prevail upon them to take the immediate advantage.

Scott investigated Te Rangihaeata’s fortifications and was “surprised to find 
it so much less defensible [sic] than we had supposed it to be”.

For both the Crown forces and Te Rangihaeata and his people the key 
problem was provisions. At Horokiwi Scott noticed "an evident want of 
provisions, from the remains of native food - nakau and mamaku - which 
seemed to have been their chief support". Te Rangihaeata, unlike his 
pursuers, had women and children with him, and in a winter campaign 
obviously had little choice but to attempt to flee to some safe place where 
food supplies could be obtained. It seems that his objective was the Otaki 
region, where he could count on support from his Ngati Raukawa kin (like 
Te Rauparaha, Te Rangihaeata was as much a Ngati Raukawa as he was a 
Ngati Toa chief). He must have known that once he was safely through 
hostile Ngati Awa territory around Waikanae (which was why he kept 
inland and did not come down to the coast) he would be in Ngati Raukawa 
territory where the Ngati Awa could only follow him at the risk of 
provoking a major tribal conflict. The obvious shortage of food may be one 
clue to Te Rangihaeata’s unwillingness to compromise over the Hutt 
Valley: without a supply of food from the Hutt cultivations Te Rangihaeata 
lacked the resources to continue to defy the Crown.

Te Rangihaeata and his party continued to move north along the 
high ridge line above the coast, and Ngati Awa and Puaha’s Ngati Toa 
continued to chase them. On 18 August the pursuers once again came to a 
camp which Te Rangihaeata had only just left. The remains of the fires were 
still very fresh. All that was left in the place were some dead dogs which had 
of starvation and "several New Testaments and prayer books in the native 
language with the leaves torn out". Scott believed that "their only food was 
such as they procured in the bush, which convinced us that they could not 
hold out again in another camp". Later that day, however, some of Te 
Rangihaeata’s people managed to ambush a section of the Ngati Awa out in 
front of the main force; three Ngati Awa were killed as well as two of Te 
Rangihaeata’s force.

The pursuit was now not far from Waikanae, and the Ngati Awa 
assumed that Wiremu Kingi, the Ngati Awa chief at Waikanae, would 
naturally come to their aid. However he declined to do so, and his refusal

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seems to have been one of the main reasons for the eventual abandonment of the pursuit. On 20 August the pursuing party descended to Wainui (Paekakariki) to obtain provisions from the local chief, Te Hurumutu; Scott and some others went on to Waikanae "where we found Capt. Stanley, Officers and thirty men of H.M.S. "Calliope", Major Durie, Mr. Strode and some policemen, and Mr D.A.C.G. Power (son of celebrated Tyronne Power". R. Deighton, interpreter to Captain Stanley of the Calliope was sent on to Otaki to try to obtain the assistance of the Ngati Raukawa, apparently "in answer to Te Rauparaha's letter, calling upon them to join against the rebels". Scott, Stanley, and Durie went to see Wiremu Kingi, but failed to gain the expected support. Proceeded to Wareroa and Waikanae, in company with Capt. Stanley and Major Durie to see William King, the principal chief of the latter place, to ascertain the feeling there as to joining us against the rebels. At the former place, the natives all declared themselves willing to join us. We next saw William King and stated the object of our visit - to which he replied, that he was not aware the Governor required him to proceed against the rebels amongst the hills, but only to prevent their coming to the coast, and that he had done all that was required by proceeding to the Paripari for three days, and assisting to take the prisoners received at that place; and that he intended repairing his Pa, in case of attack from any other quarter, and that he did not consider it safe to leave the women and children of the tribe, in its present state. Captain Stanley offered to station there, during his absence, one hundred men for their protection, but this he declined and said he would attack the rebels if they made their appearance on the hills near his place, but would not join any pursuit in the bush.

Deighton fared no better with the Ngati Raukawa, who had decided to remain neutral:

Mr Deighton had returned from Otaki, and reported the determination of the natives of that place to remain neutral, saying that had Te Rauparaha spoken to them personally, they would rise to a man, but would not attend to his letter, insinuating that it might have been written at the dictation of the Europeans.

285 Scott, Narrative, 21 August 1846.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid, 22 August 1846.
Scott and the Ngati Awa and Puaha's Ngati Toa had come down to Paekakariki on 20 August and the pursuit did not resume until Saturday 22nd. Te Rangihaeata had, perhaps not surprisingly, made good his escape. The body of Te Pau of Ngati Rangatahi was found, shot dead a few days earlier by Wi Tako (Te Pau had killed the elder of the two Gillespies in the Hutt Valley in April):

The rebels' camp was again situated in a strong position on the ridge of a spur leading down from the mountain, fenced at both ends, and the trees cut and thrown down for defence on each side. Three graves were observed, but not opened, the body of Te Pau was found laying outside the fence, with only the face and a part of the body covered, and was immediately recognised by our natives, who supposed that he was left in that situation to satisfy us of his death, in hopes that we would not continue the pursuit further.

However, the Crown's Maori allies declined to continue the pursuit without the assistance of the Ngati Awa of Waikanae. The Waikanae area was Ngati Awa territory and Wi Tako and Rawiri Puaha were reluctant to lead a campaign through it in the absence of local support. Rawiri Puaha's Ngati Toa also were concerned to learn the attitude of Ngati Raukawa, and in order to ascertain this on a large meeting was held at Otaki on August 28. Here Nohorua and other chiefs of Ngati Toa attempted to persuade Ngati Raukawa to attack Te Rangihaeata and the "rebels", holding them responsible for the disaster of Te Rauparaha's capture. Ngati Raukawa responded coolly to this argument. Te Rauparaha's capture "was the same as his death to them" but they did not have any quarrel with Te Rangihaeata and were willing to allow him and his people to cross their lands in peace.288 (Both Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata were, of course, rangatira

288 See Scott, ibid, 28 August 1846: "The Ngatitoas arrived early, when a very general meeting of the Otaki natives took place to receive them. The meeting was at first somewhat reserved on both sides, as was also the tone of their respective speeches, which in a very general, though candid, manner, expressed the views of both tribes. The meeting was addressed on the Ngatitoa side by Nohorua, a very old man, and near related to Te Rauparaha, Pukeko, Mohi, Te Rangi Korauata and Te Peko, a chief from Rangitoto [i.e. D'Urville Island: he must have been Ngati Koata]. The Ngatitoas urged the policy of attacking and driving the rebels out of this district, should they make their appearance there; imputing all the evil that had arisen to these parties, including the imprisonment of Te Rauparaha; and asking them what claim Rangihaeata had upon their sympathies, after the course he had pursued in leaving them and connecting himself with the Tauwhewehue or Wanganui people, and not to countenance their settlement amongst them, or evil would also shortly come on them; and also to consider that Te Rauparaha and two of his relations were, through the rebels' proceedings, imprisoned, and declaring that they, the Ngatitoas, intended to remain at peace with the Europeans. The Ngatiraukawa replied that they had

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of Ngati Raukawa in their own right.) Te Rangihaeata's sister also spoke, urging the Ngati Raukawa to actively support Te Rangihaeata, but this too was rejected. The meeting then ended under a "titanic heap of comestibles". Without Ngati Raukawa support Rawiri Puaha was unwilling to carry on with the pursuit, and in any case the Ngati Awa could not contemplate pursuing Te Rangihaeata through the Otaki region, occupied by their Ngati Raukawa enemies. This meant that the campaign was effectively over:

...The rebels had evidently proceeded towards Otaki, into which district all the Ngatiawa tribe objected to follow them, stating as a reason their not wishing to act with, or put themselves in the power of the Otaki tribe, anticipating that the rebels would themselves receive support in that district.

In early September Rawiri Puaha and his supporters returned to Porirua. Now safely in Ngati Raukawa territory, Te Rangihaeata ensconced himself at Poroutawhao, a swamp pa located between Levin and Foxton. This place, more correctly Poro-tawhao, belonged to Ngati Huia, Te Rangihaeata's and Te Rauparaha's Ngati Raukawa hapu, and was a place where Te Rangihaeata would have confidently expected support. When the fighting was over Te Rangihaeata remained at Poroutawhao, where Eyre, Richard Taylor and Grey sometimes visited him. Grey took no further action to dislodge him, and indeed had no need to: his objectives had been achieved. As far as Grey was concerned the campaign was effectively over in no way been the cause of or connected with these events. They had heard of them and remained thoughtful in the matter, not foreseeing the result to themselves, or from what quarter evil might arise. Their intention was to remain neutral, having as yet no cause of quarrel with Rangihaeata. If he arrived there, they should desire him to pass on in peace.

W. Tyrone Power, *Sketches in N.Z.*, 32-33: "Rangihaeata's sister was present, and addressed the meeting in favour of her absent brother, making, at the same time, some very unparliamentary remarks on the aggressions of the pakehas, and the want of pluck of the Maories in not resisting them, as her illustrious brother was doing. An old chief requested her to resume her seat, informing her, at the same time, that she was the silly sister of a sillier brother, and no better than a dog's daughter. He then put it to the meeting whether pigs and potatoes, warm fires, and plenty of tobacco, were not better things than leaden bullets, edges of tomahawk, snow, rain, and empty bellies?"

Ibid. On the meaning of the name, history and location of Poro-tawhao see Adkin, *Horowhenua*, 306-7.

Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, 339-40. Te Rangihaeata continued to oppose land sales to the Crown. For his role in the Rangitikei sale see Boast, *Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region*, 149-53.

As Wards notes: see Shadow, 288: "The Wellington settlement was secure, the whole area was pacified, and all approaches well garrisoned - for the moment there was no point in
by the end of August. On August 31 he reported to Gladstone in fulsome
tones that he "did not think that a more gratifying and useful series of
results could have been obtained", and that "there will soon be no more
prosperous nor contented settlements than those which have been
established in the southern district of New Zealand." In February 1847
martial law was ended.

4.5. Public execution at Porirua: Following the campaign there was the
coercive example of a public execution of a rebel chief at Porirua:

A day or two after the conclusion of our journal Mr Scott and I returned to Wellington
and went again to hear the trial of the prisoners who had been taken during the
campaign. The first who was tried was the second man that was taken the day we
arrived at Porirua, he was proved to be of unsound mind and was therefore sentenced
to be confined for life. The second prisoner tried was the first one we took on that
occasion; he is a chief of some consequence and it was proved that he had been a very
active leader of the attacks on the Hutt, he was sentenced by the court martial to be
hung, which was carried into execution the next day in front of the camp at Porirua.
The trial of the remainder of the prisoners is for some reason or other put off.

The man hanged was the chief known as "Martin Luther", Matini Ruta Te
Wareaitu, from Wanganui, tried and convicted of rebellion by a Court
Martial which sat at Paremata on the 14 and 15 of September. The
circumstances of his capture have already been described. Why this
unfortunate man was selected as an example is not clear. Matini Ruta was
hanged on September 17 in front of the army camp at Paremata. William B.
White thought his execution "a great shame". Another man named
Rangiatea was found to be insane and was "let off with imprisonment for
life". Matini Ruta's execution caused a sensation among the tribes. According to a letter written by one T.B. Collinson in November 1846:

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294 Grey to Gladstone, 31 August 1846, GBPP, 5, 499.
295 W.J. Swainson to J. Parkes, 20 September 1846, G.M. Swainson (ed), William
Swainson, naturalist and artist: family letters and diaries 1809-1855, (1992), 127.
296 See the discussion in Wards, Shadow, 294. He was not accused of involvement in the
Gillespie murders but only of resisting and wounding Tamati Ngapuna (Ngati Awa) and of
being in rebellion against the Crown.
297 Highlights in the life of William B. White, typescript, Ms 4542, WATL.
298 Crawford diary, MS 1001:5, WATL.
299 T.B. Collinson to his mother, 17 November 1846, Ms 1039-1. WATL
Out of those captured in July near Wellington, one has been hanged by sentence of court martial for rebellion, & seven transported to Hobart town for life. The principal chief Rauperaha...is still a prisoner on board the Calliope; his comrade, the rebel chief Rangiheeata [sic] has retreated 100 miles from Wellington. The hanging of that native has startled all the natives in New Zealand. They think they ought to revenge it according to their own laws; but they also wish not to risk the profits they are making from English trade.

Collinson believed that one reason why Te Rangihaeata was finding it difficult to gather more support was the interests of the tribes in road-building and commerce.300

Other "rebels" were transported to Van Diemen's Land. These were a group taken prisoner by Wiremu Kingi at Pari Pari near Waikanae on August 13, "eight half-starved fugitives"301. Of the eight taken prisoner and convicted by court martial on 12 October, five were eventually transported; but when the Colonial Office and the Governor of Van Diemen's Land queried the legality of the proceedings Grey had all five returned to New Zealand and released.302 Two of them had been detained in Auckland as witnesses against Te Rauparaha, but in fact Te Rauparaha was never put on trial. As Wards puts it:

[A]lthough Te Rauparaha had been captured he was never tried and both the manner of his capture and his continued reception had no demonstrable legal basis. Nor was Grey, try as he would, ever able to formulate one.

Martial law at Wellington ended with an Act of Indemnity passed in 1847.

300 See ibid: [T]here is a very strong desire for making money in trade with the English settlers, over the whole Country, which is superseding their old desires for fighting; and is introducing with it, a desire to conform to European customs and clothing. There was always this desire in the neighbourhood of the mission stations; it is now spreading over the whole island, by the more potent influence of money. As a proof of it - the other day Rangihaeata sent messages to all the tribes on the Lake Taupo to come down and assist him in a grand attack upon Wellington. They have returned for answer: what is your pay - Will you give as much as the Queen gives her soldiers? The Governor has been furthering this desire to engage in traffic; by proclaiming that he is going to make a road from Auckland to Wellington, upon which natives will be employed at a daily rate of wages. There have been several chiefs from the interior, here, to visit the Governor upon this; and they have shown as much anxiety to have the road carried through his own part of the country; as Landlords in a county in England; and have each trumpeted forth the praises and advantages of their own line, as flourishingly, as if they had been Railway directors.

301 Wards, Shadow, 285.

302 The complex legal manoeuvres are described in Wards, Shadow, 294-6.
4.6. Land transactions: Grey was not yet done with Ngati Toa. The traditional leadership of the tribe had been neutralised: Te Rauparaha was in custody and Te Rangihaeata had been driven out of the region. Leadership passed to the younger Mihanere chiefs, Rawiri Puaha, Matene Te Whiwhi and Tamihana Te Rauparaha. Grey seems to have had little difficulty in persuading this group to sell Ngati Toa lands at the Wairau and at Porirua to the Crown. These transactions are detailed in my first report.303

The first of the Ngati Toa deeds was the Wairau deed of 18 March 1847, signed by Rawiri Puaha, Matene Te Whiwhi and Tamihana Te Rauparaha. The Crown paid £3000 for this block, the payments being spread over a period of six years. Substantial areas were reserved. George Clarke believed that the Wairau was "wrung and wrested" from Ngati Toa by Grey, using the lever of Te Rauparaha's detention.304 The Te Kanae manuscript has a somewhat different emphasis:305

In 1847 Sir George Grey asked Rawiri Puaha and his people to give over Wairau, the place where Wakefield and his comrades died, to the Queen in commemoration for her dead. This was the word of Sir George Grey, "Give me the land where my dead died". Rawiri Puaha and his tribe agreed and so passed Wairau even unto Kaikoura on account of their dead who died at Kaiapoi.

Grey also left an account of this transaction, which is different again. His main concern seems to have been the fact that the New Zealand Company had already sold lands in the Wairau Valley. Here (in Grey's words) "the Company had actually disposed of large quantities of land to European settlers, whom, of course, it was desirable, if possible, to place in possession of the sections which they had purchased...".306 Grey sought McCleverty's advice as to how much should be paid for the Wairau: Ngati Toa wanted £5000, but McCleverty suggested £3000, which is what Ngati Toa were paid.

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303 Boast, Ngati Toa in the Wellington Region, 146-9.
304 Cited Burns, Te Rauparaha. 148.
305 Te Kanae MS, Graham trans., Typescript, APL, p. 16. In this narrative the sale of Wairau is paired with the acquisition by Ngati Toa of some land at Kaiapoi where their own dead lay. The Te Kanae MS claims that while Ngati Toa paid £200 for the land at Kaiapoi, Ngati Toa did not receive any money for the land at the Wairau. It may be significant that in this MS while usually the references are to the "chiefs of Ngati Toa" the sale of the Wairau is attributed to Rawiri Puaha "and his tribe" or Rawiri Puaha "and his people".
The other main transaction was the Porirua deed of 1 April 1847, by which Ngati Toa sold to the Crown an extensive area from Ohariu (Makara) in the south to Wainui (Paekakariki) in the north and bounded to the east by "the line determined by Mr Commissioner Spain for the Port Nicholson block". Grey wanted this area for two reasons. The first was the fact that, as with the Wairau (or Port Nicholson itself, for that matter), the Company had already sold sections at Porirua to the settlers. To Grey it was obvious that the settlers had to be placed in possession of the sections for which they had paid, which could only be done by means of an extinguishment of Ngati Toa's title by the Crown. This extinguishment had to be wholly separately done by the Crown as Spain had repudiated the Company's Kapiti deed and had concluded that the Company was not entitled to a Crown grant at Porirua. The Porirua deed included most of the Porirua sections earlier sold by the Company. In Grey's words:

Under such circumstances I determined to purchase, on behalf of the Government, from the Ngatitoa Tribe, a large district of land surrounding Porirua, including as much of the land which had previously been disposed of by the New Zealand Company as I could induce the Natives to alienate, thus meeting, as far as practicable, the specific claims of European settlers; and in addition to the land so acquired by the New Zealand Company, I determined to include within the limits of the purchased land a very extensive block of country to meet the probable prospective requirements of the Government and the settlers.

Grey obtained McCleverty's advice as the amount of compensation to be paid for Porirua:

The Ngatitoa Tribe, after securing an extensive reserve for themselves in one continuous block, agreed to dispose of the tract of country I required, which included the whole of the sections the New Zealand Company claimed, with the exception of about sixteen. As Lieut-Colonel McCleverty had been directed by Her Majesty's Government to decide upon the reasonableness of the price paid to the Natives for land, and he was then at Wellington, I thought it right to take his opinion as to the sum which should be paid for this tract of land. He named the sum of £2000, which,
under the all the circumstances of the case, appearing to me to be a reasonable and proper sum, I agreed to pay it to the Natives...

Grey also, however, had wanted Porirua for its strategic value:

...[I]n a military point of view, the possession of a great part of the Porirua District, and its occupation by British subjects, were necessary to secure the town of Wellington and its vicinity from evil-disposed Natives, as it was only by the occupation of the Porirua District that the various tracks leading across the woody mountains which lie between Porirua and Wellington could be effectively closed against an enemy.

The deed was signed by Rawiri Puaha, Nohorua, Mohi Te Hua, Matene Te Whiwhi, Tamihana Te Rauparaha, Nopera Te Ngiaha, Ropota Hurumutu and Paraone Toangina for Ngati Toa and by McCleverty on behalf of the Crown.

The subsequent history of Ngati Toa's remaining lands and the Crown is beyond the scope of this report. The Rangitikei deed of 1849 and the Te Waipounamu deed of 1853 are described in my first report. Both of these transactions were concluded on the Crown's behalf by Donald McLean. So far there has been no full investigation of the lengthy legal history of the Whitireia block (the subject of Prendergast J's decision in Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington310 one of the three reserves within the Porirua deed of 1847, of the Native Land Court investigations of title to remaining Ngati Toa blocks such as Pukerua, or of the Crown's acquisition of Kapiti Island.)

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310 3 NZ Jur NS SC 72; see also The Bishop of Wellington v. The Solicitor-General, (1901) 19 NZLR 214, Solicitor-General v. Bishop of Wellington, (1901) 19 NZLR 665, Hohepa Wi Neera v. The Bishop of Wellington (1902) 21 NZLR 655, and Wallis v Solicitor-General, (1902) NZPCC 23. While these cases are well known in New Zealand legal history, especially Wi Parata and Wallis, there has been no report commissioned on Whitireia or on any of the other reserves in the Porirua Block.
5. Later developments

5.1. Ngati Toa and the Wellington Tenths lands: Since presenting my first report, some documents have come to light which document an ongoing concern on the part of Ngati Toa regarding the Trust lands at Wellington. Some evidence for this is to be found in Tamihana Te Rauparaha's correspondence with Mantell. In July 1866 Tamihana Te Rauparaha, at that time living at Te Horo, wrote to Mantell as follows:311

Friend Mantell, greetings to you. Hohepa Tamaihenga has been to see me. He told me that you had told him - probably he had asked you - whether he could come to see Matene [Te Whiwhi] and me about preparing a memorandum setting out some of the Maori Reservations within the town of Wellington and for you to make an announcement to the gathering. Perhaps Hohepa hopes to obtain some of the said lands.

Therefore I am asking you, is it correct that Hohepa Tamaihenga has told me or is it false? Nevertheless, I wish you write to me so that it will be clear to me. It may be Hohepa is under a misapprehension.

I did not fully understand what he told me. I should be glad if you would let me know as soon as you can by Thursday's mail.

This indicates, then, that Hohepa Tamaihenga wished to prepare a "memorandum" in association with the two leading chiefs, Tamihana Te Rauparaha and Matene te Whiwhi, regarding the "Maori reservations" at Wellington, and that Hohepa had some hope of gaining a legally recognised interest in some of the lands. Hohepa Tamaihenga himself lived at Porirua and was a chief of Ngati Toa. He had travelled south in the main Ngati Toa migration led by Te Rauparaha.312 He was one of the group of Ngati Toa taken prisoner by Major Durie when Te Rauparaha was kidnapped on Grey's orders in July 1846.313 Hohepa Tamaihenga was one chief who felt strongly that Ngati Toa had rights in Wellington. In 1868, in the Himatangi case, he told the Native Land Court:

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311 Tamihana Te Rauparaha to Mantell, 16 July 1866, MS 83/192A, ATL.
312 See Hohepa Tamaihenga's evidence in the Himatangi case, (1868) 1 C Otaki MB, 398-9: "Hohepa Tamaihenga, sworn. [I live at] Porirua, [I am] Ngati Toa...I came in the same 'heke' with Te Rauparahe."
313 Cowan, NZ Wars, I, 120.
I have signed the deed of sale. It was my land. It was all mine - all the land is mine, to Wellington and Wairarapa... The boundary of my mana is at Whangaehu. When Rangitikei was sold that land was under my mana. I and Ngati Toa sold the land in the Middle Island. The occupiers of the land were on it at the time. I sold it - they did not sell it, I sold it and gave them part of the money: - it would not be right for them to sell, because I was their rangatira.

Hohepa Tamaihengia thus appears to have been a conservative, older Ngati Toa rangatira who had no doubt at all of Ngati Toa's rights as holders of the mana over the extensive lands they had conquered. He is also known to have lived at Wellington at one time and to have been involved in business there. As a younger, self-consciously "Mihanere" chief, Tamihana Te Rauparaha himself may not have been so sure. Judging by his letter to Mantell, Tamihana Te Rauparaha does not himself seem very certain about the situation and is dependant on Mantell for advice. So far no further documents have come to light to throw more light on this episode.

5.2. The Wellington Tenths case, 1888: As noted in my first report, the Wellington Tenths case of 1888 is something of a puzzle, due to the paucity of evidence recorded in the Native Land Court's minute books. The recorded evidence relates in the main to an unsuccessful claim by Kere Ngataierua of Ngati Tama. Judge Mackay saw Ngati Toa as having a valid claim which, as far as he could tell, they had relinquished:314

The only hapus who would have been justified in making a claim to the territory sold by the Ngati Awa in 1839 were the Ngati Toa but the part of the [] they preferred a claim to was the Porirua district for which they received a final payment in 1847...

Mackay is here referring to the Porirua deed of 1847. It is strange that he says nothing about the Hutt Valley. No information has as yet come to light detailing Ngati Toa's reaction to the 1888 decision.

314 (1888) 2 Wellington MB 99, 134. Of course Mackay's assumption that the only part of the region to which Ngati Toa laid claim was Porirua is quite wrong. That Mackay would have been unaware of Ngati Toa receiving payment for Wellington and of the breakdown of negotiations regarding the Hutt Valley is very surprising.
6. Conclusions

What does it all add up to? This report has basically described a military resolution of the political situation at Wellington in favour of the Crown. What happened was nothing more or less than an armed extinguishment of Maori sovereignty using the coercive instruments of military garrisons, armed policing, capital punishment, transportation, and a military attack on the Crown’s major opponent, Te Rangihaeata of Ngati Toa. Grey’s plans for the Wellington region were, as noted above, formulated by April of 1846. At this stage his main plan was to secure the region by blockhouses and roads, and to back up the army with a military police force. His decision to kidnap Te Rauparaha was not part of this initial scheme. Grey resolved on this somewhat later, in July or early August, after he had returned to Wellington from Auckland, and in consultation with Major Last. Grey’s decision to arrest him was based on correspondence which supposedly pointed to Te Rauparaha’s support of Te Rangihaeata’s defiance of the Crown, although I have suggested in this report that Te Rauparaha’s position was somewhat more complicated than that.

Grey was certainly right to see Te Rangihaeata as an opponent of the Crown. He was not swayed by missionary rhetoric, and knew that Grey and his soldiers and Te Ture were very definitely not the same thing. While Grey and the settlers, however, could not tolerate a Maori presence in the Hutt Valley, Te Rangihaeata was quite willing to contemplate a European presence there. But he did want to place a boundary around the Crown and the settlers: Wellington they could have, even some of the Hutt, but not all of it.

But Grey was probably wrong to see Te Rauparaha as an opponent. Rauparaha was shrewder and more realistic than Te Rangihaeata. Te Rauparaha certainly did his best to mediate. But to mediate what? The Wellington community and Grey wanted one thing: Maori to leave the Hutt Valley. If they would not go, they had to be driven out. Rauparaha may, perhaps for the first time in his life, have been uncertain what to do. He seems to have been as baffled by Grey as Grey was by him.

Ngati Toa were themselves divided over how to react to the transformed power relations that existed at Wellington after Grey’s arrival. (It is perhaps conceivable that Te Rauparaha devised some elaborate strategy which carefully ensured Ngati Toa participation on both sides to ensure the survival of the tribe come what may, but there is no evidence of this.) Te
Rangihaeata, partly out of conviction, and partly because he was pushed into a corner, resolved on military resistance. In this he was supported by a substantial section of Ngati Toa. It seems likely that there were some Ngati Toa along with Ngati Tama and Ngati Rangatahi cultivating in the Hutt Valley by late 1845. It is also likely that there were some of Ngati Toa involved in the fighting at Boulcott's farm. What is beyond doubt is that after Te Rangihaeata withdrew from Taupo Pa to Motukaraka and then ultimately to Pauatahanui, a substantial section of Ngati Toa was with him. Rawiri Puaha and his followers, on the other hand, threw in their lot with the Crown and accompanied the Crown forces in the winter campaign of 1846. Even so, they seem to have fought a moderate and cautious war, keeping in contact with Te Rangihaeata, on some occasions taking care to see that Te Rangihaeata was given time to escape, and never quite trusted by Ngati Awa or by the Crown. This is best seen as reflecting a belief that the fighting should cause as little bloodshed as possible.

The rhetoric of "tribal" politics and tribal identities, while obviously important, obscures at least two other important realities. The first, about which much has been said in both my reports, is the fluidity of tribal identities. But it can also obscure wider, pan-Maori identities. We may be too ready to assume that Maori were wholly locked into a "tribal" world in 1846 and unable to see beyond it. The Ngati Toa leadership, as did other chiefs, took a keen interest in Hone Heke's war in the North and were well-informed about it. Te Rangiheata arguably should be seen not only as a Ngati Toa leader but as a Maori patriot. The war in the Hutt and Porirua was a war of sovereignty, a preliminary to the conflicts of the 1860s.
Appendix 1
Extracts from the Journals of Richard Taylor
WATL Ms 0254-04

2 March: ...Sailed to Paremata, where I held evening service and preached. The Europeans here are very much alarmed. I went on to the other Pa and got my tent up and after tea I had a large assemblage of the Natives to hear all that is going on. I gave them a full account. They said the Governor was right. He was a good man. I then went to Rangihiaeta and I found him under an old sail with a fire before him. I went to his side although I was almost devoured by fleas and stifled with smoke. He said he had written an angry letter to Kaparatehau to return all the things stolen. He said if the Governor will give him a piece of land there all will be well otherwise all will rise as far as Taupo. He was very civil and so I left him. It was near one before I wrote my journal and went to bed.

3 March: I awoke this morning with a bad headache. I had [] preached after service. Mokau or Rangihiaeta came in talking very loudly he was followed by Mr Nixon who hearing I had left started off immediately to be under my escort. He slept at the ferry. He said the town was in great confusion, several boat loads of outsettlers having come in and Hanson the Crown Solicitor had just sent in a Protest declaring martial law to be illegal up the Hutt that according to the terms of the grant made to the Company the very land in question was granted to the Natives. Strange to say none of the authorities had remembered the terms of the deed. I had another long talk with Rangihiaeta. He again wished me to write to the Governor that if he would give up a piece of the land to Kaparatehau all would be well as they did not wish to fight. I therefore did as he wished me. He called us a murdering people. I said ironically Yes his was the good Tribe. He retorted I was a murderer. I answered he was the good man, that we know the good tree by its fruit. I told him God would judge the murderer. He put out his tongue in blasphemous defiance. He said what did he care for God, that he was one himself, that the reason Kawiti was not conquered was that he was a God. This is a general belief, that great Chiefs are Gods, or rather demons. At last I left him.

On the hill over against his Pa by the road side I noticed a large sheet of paper stuck up on a post containing a notice that all pigs passing by that way to Wellington would be turned back, that war was at hand and it was not right to feed the Pakehas that all who went without anything would be
suffered to pass but all others would be sent back and if they persisted would pay for their temerity with their lives. This was a notice to all the tribes. He has already turned several back. At the rocks I met Rauparaha. He said he was going to see the Governor that he might help him. He scolded Tahana because Mamaku had gone back to the hostile Natives. He inquired how many Soldiers, how many Sailors. He was answered as though they had been carefully counted, the soldiers up the Hutt he said were 207. Rauparaha spoke very favourably but time only will tell how far his sincerity is to be trusted. Rangihiaeata said said Tamihana and Matini [Matene Te Whiwhi] were taken to Auckland to be put in prison. I said Yes, that when the Bishop returned he might induce them to let them have more of their sons which made them laugh. When we passed Kapiti a singular whirlwind crossed over from the Island next to the spot where we were, taking up the water and giving it at a distance the appearance of smoke. When it reached us we had some difficulty to stand so great was its power. It was followed by rain.

We reached Mr Govett's house at 5 1/2 very weary and I with a bad head ache. Mr Govett was at Otaki but getting the key we have taken up our abode at his house.

4th March. We had an early breakfast which we did not relish as the water used to make our tea with was quite salt. I went and took the Service and preached afterwards. I and Mr Clarke proceeded on our way to Otaki walking through the river which was up to our middle, we reached Otaki river by noon where we had met several Natives who I have no doubt are gone to join Rangihiaeata. We could not find Mr Govett's native on our arrival and as he is at Manawatu we were obliged to get in at the window to open the door. It was a long time before we succeeded in getting some food cooked but we did justice to it when we got it. I determined staying the night here as the Natives wished it and several moreover came from Waikanae to be baptised. I examined 14 who had previously been examined and approved by the Bishop and recommended to us by Mr Govett for baptism.

5th March. I baptised the 14 Natives, and preached on the subject. We left about 9. When near Waikaua a native met me saying he had been waiting for my arrival as there was the corpse of a boy which had been waiting interment the last three days. I accordingly went to Waikaua where I had to wait till the grave was [ ] and the funeral arranged. He was buried near the unfortunate young man an European who was drowned in the beginning of last month in the Ohau for whom the Natives have made a
neat and substantial fence of totara rubbed over with red ochre round the grave and at the head placed a cross board stating when he died and his name. They also made him a good coffin. At present they have received nothing for their pains. Thence I was taken inland to see a sick person. I met a white man residing here who appeared dreadfully alarmed at the reports of the war and afterwards three other Europeans from Wanganui. I also saw several Natives who were on their way to Rangihieata. We were accompanied by a considerable number of Natives for the Sacrament, and have encamped about five miles from the mouth of the Manawatu.

6th March. Mr Robinson the nearest settler came to call on me this morning before breakfast. He anxiously inquired the news. He determined on sending his wife away for safety. He said it was supposed Rauparaha came here last week to ascertain how many would accompany him and that his true feelings were shown in uttering an English oath that had not Tamati Waka helped the whites they would never have overcome the Natives. Thence I proceeded to Rewarewa where I found Mr Govett and a considerable number of Natives assembled. I had not been long there when one of Watanui's sons arrived and stated that the English and Natives had been fighting for the past three days and that Rauparaha had sent for them all to meet him at Porirua that he was 'pouri' about his daughter who was buried there in the enclosure where Te Hiko was buried. I fear there can be little doubt that crafty chief is playing false with the Europeans. I preached to a large congregation in the evening. I was sorry to hear a large party of the young men singing one of their hakas or war dances. I went out to stop them but someone was before us and had them give over which they did immediately.

7th March 1846. The Natives who sang the war dance last night were a party from Taupo on their way to Rangihieata. I addressed 82 communicants. An Englishman came to learn particulars. I recommended the men to stay but to send their wives and families away. I spoke to several of the Christian Chiefs and they said that if they perceived any real danger from which they could not defend them they would give them timely notice. The Englishman said he should stay for the present.

8th March 1846. This morning I administered the sacrament to 82 and had a very large congregation both in the morning and evening. We heard that a large party of Natives from this Pa were going to join Rangihieata early on
the morrow. The Christian chiefs therefore proposed we should hold a meeting before they left to endeavour to hinder them.

9th March 1846. Immediately after Prayers this morning we held a Council with all the Natives on the subject of the present war with the Europeans. The principal chiefs made some long and excellent speeches. One old man named Paora said if they went they must leave their books behind and give up their Ministers and return to their former evil courses, but said we have forsaken them because we know them to be bad, therefore now having turned to the living God we must remain firm in his service. One chief named Puke made a very long and excellent speech in a very droll and sarcastic tone he alluded to all the reasons urged by the advocates for War and refuted them. He showed the advantages of living at peace with the English and said they would not [ ] to him to return to his place that the late Govr. said his people were then in the wrong and therefore sorry as he was to speak it seek any payment. But now the English were in the right and therefore the Governor came to give them the land and he for his part [ ] as it still recommend them to do so. Ihakara a teacher and chief made a very good speech after I had addressed them. He said don't forget this meeting and the day it was held the 9th of March. It is a great meeting and must not be forgotten. He was afraid many had double hearts though they all asserted that there was a Judas amongst them as there was a Judas amongst the Apostles. One only of the opposite party briefly addressed the meeting. He seemed afraid to avow his desire of War. I was much pleased with this meeting as I cannot but think it will have a very beneficial effect on the Natives of this part. They will say as Christians it was their duty to listen to their Ministers and they were determined to do so. I shook hands with some of the speakers and especially with Puke and told him his speech was a very good one, another said and was not mine a good one, and so on with them all. It appears now that my being not able to administer the sacrament service was ordered by a higher power for good. Had it been administered the week before as was my intention then this week's meeting would not have been held and many would have gone to the seat of War. I have also noticed that whenever the holy sacraments have been administered they are attended with a perceptible benefit to the recipients in confirming their faith and strengthening their good resolutions. The meeting was not over before [ ] we swallowed a hearty breakfast and then left. I called on William Robinson who having heard a more favourable account that no fight had taken place, had returned from the vessel and in common with the other
settlers determined on staying and relying on the promised protection of the Christian chiefs. He paid Timoti of Waikaua 30s. for the coffin and fencing around the Pakeha's grave at his place who was drowned in the Ohau. Timoti watched the body 8 days until the poor man's friends heard of the accident and bid him bury him. He would not do so before lest any should say the Natives had killed him, he therefore wholly deserved what he got.
Feb 5th. Sailed in HMS Driver for Wellington at 10 a.m. leaving on board the artillery and a detachment of the 50th foot. Passed Cape Colville. 6th. [ ]
7th. Wind south, passed East Cape.
11th. Sighted Cape Palliser at sunset.
12th. Becalmed. 2 p.m. lighted fires and steamed into Port Nicholson.
14th. Landed and got into lodgings in Mr Blythe's house at Te Aro. I found the town of Wellington much improved, the houses better and the gardens much increased - patches laid down in grass produced a beautiful effect. The cultivations at the Hutt much extended and the crops magnificent.
Feb. 18th. The Driver practiced firing. Governor on board.
19th. Ball at Barretts' Hotel very good and well attended.
22nd. Walked to Karori. The scenery on this road is very picturesque and the number of small settlers very great. Observed an immense number of children.
23d. Walked to Captain Daniels' on the Porirua road. He has done much in laying down pasture.
Feb 24th. The intruding natives refused to leave the Hutt. I walked up there. The Governor went up and had a parley they still refused to move. He returned to the stockade and ordered the troops to move up. They marched and occupied a potato ground. The artillery and a gun from the Castor was ordered up. I returned in Captain Graham's gig. Kaparatehau or one of his natives was said to have thrown a blunt spear at the Governor, their superstition being that should he flinch then the Maoris would eventually gain the victory.
Feb 26th. Visited the encampment at the Hutt. Found the troops bivouacked in a potato field - men roasting potatoes in all directions.
Feb 28th. The natives on the Hutt commenced plundering the Waiwetu settlers.
March 8th. HMS Castor and March 9th Driver sailed for Porirua with Governor. 10th Driver returned. 11th Castor, do. 12th. Governor disbanded the town militia.
March 16th. [ ] Fanny Morris arrived with one servant and furniture from Sydney.

17th. Ball and dejeuner on board H.M.S. Driver.

March 24th. There was a picinic at the Hutt and the ladies in returning upset in the only carriage belonging to Wellington [ ].

March 25th. Took possession of Mr Evans' house.

April 3d. Andrew Gillespie and son were murdered at the Hutt by the ejected Natives. 4th. Rauparaha wrote that he was friendly and would assist to secure the murderers. Steamer got up steam.

April 5th. Troops sent to Porirua. HMS Driver took Governor there and returned on the [8th?].

April 22nd. HMS Castor and Driver sailed for Auckland with Governor and Mrs Grey.

April 28th. Walked to Petoni with Clifford. Dined and slept at Petre's.

29th. Stafford arrived at 8 am. Walked to Orongorongo. A villainous road, called at Wallace's and Donald's.

30th. I started at 9. [Muka muka rocks?] at 2 p.m. Slept at Maori Inns in the Wairarapa valley. After passing the mountain formation of old rocks the change is abrupt to sedimentary rocks of earth and boulders with layers of trees. This formation characterises the Wairarapa valley.

May 1-7 omitted.

May 16th. This morning rather before daybreak the troops encamped on the Hutt were attacked by the rebel natives with great vigour. They succeeded in driving off the Maories but sustained a loss of 6 killed and 5 wounded out of a force of about 45 men. Great alarm was felt in all quarters. Many families abandoned the Hutt; the militia were called out and patrols appointed to perambulate the town at night. The officer in command of the party attacked (Page) had a very narrow escape, having been fired at when forcing a passage out of his house. Wellington was in a state of great excitement for a considerable time after this attack and a strong party of militia and volunteers patrolled the town every morning before daylight. Despatches were sent to the Governor by the [Mule?] 1 am direct and by the Cecilia to Kaipara. The former vessel was lost at Hawke's Bay and the despatches by the latter were long in coming. In the meantime the Government Brig returned with Lieut Symonds from Wanganui having failed in settling the land claims in that place, the refactory natives there having become impracticable in their demands when they heard of the [supineness?] of the troops at Wellington and the success of Rangihaeata. The brig sailed soon after her arrival here for Auckland.
June 16: News arrived that Bush a carrier on the Hutt road had been murdered by the rebels. It appears that he was out near the stockade at the bridge looking for his horse when they came upon him unawares and murdered him. The rebels gave the first intimation of it for they called across the river to the friendly maories boasting of it and mentioning the names of the murderers. Buck's dog gave a singular instance of fidelity. He was found watching over his master's corpse and so fiercely did he defend it that those who came for the body were obliged to shoot the dog before they could obtain possession of it.

June 17th. Captain Bird of the 99th went out from the upper stockade with a party of forty soldiers and 15 natives, Lt Herbert of 50th and and Mr [Polkinghorne?] of Calliope as volunteers, and proceeded towards the Taita to reconnoitre. Suddenly a Maori who was leading discovered the rebels and gave the alarm by firing his musket and throwing himself on the ground. The rebels then fired a volley but without effect, when a skirmish commenced which ended in the rapid retreat of the military with a loss of 4 wounded and 2 missing. Lt. Herbert being wounded through the arm and in the finger found himself abandoned and by good luck managed to secrete himself from the observation of the enemy and was afterwards discovered by the friendly natives and brought into camp. The militia about 12 under Lt White stationed at Taita hearing the fire hastened down to the assistance of the troops (who however had disappeared before their arrival) and engaged the rebels for an hour and a half driving them across the river.

June 26th. Te Rauparaha came over from Porirua accompanied by Major Arney, 315 Lt Peddar and escorted by a party of soldiers. He was lodged in [Rev?] Mr Douglas' house. The old rascal was made much of during his stay although the Maories would have nothing to say to him. His appearance is not particularly remarkable. He is rather bent by age, moderately tall and his expression of countenance but little more sagacious than that of other Maories. A large bunch of feathers decorates his ear. His dress changed day by day - sometimes a [ ], sometimes European clothes. He was accompanied by his two wives one of whom is young and handsome.

June 29th. Rauparaha returned to Porirua.

July 1st. HMS Driver arrived at 8 pm with the Governor on board and a small party of artillery under Captain Henderson. Captain Hayes came to stay with us.

July 11. Driver sailed for Porirua with a party of soldiers and Governor.

315 Major Arney was the commander of the force stationed at the Paremata barracks.
12th. HMS Calliope sailed for Porirua. We now thought some forward movement was in progress for large munitions of war had been embarked in the Driver overnight and the Calliope carried a gun boat, which had been constructed by lengthening the long boat of the Tyne lately wrecked, but on the 15th the steamer and the 16th the Calliope returned to Port having done nothing but transship the troops from the former to the latter and deliver the gun boat to the charge of Mr McKillop of the Calliope.

On July 18th however the steamer again made preparations for moving and it was soon ascertained that the Governor had received intelligence of a party of Wanganui natives headed by Maketu en route to join Rangihiaeata. On the 20th the steamer sailed with the Governor. 70 men of HMS Calliope commanded by Captain Stanley and Lieuts [ ] and Beresford. 24 police and a party of soldiers.

July 24th. Heard of the steamer's proceedings. She had first proceeded up the coast to Waikanae and having lulled suspicion returned under cloud of night to Te Rauparaha's pa at Taupo on the Porirua harbour. The boats were manned and rowed and the pah surrounded at daybreak, when Te Rauparaha and 4 of his chiefs were taken prisoner and conveyed on board the steamer the Governor having full proof of the treachery of the former.

July 27th. Steamer returned with the prisoners on board which were transshipped into the Calliope. It appears that the prisoners were nearly suffocated on the passage round when sleeping in a cabin near the steam chest and that when the steam began to fill the room Te Rauparaha roared out most lustily for assistance thinking most probably that he was at last in a fair way of being cooked.

July 29th. The boiler of the steamer requiring repairs the Governor sailed in HMS Calliope taking with him a strong party of the 65 Regt which had just arrived from Sydney.

Aug 2nd. News arrived that the militia and friendly natives, who had marched across to Porirua from the Hutt, had entered Rangihiaeata's pah without opposition and had taken possession of it and had it not been for disregard of orders to advance on the part of the troops would probably have succeeded in capturing the whole gang of rebels. The Governor however is now determined and is actively following up the enemy.

Aug 3. HMS Driver sailed for Porirua.

Aug 4th. Arrived HMS Castor from Sydney in 18 days and from Auckland in five. The troops had now pushed Rangihiaeata into the hills and he had taken up a position on a steep and difficult ridge above the Horokiwi valley. The force against him consisted of several hundred soldiers, about 200
Natives and a strong party of militia and police. On the ....... an unsuccessful attack was made in which Ensign Blackbird (99th) two soldiers and two seamen were killed.

On the 17th HMS Castor returned to Port with the Governor on board Captain Graham having ordered all the blue jackets to return to their ships and by his interference broken up the attack.

Aug, 19th. HMS Castor sailed with the Governor for Auckland. When the troops evacuated the position before Rangi[haeata] at Horokiwi they left the friendly natives to build a fence around Rangi's position and thereby to put him in a pound but Rangi did not choose to wait for this but proceeded up the coast. The Ngati Awa with the friendly (soi disant) Ngati Toa under Puaha promised to pursue Rangi and did follow him and on one occasion lost three men in an ambush but they nevertheless did not show any great anxiety to come to close quarters. The supineness of the troops at this time is too disgraceful to believe. There they remained in quarters at Porirua when a little exertion would have enabled them to attack and take Rangi and his party and thereby put an end to the war.

Aug 24th. Heard of further retreat of Rangihaeata and that Epau the murderer of Gillespie had been found dead in the evacuated pa.

Aug 28th. Information was brought to Wellington that a party of Whanganui natives had got into the Wairarapa with the intention of issuing from there by the Upper Hutt to join Rangi. Sixty militia were sent up to Taita to intercept them if possible and the Ngatikahuhunu promised to prevent them returning to the Wairarapa.

Sept. 7th. The grand jury found true bills against those men who had committed several daring acts of bushranging at Port Cooper and Otago. They were found guilty and sentenced to 15 years transportation.

Sept 15th. Heard of Court Martial at Porirua on two natives, Rangiatea and Martin Luther or Wareaitu. The former was found insane and was therefore let off with imprisonment for life, the latter was sentenced to be hung and was hung accordingly.
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